Congressional Documents

SEN. HELMS: The committee will come to order.

And, Madame Secretary, as you know, we welcome you. We appreciate your being our lead-off witness as the Foreign Relations Committee begins its consideration of NATO expansion.

For nearly 50 years, NATO has defended democracy against communism and other forms of tyranny in Europe. Despite that success, many Americans will never forget the betrayal at Yalta which left millions of Europeans behind enemies lines.

Today, with the expansion of the NATO alliance, we have an historic opportunity to right that wrong by accepting Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO. Americans should welcome these nations as they finally become equal partners in the community of democratic nations, thereby ensuring that their new democracies shall never again fall victim to tyranny.

If Europe and the United States are to enjoy a century of peace upcoming, one that does not replicate the bloody wars of the past century, we must embrace these democracies and guide them and show them, show them a way from their tragic histories of ethnic division and war.

That said, there's a right way and a wrong way to proceed with NATO expansion. We in the Senate recognize that this vital undertaking is not without cost to the United States, and I am convinced that the three new democracies are willing and eager to bear their fair share. But we must now make certain that our present NATO allies are likewise willing to fulfill their end of the bargain.

Just last week our allies made clear to us that they expect the United States, meaning the American taxpayers, to pay the lion's share of the cost of expansion. Now, Madame Secretary, ratification of NATO expansion by the United States Senate may very well succeed or fail on the question of whether you can dissuade our allies of that notion.

Further, we must resist any temptation by the leadership of our country to rush forward into an ill-considered NATO partnership with Russia. Now while the United States is willing to take steps to demonstrate that NATO represents absolutely no threat to a democratic Russia, NATO's relations with Russia must be restrained by the reality that Russia's future commitment to peace and democracy, as of this day, is far from certain. In fact, I confess a fear that the United States' overture toward Russia may already have gone a bit far.

I believe, Madame Secretary, that it is fair to expect the administration to outline a clear strategic rationale for NATO expansion and to explain clearly to the United States Senate what potential threats NATO may face in the 21st century and why an expanded NATO alliance is necessary to counter such threats.

To illustrate, it's self-evident, I think, that one such potential threat will manifest itself if and when Russia takes a turn for the worse.

Now in your testimony today, Madame Secretary, I hope that you will address this and other possible threats to Europe's security.

Now we live at a time when the United States finds few allies within NATO or elsewhere in the struggle for freedom. Too many expect the American taxpayers to pay the bills and to leave the driving force up to these other nations.

For example, France boasts of investments to prop up the terrorist regime in Iran, a regime that has spilled the blood of American and French citizens alike. In fact, the European Union waits with bated breath for Iran to allow their ambassadors to return to Teheran. Oct 07, 1997 10:46 ET

Denmark and the Netherlands, both having courageously condemned China's human rights record in Geneva earlier this year, now find themselves in the incomprehensible position of being sanctioned by the Chinese, while their opportunistic European Union partners rush to enrich themselves with new business opportunities.

So somehow, an understanding must be made clear that the United States did not create the NATO alliance and prepare for war and send our troops to fight and die in Europe, and spend our country into debt for 50 years, simply to defend European real estate or European economic interests. Our commitment was, first and foremost, to the defense of democracy and the preservation of human liberty, and it must remain so.

So many of our Cold War allies have so quickly forgotten how close they came to losing their freedoms. But you, Madame Secretary, more than most know that freedom cannot be taken for granted because your family personally suffered the terror of tyranny, ignored or tolerated by those entrusted with the leadership at that time.

NATO has yet to fight a war because NATO was thoroughly convinced, and convincing, all along that NATO has been prepared to fight a war, if necessary. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the American people have turned their attention to problems at home. There is no audible demand by the American people to play the role of international referee or world policeman. Together, we must explain to the American people that NATO enlargement is vital precisely because it will secure peace and security into the next century and ensure, at the same time, that America will not be called upon once again to save Europe from the advance of tyranny.

And, Madame Secretary, as I conclude, I want to share with you and others here today a passage written by the man I consider the greatest statesman of the 20th century, Winston Churchill. In his 1929 book, "The Aftermath," Mr. Churchill tried to warn the world about the slide down the slippery slope toward the next world war. At first, his apprehensions fell on deaf ears. And in connection with that, Mr. Churchill years later wrote the following, with which I shall conclude. He said, "Through the faithful toil-burdened masses, the victory was so complete that no further effort seemed required. Germany had fallen, and with her the combination that had crushed her. Authority was dispersed, the world unshackled. The weak became the strong, the sheltered became the aggressive. The contrast between victors and vanquished tended continually to diminish.

"A vast fatigue," he said, "dominated collective action, and through every subversive element endeavored to insert itself. Revolutionary raids, like every other form of physic energy, burnt low. Through all five acts the drama had run its course," he said. "The light of history is switched off, the world stage dimmed, the actors shrivel, the chorus sings: The war of the giants has ended. The quarrels of the pygmies has begun."

And I think that just about says it all.

Senator Biden?

SEN. JOE BIDEN (D-DE): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madame Secretary, welcome. It's always a pleasure to have you here.

Mr. Chairman, I've stated my support for NATO enlargement many times on the floor of the United States Senate and in private forums, so today I'll only summarize my rationale for this policy.

Europe remains a vital interest of the United States. Other than North America, no other region can match Europe's combination of political, economy, military and cultural power and significance to the United States. The European Union, for example, has a population one-third larger than ours, and a combined GDP slightly greater than ours. A large percentage of the world's democracies are in Europe. By any geo-political standard, it would be a catastrophe for American interests if instability were to alter the current situation in Europe.

After the Cold War, there are new threats to Europe: ethnic and religious conflicts; one nation crossing the borders of another, as Yugoslavia did in Bosnia; international crime and drugs; also, I might note, a possible future threat to Mideast oil supplies. For this reason, enlargement is being combined with a new strategic doctrine and a force posture that provides a more mobile and capable force projection capability in an event of any of those crises. In the 21st century -- excuse me, in the 20th century, Europeans have proven incapable if left to themselves of settling their differences peacefully. The United States, seems to me, must continue in leading the new security architecture for that continent for if we don't, I don't know who will.

In this context, admitting Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary into NATO will extend the zone of security to Central Europe in a way that if left un-done will leave a gray zone and insecurity in that region. The question, I would emphasize, is not enlarge NATO or remain the same. The status quo, Madame Secretary, in my view is not an option. If we were not to enlarge the countries between Germany and Russia would inevitably seek other means to protect themselves, creating bilateral or multilateral alliances as they did in the '30s, with, I predict, similar results.

There is also a powerful morals argument for enlargement: Redeeming our pledge to former captive nations to rejoin the West, both NATO and the EU when I say the West, because the Europeans, I think, has to step up to that ball as well. When they're fully -- when they're fully qualified to join both, their security will be fully secured. This Fall's final accession talks between NATO and each of the three candidate countries, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, will reveal whether each of them meets the alliance's demanding qualifications and based on my look at it and my travels, I believe they do.

Enlargement, Mr. Chairman, need not adversely affect our relations with Russia. We must re-double our political economic engagement with that country in my view and the NATO-Russian founding act of May of 1997 is a significant step in the right direction in the Partnership for Peace arrangements are equally as important.

The NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council created by the founding act has begun functioning. I especially look forward to the fourth in our series of hearings on October 30th when we'll examine the new NATO-Russian relationship.

Mr. Chairman, two big issues in my view must be solved before the Senate considers ratification. One is directly related, one not as directly but they're both important. Bosnia and cost-sharing. If Bosnia is a proto-typical European crisis of the 21st century, then in the coming weeks, and I mean weeks, the United States and its NATO allies had better come up with a workable post-SFOR scenario.

Similarly, while the United States must continue to exercise its leadership role in NATO, our European and Canadian alliance partners must agree, as you indicated, to step up to the plate and bear their fair share of enlargement costs.

The definitive NATO study on cost will come out in December. In anticipation of the report, this committee will hold its third hearing on NATO enlargement on October 22nd. We'll examine the cost and burden-sharing items, so I'll not speak much to those today in my questioning.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that admitting Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to NATO -- if they meet the qualifications, which they appear to -- will be in the best security interest of the United States of America. I believe to do otherwise would extend a zone of instability, rather than stability.

I look forward to the secretary's testimony. And thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for setting up an aggressive series of hearings prior to the requirement for us to decide whether or not to expand the Washington treaty or not. Thank you.

SEN. HELMS: Thank you, Senator.

Now we will hear from you, Madame Secretary.

SEC. ALBRIGHT: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, members of the committee, it is with a sense of appreciation and anticipation that I come before you to urge support for the admission of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to NATO.

Each of us is playing our part today in the long unfolding story of America's modern partnership with Europe. That story began not at the Madrid summit, nor when the Berlin Wall fell, but half a century ago, when your predecessors and mine dedicated our nation to the goal of a secure, united Europe. It was then that we sealed a peacetime alliance open not only the nations which shared our victory in World War II, but to our former adversaries. It was then that this committee unanimously recommended that the Senate approve the North Atlantic Treaty.

