Congressional Documents

Following is the text of Clark's remarks before the Senate Appropriations Committee on October 22:

Introduction

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee, it is a privilege and a pleasure to be here today to discuss NATO enlargement.

First, let me note that NATO's decision to enlarge has been a political decision, made by all 16 allies together. I agree that it is important that we take advantage of the opportunities and address the challenges presented by this unique period in history, and NATO is the security organization best suited for this purpose. As you know, I have two sets of responsibilities, first as Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and in this role my staff has been addressing the military requirements of enlargement and is supporting NATO HQ (Headquarters) by determining military requirements, identifying training needs and conducting operational planning for all missions in Allied Command Europe. As Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces in Europe, I have been engaged in providing U.S. military support and assistance to the three prospective new members.

Costs of Enlargement

In considering potential costs of enlargement, it is best to group costs into three categories. First is the cost borne by the new members for their own national security and contributions to the Alliance. Although we do not yet know the full extent of the defense requirements these countries will identify, each has professed its willingness to commit additional resources to live up to its obligations. As a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Poland is spending 2.2 percent on defense, Hungary is increasing to 1.8 percent and the Czech Republic is increasing to 2 percent. This compares to the NATO average of 2.2 percent. Moreover, the projected growth rates of their economies is higher than the average for current NATO nations, so the defense budgets will become larger in absolute terms. Clearly, the newly invited members are willing to bear the cost of their own defense. My force planners tell me that their initial assessment of their force proposals indicates that these nations' plans will be appropriate for the strategic circumstances of the 2lst century.

The second category of cost is expenses borne by the present 16 member nations to enhance their own contributions to the alliance in support of accession. As NATO has adapted from a static defense to emphasize more-mobile operational concepts, the operational and strategic deployability of forces has been strengthened. As NATO enlarges, this characteristic is clearly desirable because it offers an alternative to larger permanently stationed forces. These force requirements are routinely developed through the NATO force planning process and funded by each nation. We have established that fulfilling existing force goals will fully prepare all current members for the strategic requirements introduced by NATO enlargement.

The third category of costs consists of the NATO common-funded accounts of which there are two major areas: The military budget which covers travel, common operations and maintenance, civilian salaries and pensions, training and exercises, etc. The other account is the NATO Security Investment Program or NSIP. This account, approximately $800 million in size, provides for infrastructure improvements and is the area most impacted by enlargement. The NATO Senior Resource Board prioritizes and funds projects to be executed from all these common accounts. The ongoing accession process will recommend projects required to improve infrastructure in the three invited countries to meet the minimum military requirement for an Article V response. It is this category of costs that will directly impact U.S. and allied expenditures for enlargement. National contributions to common funds are agreed on at the ministerial level and have remained fairly constant over the years. Presently, the U.S. provides about one fourth of the NATO common funds. The requirements for command and control, integrated air defense, reinforcement infrastructure, training and exercises, and related projects are the subject of a rigorous study that will be submitted to me in two weeks. I am confident that we have addressed all potential requirements in a comprehensive manner, and that NATO's final report based upon our requirements will accurately capture costs to NATO through the first decade after enlargement. This report is intended to support the December ministerials in Brussels.

Planning for Enlargement

Every year, NATO submits a Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) to each of its members. This DPQ document is used by each nation to provide a self-assessment of its military capabilities and contributions to the Alliance. This year, the three newly invited nations have also completed the DPQ. Because this is their first effort at this process, the SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) staff has worked closely with them to produce this detailed document. From this information, we are establishing Target Force Goals for the invited nations. Their force goals are "Targets" for this cycle because we recognize that accession does not occur until all nations ratify the process with a target of 1999. We are in the middle of this process now. NATO and SHAPE force planners have traveled to each of the three nations to assess their military capabilities. By the spring ministerials, NATO will be able to describe Target Force Goals for the new nations.

Military Capabilities of New Members

We welcome the military capabilities that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic bring to the alliance. First and foremost, all three nations have transitioned their militaries to civilian control under democratic political leadership. Although all have inventories of predominantly Soviet equipment, they recognize the need to modernize. As with many other nations, they are downsizing their force structures to finance modernization. We have been active with all three nations in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and they have all contributed units to the Implementation and Stabilization Forces in Bosnia. Poland and the Czech Republic also contributed forces to the Gulf War Coalition. Hungary has served as an invaluable staging area for NATO forces in Bosnia. In working with the invited nations, we have learned to respect and value their capabilities. All three are moving to adopt NATO standards and doctrine. Through the Partnership for Peace Program and our Bosnian interface, we have built a solid foundation for interoperability. During our survey of military facilities in the three new nations, we have been pleasantly surprised by both the quantity and quality of the infrastructure we saw. Let me expand on what they have found.

Poland

By far the largest of the three, Poland's military is downsizing from 214,000 to 180,000 troops. They have 1,700 tanks, 1,400 Armored Combat Vehicles (ACVs), 340 fighter aircraft, and a modest navy. At the recent ministerials in Maastricht, their Defense Minister pointed out that NATO membership is broadly supported in Poland by all political parties and 90 percent of the population. Key priorities are to enhance interoperability with NATO forces with modernization of equipment, starting with command and control elements and education in the English language and professional military courses. They have developed a 15-year plan to upgrade their military and are financing it with 2.2 percent of their GDP allocated toward defense. Our survey team was especially impressed with the infrastructure located in the Malbork area which featured a superb airfield, expansive training complex, extensive rail support to both and proximity to Baltic ports. This could prove to be an excellent NATO training complex comparable to Grafenwohr, Bergen, or Irwin.

