LEVIN: First, Madam Secretary, could you list for us the criteria which will be applied in judging the applications for membership of various countries?
ALBRIGHT: Senator Levin, what we are doing is looking at a general set of criteria that fit into some of the comments that I made in my statement as did Secretary Cohen. That is, that we are interested in countries first of all that can be active contributors to the alliance. This is not a way of just trying to give gifts to countries. This is the world's strongest military alliance, and members have to be capable of pulling their weight on it.
We are looking at democracies, at free market systems. We are looking at the way that countries treat their minorities, their attitude towards human rights. We are looking to make sure that there's civilian control over the military, generally looking at the ways that they are approaching the post-cold war world and their sense of responsibility towards their own populations. These are guidelines that we will be considering for each country. So, in broadest terms what they are, first of all, their ability to contribute to this foremost alliance, so that the alliance itself is never diluted. And second, their bona fides, in terms of being functioning democracies with market systems that respect their people and where civilian and military relationships are the kind that we believe are pursuant to those ends.
LEVIN: One of the purposes that you mentioned, and one of the effects that you made reference to, of NATO enlargement would be that it will erase the illegitimate lines drawn during the Cold War. At least some of those lines. How can we accomplish this enlargement without drawing new lines in ways that don't leave out countries that meet those criteria or leave out countries with whom we're trying to establish new positive relationships that don't isolate countries such as Russia? How do we avoid creating instabilities and uncertainties by this very act of accepting whatever number of countries are accepted?
ALBRIGHT: Well, I think, Senator, that this is a very important question, and it is the reason that we make very clear that the enlargement of NATO is a dynamic process. We are beginning it this summer, but it is something that will go on.
Second, that as the president has said -- and we all have said -- is that the first members accepted shall not be the last; that NATO is going to be open to democracies that meet the variety of criteria that I have stated; and that we will, in fact, be working very closely with those countries that have not gotten in through other mechanisms -- some directly related to NATO through the Partnership for Peace, and a council that we are going to be establishing that will allow -- the partnership council -- that will allow them to have an ongoing voice within other circles of the NATO family; also that there are other systems within Europe that will help bind countries together.
One of the whole policies that we're working on is we're trying to get a series of systems into place into Europe that do include larger numbers -- the EU accession, the greater action through the OSCE, the ability of countries to work together through a variety of structures.
So we -- and one of the ways to avoid a new dividing line is to reiterate the fact constantly that the first shall not be last, and that all democracies are capable and are in the long run able to enter this new system.
LEVIN: In your testimony relative to Russia, you indicated that you don't expect the Russian government to change its mind. We should recognize their opposition for what it is -- an issue of perception, not reality. I think perceptions are important. So even though it's, quote, "only perception," nonetheless that perception is important.
You indicate also that the fate of Russian democracy is certainly not at stake in NATO's decision on enlargement, and I would agree with you. But it could be affected by how that enlargement is accomplished.
It's those nuances, which I think are important. And another nuance which crept into your statement is on page 9 where you talk about a joint NATO-Russia council. It will give Russia a voice but not a veto, a chance to work in partnership with NATO, not within NATO. And then you said both sides will retain complete freedom of action.
That language is not the language I think which we're trying to really urge that this is all about. It's not sides of anything, because we aren't in this proposal creating this line, as I understand it.
Would you agree we're not -- that we're going to do whatever we reasonably can without giving Russia a veto; that we're going to do what reasonably can be done to avoid creating new lines, which leave out people, such as the Baltic nations, which isolate countries, such as Russia.
We're not going to give Russia a veto, nor can we, nor should we. But we are going to do what we can to see if we can't help create, establish, maintain, support, promote this relationship with Russia. Is that a fair statement?
ALBRIGHT: That is a fair statement. Senator, let me just say I think that -- and this has a lot to be based on the way Secretary Cohen described this -- we are in a really, I think, fascinating and dynamic new era where we have an opportunity to fashion a whole set of new relationships that will take us into the 21st century.
It requires us to move away from old language and oldthink, and to think in a way that is dynamic and creative.
