Congressional Documents

Statement of The Honorable William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense
before the Committee on Foreign Relations U.S. Senate
February 24, 1998



On NATO Enlargement



(as prepared)



Senator Helms, Senator Biden, members of the committee, thank you for
the opportunity to appear before you today. It is a great privilege to
be here to discuss one of the President's top foreign policy
objectives: NATO enlargement. Last year the Secretary of State and I
appeared jointly before the Senate Armed Services and Appropriations
Committees to discuss this topic. I welcome the opportunity to
continue our dialogue with the Senate.


WHY ENLARGE NATO?



Nowhere are American concerns more vital or our efforts more focused
than in Europe. The United States maintains a strong and real
commitment to Europe as demonstrated by our troops on the ground, our
capacity to reinforce as needed, and our political engagement in
seeking to resolve problems. America makes this commitment not as an
act of charity, but because the security of Europe is vital to our own
security, as events in this century have shown.


Twice before, our veterans witnessed how even the vast Atlantic Ocean
could not protect us from being drawn into the fiery hatreds of the
Old World. In World War I they marched into battle singing, "We won't
be back 'til it's over, over there." But to our lasting regret, when
the guns of August fell silent, America ignored the embers of hatred
that still smoldered in Europe and we missed the opportunity to
prevent another war, the deadliest in human history.


Millions of American sons returned to the very same terrain that their
fathers died defending, and thousands of them paid the ultimate price
for this missed opportunity. But those who fought in World War II gave
us a second chance to build a safer world.


President Truman, speaking of the Marshall Plan, said, "Our purpose
from the end of the war to the present has never changed. It's been to
create a political and economic framework in which lasting peace can
be constructed." Western Europe embraced the Marshall Plan, built
strong democracies and economies, and developed the strong alliance
that we call NATO. And American workers prospered as Western Europe's
economy flourished under the protective umbrella of security and
stability ensured by NATO. But Joseph Stalin denied the Marshall Plan
to the other half of Europe when he slammed down the Iron Curtain and
began a separation of the continent which would last for 50 years.


Today, having emerged victorious from the long winter of the Cold War,
we have an historic opportunity to complete George Marshall's vision
and a chance to build a security system for all of Europe. And we need
to do so. For unfortunately, while the massive Soviet threat has
evaporated, we continue to face problems as well as opportunities. A
stable Europe is necessary to anchor America's worldwide presence.
Threats to European stability and security can still arise from old
national and ethnic hatreds, from home-grown and state-sponsored
terrorism, from threats from unstable regions outside Europe, and from
adversaries prepared to use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.


ENLARGEMENT ENHANCES NATO



Some ask whether a larger NATO will be a weaker NATO. A larger NATO
will be a stronger NATO and will provide a wider allegiance in Europe
to our values. It was the creation of NATO in 1949 that halted Soviet
designs on western Europe. It was the enlargement of NATO, with Greece
and Turkey in 1952, West Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982, that
helped strengthen the bulwark of democracy in Europe. If, in the
future, another direct threat of attack arises, an enlarged NATO would
have additional manpower, added military capability, more political
support, and greater strategic depth. Enlargement will enhance, not
dilute, NATO's military effectiveness and political cohesion.


Further, by providing an institutional framework for improving
relations among both members and non-members, an enlarged NATO will
secure stability for the 21st century in Central Europe -- the
spawning ground of crises throughout the 20th century. We must seize
this opportunity to continue to shape the security environment in
Europe. In doing so, we will provide the security framework in which
the political democracies and market economies of Central Europe can
flourish, and thereby enhance stability and reduce the risk that such
crises will ever emerge. As was the case with nuclear deterrence
during the Cold War, in this new era NATO enlargement is an insurance
policy with an unusual twist: by paying a modest premium, we not only
will be protected in case of fire, we will make a fire less likely to
ignite.


THE CHOICE OF NEW MEMBERS



Formal membership in NATO carries as President Clinton has said,
"(t)he most solemn security guarantees."


Admission to NATO has been likened to a door -- but I would emphasize
that it is a door at the top of a staircase. The door is open, but the
stairs are steep. And any country seeking to walk through the open
door must first ascend those stairs. Sincere aspiration is not enough
to guarantee membership in NATO. New members must demonstrate a
commitment to: democracy and the rule of law, an open market economic
system, civilian constitutional control of their militaries, peaceful
resolution of disputes with their neighbors, respect for human rights,
and development over time of military capabilities interoperable with
NATO.


