Congressional Documents

Secretary Albright on NATO Enlargement

Opening Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Washington, DC, February 24, 1998

As Submitted to the Committee



Chairman Helms, Senator Biden, members of the committee: It is my high
honor to appear with my colleagues to present the protocols of
accession to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 that will add Poland,
Hungary and the Czech Republic to NATO. We view the ratification of
these protocols as an essential part of a broader strategy to build an
undivided, democratic and peaceful Europe. We believe this goal is
manifestly in America's own interest, and that it merits your strong
support.


We are approaching the culmination of a remarkable process. It began
four years ago when President Clinton and his fellow NATO leaders
decided that the question was not whether NATO would welcome new
members, but when and how it would do so. It moved forward in Madrid,
when, after months of study and deliberation, the Alliance agreed that
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic would make NATO stronger and
met every qualification for membership. It advanced two weeks ago,
when President Clinton transmitted to the Congress the documents that
will, with your consent, make these three nations America's newest
allies.


I want to stress today, Mr. Chairman, that from the start, the
Administration's decisions have been shaped by our consultations with
you, with this committee and with others, with the NATO Observer
Group, and with your colleagues in both Houses of Congress and both
parties. Over the last few years, and especially the last few months,
you have truly put the "advice" into the process of advice and
consent. Our discussions have been a model of the kind of serious,
bipartisan conversation we need to be having with the Congress and the
American people about our nation's role in the world.


Of course, this is not the first time we have discussed NATO
enlargement together. It is also not the first time that we as a
nation have considered the addition of new members to our alliance.


Almost 50 years ago, my predecessor Secretary Dean Acheson transmitted
to President Truman the original North Atlantic Treaty. He pointed out
that if NATO was to be "fully effective" it had to be open to "as many
countries as are in a position to further the democratic principles
upon which the Treaty was based, to contribute to the security of the
North Atlantic area, and ... to undertake the necessary
responsibilities."


In the years since, the Senate has given its consent to the admission
of Greece, Turkey, Germany and Spain into NATO. Each time, the
Alliance became stronger. Each time, old divisions were overcome. Each
time, new nations became anchored, once and for all, in the community
of democracies that NATO exists to unite and protect. And this time
will be no different.


But this moment is historic in another way. For if the Senate agrees,
NATO will, for the first time, step across the line it was created to
defend and overcome -- the line that once so cruelly and arbitrarily
divided Europe into east and west.


During the Cold War, I'm sure some of you had the strange experience
of seeing that line up close. There were bunkers and barbed wire, mine
fields and soldiers in watchtowers fixing you in their crosshairs. On
one side were free people, living in sovereign countries. On the other
were people who wanted to be free, living in countries being
suffocated by communism.


Go to the center of Europe today, and you would have to use all the
powers of your imagination to conjure up these images of that very
recent past. There are still borders, of course, but they are there to
manage the flow of trucks and tour buses, not to stop troops and
tanks. On both sides, people vote and speak and buy and sell freely.
Governments cooperate with one another. Soldiers train and serve
together. The legacy of the past is still visible east of the old
divide, but in the ways that matter, the new democracies are becoming
indistinguishable from their western neighbors.


We are here today, Mr. Chairman, because the status quo in Europe was
shattered by the geopolitical equivalent of an earthquake. That
earthquake presented us with a dual challenge: first, how to preserve
a favorable security environment into the next century; and second,
how to seize the opportunity to build a Europe whole and free.


In meeting that challenge, NATO faced a blunt choice. Would our
alliance be the last institution in Europe to continue to treat the
Iron Curtain as something meaningful? Or would it aid in Europe's
reunification and renewal? Would it exclude from its ranks a whole
group of qualified democracies simply because they had been subjugated
in the past? Or would it be open to those free nations that are
willing and able to meet the responsibilities of membership and to
contribute to our security?


I believe NATO made the right choice. NATO's decision to accept
qualified new members will make America safer, NATO stronger, and
Europe more stable and united.