On that day the leaders of this body rose above partisanship and they rose to the challenge of a pivotal moment in history.

Mr. Chairman, I believe you are continuing that tradition. I thank you for your decision to hold these hearings early, for the bipartisan manner in which you and Senator Biden are conducting them, and for the serious way in which you have framed our discussion. I'm honored to be a part of what you have rightly called the beginning of the process of advice and consent.

As I said, I've very conscious of history today. I hope we can take a moment to remember what was said half a century ago about the alliance we are striving to renew and expand today.

Senator Arthur Vandenberg, Chairman Helm's extraordinary predecessor, predicted that NATO would become the greatest war deterrent in history. He was right. American forces have never fought, never had to fire a shot to defend a NATO ally. This committee predicted that NATO would free the minds of men in many nations from a haunting sense of insecurity and enable them to work and plan with that confidence in the future, which is essential to economic recovery and progress. Your predecessors were also right.

President Truman said that the NATO pact will be a positive, not a negative, influence for peace, and its influence will be felt, not only in the area specifically covered, but throughout the world. And he was right, too.

Thanks in no small part to NATO, we live in a different world. Our Soviet adversary has vanished. Freedom's flag has been unfurled from the Baltics to Bulgaria. As I speak to you today, our immediate survival is not at risk. Indeed you may ask if the principle of collective defense in NATO's heart is relevant to the challenges of a wider and freer Europe. You may ask why, in this time of relative peace, are we so focused on security? The answer is we want the peace to last, we want freedom to endure, and we believe there are still potential threats to our security emanating from European soil. You have asked me, Mr. Chairman, what these threats are. I want to answer as plainly as I can.

First, there are the dangers of Europe's past. It is easy to forget this, but for centuries, virtually every European nation treated virtually every other as a military threat. That pattern was broken only when NATO was born and only in the half century of Europe NATO covered. With NATO, each member's security came to depend on cooperation with others, not competition. That is one reason why NATO remains essential. It is also one reason why we need a larger NATO, which extends its positive influence to Europe's other half.

The second set of dangers lies in Europe's present. Because of the conflict in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union, Europe has already buried more victims of war since the Berlin Wall fell than in all the years of the Cold War. It is sobering to recall that this violence has its roots in the same problems of shattered states and of ethnic hatreds that tyrants exploited to start this century's great wars.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, and most important, we must consider the dangers of Europe's future; by this I mean direct threats against the soil of NATO members that our collective defense pact is designed to meet. Some are visible on Europe's horizon, such as the threat posed by rogue states with dangerous weapons; others may not seem apparent today, but they are not unthinkable. Within this category lie questions about the future of Russia. We want Russian democracy to endure; we're optimistic that it will. But one should not dismiss the possibility that Russian could return to the patterns of its past. By engaging Russia and enlarging NATO, we give Russia every incentive to deepen its commitment to peaceful relations with neighbors, while closing the avenue to more destructive alternatives.

We do not know what other dangers may arise 10, 20 or even 50 years from now. We do now that whatever the future may hold, it will be in our interests to have a vigorous and larger alliance with those European democracies that share our values and our determination to defend them.

We recognize NATO expansion involves the solemn expansion of American responsibilities in Europe. As Americans, we take our commitments seriously and we do not extend them lightly. Mr. Chairman, you and I certainly agree that any major extension of American commitment must serve America's strategic interests. Let me explain why welcoming the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland into NATO meets that test.

First, a larger NATO will make us safer by expanding the area in Europe where wars simply do not happen. By making clear that we will fight if necessary to defend our allies, it makes it less likely our troops will ever be called upon to do so. Now, you may say that no part of Europe faces any immediate threat of arms attack today; that is true, and the purpose of enlargement is to keep it that way. Senator Vandenberg said it in 1941: NATO is not built to stop a war after it starts, although its potentialities in this regard are infinite; it is built to stop wars before they start.

It is also fair to ask if it is in our vital interest to prevent conflict in Central Europe. Some have implied it is not. I'm sure you've even heard a few people trot out what I call the "consonant cluster clause" -- the myth that in times of crisis Americans will make no sacrifice to defend a distant city with an unpronounceable name; that we will protect the freedom of Strasbourg but not Szczecin, Barcelona but not Brno.

Let's not deceive ourselves, we are a European power. We have an interest in the fate of the 200 million people who live in the nations between the Baltic and Black Seas. We waged the Cold War in part because these nations were held captive. And we fought World War II in part because these nations had been invaded. If there were a major threat to the security of their region, we would want to act -- enlargement or no enlargement. Our aim must be to prevent that kind of threat from arising.

The second reason why enlargement passes the test of national interest is that it will make NATO stronger and more cohesive. The Poles, Hungarians and Czechs are passionately committed to NATO and its principles of shared responsibility. Their forces have already risked their lives alongside ours -- from the Gulf War to Bosnia.

I know you've expressed concern that enlargement could dilute NATO by adding too many members and by involving the alliance in too many missions. Let me assure you that we invited only the strongest candidates to join, and nothing about enlargement will change NATO's core mission, which remains the collective defense of NATO soil.

At the same time, it's important to remember that NATO has always served a political function, too. It binds our allies to just as it binds us to our allies. So when you consider the candidacy of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, I ask you to consider this: On the issues that matter, from non-proliferation to human rights to U.N. reform, here are three nations we have been able to count on and will be able to count on.

Mr. Chairman, the third reason why a large NATO serves our interests is that the very promise of it gives the nations of Central and Eastern Europe an incentive to solve their own problems. To align themselves with NATO, aspiring countries have strengthened their democratic institutions, made sure soldiers serve civilians, signed 10 major accords that resolve virtually old ethnic and border dispute in the region.

I have been a student of Central European history and I have lived some of it myself. When I see Romanians and Hungarians building a genuine friendship after centuries of enmity, when I see Poles, Ukrainians and Lithuanians forming joint military units after years of suspicion, when I see Czechs and Germans overcoming decades of mistrust, when I see Central Europeans confident enough to improve their political and economic ties with Russia, I know something remarkable is happening.

NATO is doing for Europe's East precisely what it did, precisely what this committee predicted it would do for Europe's West after World War II. This is another reminder that the contingencies we do not want our troops to face, such as ethnic conflict, border skirmishes, and social unrest, are far more easily avoided with NATO enlargement than without it.

In short, a larger NATO will make America safer, NATO stronger, and Europe more peaceful and united.

That is the strategic rationale, but I would be disingenuous if I did not tell you I see a moral imperative, too. NATO defines the community of interest among the free nations of North America and Europe that both preceded and outlasted the Cold War. Americans have long argued that the nations of Central Europe belong to the same democratic family as our allies in Western Europe. As Americans, we should be heartened so many of them wish to join the institutions we did so much to build.

We should also think about what would happen if we were to turn them away. That would mean freezing NATO at its Cold War membership and preserving the old Iron Curtain as its eastern frontier. It would mean locking out a whole group of otherwise qualified democracies simply because they were once, against their will, members of the Warsaw Pact. Why would America choose to be allied with Europe's old democracies forever, but its new democracies never? Were we to do that, confidence would crumble in Central Europe, leading to a search for security by other means, including costly arms buildups and competition among neighbors.

We have chosen a better way. We've chosen to look at the landscape of the new Europe and to ask a simple question: Which of these nations that are so clearly important to our security are ready to contribute to our security? The answer to that question is before you today, awaiting your affirmation.

I said at the outset, Mr. Chairman, that there are weighty voices on both sides of this debate. Let me address a few of the concerns I expect you will consider fully.

First, we all want to make sure that the costs of a larger NATO are distributed fairly. Last February the administration made a preliminary estimate of America's share. Now we are working with our allies to produce a common estimate by the December meeting of the North Atlantic Council. At this point, the numbers we agree upon, as 16 allies, are needed prior to any further calculations made in Washington.

I know that you're holding separate hearings on this question, but I will say this. I am convinced that the cost of expansion is real but affordable. I am certain our prospective allies are willing and able to pay their share because, in the long run, it will be cheaper for them to upgrade their forces within the alliance than outside it. I will insist that our old allies share this burden fairly. That is what NATO is all about.

I know there are serious people who estimate that a larger NATO will cost far more than we've anticipated. The key fact about our estimate is that it is premised on the current favorable security environment in Europe. Obviously, if a grave threat were to arise, the cost of enlargement would grow, but then so would the cost of our entire defense budget.

In any case, there are budgetary constraints in all 16 NATO democracies that will prevent costs from ballooning. That is why the main focus of our discussion, Mr. Chairman, and our consultations with our allies, needs to be on defining the level of military capability we want our old and new allies to have and then making sure that they commit to it. We should spend no more than we must, but no less than we need, to keep NATO strong.

Another common concern about NATO enlargement is that it might damage our cooperation with a democratic Russia. Russian opposition to NATO enlargement is real, but we should see it for what it is, a the product of old misperceptions about NATO and old ways of thinking about its former satellites in Central Europe. Instead of changing our policies to accommodate Russia's outdated fears, we need to encourage Russia's more modern aspirations. This means we should remain Russia's most steadfast champion whenever it seeks to define its greatness by joining rule-based institutions, opening markets, and participating constructively in world affairs. But when some Russian leaders suggest that a larger NATO is a threat, we owe it the candor to say that is false and to base our policies on what we know to be true.

