Congressional Documents
[Page S2251] Mr. ALLARD [Page S2252] Mr. LEVIN Mr. LEVIN Mr. LEVIN [Page S2253] Mr. Chernomyrdin's [Page S2255] Mrs. FEINSTEIN Mrs. FEINSTEIN Mr. LEVIN Mrs. FEINSTEIN [Page S2256] Mr. WELLSTONE PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR Mr. WELLSTONE Mr. WELLSTONE [Page S2258] Mr. WELLSTONE Exhibit 1 From the New York Times, Feb. 5, 1997 A Fateful Error [Page S2259] Mr. BOND Mr. WELLSTONE Mr. SMITH Mr. Hagel Mr. SMITH Mr. Gorbachev [Page S2260] Mr. Stalin [Page S2261] Mr. DURBIN Mr. DURBIN Mr. DURBIN [Page S2263] Mr. DORGAN Mr. DORGAN Mr. Havel [Page S2264] From the Washington Post, Mar. 18, 1998 Deciding NATO's Future Without Debate [Page S2265] Mr. DORGAN Mr. GREGG Mr. GREGG Mr. GREGG Mr. LOTT Mr. LOTT Mr. WARNER Mr. LOTT Mr. WARNER Mr. LOTT
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The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
Treaty document 105-36, Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on Accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.
The Senate resumed consideration of the treaty.
Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I rise in support of the NATO enlargement proposal of including Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. I will make a few comments in that regard.
Many people will say that the cold war is over and then will continue to argue that we can now dismantle our defenses and look inward. I completely disagree with this assessment. I think that Secretary Albright, in testifying before the Armed Services Committee on April 23, 1997, made the proper statement in relating this to an insurance policy, saying `If you don't see smoke, there is no real reason to stop paying for fire insurance.'
Because of President Reagan and his desire to see the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics put on the ashheap of history, the United States no longer faces the threat of the U.S.S.R. But this is no time to be complacent. U.S. interests are still being threatened by internal political and economic instabilities; the reemergence of ethnic, religious, and historic grievances; terrorism; and the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.
However, for nearly 50 years, NATO has been the organization which has defended the territory of the countries in the North Atlantic area against all external threats and today we have an historic opportunity to recommit to this security. I believe we must not turn our back on this historic opportunity. We must embrace these new market democracies and say that the old ways are gone and that we welcome them into the free world. Relative peace should not stop us from being engaged for peace and freedom. I believe expanding NATO to the Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic is the best way to ensure peace and stability.
Over the last few decades, much of the United States' focus has been on the Middle East, the Far East, and Russia. Throughout history, the United States has been closely linked to the stability of Europe. We have been through two world wars and one cold war in Europe. However, since the formation of NATO, not one major war or aggression has occurred against or between member states, except for Argentia's invasion of the British Falkland Islands. Adding these three deserving countries to NATO can do for all of Europe what it has done for Western Europe. It can strengthen emerging democracies, create conditions for continued prosperity, assist in preventing local rivalries, diminish the need for an arms buildup and destabilizing nationalistic policies, and foster common security interests.
Just as important, enlargement will signal the end of the cold war. It will further break down the Stalinistic wall. We will reassure the world that these once occupied nations are welcomed free countries. No longer will we validate the old lines of Communism but will begin to secure the historic gains of democracy in Central Europe. Unlike, the Warsaw Pact, these countries are voluntarily wishing to join NATO, without the coercion or force from any NATO member.
Not only will the Stalinist wall be gone, but the acceptance of these three countries will positively show that the West will not lock these countries out, but will lock in Central Europe's democracies. Enlargement will promote multinational defense structures and prevent the renationalization of these democracies. Enlargement will fill the security vacuum created with the fall of the Soviet Union. If this vacuum is not filled, there is concern that the area will begin to divide nationalistically and Central Europe could look like the former Yugoslavia.
However, just the possibility of membership into NATO has given these countries the incentive to peacefully resolve many of their border disputes. Since 1991, there have been 10 major accords settling differences and much of this progress is credited to the opportunity to join NATO. Even if some of the old disputes arise, NATO membership will help keep the peace, just as it has done in relation to the problems between NATO members Greece and Turkey. I do not believe the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union, or any other international bodies have the ability to keep the peace and promote the stability needed that NATO can bring to the area.
We all know that there has been much concern about the Russian response to NATO enlargement. The Russian leaders have been very public in their displeasure about enlargement. I believe that this is do in part to their misperception that the Alliance poses a threat to Russia's security, NATO is not, and never has been an offensive alliance. NATO is a defensive alliance only.
We must respect Russia's concerns. But as my respected predecessor Senator Hank Brown has written, `[W]orking closely with Russia in an attempt to allay their concerns makes sense. Slowing or altering NATO expansion . . . hands the Russian government a veto pen.' Like Senator Brown, I believe that this would be a mistake. An enlarged NATO only promotes security and stability in an area of Europe that is vital to Russian security. The invited states must clearly know that they are no longer `eastern bloc nations' but an integral of the circle of democratic countries.
Lastly, with any expansion there is a concern about the cost. There have been wide ranging estimates. The total amount is estimated at $27 to $35 billion for all current members and the invitees over 13 years, from 1997-2009. A bulk of this cost is to modernize and reform militaries and make them operable with NATO. However, with the United States already having the world's premier armed forces, the bulk of the cost will be incurred by our allies and the three invitees, as they upgrade their forces and facilities
to meet those standards of the United States and NATO.
With the addition of these countries, the U.S. percentage share of the NATO budget will go down, and the resolution before us provides that U.S. costs will be kept under control and not be allowed to subsidize those members that are not putting forward their share of the funds. Adequate defense systems always cost money, but alliances make costs more evenly shared through the alliance.
Let me end with this: NATO enlargement is the Western World's way to show that the cold war is over and that we welcome these countries to freedom. The new threats we face can only be met by forming new alliances to ensure that these democracies do not fall prey to nationalistic or terrorist regimes. The Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, know life without freedom and now deserve the freedom and security that only NATO can provide.
I yield the floor.
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Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I inquire whether we are operating under a time limit.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are no limitations on debate.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair.
Mr. President, I will support the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into NATO. I do so with the realization that this represents, in its most basic meaning, a serious commitment by the United States to treat an armed attack on any of these nations as an attack on the United States.
NATO has been called the most successful alliance in the history of the world. It successfully deterred an attack by the former Soviet Union and also, very importantly, it helped to keep the peace among the nations of Western Europe. I am convinced that the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO will help ensure long-term stability and peace in Europe and will demonstrate our continuing engagement and leadership in transatlantic affairs.
The inclusion of these three nations that are willing and able to defend the common interests will strengthen the alliance. Each of these nations provided forces to the United States-led coalition during the Persian Gulf war. Their troops are serving with the NATO-led stabilization force in Bosnia. Hungary provides a staging and training base for U.S. forces in Bosnia. All three are prepared to contribute forces to the United States-led force presently deployed in the gulf, if that proves necessary. They have, thus, already demonstrated their commitment to burdensharing and to be not just consumers of security but also contributors to a more secure Europe.
Most important, I believe that a military invasion of Poland, or Hungary, or the Czech Republic would threaten the stability of Europe and involve the vital national security interests of the United States. All three of these countries have established good relations with their neighbors. For example, Poland and Ukraine concluded a declaration of reconciliation in December of 1997. Hungary ratified treaties on understanding, cooperation, and good neighborliness with Slovakia in March of 1995, and with Romania in September of 1996. The Czech Republic signed a formal reconciliation pact with Germany in January of 1997.
Several issues need to be addressed as part of this momentous debate. These issues include the impact that enlargement will have on Russia, the commitment of these three nations to the principles of the NATO treaty, the cost of NATO enlargement, whether the door to further enlargement should remain open after the accession of these three nations, and whether the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic should be delayed until they are admitted to the European Union.
First, the impact of enlargement on Russia. I start this with the sobering thought that Russia is the only country that could destroy the United States. Additionally, although Russia does not today pose a conventional threat to NATO, it is a large and resource-rich country, whose policies of democratization and movement to a market economy are very important to the U.S. and its NATO allies. It is, therefore, an important national security interest of the United States to do what we reasonably can to ensure that NATO enlargement does not contribute to a reversal of Russia's course toward democratization and a market economy, nor contribute to a Russian view of the United States as a hostile nation.
In a statement I made at the Armed Services Committee's first hearing after NATO's decision to enlarge, a hearing in April of 1997, in which Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Secretary of Defense William Cohen testified, I said the following:
I believe that we must do everything we reasonably can to enlarge NATO in a way that contributes to a greater, rather than less, stability in Europe. How we enlarge NATO is critically important, along with whether we enlarge NATO, since we do not want to contribute to the very instability that NATO enlargement is aimed at deterring.
Now, in May of 1997--and what is important is that this came subsequent to NATO's decision to expand--Russia's President, Boris Yeltsin, President Clinton, and leaders of other NATO countries, signed a founding act on mutual relations, cooperation, and security between NATO and the Russian Federation. I think it is important to read the second paragraph of that founding act, which succinctly states the relationship between NATO and Russia and the goal of the act. That paragraph reads as follows:
NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries. They share the goal of overcoming the vestiges of early confrontation and competition and of strengthening mutual trust and cooperation. The present Act reaffirms their determination--
That is NATO and Russia after the decision was made to expand, and now we have NATO, having made that decision, and Russia saying that they reaffirm their determination--
to give concrete substance to our shared commitment to a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, whole and free, to the benefit of all its peoples. By making this commitment at the highest political level, we mark the beginning of a fundamentally new relationship between NATO and Russia. They intend to develop, on the basis of common interest, reciprocity and transparency a strong, stable and enduring partnership.
Now, that was an action that was taken by Russia after the decision by NATO was made to expand. It sets up a NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council to `provide a mechanism for consultations, coordination, and to the maximum extent possible, where appropriate, for joint decisions and joint action with respect to security issues of common concern.'
The Founding Act further provides that `The consultations will not extend to internal matters of either NATO, NATO member states, or Russia.' Finally, it states--and this is important to all of us--`Provisions of this document do not provide NATO or Russia, at any stage, with a right of veto over the actions of the other, nor do they infringe upon or restrict the rights of NATO or Russia to independent decision making and action. They cannot be used as a means to disadvantage the interests of other states.'
Now, the signing of this partnership agreement between NATO and Russia after the announcement relative to expansion--and it doesn't, of course, mean that Russia is happy with NATO enlargement; they are not--at least many of the leaders are not, although I will get to a public opinion poll in a minute, which seems to imply that the majority of Russians are satisfied that Russia should expand; nonetheless, it is clear that the leaders in Russia, in the Duma, are not happy about NATO enlargement, but it does mean that Russia is willing to work with NATO for a stable, peaceful, and undivided Europe. I think that the Clinton administration, which exercised leadership to move the alliance to enlarge, deserves much credit for also leading the alliance to enlarge in a way that a new relationship with Russia is possible.