We recognize, Mr. Chairman, that the decision to build a larger NATO
has implications for our security that must be weighed carefully. It
involves solemn commitments. It is not cost-free. It can only be
justified if it advances America's strategic interests.


Last October, I had the opportunity to come before you to make the
case that a larger NATO will serve our interests. I will try to
summarize that case today, and then focus on the questions and
concerns that may still exist.


First, a larger NATO will make America safer by expanding the area of
Europe where wars do not happen. By making it clear that we will
fight, if necessary, to defend our new allies, we make it less likely
that we will ever be called upon to do so.


Is central Europe in immediate jeopardy today? It is not. But can we
safely say that our interest in its security will never be threatened?
History and experience do not permit us to say that, Mr. Chairman.


There is, after all, the obvious risk of ethnic conflict. There is the
growing danger posed by rogue states with dangerous weapons. There are
still questions about the future of Russia. Whatever the future may
hold, it is hardly in our interest to have a group of vulnerable and
excluded states in the heart of Europe. It will be in our interest to
have a vigorous and larger alliance with those European democracies
that share our values and our determination to defend them.


A second reason is that the very prospect of a larger NATO has given
the nations of central and eastern Europe an incentive to solve their
own problems. To align themselves with NATO, aspiring allies have
strengthened their democratic institutions, improved respect for
minority rights, made sure soldiers take orders from civilians, and
resolved virtually every old border and ethnic dispute in the region.
This is the kind of progress that can ensure outside powers are never
again dragged into conflict in this region. This is the kind of
progress that will continue if the Senate says yes to a larger NATO.


A third reason why enlargement passes the test of national interest is
that it will make NATO itself stronger and more cohesive. Our
prospective allies are passionately committed to NATO. Experience has
taught them to believe in a strong American role in Europe. Their
forces have risked their lives alongside ours from the Gulf War to
Bosnia. They will add strategic depth to the Alliance, not to mention
well over 200,000 troops.


Two weeks ago, Foreign Minister Geremek of Poland was in Washington
along with his Czech and Hungarian colleagues, and he was asked why
his country wants to join NATO. He replied that Poland wants to be
anchored at long last in the institutions of the transatlantic
community. He said "we owe to America this revival of Poland's
attachment to the West... Very simply, we owe our freedom to the
United States."


Mr. Chairman, let us remember that these countries look forward to
assuming the heavy responsibilities of NATO membership not as a
burden, but as an opportunity. An opportunity to show the world that
they are now mature, capable democracies, ready, willing and able to
give something back to the community of freedom that stood by them in
their years of darkness.


This point should be especially important to us today. Our nation is
now engaged in an effort to ensure Iraq's compliance with UN Security
Council resolutions. We have marshaling the support of other nations
in this just cause. When I met with the Foreign Ministers of our three
prospective allies two weeks ago, I asked them to stand by our side.
Their response was swift and sure. If we have to take military action,
they will be with us.


The bottom line is that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are
already behaving as loyal allies. They will be good allies in the
future, of that I have no doubt.


Nevertheless, I know that there are still serious critics who have
legitimate questions about our policy. We have grappled with many of
the same questions ourselves, and I want to address a few of them
today.


Some of the concerns revolve around the potential cost of a larger
NATO. The last time I was here, Mr. Chairman, we could only talk about
estimates, for NATO had not yet come to agreement on this issue. Now,
all 16 allies have agreed on the numbers and backed them up with
commitments. We know today that the costs will be real, but also that
they will be manageable, that they will be met, and that they will be
shared fairly.


Some of those costs will be paid by our three new allies. I know some
people have argued that these new democracies should not be asked to
bear additional military burdens at a time when they are still
undergoing difficult economic transformations. But these nations will
be modernizing their armed forces in any case, and they have told us
that in the long run it will be cheaper to do so within NATO than
outside it.


Ultimately, only the people of these countries can decide what is best
for their future. Today, in all three, solid public majorities and
every mainstream party support membership in NATO. All three have
growing economies. All three are building stronger, leaner, more
professional armed forces. They are telling us they see no
contradiction between security and prosperity and we should not
substitute our judgment for theirs.


