06 May 1998
(Senate advice and consent on NATO Accession Protocols) (5670) Washington -- The United States Senate gave its advice and consent April 30, 1998, to the Resolution of Ratification on the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Following is the authoritative text of the Resolution of Ratification as printed in the May 4, 1998, Congressional Record: (Begin text) (The text of Resolution of Ratification to the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as agreed to by the Senate on April 30, 1998, reads as follows:) Resolved, (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), SECTION 1. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO DECLARATIONS AND CONDITIONS. The Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic (as defined in section 4(7)), which were opened for signature at Brussels on December 16, 1997, and signed on behalf of the United States of America and other parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, subject to the declarations of section 2 and the conditions of section 3. SEC. 2. DECLARATIONS. The advice and consent of the Senate to ratification of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic is subject to the following declarations: (1) Reaffirmation that United States membership in NATO remains a vital national security interest of the United States: The Senate declares that-- (A) for nearly 50 years the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has served as the preeminent organization to defend the territory of the countries in the North Atlantic area against all external threats; (B) through common action, the established democracies of North America and Europe that were joined in NATO persevered and prevailed in the task of ensuring the survival of democratic government in Europe and North America throughout the Cold War; (C) NATO enhances the security of the United States by embedding European states in a process of cooperative security planning, by preventing the destabilizing renationalization of European military policies, and by ensuring an ongoing and direct leadership role for the United States in European security affairs; (D) the responsibility and financial burden of defending the democracies of Europe and North America can be more equitably shared through an alliance in which specific obligations and force goals are met by its members; (E) the security and prosperity of the United States is enhanced by NATO's collective defense against aggression that may threaten the territory of NATO members; and (F) United States membership in NATO remains a vital national security interest of the United States. (2) Strategic rationale for NATO enlargement: The Senate finds that-- (A) notwithstanding the collapse of communism in most of Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States and its NATO allies face threats to their stability and territorial integrity, including those common threats described in section 3(1)(A)(v); (B) the invasion of Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic, or their destabilization arising from external subversion, would threaten the stability of Europe and jeopardize vital United States national security interests; (C) Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, having established democratic governments and having demonstrated a willingness to meet all requirements of membership, including those necessary to contribute to the territorial defense of all NATO members, are in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area; and (D) extending NATO membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will strengthen NATO, enhance security and stability in Central Europe, deter potential aggressors, and thereby advance the interests of the United States and its NATO allies. (3) Supremacy of the North Atlantic Council in NATO decision-making. -- The Senate understands that -- (A) as the North Atlantic Council is the supreme decision-making body of NATO, the North Atlantic Council will not subject its decisions to review, challenge, or veto by any forum affiliated with NATO, including the Permanent Joint Council or the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, or by any non-member state participating in any such forum; (B) the North Atlantic Council does not require the consent of the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or any other international organization in order to take any action pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty in defense of the North Atlantic area, including the deployment, operation, or stationing of forces; and (C) the North Atlantic Council has direct responsibility for matters relating to the basic policies of NATO, including development of the Strategic Concept of NATO (as defined in section 3(1)(F)), and a consensus position of the North Atlantic Council will precede any negotiation between NATO and non-NATO members that affects NATO's relationship with non-NATO members participating in fora such as the Permanent Joint Council. (4) Full membership for new NATO members: (A) In general: The Senate understands that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, in becoming NATO members, will have all the rights, obligations, responsibilities, and protections that are afforded to all other NATO members. (B) Political commitments. -- The Senate endorses the political commitments made by NATO to the Russian Federation in the NATO-Russia Founding Act, which are not legally binding and do not in any way preclude any future decisions by the North Atlantic Council to preserve the security of NATO members. (5) NATO-Russia relationship. The Senate finds that it is in the interest of the United States for NATO to develop a new and constructive relationship with the Russian Federation