The signing of this NATO-Russia Founding Act is evidence of the fact that Russia accepts, albeit grudgingly, the concept of NATO enlargement. The leadership in Russia has accepted the likelihood that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, former members of the Warsaw Pact, but independent nations, will join the NATO alliance. Based upon my meeting with Russian parliamentarians, indeed, Russian Ministers, I am convinced that Russia's political leaders, from all parties, want to develop a cooperative relationship with NATO and its members, particularly the United States.
Despite NATO enlargement on the horizon, Russian soldiers still serve side-by-side with American soldiers in Bosnia to create a secure environment in which the Dayton accords can be implemented. I have visited with United States and Russian troops in Bosnia. I witnessed firsthand how well they are working together. There has not even been a hint of ending Russia's military presence in Bosnia, despite NATO enlargement, even though the financial cost, by the way, of that presence is clearly a funding problem for the Russian Ministry of Defense. Other evidence of the fact that Russia, despite NATO enlargement, wants to work with NATO and work with the United States, is that Russia has recently agreed to more active participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace program. More evidence. Just last week, Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin publicly pledged at the end of his talks with Vice President Gore that the Russian Government will push hard in the Russian Duma for ratification of START II, despite NATO enlargement.
So we have actions here on the part of Russian leadership--staying in Bosnia, working with an expanded Partnership for Peace, signing an alliance agreement, an agreement with NATO to work with NATO. We have all of this evidence of a willingness on the part of the Russian leadership to work with NATO and the United States, despite this enlargement.
Again, interestingly, there was a Gallup poll taken in Moscow, released last week, that revealed that 57 percent of Muscovites supported the Czech Republic's bid to join NATO, 54 percent supported Hungary's admission, and 53 percent said Poland should be allowed to join NATO. More than a quarter of those polled had no views on the subject.
So, based in part on all of these factors, I am satisfied that NATO enlargement will not produce the unwanted effect of causing Russia to reverse its course toward democratization and a market economy, nor to view the United States as a hostile nation.
What about commitments to the principles of the NATO treaty, the Washington treaty? Article 10 of that treaty addresses the subject of the accession of new members to the alliance. It states, in pertinent part, the following:
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The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.
The principles in Article 10 can be summed up in the preamble to the NATO treaty, as follows:
They (the NATO Parties) are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.
The first chapter of the alliance's September 1995 `Study on NATO Enlargement,' in addressing the criteria for candidates for accession, stated that candidates must:
Conform to basic principles embodied in the Washington Treaty: democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.
Mr. President, I know that most of us have met with Cabinet-level officials and parliamentarians from Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. As a member of the Senate NATO Observer Group, I have also been able to meet with those officials, as well as with NATO officials, including Secretary General Javier Solana; the Chairman of NATO's Military Committee, General Klaus Naumann; and other members of the military committee, and the Chiefs of Defense of the present alliance members.
I also have explored the important issue of the commitment of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO'S basic principles: democracy, individual liberty, and a commitment to the rule of law.
It has been 9 years since the democratic revolutions of 1989 swept Eastern Europe. Poland established the first non-Communist-led government in the Warsaw Pact in April of 1989. I can still remember the feelings of admiration, respect, and, indeed, elation that we all experienced when we watched the Solidarity-led movement of Lech Walesa guide Poland into democracy. Hungary moved gradually and systematically toward democratic and market economic reforms and was generally viewed as a haven of stability in Eastern Europe. In Czechoslovakia, former dissident playwright, Vaclav Havel, was named President in December of 1989 and has guided first Czechoslovakia and, after the split, the Czech Republic, with a steady and inspiring hand ever since.
Many of us had the opportunity to be in Eastern Europe in 1989 and 1990 when these events took place. I remember my wife Barbara and I being in Prague when Havel, after elected, was about to assume the Presidency of that nation, and the inspiration that was provided by the people of Prague, protecting that election and protecting his movement to the castle, where he would serve,
and how they would fill the streets protecting that free election and protecting their democracy.
After the freedom came, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic signed association agreements with the European Union in 1991. The European Union leaders decided in March of 1998 to convene full accession negotiations with these three nations. Poland has held seven free and fair elections since 1989. Hungary has had two democratic changes of government since 1989 in fully free and fair elections. Since 1989, first Czechoslovakia and then the Czech Republic have had three free and fair elections. All three governments established civilian control over their military, and their Parliaments are increasingly active in overseeing military budgets and activity.
So I am satisfied with the commitments of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. Indeed, I believe the people throughout the world can draw inspiration from the extraordinary accomplishments of these three formerly Communist-ruled nations.
What about the cost of NATO enlargement? It has perhaps been the most written about and the least understood aspect of NATO enlargement. It is an important subject, and it needs to be examined carefully.
Pursuant to congressional direction, the Clinton administration sent a report to Congress in February of 1997 on NATO enlargement that included an illustrative estimate of the cost in the range of $9 billion to $12 billion over 13 years. The term `illustrative' was necessary because the Department of Defense, which prepared the estimate, did not know which nations or even how many nations would be chosen for NATO membership and it, therefore, could not conduct a detailed and comprehensive analysis that would be required for a true cost estimate. That report estimated not only the costs that would be occasioned by NATO enlargement, but also the costs to present NATO members to implement the alliance's new strategic concept that requires reorientation from a static defense posture suitable during the cold war to a more flexible and mobile set of capabilities to respond to different types of threats.
So, the costs that were looked at related only in part to NATO enlargement and were illustrative, based on no knowledge as to how many or which nations would be added, but also included illustrative costs of an entirely new concept, a strategic concept for NATO, which didn't relate to the question of NATO enlargement at all, but which would occur whether or not NATO was enlarged.
This report provided a comprehensive look at some possible future costs, but it also added some confusion since it went beyond the common costs to NATO members that are a direct result of NATO enlargement, which is the real issue that we must deal with in considering the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The really relevant aspect of the administration's cost assessment, the assessment of the costs for NATO members for the direct costs, is the figure $9 billion to $12 billion over 13 years. But that figure, again, included both costs that would be eligible for common funding and those that would have to be borne by the new member states.
There was a new cost assessment that was made in November of 1997. That was made by the NATO staff. The assessment was produced under the direction of NATO's Military Committee and has since been approved by the North Atlantic Council. It estimates the costs which will be eligible for common funding at $1.5 billion over 10 years. Those are the real costs as estimated carefully, knowing which countries would come into NATO which had been approved for accession and looking at just the direct cost of adding those countries and excluding other costs which are not directly related to that accession. The estimate, again, for all of the members was $1.5 billion over 10 years. The U.S. share would be about $400 million over 10 years. The Department of Defense reviewed the NATO study and has determined that its conclusions concerning enlargement requirements is thorough, militarily sound, and based upon a range of reasonable contingencies, and the Department concurred with the NATO cost assessment. The General Accounting Office evaluated the basis for NATO's cost estimate, reviewed the DOD assessment of that NATO cost estimate, and concluded that the approach used by NATO in determining the estimated direct enlargement cost for commonly funded requirements is reasonable. They also determined that the DOD assessment of the NATO cost study was reasonable.
Thus, the question is why was there such a discrepancy between that original estimate of $9 billion to $12 billion and NATO's estimate of $1.5 billion? The answer then lies in several of those factors.
First, the administration's estimate included both costs that would be eligible for common funding and those that would be needed to be borne by new member states. Deducting the cost that would have to be borne by new member states reduces the administration's original assessment, which was $9 billion to $12 billion, to $5.5 billion to $7 billion.
Second, the DOD assessment was based upon four new NATO members, not the three new members which were actually selected
for accession to NATO. Had the administration made an assessment of the cost for three new members, that would have reduced its estimate to between $4.9 billion and $6.2 billion.
Additionally, NATO actually visited the facilities in new member countries that would need to be upgraded in order to extend NATO's communication links to new members; in order to conduct air defense, which reflects the integration of new members into NATO's air defense systems; in order to provide reinforcement reception facilities, which reflect upgrades for infrastructure, particularly airfields to receive NATO forces; and in order to carry out training and exercises. NATO found that those facilities were in better shape than the Department of Defense had assumed. The Department of Defense had not actually visited those facilities. NATO's staff did. In addition, NATO used the more limited funding eligibility for NATO common funding, NATO had more empirical data as to actual pricing, and there were some minor differences between NATO and the United States as to new member requirements.
So for all of those reasons, that original estimate of the administration was way off and it was way high, and the revised estimate done by NATO after on-site visits and looking only at the direct costs resulting from the increase in the size of NATO, that assessment has been approved by the GAO and by the DOD.
Next, should we have a pause? In the course of this debate the Senate will be dealing with an amendment that would, in essence, establish a 3-year pause, after the accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, before NATO could consider the accession of any other nations to the alliance.
I have already cited article X of the NATO treaty. On July 8, 1997, NATO heads of state and government, in their Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation, in which they announced their decision to invite Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to begin accession talks, reaffirmed that `NATO remains open to new members under article X of the North Atlantic Treaty.'
Since its inception in 1949, the alliance has been enlarged on three separate occasions to include Greece and Turkey in 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982. All of these enlargement decisions, including the decision to invite Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, have been the product of careful and comprehensive consideration. The alliance's 1995 `Study on NATO Enlargement' set out the criteria that was used for these three nations and that will be used for any consideration of future enlargement of the alliance. I am satisfied with the criteria and with the process that has been and will be used. I see no reason to mandate a pause, particularly since the desire to join the alliance has been such a productive force for candidate nations to proceed on the road to democracy and the rule of law and to reach accommodations with their neighbors.
Given the deliberative process that was involved in NATO's enlargement decision, it is clear that it will take some time before any new nations will be chosen for accession to NATO. But a 3-year mandated pause could actually imply too much. It could imply that, after 3 years, we will support more nations joining NATO, and that is not necessarily the result of the process which has been adopted.
It seems to me that mandating a pause is no more logical than mandating when the next round of NATO accessions should occur. Further enlargement of the alliance should be judged by the circumstances and developments that exist at the time and whether a candidate nation meets the criteria for NATO membership. That should not be decided arbitrarily in advance by either deciding that new members should not be taken in before a certain date or that new members will be taken in after a certain date.
No nation can be admitted to NATO without the advice and consent of this Senate. We do not need to condition our advice and consent on the admission of these three nations in order to establish that fact, the fact that we have control over who is admitted, and when, to NATO. So I would vote against such an amendment that would establish that arbitrary 3-year moratorium.
Mr. President, another issue that is going to come up is membership in the European Union and whether or not we should delay the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic until they are admitted into the European Union. I understand the positive motivating forces behind that amendment. There may even be some truth to the statement that in the present low-threat environment, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have a greater need for economic stability than for the added security that membership in the NATO alliance will bring.
I have discussed this issue with numerous visitors from the three countries with whom I have met. They have all stated their preference for joining NATO before joining the European Union. They want to be in the European Union, but they want to be in NATO even more, and they want it first. They cite the historical experience of their countries under foreign domination. They stress that they seek a closer relationship with the United States, a relationship to which NATO but not European Union membership is related.