I believe our approach is producing results, from our cooperation in Bosnia to agreements to pursue deeper arms cuts, to new signs that the START II Treaty may be moving ahead in the Duma, to NATO's new relationship with Russia. I know that some are concerned that this relationship with Russia may actually go too far. You have asked me for an affirmation, Mr. Chairman, that the North Atlantic Council remain NATO's supreme decision-making body. Let me say it clearly: It does, and it will.

The NATO-Russia Founding Act gives Russia no opportunity to dilute, delay or block NATO decisions.

Another important concern is that enlargement may create a new dividing line in Europe between a larger NATO and the countries that will not join in the first round. We have taken a range of steps to ensure this does not happen; from NATO's commitment to an open-door policy, to a stronger Partnership for Peace, to the new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Among the countries that still aspire to membership there is enthusiastic support for the process NATO has begun. They understand a simple fact: with enlargement, no new democracy is permanently excluded; without enlargement, every new democracy would be permanently excluded. The most important thing the Senate can do to reassure them now is to get the ball rolling by ratifying the admission of the first three candidates.

A final concern I wish to address has to do with Bosnia. Some have suggested our debate on NATO enlargement simply cannot be separated from our actions and decisions in that troubled country. I agree with them. Both are aimed at building a stable, undivided Europe. It was our experience in Bosnia that proved a fundamental premise of our enlargement strategy: there are still threats to security in Europe that only NATO can meet. We cannot know today if our mission in Bosnia will achieve all its goals, but we can say that whatever may happen, our interest in a larger, stronger NATO will endure long after the last foreign soldier has left that country. We can also say that NATO will remain the most powerful instrument we have for building effective military coalitions such as SFOR. At the same time, Bosnia does not by itself define the future of a larger NATO. NATO's most important aim -- if I can paraphrase Arthur Vandenberg -- is to prevent wars before they start so it does not have to keep the peace after they stop.

These are some of the principal concerns I wanted to address today. I know our discussion is just beginning. I'm glad that it will also involve other committees of the Senate, the NATO Observers Group and the House of Representatives.

Most important, I am glad it will involve the American people. When these three new democracies join NATO in 1999, as I trust they will, it will be a victory for us all, Mr. Chairman. And on that day, we will be standing on the shoulders of many. We will be thankful to all those who waged the Cold War on the side of freedom, to all those who championed the idea of a larger NATO; to all those members of Congress, from both parties, who voted for resolutions urging the admission of these three nations; to all those Republican members who made NATO enlargement part of their Contract with America. And now, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, all of our allies and future allies are watching you for one simple reason; the American Constitution is unique in the power it grants to the legislative branch over foreign policy, especially over treaties.

In this matter, you and the American people you represent are truly in the driver's seat. That is as it should be. In fact, I enjoy going to Europe and telling our allies, "This is what we want to do, but ultimately, it will be up to our Senate and our people to decide." I say that with pride because it tells them something about America's faith in the democratic process.

But I have to tell you that I say it with confidence, as well. I believe that when the time comes for the Senate to decide, Mr. Chairman, you and I and the American people will stand together, for I know that the policy we ask you to embrace is a policy that the administration and Congress shape together. And I am certain that it advances the fundamental interests of the United States.

Thank you very much.

SEN. HELMS: Thank you, Madame Secretary. A very eloquent statement, and it will be written about and talked about for some time because this is an important subject. It's an important milestone in, not only the history of this country, but the world.

We are going to have a round of six-minute questions by each senator, and I hope that they will not be taking up by statements up until 10 seconds before the red light comes on -- (laughter) -- and, therefore, give you a chance to answer.

Reports that NATO intends to consult with Russia on such fundamental matters as the military strategy and nuclear doctrine of the alliance have caused great concern among a great many leaders of our country, past and present. They, you better believe, are contacting me with suggestions. Now, how can NATO consult with Russia, on these and other matters, without compromising the security or decision-making process of NATO?

And I guess that leads to a second question: Will you establish firewalls in NATO's relations with Russia and assure that Russia has neither a voice nor a veto in NATO discussions of issues such as arms control, strategic doctrine, and further alliance expansion?

A pretty hefty question, but I know you can handle it.

SEC. ALBRIGHT: Thank you. Mr. Chairman, we are pleased with the development of the NATO-Russia relationship to date. We believe that the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and the Permanent Joint Council it created, offers real opportunities to develop a partnership between NATO and Russia through regular consultations and activities to build practical cooperation. I've been very pleased with the early work of that council, including its first ministerial meeting in New York on September 26th, and I think that in many ways that was quite a remarkable meeting in starting this process out. I believe that these elements of the NATO-Russia relationship, together with our bilateral efforts to integrate Russia more fully into the rest of the West, are beginning to bear fruit.

At the same time, let me be very clear about your concern. The Founding Act, and the Permanent Joint Council created as a result, do not provide Russia any role in decisions the alliance takes on internal matters. The way NATO organizes itself, conducts its business, or plans, prepares for, and conducts those missions which affect only its members, such as collective defense, as stated under Article 5.

The Permanent Joint Council will not be a forum in which NATO's basic strategy doctrine and readiness are negotiated with Russia. Nor will NATO use the Permanent Joint Council as a substitute for formal arms control negotiations, such as the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe CFE Treaty.

Consistent with our past approach to relations with Russia, NATO will continue to explain to Russia its general policy on a full range of issues, including its basic military doctrine and defense policy. Such explanation will not extend to a level of detail that could in any way compromise the effectiveness of NATO's military forces. Such explanations will only be offered -- and I state this very emphatically -- after NATO has first set its policies on issues affecting internal matters. NATO has not and will not discuss these issues with Russia prior to making decisions within the North Atlantic Council.

Now, further, the Permanent Joint Council operates by mutual agreement, which means both NATO and Russia must agree to discuss an issue in the first place.

NATO's policy always will first be established by consensus, requiring all allies' agreement.

Moreover, NATO is not required to discuss any issue. The Founding Act is a political commitment, not a legal document. The U.S. thus will always retain the ability to prevent the Permanent Joint Council from discussing any issue which it does not want addressed, for whatever reason, within that forum.

So let me just reemphasize, I can assure you that the Permanent Joint Council will never be used to make decisions on NATO doctrine, strategy, or readiness. The North Atlantic Council is NATO's supreme decision-making body, and it is sacrosanct. Russia will not play a part in the NAC or NATO decision-making, and it will never have a veto over NATO policy. Any discussion with Russia of NATO doctrine will be for explanatory, not decision-making, purposes.

But I also would like to state, Mr. Chairman, that I think we will find the Permanent Joint Council a very useful mechanism for having discussions with Russia on issues of mutual interest. And if the first meeting that we just held in New York is an example of it, I look forward to seeing that as a very useful mechanism as we develop our relationship with a democratic Russia.

SEN. HELMS: Very quickly, because the yellow light's on -- and that's a good answer to my question, and I appreciate it -- have our allies met the current defense obligations to which they have committed themselves, as members of NATO?

SEC. ALBRIGHT: They -- yes, they have. I mean, they -- we are all part of how we burden-share, in terms of allotments for NATO.

As you know, the NATO budget is -- there are really two parts to it. There are common budgets, for which there are assessments. And then each country provides within its defense budget to live up to its obligations under NATO. And I believe that they are doing so, and I also believe that they will do so as we go through developing processes for the payment of the enlargement.

SEN. HELMS: Very well.

Our distinguished ranking member, Mr. Biden.

SEN. BIDEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madame Secretary, I've had the occasion now -- it seems a little premature -- to have debated this subject in different fora with several of my colleagues who oppose the expansion of NATO -- recently before a group of chief executive officers and opinion leaders from one of our states, who are here in town. And in the meetings that Senator Roth and I have set up in this NATO Observer Group, here our colleagues come in and state their either support, opposition or concern in the closed meetings. And it seems to be coming down to a pretty basic thing. It's kind of ironic. On the one hand, the only thing that seems to be carrying the momentum right now in the minds of many of colleagues and the American people is the moral imperative; and that is that Poland, and particularly Hungary and the Czech Republic, were left behind the curtain, the curtain is up, now is the time to let them come East -- or come West from the East. But there is very little knowledge -- or I shouldn't say knowledge. There's very little consensus about why this is in the vital interest of the United States to do so. Very few people believe that adding -- as brave and as valiant as they may be -- the Polish army and the Czech army and the Hungarian army -- are any more like to make them sleep more safely in Peoria than they sleep today.