as the Russian Federation pursues democratization, market reforms, and peaceful relations with its neighbors. (6) The importance of European integration: (A) Sense of the Senate. It is the sense of the Senate that -- (i) the central purpose of NATO is to provide for the collective defense of its members; (ii) the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is a fundamental institution for the promotion of democracy, the rule of law, crisis prevention, and post-conflict rehabilitation and, as such, is an essential forum for the discussion and resolution of political disputes among European members, Canada, and the United States; and (iii) the European Union is an essential organization for the economic, political, and social integration of all qualified European countries into an undivided Europe. (B) Policy of the United States. The policy of the United States is -- (i) to utilize fully the institutions of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to reach political solutions for disputes in Europe; and (ii) to encourage actively the efforts of the European Union to expand its membership, which will help to stabilize the democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. (7) Future consideration of candidates for membership in NATO. (A) Senate findings. The Senate finds that -- (i) Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides that NATO members by unanimous agreement may invite the accession to the North Atlantic Treaty of any other European state in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area; (ii) in its Madrid summit declaration of July 8, 1997, NATO pledged to "maintain an open door to the admission of additional Alliance members in the future" if those countries satisfy the requirements of Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty; (iii) other than Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the United States has not consented to invite, or committed to invite, any other country to join NATO in the future; and (iv) the United States will not support the accession to the North Atlantic Treaty of, or the invitation to begin accession talks with, any European state (other than Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic), unless -- (I) the President consults with the Senate consistent with Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States (relating to the advice and consent of the Senate to the making of treaties); and (II) the prospective NATO member can fulfill the obligations and responsibilities of membership, and its inclusion would serve the overall political and strategic interests of NATO and the United States. (B) Requirement for consensus and ratification: The Senate declares that no action or agreement other than a consensus decision by the full membership of NATO, approved by the national procedures of each NATO member, including, in the case of the United States, the requirements of Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States (relating to the advice and consent of the Senate to the making of treaties), will constitute a security commitment pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty. (8) Partnership for Peace: The Senate declares that -- (A) the Partnership for Peace between NATO members and the Partnership for Peace countries is an important and enduring complement to NATO in maintaining and enhancing regional security; (B) the Partnership for Peace serves a critical role in promoting common objectives of NATO members and the Partnership for Peace countries, including (i) increased transparency in the national defense planning and budgeting processes; (ii) ensuring democratic control of defense forces; (iii) maintaining the capability and readiness of Partnership for Peace countries to contribute to operations of the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; (iv) developing cooperative military relations with NATO; and (v) enhancing the interoperability between forces of the Partnership for Peace countries and forces of NATO members; (C) NATO has undertaken new initiatives to further strengthen the Partnership for Peace with the objectives of (i) strengthening the political consultation mechanism in the Partnership for Peace through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council; (ii) enhancing the operational role of the Partnership for Peace; and (iii) providing for expanded involvement of members of the Partnership for Peace in decision-making and planning within the Partnership; (D) enhancement of the Partnership for Peace promotes the security of the United States by strengthening stability and security throughout the North Atlantic area; (E) the accession to the North Atlantic Treaty of new NATO members in the future must not undermine the ability of NATO and the Partnership for Peace countries to achieve the objectives of the Partnership for Peace; and (F) membership in the Partnership for Peace does not in any way prejudice application or consideration for accession to the North Atlantic Treaty. (9) Regarding payments owed by European countries to victims of the Nazis: (A) Declaration: The Senate declares that, in future meetings and correspondence with European governments, the Secretary of State should (i) raise the issue of insurance benefits owed to victims of the Nazis (and their beneficiaries and heirs) by these countries as a result of the actions taken by any communist predecessor regimes in nationalizing foreign insurance companies and confiscating their assets in the aftermath of World War II; (ii) seek to secure a commitment from the governments of these countries to provide a full accounting of the total value of insurance company assets that were seized by any communist predecessors and to share all documents relevant to unpaid