Congressional Documents

[Page: S3724]

(Ordered to lie on the table.)

Mr. CONRAD (for himself and Mr. Bingaman) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by them to the resolution of ratification for the treaty (Treaty Doc. No. 105-36) protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. These protocols were opened for signature at Brussels on December 16, 1997, and signed on behalf of the United States of America and other parties to the North Atlantic Treaty; as follows:

At the appropriate place in section 3 of the resolution, insert the following:

( ) Non-strategic nuclear weapons:

(A) Findings.--The Senate finds that

(i) the United States Strategic Command has estimated that the Russian Federation has between 7,000 and 12,000 non-strategic nuclear warheads, weapons that--unlike strategic systems--are not covered by any arms control accord;

(ii) the thousands of tactical nuclear warheads inside Russia present the greatest threat of sale or theft of a nuclear weapon in the world today;

(iii) with the number of deployed strategic warheads in the Russian and United States arsenals likely to be reduced to around 2,250 warheads under a START III accord, Russia's vast superiority in tactical nuclear warheads becomes a strategic concern;

(iv) the Commander in Chief of the United States Strategic Command has stated that future nuclear arms control agreements should include tactical nuclear weapons;

(v) statements from Russian officials that NATO enlargement would force Russia to rely more heavily on its nuclear arsenal have caused concern to be expressed that NATO expansion could be an impediment to progress on tactical nuclear arms control; and

(vi) the danger of theft or sale of a tactical nuclear warhead, and the destabilizing strategic implications of Russia's enormous lead in tactical nuclear weapons creates an urgent need for progress on increasing the security of Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal and working toward conclusion of a US-Russian agreement on tactical nuclear arms in Europe.

(B) Sense of the senate.--It is the Sense of the Senate that

(i) it would be advisable for future nuclear arms control agreements with the Russian Federation to address non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe; and

(ii) the Administration should work with the Russian Federation to increase transparency, exchange data, increase warhead security, and facilitate weapon dismantlement.

(C) Certification.--Prior to the deposit of the instruments of ratification, the Administration shall certify to the Senate that with regard to non-strategic nuclear weapons

(i) it is the policy of the United States to work with the Russian Federation to increase transparency, exchange data, increase warhead security, and facilitate weapon dismantlement; and,

(ii) that discussions toward these ends have been initiated with the Russian Federation.

(D) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the deposit of the instruments of ratification, the President shall submit a report to the Senate on the Russian Federation's non-strategic nuclear arsenal. This report shall include

(i) current data and estimates regarding the current numbers, types, yields, and locations of Russia's non-strategic nuclear weapons;

(ii) an assessment of the extent of the current threat of theft, sale, or unauthorized use of such warheads;

(iii) a plan to work with the Russian Federation to increase transparency, exchange data, increase warhead security, and facilitate weapon dismantlement; and,

(iv) an assessment of the strategic implications of the Russian Federation's non-strategic arsenal.