After discussions with allies, candidate countries, members of
Congress and within the Administration, the President decided the U.S.
would support extending invitations to the Czech Republic, Hungary,
and Poland. The President met with the other leaders of the NATO
nations in a summit last July, and together they agreed to invite
these nations to begin accession talks to join the Alliance.


You have heard it argued that by enlarging NATO we are going to create
a new dividing line in Europe. That argument fails to appreciate the
new dynamic that is underway in Europe, erasing these old lines and
avoiding these new divisions. The mere prospect of having NATO
membership has unleashed a powerful impetus for peace in Europe. Old
rivals have settled their historic disputes: Poland and Lithuania,
Poland and Ukraine, Hungary and Romania, Italy and Slovenia, and
Germany and the Czech Republic. Without the prospect of NATO
enlargement, these smoldering embers -- rather than being extinguished
-- could have been fanned by nationalist fervor.


This argument also fails to realize that by not enlarging, we would
allow to stand an illegitimate dividing line drawn across the
continent by Stalin 50 years ago. Without NATO enlargement, some
countries would feel compelled to seek security via other avenues,
including ones potentially destabilizing and contrary to U.S.
interests. We must move, with Europe, into the future. The Poles,
Hungarians, and Czechs are vital, vigorous, and dynamic people. They
share our ideals. They are making remarkable recoveries from decades
of foreign domination. Now they want to return to their rightful place
as equal partners in the European family of free and democratic
nations. We need them and they need us.


To ensure that enlargement does not draw new dividing lines in Europe,
we must continue to give careful consideration to the security
interests and concerns of those states that were not chosen for
membership at the NATO Summit in Madrid. With no time lines drawn, the
door to membership is open for future invitations, and no European
nation is excluded from consideration. We expect other nations to
become members as they meet the requirements. We need to continue to
make clear to other aspirant countries that active participation in an
enhanced Partnership for Peace program is the primary pathway to
membership in the Alliance and to a solid security relationship with
NATO. At the same time, there are no "assured invitations" in 1999, or
at any time, and future invitees will be held to the same standards as
the current three. And, of course, any future accessions will, like
these three, require Senate approval.


WHAT ABOUT RUSSIA?



Any vision of future European security and prosperity must include
Russia. NATO has embarked on a new relationship with Russia. NATO and
Russia are erasing old dividing lines every day, not least in our
interactions in Bosnia where Russian and NATO soldiers patrol side by
side in the cause of peace. There are some who claim that enlarging
NATO is going to feed extremism in Russia and jeopardize Russia's move
toward democracy and cooperation with the West.


Mr. Chairman, we should not permit these fears to overwhelm the facts.


Permit me a moment of personal reflection. In February 1997, shortly
after I was sworn in as the Secretary of Defense, I traveled to
Bosnia, and met with some of the American troops serving there. During
lunch, a Russian soldier came up to me and gave me his beret as a
gesture of peace, saying how proud he was to be serving alongside
Americans. I still have that beret in my office.


Last fall, on another trip to Bosnia, I met with the Russian
commander, General Krivolapov. He concluded the meeting by declaring,
in Russian, "one team, one mission" SFOR's motto adopted by General
Joulwan. Our new relationship with Moscow must acknowledge Russia's
changing role in Europe and not be forever bound by the notion of a
Russia in confrontation with NATO. At the same time, we cannot
acquiesce to every Russian request.


The objectives of NATO's new relationship with Russia are: to
recognize Russia's inherent importance in European security -- after
all, they have been a major factor in European security for 300 years;
to engage Russia in the new European security order; to facilitate a
security dialogue; and, when desirable and appropriate, to cooperate
with Russia. Russia is going to play a role in Europe in any case. Our
objective is to ensure, through the development of the NATO-Russian
relationship and a growing network of bilateral and multilateral ties,
that this role is a positive one. Equally important to remember are
the limits to NATO's new relationship with Russia: it does not allow
Russian participation in internal NATO issues; it does not give Russia
a voice or a veto over NATO's decisions; and it does not give Russia a
de facto membership in NATO or a role in determining who will gain
admission to NATO.