insurance claims that are in their possession; and (iii) seek to secure a commitment from the governments of these countries to contribute to the payment of these unpaid insurance claims in an amount that reflects the present value of the assets seized by any communist governments (and for which no compensation had previously been paid). (B) Definition: As used in this paragraph, the term "victims of the Nazis" means persons persecuted during the period beginning on March 23, 1933, and ending on May 8, 1945, by, under the direction of, on behalf of, or under authority granted by the Nazi government of Germany or any country allied with that government. SEC. 3. CONDITIONS. The advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic is subject to the following conditions, which shall be binding upon the President: (1) The strategic concept of NATO: (A) Policy of the United States toward the strategic concept of NATO: The Senate understands that the policy of the United States is that the core concepts contained in the 1991 Strategic Concept of NATO (as defined in subparagraph (F)), which adapted NATO's strategy to the post-Cold War environment, remain valid today, and that the upcoming revision of that document will reflect the following principles: (i) First and foremost a military alliance: NATO is first and foremost a military alliance. NATO's success in securing peace is predicated on its military strength and strategic unity. (ii) Principal foundation for defense of security interests of NATO members: NATO serves as the principal foundation for collectively defending the security interests of its members against external threats. (iii) Promotion and protection of United States vital national security interests: Strong United States leadership of NATO promotes and protects United States vital national security interests. (iv) United States leadership role: The United States maintains its leadership role in NATO through the stationing of United States combat forces in Europe, providing military commanders for key NATO commands, and through the presence of United States nuclear forces on the territory of Europe. (v) Common threats: NATO members will face common threats to their security in the post-Cold War environment, including -- (I) the potential for the re-emergence of a hegemonic power confronting Europe; (II) rogue states and non-state actors possessing nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and the means to deliver these weapons by ballistic or cruise missiles, or other unconventional delivery means; (III) threats of a wider nature, including the disruption of the flow of vital resources, and other possible transnational threats; and (IV) conflict in the North Atlantic area stemming from ethnic and religious enmity, the revival of historic disputes, or the actions of undemocratic leaders. (vi) Core mission of NATO: Defense planning will affirm a commitment by NATO members to a credible capability for collective self-defense, which remains the core mission of NATO. All NATO members will contribute to this core mission. (vii) Capacity to respond to common threats: NATO's continued success requires a credible military capability to deter and respond to common threats. Building on its core capabilities for collective self-defense of its members, NATO will ensure that its military force structure, defense planning, command structures, and force goals promote NATO's capacity to project power when the security of a NATO member is threatened, and provide a basis for ad hoc coalitions of willing partners among NATO members. This will require that NATO members possess national military capabilities to rapidly deploy forces over long distances, sustain operations for extended periods of time, and operate jointly with the United States in high intensity conflicts. (viii) Integrated military structure: The Integrated Military Structure of NATO underpins NATO's effectiveness as a military alliance by embedding NATO members in a process of cooperative defense planning and ensuring unity of command. (ix) Nuclear posture: Nuclear weapons will continue to make an essential contribution to deterring aggression, especially aggression by potential adversaries armed with nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. A credible NATO nuclear deterrent posture requires the stationing of United States nuclear forces in Europe, which provides an essential political and military link between Europe and North America, and the widespread participation of NATO members in nuclear roles. In addition, the NATO deterrent posture will continue to ensure uncertainty in the mind of any potential aggressor about the nature of the response by NATO members to military aggression. (x) Burdensharing: The responsibility and financial burden of defending the democracies of Europe will be more equitably shared in a manner in which specific obligations and force goals are met by NATO members. (B) The fundamental importance of collective defense: The Senate declares that -- (i) in order for NATO to serve the security interests of the United States, the core purpose of NATO must continue to be the collective defense of the territory of all NATO members; and (ii) NATO may also, pursuant to Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, on a case-by-case basis, engage in other missions when there is a consensus among its members that there is a threat to the security and interests of NATO members. (C) Defense planning, command structures, and force goals: The Senate declares that NATO must continue to pursue defense planning, command structures, and force goals to meet the requirements of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty as well as the requirements of other missions agreed upon by NATO members, but