Lynn Davis
under secretary of state for
arms control and international security policy.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
29 April 1997
I welcome this opportunity to meet with you to urge the Senate's advice and consent to the ratification of the CFE Flank Agreement. This agreement represents the culmination of over two years of negotiations with the Russian Federation, NATO Allies and other CFE treaty partners. The CFE Flank Agreement is critical to ensuring the CFE treaty's long-term viability and preserving security and stability in Europe.
The CFE treaty has contributed importantly to military stability, predictability and confidence during a period of historic change in Europe, and has enjoyed broad bipartisan support since the Bush administration successfully negotiated it. Since the CFE treaty was signed in November 1990, the Warsaw Pact has disappeared, the Soviet Union has dissolved, and the North Atlantic Alliance has been transformed. The treaty has evolved as well, as its 22 original signatories have become 30 sovereign states. The States Parties to the CFE treaty have eliminated more than 53,000 pieces of heavy military equipment, and have accepted and conducted nearly 3,000 intrusive on-site inspections.
For two treaty partners, however, these dramatic political changes raised difficulties for implementing certain provisions of the treaty, involving the "flank" limitations of Article V. These limitations were originally designed to prevent destabilizing concentrations of Soviet forces opposite Turkey and Norway, as large numbers of forces and equipment were pulled back from central Europe. From early 1993, Russia argued that these limitations restricted its ability to meet its security requirements in the North Caucasus, where they were restructuring their military forces following the collapse of the USSR. The Russians cited in particular their low armored combat vehicle (ACV) entitlement for the flank region. The Russian portion of the flank zone represents approximately one-third of Russian territory west of the Urals, an area more than five times the size of Germany, in which Russia can hold no more than 580 ACVs with active military units.
Ukraine claimed that the flank limitations were outdated, in that none of its neighbors considered a Ukrainian military presence in the flank threatening. The Ukrainians also complained that the flank restrictions would result in unreasonable implementation costs, as they would require the construction of facilities in northern Ukraine to accommodate units and equipment that would have to be moved out of the flank zone.
By the end of the treaty's reduction period in November 1995, Russia was in substantial compliance with its overall equipment ceilings, but indicated that it would be unable to comply with the Article V flank limitations. Ukraine exceeded both its overall and flank entitlements, but indicated it would come into full compliance as soon as the division of equipment held by the former Soviet Black Sea Fleet between Russia and Ukraine was completed. Although there has been no official notification of a settlement over the division of this equipment, Ukraine has subsequently come into full compliance with all treaty limits.
The Flank Agreement addresses these concerns on the part of Russia and Ukraine in a manner that other CFE parties can accept, and thereby reinforces the importance and legitimacy of regional equipment ceilings, a feature unique to the CFE treaty. At the same time, the Flank Agreement reaffirms Russia's commitment to the basic obligations of the treaty at a time when there have been voices in Moscow arguing that Russia should not be subject to restrictions on where it can locate forces on its own territory.
The flank negotiations were difficult. The Russians initially sought elimination or suspension of the flank limits. They then called for the creation of an "exclusion zone" in the southern portion of the North Caucasus Military District, where the treaty's provisions would no longer apply. The United States and our NATO Allies firmly rejected all proposals that could have had the effect of calling into question the legitimacy of the treaty's flank regime. We rejected certain claims by Russia concerning its security problems, particularly with regard to the amount of equipment Russia said it needed in the flank zone. The Alliance did appreciate, however, that significant changes to political borders had occurred in the flank region since 1990, and that Russia's low armored combat vehicle (ACV) limit in the flank zone raised legitimate questions that needed to be addressed.
For over two years, CFE states worked to find a way to address these concerns about the flank limitations that would be acceptable to all Parties. The resulting agreement is based on an approach that was initially designed by NATO, and endorsed by all CFE States Parties in November 1995 at the Joint Consultative Group (JCG) in Vienna.
The Flank Agreement has three basic elements:
-- a map realignment, which reduces the geographic area covered by the treaty's flank limitations;
-- additional constraints on equipment in areas removed from the flank zone through the realignment; and
-- additional transparency measures for the revised flank zone and those areas removed from the flank zone.
The map realignment would remove certain areas in Russia and Ukraine from the flank zone.
The Flank Agreement does not authorize an increase in any state's overall permitted holdings of treaty-limited equipment (TLE) in the total area of application of the treaty, nor does it change the equipment limits for the flank zone as specified in the CFE treaty. However, after the Flank Agreement enters into force, the treaty's flank limits will apply to a smaller geographic area than before. It is important to note that the geography of the map realignment was carefully negotiated to minimize the security impact of this change for neighboring states. NATO Allies Turkey and Norway, themselves subject to the treaty's flank restrictions, played a key role in defining the geography of the revised flank zone.
The Flank Agreement also contains a unilateral Russian commitment, provisionally applied as of May 31, 1996, not to increase its equipment holdings in the original flank zone above the levels reported in Russia's January 1, 1996, CFE data submission. By May 31, 1999, Russia must be in full compliance with all treaty provisions, including:
-- the flank limitations of Article V, which will apply to the revised flank zone;
-- overall caps on treaty-limited equipment in the original flank zone, at levels lower than the provisionally-applied interim caps; and
-- sub-caps on Russian ACVs in the specific areas removed from the flank.
The Flank Agreement also contains provisions that will provide greater transparency for all CFE states, including additional inspections, and more frequent data submissions by Russia on its flank holdings.
Neither the CFE treaty nor the Flank Agreement is designed to resolve the many thorny problems in the flank region that may have a military dimension, but are fundamentally political in nature. However, by approving the flank agreement, CFE states can retain tight constraints on Russian forces, along with a valuable system of transparency measures. In this way, the treaty will continue to serve as an important basis on which to build the necessary bilateral and multilateral efforts to address these other problems.
Provisional application of certain portions of the agreement until May 15, 1997, has directly benefited the U.S. and NATO Allies. It made the enhanced transparency provisions of the agreement, including additional on-site inspections, effective immediately and has provided protection against any increase in Russian deployments in the flank zone prior to entry into force of the Flank Agreement. Provisional application was based upon the understanding that Russia was not relieved of its existing CFE obligations, including its obligations with respect to its TLE holdings in the flank zone. The map realignment itself has not been provisionally applied and will not become effective unless and until the agreement enters into force. This will happen when all CFE States Parties have deposited confirmation of their approval of the Document with the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which is the depositary of the agreement.
Recognizing that time is short, we urge that the Flank Agreement be approved by May 15. Otherwise, the agreement becomes subject to review, and there is a great risk that the flank issue would be swept into the negotiations on adaptation of the CFE treaty. Reopening the flank issue would put the entire flank regime at risk. It would almost certainly preclude agreement in the next few weeks on basic elements of CFE adaptation, a central element of our effort to smooth the way for NATO enlargement.
I believe that entry into force of the CFE Flank Agreement is in the best interests of the United States and will contribute to our broader efforts to establish a European security order based on cooperation and shared values. As we proceed with negotiations to adapt the CFE treaty to Europe's evolving security environment, including the prospect of an enlarged NATO, the administration remains committed to preserving the landmark achievements of the current treaty. By maintaining the integrity of the CFE flank regime, the Flank Agreement is a key step toward this goal. I urge the Senate to give its advice and consent to the agreement prior to May 15, 1997.