Congressional Documents[Page S3695] Mr. WARNER EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2310, AS MODIFIED Mr. WARNER Mr. WARNER Mr. KYL Mr. WARNER Mr. KYL Mr. WARNER Mr. KYL Mr. WARNER Mr. Sessions Mr. BIDEN Mr. BIDEN Mr. WARNER [Page S3696] Mrs. HUTCHISON Mr. BIDEN Mr. BIDEN Mr. WARNER Mr. BIDEN [Page S3697] Mr. WARNER Mr. BIDEN Mr. SMITH Mr. KYL Mr. SMITH Mr. MOYNIHAN Mr. KYL Mr. MOYNIHAN Mr. KYL Mr. MOYNIHAN Mr. KYL Mr. WARNER Mr. KYL Mr. WARNER Mr. KYL Mr. MOYNIHAN Mr. KYL [Page S3698] Mr. MOYNIHAN Mr. KYL Mr. MOYNIHAN Mr. BIDEN Mr. BIDEN Mr. KYL Mr. FORD Rollcall Vote No. 107 Leg.
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Mr. WARNER. For the benefit of the Senate, the Chair should state the order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there is to be 30 minutes of debate on amendment No. 2310 offered by Senator Kyl of Arizona to begin at 4:30 p.m.
Mr. WARNER. I ask unanimous consent to proceed for about a minute and a half.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WARNER. I direct my comment to the distinguished Senator who is proposing the amendment, Senator Kyl, which will now be the subject of further debate. In particular, on page 1 entitled `common threats,' it says, `NATO members will face common threats to security in the post-cold war environment, including . . .'--and on page 5 it says--I guess that was 4. It says, `. . . conflict in the North Atlantic area stemming from ethnic and religious enmity, the revival of historic disputes, or the actions of undemocratic leaders.'
I find that far afield from the NATO charter itself. Indeed, it is somewhat far afield from the 1991 restatement of the mission of NATO. Speaking for myself, I have grave concerns about NATO incorporating in any future document the fact that it stands ready to stamp out ethnic and religious enmities and the revival of historic disputes. That is the very thing we are involved in now in Bosnia. I just don't have time to get into it, but I would like to have a clearer explanation from the proponent of this amendment as to what he intended by the inclusion of this paragraph in this amendment. Basically, I wanted to support the amendment, but I cannot support a document that says NATO is going to take it upon itself to put out civil wars and religious enmities and ethnic disputes. I am concerned about the future of American servicepersons and that the men and women who will proudly wear the uniform of the United States and be an integral part of NATO would be subject, under NATO commanders, to go into these areas and meet such conflicts.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I will be delighted to answer the question of my distinguished colleague from Virginia. I will begin, first of all, by setting forth the essential concept or idea underlying this amendment.
The future course of the NATO alliance, its core purposes and its strategic orientation in this post-cold war era, will be decided by allied negotiations upcoming on the so-called revised strategic concept of NATO. The new document is going to be agreed upon in a little bit less than a year--next April. Senate advice and consent to the NATO enlargement issue here presents a unique opportunity for the Senate of the United States to speak on this issue, an opportunity we would not otherwise have. We, therefore, can help to lay out the strategic vision of NATO from the standpoint of the United States and thus influence the outcome of these negotiations.
In my view, the current resolution focuses too much on what NATO should not be and should not do. The resolution does not attempt to lay out a comprehensive set of principles to guide development of the strategic concept. And so this proposed amendment will establish the Senate's vision of the future of NATO and, I hope, help to lay the foundation for American positions on the strategic concept.
Here is the background that will lead up to the answer to the Senator's question. I hope it is the only expression of concern about the amendment because I would certainly like to have his support for what I think is an amendment that will be overwhelmingly supported by both proponents and opponents of expansion. Our principal objective here, I say to the Senator from Virginia, is to ensure that NATO remains an arm of U.S. power and influence. NATO, not the WEU or the OSCE, must remain the principal foundation for the security interests of its members. This means NATO must be prepared militarily to defend against a range of common threats to our vital interests. We have tried to identify what they all are.
