Congressional DocumentsMr. FEINGOLD [Page S3700] Mr. INHOFE Mr. INHOFE [Page S3701] Mr. ROBERTS Mr. Brownback Mr. ROBERTS [Page S3702] Dr. Perry's [Page S3703] From the New York Times on the Web, Apr. 27, 1998 The Senate Should Halt NATO Expansion [Page S3704] Mr. ROBERTS Mr. DURBIN Mr. DURBIN Mr. Kyl [Page S3705] Ms. SNOWE Mr. Allard Ms. SNOWE [Page S3708]
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin is recognized.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for Senate ratification of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty on accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. I have been privileged to participate in the historic debate on the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations. Since last October, the committee has held 8 hearings on this issue and heard testimony from 37 witnesses with a variety of opinions on NATO enlargement.
I will take this opportunity to thank the chairman of the committee, the Senator from North Carolina, and the committee's ranking member, Senator Biden, for the balanced manner in which these hearings were conducted and for their support for expeditious consideration of this important matter.
As we all know, Mr. President, NATO has been the most important factor in maintaining peace in Europe since the devastation of World War II. As we prepare to mark the alliance's 50th anniversary next year, it is appropriate to look back on its successes and look forward to see what role NATO will play in the next 50 years. The world will be a much different place in 1999 than it was in 1949 when this alliance was formed as a buffer against Soviet aggression and as a means of protection for nations whose people had just emerged from one of the costliest wars, in both human and financial terms, in our history.
But to fully understand and appreciate what the security of NATO represents to the people of Eastern Europe, we must first remember what they have endured in the years since we celebrated V-E Day. At the same time the people of Western Europe were working to found an alliance that would ensure security and were fighting to rebuild their countries and the economies after the fall of the Third Reich, a new threat was emerging on the other side of the continent.
The Soviet Union, which had been our ally against Hitler, was about to become our foe in a cold war that would last almost a half century and result in the sacrifice of lives, traditions, and religious liberty throughout Eastern Europe. The people of Eastern Europe barely had time to recover from the devastation of a world war when they were faced with Soviet tanks. Foreign subjugation was, of course, nothing new for the people of Eastern and Central Europe.
For centuries, Mr. President, this part of the world had been a battleground where people and territory seemed little more than spoils in a seemingly endless series of bloody fights. Bit by bit, the Soviet Union redrew Europe's map until it swallowed up the entire eastern and central region. Under the reign of the Communist Party, people lived in fear that they would be accused of being disloyal to the party. Religion was outlawed, and the myriad beautiful places of worship in the Soviet Union were left vacant; many were destroyed.
In spite of the treatment they were forced to endure at the hands of the Soviet regime, the people of Eastern Europe never lost their will to be free, as demonstrated by events such as the Prague Spring and the Solidarity movement. By the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union was beginning to crumble and the people of Eastern Europe yearned to satisfy their hunger for democracy and freedom. Beginning in 1989, the people of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia peacefully ousted their Communist governments and replaced them with democracy.
It was, in the words of Vaclav Havel, a `velvet revolution.'
Because of modern technology, the world community has had a front-row seat for the transformation of Eastern Europe. We literally watched the Berlin Wall fall and marveled at cranes dismantling statues of Lenin and laying low the hammer and sickle.
Today, nearly a half a century after World War II, the Iron Curtain is gone and the Soviet regime is no more. The changing face of Europe is marked by newly-independent countries eagerly embracing democracy for the first time in more than two generations. But the people of these former Soviet satellite countries still live in the shadow of the history of Soviet domination. These nations and their people seek to rejoin the West, and seek a means to ensure that they will never again fall victim to a Soviet-style regime.
The lingering memory of Soviet domination was evident at the Winter 1998 Olympic Games, where a player on the Czech Republic's hockey team wore the number 68 to mark the February 25, 1968, invasion of his country by the Soviet Union. When the Czech Republic's hockey team beat the Russian team for the gold medal, many Czechs felt that the victory represented more than athletic excellence. It also symbolized their country's freedom from the Soviet domination of the past.
Now, there is a new, democratic Russia, and the nations of Eastern Europe, which have become our friends and trading partners, are caught, both literally and figuratively, between this new Russia and the West. This is a critical time for the newly-independent states of Eastern Europe to establish themselves as countries in their own right, finally free of the yoke of Soviet domination.
It is only natural that these Eastern European countries would seek to join NATO, an alliance which shines as a beacon of democracy and security on the European continent. The proposed enlargement of this alliance represents a crossroads in American foreign policy, and, indeed, in the fragile balance of power in Europe. Some opposed to enlarging this alliance have said that it would create a new series of dividing lines in Europe, between NATO, Russia, and those countries which are caught in the middle--neither members of NATO nor under the sphere of Russian influence. Others have argued that all countries meeting the criteria for membership in NATO should be allowed to join. Opponents fear that this would lead to a different dividing line --one between Russia and the rest of Europe.
Many of my constituents, and indeed many people around the world, have a special interest in the debate over NATO enlargement due to their ethnic heritage or their memories of the iron fist of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe. I share their commitment to a Europe which will never again fall victim to such oppression.
The proposed enlargement embodied in the protocols currently before this body leads to many questions: How many countries? How many rounds of enlargement? What about Russia? What about those that may be left out?
It is my view that the newly-independent countries in Europe should not be forever caught between Russia and the West. It is also my strong view that the United States must proceed carefully so that we do not damage our relationship with a democratic Russia. Unfortunately, parts of the debate over NATO enlargement have taken on an `us versus them' quality. We must not forget that the Russian Federation is not the Soviet Union, and that we should encourage democracy wherever it takes root. Instead of the `us versus them' of the Cold War era, this debate should be about the new landscape of Europe. We
must not make Russia feel as if it is being ganged up on by the West. We must encourage democracy there as we do elsewhere on the globe, and we must encourage the newly-independent states to take control of their own futures.
That is why the Administration helped to successfully negotiate the NATO-Russia Founding Act. And that is why the language in the resolution of ratification currently before this body encourages the continuation of a constructive relationship between NATO and Russia.
I support the fundamental goals of NATO enlargement, and believe it is in America's national interest to pursue this first round, as it has. However, I do have some concerns, that I know are shared by many other Members of Congress, about the commitment--financial and otherwise--the United States will undertake as it pursues enlargement of the alliance.
On that point, Mr. President, I would like to speak for a moment on one of my concerns about this debate: the disparity among the various estimates on the financial commitment the United States would be undertaking if NATO enlargement were to proceed. There have been at least three major studies conducted on this subject, each of which has taken a different approach with respect to the basis for their estimates. While I understand that it is impossible to account for all of the different variables that will be included in this endeavor, each study assumes a different set of costs, and thus reaches very different cost projections for the U.S. share of this undertaking--any- where from $2 billion to $7 billion.
I am pleased that I was able to get clarification on this issue through the hearings we held in the Foreign Relations Committee, and I am pleased that the members of the Committee devoted so much time to this important aspect of NATO enlargement. The Committee based its evaluation of the estimated cost of NATO enlargement on the following four assumptions that can be found in the Department of Defense and NATO studies:
First, because there is no immediate threat to NATO, the alliance will continue to operate in the current strategic environment for the foreseeable future.
Second, NATO will not station substantial forces on the territories of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.
Third--and this is a key point for me--NATO's standard burdensharing rules will apply to the costs of enlargement.
Fourth, the modernization of the United States military is considered to be a strictly American project that will not be funded through the NATO common budget, and, thus, NATO enlargement will not require the United States to undertake any new force modernization initiatives beyond those already planned.