must do so in a manner that first and foremost ensures under the North Atlantic Treaty the ability of NATO to deter and counter any significant military threat to the territory of any NATO member. (D) Report: Not later than 180 days after the date of adoption of this resolution, the President shall submit to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives a report on the Strategic Concept of NATO. The report shall be submitted in both classified and unclassified form and shall include -- (i) an explanation of the manner in which the Strategic Concept of NATO affects United States military requirements both within and outside the North Atlantic area, including the broader strategic rationale of NATO; (ii) an analysis of all potential threats to the North Atlantic area (meaning the entire territory of all NATO members) up to the year 2010, including the consideration of a reconstituted conventional threat to Europe, emerging capabilities of non-NATO countries to use nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons affecting the North Atlantic area, and the emerging ballistic missile and cruise missile threat affecting the North Atlantic area; (iii) the identification of alternative system architectures for the deployment of a NATO missile defense for the entire territory of all NATO members that would be capable of countering the threat posed by emerging ballistic and cruise missile systems in countries other than declared nuclear powers, as well as in countries that are existing nuclear powers, together with timetables for development and an estimate of costs; (iv) a detailed assessment of the progress of all NATO members, on a country-by-country basis, toward meeting current force goals; and (v) a general description of the overall approach to updating the Strategic Concept of NATO. (E) Briefings on revisions to the strategic concept: Not less than twice in the 300-day period following the date of adoption of this resolution, each at an agreed time to precede each Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, the Senate expects the appropriate officials of the executive branch of Government to offer detailed briefings to the appropriate congressional committees on proposed changes to the Strategic Concept of NATO, including -- (i) an explanation of the manner in which specific revisions to the Strategic Concept of NATO will serve United States national security interests and affect United States military requirements both within and outside the North Atlantic area; (ii) a timetable for implementation of new force goals by all NATO members under any revised Strategic Concept of NATO; (iii) a description of any negotiations regarding the revision of the nuclear weapons policy of NATO; and (iv) a description of any proposal to condition decisions of the North Atlantic Council upon the approval of the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or any NATO-affiliated forum. (F) Definition: For the purposes of this paragraph, the term "Strategic Concept of NATO" means the document agreed to by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on November 7-8, 1991, or any subsequent document agreed to by the North Atlantic Council that would serve a similar purpose. (2) Costs, benefits, burdensharing, and military implications of the enlargement of NATO. -- (A) Presidential certification. -- Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to the Senate that -- (i) the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO will not have the effect of increasing the overall percentage share of the United States in the common budgets of NATO; (ii) the United States is under no commitment to subsidize the national expenses necessary for Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic to meet its NATO commitments; and (iii) the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO does not detract from the ability of the United States to meet or to fund its military requirements outside the North Atlantic area. (B) Annual reports. -- Not later than April 1 of each year during the five-year period following the date of entry into force of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report, which may be submitted in an unclassified and classified form, and which shall contain the following information: (i) The amount contributed to the common budgets of NATO by each NATO member during the preceding calendar year. (ii) The proportional share assigned to, and paid by, each NATO member under NATO's cost-sharing arrangements. (iii) The national defense budget of each NATO member, the steps taken by each NATO member to meet NATO force goals, and the adequacy of the national defense budget of each NATO member in meeting common defense and security obligations. (iv) Any costs incurred by the United States in connection with the membership of Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic in NATO, including the deployment of United States military personnel, the provision of any defense article or defense service, the funding of any training activity, or the modification or construction of any military facility. (v) The status of discussions concerning NATO membership for countries participating in the Partnership for Peace. (C) United States future payments to the common-funded budgets of NATO.