When the experts speak of the contribution that NATO has made or that the U.S. military presence in Europe or the Far East has made, the first thing that is noted is the peace and security that allows economic development to then occur. Nations look to their external security first and then to their economic security, for without the former, you cannot have the latter.
During the Senate NATO observer group's meeting with NATO's military committee, I was struck by a statement by its chairman, General Klaus Naumann. He made the point that one of the major benefits of NATO enlargement was to prevent the renationalization of defense in candidate countries. In other words, if Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were not admitted to NATO, they would have to devote much more of their scarce resources to national defense. That would have a significant negative impact on their economies. And General Naumann could also have added that the burdensharing that membership in NATO provides allows NATO member nations not to build large military forces that could be perceived as threatening to their neighbors and prove destabilizing to the region.
But finally on this issue of whether we should condition accession of these three nations to their membership in the European Union, there is one other thought that I think we have to consider. If we condition our action on something that Europe does or must do, it seems to me that it would justify the perception in some quarters of Europe that we decide that we are determined to dominate our friends and our allies. We should not dictate membership in a partnership to which we do not belong.
I happen to favor that membership very strongly. And, again, in this low-threat environment, these three nations might be wiser to seek that membership before they seek membership in NATO, even though I think if we were in their position, we would put NATO first, too, because security physically of a nation, I think, instinctively is more important to people in that nation than economic security, as important as the latter is.
What troubles me about this relationship that is being attempted in European Union membership perhaps more than anything is that it would reinforce a perception that even though we are not a member of that partnership, we are trying somehow or other to dictate or to dominate that partnership. I do not think that perception is either accurate or we should give any credence to it by conditioning accession or our approval of accession of these three nations into NATO based upon their acceptance into the European Union. I just do not think it is healthy for our partnership and our relationship with our European allies for us to condition in that way.
So in conclusion, Mr. President, I believe the accession of these three nations will contribute to stability in Europe and is in the national interest of the United States.
I have carefully considered the strategic rationale for NATO enlargement and the impact that enlargement would have on the movement toward democratization and a market economy in Russia, the commitment of the three nations to the principles of the NATO treaty, and the cost of enlargement. I believe the three nations that have contributed forces to the Persian Gulf war and to the stabilization force in Bosnia are willing to do their part to defend the common interests and will strengthen the alliance. In my view, accession of these three nations will not contribute to a reversal of Russia's course toward democratization and a market economy nor to a Russian view of the United States as a hostile nation.
And again, we should consider carefully and thoroughly the impact on our relationship with Russia. It is an important relationship and we should not unwittingly damage it.
We should not in the effort to create stability in Europe unwittingly contribute to instability. But I don't think the accession of these three countries will have that effect. And I emphasize, after the announcement of NATO enlargement, Russia agreed to an expanded participation in the NATO Partnership for Peace program, signed an agreement with NATO providing for a special relationship between NATO and Russia--after the announcement of an expanded NATO, nonetheless agreed to a relationship with NATO.
With Mr. Chernomyrdin's, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's, decision last week to go to the Duma and press for the ratification of START II in the Duma, all of these things are despite the increase in the size of NATO. Despite an enlarged NATO, these actions on the part of Russia show how important it is to Russia to relate to Europe and to relate to us. It is important to us, too. But I do not think that ratifying the expansion of NATO will jeopardize in any way our relationship with a democratic, market-oriented Russia, and their actions are more important in this respect than my words.
Their action in working out an agreement with NATO, participating in Bosnia--there has been no suggestion that they would no longer participate in Bosnia if NATO is enlarged. They are committed to that. I think all of these actions on their part indicate their acceptance of the idea that NATO will be enlarged.
Do they like it? The leadership doesn't like it. I mentioned a public opinion poll a little earlier, interestingly enough, just last week in Moscow, showing a majority of people in Moscow support the enlargement of NATO through the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. To the extent that public opinion polls are things that we should be relying on, it
is an interesting little footnote to this debate.
But for all of those reasons, Mr. President, I have concluded that the cost is affordable; for security and the stability it will provide in Europe it is the right thing for us to do.
I will end my comments by reading a quotation from the President of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Havel, who led the Czech democratic resistance under communism. This is what he stated about NATO enlargement.
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Our wish to become a NATO Member grows out of a desire to shoulder some responsibility for the general state of affairs on our continent. We don't want to take without giving. We want an active role in the defense of European peace and democracy. Too often, we have had direct experience of where indifference to the fate of others can lead, and we are determined not to succumb to that kind of indifference ourselves.
For all those reasons, Mr. President, I will be supporting this resolution of accession.
I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, it was a great treat for me to listen to the very eloquent comments of the Senator from Michigan. A few years ago, Vice President Walter Mondale said to me `When you go to the Senate, listen to Carl Levin; he is one of the most articulate and erudite Members of that body.' After hearing his discussion of the NATO enlargement, I just want to say the Vice President was correct.
Mr. LEVIN. Let me thank my good friend from California. I doubt that he was correct in that one respect. In so many other ways he is wise, and I hope he is also wise here.
I thank the Senator.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I thank the Senator.
Mr. President, I rise as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee to support the legislation before us. I happen to believe that admitting Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO is a natural and logical response to the end of the cold war, and is a crucial element of a larger strategy to build a Europe that is at last undivided, democratic, and at peace. I support enlargement because, first, I believe there is a sound strategic rationale for enlargement; secondly, because I believe that Russian concerns that NATO expansion presents a threat or a challenge to the well-being of Russia are unfounded; and, thirdly, because I believe that costs of enlargement will not be an undue burden on the United States but, rather, will be shared among all members on a fair basis.
Let me speak briefly about each of these issues. For almost 50 years, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has served as the centerpiece of American foreign policy in the European theater. NATO presented a firm committed alliance, a major deterrent to any aggressive thrust by the Soviet Union. It has been a successful military alliance, and it has served the national interests of the United States in preventing aggression in uncertain times.
When NATO was originally formed during the early days of the cold war, it was conceived as a purely defensive alliance, a static line protecting Western Europe from Soviet encroachment. But it has been more than 8 years since the Berlin wall came down. Today, the Soviet Union is gone and the sort of military threat for which NATO was originally conceived and designed, thankfully, no longer exists.
I believe that this new post-cold-war era calls for a new NATO, a NATO that is an alignment of like-thinking states committed to democratic values and mutual defense within a given geographic community. This new, enlarged NATO is not intended to be, nor do I believe it will be, a threat to any other State or group of States.
As our Secretary of State has put it, the strategic rationale for enlarging the Alliance is straightforward. Admitting Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO `will make America safer,
NATO stronger and Europe more peaceful and united.' I believe that.
A larger NATO will make the world safer by expanding the area of Europe where wars do not happen. Twice in this century we have sent our sons and daughters across the Atlantic to Europe to fight and die in world wars which began in Europe. By reaffirming our commitment to an enlarged NATO, history teaches us that we make it less likely that we will be called to do so again. It has often been said that vigilance is the price of freedom. NATO remains a form of vigilance.
A larger NATO will also be a stronger NATO. To align themselves with NATO, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have strengthened their democratic institutions and resolved ethnic and border disputes in the region. They are bringing their militaries into alignment with the requirements of NATO membership. They have met the requirements for application: democratic reform, development of free market economies, and that each country be able to make a substantial military commitment to the alliance.
The United States has important political, economic, security and, yes, moral and humanitarian interests in Europe. These interests demand continued active U.S. engagement in the transatlantic community. Just as NATO has for the past 50 years, I believe that an enlarged Alliance will provide an effective mechanism to maintain a more unified European community with shared values.
The second issue which I mentioned, the future of NATO-Russia relations, is one which I know is of great concern to many of our colleagues. Let me share my perspective on this issue.
I would agree with some who oppose enlargement that if it inflames `the nationalistic, anti-western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion,' as George Kennan recently wrote, then it truly would be a questionable course of action. But I do not really believe that NATO enlargement provides a realistic basis for this thinking.
In fact, for all the politicking against NATO enlargement inside Moscow's ring road, many thoughtful Russians, especially younger ones, realize that NATO enlargement is not a threat.
Russia now has a constructive relationship with NATO. Our troops are cooperating in Bosnia. Russia has requested that their troops be allowed to participate in all future Partnership for Peace exercises. And we are moving ahead with arms control. Russia is ahead of schedule under the START I treaty. Prime Minister Chernomyrdin has committed to Duma ratification of START II. And we have agreed on the outlines of a Start III treaty that will cut both United States and Russian nuclear arsenals to 80 percent below their cold war peak. Russia has joined us in banning nuclear testing and ratifying the treaty to outlaw chemical weapons.
Now, all this is not to say that future NATO-Russia or United States-Russia relations will be smooth and trouble free. There probably will be issues in the years ahead on which we will disagree and which we will have to work through. But if Russian policy and/or Russian-European relations should sour, it is my belief that it will be because of the internal dynamics of Russia itself, not because of NATO enlargement.
In fact, it is my belief that enlargement of the Alliance and engagement with Russia may offer increased opportunity for the development of a democratic Russia and an even more productive relationship between Russia and the United States.
I strongly believe that a key and critical outcome of NATO enlargement must be a greater engagement with Russia to assure that NATO enlargement is not perceived as a threat nor as an act that in any way signals aggressive intent. It is this path, I believe, which offers the best hope for a peaceful and secure Europe in the decades ahead.
A third area of concern is questions which have been raised about the costs of enlargement.
NATO has estimated that the common fund cost for enlargement will be $1.5 billion over 10 years. The U.S. share of these enlargement costs is about $360 million, in proportion to the current 24 percent U.S. share for common-funded projects. I believe that this cost for the U.S. share of enlargement is reasonable.
In my mind, however, the critical cost issue is burdensharing. If we go forward and enlarge and adapt the Alliance, all NATO members must be willing to pay their fair shares.
I must say I was very concerned last year when French President Chirac commented, in effect, that France would not pay one more centime for the costs of enlargement.
During the hearings conducted by the Foreign Relations Committee, assurances were received from the administration that all allies will, in fact, pay their fair share. And, despite the earlier negative French comments, both the current members of NATO and the three prospective members have pledged that, indeed, they will meet their share of Alliance costs.
I have been reassured by these comments, and I have also worked with the chairman and ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee to assure that strong, clear, and unambiguous language regarding costs and burdensharing has been included in the resolution of ratification. That in fact is now the case.
The language which we have included requires the President to certify that the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will not increase the overall U.S. share of the NATO common budget, and that the United States is under no obligation to subsidize the costs of new members joining the Alliance. The President must also certify that enlargement will not undermine our ability to meet other security obligations.
Finally, the resolution of ratification also includes a reporting requirement which will provide Congress with detailed information on the national defense budgets of NATO members, their contributions to the common budget, and U.S. costs associated within enlargement.
So, as we proceed with the process of enlargement, this information will allow Congress to make a determination about the efforts that our allies are making and, if necessary, take action at the appropriate time to ensure that the burdens of the expanded alliance are fairly met.