On the first part of what you have said -- in terms of perception of the Russians -- I have had some very interesting discussions when I was in Moscow on my trip where the Russian leadership asked us to think about a new Russia. And in turn, I answered, you all need to think about a new NATO.
We both have to think about what is the best approach to dealing with the end of this century and the beginning of the next.
And I did say that we were not on different sides. We were both on the same side. Therefore, I think your very careful editing is appropriate. I think we have to try to figure out what the entities, parties, whatever -- there are two negotiating partners. Maybe that is the best way to put it.
It is my belief that even if we were not enlarging NATO, we would need to develop some kind of a NATO-Russia relationship because one of the things we're trying to do is to make sure that the Russians do not feel isolated, that they feel a part of the new Europe, and that they feel that they have a stake in having a secure and stable Europe.
When I was in Russia again, I said to them they have suffered also from an unstable Europe. They -- the two world wars affected them deeply, and they also came as a result of a destabilized Europe.
So they need to see enlargement in their favor, and we need to understand that a Russia anchored in Europe is a good idea. And so we are going to be working on that, choosing our vocabulary more carefully, and making very clear that that also is a process of integration.
LEVIN: Thank you very much.
LEVIN: Secretary Albright, at the time that the reunification of Germany was being discussed with former Soviet Union President Gorbachev, according to our former ambassador to the Soviet Union, Jack Matlock -- and here I'm quoting from his congressional testimony last year, quote, "Gorbachev did get an informal but clear commitment that if Germany united and stayed in NATO, the borders of NATO would not move eastward." Close quote.
That's our ambassador's statement. Is that an accurate statement?
ALBRIGHT: Senator Levin, not the way that we understand it. The treaty on the final settlement with respect to Germany that was signed in 1990 had to do only with German unification and how NATO would act within Germany. And the treaty restrictions do not apply with respect to other states to the west or east of Germany, and therefore, have no bearing on NATO enlargement.
I think that it's important to put all this into context. Every state has a sovereign right to choose its own security arrangements, including alliances. This is a basic principle of the Helsinki Final Act, the Two-Plus-Four Treaty, the one that was in fact the determination of Germany, the CFE treaty, and the 1994 OSCE Budapest Summit Declaration, all of which the Russians have endorsed.
And we believe that that is the appropriate interpretation of what happened in 1990.
LEVIN: Madame Secretary, are Romania and Slovenia on the list of countries being considered for admission to NATO?
ALBRIGHT: They, along with all the other members of -- the European members of Partnership for Peace are part of the list as we're looking at it.
LEVIN: You've raised the issue this morning -- I think Secretary Cohen has, too, commented on the Chemical Weapons Convention. I want to ask you a quick question on that.
One of the claims made by opponents of the convention is that Article X will require states to give the best defensive chemical weapons protective equipment, the technology to defend against chemicals, that we would be required to give that equipment or technology to rogue states like Iran.
That argument is being made against the treaty and in favor of one of the so-called killer amendments. Can you comment on that? Does Article X have that requirement?
ALBRIGHT: Senator, it does not. And let me explain why. First, it is very important to understand that any assistance given under Article X is only available to a state if it does what we want it to do -- to join the CWC and renounce chemical weapons and destroy any stockpiles that it might possess.
Second, states that meet this test can only request assistance under Article X if they are attacked with CWs by a state outside the treaty or about to be attacked with chemical weapons.
Third, it is strictly up to the providing state to decide what kind of assistance it will give in such a case. And the administration has negotiated a binding condition to the resolution of ratification in which the president will guarantee that the only aid we would provide certain countries of concern, if all these tests were met, would be medical assistance.
So we can make that choice, and that is the choice that the president has made.
Fourth, with regard to other countries, it's crucial to understand that Article X does not supersede or waive a state's fundamental obligations under Article I, and one of the most fundamental obligations under that article is that no state under any circumstances is to assist, encourage or induce in any way anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a state party under this convention.
ALBRIGHT: And a key prohibited activity defined in Article I, Senator, would be to engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons. And so therefore, in short, if a state did what the critics worry it might do under Article X, it would be violating the treaty.
And we have also made our choice as to what it is that we would like -- how we would respond.
LEVIN: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.