Mr. President, I believe that these four assumptions are at the heart of the debate over the cost of NATO enlargement. While, in my view, the enlargement of the alliance is in the best interest of the United States, I remain committed to ensuring that the federal government achieves--and maintains--a balanced federal budget. The Committee's careful analysis of the costs involved in NATO enlargement addressed many of my concerns in this regard. I agree with the language included in the Committee Report which states that the Committee `stresses the importance of all current and future allies to meet their commitments to the common defense. Anything less will result in a hollow strategic commitment.' At the same time, I will look carefully at any of the amendments before us that seek to control the costs to the U.S. taxpayer of this enlargement.
Because of the necessity of all NATO members to meet their commitments to the common defense, I asked Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, at a February 24, 1998, Foreign Relations Committee hearing, if Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic would be prepared to take on these commitments. She told me that `We are confident that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will take on the financial commitment involved in NATO membership. Indeed, to prepare for this commitment, all three have increased their defense budgets to fund necessary defense reforms, and to bring them in line with the standard outlays of NATO Allies. . . . Moreover, the cost of defense would undoubtedly be higher if these countries did not join NATO.'
In addition, I have been assured by both Secretary Albright and Secretary of Defense William Cohen that the United States share of NATO enlargement costs will not exceed $7 billion over ten years. They have insisted that the wide range of cost estimates can be attributed to the use of varying data and the fact that the original estimates assumed the admission of four new countries into the alliance. I respect the views of the Department of Defense and the General Accounting Office in explaining the differential, and will continue to monitor revised cost estimates as they become available.
The many cost estimates involved in this first round of NATO enlargement also lead me to wonder if we will have a clearer picture of the cost of future rounds, or if we will be faced with the same financial uncertainties that loom before us today. This is an issue the Senate will be looking at closely as the Alliance develops its policies regarding future enlargement. This is also the subject of at least one amendment to the resolution of ratification currently before this body.
I also have concerns about the impact of new U.S. commitments to NATO on America's general military readiness, especially at a time when so many of our forces are deployed around the world in Bosnia, the Persian Gulf, Korea, and other posts. I asked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Hugh Shelton, about this concern when he testified before the Committee on Foreign Relations. He said, `I see nothing in the NATO enlargement concept that will detract from our overall readiness. To the contrary, the additional troops, military equipment and capabilities that the three new countries bring to the Alliance can only reduce the demands on current members.'
I am encouraged by his answer, and I am also encouraged by the willingness of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to participate in NATO's Partnership for Peace. All three countries were original members of this program, and all have provided troops and equipment for NATO missions. In my view, the willingness of these three countries to participate in NATO efforts will only strengthen the alliance.
As I stated earlier, I share the Administration's basic views on the merits of enlarging this alliance. The people of Eastern Europe must never again be subjected to the conditions they were forced to endure under Soviet rule. They see NATO membership as a means to ensure their future safety. My concern is about the extent of the commitment the United States will be making, and the uncertainty regarding the price tag that American taxpayers will be asked to pay in this time of fiscal restraint and personal sacrifice. But voting in favor of NATO enlargement should not be considered a blank check for military or other spending in the region. Should the Senate ratify the protocols we are considering today, I and my colleagues in both the House and the Senate will continue to monitor the new U.S. commitments to NATO--financial and otherwise--through the regular congressional budget and appropriations process.
Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support this resolution of ratification.
I yield the floor.
[Page: S3700]
Mr. INHOFE addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I have been watching with a great deal of interest the debate that is taking place. It has been a very healthy debate. Certainly the Senator from Wisconsin raised some very good points. As I listened to his comments, I can only say that I agree with almost everything he said except for his conclusion. I look at the cost of this, and we do not know what to anticipate should we extend NATO to these countries. I am deeply concerned about the costs that would be incurred. The range has been incredible. You talk about something between $400 million and $120 billion. That range is not one that gives me much comfort.
I would like to remind my colleagues that the same group of people that are giving us their assurances now--that is, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the White House --that it is not going to cost over a certain amount of money, are the same ones that told us in November of 1995 that it would not cost more than $1.2 billion for our participation in Bosnia. We knew better. But, nonetheless, that is what they said. They said that is a guarantee. Yet here we are now. Our direct costs in Bosnia have exceeded $9 billion. I suggest that is less than half of the total direct and indirect costs. So I don't have a very high comfort level when it comes to being able to rely on what it might cost us to extend NATO to these three countries.
The second thing as I read article V, which is the security guarantee, is that I see this as a very expensive security guarantee, and it is open ended. It stipulates that, `An armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered as an attack against them all.' It doesn't say that we would come to the aid of someone who is attacked if we have any national security interests. It doesn't say that if it should impair our Nation, we are going to be in a position to defend them. It is not like many of the situations where we have become involved in helping countries such as Nicaragua and others because we know it is cheaper actually to help them than it is to have to fight these battles ourselves. This just says, `as an attack against them all.' That means that if there is an attack, we have to come to their aid. We always take a much greater share of the burden than our partners do.
The third thing is that I have no doubt in my mind that if we do this, this is just the beginning and that we will be extending it to more and more countries.
I would like to remind you, Mr. President, of a quote from Secretary Albright that the door is open, she said, to other countries with democratic governments and free markets. `The administration is fighting an effort by Warner and others to place a moratorium on admission of additional countries until it is known how well the first recruits are assimilated.' After the first three recruits were invited last year, Albright said, `We must pledge that the first new members will not be the last, and that no European democracy will be excluded because of where it sits on the map.'
So with the increased costs as we make these extensions, we are looking at Romania, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Slovakia, and many others.
I don't see where there is an end it to. However, I remind my colleagues that this is not a partisan subject.
I was honored to serve on the Senate Armed Services Committee with the Democrat who is probably more knowledgeable than any Democrat has been--certainly in my recollection--on that committee, Sam Nunn. Sam Nunn was quoted as saying, `Russian cooperation in avoiding proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is our most important national security objective, and this NATO expansion makes them more suspicious and less cooperative.' He further said, `The administration's answer to this and other serious questions are what I consider to be platitudes.'
I agree with Senator Nunn that this is opening the door to something that is very expensive, and also it could impair what progress we have made with Russia.
Just to quote the Duma, on January 23 they passed a resolution--this is in Russia, the Russian Duma--calling NATO expansion the biggest threat to Russia since the end of World War II.
All of these things have been talked about on this floor. One thing that has not been talked about is what I would consider to be the greatest exposure we would be inheriting by making this extension.
I can remember being here on the Senate floor back in November of 1995. We missed passing a resolution of disapproval to keep sending our troops over to Bosnia. We had no national security interest on a very expensive thing that now has caused the decimation of our entire defense system. We did that as a response to the strongest argument; that is, we must continue our commitment and our allegiance to NATO. So NATO is the reason that we are over in Bosnia today. Even though the administration said this would be something that would cost approximately $1.2 billion, it has cost directly $9 billion, and indirectly far more than that.
Mr. President, it wasn't long ago that we were talking about making some strikes on Iraq. We know there are problems there. We know they have not kept their commitment to the United Nations. They have not allowed our inspection teams to see what they had agreed they should be able to see, and it looks like those storm clouds may be there. If that happens, I don't know of one person who has a background in military strategy in the Pentagon or one person in the administration who can tell you that you can go in there and do surgical strikes from the air and not end up having to send in ground troops. Where are we if we should have to do that?
