It is a privilege to appear before the Subcommittee today to testify to the strong support of the Department of Defense for the Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, adopted at Vienna on May 31, 1996 -- known as the CFE Flank Agreement.

Introduction

The CFE Flank Agreement retains the limits on ground treaty-limited equipment (TLE) -- tanks, armored combat vehicles, and artillery -- in the Russian and Ukrainian flank zone, but applies them to a smaller area. The regions removed from the original flank zone will be subject to new constraints and additional verification and transparency measures.

The treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) is a vital element of the new, more favorable security situation in Europe. When the CFE treaty was signed in 1990, it represented a major advance in European security and arms control, through its unprecedented requirements for reductions in conventional military equipment, detailed annual exchanges of military information, and intrusive verification. Consolidation of those strengths and benefits continues to be a major objective for the United States and our NATO Allies.

For those benefits to continue, the CFE treaty must adjust to changes in Europe, particularly to the break-up of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The CFE treaty Flank Agreement is such an adjustment. It is an important part of the NATO position for adapting the CFE treaty to broader changes in Europe, which include the enlargement of the Alliance. Approval of the Flank Agreement by May 15 is essential to preserve the long-term benefits of the CFE treaty and to keep the adaptation process on track.

In my testimony today, I would like to concentrate particularly on the impact of the CFE Flank Agreement on the military security of the United States, our NATO Allies, and our friends in the flank zone and surrounding regions. It is the firm view of the Department of Defense that the Flank Agreement serves the military security interests of all those countries. Our security and theirs could be adversely affected if the Flank Agreement is not approved.

Genesis of the Flank Issue

The flank region, one of four zones into which the CFE area of application is divided, covers Norway, Iceland, Turkey, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and parts of Ukraine and Russia. The flank limits were established during the CFE treaty negotiations primarily to address Norwegian and Turkish concerns that the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Central and Eastern Europe might result in a significant build-up of Soviet forces on or near their borders. The original flank limits allowed the Soviet Union to hold within the northern and southern parts of the flank zone up to 1850 tanks, 2775 artillery pieces and 1800 armored combat vehicles (ACVs) in active units, and up to 1000 tanks, 900 artillery and 800 ACVs in designated storage sites in specific parts of the flank region.

Approximately one year after the CFE treaty was signed, the Soviet Union dissolved. In May 1992, before the treaty entered into force, the former Soviet states which succeeded to the CFE treaty (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakstan, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) signed the Tashkent Agreement on dividing the equipment entitlements of the Soviet Union. Under that agreement, Russian active units in the flank zone may hold no more than 700 tanks, 580 ACVs and 1280 artillery pieces. Russia was allocated another 600 tanks, 800 ACVs, and 400 artillery pieces in Designated Permanent Storage Sites in a specified part of the northern portion of the flank region. Ukrainian active units in the flank zone are limited to 280 tanks, 350 ACVs and 390 artillery pieces, with another 400 tanks and 500 artillery pieces in Designated Permanent Storage Sites. Russia and Ukraine are the only CFE states whose treaty-limited equipment (TLE) is subject to geographic sub-limits within their national territory.

Thus, Russian and Ukrainian forces were left with far less flexibility in the flank region than had been given to the Soviet Union. Beginning in the fall of 1992, both states asked the other CFE parties for relief from the flank limits, which they felt were too restrictive. Ukraine was particularly concerned about the economic burden of having to move TLE, relocate units from its flank zone, and build new infrastructure in the interior to receive them. Russia shared that concern, but its primary focus was on the need for a larger equipment entitlement in the flank -- especially ACVs -- given the instabilities in the North Caucasus Military District and Caucasus states.

Key Security Factors in the Flank Issue

As the United States and the other CFE parties considered Russia and Ukraine's calls for relief from the flank limits, two security concerns were paramount in our thinking. First, and most important, was the need to retain the integrity of the CFE treaty. The Russian military felt so strongly the need for additional TLE in the flank zone that at various points their representatives threatened to urge Russian withdrawal from the treaty if their flank demands were not satisfied. An end to the CFE treaty would have greatly affected the United States and our NATO Allies, by undermining a key element of the new European security situation. The Russian government's official position was that while Russia would implement all of CFE's other provisions in good faith, it would not be able to achieve compliance with the Article V (flank) obligations without jeopardizing its security. Indeed, Russia's overall compliance with its CFE obligations has been good. Russia fulfilled its overall notified CFE reduction obligations on schedule by November 1995. This involved the destruction or conversion to non-military use of over 11,000 pieces of TLE, including tanks, artillery, ACVs, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. This Russian effort represented one-fifth of total CFE equipment destruction -- over 53,000 pieces of TLE by the 30 CFE states. Despite that record, Allies believed that continued failure by Russia to meet flank obligations would have the effect of undermining the legitimacy of the flank regime as a whole, and possibly of the treaty itself. This could have very serious security implications for all members of the NATO Alliance, especially our Allies in the flank region.

The second major consideration was that any adjustment to the CFE flank arrangements must not adversely affect the security of any CFE state or of any other state near the Russian flank zone. The Russian flank limits did not affect the immediate military security of the United States or most of our NATO Allies. However, they did have such an immediate effect on Turkey and Norway, and on friends in the region such as the Baltic States, Finland, Ukraine, Moldova and the Caucasus states -- and thus an important, if indirect, effect on our security as well.

One Russian proposal during the flank negotiations -- to establish a CFE "exclusion zone" in the south -- was completely unacceptable from both perspectives. Suspending important provisions of the treaty in any part of the CFE area of application would be contrary to the need to preserve the integrity of the treaty as a whole. It also could potentially allow Russia to build up forces in the southern part of the flank that could threaten Turkey and the neighboring former Soviet states.