There are also people who worry that the cost of a larger NATO -- to
us and to our allies -- will be far greater than the Alliance has
projected.


That fear is partly based on a natural belief that governments tend to
underestimate costs, sometimes severely, sometimes on purpose. But
that is not the case with NATO. Our contributions to NATO are a
budgeted line item, not an open-ended entitlement. They are funded in
an annual exercise that will be fully in your own control. There is no
history of running NATO on supplemental appropriations.


That fear is also partly based on an assumption that we will someday
have to respond to a military threat to our new allies. If we are
called upon to send troops to defend our new allies, then the cost
will surely grow. But then, if such a dire threat were to arise, the
cost of our entire defense budget would grow, whether we enlarge NATO
or not. If you believe, as I do, that we have a security interest in
the fate of these countries, then the most effective -- and
cost-effective -- way to protect that interest is to make them allies
now. As President Havel of the Czech Republic has rightly said: "Even
the costliest preventive security is cheaper than the cheapest war."


Another concern that I want to address today is that adding new
members to NATO could diminish the effectiveness of the Alliance and
make it harder to reach decisions -- in short, that it could dilute
NATO. But we have pursued NATO enlargement in a way that will make the
Alliance stronger, not weaker.


This is why we have insisted that any nation wishing to join NATO must
meet the strict conditions that former Secretary of Defense Perry
enunciated in 1995: They must be market democracies with civilian
control of the military, good relations with neighbors and the ability
to contribute to NATO's mission of collective defense. This is why
when President Clinton went to the Madrid summit last July, he
insisted that only the strongest candidates be invited to join in this
first round. As you know, the President was under some pressure, both
at home and abroad, to agree to four or five new allies. He agreed to
three, because we are determined to preserve NATO's integrity and
strength.


Ultimately, what matters is NATO's effectiveness in action. We need to
be confident that our allies have the resolve to stand with us when
the going gets tough. So let us remember: When we asked Poland,
Hungary and the Czech Republic to join us in the Gulf, they did not
hesitate. When we asked them to put their soldiers in harm's way in
Bosnia, they did not hesitate. When we asked Hungary to open its bases
to American troops, so they could deploy safely to Bosnia, it did not
hesitate.


NATO is a military alliance, not a social club. But neither is it an
inbred aristocracy. We must be prudent enough to add members
selectively, but we must be smart enough to add those members that
will add to our own security. These three will. Others may in the
future.


And that in turn, raises another question I know a number of Senators
have: namely, where will this process lead us and what about those
countries that are not now being invited to join?


Part of the answer lies in NATO's Partnership for Peace and in its new
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Through these arrangements,
virtually every nation from Armenia to Finland can act side by side
with NATO and help to shape the exercises and missions we undertake
with them.


But an equally important part of the answer lies in NATO's commitment
to keep its door open to additional members. This is central to the
logic of a larger NATO. After all, we set out on this policy because
we believe that NATO cannot respect and must not perpetuate arbitrary
lines of division in Europe. We gain nothing by ruling out a country
as a future ally if it is important to our security, and if it proves
that it is willing and able to contribute to our security.


Let me say very clearly that we have made no decisions about who the
next members of NATO should be or when they might join. But we should
also have some humility before the future.


How many people predicted in 1949 that Germany would so soon be a
member of the Alliance? Who could have known in 1988 that in just ten
years, members of the old Warsaw Pact would be in a position to join
NATO? Who can tell today what Europe will look like in even a few
years? This is just one reason why we want to preserve our flexibility
-- and that of those who will lead the Alliance in years to come.


Some now propose that we freeze the process of enlargement for some
arbitrary number of years. Some of these people have said, with
candor, that their real aim is to freeze the process forever. Let me
be absolutely clear: this Administration opposes any effort in the
Senate to mandate an artificial pause in the process of NATO
enlargement.