Having reviewed the big picture in which enlargement will occur, let
me focus in detail on several specific questions I have often been
asked. First --


WILL AN ENLARGED ALLIANCE BE MILITARILY EFFECTIVE?



Yes. It is my unshakable conviction that we must continue to have a
militarily defensible and strong Alliance from the first day of
enlargement. We cannot invite new members into NATO if the Alliance
cannot extend the same guarantees to them that we have so successfully
extended to all NATO members for the last 49 years. Conversely, the
new members cannot expect to be mere consumers of NATO's security;
they must be able to contribute to their own defense and to the
security of the Alliance, as a whole. Let me share with you some
information about, and experiences we have had with, the three invited
nations.


First, some troop numbers: Poland will have a force, after
restructuring, of 180,000, roughly the size of the forces of Spain
(200,000). After their restructuring, the Czech Republic and Hungary
will have forces of 55,000 and 51,000, respectively, roughly the size
of the armed forces of Portugal (56,000). Combined, the three invitees
will add almost 300,000 soldiers, sailors and airmen to the Alliance,
including units with unique and specialized capabilities such as
chemical decontamination and combat engineering.


Poland



With the largest and most capable military in Eastern Europe, Poland
has brought its 24 years of peacekeeping experience to NATO's efforts
in Bosnia. These deployments with multinational operations have
enabled Polish troops to gain experience which has greatly enhanced
their interoperability with NATO. Poland has a 400-person airborne
infantry battalion in SFOR's U.S. sector, a 355-person logistics
battalion in the Golan Heights, an infantry battalion and military
hospital (632 troops) in Lebanon and troops supporting eight United
Nations' observer missions. In 1989, they established a military
training center for U.N. operations in southeastern Poland. In 1992,
the Poles deployed an infantry battalion with U.N. forces in Croatia.
Since then, Poland has shown an increased willingness to provide
combat forces as reflected by their commitment to IFOR and SFOR.


Czech Republic



The Czech Republic currently has a 620-person mechanized infantry
battalion in SFOR, and prior to that it contributed an 870-person
mechanized infantry battalion to IFOR and a 985-person infantry
battalion to the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR). The Czechs also
deployed a 200-man decontamination unit to DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.


Hungary



Hungary contributed a 400-500 man engineer battalion to conduct
bridging and other engineering operations in support of IFOR. This
battalion, now reduced in number to 200-250, is currently deployed in
support of SFOR. Hungary's support to IFOR and SFOR also included
allowing U.S. and NATO forces to station at its airfields, use its
facilities and transit its airspace. Hungary demonstrated its ability
to operate as part of the NATO team with every bridge that was built
and every plane that landed and took off from its airfields. Over
95,000 U.S. military personnel rotated in and out of IFOR and SFOR
assignments through the Hungarian air base at Taszar. U.S. armor units
conducted live fire training at Hungarian ranges to calibrate their
guns prior to deploying to Bosnia, and again upon re-deploying.


In short, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are already working
with NATO and NATO Allies in the field.


IS NATO'S MILITARY REQUIREMENTS STUDY MILITARILY SOUND AND ROBUST?



The United States has long argued that any NATO cost estimate must be
driven by the military requirements of enlargement. We were successful
in pressing that argument in the Alliance, and a review of the
military requirements was undertaken by the NATO military commanders
last summer.


As part of the process of developing the military requirements of
enlargement, the invitees worked with the NATO international staff to
fill out a special Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) as their
initial step into the NATO Defense Planning Process. This reply gave
detailed information from each country on the forces each would commit
to NATO as their contribution to collective defense. All NATO allies
provide this transparency into their defense plans.


Also, in an effort to better understand requirements as well as the
current capabilities of the invited nations, members of NATO's
international military staff conducted site visits at various military
facilities in the invited countries last year. They visited airfields
and railheads in each country.


On the basis of this work, NATO's military commanders produced a
report laying out an initial assessment of the military requirements
of enlargement. In an open hearing I can only talk about this report
in broad terms. However, it sets forth requirements for
communications, reinforcement of the new nations, air defense, and
training and exercises.


This report underwent an intensive review by the Joint Staff and OSD
staff which found the military requirements study to be thorough,
militarily sound, and based on a range of reasonable contingencies.
The requirements, as agreed to by all member nations of NATO, will
enable the Alliance to effectively counter all anticipated
contingencies. As a result of that review, senior military officers on
the Joint Staff recommended that the U.S. accept the document. We did,
and in the first week of December, the Alliance agreed to the report.