In summary, I believe the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO will contribute to a stronger, more stable, and more secure Europe, one that is even a more reliable partner for the United States. Such a Europe is clearly in U.S. national interests, and I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of the resolution of ratification.
I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
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Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I ask that Corey Perman, who is a fellow in my office, be granted the privilege of the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, it is my understanding--although I think really what we are doing here is just making opening statements on NATO expansion--and my hope, if not this week then when we come back to this discussion, that a number of us will have amendments on the floor and that we will have, hopefully, a sharper and more focused debate.
Mr. President, I speak on the floor of the Senate about a matter that I think is of great importance. I think the decision that we make here in the Senate about whether or not to support expansion of NATO will, as a matter of fact, crucially affect the quality or lack of quality of the lives of our children and our grandchildren. I have given this matter a great deal of thought. For the last year I have had a lot of discussions, a lot of briefings with a lot of people on both sides of the question. I have done my very best as a U.S. Senator from Minnesota to inform myself. This is a very difficult decision to make.
There are thoughtful and knowledgeable Senators who are on the other side from where I am. Certainly there are thoughtful and knowledgeable Minnesotans, whom I respect greatly, who have urged me to vote in favor of expanding NATO. So have many of my colleagues. So has President Vaclav Havel from Czechoslovakia, who I believe is one of the giants of the 20th century, a playwright and former prisoner of conscience. When he speaks, with such passion, about the importance of expanding NATO, I listen. I will tell you, probably more than anything, I would like to cast a vote that would please President Havel.
Why, then, do I oppose the expansion of NATO? Because I have come to believe that it would lead to the redivision of Europe and that we would needlessly poison U.S. relations with Russia for years to come and increase the prospects that in the post-Yeltsin world--President Yeltsin will not be there forever--the ultranationalists and anti-U.S. forces, militaristic forces, will gain power.
Before I go into greater detail on the reasons for my opposition to enlarging NATO, just permit me to say a few words about the process that I have gone through to reach this decision. Again, I understand full well that our decision has enormous implications for our country and the world. I am a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. We have had any number of different hearings on this. I have read as many articles as I can read and have talked with as many people as I can talk with. I want to assure my fellow Minnesotans and my colleagues that in reaching this decision I have done my homework.
That does not mean I am arrogant about it. That does not mean that I believe the people who take a different position have not done their homework. But there are a number of questions and doubts that I have. I have submitted questions in writing to Secretary of State Albright and to other key administration officials. Last June I sent a letter to President Clinton, cosigned by my distinguished colleague Senator Harkin, where we raised a number of different questions. Unfortunately, at least from my point of view, a number of these questions are still out there and administration officials have not allayed my concerns about NATO expansion. So, as I give this matter a great deal of thought, carefully weighing the pros and the cons of NATO expansion and meeting with those who have strong expansionist viewpoints, I still believe that I must oppose NATO expansion.
Permit me to outline my concerns. The best way is for me to summarize questions that I have had and to talk about some of the answers that have been given but which I do not think are persuasive answers.
First, what military threat is NATO expansion intended to address? The Russian military has collapsed, the Russian Army's ability to quell tiny, ill-equipped Chechen forces raises doubts about Russia's capability to threaten its former Eastern bloc allies in the foreseeable future.
Second, arms control agreements signed between 1987 and 1993, that were pushed through by Presidents Reagan and Bush working with President Gorbachev, have helped to establish a new security structure that makes a surprise attack on Central Europe virtually impossible.
Third, there is peace between states in Europe, between nations in Europe, for the first time in centuries. We do not have a divided Europe, and I worry about a NATO expansion which could redivide Europe and again poison relations with Russia. Why, then, are we rushing to expand a military alliance into Central Europe?
How can Russia not feel threatened by, one, the prospect of NATO forces moving hundreds of miles closer to its borders and, two, the possibility of further NATO expansions, including even the Baltic States? This has all been left, as my colleague the distinguished Chair knows, open-ended.
Although the administration claims that extending NATO toward Russia's borders would not threaten Russia, there seems little doubt that many Russians feel threatened, especially, I argue, any number of the opinion leaders in Russia. Whatever explanation there is for the fact that Russian politicians, the reformers, the pro-Western democrats to the centrists to the Communists and even to the extreme nationalists, who may agree with us on little else, all strongly oppose NATO expansion.
In pursuing the NATO expansion, why is the administration disregarding the warnings of George Kennan and other distinguished Russian scholars that NATO expansion is likely to sow the seeds for a reemergence of antidemocratic and chauvinistic trends in Russia?
I am especially puzzled by this since it must be evident to both supporters and foes of NATO expansion that European security and stability--and I need to make this point twice--that European security and stability is greatly dependent on Russia's successful transition to democracy. That, I think, is the central point. A democratic Russia is unlikely to threaten its neighbors. I am worried, I am terribly worried. I think this is a profound mistake. I think this NATO expansion could threaten that democracy in Russia, and I think, if we do not have a successful transition to democracy in Russia, that, in turn, threatens European security and stability.
Why then are we considering a step that is apt to strike at Russian ultranationalists who oppose democracy? George Kennan, who is probably over 90 now, a great scholar--George Kennan is probably as wise and profound a thinker as we have in our country about Russia, about the former Soviet Union. I might add--and I have said this to friends--my father, who was born in the Ukraine, born in Odessa, his family then moved to Russia--they kept moving to stay one step ahead of the pogroms--he was a Jewish immigrant; he came over in 1914 at the age of 17. He never saw his family again. My father had the honor many times--he passed away in 1983--but he had the honor many times to speak with and meet with George Kennan. My father, who spoke 10 languages fluently--I am sorry to say I don't--but my father, who spoke 10 languages fluently, had such great respect for George Kennan's mastery of the language and his understanding of Russia.
George Kennan has said that expanding NATO `may be expected to inflame nationalistic anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion and to have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy.'
I urge my colleagues to carefully consider George Kennan's words before they cast their votes on ratification of NATO expansion.
I want to say this about the process: I am in sharp disagreement with the majority leader on the way we are doing this. We had hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I give Chairman Helms full credit for that. He and Senator Biden--who takes a very different position than I do--have been very respectful about the need to have a debate. But the way we are doing this is we are doing it in bits and pieces. We should have been on the education bill, and we have just come back to NATO as filler until we get back to the education bill. It is a way of avoiding debate about education and education amendments.
This decision we are going to make about NATO expansion is as important a decision as we are ever going to make. But Senators coming out here, as I have, individually and then leaving after they give speeches is not enough. Yesterday, we had some good discussion. I hope next week, or whenever we take this back up, we will figure out a way to have Senators out here with amendments and we can have a give-and-take discussion and we can have an important debate about this.
What basis is there for Secretary Albright's claim that expanding NATO will produce an `undivided' Europe? Rather than creating an undivided Europe, my view is that NATO expansion would re-create a dividing line in Europe, only further to the east than the original cold war dividing line, and I do not consider that to be progress for the world.
In fact, President Clinton himself, before he decided to back NATO expansion, avowed that it would `draw a new line through Europe just a little further east.' This is hardly an academic question, for I believe that a Europe without dividing lines is vital if the continent is to be peaceful, prosperous and secure. That is why I think we will be making a fateful mistake if we vote for the NATO expansion, if we support this.
Finally, Mr. President, I must ask whether it makes sense for the administration to contend that a key reason NATO expansion is necessary is that it will promote democracy, stability and economic reform in Central Europe. There are a whole lot of countries in the former Soviet Union for whom that challenge is out there. I am not even sure these countries would be the first countries by that criteria. But what I do know is that, if the administration really believes that a prime goal of NATO expansion is to solidify democracy and economic reform, then perhaps we ought to really think about other countries first. Yet I think that would be a mistake. And, most important of all, if we are going to be talking about expanding markets and expanding democracy, why don't we use our leverage--the United States of America--to promote membership in the European Union?
I think that is the single best way that our country could exert its leadership. The single best way that we could exert our leverage for Poland, for Hungary, for the Czech Republic, if the goal of this is to expand markets and democracy, would be for the United States to be the leader, the leading voice in calling for expansion in the European Union.
Let me simply say that I do not think a military alliance is the way to do that. I do not think a military alliance has as its primary goal expanding markets and democracy, and, moreover, I think we take a terrible risk.
In closing, I would like to quote from a New York Times op-ed written over a year ago by George Kennan, a man who, as I said, I have long admired for his remarkable contributions to American diplomacy and scholarship and keen insights into Russian history, politics and diplomacy:
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. . . something of the highest importance is at stake here. And perhaps it is not too late to advance a view, that, I believe, is not only mine alone but is shared by a number of others with extensive and in most instances more recent experience in Russian matters. The view, bluntly stated, is that expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American
policy in the post-cold-war era.
Mr. President, I say to my colleagues, let me repeat this. I am quoting a profound thinker. George Kennan states:
The view, bluntly stated, is that expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era.
Such a decision may be expected to . . . restore the atmosphere of the cold war in East-West relations, and to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking. And, last but not least, it might make it much more difficult, if not impossible, to secure the Russian Duma's ratification of the START II agreement and to achieve further reductions of nuclear weapons.
George Kennan's words have already proved to be prophetic. The START II agreement is stalled in the duma, and troubling frictions have developed with Russia on a number of other issues, ranging from U.S. policy toward Iraq to the management of Russia's nuclear materials.
I urge my colleagues to ponder George Kennan's powerful arguments and to join me in opposing ratification of NATO expansion.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of George Kennan's article be printed in the Record at the end of my statement.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. WELLSTONE. Let me conclude on a personal note. What I have tried to say on the floor of the Senate, and I want to summarize, because, again, I actually believe, without being melodramatic, I can truthfully say this has been one of the most difficult decisions. I do not believe for a moment that people who favor NATO ratification are doing it because of simplistic thinking or because they have not thought this issue through, although I think all of us before we cast the final vote should inform ourselves.
Some people I have tremendous respect for strongly favor NATO ratification. I have met with people back in Minnesota--Czechs, Hungarians and Poles--people who feel so strongly about this, wonderful people, people who have been big supporters of me, and they are disappointed in me.
I want to say one more time, I have done my best to really be a scholar and to study this matter. I have tried to meet with people representing different points of view. But I very honestly and truthfully believe that this would be a terrible mistake. I think the way to expand democracy and market economies, which is a very important goal for Hungary, for the Czech Republic, for Poland, for other countries, is membership in the European Union. Our country should be using our leverage to make that happen.
I think there is no reason for NATO expansion. I see no military threat that calls for expansion of a military alliance. I think the downside is that we risk signing arms agreements with Russia, we risk poisoning relations with Russia, we risk putting the democratic forces in Russia in peril, and I think if we don't have a stable Russia, if we don't have a secure Russia, then all of Europe is threatened by that.