In the case of Iraq, we are talking about a theater that includes Bosnia. We are talking about the 21st COCOM located in Germany that was supposed to be offering the logistical support for any ground movement in any place within the theater. That would include Iraq.
Right now, you go over to the 21st COCOM in Germany, and you will find out that we don't have the capability of supporting any other ground operations in addition to Bosnia because they are at over 100 percent capacity right now trying to support Bosnia. They don't have the spare parts for their equipment. They don't have the equipment. They are using M-115 trucks that have 1 million miles on them. It is something that we can't afford. It is something that we can't afford in terms of using up our military assets and our capability. Yet we are not able to support any ground operation anywhere else in the theater so long as we are offering that support to Bosnia. And the reason we are there is this allegiance that we apparently have to NATO.
It seems to me, Mr. President, that in addition to all the other arguments we have heard, from the cost of the operation to our relationship with Russia and all the rest of them, that there is another very serious problem we are facing, and that is how many more Bosnians are out there that we are going to be obligated to support as a result of increasing our commitment to NATO.
Mr. President, I would like to say that if you were in a position where most Americans think we are in right now, and that is where we are the superpower, that we are able to defend America on two regional fronts, then I would say maybe we should consider doing this. But right now we have a hollow force. We are in a situation very similar to what we were facing in the 1970s.
Mr. President, I think we can no longer afford the luxury of any more activities such as the Bosnian operation. I think we would be best served not to extend NATO to these three countries.
[Page: S3701]
Mr. ROBERTS addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Brownback). The Senator from Kansas.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I rise today to join my colleagues to discuss the issue of national security and the vital security interests to the United States and Europe, and obviously I am talking about the proposed expansion of NATO.
To borrow a very well-known phrase, now we are engaged in a great debate, or at least a very good discussion, to determine and to test whether that alliance or any alliance so conceived and so successful in the past can meet the challenges of today.
We are in the amendment process, but I do want to offer some general comments and some concerns.
But for NATO and the collective security of Europe and the United States, the time has come. I must say that from the time of news accounts on old newsreels, or what we in my age can recall as the Movietone News or to CNN today, it has been quite a show for NATO. But it is time to turn off the movie projector, sweep up the popcorn, and turn out the lights. The old NATO show is over. Just as in that great 1971 movie, `The Last Picture Show,' when the camera pans back from the now-closed movie theater and pictures a deserted small, dusty town in Texas and tumbleweeds blowing down the street, we are not sure what the future holds but we know it will be different from the past.
We now face the uncertainty of NATO either enlarged or with the same 16 members. We don't know what it will be in the future, but we are certain it will be different than in the past and, quite frankly, peace and stability in Europe and throughout the world hang in the balance.
The debate on the addition of three new members will soon be over and the time for the vote will rapidly approach, perhaps as of this week.
The administration assures us that to fundamentally alter the most successful alliance in our history is a good thing. They tell us that we will be more secure with an expanded alliance, that the wrongs of Yalta will be corrected, the candidate countries will now be free to fully develop as democratic and market-driven societies. We are guaranteed that no new dividing lines between the West and the East will result from this or any kind of future enlargement, that the door is open to all, and that further rounds of enlargement are a certainty. The administration also predicts that although the Russians are upset, and they are, with the enlargement of NATO they will simply `get over it' and come to understand we have their best interests in mind with enlargement and Russia will also be more secure.
Now, we get all this for the amazing value of about $1.5 billion over the next 10 years. We are reassured that although the cost estimates have varied from $125 billion to $1.5 billion over the next 10 years, NATO's sharp-penciled budgeteers certainly have it right. Much to our relief, the burdensharing problems between our NATO allies that have plagued the alliance in the past will not be a problem now or in the future of an enlarged NATO, so the argument goes. The administration is confident the United States will not have to pick up any unexpected costs, although the allies have said they will refuse to pay one additional mark or franc for enlargement.
Now, I have spent considerable time looking into each of these controversial areas surrounding the enlargement of NATO, and one of the most amazing things about this debate is that in each concern for enlargement, the basis of the arguments, both pro and con, are fundamentally the same but the conclusions are the opposite.
Let me take a few minutes to lay out the pros and cons of NATO enlargement, if I might. First is the issue of cost and also burdensharing. Unfortunately, only time will truly show what the costs for NATO enlargement will be. With such a wide variance in the estimates, there clearly is not a single set of assumptions to gauge the true costs of enlargement. I do not know how we could. I can tell you the final costs will not be $1.5 billion over a 10-year period, but I cannot tell you what the costs will be, and I do not think anybody else can.
The opponents of enlargement say the $1.5 billion number is laughable, and the opponents breathe a sigh of relief that the agreed-to number is so low that no one could suggest we cannot afford the costs of enlargement. We are told the reasons for $1.5 billion being the correct cost include the fact only three
countries are being invited as opposed to four or five, and the military infrastructure in the candidate countries is in much better shape than originally thought.
I am a little surprised at the infrastructure point. NATO has been involved in Partnership for Peace exercises and military-to-military contacts with those countries for more than a few years. We have a huge facility at Taszar in Hungary at a former Soviet air base. Didn't anyone in NATO or the United States notice the condition of the infrastructure during any of the exercises, and particularly in the three candidate countries?
Finally, another reason the cost has been reduced is that NATO has shifted some of what some thought to be shared costs to the three candidate countries.
I am concerned, regardless of the public statements by these countries, that they will not be able to fund NATO enlargement or, if they do, they will divert needed resources away from more important domestic issues and into military spending. If they are unable to meet their fiscal obligations for enlargement, will the costs be deferred or will NATO simply pick them up?
I might point out in terms of paying the contribution to NATO there are three accounts. The NATO Security Investment Program, formerly called the NATO Infrastructure Program, comes from the annual military construction appropriation. We do not have the money in that account to pay for this. The NATO civil budget money comes from the annual State Department appropriation `Contributions to International Organizations,' and that money is tight. The NATO military budget comes from the Department of Army annual appropriation, and that budget, too, is under very severe pressure.
Let's take up one other subject, if I might, Mr. President. What about the correction of the wrongs of Yalta? The candidate countries are proud, developing democracies and countries wanting very badly to become a part of the West. They have already made some great strides. We all understand they suffered terribly during the many years of Soviet domination. I applaud their efforts. I am confident they would be wonderful allies, capable at some point of carrying out their NATO responsibilities. I have been to Prague. I have been to Budapest. I have listened to the history. I have felt the pride of their accomplishments. A freedom-loving person cannot experience the strength of their conviction without reaching out to help them attain their stated goals of Western integration. But understanding and empathizing with their feelings and their desires are not reasons for the Senate to ratify a change in NATO membership.
The only reason to enlarge NATO is if it is in our vital national interest to simply do so. Proponents of enlargement do not see it that way. For example, General Shalikashvili in a recent Los Angeles Times article said, `Meanwhile, there are urgencies to expanding NATO. It is nearly 10 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the countries of Eastern Europe--including my native land, Poland--have waited long enough for a place at the table where they have yearned to be for so long.'
That is a common theme for the enlargement proponents, including the Secretary of State. They have the right to join NATO, and that is good enough to alter the alliance. Others argue that enlarging NATO will show the continued interest and commitment of the United States in a stable and secure Europe. As a matter of fact, I think the distinguished Presiding Officer has made that very cogent argument.
It is still not clear why NATO must enlarge to demonstrate, however, in this Senator's opinion, U.S. resolve or commitment to Europe. There is no question in my mind a secure and stable Europe is in our vital interest, but I fail to see the connection between an enlarged NATO and that end goal.