Now, some of us may not like what some of them are and may not like the fact that we will have to respond to them. For example, a radical Islamic terrorism threat in the North Atlantic region may require that we defend against that. That didn't used to be a big problem for NATO. What I have done is insert the words `in the Atlantic area'--words that were not in the underlying resolution of ratification that came out of the committee. So what I have tried to do is both to, yes, acknowledge a threat that we all acknowledge that could arise, but to limit the nature of our response to that in the Atlantic area by the specific language of the section that the Senator from Virginia and the Senator from Texas are concerned about.
This amendment underscores that collective defense will remain the core alliance mission. But it acknowledges that new threats have emerged in the post-cold war era that will require NATO to adapt its military forces and defense planning mechanism.
Mr. WARNER. May I have one word of clarification?
Mr. KYL. I am happy to try to answer the question.
Mr. WARNER. The mix of NATO is the collective security of member nations and the collective security of the continent that they occupy. That has been the traditional mission. Now, you are recognizing these are threats, and I agree they are becoming more and more threats--religious and ethnic strife. But do you intend, by this document, to say that that should be written in as a mission of NATO, to stand ready to intervene in these types of conflicts? Or are you just recognizing them as potential threats and subsequently, depending on the magnitude of the threat, the NATO commanders, and the NAC, North Atlantic Council, can determine if in fact it threatens the collective security of a nation or the nations?
Mr. KYL. That is an excellent question, Mr. President, and it is, of course, the latter--something that I think the Senator from Virginia and I support. I point to the specific language to confirm my point. In paragraph 5, `common threats,' it says: `NATO members will face common threats to their security in the post-cold war environment, including. . .' Then we list threats. We hope they will never arise. That is the context in which this particular provision is listed.
If I could just close my comment here, Mr. President, because the Senator from Delaware wishes to comment. This amendment merely conditions Senate advice and consent to its understanding of U.S. policy as it relates to the revising strategic concept of NATO. It acknowledges the principles that have animated our participation in NATO from the very beginning and also identifies the threats that we may face. It states that the Senate understands that the core concepts contained in the 1991 document remain valid today.
I say to my friend from Virginia, in essence, that the 1991 strategic concept provides a foundation on which to build the revised statement of NATO strategy and sets forth the 10 principles which the Senator understands will be in the new document.
I urge my colleagues who support and oppose the expansion of NATO to support this amendment and to put the Senate on record as defining the NATO of the future. I reserve the remainder of my time.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, collectively, with the Senator from Texas--
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sessions). The Senator from Delaware controls the time. Who yields time?
Mr. BIDEN. How much time do I control?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Fifteen minutes.
Mr. BIDEN. I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. The Senator from Texas and I wish to discuss the capacity to respond to common threats. NATO's continued success requires a credible military capability to deter and respond to common threats. And when you look at the definition of common threats, it includes historic disputes, religious enmities, ethnic and the like. I fear that, although the Senator in his statement seemed to clarify that this is not to be a mission, somehow the language, I believe, is somewhat tangled. I yield to my colleague from Texas.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
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Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I have just been looking at the amendment with the Senator from Virginia. I like every other part of the amendment.
I like every other part of the amendment. But it seems that the words define what a common threat is, and included in the common threat are ethnic divisions or uprising, and then it says that one of the missions of NATO is to respond to common threats. I just wondered if there could be a clarification, or perhaps a clarifying amendment that would assure that is not going to be a responsibility of NATO to come into a situation in which there is a border dispute or an ethnic dispute. In fact, that is one of the amendments I would offer later, which is to avoid having the United States get into an ethnic dispute.
If the Senator from Arizona can clarify it, I think the Senator from Virginia and I would like to support the amendment. But if it needs some work to assure its intent, then perhaps we could work on that as well.
Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. On my time, let my take a crack at that, if I may. I am a cosponsor, although I cannot take credit for the drafting. It is totally a product of my friend from Arizona, and it is an admirable job. The Senator from Oregon and I were just talking about what a good amendment this is. I am glad to cosponsor it. But let me maybe help.