Hungary

Hungary has 67,000 troops, 800 tanks, 1,300 ACVs and 150 fighter aircraft. They are weaning themselves from conscription and developing a professional corps of non-commissioned officers. At Maastricht, their Defense Minister said that Hungary recognizes its requirement to finance its proper share for NATO membership. They are prepared to commit the bulk of their forces to the common defense and are ready to participate in other Alliance missions such as peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. Hungary is initiating a comprehensive defense review in 1998 to posture its military to fully integrate into the NATO structure. They are emphasizing interoperability, especially in command and control, air defense and air control. The government has pledged to raise their defense expenditures by 0.1 percent of their GDP annually until 2001 when they will be spending 1.81 percent of GDP on defense. Hungary's NATO accession is supported by all political parties and they have launched a campaign to increase public awareness and support. Hungary has already demonstrated its ability to support major NATO force projections. Taborfalva and Taszar, the bases that supported IFOR (Implementation Force) and SFOR (Stabilization Force) deployments have been used by thousands of NATO troops.

Czech Republic

The Czech military has 65,000 troops, 950 tanks, 1,360 ACVs and 140 fighter aircraft. They committed to the challenge of meeting NATO standards. Their Defense Minister has identified the priority areas that they need to fix such as increasing the budget, defense planning and interoperability. Despite funding recovery from devastating floods, they are increasing their defense budget and by the year 2000 will be spending 2 percent of their GDP on defense. They have formed a high-level committee to address integration issues, chaired by the Prime Minister. They have pledged 90 percent of their forces to NATO's use and are aggressively pursuing language training, interoperability of air defense as well as command and control functions. They have recognized the need to build public support for NATO integration and are working a media campaign to inform the public. We can in fact see the momentum building in the Czech Republic, as evidenced by their energetic efforts to bring communication and information systems up to NATO standards even prior to accession.

Training/Integration

As the SHAPE staff works with NATO in assessing capabilities and requirements for the new nations, one area that I have directed them to examine closely is the area of training. Although we have a solid record of combined operations and exercises with the three nations, we have not fully exploited the capacity of structured command training to teach and reinforce NATO doctrine and standards, particularly leadership and decisionmaking. We have found it very successful in economically training our own forces, and I think it will have a direct application to rapidly enhancing the interoperability of our NATO allies. My goal is to make the new nations providers of security rather than consumers of security as quickly as possible.

Let me share how some of our major NATO Commands have been interfacing with the three new nations. From an air perspective one of my components, AIRCENT, the air arm of NATO's Central Region, has been interfacing with the Air Forces of the three new nations. Because flying safety demands close cooperation of all users, AIRCENT has developed a graduated and disciplined program to address interoperability with the new nations. They have prepared an Air Interoperability Handbook with separate sections on Flight Safety, Air Defense, Logistics, Air Refueling, etc. They are also pursuing an Air Operation English Course to supplement basic English courses. They have supported the European "Regional Airspace Initiative" to provide a common picture of air traffic in the region, with standardized command and control. This air picture will be exportable to NATO air command and control centers throughout Europe. All three invited nations have fully subscribed to this initiative.

On the ground, LANDCENT is even further along with respect to integration due to their long cooperative experience in Bosnia. Forces from Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have been full participants in both IFOR and SFOR. The Poles have been key players in the Nord-Pol Brigade where English is the language of command. The Czechs have been full partners with the Canadians and British. The Hungarian engineer battalion has been so useful and effective, our force planners are requesting that Hungary provide it permanently to NATO's Rapid Reaction Force. There remains a lot of work to be done of course, but the combination of Partnership for Peace and Balkan Peacekeeping have already welded a great deal of ground cooperation with the newly invited countries.

From a maritime perspective, only Poland has a navy, so less integration is required than in the above cases. Poland has been active in PfP naval activities and has successfully accomplished a number of exercises with NATO, particularly with their German and Danish counterparts.

These examples, demonstrate the range of activities we are pursuing to enhance our present activities with partner nations and when political guidance is received, to rapidly integrate the new nations. These initiatives serve to invest first "between the ears" rather than for additional hardware.

The U.S. European Command also has significant involvement with the three new countries. In 1992, we started a Joint Contact Team Program with Poland and now have the same in Hungary and the Czech Republic. In addition to numerous engagement activities common to all countries in the region, EUCOM (U.S. European Command) has intensified the exercise schedule with the three invited nations and has increased their opportunity to attend courses at the George C. Marshall Center where the role of the military in a democracy is emphasized. The State Partnership program matches U.S. National Guard units from Illinois with Poland, Ohio with Hungary and Texas with the Czech Republic. All of these activities, as well as bilateral security assistance efforts have accelerated the progress of interoperability and reduced the remaining tasks for full interoperability with NATO.

Conclusion

Throughout the remainder of this century and into the next, the United States has the historic opportunity to help expand security and democracy in Europe. Adapting NATO to the present day realities is the most important step we can take toward making this possibility become reality. NATO will continue to set the conditions peace in Europe well into the 21st Century, and, as in the past, U.S. leadership will remain key to success. Any assessment of costs should include the potential costs and risks of not taking advantage of these rare circumstances.

Again, I appreciate the opportunity to address the committee and I look forward to answering your questions.