Last July, Mr. Chairman, President Clinton and I had the amazing
experience of traveling the length and breadth of central and eastern
Europe. In those countries that were not invited to join NATO, we were
met by enthusiastic crowds and by leaders who support the decisions
the Alliance made in Madrid. They know they have a ways to go before
they can be considered. Yet just the possibility of joining has
inspired them to accelerate reform, to reach out to their neighbors,
and to reject the destructive nationalism of their region's past.


A mandated pause would be heard from Tallinn in the north to Sofia in
the south as the sound of an open door slamming shut. It would be seen
as a vote of no confidence in reform-minded governments from the
Baltics to the Balkans. It would be taken as a sign that we have
written these countries off and diminish the incentive they have to
cooperate with their neighbors and with NATO. It would fracture the
consensus NATO itself has reached on its open door. It would be at
once dangerous and utterly unnecessary, since the Senate would in any
case have to approve the admission of any new allies. It would defeat
the very purpose of NATO enlargement.


Mr. Chairman, let me take a few moments to discuss one final key
concern: the impact of a larger NATO on Russia and on our ties with
that country. I want to stress that this concern has to do mostly with
perceptions, not reality. And while perceptions can be important, our
policies must follow from what we know to be true.


For example, there is a common perception that we are moving NATO, its
tanks and bombers, and even its nuclear weapons right up to Russia's
borders, and that therefore Russia has a reason to be threatened by a
larger NATO. The reality is quite different.


Proximity is not the issue. Russia and NATO have shared a common
border since 1949 -- both Russia and Norway know this is nothing new.
There are no tensions along the border between Poland and the Russian
enclave of Kaliningrad on the Baltic Sea coast. Hungary and the Czech
Republic, meanwhile, are closer to France than they are to the nearest
corner of Russian soil.


As for weaponry, NATO has announced that in the current and
foreseeable security environment, it has no plan, no need and no
intention to station nuclear weapons in the new member countries, nor
does it contemplate permanently stationing substantial combat forces.
Just as important, the prospect of joining NATO has given our future
allies the confidence to avoid arms buildups and to work
constructively to establish lower limits on conventional forces. Their
ties with Russia are more normal and cooperative today than at any
time in history.


If we did not enlarge NATO, exactly the opposite could happen. The
central European nations would feel isolated and insecure. They would
undoubtedly spend more on defense and they might reject regional arms
control. As Senator Biden has pointed out, they would probably create
their own mutual security arrangements, which might well be
anti-Russian in character. Ironically, the problems Russia fears a
larger NATO will cause are precisely the problems a larger NATO will
avoid.


A more worrisome perception is that Russian opposition to expansion,
whether justified or not, is hurting our relationship with Moscow. But
once again, the reality is different.


I have spent much time during the last year talking with my Russian
counterpart, Foreign Minister Primakov and other Russian leaders. I
can assure you that the issue of enlargement is not a cloud that
shadows these discussions. I believe our relationship is developing
according to its own rhythms and priorities, and we have made
significant progress in a number of key areas.


The new NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council is up and running. Russia
is taking part in the Partnership for Peace. Our soldiers and
diplomats are working together in Bosnia. Russia was a full
participant at the Summit of the Eight in Denver last year, and we are
helping it prepare for membership in the World Trade Organization.
With our support, Russia has continued on the path of economic and
democratic reform.


We are pushing ahead with arms control as well: Russia is a year ahead
of schedule in slicing apart nuclear weapons under the START I treaty.
We signed a START II protocol that helps clear the way for the next
phase in strategic arms reductions, and, we hope, will expedite
Russian ratification of that treaty. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin
have agreed on the outlines of a START III treaty that would cut
strategic arsenals to 80 percent below their Cold War peaks, once
START II enters into force. Russia has joined us in banning nuclear
testing and it has followed us in ratifying the Chemical Weapons
Convention. We have begun to adapt the Conventional Forces in Europe
Treaty.