HOW MUCH WILL ENLARGEMENT COST?



When I appeared before the Senate Appropriators last fall, I stated my
belief that the forthcoming NATO estimate of the costs of enlargement
would be lower than the estimate you received from us in February
1997. This has turned out to be the case. Let me explain why.


The February 1997 study outlined three categories of costs: 1) the
costs to new members to continue to restructure their militaries, 2)
the costs of force improvements already being pursued by existing
members, and 3) costs related directly to enlargement (i.e., for
ensuring interoperability between the forces of current and new
members). The bulk of the difference between the two studies is that
the NATO study covered only the common-funded direct enlargement
costs. This is because NATO is not responsible for the other two
costs; individual nations are. Those costs, which we included because
they provide important context when thinking about enlargement, still
seem reasonable to us. We also expect that they can be paid for by the
nations of NATO, both old and new.


In the third category of costs, DoD estimated that direct enlargement
costs would be about $9-12 billion over a 13 year period. These costs
included upgrades to communications, air defense, reinforcement
reception infrastructure, and other interoperability measures. A
portion of these costs would be common-funded by NATO, about $5.5-7.0
billion. And since the share of the common-funded budgets is
approximately one quarter, we estimated that the U.S. share would
total around $1.5-2.0 billion over a ten-year period.


By contrast, NATO estimated that the total common-funded costs of
adding the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to the Alliance would
be about $1.5 billion over the next ten years. The U.S. share of that
total cost would be about $400 million over ten years.


The obvious question is: Why is there a difference between the
February 1997 DoD estimate of $5.5-7.0 billion for NATO's
common-funded costs and the December 1997 NATO estimate of $1.5
billion for these costs?


The overall point to keep in mind is that DoD made a notional estimate
based on general information while NATO made a detailed estimate based
on more recent and complete information. But here are some specific
reasons for the differences.


First, the initial U.S. cost estimate assessed four, not three,
potential new members. If the U.S. analysis had studied only the three
countries invited to join NATO, the overall U.S. estimate would have
been lower by another $1.1-1.4 billion, and the common-funded portion
of the DoD study would have been around $4.9-6.2 billion.


Second, the "good news" is that the new members' forces and
infrastructure are in better condition than we earlier assumed. In
preparing its estimate, NATO conducted on-site visits and learned that
the additional investment required to prepare new members' forces and
infrastructure for NATO membership will be less than DoD initially
estimated based on its sources.


Third, there were differences in cost methodology and modest
differences in the requirements that led to the remainder of the
difference. For example, DoD assumed that some upgrades would be
eligible for common funding that NATO officials have since stated
would not be eligible. Also modest differences in requirements had a
significant impact on the cost difference, but do not detract from
NATO's capability for Article V collective defense with new members.


Because the estimates differ by more than a factor of four, some have
asked: Have military requirements been sacrificed by NATO to save
money? No. While some military requirements differ, the differences
are modest and not operationally significant. Both studies use the
same reinforcement strategy and developed broadly similar military
requirements. Most importantly, the numbers and type of reinforcing
forces and reception facilities are almost identical. However, the
U.S. study included some requirements that NATO did not include such
as additional upgrades to airfields and training facilities. Site
surveys conducted by NATO have revealed that these upgrades are not
necessary. As I stated earlier, the Joint Staff thoroughly reviewed
these requirements and is confident that they will enable the Alliance
to meet any anticipated military contingency in the projected security
environment.


Let me give you some examples that show you why we are confident in
our assessment:


Some of the improvements in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic's
infrastructure are due directly to their participation in the
Partnership for Peace program. For example, due to preparations for
PfP exercises and lessons learned from those events, the new members'
airfields generally are more capable of receiving and supporting
western aircraft than assumed earlier. F-16s, which are sensitive to
foreign object damage, recently operated effectively from a Hungarian
airfield. This progress means that there is less work that needs to be
done -- and in turn -- less money that needs to be spent to improve
these airfields than estimated earlier.


A scout platoon leader and scout platoon sergeant from an elite
American Airborne Battalion were invited to participate in training
within a Hungarian counterpart unit. Expecting a fairly modest PfP
exercise, they were surprised when catapulted into some of the most
rigorous and demanding training they had ever experienced, including a
live-fire obstacle course, extended operations under nuclear,
biological and chemical conditions, and grueling physical demands.