It is interesting to note that Austria, a Central European country, is not seeking NATO membership. There is no cry of a security vacuum in Austria or a concern for the right to join the primer alliance, which is NATO. In fact, Austria took a good look at NATO and decided it was more important to seek its long-term security within the European Union and the Partnership for Peace and the Organization for Security for Cooperation in Europe, OSCE. This would have been the best approach, in this Senator's view, for security and acceptance into the West for the current candidate nations rather than immediate NATO membership. Unfortunately, that is not now an option. We have come too far. The administration has planted the flag of U.S. commitment and integrity--no small matter.
Let me share with you the results of a survey published in June of 1996 in an issue of The Economist. I am sure some will challenge these results, but I think it is worth reviewing these questions asked of citizens of the three candidate countries.
Would these countries support sending troops to defend another country? Only 26 percent of the people of Hungary, 43 percent of those polled in the Czech Republic, and 55 percent in Poland support sending troops to defend another country. Now, considering this is the best that the support will ever be, since the excitement of joining NATO will soon wear off, I suggest this is not a very good commentary on the weak support to carry out a core requirement of NATO. And that core requirement is the common defense and the commitment to send troops to defend an ally.
Let me ask another question: Would these countries support having NATO troops based on their soil? In The Economist, they reported that only 30 percent of the Czechs and 35 percent of the Hungarians support the notion of allowing NATO troops to be stationed on their soil. Although 56 percent of the people of Poland, obviously, supported the idea, it is still an idea that does not have broad support in any of the three of the candidate countries.
The next question: Would these countries support regular NATO exercises in their country, or regular flights over their country? Less than half of any of the candidate countries supported having NATO exercises on their soil or even allowing flights over their country, and those percentages range from 26 percent to 41 percent, representing, again, little support for the cost of simply joining the alliance.
Would these countries support spending a bigger share of their country's budget on military and social needs? The numbers in support for this question are very low, and it is a crucial question. In the Czech Republic, 8 percent; in Hungary, 9 percent; and 23 percent in Poland support spending a bigger share on defense. Unfortunately, there will be these costs associated with their membership in NATO. I know the agriculture problems they are having in those countries. A great deal of those expenses will have to be committed to the transformation from a collective farm system to a system more in keeping with the rest of Europe.
My only point in presenting these statistics is to show there are concerns in the candidate countries about the commitment to NATO. I am afraid the survey says NATO may no longer be a `one for all, all for one,' but rather it may become an `all for me, but not for you' alliance.
Let me say, in April of this past year the Roper Starch World Wide poll asked Americans the level of support for using armed forces in certain situations. I hope--and I do not believe that the American public has become so isolationist that they would never risk any American life in defense of freedom. But there is a clearly understandable concern about risking American lives in what some call a political war of gradualism where there is no clear and discernible vital national interest.
Listen to this. If the U.S. were attacked, 84 percent of those polled supported using force. This is in the Roper Starch World Wide poll. I would like to know where the other 16 percent are.
If our forces stationed overseas were attacked, 50 percent supported armed intervention. To safeguard peacekeeping within the framework of the United Nations, the support dropped to 35 percent, which explains a great deal in regards to what happened in the gulf. Finally, to stop invasion of one country by another, the support fell sharply to 15 percent. That is why it took George Bush and Jim Baker and Dick Cheney and others a whole year to rally support among our allies in regards to the gulf war.
One issue we should all be concerned about is the collective security commitment that NATO makes in the post-cold-war environment, and that commitment is contained in article V of the NATO charter. During the cold war, obviously, everybody understood that if the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries attacked Western Europe, the very survival of the free world was at stake and every NATO member would strike back with all of their military capability. But is that still true today with no threat to the survival of Europe? Would all NATO members automatically strike
back if another member was attacked tomorrow?
Article V can be read either way, and in fact the proponents and opponents argue both ways. There is a considerable amount of disagreement on this topic. I believe that if a member of NATO had a vital national interest at risk in the country under attack, they would respond with military force. If there was no threat to their vital interests, I doubt they would automatically respond with the same kind of military force. They would respond with outrage. They might threaten military force if the belligerents did not stop. But I am not sure if they would respond militarily. I am confident, however, that the candidate countries think NATO would respond to an attack on them, just as they would have during the cold war--that is, with all of their military strength.
The construction of article V is such that both interpretations are possible. Some argue--and I believe they have a point--that this ambiguity is good and may be just the right amount of deterrence in the minds of would-be belligerents. This is a serious issue, since it is at the very heart of the commitment and success of NATO during the cold war. We need to fully understand what article V means in today's environment. We just had an amendment on the floor of the Senate to try to spell that out.
The confusion over article V is only one mission concern. There is a more fundamental concern: What is the mission of NATO in the post-cold-war? The distinguished ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Biden, and the distinguished Senator from Oregon who was just the Presiding Officer, the distinguished Senator from Virginia, the Senator from Arizona, had a lengthy debate over this and considered the Kyl amendment. Let me share part of former Secretary of Defense Perry's testimony before the Armed Services Committee.
[Page: S3702]
The original mission of NATO--deterring an attack from the Soviet Union--is obviously no longer relevant. The original geographical area of NATO's responsibility is no longer sufficient. The original military structure of NATO is no longer appropriate. And the way in which NATO relates to Russia must be entirely different from the way it related to the Soviet Union.
One would think, with that array of differences, and before the alliance was changed forever, that some agreed-to long-range strategy would have been developed. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Listening to the discussion on the Senate floor by my colleagues, I believe there are many possibilities for future missions of NATO. Some say the Kyl amendment opened the door to more possible missions, and the Senator from Arizona firmly says that he wants to go back to the original 1991 strategic concept.
Can anyone in the Senate say with certainty what NATO's mission is? Can anyone articulate what mission, what role, against what threat we are rushing toward enlargement of NATO, to fundamentally alter this great alliance?
Let me say that simply to bring NATO expansion into focus, the President, it seems to me, should become engaged. In Warsaw, St. Petersburg, and in Bucharest, the President did address general European security concerns. But to my way of thinking, despite all of the hard work by the Secretary of State and others, he has not made a personal case to the Congress or the American people.
As a matter of fact, in remarks during the European trip, the President said, in a post-Soviet era--I am paraphrasing here--military matters are no longer primary, that terrorism, illegal drugs, national extremism, regional conflicts due to ethnic, racial, and religious hatreds do matter. I can assure you, using an expanded NATO to address these concerns raises some very important questions.
What means would be used? Warplanes, ground forces, and naval power are of little use in fighting ethnic hatred and racism. If NATO membership reduces the threats of ethnic rivalries, somebody should tell that to the Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, the Basques in Spain, and the Kurds in Turkey.
Do we really want to change the most successful security alliance in history to a European United Nations? With 16 NATO members and 28 other nations inaugurating the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, it seems to me the protocol, rituals, and welcoming speeches will leave no time for any serious discussion. Exactly what force requirements are necessary to prevent a power vacuum? What is the strategy to ensure stability and security in Europe?
NATO's leadership understands there is some confusion in this regard and, as I have indicated, has directed a review of its 1991 Strategic Concept to see if it is in line with the changed world and threats--and we had a good debate on the Senate floor just earlier on this very matter.
Now the Secretary of State wants to `spread NATO's security from the Middle East through Central Africa,' but several of the current alliance members remain unconvinced of the utility of these so-called out-of-area operations for NATO. Again, let's quote from Dr. Perry's written statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee.