-- (i) Sense of the senate regarding United States share of NATO's common-funded budgets. -- It is the sense of the Senate that, beginning with fiscal year 1999, and for each fiscal year thereafter through the fiscal year 2003, the President should -- (I) propose to NATO a limitation on the United States percentage share of the common-funded budgets of NATO for that fiscal year equal to the United States percentage share of those budgets for the preceding fiscal year, minus one percent; and (II) not later than 60 days after the date of the United States proposal under subclause (I), submit a report to Congress describing the action, if any, taken by NATO to carry out the United States proposal. (ii) Annual limitation on United States expenditures for NATO. -- Unless specifically authorized by law, the total amount of expenditures by the United States in any fiscal year beginning on or after October 1, 1998, for payments to the common-funded budgets of NATO shall not exceed the total of all such payments made by the United States in fiscal year 1998. (iii) Definitions. -- In this subparagraph: (I) Common-funded budgets of NATO. -- The term "common-funded budgets of NATO" means -- (aa) the Military Budget, the Security Investment Program, and the Civil Budget of NATO; and (bb) any successor or additional account or program of NATO. (II) United States percentage share of the common-funded budgets of NATO. -- The term `United States percentage share of the common-funded budgets of NATO' means the percentage that the total of all United States payments during a fiscal year to the common-funded budgets of NATO represents to the total amounts payable by all NATO members to those budgets during that fiscal year. (D) Requirement of payment out of funds specifically authorized.--No cost incurred by NATO, other than through the common-funded budgets of NATO, in connection with the admission to membership, or participation, in NATO of any country that was not a member of NATO as of March 1, 1998, may be paid out of funds available to any department, agency, or other entity of the United States unless the funds are specifically authorized by law for that purpose. (E) Reports on future enlargement of NATO. -- (i) Reports prior to commencement of accession talks. -- Prior to any decision by the North Atlantic Council to invite any country (other than Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic) to begin accession talks with NATO, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a detailed report regarding each country being actively considered for NATO membership, including -- (I) an evaluation of how that country will further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area; (II) an evaluation of the eligibility of that country for membership based on the principles and criteria identified by NATO and the United States, including the military readiness of that country; (III) an explanation of how an invitation to that country would affect the national security interests of the United States; (IV) an up-to-date United States Government analysis of the common-funded military requirements and costs associated with integrating that country into NATO, and an analysis of the shares of those costs to be borne by NATO members, including the United States; and (V) a preliminary analysis of the implications for the United States defense budget and other United States budgets of integrating that country into NATO. (ii) Updated reports prior to signing protocols of accession. -- Prior to the signing of any protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of any country, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report, in classified and unclassified forms -- (I) updating the information contained in the report required under clause (i) with respect to that country; and (II) including an analysis of that country's ability to meet the full range of the financial burdens of NATO membership, and the likely impact upon the military effectiveness of NATO of the country invited for accession talks, if the country were to be admitted to NATO. (F) Review and reports by the general accounting office. -- The Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct a review and assessment of the evaluations and analyses contained in all reports submitted under subparagraph (E) and, not later than 90 days after the date of submission of any report under subparagraph (E)(ii), shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees setting forth the assessment resulting from that review. (3) The NATO-Russia founding act and the permanent joint council. -- Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to the Senate the following: (A) In general. -- The NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Permanent Joint Council do not provide the Russian Federation with a veto over NATO policy. (B) NATO decision-making. -- The NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Permanent Joint Council do not provide the Russian Federation any role in the North Atlantic Council or NATO decision-making, including -- (i) any decision NATO makes on an internal matter; or (ii) the manner in which NATO organizes itself, conducts its business, or plans, prepares for, or conducts any mission that affects one or more of its members, such as collective defense, as stated under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. (C) Nature of discussions in the permanent joint council. -- In discussions in the Permanent Joint Council -- (i) the Permanent Joint Council will not be a forum in which NATO's basic strategy, doctrine, or readiness is negotiated with the Russian Federation, and NATO will not use the Permanent Joint Council as a substitute for formal arms control negotiations such as the adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, done at Paris on November 19, 1990; (ii) any discussion with the Russian Federation of NATO doctrine will be for explanatory, not decision-making purposes; (iii) any explanation described in clause (ii) will not extend to a level of detail that could in any way compromise the effectiveness of NATO's military forces, and any such explanation will be offered only after NATO has first set its policies on issues affecting internal