A recent PfP session of the NATO Council of National Armaments
Directors addressed the subject of inexpensively refurbishing and
modernizing Polish, Czech, and Hungarian T-72 tanks, which is the best
way to meet relevant target force goals at reasonable expense to the
newly invited members. The Ukrainians offered to not only refurbish
and modernize them, but to render them interoperable with NATO -- all
at a very reasonable price. In short order the Russians, Latvians, and
Lithuanians sought to join the project, complementing efforts Poles,
Czechs, and Hungarians already had underway.


SOME DEFICIENCIES EXIST



We have found some deficiencies in the new countries' forces as the
NATO review process continues -- especially regarding personnel,
specialized training, communications, and the levels of funding for
force modernization. While the three cannot be expected to "fix"
everything by 1999, each has a serious program that lays out a defined
path toward the enhancement of their defense capabilities.


We have told each invitee that its highest priority should be
investing in quality personnel. They must develop effective systems
for recruiting and retaining good troops. Key to this is the
development of an effective NCO corps. The next priority is training
-- including English language training -- for better personnel and new
equipment is meaningless without adequate training. The next priority
is achievement of a high degree of interoperability with NATO,
including communications, logistics, infrastructure for reinforcement,
and air defense.


While it is clear that each of the invited nations must undergo
modernization of major weapons systems in the years ahead if it is to
remain a contributor to overall alliance security, acquiring high tech
weapons systems should be a lower priority than personnel and
training.


These three countries are working hard to demonstrate that they are
ready for membership in NATO. As I outlined earlier, they have each
begun the process of participating in NATO's defense planning by
submitting Defense Planning Questionnaire responses. This process put
them in close contact with NATO international staff members who are
beginning the education process on what is required of our NATO
allies. The three invitees also hosted many visits this summer and
fall from the international military staff as they conducted surveys
of representative military facilities in each country. Each of these
nations wants to be a contributor to, not just a consumer of,
security. They are already contributing to the security of Europe by
restructuring and modernizing their militaries to operate with NATO,
by serving with our soldiers in Bosnia, and by helping to make a
success of the Partnership for Peace.


The costs of enlargement will be manageable for the likely new members
as well. The three invitees and NATO have agreed to specific cost
shares that will govern their contributions to NATO -- together the
three countries will contribute about 4% to NATO's common-funded
budgets. Each of them have committed to sufficient funding in their
defense budgets to pay for enlargement requirements. The Czechs raised
defense, spending from 1.7% of GDP in 1997 to 1.88% of GDP in 1998.
They intend to raise this to 2% by the year 2000. While both Poland
and Hungary have had similar deficiencies they are overcoming them.
Hungary has increased its budget to about 1.8% of projected GDP and
plans to increase that percentage by 0.1 percent annually for the next
five years. We are particularly pleased with Poland's extensive
15-year plan. Expected growth in their Gross Domestic Products and
savings from force restructuring also will help fund these costs. Most
importantly, the costs of joining NATO for the new members will
certainly be less than what the three countries would have to spend if
they did not join NATO and were solely responsible for their national
security.


HOW MUCH WILL IT COST THE UNITED STATES?



NATO has estimated that enlargement will cost the Alliance about $1.5
billion over ten years. The United States pays about 25% of the NATO
common-funded budgets each year. Our allies provide the remaining 75%
of the NATO common-funded budgets. Our share will not increase because
of NATO enlargement. This means that the United States will pay
substantially less than the $150-200 million per year that we
notionally estimated last February.


WILL THE ALLIES DO THEIR PART?



Since my last appearance before the Congress on this topic last
October, the Alliance has twice reaffirmed its commitment to provide
the resources necessary to support enlargement. At the meeting of all
NATO defense ministers in early December we agreed, "(c)osts
associated with the accession of the three invitees will be
manageable, and that the resources necessary to meet these costs will
be provided in accordance with our general procedures under which each
Ally bears its fair share." Shortly thereafter, the foreign ministers
met and reaffirmed the Alliance's support for this principle.


The Europeans fully understand the need to meet the financial
requirements of enlarging. In October of last year, George Robertson,
the British Minister of Defense, wrote in the "Washington Times" about
European burdensharing as it pertains to enlargement, "(I)f additional
spending is required, Britain will pay its share. We contribute nearly
one-sixth of NATO's common budget and the European allies some 70
percent of the total. These shares will apply equally to the costs of
enlargement."