And so the arguments I hear -- and I'm going to recite them very briefly and then stop and ask you to comment, because I think they're the essence of what we're going to have to answer in order to prevail. You indicated that the American will come along. I think there's only one lesson I take away from the Vietnam War, and that is a foreign policy, no matter how well or (full ?) or constructive, cannot be maintained without the informed consent of the American people. And right now there is not informed consent. Right now there is -- if you asked the American people do they think there's a need for NATO, do they like spending $120 billion a year -- whatever allocation we would conclude -- warrants -- would be accountable to our NATO membership, I suspect you'd find them to say the same thing I hear from my colleagues: Why can't Europe do this? Why not leave well enough alone? If we expand, the alliance will lose its vitality -- as one of the senior colleagues on the Armed Services Committee said in a debate I recently had with him to this audience: It ain't broke, so don't fix it. If you expand it, what you're going to do is you're going to diminish consensus. We have a hard enough time getting 16 people now -- 16 nations now to agree; expand it by three or more, it's going to even be more difficult to have consensus. You're going to do what was done 300 years ago in Poland when the princes got together and each had a veto; you're going to allow it to crumble.

These are the arguments that I keep hearing. But at its root, it's this argument: "Look, Europe," as one of our colleague says, "of the six largest armies in the world, five are in Asia. Our economic future lies in Asia. We have a disproportionate allocation of our resources in Europe. Why are we doing this?"

And it comes down, in my view, to the need to answer the following question, and I will cease when I ask it: Why cannot the Europeans take care of themselves? Their GDP is larger than ours. Their population is larger than ours. And as my father said in a different context to me in discussion, not since the Roman army invaded Europe, quelled the pagans, has there been an occupying army that's stayed in place as long as we have been required to stay in place in Europe. Why?

I believe you and the president in particular are going to have to carry that argument to the people, in explanation of that question. Why can Europe not do this themselves? Why do we have to be involved?

I think I am like that old joke about the Texan who says, "I don't know much about art, but I know what I like." I feel firmly I know the answer to that. But I think until it's explained to the American people, we're going to have this shadow debate about a lot of things other than why can't the Europeans do this by themselves; why do we need to be in Europe.

SEC. ALBRIGHT: Senator Biden, I think that that is a key question that we have to answer. And let me just say here that one has to really hark to history.

First of all, as both you and the chairman said, through -- our history is tied to the history of Europe -- even before, obviously, the 20th century. Our values and a great deal of our history comes from Europe. And strategically Europe is key to the United States in terms of its population, its economy, its geostrategic structure.

But let me also say that what is evident because of that -- those aspects -- we have found that when we have not paid attention to Europe, ultimately because those elements are so strong, we are drawn into dealing with Europe's problems often at a -- often -- always at a much greater cost than would have been there in the first place.

I believe very strongly that this is a very smart additional preventive measure, because history has shown us that we will go into Europe when we see massive wars that involve people that we are very closely related to, when it involves our economic and strategic interests.

Now, we are not an occupying power in Europe, we are a partner. And the point of this is that NATO does in fact bind us to Europe in a way that keeps us there as a partner and not as an occupying power, but as an invited partner. And I believe that if we do not stay there now and say "Let the Europeans do it," history will show us that we will be back and we will be back at much greater cost than if we were to do it now at a lesser cost as a partner and not as someone that has to go dig them out of a mess.

SEN. HELMS: Senator Lugar?

SEN. RICHARD LUGAR (R-IN): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Albright, in my judgment, the NATO enlargement debate has thus far largely ignored the central question of NATO's basic purpose. The Senate's ratification debate over new alliance members should start with that question, and I commend Chairman Helms for focusing on that theme in this committee's initial hearing.

Many of us within the Congress and the administration have been working hard to ensure ratification of the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic -- perhaps too busy to define NATO's purpose. But issues associated with purpose and burdensharing will come up in the ratification proceedings. The answers will be key to the ratification, but also for the future of NATO.

First, the absence of a clearly-defined and understood purpose can complicate the implementation of enlargement by making it appear as if the alliance's exclusive mission is to defend its members against some future yet ill-defined threat from the East. While not insignificant, such a preoccupation could, in turn, focus allied militaries on the wrong problem, particularly if major strategic threats to the United States and its allies are elsewhere.

Second, the act of enlargement is becoming confused with the alliance's reason for existing. And the issue of future additional members could either cause further delay in addressing NATO's core purpose, or be delayed by inadequate definition of the alliance's core missions.

Third, the alliance force planning, goals and programs must be based on a military strategy, and which in turn must be shaped by a strategic purpose. Adequate defense spending and the modernization and restructuring of outdated forces will not occur in the absence of strategic purpose.

Fourth, the United States' strategy and technology are driven by global priorities, while European forces are focused on territorial defense and thus are largely irrelevant to U.S. priorities. The recent Quadrennial Defense Review does not substantially take account of NATO, Europe or the allies in U.S. global strategy and requirement. In short, to judge by the QDR, America's main alliance is not confronting the main security problems of the United States. Despite alliance emphasis on defense of its members' territory under Article 5 of the Washington treaty, and the kinds of peace operations and crisis management under Article 4, NATO is in need of strategic direction. This should be accomplished before or in parallel with further decisions about forces, command, structure and membership.

To oversimplify, I believe there are at least two strategic alternatives that could drive the alliance's core purpose. The first is for NATO to be the guarantor of European security; and thus, NATO's mission is identified with a European mission and should dovetail with Europe's danger.

The second is for NATO to serve as the vehicle by which American and Europeans protect their common interests -- wherever challenged. While it subsumes the first, it also suggests that the Atlantic Alliance can and should confront the rising threats to the interests of members beyond Europe.

Geography is the chief criteria of the first strategy; interests are what matter in the second. These two strategic alternatives point toward quite different futures and may suggest different approaches to future enlargement to further encourage -- or rather engagement of PFP partners to burdensharing, to structuring forces and command.

Secretary Albright, where does the administration stand on the definition of our strategic alternatives, and what strategic direction or rationale will it promote within the alliance?

SEC. ALBRIGHT: Senator Lugar, let me say that there are two parts to the answer of this question. First of all, clearly, the basic objective originally of NATO, which was a collective defense treaty to deal with Europe, continues to be in place and, in fact, is adapted in order to deal with the changing security environment and, obviously, the change that has taken place with the end of the Cold War. And there have been studies that have been undertaken internally in order to adapt the strategic concept of NATO to the more current threats that it faces.

If I might say -- to dovetail on a question -- on a point that Senator Biden made, that those who say "it ain't broke, don't fix it" -- the truth is it ain't suitable for what we're doing now, so it needs to be fixed. Europe looks very different. And I would ask you to review what I said in my opening statement: What would happen if we didn't, one, adapt NATO and enlarge it, because otherwise we would be dealing with the past instead of dealing with the future. Oct 07, 1997 12:35 ET

At the same time, Senator, I do think that there has been an incredible amount of creativity in terms of developing institutional structures, such as the EAPC or the Partnership for Peace, that allows us to look at how to use an enlarged NATO -- or NATO along with subsidiary organs -- to deal with peacekeeping, to deal with the threats from -- potential threats from some of the rogue states. And I find what is going on is a very good exercise in creativity, with substantial backing from strategic thinkers in terms of how to use what is the best military alliance in the history of the world to deal with the new threats, both geographically and the ones that you mentioned. That process is going on. These are not two mutually exclusive goals.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you.

SEN. HELMS: Senator Sarbanes?

SEN. PAUL SARBANES (D-MD): Well, Madame Secretary, I want to join with my colleagues in welcoming you before the committee. As everyone has indicated, this is the beginning of an extended process to examine carefully this issue.

I want to get some sense at the outset about the path that we will be placed upon and where it will lead and what the timing is as we move forward. And so I'd like first to just get a sense of the parameters of the timing. How do you see that unfolding?

SEC. ALBRIGHT: Well, Senator, as of right now we are dealing both with our allies and the invitees to develop what would be their defense plans and the budget that goes with it. We would hope that by December -- this is the plan -- there would be the NAC ministerial, at which the accession protocols would be signed. Then our plan would be to submit the treaty to you formally and have in fact the official debate going on.

At the same time, there would be a ratification debate going on in the parliaments of the other NATO members. And then we would be able to in fact have the full member -- the new NATO, the enlarged NATO, at the 50th anniversary in 1999.

SEN. SARBANES: Now is the December meeting of the North Atlantic Council the meeting in which you expect approval of the entry of the three countries into NATO?

SEC. ALBRIGHT: From the perspective that they have the power to do that, the accession protocols would be signed. Obviously it is not final until this is ratified and goes through the constitutional processes of each individual country.

SEN. SARBANES: Now at that point, will the costs -- the burden of the costs be outlined or will that be something to be developed later?

SEC. ALBRIGHT: No, I mean, that is -- the plan is that the comprehensive NATO and cost report would be approved by the NATO minister in December. Now, I have to stress again, as I stressed in my statement, those are to do with the costs in the current environment. They would have worked out as a result of very careful work among the allies as well as what is going on now, Senator Sarbanes, in terms of our people going around talking with the three invitees about developing their specific defense plans.

SEN. SARBANES: I'm having some difficulty in understanding why the 50th anniversary of either the Congress's approval of the Marshal Plan or the entry into force of the Marshall Plan is relevant as a date by which this process ought to move. I wonder if you could enlighten me on that.