matters; (iv) NATO will not discuss any agenda item with the Russian Federation prior to agreeing to a NATO position within the North Atlantic Council on that agenda item; and (v) the Permanent Joint Council will not be used to make any decision on NATO doctrine, strategy, or readiness. (4) Reports on intelligence matters: (A) Progress report. -- Not later than January 1, 1999, the President shall submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees on the progress of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in satisfying the security requirements for membership in NATO. (B) Reports regarding protection of intelligence sources and methods. -- Not later than January 1, 1999, and again not later than the date that is 90 days after the date of accession to the North Atlantic Treaty by Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit a detailed report to the congressional intelligence committees -- (i) identifying the latest procedures and requirements established by Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic for the protection of intelligence sources and methods; and (ii) including an assessment of how the overall procedures and requirements of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic for the protection of intelligence sources and methods compare with the procedures and requirements of other NATO members for the protection of intelligence sources and methods. (C) Definitions: In this paragraph: (i) Congressional intelligence committees: The term "congressional intelligence committees" means the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (ii) Date of accession to the North Atlantic Treaty by Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic: The term "date of accession to the North Atlantic Treaty by Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic" means the latest of the following dates: (I) The date on which Poland accedes to the North Atlantic Treaty. (II) The date on which Hungary accedes to the North Atlantic Treaty, (III) The date on which the Czech Republic accedes to the North Atlantic Treaty. (5) Requirement of full cooperation with United States efforts to obtain the fullest possible accounting of captured and missing United States personnel from past military conflicts or Cold War incidents: Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to Congress that each of the governments of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are fully cooperating with United States efforts to obtain the fullest possible accounting of captured and missing United States personnel from past military conflicts or Cold War incidents, to include -- (A) Facilitating full access to relevant archival material; and (B) Identifying individuals who may possess knowledge relative to captured and missing United States personnel, and encouraging such individuals to speak with United States Government officials. (6) Treaty interpretation: (A) Principles of treaty interpretation: The Senate affirms the applicability to all treaties of the constitutionally-based principles of treaty interpretation set forth in condition (1) in the resolution of ratification of the INF Treaty, approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988. (B) Construction of senate resolution of ratification: Nothing in condition (1) of the resolution of ratification of the INF Treaty, approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988, shall be construed as authorizing the President to obtain legislative approval for modifications or amendments to treaties through majority approval of both Houses of Congress. (C) Definition: As used in this paragraph, the term "INF Treaty" refers to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range Missiles, together with the related memorandum of understanding and protocols, done at Washington on December 8, 1987. SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS. In this resolution: (1) Appropriate congressional committees: The term "appropriate congressional committees" means the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations, the Committee on National Security, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives: (2) NATO: The term `NATO' means the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (3) NATO members: The term `NATO members' means all countries that are parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. (4) NATO-Russia founding act: The term `NATO-Russia Founding Act' means the document entitled the `Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation', dated May 27, 1997. (5) North atlantic area: The term `North Atlantic area' means the area covered by Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as applied by the North Atlantic Council. (6) North atlantic treaty: The term `North Atlantic Treaty' means the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on April 4, 1949 (63 Stat. 2241; TIAS 1964), as amended. (7) Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the czech republic. The term `Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic' refers to the following protocols transmitted by the President to the Senate on February 11, 1998 (Treaty Document No. 105-36): (A) The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Republic of Poland, signed at Brussels on December 16, 1997: (B) The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Republic of Hungary, signed at Brussels on December 16, 1997. (C) The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Czech Republic, signed at Brussels on December 16, 1997: (8) United States instrument of ratification: The term "United States instrument of ratification" means the instrument of ratification of the United States of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic: (End text)