I have in my hand the alliance's Strategic Concept of 1991, the last one that occurred. It is the present operating doctrine for NATO. My friend from Virginia pointed out that the North Atlantic Assembly committee gets together and they decide whether this should be updated periodically, what it should say, and what article V of the Washington treaty means. Article V of the Washington treaty, the NATO treaty, was read earlier by my friend from Virginia.
It starts off, the parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, consequently, and it goes on from there. Let me read from the strategic concept, the alliance's strategic concept, which is the operating strategy of NATO, as we speak, the one that was, in effect, redone in 1991 to respond to the changed circumstances, meaning no longer the Soviet Union, the Berlin Wall is down, and all these nations. We are talking about independent republics and nations themselves. OK. That is the concept in which the strategic document came about.
On page 4, under `Security Challenges and Risks,' paragraph 10, the present strategic doctrine of NATO reads as follows:
Risks to allied security are less likely to result from calibrated aggression against the territories of the allies, but rather from adverse consequences of instability that may arise from serious economic, social, or political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes . . .
--border disputes, and ethnic rivalries. Excuse me. Let me be clear that I don't want to misquote. Go back to the quote:
. . . political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries, and territorial disputes.
Parenthetically inserted by me was border disputes, and what is going on in Bosnia now.
Back to the quote:
. . . which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe . . .
Not members of NATO.
. . . the tensions which may result, as long as they remain limited, should not directly threaten the security and territorial integrity of members of the alliance. They could however lead to a crisis inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts which would involve outside powers, or spill over into NATO countries having a direct effect on the security of the alliance.
Nothing to do with the expansion of NATO--zero, zero to do with expansion. Presently, NATO interprets article V to represent--is interpreted and laid out tactically in the alliance's strategic concept as interpreted by the 16 NATO nations. It authorizes and allows, and they in advance acknowledge that NATO will deem, under article V, instability as a consequence of ethnic rivalries, or boundary and territorial integrity. They will interpret that. They may interpret that to be a threat to the security of any of the member nations; ergo, you are then allowed under NATO strategic doctrine, if all NATO countries agree, as they do in this doctrine, to use force.
What is happening in this debate, unintentionally, as I said to my friend from Virginia yesterday, and what we are really debating in the biggest debate that has occurred is what the greatest differences have been over NATO strategy as it now exists.
That is really what people are arguing about. They are really arguing not about what these three additional countries will do to impact on strategy. They are basically arguing, as they should, as they should, whether or not this outfit we put together almost 40-some years ago still is relevant today, whether we should still have it. But the strategic doctrine today put in place in 1991 says, and I will repeat, `Risks to allied securities are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the allies but, rather, from adverse consequences of instability that may arise from serious economic, social and political difficulties including ethnic rivalries, territorial disputes which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe.'
Now, my friend from New York, who is opposing the expansion, is probably the single most qualified man in the Congress, having written about and predicting the kind of chaos that would come from the male fist of communism being lifted off of the sectarian rivalries that have been subsumed under that heavy hand in the Communist rule--he predicted in a book he published several years ago, that I recommend to everyone, that there would be crisis in Europe. It would not be Soviet armies invading.
So my friends who keep saying: Look, we ought to reflect reality, NATO should reflect the real world, as Senator Smith from New Hampshire kept saying yesterday, NATO did just that in their strategic doctrine of 1991. They said the risk--paraphrasing--is not from Soviet divisions; it is from ethnic rivalries, economic, social, and political instability. That is where our risks lie and we must respond to those risks.
So nothing new is being stated by my friend from Arizona. He is not breaking new ground. He is reiterating a basic principle of the strategic doctrine that exists now. And if we vote down these three countries, it will still exist. To the extent you have a fight, an argument with that section of his amendment, which I cosponsor, you do not have a fight about expansion. You have a fight about why don't you introduce an amendment that says the strategic doctrine of NATO should not be what my friend states it should be and, in fact, is.