I had a chance to travel to Russia a few years ago. I wanted to visit where my father grew up since he could never go back because the Communists ruled. I went there full of hope, and I came back with less hope. Of course, I am an optimist; I am always hopeful. The reason I had less hope is because of all the economic disintegration, how difficult a transition it is for this nation to move from a totalitarian government, to move from Communist rule to democracy and, indeed, too much economic pain for too many people in the country.
I will never forget being on the Trans-Siberian Railroad and talking to a woman, I am sorry to say, through a translator and having her say to me, `You can't eat freedom.'
What I worry about--I don't think this issue is the issue alone, and I know there have been public opinion polls recently taken--I am sure my colleague from Delaware, Senator Biden, has spoken about some of that--where a majority, not a large majority, but a majority says they favor NATO expansion. What I worry about is this can be a triggering event if things don't go well. I am worried if things do not go well economically; I am worried if there is a considerable amount of instability, if President Yeltsin should run into difficulty with an illness and should pass away; I am worried about what is going to happen in the future, not in the distant future but in the medium future and maybe in the near future. I do not think the benefits of NATO expansion come close when measured up against what I consider to be the very real dangers of doing this.
I think we are making a fateful decision. I said in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee--I like to say it because my father was my teacher. My father--I miss him, I wish he was alive. I wish he was here to provide me with advice. When I was growing up, I was a little embarrassed by my father because he was very `old country.' He was almost 50 when I was born. He wasn't cool and didn't fit in and really didn't fit in with my friends' parents. When I got to be high-school age, the age of some of the pages here, I realized what a treasure he was. For 3 years before I went away to the University of North Carolina, every night at 10 o'clock, except for the weekends, I would meet him in our kitchen and we would have sponge cake and hot tea, and he would talk about the world. For 3 years, I had a chance to just listen to my father and learn from him. I really believe that my father would say to me today that George Kennan is right and that we will make a fateful decision if we vote for ratification of this NATO agreement.
Mr. President, it is with strength and feeling very strongly about my position--but nevertheless it is a difficult decision--that I speak today on the floor. I urge my colleagues to oppose ratification of NATO expansion. I shall vote no, though I am hopeful that maybe we will be able to pass some amendment which I think will make a huge difference.
I yield the floor.
In late 1996, the impression was allowed, or caused, to become prevalent that it had been somehow and somewhere decided to expand NATO up to Russia's borders. This despite the fact that no formal decision can be made before the alliance's next summit meeting, in June.
The timing of this revelation--coinciding with the Presidential election and the pursuant changes in responsible personalities in Washington--did not make it easy for the outsider to know how or where to insert a modest word of comment. Nor did the assurance given to the public that the decision, however preliminary, was irrevocable encourage outside opinion.
But something of the highest importance is at stake here. And perhaps it is not too late to advance a view that, I believe, is not only mine alone but is shared by a number of others with extensive and in most instances more recent experience in Russian matters. The view, bluntly stated, is that expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era.
Such a decision may be expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of the cold war to East-West relations, and to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking. And, last but not least, it might make it much more difficult, if not impossible, to secure the Russian Duma's ratification of the Start II agreement and to achieve further reductions of nuclear weaponry.
It is, of course, unfortunate that Russia should be confronted with such a challenge at a time when its executive power is in a state of high uncertainty and near-paralysis. And it is doubly unfortunate considering the total lack of any necessity for this move. Why, with all the hopeful possibilities engendered by the end of the cold war, should East-West relations become centered on the question of who would be allied with whom and, by implication, against whom in some fanciful, totally unforeseeable and most improbable future military conflict?
I am aware, of course, that NATO is conducting talks with the Russian authorities in hopes of making the idea of expansion tolerable and palatable to Russia. One can, in the existing circumstances, only wish these efforts success. But anyone who gives serious attention to the Russian press cannot fail to note that neither the public nor the Government is waiting for the proposed expansion to occur before reacting to it.
Russians are little impressed with American assurances that it reflects no hostile intentions. They would see their prestige (always uppermost in the Russian mind) and their security interests as adversely affected. They would, of course, have no choice but to accept expansion as a military fait accompli. But they would continue to regard it as a rebuff by the West and would likely look elsewhere for guarantees of a secure and hopeful future for themselves.
It will obviously not be easy to change a decision already made or tacitly accepted by the alliance's 16 member countries. But there are a few intervening months before the decision is to be made final; perhaps this period can be used to alter the proposed expansion in ways that would mitigate the unhappy effects it is already having on Russian opinion and policy.
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Mr. BOND. Mr. President, NATO has been the keystone for Western Democracy for the past 50 years. It has stood solidly as a successful deterrent against the spread of Communism and as a community of democracies where markets have flourished and where differences are settled without drawing a sword against one another. NATO's key alliance was based upon a mutual pact of deterrence from external threats . . . and lets be honest--it was and I stress was, an alignment to offset the voracious behemoth called the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is dead. We need to keep it so. Expansion of NATO to include nations who have struggled to extricate themselves from years of slavery under the yoke of Leninist/Stalinist dictatorial regimes will insure the eternal demise of a world-communist conspiracy.
NATO was a major contributor to the successful end of the Cold War and was in fact responsible for a 50 year period of peaceful coexistence in Western Europe; the longest such period in modern history. In order to continue to fulfill its purpose of ensuring peace and freedom, NATO needs to adapt to a new Europe, a Europe without a Soviet-alliance but a Europe which faces a myriad of other challenges.
As our country adapts to a changing world situation, a world without a Cold War, so must our alliances. NATO must change or become a mere relic of the Cold War. Those who advocate the status quo ask us to live in a non-existent past.
To those who claim that the expansion of NATO will be a threat to the Russian people, I note that the 50 years of relative peace on the European continent extended to the Russian border, as well. Stability in the region has been and will be stability for the Russians. NATO poses no offensive threat to any other nation. It is a gathering of countries who want to break the cycle of war.
For those who are afraid of Russians who threaten their neighbors because these nations desire peaceful alliances, I say, `Do not bow to the will of a few radical extremists; stand up for those who strive to join a community of free and democratic nations who are our neighbors. Do not let the Russians run our foreign policy.'
For those who say that the nations of Central Europe face no threat today, I say that this expansion is the most likely way to preserve this situation.
For those who claim that this will dilute NATO, I say that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, whose people have demonstrated their embrace of democracy, will add a renewed strength of purpose to the alliance.
Yes, there are questions which must be answered concerning the costs to the United States of this expansion. I have stated time and again that the costs must be defined and we will hold NATO to those numbers. Our coffers are not limitless. But any costs which insures peace and stability will be less than the costs of the anarchy and chaos of medieval conflicts or a resumption of the Cold War. To have set a list of conditions for admittance to the organization, and then to change our minds to those countries which have achieved those conditions is isolationist, elitist and shortsighted. It could drive them to make other alliances for their own collective protection and rather than resulting in a series of treaties the likes of which have fostered the most fruitful 50 years in history, we will set the stage for a complicated entanglement of alliances which will look curiously like those which precipitated World War One. We do not need to learn that lesson all over again.
I am very comfortable in joining the company of such individuals as General Collin Powell, General Norman Swartzkopf, Former Sec Def Richard Cheney, Former Secretaries Baker, Eagleburger, Haig, former Ambassador Kirkpatrick, and a host of other Secretaries, Generals, Admirals and other distinguished personages. So, I call upon my colleagues to support an expansion of freedom, democracy and peace vote to support including Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in the NATO family of nations.
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hagel). Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Today I wish to speak from the heart about a decision we will make as U.S. Senators about one of the most solemn issues that we will face, and that is whether or not we will expand NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.
I would like to put some personal context into what I am about to say. Like you, Mr. President, I grew up in a time when we could accurately be described as children of the cold war. Unlike you, I did not serve in Vietnam, but grew up under the threat of nuclear annihilation.
I remember as an elementary school child going through drills where the teacher would tell us to get under our desks and hope for the best. It was a time when, frankly, we were taught to be afraid.
I was too young to remember the Hungarian uprising in 1956, but I was old enough to remember the Prague Spring of 1968. I remember holding my breath as I watched the Solidarity movement develop in Poland and wondering how long it would be until Soviet tanks snuffed out that breath of freedom.
And I remember with amazement and with emotion the night when this Nation sat transfixed at the falling of the Berlin wall. I never thought that would happen in my lifetime, and yet it did. I remember how courageous I thought it was of President Ronald Reagan when he went there, like his predecessor, John Kennedy, and spoke about the wall and challenged Mr. Gorbachev to tear it down.
As a child of the cold war, I now come, as a Senator from Oregon, to this decision about what we do in Europe, whether we now expand NATO. Though an Oregon Senator, I grew up fairly close to here in Bethesda, MD--my father and mother moved our family from Oregon to Maryland so my father could work for General Eisenhower, in his administration.
At the beginning of the Kennedy administration, my cousin, Stewart Udall, was nominated as Secretary of the Interior. And I suppose because of that correlation between a Republican and a Democrat administration and family ties that went across the aisle, my family participated in a number of the inaugural events for President John F. Kennedy.
I remember it was a very cold January day. I remember, with my family, hearing words that struck me then as important. John F. Kennedy called out to my generation--our generation, Mr. President--of Americans to accept the torch of liberty. At least that is what I heard. I was only 8 years old, but even though that young, I felt his words' impact. I would like to begin by quoting some of his words that he spoke that day just outside of this building.
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We dare not forget today that we are the heirs of that first revolution. Let the word go forth from this time and place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans--born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage--and unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to which this Nation has always been committed, and to which we are committed today at home and around the world.
Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty.
This much we pledge--and more.
Well, that set a standard for this country, a high water mark, if you will. And many criticized this as imperialistic rhetoric. But neither that President nor any since him have suggested that we aspire to territory--what we do aspire to is freedom.
Prior to winning the cold war, a hot one had ended. And then we won the Cold War.
As World War II ended, an agreement called Yalta was struck, signed by Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt. It promised newly liberated countries of Eastern and Central Europe that they would have a chance at freedom and free elections. Mr. Stalin broke his agreement and the countries of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and many more were denied the promise offered at Yalta.
I suggest one of many reasons that we should expand NATO is that we have a moral obligation to live up to the terms that were made at Yalta but went unfulfilled, especially with these three countries, as I said, which openly rebelled against Soviet domination.
Whether you agree with expanding NATO or not, I believe the crux of the issue is two questions. As we stand at the end of this century I ask you, has human nature fundamentally changed from this century's beginning to its end? I ask you the second question: Is the world better because of the standing and position of the United States in the world as a leader of the free world? I suggest the answer to the first question is, human nature has not fundamentally changed but that the world is a better place because the United States of America has lived up to its international responsibilities.