[Page: S3703]
The geographical area of NATO interests should be anywhere in the world where aggression can threaten the security of NATO members. . . .
Let me repeat that:
The geographical area of NATO interests should be anywhere in the world where aggression can threaten the security of NATO members--certainly including all of Europe, and certainly including the Persian Gulf.
That is a quote. Just think of that, even with the current membership and the world's global economy, what corner of this universe could not hold interest for NATO members? Are we considering NATO as a global alliance? If we are, are we to consider global membership for NATO? Is this alliance to become the military arm of the United Nations? We should be seriously concerned that we are changing NATO before we are certain of its future mission requirements.
Now, the last but most frequently debated point associated with NATO enlargement is the impact on United States-Russian relations. Here both sides of the argument can list exactly the same points but come up with opposite results. It is a paradox of enormous irony.
Unfortunately, this is the one area that will have the most profound effect on our country in the coming decades. We must be certain of what we are doing.
The proponents argue that Russia understands that NATO is no threat to them. Opponents point out that some 350 Members of the Duma, some of which we have met with in the Senate Armed Services Committee, have formed an anti-NATO group. Let me inform the President there is not one--one--Member of the Duma that is pro-NATO publicly. The proponents say the Russians will get over it--in time. Opponents state enlargement will sour our relations with the moderate Russians. The proponents vigorously point out that in dealing with the Russians, we can't be seen as simply giving in to the `hard-liners.' Opponents say if we enlarge NATO, we will play into the hands of the `hard-liners.'
Let me say, I think I know at least in part what some of the blood pressure and the motives are in regard to expanding NATO and Russia. And I quote an article from the Washington Post from Charles Krauthammer, who I think is an outstanding columnist most of the time due to the fact that he agrees with my prejudice. Obviously, I think he is a very learned columnist, but on this he tells the truth. He says here that:
. . .NATO expansion nothing more than extending the borders of peace; building new bridges; strengthening an alliance directed against no one in particular, certainly `not arrayed against Russia. . . .
Then he tells the truth.
This is all nice and good. It is, however, rubbish. In order not to offend the bear, the administration must understandably pretend that NATO expansion has nothing to do with Russia. Those not constrained by diplomatic niceties, however, can say the obvious: NATO, an alliance founded in that immortal formulation `to keep America in, Germany down, and Russia out,' is expanding in the service of its historic and continuing mission. . . .
And that is to contain Russia. We are poking the Russian bear.
So it goes with a host of NATO enlargement topics dealing with Russia-and-United States relations. Keeping or encouraging Russia moving toward a complete system of democratic reforms, I submit, Mr. President, is in our vital national interest and, from a timing perspective, it is more important than the addition of these three candidate countries.
These are the key issues surrounding the debate on NATO enlargement: cost, mission and strategy, and United States-Russia relations. Unfortunately, there are still many unanswered questions remaining on these vital areas. I trust the Senate, with the various amendments we will be considering and the very good debate that we have had, will answer these concerns. The show is over, and we must address this enlargement of NATO on the floor now with the facts we have before us.
I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record, in closing, Mr. President, an article by John Lewis Gaddis, who is a professor of history at Yale University. The information was provided to me by the granddaughter of Dwight David Eisenhower. Susan Eisenhower has played a very important role in this debate.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
New Haven--The decision to expand NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic has produced some strange political alignments. There aren't many causes that Bill Clinton and Jesse Helms can both support, or that Phyllis Schlafly and the editors of The Nation can join in opposing.
Even stranger, to a historian, is the consensus that seems to be shaping up within our community. Historians normally don't agree on much, whether it is about the origins of the Peloponnesian War or the end of the cold war. And yet I've had difficulty finding any colleagues who think NATO expansion is a good idea. Indeed, I can recall no other moment when there was less support in our profession for a government policy.
A striking gap has opened, therefore, between those who make grand strategy and those who reflect on it. On this issue, at least, official and accumulated wisdom are pointing in very different directions.
This has happened, I think, because the Clinton Administration has failed to answer a few simple questions:
Why exclude the Russians? One of the few propositions on which historians tend to agree is that peace settlements work best when they include rather than exclude former adversaries. Within three years after the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, the victors had brought France back within the concert of Europe. Within six years of their surrender in 1945, Germany and Japan were firmly within American-designed security alliances. Both settlements survived for decades. The post-World War I settlement, however, excluded Germany. The lessons of history on this point seem obvious.
Who, then, will we include? The Administration has made it clear that expansion will not stop with Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. It has mentioned the Baltics and Romania as possible future members. The State Department's Web site claims support for NATO expansion from groups like the Belorussian Congress Committee of America, the Ukrainian National Association and the Armenian Assembly of America.
The State Department assures us, though, that the Russians view this process with equanimity and that we can expect relations with Moscow to proceed normally while we sort out just who the new members of NATO will be. Perhaps it will next try to tell us that pigs can fly.
What will expansion cost? The Administration's estimate for including Poland, Hungary and the Cezch Republic comes to only $1.5 billion over the next 10 years, of which the United States would pay $400 million. That sounds like a bargain, but the estimate assumes no change in the current security environment. Has it occurred to the Administration that the act of expanding NATO, especially if former Soviet states are included, could itself alter the current security environment? It doesn't take a rocket scientist--or even a historian--to figure out that actions have consequences.
What's the objective? Alliances are means to ends, not ends in themselves. NATO served brilliantly as a means of containing the Soviet Union, but the Administration has specified no comparably clear goal that would justify expanding the alliance now that the cold war is over. It speaks vaguely of the need for democratization and stabilization, but if these objectives inform its policy, shouldn't they apply throughout Eastern Europe and in Russia as well?
I heard a very different explanation from influential government and academic figures when I visited one of the proposed new member countries last month. NATO expansion, they boasted, will demonstrate once and for all that the Russians never have been and never will be part of European civilization. Yet Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that she wants to erase `the line that once so cruelly and arbitrarily divided Europe.' It is not at all clear how this policy will produce that result.
Isn't it too late now to change course? Some argue that eve if the decision to expand NATO wasn't the most thoughtful, historically aware way to make policy, the decision has been made and going back on it would be a disaster far greater than the problems NATO expansion itself will bring. This sounds a little like the refusal of the Titanic's captain to cut his ship's speed when told there were icebergs ahead. Consistency is a fine idea most of the time, but there are moments when it's just plain irresponsible.
Only future historians will be able to say whether this is such a moment. But the mood of current historians should not give the Administration--or those senators who plan to vote this week for NATO expansion--very much comfort.
[Page: S3704]
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I simply close in quoting the last two paragraphs:
Isn't it too late now to change course? Some argue that even if the decision to expand NATO wasn't the most thoughtful, historically aware way to make policy, that the decision has been made and going back on it would be a disaster far greater than the problems NATO expansion itself will bring.
That is a good argument. As a matter of fact, I think that may be a persuasive argument. I have listed a lot of concerns that I have. I think the adjectives and adverbs that I have used and the language I have used would indicate, if somebody is watching, `Well, Senator Roberts, he is going to vote no.' I am undecided.
Again, what the professor has indicated that `the decision has been made and going back on it would be a disaster far greater than the problems NATO expansion itself will bring.
Then he goes on to say this:
This sounds a little like the refusal of the Titanic's captain to cut his ship's speed when told there were icebergs ahead. Consistency is a fine idea most of the time, but there are moments when it's just plain irresponsible.
That is the other view.
Only future historians will be able to say whether this is such a moment.