So, again, we tend to----
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I think we could settle this with two sentences. Do I understand from the sponsors--and you being a cosponsor of the amendment --that nothing in the amendment expands beyond what is stated in the 1991 doctrine, paragraph 10, which the Senator from Delaware just read? If it is to be interpreted as saying that remains as the goal, then I am comfortable with the amendment. But as drawn, largely due to the defining language, I have a problem with it in its present form.
I agree with the Senator from Delaware, if that is to be the mission in the future, a consistent one with paragraph 10.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, if I may respond, since I am not the author but only the cosponsor, I do not want to take the liberty of suggesting what the Senator from Arizona meant, but that is my understanding. It is my understanding that the words as drafted now in paragraph 5--and I apologize. I am searching for the language--say each of the threats are self-evidently covered by present NATO doctrine: `Re-emergence of hegemonic power confronting Europe,' i.e., Russia. That is part of our existing doctrine today. `Rogue states and non-state actors possessing nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and the means to deliver these weapons by ballistic or cruise missiles,' et cetera. That, as I read paragraph 10, is contemplated within the `serious economic, social and political difficulties.' It says, `including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes' but not limited to those two items.
No. 3, `Threats of a wider nature, including the disruption of the flow of vital resources' obviously would affect the economic security and the stability of the NATO nations. No. 4, `Conflict in the North Atlantic stemming from ethnic and religious enmity.' That is covered. So as I said----
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Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the Senator is a little swift in saying that is covered. Look, in paragraph 10, in referring to such disputes as ethnic and religious enmity, they say this response: `These tensions which may result as long as they remain limited should not directly threaten the security and territorial integrity of members of the alliance,' and therefore NATO stays out.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, to respond, that is exactly what this amendment says. The amendment says, as my friend from Arizona has drafted it, it is a decision self-evident. In this amendment, it is a decision for the NAC to make whether or not it is an armed conflict that will spill over. There have been a number of ethnic conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe which we had concluded not to get involved in because the NAC concluded they were not directly threatened, they did not directly threaten the security of those countries. They did conclude that the ethnic rivalries and the war in Bosnia did--did--threaten their security. They made that judgment internally within the NAC, within that governing body of NATO.
So I reserve the remainder of my time. I have 2 minutes, I am told.
Mr. SMITH of Oregon addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona has 7 minutes.
Who yields time?
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous the following Senators be listed as cosponsors to my amendment--Helms, Roth, Biden, and Smith of Oregon.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The Senator from Oregon.
Mr. SMITH of Oregon. I thank the Chair. I thank Senator Kyl. The Senator just took away some of the business I wanted to do.
I am very pleased to be added as an original cosponsor of this amendment.
Mr. President, I think the Clinton administration made a serious error in allowing the other NATO countries to reopen the strategic concept issue. The current document agreed to in 1991 needs no alteration. The approach taken under President Bush's strategic concept has served NATO well for the past 7 years and would have served equally well for the next 7. That said, what is done is done. The administration failed to prevent the French and others from opening a Pandora's box.
Negotiations on the strategic concept for the purpose of amending it will commence this summer, and I expect that a document will be agreed upon by early next year. Senator Kyl's amendment establishes a vision for NATO's future. It does so by emphasizing those aspects of the current NATO policy which the United States finds most important. For instance, the Kyl amendment makes clear that NATO, not the European Union, not the OSCE or any other United Nations-type organization, must remain the principal foundation for collective security in Europe.
It also takes note of the broad range of threats that will face the United States and our NATO allies in the post-cold war world and calls upon NATO members to ensure that their forces can be rapidly deployed and sustained during combat operations.
Taken together with paragraph B of the current condition 1 of the resolution, which calls upon NATO military planners to put territorial defense above all other priorities, this amendment makes clear that the United States expects every NATO member to pursue the capability of operating with the United States in any contingency under any circumstance.
Finally, it reaffirms the key tenets of current NATO nuclear policy. I find this paragraph of the Kyl amendment particularly important.
In conclusion, Senator Kyl has identified the 10 most important aspects of NATO's current strategic concept which must be preserved. His amendment sets forth the Senate's expectations that any future revisions to the strategic concept must reflect these
principles. I welcome his contribution to the resolution of ratification. It provides a much-needed vision for the future course of the NATO alliance. The administration can expect that I for one will hold it to the policies established under the Kyl amendment during the course of future negotiations of the strategic concept.