I have been throughout my life a student of history. I have particularly enjoyed European history. As I look at the Balkans today and I see the turmoil and the terror that rage between the Balkans, the Croats and the Serbs, I am reminded that the Balkans are but a microcosm of Europe as a whole throughout its history. As I look at this century and European history, I see the United States of America as having twice been drawn into European civil wars over the first 50 years. But for the last 50 years we have been waging peace. And we have done it through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
And lest you think this does not matter anymore and it is over and we can go home, I remind you, looking further back in history, you will see since the 1600s when Europeans began to settle in America establishing colonies in Virginia, Massachusetts, and throughout the eastern seaboard--since that time there have been nine major European wars. In every one of them, Americans died. We were drawn into them. America has a role in European history. We have come out of Europe; we are even a European power. I suggest to you that Europe has been at peace for 50 years because America did not retreat and become isolationist. NATO has been called the most successful military alliance in history, and so it is.
I believe that all the discussion about the costs of NATO expansion--we have heard wild estimates that are undoubtedly false, and we have heard other estimates that are as low as saying that over 10 years America will pay $400 million to participate in this portion of NATO expansion. I believe the latter. I have to say, if history teaches us anything, it is that nature abhors a vacuum and we can either fill that vacuum with our values or leave it there for the mischief of others. How can we morally say to the Hungarians, the Czechs, and the Poles that even though we won the cold war and they were at play throughout it, that we now want to walk away from this victory without leaving our values, democratic institutions, the spreading of private property, of free elections, and great dreams for these nations? I don't believe we can.
I do know that history teaches us that waging peace, or peacekeeping, is always less expensive than war. So when a mother in Oregon asks me, why should we expand NATO and put at risk the life of a son or daughter to die for a Czech, a Hungarian or a Pole, my answer to her is that in order that your son or daughter not die in that cause, we should expand NATO.
Now, where does this leave Russia? I am not anti-Russia; I am hopeful for Russia. But as part of NATO expansion, the Clinton administration has held out to Russia, along with our NATO allies, the Russia-NATO Founding Act. I happened to be present in Paris when this was signed. Now, there are parts of this that give me
heartburn, but there are parts that give me great hope, because with this Founding Act I think what we have done is held out to Russia the opportunity to develop in the best of ways and to become a part of the Western community of European nations. But if it does not develop that way, what we are doing by expanding NATO is hedging against the worst kinds of developments there. I think we must do that. I think we owe it to our friends, the Czechs, the Hungarians, and the Poles. But more, we owe it to ourselves, as defenders of peace and liberty in the world.
I began with the words of John F. Kennedy and I will end with them, also, again from his inaugural address. I will say it is my view that America is the indispensable nation. Europe needs what we bring in its history. They need us in Bosnia to help keep the peace. They need us in NATO in order that they not begin fighting again. I believe NATO is really responsible for the Franco-Prussian rapprochement that has occurred since the founding of NATO. I believe NATO's existence has helped to settle disputes between the British and the Spanish. It is helping to settle disputes between the Hungarians, who are offered membership, and the Romanians, who still want membership in NATO. In instance after instance, you will see where NATO membership provides a vehicle for these kinds of differences to be worked out. And they are long-lasting cultural, ethnic, religious kinds of differences which have manifested themselves throughout European history in bloodshed. NATO means that those things don't occur. Again, waging peace is always less expensive than waging war, either in terms of treasure or especially in terms of human life. So we are, I think, the keeper of the peace, and it is in our interest that we remain so.
In America, we often talk about the American dream. But really it isn't America's dream, it is a human dream. It is a dream that all people aspire to. It is just that we enjoy it in great abundance--life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. And we must continue to keep that dream and to defend it in the world for our sakes, not just theirs.
So said President John F. Kennedy in 1961,
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`To those new states whom we welcome to the ranks of the free, we pledge our word that one form of colonial control shall not have passed away merely to be replaced by a far more iron tyranny. We shall not always expect to find them supporting our view, but we shall always hope to find them supporting their own freedom.
I believe we should expand NATO for that reason, because these people deserve freedom. They can secure it with our help. With that security will come capital and investment so that their labor can be busy, so that their dreams can be realized, and so that American opportunity there can also be expanded. Security goes before economic investment. It always has, and it always will. Capital is something like a river. It will take the course of least resistance to seek the highest rate of progress.
I don't believe our option is to expand NATO or to leave it as it is. I believe NATO desperately needs new blood. We desperately need the new voice of freedom that Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs will bring because they have known the opposite of freedom for too long. Some of us become complacent as to what that means. We need their blood, we need their spirit, we need their sense of freedom, so that we can keep NATO fresh and alive. Our option in the end isn't expanding NATO or not. But ultimately, if we don't expand, I believe we will disband, and that will leave a vacuum that will be filled by the values of others when history calls us to fill it on the basis of ours.
I believe America is a better world because we are not isolationist but because we are internationalists who care not for territory or treasure but for freedom and liberty.
Mr. President, the United States is engaged in an ambitious effort to reshape the political and security structures of post-cold-war Europe. The goal is to build strong states, stable democracies, prosperous economies, and friendly governments across the breadth of Europe. We are joined in this endeavor by our NATO allies and by newly democratic people yearning for the opportunity to pursue political freedom and economic prosperity.
This effort should fulfill the stolen promise of Yalta, and provide the formerly captive nations of Central and Eastern Europe with the opportunity to pursue democratic institutions and economic development of their own choice. This is accomplished first and foremost through the enlargement of NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.
NATO has proven its value over the past half century as a mechanism through which the United States has been able to exercise leadership in Europe. By its unequivocal commitment to the collective defense of its members, NATO successfully withstood the communist threat posed by the former Soviet Union during the cold war. Though confronting communism is no longer NATO's primary purpose, a secondary function--the cementing of relationships between former adversaries in Europe--is equally as relevant in the post-cold-war period as it was after World War II. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, as well as other countries in Central and Eastern Europe that aspire to join NATO, have worked to alleviate historical grievances and build relationships with their neighbors based on mutual trust, respect, and cooperation. In doing so, stability in Europe has been enhanced and the likelihood that European nations will return to the competitive policies that led to two World Wars in the first part of this century is greatly reduced. It is in the interests of the United States to encourage and foster these developments.
Last May, I travelled with President Clinton to Paris for the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act. After witnessing this historic event, I was left with a profound feeling that NATO was holding out a hand to Russia, and that addressing legitimate issues, such as international terrorism and drug trafficking, could be well served by NATO and Russia acting together. However, it is incumbent upon Russia to use this opportunity in a responsible manner. The consultative mechanism established by the Founding Act should be one that furthers the interests of both NATO and Russia, and is not used to infringe upon internal Alliance matters.
It is also imperative that the goals of the Founding Act are implemented
in a manner that does not weaken the principal function of the Alliance or threaten the interests of Central and Eastern European countries that aspire to NATO membership.
Mr. President, I take this opportunity not to simply state my support for the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into NATO, but also to address the issue of imposing a pause on NATO enlargement for several years. Before I do so, however, I emphasize that neither NATO, nor the United States, has invited any country other than Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to join the Alliance. Proceeding with future rounds of enlargement is a decision that all members of NATO will certainly face, but is a question that is not before the United States Senate today.
In Article 10, the North Atlantic Treaty clearly lays out the process by which NATO may invite additional countries to join the Alliance. This provision states `The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty'. Of course, any such revision to the North Atlantic Treaty requires the advice and consent of the United States Senate, which is what brings us here today.
I wholeheartedly agree with my colleagues who want to ensure that NATO remains a strong, military alliance of democratic nations. However, I firmly believe that Article 10 of the Treaty sets a high standard for the inclusion of new members--not only must a country be in a position to further the principles of democracy, but must be a contributor, not just a beneficiary, of security. The possibility of Alliance membership has been a source of hope to countries in Central and Eastern Europe and an important incentive for democratic and economic reform. Were the United States to impose an artificial time period when NATO's door will be shut--despite the qualifications of a country for membership--would send a signal to these countries emerging from communist domination that their historical affiliation is more important to NATO than their ability to contribute to security and stability in Europe.
History awaits American leadership at this propitious moment. We cannot be certain what the European security environment will look like in three, five, or ten years, but if we act now, we will be better prepared for any outcome. We should not be overly consumed with the picture of Europe as it looked during the last century. It is up to the United States to outline a vision of what we want Europe to look like in the next century. That vision is a democratic, undivided, Europe safe for American commerce and friendly to American values. That vision includes Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO.
I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I seek recognition to speak on this issue of NATO enlargement and ask unanimous consent that Senator Dorgan be allowed to follow me.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DURBIN. I thank the Chair.
Mr. President, we are debating something of historic proportion, and that is the question of whether or not the NATO alliance shall be enlarged to include three countries. At this point, those three countries are Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. This is not a new concept.
In 1994, the United States announced that we were, in fact, going to consider the enlargement of NATO. Why? The world has changed so dramatically. The Berlin Wall is down. The Soviet Union has dissipated, or at least broken up into different political entities. We are starting to see the world in different terms. For over 50 years, we saw the world in terms of East and West, the Soviet Union and the United States, the cold war.
How many of us, as kids in the 1950s, huddled under our desks in preparation for the possibility of an air raid? Now what a different world we live in--a world where the United States of America and its taxpayers, since 1991, have given to Russia over $100 billion in an effort to help that country get back on its feet. What was once our mortal enemy, a country that we literally spent $6 trillion to defend against, is now our ally. So we view the world in much different terms, and now we should view NATO in different terms.
My colleagues who come to the floor in opposition to NATO enlargement are stuck in old thinking, as far as I am concerned. They view Europe, East and West, in terms of lines that were drawn by Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin. We should not. We should view Europe and its future in terms of a new century and new opportunities.
When you visit a country like Poland--which I did a year ago--and realize now that the Poland of today is not looking to the East, but rather to the West, that the Poland of today wants to be part of an axis which includes Western Europe, the United States, and freedom-loving countries around the world, then you can understand the momentum and impetus behind the enlargement of NATO. These countries like Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are willing to step away from the old Soviet way of doing things; they are willing to pledge themselves to human rights, respecting the borders of their neighbors, and to civilian controlling of the military, and to free markets. They are prepared to join NATO because they know NATO is the future.
What an alliance NATO has been in the history of the world. If you study the history of the world and consider all of the different countries that have come together for various reasons, NATO is an anomaly, NATO is an oddity. Why? Because it is a purely defensive alliance. It was created by the United States and our allies after World War II to defend Western Europe against the possibility of Soviet aggression and expansion. Throughout its history, since 1949, NATO has consistently stood for that principle. There is not a single instance that anyone can point to in the history of the alliance where the NATO countries have come together in an aggressive way to try to take over some other country. It is just not the nature of that alliance.
So when I hear the criticisms--and you hear them from many people who come to this floor--that the Russians are worried about NATO expansion, my obvious question is, Why? Why would any country be concerned about other countries coming together simply to defend their own borders and pledge themselves to principles that I think all freedom-loving countries should be dedicated to? This troubles me, too. If there is genuine concern in Russia that these countries are going to come together in a defensive alliance, maybe the defensive alliance is necessary. It is something to pin our hopes on the relationship between the United States and Russia on the medical reports on Boris Yeltsin. I hope that he continues in power for a long time. I am happy to report that, by and large, with few exceptions, his relationship with the United States has been a very positive one. But we have to accept the reality that there will be change in Russia. I hope it is change for the better.