SEC. ALBRIGHT: Well, we have been celebrating the 50th anniversary of everything. (Laughter.)

SEN. SARBANES: Well, I understand that.

SEC. ALBRIGHT: And -- are you suggesting, Senator --

SEN. SARBANES: I take it that -- I take it that's about the only rationale for it. (Laughter.)

SEC. ALBRIGHT: We believe, Senator, that actually it's -- that the debates will be going on in the various parliaments. We want to give the public a chance to really be a part of the debate. We would like to be early on in the ratification process because we are the United States and provide the leadership. We --

SEN. SARBANES: I take --

SEC. ALBRIGHT: -- thought it would be a nice time, but it could be earlier if everyone were ready to go obviously.

SEN. SARBANES: I take it once that process is completed, then the immediate issue before us as we're moving down this path would be the accession to NATO of other countries which are seeking to become members. Would that be correct?

SEC. ALBRIGHT: We have said that -- it's an ongoing process. We have not specifically set a date for the next tranche, and we will be considering new members in -- we have said hypothetically, that it could take place after these members were full members, which is where we have put it, in 1999.

SEN. SARBANES: Well, isn't it reasonable to assume that once these members are dealt with, that that issue will then be immediately before us?

SEC. ALBRIGHT: It is reasonable to assume that. I think that there are countries that wish to be considered in the next tranche. There are those that we would like to be looking at that are, as part of the Partnership for Peace process, already very much involved with what we're doing. We are setting up relationships with those countries. So this is an ongoing process, Senator.

SEN. SARBANES: Well, that would encompass not only, say, the two that were considered at Madrid -- Romania and Slovenia -- but I take it other Eastern European countries; would it not?

SEC. ALBRIGHT: We have said that all those countries that met the criteria, the guidelines, that they are eligible; that NATO is open to all democracies, market systems, those which can show a real dedication to the development of democratic institutions, which includes civilian control over the military, and can provide -- can add to the security of NATO. We are not taking on -- we would not even consider other countries that could not contribute generally to the enhancement of NATO. And that is the basis on which these three were invited, and that would be the basis on which others would be considered.

SEN. HELMS: The able senator from Nebraska.

SEN. CHUCK HAGEL (R-NE): Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Secretary Albright, thank you for taking time this morning and for your testimony. As you mention in your statement -- and I think your statement, Secretary Albright, is a good beginning to this debate -- but you mentioned clearly that NATO expansion is interconnected, it's connected to many variables, many interests -- economic, trade, national security, Bosnia, Middle East, Caspian Sea and others.

Is the president of the United States going to set out a clear visionary, comprehensive foreign policy so that this Congress, the American people, the world can understand what it is that he thinks is important as we move into the next century, including NATO expansion? How does that fit together? Will that be forthcoming?

SEC. ALBRIGHT: Well, Senator, I believe that all along we are giving speeches, as is the president, about the direction of our foreign policy. He has made a number of statements already. He obviously will continue to do so, as will the rest of us.

We are in a period, I think, that is more exciting than any that I have witnessed in terms of the possibility of putting all those pieces together and explaining to the American public what our national interests are and how we are -- what the stake of each American is in all those issues that you have raised.

And yes, the president will be speaking out, as will the rest of us.

SEN. HAGEL: On Bosnia -- which you alluded to and did mention that obviously Bosnia has an effect, will continue to have an effect as we debate NATO expansion -- could you give us an update at this point? Where are we in Bosnia? What is our course of action? When do we look at pulling some troops out, leaving some behind? Where might they be left? Where -- whatever you can give us in regard to Bosnia --

SEC. ALBRIGHT: Yes. Senator, I think, you know, it's very interesting. Bosnia has always -- has obviously been very much on our minds in the last couple of years. And often we focus too much on the negative aspect of the fact that the situation has not been totally resolved.

I prefer to focus on the positive, which is that if we go back three or four years, there were hundreds of thousands of people dying. It was impossible to -- for any of us to feel that we were doing the right thing in terms of ethnic cleansing. There were refugees not only throughout the Balkans, but throughout Europe. And there was a question about the survival of the whole region.

I think, thanks to the resolute actions of the United States, led by President Clinton, we have in fact been able to reverse the tide, and not only reverse the tide, but take some very positive actions.

First of all, there is a development of the centralized institutions within the Federation, where they are moving more and more to those central institutions. We have had municipal elections. New elections have now been scheduled in Republika Srpska for November.

We have managed to see a return of refugees.

There has been a real change in terms of the economic reconstruction.

War criminals have now -- are going to The Hague. As we know, we had a -- 10 of them that have just gone from -- that the Croats have turned over. And we see a genuine change.

The president has stated, as has -- as have I and Sandy Berger, that we see the SFOR mission ending in June 1998, but that clearly there will be need for a continued international presence in Bosnia. And that is evident in terms of an economic and political presence.

We will have to see about what kind of a security presence will be needed after that time, and that discussion has not taken place either in NATO or for us specifically. And that is what we are turning our attention to now.

But after a large review of our Bosnia policy last year, I do believe that we have new momentum and that we have done a great deal to improve the situation for the Bosnian people and ultimately therefore for the United States, because it is in our national interest that there not be instability in the Balkans.

SEN. HAGEL: One additional comment, and I'd very interested in your thoughts on this, Madame Secretary. It seems to me, although I was barely around 50 years ago, that one of the reasons that NATO has been such a great success is because the leaders at the time had very clear vision that called upon the best of our people worldwide, and certainly in America. And they were able to articulate that and express that in not just a grand vision but a realistic vision that called upon the best that we as a people, as a nation had and as a community of nations.

And I would hope that the president will be very engaged in this debate, because it is very clear that his leadership, personal commitment and leadership, is going to be critical to whatever happens here. And he, as you suggest, has a tremendous opportunity, one of the few opportunities in history, to really put a print on the future for the world.

SEC. ALBRIGHT: I was kind of barely around. I was 10 years old. (Laughter.) But I was on the other side of this. I have to tell you, if I might, Mr. Chairman, take a minute, I was living in Czechoslovakia at the time, and it was left out of NATO because it was -- there was a communist coup, and the Soviets had liberated Czechoslovakia, and it was not allowed to be in this great Western alliance that was there to save the West. Oct 07, 1997 13:15 ET

It did take the leadership of a lot of people in the United States to finally realize that in order to stop the slide towards communism, it was essential for the American people, with our European allies, to draw the line. And it took a great deal of work by President Truman and by your predecessors, and by my predecessors. And I hope very much that that same kind of dedication takes place, now. And I can assure you that President Clinton and the administration is fully with this. And I know, from listening to all of you, and the fact that we've started now, is that we do have that kind of commitment and partnership in examining the questions in 1997 as they were examined in 1948.

SEN. HAGEL: Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

SEN. HELMS: I'm obliged to acknowledge that I was not "barely around" 50 years ago! (Laughter.)

Senator Robb?

SEN. CHARLES ROBB (D-VA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was here, but I was not concentrating on these particular matters at that precise moment in history. And I join you and other members of this committee in thanking the secretary for coming and being with us this morning, and thank her for her leadership.

I might observe, if I may, that a distinguished colleague, and my senior senator from Virginia, who is the ranking Republican member on the Armed Services Committee, has joined us this morning. I don't recall recently having had the privilege of his visit on this particular committee before, although we both serve on the other committee. I don't know whether he's going to join the questioning or not, but I'm delighted that he could join us.

Madame Secretary, let me just ask a couple of process questions or timing questions that are follow-up on questions that have already been asked in part this morning. One of the questions has to do with the basic criteria -- you indicated in your statement that no new democracy would be permanently excluded from NATO membership, but were not -- understandably not precise as to exactly how long that whole process might be open and inclusive.

I wonder if you could indicate what your thinking is, at least at the moment, with respect to additional accessions. Will it be based strictly on the criteria that have been established? Will it be based on concerns about collective security? Will it be based on concerns about threat assessments or circumstances as they exist at that particular time? Will it be based in part on the success, both politically and as a matter of creating a more stable relationship of the first three accessions or the invitees that presumably will be formally accepted sometime in the near future?

SEC. ALBRIGHT: Senator, I think that what we have based ourselves on as a guiding principle here is that in enlarging NATO we do not wish to diminish its effectiveness. And as we look at new members, we have to keep in mind that what is prime for us is to maintain the cohesiveness of NATO and have those that joint it be contributors to its strength rather than to draw on it and to detract from it. So that is a guiding principle.

At the same time, we have made very clear that enlargement is not a one-time event; that this is a process and that we have to have a robust, open-door policy in principle, but maintain a certain amount of flexibility and non-specificity as we move forward on this.

I think, as I've stated to Senator Sarbanes, we agreed that NATO will review the process in 1999, and we have made no decisions or formal commitments regarding future members. And we are going to be using the same guidelines as we did for the invitations to these three current members.

Now, obviously, the circumstances of the time will be part of what we're looking at. But it is our belief that what needs to be the guiding principle is to maintain the cohesiveness and strength of NATO and have the new members be additions to that central goal.