Again, my thanks to Senator Kyl. I think his amendment is forward looking. It is visionary. Unlike so many amendments offered here today which are sort of in the category of `thou shalt not,' this is in the category of `thou shalt do.' So I thank Senator Kyl for that and his leadership. I am proud to be a cosponsor with him.
I yield the floor.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Will the Senator yield for a question?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. KYL. I would be delighted to yield for a question from the Senator from New York.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Would it be correct to say that the statement, `Conflict in the North Atlantic area stemming from ethnic and religious enmity, the revival of historic disputes or actions of undemocratic leaders' does not represent any expansion of the 1991 doctrine?
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I say to my colleague from New York that I am in total agreement with the Senator from Delaware. That is the case, that this was not intended to be an enlargement of existing NATO policy.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank my friend from Arizona.
Mr. KYL. I thank the Senator.
Mr. President, I make that statement in order to assure my colleagues who are concerned about enlarged missions that it is not our intention to try to expand the mission of NATO. But what we are concerned about is helping the administration of the United States define very clearly to our European allies our strategic vision of NATO as a defense alliance. Unfortunately, some Europeans have a different point of view. They would limit NATO solely to the mission of collective defense against an armed attack, elevate the WEU to the principal military organization for responding to all other threats to NATO security, and cuts the United States out of decisionmaking on issues affecting our vital interests. Some undermine our ability to shape NATO as a viable 21st century military alliance, and that is why I offered this amendment, to help make clear an unambiguous U.S. policy on the future direction of the alliance using the fundamental principles which have existed since 1949 when these concepts were first enunciated and which in the Foreign Relations Committee report at that time said that, of course, each party would have to decide in the light of circumstances surrounding the case and the nature and extent of the assistance whether, in fact, an armed attack had occurred and article 5 thus brought into play--armed attack relating to different kinds of situations that might not be a direct invasion but might, from other kinds of causes nevertheless, pose a security risk to the states within NATO.
So I really believe we have not expanded the current policy, but I hope we have clarified for our friends in Europe the limits of the U.S. policy, the vision, the strategic vision that we have. I appreciate the questions raised by the Senators from New York and Virginia to help us clarify that point.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we thank the Senator and with that assurance I will give you my support. But the amendment is to restrict in some way the expressions in the resolution that is before the Senate.
Mr. KYL. That is correct.
Mr. WARNER. Would the Senator state that for the record?
Mr. KYL. Yes. Mr. President, that is correct. We explicitly, for example, insert `in the North Atlantic area" which is not in the underlying resolution of ratification.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Will the Senator yield for a brief question?
Mr. KYL. I am happy to yield. I think I am out of time.
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Mr. MOYNIHAN. Would the Senator agree that in 1949 the issue facing Western Europe and the United States was not ethnic and religious conflict, it was international communism in the form of the Soviet Union, which had declared ethnic and religious conflict to be a premodern phenomenon, long since sent into the dustbin of history?
Mr. KYL. The Senator is correct that the concern at the time was the great conflict between the West and communism from the Soviet Union. I suggest the Senator probably knows better than any of the rest of us about the longstanding disputes, some ethnic and religious in origin, which were, perhaps, always under the surface. But at that time, of course, the Senator is absolutely correct.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank my colleague.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.
Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am not one for shilling for books, but for those of you who are interested in this subject and the religious and ethnic conflicts that have erupted after the mailed fist of communism has been lifted in Central and Eastern Europe, I strongly recommend--and I mean this sincerely--Senator Moynihan's book entitled `Pandaemonium.' It is worth, as they say, the read, and is incredibly instructive. I mean it sincerely. It is incredibly insightful, and those of you who have an interest should take a look at it.
I yield the floor and yield the time, and I am ready to vote.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk called the roll.
Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Illinois (Ms. Moseley-Braun) is necessarily absent.
The PRESIDNG OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber who desire to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 90, nays 9, as follows:
The executive amendment (No. 2310), as modified, was agreed to.