We are also working with Russia to improve the security of nuclear
weapons and materials, making good use of the programs pioneered in
the Nunn-Lugar legislation. We are helping Russia stop production of
weapons-grade plutonium. As we speak, our experts are helping to build
safe and secure storage facilities for tons of fissile material, and
to upgrade security at nuclear weapons storage sites throughout
Russia.


I am not here to pretend that everything is perfect in our
relationship with Russia. We are frankly concerned about the slow pace
of action on START II ratification. We have serious concerns about
Russia's relationship with Iran. Our perspectives on Iraq differ as
well, though we fully agree on the fundamental goal of full Iraqi
compliance with UN resolutions.


But let us be clear. It is a big mistake to think that every time
Russia does something we do not like, it is to "punish" us for
bringing Hungary or Poland into NATO.


Our disagreements with Russia, especially about the Middle East and
Gulf, have come about because of the manner in which Russia is
defining its national interests in that part of the world. These
differences existed long before NATO decided to expand. If the Senate
were to reject enlargement, we would not make them go away. We would,
however, be turning our backs on three nations that have stood with us
on Iraq, on Iran and on the range of security issues that matter to
America.


Mr. Chairman, I think there is a larger issue at stake here. Those
critics who focus on Russia's opposition to enlargement are making an
assumption that Russia will always define its national interests in
ways inimical to our own. These voices assume Russia will always be
threatened and humiliated by the desire of its former satellites to go
their own way; that it will never get over the end of its empire. They
say that we should be realistic and accept this. They would have us
ask Russia's neighbors to set aside their legitimate aspirations
indefinitely for the sake of US-Russian cooperation.


I believe those assumptions sell Russia short. I believe they ignore
the progress we have made, and that Russia has made in coming to terms
with a world that has radically changed.


I am confident America can build a true partnership with a new Russia.
But the partnership we seek cannot be purchased by denying a dozen
European countries the right to seek membership in NATO. A partnership
built on an illegitimate moral compromise would not be genuine and it
would not last.


I am also confident that Russia can succeed in its effort to become a
prosperous, stable democracy -- that it is becoming a normal power
that expresses its greatness by working with others to shape a more
just and lawful world. That transformation will only be delayed if we
give Russia any reason to believe that it can still assert its
greatness at the expense of its neighbors in central Europe. It is
much more likely to advance as Russia recognizes that the same rules
apply to every part of Europe; that Poland is no different from
Portugal in its right to pursue its own aspirations.


Mr. Chairman, for all these reasons and more, I believe that the
choice before you involves much, much more than the immediate future
of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. It involves the future
security of the United States; the future of an undivided Europe; the
future of Russia and the character of our relationship with it.


In a sense, it involves the most basic question of all in our foreign
policy: how do we avoid war and maintain a principled peace?


For some people, the answer seems to revolve around catch phrases such
as globalization, and the naive hope that people who trade and
exchange e-mails won't fight. But I do not believe we can bet our
future on such an assumption. This is still a dangerous world.


We need to remain vigilant and strong, militarily and economically. We
must strive to maintain the cordial relations among major powers which
has lent brightness to the promise of our age. At the same time, we
cannot assume that great power diplomacy alone will achieve the
peaceful conditions in the future that it has so often failed to
achieve in the past.


That is why we must also strengthen the proven alliances and
institutions that provide order and security based on realism and law,
for nations large and small. Institutions that deter aggression, and
that give us a means to marshal support against it when deterrence
fails.


That is what NATO does. That is why we decided to keep it after the
Cold War ended. That is why we decided to expand it. That is why I
thank you today, Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, for working
with us to make this day possible.


I commend you and the Committee for the time and effort you have
dedicated to this vital decision. The NATO enlargement debate has not
always been in the limelight. It is not about responding to the crisis
of the moment; it is about the less glamorous, less headline-grabbing
business of preventing the crises of the future. It calls for serious
attention to be paid to the long-term challenges facing our country.
And that is what you have done, with an emphasis on patriotism, not
partisanship.


I thank you for helping to make this Committee, and the Senate as a
whole, our full partner in the creation of a larger, stronger, better
NATO. I look forward to your questions today and in the days to come.


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