Professor Gaddis goes on to say:
. . .But the mood of current historians should not give the Administration--or those senators who plan to vote this week for NATO expansion--very much comfort.
I thank you, Mr. President, and I thank the indulgence of my colleague from Illinois. I apologize to him for going on a little bit longer than I told him, and I yield the floor.
Mr. DURBIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from the great State of Illinois.
Mr. DURBIN. Thank you, Mr. President. I thank my colleague from Kansas for his remarks. It is always a great education to listen to his statements on the floor. Though we may not agree on any particulars, I certainly do respect him very much and have enjoyed our service together both in the House and the Senate.
I stand this morning not to give a long speech, even by Senate standards, but I would like to say I hope all Members of the Senate will put this debate into its historical context. This may be one of the most important foreign policy debates of the decade. It is to determine the future of the U.S. relationship with a new Europe, a Europe after the cold war.
Since 1949, the United States understood, particularly through the NATO alliance, our relationship with Europe. We defined that relationship in specific terms and committed not only the United States on paper but, in fact, at one point stationed some 300,000 Americans in Europe, in an effort to make certain that that sector of the world will continue to be safe from any type of aggression or invasion.
When I think back on my own life and all of the concerns of the cold war, it focused primarily on the possibility that the Soviet Union might expand through some manner through its Warsaw Pact nations into the a NATO alliance and force us to respond. It was a concern that cost us lives, it cost us money, and it really was the focus of our foreign policy for many, many decades.
With the tearing down of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Soviet Union, as we knew it, and the emergence of countries in Eastern and Central Europe, formerly part of the Soviet orbit, we now are in a position to redefine the U.S. position in the world. There are some people who naturally tend toward the American tradition of isolationism. We are pretty far away from these countries. `Perhaps we shouldn't be concerned about them,' they will say. `Let them worry about their own future, we have our own concerns here.' But, we have heard that response many times in our past, and the Americans, by and large, have rejected it. We understand we are part of the world community. In fact, we are viewed by most nations of the world as a major leader, an example, in many instances, of democracy and a country which most nations choose to emulate.
I found it interesting, when the wall came down in Berlin and the Eastern and Central European countries started emerging as democracies, how many of the new leaders made a point of coming not to London, not to Paris, but to Washington, DC, in the hopes that they might address a joint meeting of Congress. To them, it was a validation that the new Czech Republic and the new Poland was going to embark on a democratic experiment, and coming here to this building in Washington, DC, was really shown to be a break from the past; that they would separate themselves from the past and their connection with the Eastern powers, with communism, with the old Soviet Union, and dedicate themselves to democracy.
Now we have the natural evolution of their emergence as democracies and our natural evolution as a leader in today's world. We are debating on the floor of the Senate the question of enlarging the NATO alliance to include newcomers, to include nations which just a few years ago were perceived as potential enemies and now we see as allies. What a refreshing change in this world that a nation like Poland, which we identify with certainty in my home State of Illinois and the city of Chicago very closely, that a nation like Poland now has a chance to join us as close allies.
I listened carefully as some of my colleagues talked about the attitudes in these nations about the possibility of NATO membership. Make no mistake, if you visit these countries, that is all they talk about--the possibility that at some point in time, they will be part of the NATO alliance.
This is an exciting prospect for them, not so much because they anticipate some military invasion or the need for military defense, but rather because they see this alliance with the United States and with other NATO allies as an assurance that they are committed to many things, to democracy, to a free market and, most importantly, to the principles of NATO.
It is interesting, this alliance, in our world's history, is a unique one because for 50 years this was not an aggressive alliance, this was a defensive alliance. We basically said we respect others' boundaries as we expect them to respect ours and we are not setting out to invade and claim territory but merely to protect our own. It was a defensive alliance. It has been throughout history. And that is its future as well.
As other countries come in--Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic--they accept the premise. The premise is, you are on board as an alliance to protect our borders and to try our best to maintain stability in this new and developing world. I think that is the bottom line here. It is no longer a fight against ideology or even the aggression of some superpower but rather the stability of the region.
Is that stability important to the United States? I think it is critical to the United States. In just a few months we are going to see the creation of the Eurodollar, or the Eurocurrency, which is going to be perhaps one of the more dominant currencies in the world. We will see the European nations by and large coming together as an economic unit as a major competitor to the United States, and at the same time we will see opportunities in Europe for American firms.
If we are going to engender this relationship, this free market economy and this new democracy, it is entirely consistent for us to build an alliance with these countries through NATO.
I hear some of my colleagues arguing against the expansion of NATO, and as I listened carefully, they are actually arguing against the existence of NATO. I hope they are not. To pause on reflection, it has been one of the most successful military alliances in our Nation's history, perhaps in the history of the world. And it is important for us to maintain NATO and to expand it.
I watched carefully the amendment offered by the Senator from Arizona, Mr. Kyl, just an hour or two ago. I read it carefully, and I thought, does this amendment, which seeks to spell out the parameters of the expansion of NATO, in any way preclude the possibility that one day Russia would join NATO? Well, it does not, because it speaks in terms of principles and goals and values.
I think when we talk about the nervousness in Russia about the expansion of NATO, we should put it in historical context. The Russians have gone through a major transformation in a very short period of time. Once considered a superpower and a major leader in the world, they are now struggling to redefine themselves in the 21st century.
I know this causes angst and pain among many Russian leaders who can recall, I am sure with fondness, days of empire. But the fact is, it is a new world and a new opportunity, and they have a chance for a new relationship. A new and expanded NATO is no threat to Russia. A new and expanded NATO is an invitation to Russia to join us in the same principles and values. I think that should be our view, our vision of the new world.
When I hear about this Russian concern and nervousness, I
really hope they will take the time to consider the history of this alliance, which has been a peaceful alliance, a defensive alliance.
Let me speak for a moment before I close about the Baltic States. I always confess my prejudice when I come to this issue. My mother was born in Lithuania. So when I speak of the Baltic States, it is with some particular personal feeling. I have visited Lithuania on four our five different occasions and have also visited Latvia and Estonia.
I did not believe in my lifetime that I would see the changes that have taken place in those three tiny countries. When I first visited Lithuania back in 1978 or 1979, it was under Soviet domination, and it was a rather sad period in the history of that country. The United States said for decades that we never recognized the Soviet takeover of the Baltic States. We always believed them to be independent nations that were unfortunately invaded and taken over by the Soviets.
When I went to visit them in 1979, I saw the efforts of the Soviet Union to impose upon the people in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia the Russian culture. They expatriated so many of the local people and sent them off to Siberia and places in the far reaches of Russia; and then they sent their own populations, the Russian cultural population, those speaking the Russian language, into the Baltic States in an effort to try to homogenize them into some entity that was more Russian than it was Baltic.
But it did not work. The people maintained--zealously maintained--their own culture, and they kept their own religion, their own language, and their own literature and their own dreams. I did not imagine in my lifetime that I would ever see these Baltic States once again free, and yet I lived to see that happen.
In fact, at one point I was sent as a member of a delegation by then-Speaker of the House Tom Foley to witness the first democratic election in Lithuania. The Soviets refused to give me a visa. I sat in Berlin day after weary day waiting for a chance to get in. And finally I was only able to be there the day of the election, that evening for the celebration. But I was there for an important moment, and I am glad I saw it.
Today these three nations are trying their best to become mature economies, to watch their democracies flourish. And they have ample evidence of real progress. The fact that they would entertain the possibility of being part of NATO should not be a source of concern to us but one of great hope and great optimism, because as countries like Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and so many others that were either part of the Warsaw Pact or even Soviet republics become part of NATO, they really show this transformation and this progression into a democratic form and a new democratic vision in Europe.