SEN. ROBB: Given the criteria that you have suggested and the ultimate ability for any democratic state, if they meet the criteria, and whatever other matters will be considered by member nations in NATO at the time, what would you assess is the prospect for the ultimate accession of, say, the Baltic States?

SEC. ALBRIGHT: Well, I think that, again, we will have to look at it as we move forward and make an assessment as to how the situation is evolving, what the first round has brought us. But let me specifically address myself to the Baltic states.

We are taking a number of steps in order to ensure that the Baltic states are more and more enveloped in European institutions and that they are a part of an evolution that makes them a part of what we are doing, knitting them in.

So, for instance, we have done more in terms of knitting them into Baltic organizations. In Northeastern Europe, we're founding members of a new group called the BALTC (sp), which does better coordinate donor military assistance.

We're also promoting closer ties with Nordic states, as well as coordinating efforts to promote cooperation between Northern Europe and Northern Russia.

So we are -- and we are encouraging the Baltic states in terms of EU membership.

We are working very hard, I think, to make sure that they are very much a part of what we are doing.

But the major statement, Senator, is that NATO is open to all democracies that meet those guidelines that we have been talking about. It -- there is -- it is not closed to anyone, and there is a process en train. But I'm not going to predict specifically what the next group of countries will be.

SEN. ROBB: I can understand about not wanting to address the question of timing. But clearly, for those who have some hopes and aspirations, for those states, that is precisely not ruled out.

SEC. ALBRIGHT: Absolutely.

SEN. ROBB: Thank you. I had another question. My time is expired, however. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. HELMS: Thank you, Senator.

I think all of us welcome the distinguished chairman of the Rules Committee. I enjoy sitting -- where else? -- to his right on the Rules Committee. (Laughter.) Senator Ashcroft?

SEN. JOHN ASHCROFT (R-MO): Think you, Mr. Chairman.

Madame Secretary, I thank you for coming before us.

You've stated today that there are no parts of Europe that face immediate threat, and indicate that one of the things we need to do is to enlarge NATO and to adapt NATO.

Obviously, the enlargement is the subject of the discussion. Will the adaptation of NATO require us to restate the purposes of the organizing documents in some way? Or is the adaptation somehow within the limits of the purposes as stated in the document?

SEC. ALBRIGHT: We believe that it is within the purposes of the document, a collective defense agreement.

SEN. ASHCROFT: In terms of collective defense, I'm interested in what Senator Lugar mentioned.

Defense seems to geographic, at least to predominate and defend the soil of those nations that are members. Senator Lugar talked about pursuing the interests of the member nations. Do you see the adapted NATO and the enlarged NATO as pursuing the interests as well as defending the soil?

SEC. ALBRIGHT: I do, because I think that, as I mentioned to him, I think that there are increasing interests out of area that the NATO countries themselves agree to pursue. They are looking at ways to pursue the interests in a way that is commensurate with the way that they define them.

So it's not overreaching. On the other hand, there are threats that are different from the original founding that in fact can be subsumed in the way that the treaty in currently outlined.

SEN. ASHCROFT: Your use of the phrase "out of area" in your response in instructive to me. I believe we see an out-of-area deployment in Bosnia. How wide-ranging would you anticipate out-of- area deployments might become under and enlarged NATO. For instance, would you see them extending as far and the Pacific Rim in the event our interests were challenged there? Or would you define it as maybe extending to the subcontinent of Asia? Or would you see us as having potential out-of-area deployments in Africa, for example?

I guest, then, the thrust of my question is if NATO becomes an agency which addresses the interests of NATO nations, wherever they might take place, is it to be a sort of limited UN that doesn't require quite as much consensus? Or could you comment about the potential limits? What would be beyond the limit of a NATO which is to respond on the basis of interests rather than on the basis of democracy?

SEC. ALBRIGHT: Well --

SEN. ASHCROFT: Is there any place in the world to which they might not be assigned?

SEC. ALBRIGHT: Well, first of all, while I have said it is the prime military alliance of our time, it is not the only military arrangement that exists. And the NATO Council operates by consensus, and we are obviously not just one, but I think people see us as a senior partner within the NATO -- the North Atlantic Council.

I think that the definition of what is -- how far it would go is obviously based on that kind of a discussion. But let me say what I have been particularly impressed by, Senator, in the last couple of years is the creativity of the international community in terms of dealing with non-specific -- non-specific threats that we had not heard about before.

And so there are a variety of ways that issues can be dealt with. In the Pacific, we have just published new guidelines in our dealings with Japan. We have a whole different way of dealing with issues.

But let me, without making any kind of a statement that rules anybody in or out that might cause us problems later on, I would like to underline the fact that what is interesting about this era is the variety of ways that coalitions of the willing can be formed where there is a core group and then there are ways to deal with a problem where other join. Or the Partnership for Peace that is now viewed as a very creative way of dealing with issues.

SEN. ASHCROFT: I think I'm hearing you say that the NATO Council's willingness to agree would be the only limit in terms of our ability to enlist the aid of individuals pursuing our interests somewhere else in the world.

SEC. ALBRIGHT: Well, and not only -- there's that, but also obviously constitutional processes of each of the countries involved. And while we always talk about NATO as triggering this Article V, where we all -- an attack on one is an attack on all, there are different ways to grade whatever the threat has been and the way that a country responds to it in which our constitutional processes are the determinative factor.

SEN. ASHCROFT: I'd like to raise one other issues. I see the yellow light is on. I'm a little bit concerned about our relationships with the Soviet Union. I think to take this enlargement without understanding our relationship to the Soviet Union and the context of it would be an error, and I'm sure you're doing that.

But in one sense, it seems like we're isolating a potential ally in the Soviet Union. We're telling them that you're not a part of the European or Western-facing oriented group of nations. And that of trouble to me, particularly at the same time where it appears to me that the administration is beginning to, while isolating a potential ally, embrace a new threat, especially as it relates to the People's Republic of China and the consideration the administration is giving to okaying nuclear cooperation with China. And I suppose the other hearings will be opportunities to do this, but I think we've got to be careful not -- having won the Cold War against the Russians, not to turn them from Europe and an orientation to the West.

SEC. ALBRIGHT: If I might, sir?

SEN. ASHCROFT: Sure.

SEC. ALBRIGHT: On the contrary. I believe that what we have managed here is to do a very important balance between asking Russia to join us in the NATO-Russia Founding Act, which allows them, as I mentioned in my remarks, and also in answer to Chairman Helms, a way to be a part of a discussion about issues of mutual interest, and at the same time leaving the door open to them and making very clear that the new NATO is not directed against them.

So I feel very strongly that while we need to maintain NATO as a guard against any potential resurgence, at the same time we have walked this line very carefully in terms of not isolating a new Russia from a new Europe and a new NATO.

The question about China, sir, is that we are very careful in our dealings with China and as we -- in terms of having a multi-faceted relationship with them -- making sure that they are part of what we're trying to accomplish, which is a regime that does not allow proliferation of any weapons of mass destruction. And it is important for us to engage with China also in a way that does not isolate them as a huge power as we move into the 21st century.

SEN. HELMS: Thank you very much.

Senator Feinstein?

SEN. DIANNE FEINSTEIN (D-CA): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Madame Secretary, it's good to see you again. You look wonderful -- none the worse for wear. And very happy to --

SEC. ALBRIGHT: I love my job! (Laughs.)

SEN. FEINSTEIN: Well, that helps. (Laughter.)

Let me follow up on Senator Ashcroft's questions. My concern about NATO is twofold; one is Russia and the second is the cost item. Let me talk just for a moment about Russia.

I, for one, see a kind of growing instability there. I see an increasing problem with proliferation, certainly a dramatic impact in Iran and Iraq with that proliferation. Some have said that there might be a response by Russia to NATO by Russia's trying to develop an alliance down south with those countries. I don't know whether that's correct or not. But when you see Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's comments, too, on the subject that developments in Russia could take an ominous turn, he says, "I'm not afraid that Poland or Hungary or anyone else will be within NATO, it is not so dangerous for Russia. The thing I'm worried about is Russia and what might happen in Russia, and nothing else." End quote. And I think as we watch some of these events, I, for one, see his point.

I also recognize that START II is pending before the Russian Duma. It would be hopeful for its ratification soon. I'd like your comment on that, and then whether promised negotiations for a START III might be able to ease some of this.

But I think politically what happens in Russia, as a product of this, is a potentially very dangerous thing. I'd like you to explore that a little further, if you would.

SEC. ALBRIGHT: Senator, clearly, one of the major assignments that we have is managing the devolution of the Soviet empire and creating a positive relationship with the new Russia. I think we all see that as one of the major priorities of this administration. And there have been all kinds of statements about how where we were moving with NATO enlargement was going to undercut our relationship with Russia. It simply has not happened.

First of all, let me say Russia does not like NATO enlargement -- there's no question about that. And every time that I meet with Foreign Minister Primakov or President Clinton meets with President Yeltsin or Vice President Gore meets with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, that point is made clear. Nevertheless, it has not harmed us in terms of an ongoing relationship with them. As I mentioned, this Joint Council went very well. I've had extensive meetings with Foreign Minister Primakov dealing with a whole host of issues that we deal with on a mutual basis.