Now put yourself in the shoes of Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic, or, for that matter, the Baltic States. What gamble are they willing to take about the future of Russia? What they have said to us is: We feel comfortable coming together with you in an alliance, which will stabilize our boundaries and give us some certainty about our future. So if a future leader in Russia is more conservative, more liberal, more expansionist, or more friendly, they know that they have this alliance to turn to.
When you look at those who are supporting the idea of
expanding the NATO alliance, the list is very impressive. It includes not only General Colin Powell, but former President Bush, Margaret Thatcher, Lech Walesa, and Vaclav Havel. The list goes on and on and on. These leaders, worldwide, understand what NATO means.
Now, let me say this. Some criticize this NATO enlargement by saying, `There they go again. They are ending up giving away U.S. taxpayer dollars for the defense of Europe. Shouldn't the Europeans be defending themselves?' The answer is, of course, that they should. That is their own personal responsibility. I, for one, in my 15 years on Capitol Hill in the House and Senate, have argued for burdensharing at every turn in the road. I think more and more of these countries should accept that responsibility.
But let's be honest. If these countries come together, if they agree on certain standards for their own military development, if they agree on certain principles, if this alliance is in place and strong, the likelihood of needing these military forces is dramatically diminished. And each of these new countries that wants to join us in NATO has proven their bona fides in terms of their good-faith effort to be part of a Western alliance by already committing troops when we have asked, some in the Persian Gulf war, some in Bosnia.
In fact, in the situation in Bosnia, Lithuania sent a brigade down and within a few weeks one of their soldiers was killed by a landmine. It was devastating news in that tiny country. It might have led their legislature to convene and bring their troops home from Bosnia. But they did not. They convened and, with a vote that should tell you about their view of the world, voted to send even more forces down to Bosnia. To prove that they wanted to be part of this alliance, they were willing to put their troops and the lives of their countrymen on the line.
That story is repeated over and over. This is a positive thing. This is something that we should view in terms of NATO's future as really, I guess, an excellent start for the 21st century--that we are now at a point where we can talk about all of these countries--which once were at war and in the past had been rivals with conflicting ideologies--that are now coming together.
Some have said, Well, let's not hurry this debate. Can't this wait 6 months or a year? I suppose it could, but I hope it doesn't, because we have spent more than 4 years preparing for this debate. We have gone through lengthy hearings in the Foreign Operations Committee. We have had many people meet--NATO allies and others--to discuss the expansion of NATO. We have studied this to the point where we can make an intelligent and mature decision, and we should.
Last Friday night in Chicago, IL--which is in my home State and which boasts the largest Polish population outside of the city of Warsaw, Poland--we entertained the new President of the Assembly of Poland. Marian Krzaklewski is the new President and a member of the Solidarity party. I can't tell you what this issue means to the future of Poland. Any of you who have studied World War II and understand the devastation that was wrought on Poland as a result of World War II understand how important it is to the people of Poland today to have the security of an alliance that they can count on. We, of course, know of the tragedy of the Polish Jews who were lost in the Holocaust, but there were many others of other religions, and some of no religion, but they were all victims in World War II. The numbers stretch into the hundreds of thousands and millions. That is the legacy of war in countries like Poland.
For those who come to the floor saying, `Can't we wait 6 months or a year before we give to countries like Poland the assurance that those days are behind them?' I have to say that I think that is shortsighted. I think the right thing for America to do is to follow the leadership of the President, follow the bipartisan support on the floor of the U.S. Senate, and enlarge NATO. This Senate should vote for the enlargement, first, to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, and then, frankly, open it up to any other country that is able and willing to dedicate itself to these same principles.
We don't like to think in terms of the military and war; we tend to focus more on domestic life in the United States, as we should. But I happen to believe that an investment in our time and debate on this issue at this moment is the right thing to do. I believe that if we make the proper move today, this week, and next week in the Senate to debate this issue fully and vote on it, we can bring together the kind of alliance that will give our children and grandchildren peace of mind for decades to come. I hope that we will do that, and I hope that we will understand, as well, that what is at stake here is more than just a debate over a single issue; what is at stake here is whether the legacy of World War II and the legacy of the cold war will or will not be revisited on our friends in Europe.
The United States cannot be the policeman for the world, but we can ally ourselves with other nations of like mind and like values, who will join us in bringing stability to this Earth, so that the day may never come when we are asked to send large numbers of Americans to fight in foreign lands for issues and causes and for American interests. These are things that I think are part of this debate today.
I close by saying that I appreciate this time to speak, and I hope my other colleagues will join me. I don't know that there is another single issue relative to global security that is more important than this debate about the future of NATO. I hope that the United States and our NATO allies will write our foreign policy and plan our future based on the interests and values that have held us together as a Nation for over 200 years.
When the argument is made that moving forward with the expansion of NATO makes some people nervous in Moscow, I have to ask, Why should it? Why should we not even hold out the possibility that the day will come when Russia will ask to be part of NATO? It is not an incredible idea. The thought that they would give civilian control of the military, pledge to the same principles, and cooperate with the United States--that should be the new world order; that should be the new thinking.
But the belief that we should hold back and not engage these other countries in an alliance, important for our security and theirs, because of some misgivings among some hardliners in Moscow is just plain wrong. We should be driven by foreign policy decisions right for America, right for our allies. We should not be driven by the melancholy of the few in Moscow who long for the return of empire. When you hear the argument made that we can include Warsaw Pact countries like the three I mentioned, and that is all right, but you can't include former republics like the Baltic States, it troubles me greatly. My mother was born in Lithuania, so I come to this debate with a special interest, and maybe even some prejudice is involved.
For 50 years, we refused to recognize Soviet domination over the population of those sovereign states and thought they were entitled to have their own self-government. We ignored Soviet domination and we fought Soviet domination for over 50 years. And now, to defer to some Russian thinking that because these republics that were once part of the Soviet Union want to be in NATO, that is supposedly unthinkable, I disagree. For the Baltic States and so many other countries in Eastern Europe and near the Baltic Sea, NATO really is their security of the future. It is something the United States can be proud to support. I know they will be supportive of the values which we treasure in this country.
Mr. President, I yield the remainder of my time.
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Mr. DORGAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I enjoyed hearing the comments of my colleague from Illinois, Senator Durbin. He, as always, is interesting and thoughtful, and he comes to this debate with a substantial amount of knowledge about the foreign policy issues. I appreciate his position.
I must confess, however, that I come to the Senate with a different position on this issue. I want to explain why I have reached that position.
I must confess, also, that I am not someone who considers himself an expert in foreign policy. There are some--only a handful of Members here in the Senate--who spend a great deal of their time thinking about and working on foreign policy issues. I have great respect for them. But I don't consider myself a part of that group of Senate foreign policy experts.
But all of us in the Senate have some acquaintance with the questions that are presented to us on issues of international policy. And NATO expansion is one such issue. Indeed, as I indicated yesterday, it is a `legislative main course.' NATO expansion is a very significant matter for this country and for many other countries in the world that are affected. One of those countries is Russia.
Russia is an important part of our future, and our relationship with Russia will have a significant impact on the future of everyone in this country. I want to speak about that just a bit, because Senator Durbin also alluded to that issue.
I want to remind my colleagues that some while ago I stood on the floor of the Senate and held up a piece of metal that came from a missile silo near Pervomaysk, Ukraine, a silo that had held a Soviet missile aimed at the United States. But the piece of metal I held up here on the floor of the Senate was no longer a missile. It was scrap metal. The missile is gone from the silo and destroyed. The weapon does not any longer exist. Where there was a missile with a nuclear warhead aimed at the United States, planted in that ground in the Ukraine now are sunflowers--planted on exactly that same ground. The missile is gone. The warhead is gone. Sunflowers are planted.
How did that happen? Was it by magic? No. It was as a result of arms control agreements between this country and the then Soviet Union, now Russia, that required the reduction of nuclear devices and systems to deliver them. It was also the result of U.S. funding initiated here in the Senate--funding that comes from the Nunn-Lugar program--that actually helps to pay for the destruction of Russian nuclear weapons that had previously been aimed at this country. We have had very substantial success in reducing Russia's nuclear stockpile.
We have had that success not just because the Soviet Union no longer exists. We have had that success because Russia and the United States abide by a series of arms control agreements that call for the reduction of nuclear weapons, the reduction of missiles, and the reduction of bombers. And that reduction has taken place. It means that this is a safer world.
So, the Soviet Union has disappeared. Eastern Europe and the Warsaw Pact in Eastern Europe has dramatically changed. There is no Soviet Union. There is no Warsaw Pact. There is Russia. There are Baltic States. There exists in Eastern Europe a series of countries that are now free and democratic. The world has changed dramatically.
All of this relates to the discussion we are having today. I want to describe how and why.
But I wonder, in the context of this issue of the reduction of the nuclear threat, how many of my colleagues--for that matter, the American people--are aware of an incident that occurred on December 3, 1997, in the dark hours of the morning. North of Norway in the Barents Sea, several Russian ballistic missile submarines prepared to fire SS-20 missiles. Each of these missiles
could carry 10 nuclear warheads and travel 5,000 miles--far enough to have reached the United States from the Barents Sea.
That morning, on December 3, 1997, the submarines launched 20 of those SS-20 missiles. Twenty of them roared skyward. Swiftly they rose to an altitude of tens of thousands of feet. U.S. satellites quickly detected these missiles and tracked them as they rose. Our early warning phased array radars in Thule, Greenland, and Flylingdales, England, tracked the missiles.
The radars and satellites alerted the U.S. Space Command Missile Warning Center at the NORAD complex in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado. Space Command plotted the trajectories to determine where the missiles were going.
However, within a few moments, every single one of those SS-20 missiles blew up at about 30,000 feet. Why? Because this wasn't a Russian missile attack. In fact, seven American weapons inspectors were watching from a ship a few miles away as the missiles were launched from the Russian submarines. These were self-destruct launches. It was a quicker and cheaper way for Russia to destroy submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which it was required to do under the START I arms reduction treaty. These were self-destruct launches to destroy missiles under the START treaty.
These missile launches should remind all of us about what the ultimate security threat to the United States has been. Only Russia, if it desired today, can renew the hair-trigger nuclear tensions of the cold war. Only Russia could do that. And only Russia can destroy its nuclear weapons and its delivery mechanisms, missiles and bombers, by which it delivers those weapons. Whether we like it or not, we must take this into account when we evaluate international security issues. Yes, even in the debate about the expansion of NATO, we must evaluate those issues in the context of our relationship with Russia and with others, but especially with Russia.
I don't come to the floor of the Senate saying that Russia should have some kind of special veto power over American foreign policy. Russia should really play no role in our decision about what is best for this country. But the opportunity to reduce the nuclear threat, the real opportunity that has allowed us to reduce in real terms the nuclear threat, is something that we should take into account.