One of the resolutions being offered by one of my colleagues wants to single out the Baltic States as if they are the real concern of Russia. If you took a look at a map of the world and saw the huge expanse of Russia today, and then took a look at these three tiny nations, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, it is almost laughable that the Russians would look to them as any threat to their future or to their security. They are small nations with very small armies and virtually no sophisticated military forces. What they are asking for is a chance to flourish, and I think they should have that chance.
So I close by saying that I hope my colleagues in the Senate who have followed this debate will understand its historic importance and understand that those of us who are privileged to serve in the Senate and have a chance to vote on this question of NATO enlargement may be casting a vote on foreign policy that is going to be viewed for generations to come as a milestone--the end of the cold war, the new vision of the world, the new definition of an alliance involving the United States and freedom-loving democracies in Europe that led to stability and to growth. That is my vision of the world. That is my vision of NATO enlargement.
I hope that a majority of my colleagues will join me in supporting President Clinton and supporting virtually all of these nations that are asking for NATO to be enlarged to reflect this new vision.
Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
[Page: S3705]
Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Allard). Without objection, it is so ordered.
Ms. SNOWE. I rise to express my intention to vote for the admission of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
In taking up this decision, the Senate takes up one of its basic constitutional mandates. A nation's most sacred obligation is to protect its citizens and its territory from hostile forces. The NATO alliance has been the cornerstone of our efforts to do so on behalf of free citizens for nearly 50 years. It has emerged as the most successful enterprise of common defense in human history. Any changes in the membership of the Alliance that we contemplate must undergo careful consideration.
I have done so and am confident that this enlargement is in our national security interests and will ensure that NATO continues to do in the 21st century what it has done in the latter half of the 20th for the United States, and the people of Europe--guarantee their security, freedom and democratic forms of government.
Mr. President, last year, I was asked by the Senate Majority Leader and the Senate Democratic Leader to join a bipartisan group of 28 Senators to study the issues associated with NATO enlargement. I was honored to join in such a task. The NATO alliance has been for nearly 50 years the greatest force for maintaining peace and security in the world. When it was funded, the United States had just emerged from fighting the most destructive war in history on the European continent and was just beginning to lead the fight against imperial Soviet communism--a Cold War against a totalitarian foe who was committed to imposing another form of tyranny first in Europe and then around the world.
The nations of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, therefore, faced the bitter prospect of exchanging one form of tyranny for another. I knew that if NATO was to continue to protect freedom and democracy in Europe, it needed to face the changing circumstances posed by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and communist ideology. The Alliance had to change in form to preserve the principles that it had safeguarded in modern times.
Today, the United States and the other 15 members of the Alliance hope to move the frontiers of NATO eastward at a time when there is not a visible threat to the security of any of its members. When the Alliance expanded between the 1950s and the 1980s to add Greece, Turkey, West Germany and Spain, the grim shadow of Soviet power menaced Europe and the West.
I believe that the parallels with the decision to expand NATO in the 1990s are in some ways similar to those which existed at the end of World War II. At that time, the strategic security situation on the continent of Europe was also in flux. The threat from Nazi Germany had collapsed, but no protective machinery had yet been set up to prevent the emergence of a new tyranny. As the great statesman Winston Churchill noted, `From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended upon the continent [of Europe].'
Unlike the era beginning at the end of World War I, when we retreated
from victory to a fateful isolationism, the United States realized that our own security depended upon the building and maintenance of a free and democratic Europe.
President Harry Truman, with the able leadership of Senator Arthur Vandenberg, began the shaping of what became known as the `containment' policy. The United States and its friends in Europe would resist the westward march of communism. Harry Truman and his generation were determined to block the Soviet Union from leveraging the political fate of a continent that had drawn millions of Americans into war by ensuring that its expansion not go any further.
At first it was thought that economic assistance to Europe was sufficient. The Marshall Plan, named for the then Secretary of State George Marshall, was first articulated in 1947 and approved by the Congress in 1948. Just as today some believe that membership in the European Union is enough to ensure the security of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, it was hoped in the 1940s that economic aid alone would suffice in strengthening Europe to resist the designs of the Soviet Union. However, that was not to be the case. Both the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, and the 1948 Berlin blockade, convinced the United States that more than economic aid was needed to protect freedom and democracy in the Western world.
As a result, on April 4, 1949, the United States and eleven nations of Western Europe signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington. NATO was born, and for the first time in history, a military alliance was created for the sole purpose of defending freedom and democracy. And without firing one shot in 40 years, it gave ready firepower to the policy of containing Communism until that system collapsed under its own contradictions.
Our commitment to security in the North Atlantic Treaty is spelled out in Article V. The words `an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all' signify the commitment of this country to forego isolationism and to play a critical role in helping to guarantee freedom and security in Europe.
Today of course, there is no immediate threat to the security of Western Europe. The United States and the other 15 members of NATO face an incipient Russian democracy. Communism as a system and a power
has receded from the tormented heart of Europe. The mighty Red Army of the 1940s is now a force that is in military decline. Today, we live in a different world--but not one without dangers or threats. Today, we face our own set of challenges--and we must create our own set of solutions.
The end of the Cold War has not meant that freedom has suddenly become free-of-charge. While the Soviet Union has disintegrated and the threat of invasion from a much weaker Russia has receded, this development by no means signals that NATO's mission has evaporated. To the contrary, just as NATO protected and guaranteed the freedom of the United States and Western Europe during the latter half of the twentieth century, it can, and must, continue to do so for all of Europe as we prepare to enter the new millennium.
For forty years, NATO could protect only the Western half of Europe--the other half was trapped behind the Iron Curtain of communism. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, three of those nations--the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are now poised to enjoy the freedoms that the totalitarians so long withheld and to take fresh responsibility for their political pluralism as members of a voluntary alliance.
I know that some of my colleagues in this chamber, whose opinions I respect, assert that it is more important for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to achieve membership in the European Union and to enjoy the economic benefits that it offers as a prelude to joining NATO. This proposal brings the echoes of history to the Senate if we recall that some advocates of the Marshall Plan thought economic health was sufficient for the protection of freedom and democracy. Unfortunately, it was not true then, and it is not true today.
The European Union is not a substitute for the NATO alliance. If that were the case, then the nations of Western Europe would not need the benefits of NATO membership to ensure their security. They realize that the two entities each serve their purpose and reinforce rather than substitute for each other. The European Union is an economic entity that will shepherd the prosperity of Europe well into the next century. I have little doubt that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will eventually become members. However, membership will only be part of the way they help fulfill their desire--for the first time in over fifty years--to determine for themselves how they will ensure their security.
NATO was and is more than a defensive military alliance. It reflects the civic values underpinning trans-Atlantic security through the cultivation of peaceful ties among governments that rest on the consent of the governed. It is a tangible symbol of the resolve of democratic nations, united in a common purpose, to promote freedom and democracy. While the threat in the Cold War was from a large conventional army led by the Soviet Union that could sweep across Germany, today the threat is far more subtle but just as real. Today we all face threats from terrorism, weapons of mass destruction in the hands of rogue states and nationalistic passions liberated from Cold War restraints. The Gulf War showed that the United States and the European members of NATO face threats far from their borders. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic must deal with these same threats, and they can overcome them as members of the NATO alliance.