In November, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel wrote an editorial
in "The Washington Post" that said, "It goes without saying that
Europe and Germany, like the United States, must bear their fair share
of the costs of NATO enlargement ... Already now the European Alliance
partners are financing roughly 70 percent of the joint NATO budgets
and making available 95 percent of NATO forces in Europe. This
European contribution to the Alliance will not drop with the admission
of new members but will further increase."


While it is true that both the United States and our NATO Allies have
made big cuts in our defense budgets since the end of the Cold War,
most of our NATO Allies still make very substantial contributions to
the common defense. For example, more than two-thirds of the troops
currently participating in SFOR are non-U.S. forces.


For some time we have pressed our allies to do more to improve their
capability for mobile, flexible operations which NATO will undertake
in the future. They have responded with specific improvements, and are
committed to more. For example, Britain provides NATO's only
rapidly-deployable corps headquarters committed to NATO and British
forces are the backbone of the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid
Reaction, Corps (ARRC). The U.K. also has the capability to deploy and
sustain a division-sized force of 20-25,000 personnel and, as you all
know, the British aircraft carrier HMS Invincible recently deployed to
the Gulf in support of the latest military buildup there.


France, in general, is restructuring its armed forces to be more
mobile and easily deployable. The French are establishing a Rapid
Action Force (FAR) designed for rapid response in both European and
overseas contingencies. France also participated heavily in IFOR
efforts to implement the Dayton peace accords in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. With nearly 8,000 troops, France was the third largest
troop contributor, after the United States and Britain, and was
responsible for one of the three geographic sectors -- and continues
to be in SFOR.


Likewise, Germany is standing up a Rapid Reaction Force of some 53,000
fully-equipped troops from the Army, Navy and Air Force. The first
units stood up in 1996 and the force will be fully capable this year.
In general, German armed forces are in the process of re-creating
themselves into a mobile, deployable force.


The smaller European nations are also improving their forces. For
example, the Royal Netherlands Navy and Air Force have improved both
their transport and air defense capabilities with new procurements
such as: two KDC-10 transport/tankers (the Dutch can now deploy their
own F-16s without reliance on the United States); an amphibious-lift
ship to make the marine brigade self-deployable; and upgrades to their
F-16 fleet and their Patriot systems.


THE COSTS OF NOT ENLARGING



The most important point to make about costs is that there would be
greater costs and greater risks to not enlarging. If we fail to seize
this historic opportunity to help integrate, consolidate, and
stabilize Central Europe, we would risk a much higher price later. The
most efficient and cost effective way to guarantee stability is to do
so collectively through NATO. That was true in the Cold War. It is
true now. It will be true in the future.


The costs of collective defense are manageable for all concerned.
Alliances save money. Collective defense is both cheaper and stronger
than relying solely on national defense.


A decision to defer enlargement, much less to withhold it altogether,
would send a message to Central Europe that their future does not lie
with NATO and the West. It would falsely validate the old divisions of
the Cold War. The resulting sense of isolation and vulnerability would
destabilize the region and encourage nationalist and disruptive forces
throughout Europe. Similarly, a mandated pause of arbitrary duration
before future rounds of enlargement would heighten insecurity and be
destabilizing.


Unless we move forward, NATO will remain stuck in the past, in danger
of irrelevance, while the United States will be seen as inconstant and
unreliable in its leadership, and as withdrawing from its
responsibilities and interests in Europe and in the world.


CONCLUSION



In the conclusion to his book, "On the Origins of War," historian
Donald Kagan states:


"A persistent and repeated error throughout history has been the
failure to understand that the preservation of peace requires active
effort, planning, the expenditure of resources, and sacrifice, just as
war does. In the modern world especially the sense that peace is
natural and war an aberration has led to a failure in peacetime to
consider the possibility of another war, which in turn, has prevented
the efforts needed to preserve the peace."


If this century has taught us anything, it is that our security is
inextricably tied to peace and security in Europe. We must hold up the
lamplight of history so that we do not stumble on the footpath to the
future. In building a Europe of the 21st century that is whole and
free, we will also provide coming generations of Americans a future
that is more secure, peaceful and prosperous.


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