When we talk about expanding NATO with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, I think of the story I heard one day in the dark days of the fight for a free Czechoslovakia when very courageous, brave men and women were storming the streets of Czechoslovakia demanding their freedom. I remember the story about Mr. Havel, who was a playwright and an intellectual who then became President of that new democracy. I remember how at midnight the knock on his door from the Communist secret police was a knock that he knew too well because it had come before. He knew it was the secret police. He knew he would be arrested again. He knew they would throw him in jail again, because he had been in jail before. I remember the story about this courageous man and what he did for his country. I remember the stories about in the middle of the crowd in downtown Prague someone standing on the upper strut of a streetlight hanging with one arm and reciting the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America. Think of that--a crowd in Prague inspiring itself by a recitation of the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America.
We understand what we mean to much of that part of the world. We know that this democracy has given great inspiration to those who want freedom and who have had the courage to fight for freedom in their countries. We understand all of that. And I think it is critically important that in every way possible we support these emerging democracies. Our relationships with them are important to this country.
However, expanding NATO is a much larger question than that as well. It involves a number of broader issues. Again, I say that there are other Senators who have had longer relationships with the
question of NATO than I have had.
But it seems to me, first, that NATO has largely been a security alliance over many years and a very successful alliance at that. It also seems to me that the decision that has been made to expand NATO is largely a decision that moves in the direction of forming an economic alliance, or one that meets the economic needs of the new members.
Second, to the extent that it remains a security alliance, it, of course, will require countries in Europe, many of whom can least afford it, to spend a substantial amount of additional money on new arms to bring them to the standards that NATO requires. The requirement that the new entrants to NATO rearm, modernize their military equipment, to bring themselves up to NATO standards, also means that some of us are very concerned that in the end, while some of that burden will fall on these countries, much of that burden will fall on us.
This leads me to the third issue. The question of what this expansion will cost the United States produces answers that wildly roam all over the board. I have not found a good answer except that most do not know the answer to the question. It is an important question. What will NATO expansion cost the taxpayers of the United States?
And the fourth issue is the one I have spoken about at length. What does NATO expansion mean to the long-term security interests of the United States? Will expansion of NATO lessen the danger of nuclear war? Will it lessen the danger of nuclear threat? Will the expansion of NATO forge a continued, new, or expanded relationship with Russia that will allow us to reduce even further the nuclear threat? Will NATO expansion allow us to continue to reduce the number of warheads and delivery vehicles, to lessen the nuclear threat for us and all the people of the world? I fear the answer to that is no.
I think the expansion of NATO will likely create divisiveness in our critical relationships with Russia and with some other nations as well. We have made great progress in our relationship with Russia. I hope that progress will include a decision by the Russian Duma to ratify START II and immediate movement by Russia to begin START III talks. But I fear that NATO expansion will retard that kind of movement, which I think is very important to us. We must continue the progress we have made in reducing the nuclear threat.
It is interesting to me how many people would have predicted in this Chamber--the best foreign policy thinkers or anywhere in this country--how many would have predicted that, if you backed up 10 years ago, that in 5 years or 10 years the following will exist in our world: There will be no Berlin Wall, there will be no Warsaw Pact, Eastern Europe will be free, there will be no Soviet Union, the Ukraine will be nuclear-free, and spots in the Ukraine that used to hold missiles and nuclear warheads will now hold sunflowers. How many would have predicted that? I bet almost no one.
We have made enormous progress. To the extent that we feel that the cold war and the tensions between us and the Soviet Union, produced a nuclear threat, and to the extent that we have moved away from that with Russia, that is wonderful progress for the entire world.
The question today is not just a narrow question of, Shall we admit three additional countries to NATO? The question is much, much more than that. It deals with other relationships. It deals with the issue of nuclear proliferation of weapons and delivery mechanisms and so on, and the desire by many of us to move along quickly, not slowly, on the question of further arms reduction talks and treaties and agreements that will further reduce the nuclear threat. That is what is embodied in this question.
I have spent a lot of time reading about this issue, studying this issue, and trying to understand this issue. As I said when I started, I confess I am not a foreign policy expert. But I believe very strongly that a security alliance as successful as NATO has been should not become an economic alliance; should not become an alliance that imposes new burdens on countries that can least afford to ramp up military spending in order to comply with NATO requirements; should not, in any event, add substantial new burdens to the American taxpayers; and should not, especially and most importantly, do anything that interrupts the stream of progress we have made in reducing the nuclear threat through arms reduction talks, treaties, and agreements.
I am fairly well convinced that this step to expand, which to some seems so modest, is just a step in the wrong direction.
Can we, should we, will we be involved with the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, with or without NATO expansion? Of course. They are wonderful people. They are countries that are very important. Our relationship with them is very important. I have just come to the conclusion, however, that this proposal to expand NATO is not a step in a constructive direction.
The columnist David Broder yesterday wrote a column that I think was important in this discussion. He indicated that this debate about NATO seemed to be forming here in the Congress with almost no fanfare, and the implication of his column was that that is not the way it should happen.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Broder's column be inserted into the Record.
There being no objection, the column was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
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This week the United States Senate, which counts among its major accomplishments this year renaming Washington National Airport for former president Ronald Reagan and officially labeling Saddam Hussein a war criminal, takes up the matter of enlarging the 20th century's most successful military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
The Senate just spent two weeks arguing over how to slice up the pork in the $214 billion highway and mass transit bill. It will, if plans hold, spend only a few days on moving the NATO shield hundreds of miles eastward to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.
The reason is simple. As Sen. Connie Mack of Florida, the chairman of the Senate Republican Conference, told me while trying to herd reluctant senators into a closed-door discussion of the NATO issue one afternoon last week, `No one is interested in this at home,' so few of his colleagues think it worth much of their time.
It is a cliche to observe that since the Cold War ended, foreign policy has dropped to the bottom of voters' concerns. But, as two of the veteran senators who question the wisdom of NATO's expansion--Democrat Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York and Republican John Warner of Virginia--remarked in separate interviews, serious consideration of treaties and military alliances once was considered what the Senate was for.
No longer. President Clinton's national security adviser, Sandy Berger, has pressed Majority Leader Trent Lott to get the NATO deal done before Clinton leaves Sunday on a trip to Africa. When Warner and others said the matter should be delayed until the Senate has time for a full-scale debate, Lott refused. He pointed out that a Senate delegation had joined Clinton at NATO summits in Paris and Madrid last year (no sacrifice being too great for our solons) and that there had been extensive committee hearings.
Wrapping the three former Soviet satellites in the warm embrace of NATO is an appealing notion to many senators, notwithstanding the acknowledgment by advocates that the Czech Republic and Hungary have a long way to go to bring their military forces up to NATO standards. As the date for ratification has approached, successive estimates of the costs to NATO have been shrinking magically, but the latest NATO estimate of $1.5 billion over the next decade is barely credible.
The administration, in the person of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, has steadfastly refused to say what happens next if NATO starts moving eastward toward the border of Russia. `The door is open' to other countries with democratic governments and free markets, Albright says. The administration is fighting an effort by Warner and others to place a moratorium on admission of additional countries until it is known how well the first recruits are assimilated.
Moynihan points out that if the Baltic countries of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, which are panting for membership, are brought in, the United States and other signatories will have a solemn obligation to defend territory farther east than the western-most border of Russia. He points to a Russian government strategy paper published last December saying the expansion of NATO inevitably means Russia will have to rely increasingly on nuclear weapons.
Moynihan and Warner are far from alone in raising alarms about the effect of NATO enlargement on U.S.-Russian relations. The Duma, Russia's parliament, on Jan. 23 passed a resolution calling NATO expansion the biggest threat to Russia since the end of World War II. The Duma has blocked ratification of the START II nuclear arms agreement signed in 1993 and approved by the Senate two years ago.
George Kennan, the elder statesman who half a century ago devised the fundamental strategy for `containment' of the Soviet Union, has called the enlargement of NATO a classic policy blunder. Former senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, until his retirement last year the Democrats' and the Senate's leading military authority, told me, `Russian cooperation in avoiding proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is our most important national security objective, and this [NATO expansion] makes them more suspicious and less cooperative. . . . The administration's answers to this and other serious questions are what I consider to be platitudes.'
Former senator Mark Hatfield of Oregon, for 30 years probably the wisest `dove' in that body, agrees, as do former ambassadors to Moscow and other Americans with close contacts in Russia.
To the extent this momentous step has been debated at all, it has taken place outside the hearing of the American people. Too bad our busy Senate can't find time before it votes to let the public in on the argument.
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Mr. DORGAN. I placed David Broder's column in the Record because I agree with what he says. NATO expansion is a big issue. It is an important issue. We all come to this issue with our points of view, and no one knows exactly what the future will hold. But this country deserves a long, full, thoughtful Senate debate on the question of NATO expansion and then a vote. This President deserves a vote on expansion as well.
But when the vote comes, I have concluded I think the best course for this country, the best course for the world for that matter, and the best course to stimulate further reductions in the nuclear threat for this world, is to vote `no' on this particular plan for NATO expansion.
Mr. President, I yield the floor, and I make a point of order that a quorum is not present.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The Senator is recognized.
Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as if in morning business for 10 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(The remarks of Mr. Gregg are printed in today's Record in `Morning Business.')
Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I make the point of order a quorum is not present.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, let me observe, first, that I have had the opportunity off and on during the day to listen to some of the debate on the NATO enlargement issue. I have to say there have been some excellent speeches and some very thoughtful observations about the importance of this legislation and what we should do. I am glad we have gone ahead and taken it up. It has given Members notice that we are moving toward a period where we will have the final debate on amendments and a vote on this issue. But I have been very impressed with the quality of the speeches that I have heard today. We will continue on until, I think it is quarter till 5, this afternoon on NATO enlargement. We will continue to have debate on NATO enlargement until we get something worked out on the Coverdell education savings account legislation and conclude that, and then we will go to the final round of debate and amendments on NATO enlargement.
The way we are doing the debate, the dual track of both the education issue and NATO enlargement, is not intended at all to diminish either. It is intended to raise up both of them and the awareness and consciousness of the American people and give Senators an opportunity to make their positions known on both these issues. We will do them in a way where we will get a focus on the issue and have a good debate in the final analysis.
Mr. WARNER. Will the distinguished leader yield?
Mr. LOTT. Yes, I will yield.
Mr. WARNER. I anticipated that, and I think it is working out. I, in many respects, wish it was more in block pieces. Very substantive debate has taken place in the last 48 hours, plus the Armed Services Committee held a 3-hour hearing on the subject. So work is going on very conscientiously on this subject.
Mr. LOTT. I thank the Senator from Virginia for his comment and his thoughts on this important issue. I know he has a lot of reservations. That has a real impact here with his knowledge in the defense area, and we are going to be listening to his remarks.
There have been good speeches on both sides. Senator Smith from Oregon gave a magnificent speech this afternoon, I thought one of the best I have heard this year.
I think it is working, and we will have a focused debate when we get toward the end of the final debate.
Mr. President, as in morning business, I would like to take this moment also to talk a little bit about the other issue that is pending before the Senate at this time.
END