And I also think that those who have predicted that NATO enlargement would give solace to the hard-line members within Russia have been wrong also. The process there in terms of democratization is moving forward. I think we're seeing advances in the market in their movement towards a market economy. It is not without its problems, but it is not due to NATO enlargement, it is due to very serious issues that go in the transformation of that society. And our continued relationship with them and our ability to support the reform process is something that we must make sure continues.

On START, I was very pleased that while I was in New York last week I was able to sign a protocol to START II with Foreign Minister Primakov which is going to make it possible for them to move START II in the Duma. And the defense minister and the foreign minister now together have gone to the Duma pushing for start to ratification. So we are hopeful on that. They are going to take up the CWC Treaty first, but they are going to move on that in the next four or five weeks, we have been told. And I am hopeful on that.

We have said that START III talks would begin after START II goes into effect, but there are already expert talks that are going on, and there's a team in Russia right now that is following up on a lot of these decisions.

So I think that we are moving along well -- not without problems. But I think we have to understand that the dire prediction about the end of the world if NATO enlarged are not coming true. And I ask you to all look at the statement of -- the kinds of statements that Foreign Minister Primakov has been making when we signed these protocols, or the kind of discussion we had in the Permanent Joint Council. So the process is moving forward, and we have to support the reformers in Russia.

SEN. FEINSTEIN: Quickly, on the subject of cost, with the opening costs being between $27 billion and $35 billion, with France's recalcitrance and the limited means of the European Union monetarily, how is this money going to get paid, and will it be paid?

SEC. ALBRIGHT: Well I -- first of all, as I said, we are now going through the process of what the cost actually will be under the current environment. The NATO allies have committed themselves -- they did in Madrid -- to paying the cost, and we are going to make sure that they do. We will pay our share and they will pay their share. And the question I think for them is a domestic question for them, is whether they reallocate their resources, defense resources, in other ways. But they have made a commitment to pay for the cost of enlargement.

SEN. HELMS: Thank you.

Madame Secretary, the next senator who will question you has a fan club in North Carolina. He's the only senator past or present, maybe not future, who has done heart transplants. He flies his own jet plane, and he has done transplants, I understand, at every major hospital in North Carolina and probably all the other 49 states as well.

Dr. Frist.

SEN. BILL FRIST (R-TN): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madame Secretary, welcome. I join my colleagues in thanking you for your forthright comments today.

I want to turn and shift focus a little bit on expectations of the various parties that have involved and what visions that they have. Undoubtedly the singularity of mission has been the glue which in the past has bonded NATO members together so effectively since the creation of the alliance. However, we all now recognize that that bond and singularity of purpose created by the Soviet threat has largely dissolved.

As we face the challenges of maintaining that alliance and at the same time redefining that common bond, something that concerns me in this or any other multilateral obligation is the difference in expectations of each of the parties both currently at the table and coming to the table.

The United States seems to believe that NATO can and should continue to maintain its original mission of mutual defense and include whatever necessary changes there might be to meet new evolving European demands. As indicated in remarks in Madrid in July, at least some of our main European partners view such a mission and a level of commitment as either too costly or unnecessary in the current environment, and that a more loosely defined security should be the mission of the alliance.

The incoming European countries with Soviet domination and presence clearly in their minds really having had Soviet troops on their soil just a few years in the past, have an understandably even different expectation of NATO, especially how it will relate to membership in the European Union.

I ask you to comment on these different visions and these different expectations and ask whether you think such different visions among the members and the potential members create an internal tension, which the alliance simply has never had to address in the past, and then, beyond that, how you see such differences in expectations affecting the alliance.

SEC. ALBRIGHT: Well, I think you've stated a very interesting proposition, but I'm not sure that I totally agree with it. I think that my -- the discussions that I have participated in and witnessed, of our current NATO allies, is that they are dedicated to the NATO they have seen and frankly are also proponents of enlargement; otherwise, we wouldn't have it. And when we were in Madrid, I think our internal discussions there showed a basic dedication to the original purpose of NATO and the fact that it should be expanded to cover a certain number of countries. The discussion we had was whether it shouldn't cover more, not -- there was no one that is now arguing that it should not have expanded.

I think what I have again found so interesting about the NATO alliance is its creativity in adapting itself and looking at how to restructure itself internally, as well as look at what a new strategic concept is. And we are going through that process.

As far as the new allies are concerned, I think there's no doubt that they see membership in NATO as kind of the possibility of being in the world that was denied them in the first place -- as the chairman was saying, kind of the promise of the end of the Second World War that they were cut out of. And they do see that as a way of rejoining the West that they belong to. And President Havel, who was in Washington on Friday getting the Fulbright Statesman Award, spoke, as is always his way, very movingly about what this means to come back to the West.

At the same time, I think they do see it as an important security structure, one, within the original context and two, as a way that is an impetus to them to deal with their current instabilities -- the instability that we are trying to guard against; the problems that we see in Europe of ethnic conflict, of instability created as a result of that; and the fact that it has driven many of them to signing agreements with people and groups that they would never have imagined doing, as I mentioned in my statement -- Hungarians and Romanians. So they see it as a return to where they ought to be, but also a way of dealing with what they see as their security problems, not unlike, I think, what the original NATO group also sees.

SEN. FRIST: Thank you. That -- the expectations issue is one that I hope to continue to explore in our future hearings. But thank you for setting that foundation for me.

We've mentioned Bosnia a couple of times, and let me just go back, because in my own mind -- the U.S. has set next July as a date certain for withdrawal of at least our ground forces in Bosnia. Consequently, our European allies have said that should the United States leave, withdraw, they too would withdraw, and as you pointed out in your statement earlier, the implications for Bosnia are clear.

Now Bosnia stands what realistically could be called the first test of an expanded or new mission of NATO -- that is, peacekeeping or peacemaking beyond the borders of its members. Should this specific point of withdrawal become one of the major contentions between us and our allies? And if so, what are the implications for the so-called new NATO? And what implications are there for defining this mission?

SEC. ALBRIGHT: Well, first of all, I think there's been a meeting now in Maastricht, where some of this discussion started, in terms of how we all operate together as we look at Bosnia in the future. And let me just say not so parenthetically here that as we begin to think about this decision, obviously we will be consulting very closely with all of you.

I think that what we have seen is that Bosnia in many ways has been a very good example of how NATO countries can work with non-NATO countries, how there can be the possibility of dealing with the kinds of destabilizing conflicts within a new context. And I would imagine -- I would hope, in fact -- that we would look at the lessons of Bosnia as we think about future missions, both positively and negatively, and try to see how NATO and NATO in coordination with Partnership for Peace countries and a wider alliance can in fact deal with what are the kinds of new threats.

These two discussions are obviously going to intersect, and we welcome that. I think that it's important for us to see not -- they're on parallel tracks. We can't equate the discussions, but they do -- they will be intersecting here and in Europe.

SEN. FRIST: Thank you.

SEN. HELMS: Thank you very much.

Senator Wellstone?

SEN. PAUL WELLSTONE (D-MN): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madame Secretary, thank you for being here.

I can very honestly and truthfully say that this is a -- quite often I always have, you know, a real clear view about issues and know where I stand. And on this question, I'm really quite undecided. And I'd like to give you just a little bit of context and then put at least one question to you.

My father was born in the Ukraine, but his family kept staying one step ahead of the pogroms, and then he lived in Russia. And ultimately he came to this country in 1914, when he was 17.

He later on became -- had a chance to become friends with George Kennan, and he always used to praise George Kennan not only for his wisdom, but also for his command of the language.

George Kennan wrote a piece in the New York Times a while ago now, but when I read it, he said something like he thought that this expansion of NATO could be the most fateful decision, that it could have consequence that we couldn't even begin to prophesy.

So there you have George Kennan, a real giant -- and I have visited Russia, my father's home. And every time there's a delegation that comes here, I try and meet with people. And they -- I haven't met anyone from Russia of any political persuasion who is not -- (pauses) -- very much opposed to this. On the other hand, there's President Havel and there's you and others, who have, of course, taken a very different position.

This is what I don't quite understand: If we're talking about the importance of improving the economies and democratization of countries like Hungary and Czechoslovakia and Poland, there's the European Union, I don't know what a military alliance, how that really meets those concerns. And I do think, even though you say, "Well, so far -- ", Senator Feinstein talked about the prime minister's remarks where he said, "I'm not worried about Czechoslovakia or Poland or Hungary, but I'm worried about what's going to happen in the country," and you said, "Well, there's no evidence yet." But that's kind of a snapshot of right now. The question is where are we heading? I mean we have to look to the future. If -- for example, we're saying that this isn't the end. The others, the Baltic countries are welcome, Ukraine is welcome, what then would be the consequences within Russia?