Concern for the military security of neighboring states also led us to reject proposals that could lead to unacceptably large TLE increases in either the southern or northern part of the Russian flank zone. Finally, and very important, it was essential that any solution to the flank problem be consistent with treaty requirements regarding territorial sovereignty and host state consent to stationing of forces.

Negotiation of the Flank Issue

Resolution of the flank issue took over two years and the involvement of all CFE states. The U.S. undertook intense consultations with our NATO Allies (especially Turkey and Norway), Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the other treaty partners to achieve resolution of this difficult issue. In addition, we consulted with interested non-treaty states, including the neutral Nordic and Baltic states. As we did throughout the original CFE negotiations, the NATO Allies adopted common positions in the flank negotiations, which we presented to Russia, Ukraine and the other CFE parties.

Consultations with particularly interested CFE parties took place both multilaterally, within the CFE Joint Consultative Group (JCG) in Vienna, among NATO Allies in NATO's High Level Task Force on Arms Control, and bilaterally in capitals. Because of the specific military concerns involved, the Department of Defense worked actively with Ministry of Defense counterparts, particularly with interested parties such as Turkey, Norway, and Russia.

In September 1995, NATO tabled a proposal at the JCG to resolve the flank issue. The NATO proposal, on which the final Flank Agreement is based, consisted of several specific elements:

-- maintenance of the treaty flank limits;

-- removal of some defined areas from the Russian and Ukrainian flank zones, so that the treaty flank limits applied to a smaller region, and TLE movement was encouraged toward the interior;

-- constraints on TLE in the areas removed from the flank zone; and

-- additional transparency and verification measures in the "old" and "new" flank zones.

The JCG agreed in November 1995 on the outlines for a Flank Agreement, following those provided in the NATO proposal. Intensive consultations and negotiations followed in Vienna and in capitals, to conclude the details within that general outline. Final agreement was reached at the CFE Review Conference in May 1996.

Elements of the Flank Agreement

Under the Flank Agreement, the following areas will no longer be part of the flank zone:

-- Odessa oblast in Ukraine;

-- Volgograd and Astrakhan oblasts in southern Russia;

-- An eastern part of the Rostov oblast in southern Russia;

-- Kushchevskaya repair facility in southern Russia and a narrow corridor in Krasnodar Kray leading to Kushchevskaya; and

-- Pskov oblast in northern Russia.

Although those areas will not be subject to the flank limits, they remain constrained by the overall sub-zonal limits of the CFE treaty. In addition, sub-limits on ACVs are provided for Pskov (600), Astrakhan (552); Volgograd (552); and eastern Rostov (310). Finally, the Flank Agreement imposes overall constraints on the Russian "original flank" zone of 1800 tanks, 3700 ACVs, and 2400 artillery pieces. These overall constraints will limit the flow of equipment from the revised flank area to the "original flank" zone.

Thus, Russian TLE holdings in the regions near Ukraine, the Caucasus, Turkey, the Baltic and Nordic states will be constrained. Furthermore, the Russian areas bordering the Black Sea (Krasnodar Kray, western Rostov oblast) and the Baltic Sea/Barents Sea (Leningrad Military District) remain part of the flank zone. Both those features of the Flank Agreement meet important security concerns of Turkey, Ukraine, the Baltic States and the Nordic States.

Russia has until 31 May 1999 to bring its accountable holdings in the realigned flank zone into full compliance with the treaty's flank limits. However, the Flank Agreement requires that Russia not increase its TLE holdings in the original flank zone after 31 May 1996, under the provisional application of the agreement. Provisional application has been extended to 15 May 1997. If all CFE parties have not approved the agreement by then, it is subject to review.

The Flank Agreement recognizes that Russia has the right to seek to increase its TLE allowed in the realigned flank zone through one or both of two mechanisms: reallocation of the Tashkent TLE quotas, and use of the limited temporary deployments allowed under the treaty. However, the agreement specifies that either outcome must be achieved by means of free negotiations and with full respect for the sovereignty of the States Parties involved. These provisions in the Flank Agreement reinforce the provision in Article IV(5) of the treaty itself that, within the context of the CFE treaty, a state party cannot station forces on the territory of another state party without its permission. Consequently, if a state party did so, it would be considered a violation of the treaty.

Finally, the Flank Agreement provides for additional transparency measures in the original flank zone, effective with provisional application. Ten supplementary declared site inspections may be conducted in the various areas removed from the flank zone. In addition, data required under the CFE treaty information exchange provisions must be provided every six months for the original flank zone, rather than annually. For Kushchevskaya, periodicity is increased to every quarter.

Flank Agreement and European Security

Although the Flank Agreement gives Russia and Ukraine more flexibility in TLE deployments than they had before, it does not change the military balance in the northern or southern regions. Nor does it adversely affect the security situation or the sovereignty of Russia's smaller neighbors. Instead, the Flank Agreement advances the security of Russia's neighbors, the United States and all states within the CFE area of application by its central contribution to ensuring the continued viability of the CFE treaty.

When the United States and the other CFE parties entered into the flank negotiations, we had several fundamental aims: retain the integrity and viability of the CFE treaty; preserve the security interests of all states parties and regional nonparticipating states near Russia's flank region; and accommodate if possible Russia and Ukraine's legitimate TLE needs in the flank zone. The Flank Agreement succeeded in meeting all those objectives. It gives Russia and Ukraine needed flexibility in their TLE deployments, but in a way that is limited in its geographic scope, numerically constrained, transparent, and consistent with their neighbors' security requirements. It ensures the continued viability of the flank regime, which is a matter of critical importance to our flank allies and friends in the region.

The Department of Defense firmly believes that the Flank Agreement is in the best security interest of the United States and of all of Europe. We strongly recommend that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification of the agreement.