Already, we have seen a preview of some of the potential security
benefits of having these nations--all of which are now strong democracies that have worked to strengthen civilian control of the military--as NATO members:
All three have contributed to the success of the SFOR mission in Bosnia. Hungary's base at Taszar has been host to over 95,000 U.S. military personnel rotating in and out of IFOR and SFOR duty. And if there had been a need to fight Iraq, our new NATO members would have been ready to assist. Poland has chemical weapons experts ready to support us if necessary. The Czech Republic would also supply chemical weapons experts. Hungary's Foreign Minister would have urged his nation's parliament to open its airspace and airports to U.S. aircraft if military action had been needed.
The spur to all of these actions was prospective membership in NATO, and the assumption of a fair share of responsibilities as full fledged members of the Western community. This enthusiasm should make us realize how important NATO is and how established members often take the Alliance and its benefits for granted.
It would be unjust to deny the Poles, Hungarians and Czechs a role in safeguarding the freedom of the European-American community--a freedom, incidentally, we rhetorically upheld for these nations over the past four decades. It would be morally wrong to create an artificial dividing line in Europe just a decade after another such line was erased.
Mr. President, what would happen if the Senate were to reject NATO expansion? I believe that we would signal the willingness of the West to confuse the tranquility of today with the potential turmoil of tomorrow for which history warns us to prepare. If we reject expansion now, we would also reject the enduring link, shown by our experience in NATO, between democratic institutions and the defense of peace.
The incentive of NATO membership has furthermore stabilized democratic forces in all three candidate nations. Poland instituted civilian control of the military and formed a joint battalion with the Danes and Germans. Hungary and Romania, the latter a possible future member of NATO, signed a treaty respecting the rights of the Hungarian minority in Romania. If NATO membership did not provide the framework for these actions, the Poles, Czechs and Hungarians could still be struggling with the social and military legacies of authoritarianism.
Mr. President, if we were to reject the logical first step of NATO membership for these three states, then the progress made by these nations might be reversed. All three nations could and would be entitled to feel that NATO and the West do not care about them. We in the Senate would be sending a message that while the United States and Western Europe are entitled to the benefits of freedom and the confidence that a military alliance will sustain them that NATO is an exclusive club which will not admit those willing to make it even better. All three nations might then form another military bloc.
Such an organization might turn inward or Eastward to make security arrangements without the participation of the West. But I would rather see Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic work within the NATO alliance to address the concerns of the Baltic states and other regional parties.
Another aspect of this issue which has concerned me and I know, many Senators, is the
cost of this expansion. It is a legitimate concern. The General Accounting Office produced a report just last month concluding that the Defense Department's assessment of the NATO cost of expansion was reasonable if the current environment of a diminished military threat to the continent will continue for years into the future. New members, in turn, will sustain their own internal budgets for critical defense modernization. It is also up to them to meet their formal treaty commitments to the commonly-funded budgets of the Alliance.
The governments of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have agreed to specific 10-year obligations on payments for the integration of military systems and command structures with existing Alliance members. I commend our prospective new partners and the Defense Department for developing this blueprint for enlargement. They must also expect that NATO as well as Congress will hold them accountable for it.
Mr. President, Secretary Albright summed it up well last year when she said: `Let us not deceive ourselves. The United States is a European power.' We fought two world wars because much of Western Europe was threatened, invaded and occupied. The Cold War was fought because some of these nations were again threatened and others forced to endure Communist tyranny.
The enlargement of NATO will mean that more of Europe is part of an alliance designed to protect freedom and democracy. That makes conflict and the defense of our security interests much greater.
NATO will be stronger with the addition of more territory and more armed forces--200,000 in fact--a valuable addition if we account for the reductions in Western military forces since the end of the Cold War. Peace through strength may be a slogan to the cynics, but to me, it summarizes the invaluable lesson that we learned on the post-war ashes of a Europe leveled by aggression.
One of the Senate's most illustrious members, Senator Arthur Vandenberg, said at the time of NATO's founding in 1949 that `[NATO] is not built to stop a war after it starts . . . It is built to stop wars before they start.'
The admission of these three applicants will strengthen NATO's ability to prevent war. I cannot imagine that the United States and the other members of NATO would do nothing if the territorial integrity of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were threatened--even if they were not a part of NATO. But by having them become members, we would bring into the democratic family a region that has hosted the century's bloodiest conflicts.
Furthermore, by formally extending NATO's territorial jurisdiction further east, the Alliance will be even better placed to prevent any security threat to all of its members. NATO's role has evolved from deterring an invasion of the West by the Soviet Union to preventing armed conflict on the continent of Europe, and admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will augment this shift in mission.
Others will argue that NATO expansion will cause problems in relations with Russia; that expansion undercuts efforts to build democracy in Russia; that we are still treating Russia as a Cold War adversary, instead of a nation building a democracy and a free-market economy or that expansion will anger Russia at a time when we need to work together on issues such as Iraq and the danger of weapons proliferation. Mr. President, I do not agree with these arguments.
Even if NATO had never promised to expand, the United States and Russia would continue to have international policy differences. There is also no evidence that the prospect of NATO expansion has hurt efforts to ratify arms control treaties or to address concerns over the need to control nuclear weapons of all varieties.
I also do not believe that enlargement will harm efforts to build a secure and strong democracy across the 11 time zones of Russia. The stability an enlarged NATO will bring to Eastern Europe will provide a more secure environment in which democracy's roots can grow stronger. NATO is furthermore not building a military force which can threaten Russia, as demonstrated by its intention not to station either nuclear weapons or substantial forces in the territories of the new members.
Finally, the United States and NATO have worked hard to address Russian concerns over expansion through the Founding Act and the creation of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. The Permanent Joint Council allows NATO and Russia to talk directly about ways to promote and enhance Europe's security. It offers a means to discuss matters of concern to either or both parties. If Russia chooses to work with the Permanent Joint Council in a cooperative manner, then this Council can help take NATO-Russia relations to a level of cooperation that benefits all of Europe. The Permanent Joint Council, however, will never substitute for or supersede any NATO policy making organs. Russia does not have a veto over NATO actions and must never be allowed to obtain one.
It is not possible for NATO to remain static and at the same time effective in the post-Cold War environment of Europe. NATO is, and must remain a military alliance that will guarantee the security of its members. However, it does face a different set of challenges as the 21st century approaches. Because the threat to NATO's territorial integrity today is significantly diminished, the Alliance has the opportunity to vanquish the dangers posed by unbridled nationalism and great power policies and to replace them with free-market democracies that can grow and prosper.
Mr. President, when Secretary of State Madeleine Albright testified before the Foreign Relations Committee, she quoted an individual who appreciates what freedom means and that is not to be taken for granted. Czech President Vaclav Havel stated that `Even the costliest preventive security is cheaper than the cheapest war.'
By admitting the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, NATO will be taking a giant step toward insuring that the freedoms won by Eastern and Central Europe at the end of this century will survive and prosper in the next. By expanding NATO, the West will ensure that the freedoms it preserved through the darkest days of World War II and the Communist threat of the 20th century will survive and prosper through the millennium.
In conclusion, NATO enlargement will enhance our national security and the stability of Europe. As my former Senate colleague and current Defense Secretary Bill Cohen stated, `a stable Europe is necessary to anchor America's worldwide presence.'
The addition of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO will mean a stronger NATO, and our approval of this enlargement will show that the United States is ready to do so in the 21st Century what it did for the latter half of this one: be a force, with other democracies, for the protection of freedom today and for the generations to come.
[Page: S3708]
END