And I guess all of this leads me to one question, and maybe this is my way, as somebody who's trying to sort through these issues to sort of, kind of get closer to what I think would be the right position for me to take as a senator, you said that if countries meet this criteria, democratic criteria, they're welcome. Would Russia be welcome? Maybe that's the question I should ask. If Russia meets the criteria -- after all, all of us hope that they will build a democracy -- I mean, it'll be a very dreary world if they're not able to -- I mean, this country is still critically important to the quality of our lives and our children's lives and our grandchildren's lives -- if Russia meets this criteria, would they be welcome in NATO?

SEC. ALBRIGHT: Senator, the simple answer to that is yes. We have said that if they meet the criteria, they are welcome. They have said that they do no wish to be a part of it. But let me just say several things to your very, I think, well articulated question and your legitimate concerns. I think all of us that have spent -- grown up in this era have the concerns that you've stated. I've spent my entire life studying the Soviet Union and now Russia and the republics. I think we have to understand that Russia is not the Soviet Union, and Russia is a different place than any of us ever thought it would be. And all of us have genuflected in from of George Kennan. You know, we all have felt that he was kind of the father of the way that we have studied the Soviet Union and Russia.

But with all due respect, I disagree with him on this subject. I think that we are in a new era, and I have spent a lot of time talking with the Russians about this and persuading them that if they want us to think about a new Russia, they have to think about a new NATO and a new Europe.

Russia has a long way to go, but it is on a very important path. And while they are not -- they are objecting or stating that they don't like NATO expansion, we are involved in a whole web of relationships with them now in a way that I think is supportive of their democratic processes. And we don't have time to go into all that, but the fact that we are in a set of arms-control negotiations with them on a completely different approach than being adversaries in the way that we were, that there are trade agreements and market forces working, that there are democratic forces working, and that they are part of a discussion about our mutual interests in Europe is to me a sign that we are heading in a different direction.

Now another aspect of this is I cannot understand why we would self-limit our desires for Central and Eastern Europe by what the Russians want. That is going back to the post-World War II era. And I don't think that is correct. It is not correct in terms of security, and it is not correct in terms of the morality that we talked about. And why should we now, in 1997, agree to a line that was created in 1945? I think it's wrong.

SEN. WELLSTONE: If I could, Madame Chair (sic), just in 30 seconds, just sort of add a -- I do not have all of your intellectual capital in this area, but a different formulation might be why would we be trying to expand a military alliance which we built vis a vis a Soviet Union that doesn't exist any longer? And it's not so much a question of our policy being governed necessarily by, quote, "paranoia in Russia," but it has more to do with, as we look to the future, whether or not this could in fact invite the very instability that would be I think so dangerous to the world that we live in. I mean, it's a legitimate, a very legitimate, important concern that I think we'll have more debate on. And again, for myself, I still am trying to wade through this.

SEC. ALBRIGHT: May I, Mr. Chairman on that --

SEN. HELMS: Sure.

SEC. ALBRIGHT: -- say the following. First of all, we have options here. We could say, "The threat is different, so let's just kind of junk NATO and start over." Why do that when NATO as a structure has worked very well and is, I think, capable of expanding and enlarging in terms of its strategy as well as its membership, as I answered two members over here.

So I think that the purpose here is NATO has -- while it maintains its central core of being a defensive alliance, it has the capability of adjusting its strategic concept in a way that is not directed against Russia.

The threat at the moment in Europe is instability and the undermining of the overall structure of what we want, which is a free, undivided, and fully united Europe. That is what is a priority for the United States. And NATO provides a very good structure for that. And it is adjusting. It is a new NATO. It is not the NATO that you and I grew up with.

SEN. HELMS: Thank you very much.

And now, my chairman of the Rules Committee, Mr. Warner.

SEN. JOHN WARNER (R-VA): Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you and the other members. And I'll ask but one question -- the same question that I've debated very lively, publicly, with Senator Biden about. I happen to be a very firm skeptic of this program.

First, a quick answer to -- if Russia is admitted, I suggest that that would be the end of NATO, because one of the primary missions of NATO would no longer exist. It would be the end because when I joined the Senate 19 years ago, for the first five years this senior group up here led the defense against withdrawing from NATO, pulling our troops back, predicated both on an economic argument and other arguments. And we remember very well our distinguished majority leader, Mike Mansfield, who led that fight. And I think if Russia were admitted, that fight would start again.

But my concern, Madame Secretary, goes to the other threat that faces all of the new nations that are looking towards admission, and that is they're fighting fairly today and peaceably for economic survival, and by conferring a NATO status on the three, it puts the other three, in my humble judgment, at a severe disadvantage, in two ways.

First, they can put in their advertisements for foreign capital "Come invest here, because you'll be more secure, because NATO is here" -- not unlike the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation when you deposit in your bank.

Secondly, these nations will not have to mount their own defenses, because they'll be a part of NATO. And I have discussed this with the ambassadors and the foreign ministers and the defense ministers of these countries that readily admit our cost to build that level of defense, we think, and security that is necessary will be one third or perhaps one half of what the nations that are not admitted will have to cough up. All of this to me indicates that you'll begin to breed dissension. And as we know today, part of the security of the world, the growing part of it that is threatened, are the ethnic strife, the border strife, religious strife. And you superimpose on their struggle today for economic survival, economic competition, NATO status and a less cost for their defense, and I think you're sowing the seeds of strife between these countries.

And I go back to Harry Truman's biography, in which he said his two proudest accomplishments were the Marshall Plan and NATO. And I fear we may be undoing one of his proudest accomplishments.

SEC. ALBRIGHT: Senator, I was looking forward to seeing you in your committee and very glad that you are here --

SEN. WARNER: We will make that opportunity available. And this record will be a very important part of that discussion.

SEC. ALBRIGHT: Let me say we have had this discussion, and we will continue to have it.

But let me just say, on the Russian question, first of all, I think that, as I have said, they have expressed no interest in being members. I was answering a question for Senator Wellstone -- whether it was hypothetically possible, and it is, because as we have said, it is a process that is open to democracies that meet the agenda. But it is a hypothetical question at this stage. And we are -- I think we need to focus on the fact that we are looking at a very different world. And should that stage come, then we -- who would have ever expected the things that we've seen in the last 10 years? So I would just leave it in the realm of the hypothetical at this stage.

Now on your other question, I think that there is no proof of the fact that NATO status confers better investment. If you just look, for instance, at what we have see in Western Europe, NATO membership has not been used over the past half century to draw investment, let's say, to Norway or Sweden. I think that there is no historical evidence of the fact that NATO provides economic benefits.

At the same time, I -- having spent a lot of time studying Central and Eastern Europe, I can tell you that the other countries, the non-invitees, are working very hard in terms of their privatization, their various other institutions that would make them good climate investment -- provide good investment climate, plus creating a whole web of other relationships, with the hope that they will be in NATO.

I also think that we cannot get ourselves into this argument of none or all. We have to do what is right for NATO, which is expand in a way that is good for the central core of keeping a cohesive alliance.

And, Senator, on your final point, I think that our greatest leaders historically have been those who have understood that history does not stand still and that there are opportunities to be seized. And what Harry Truman did with both the Marshall Plan and NATO was go against the tide and assume leadership at a time when creativity was needed. And while one can never speak for the dead, one would assume, in looking at his record, that he would be the kind of person that would see the opportunities that NATO enlargement offers for U.S. national interests.

SEN. WARNER: I thank the witness. Thank the chair and the ranking member.

SEN. HELMS: A bit of housekeeping. I ask unanimous consent that the statement by Senator Smith of Oregon be submitted at the appropriate place in the record. Also, the record will be kept open for three days for additional written questions to be submitted to the distinguished secretary.

Madame Secretary, you have acquitted yourself admirably and effectively, as always. Been a pleasure to have you with us --

SEN. BIDEN: Mr. Chairman, before you close, would you yield me 30 seconds?

SEN. HELMS: Certainly.

SEN. BIDEN: Mr. Chairman, I think the last argument that Senator Warner made is the most compelling, which is that these nations are going to spend more money to go it alone or less money to be part of the West. It seems to me he makes the argument for NATO when he makes the argument that we in fact -- they'll be spending less money. They're going to spend the money, they're going to seek their own alliances. Bring them to the West.

SEC. ALBRIGHT: I agree with that.

SEN. HELMS: You agree?

SEC. ALBRIGHT: Absolutely. And that's why when people are saying, "Can they meet their obligations?" they know that they can do better by increasing their defense budgets to be a part of NATO and that they will spend less by being a part of it. Yes, I do.

SEN. HELMS: Madame Secretary, is there anything else that -- sometimes when I make an appearance, driving home I make the best speech of my career. (Laughter.) I think you have done well this morning, but do you have any closing note that you would like to add?

SEC. ALBRIGHT: Well, the only note that I would like to make, senators, is that I do think we are embarked on a great historical partnership here of being able to take what we have been watching very carefully -- the evolution of Europe -- and being able to now put our stamp on it, and to do for the 21st century what our predecessors did for the second half of this one.

And I consider it a great honor to be here working with all of you on this. I know we're going to have an interesting debate. I think the questions are terrific. I don't know about all the answers. But I really do appreciate this, and I feel that we are all making history here together.

Thank you.

SEN. HELMS: Very well. There being no further business, the committee stands in recess.