KEMPTHORNE: Secretary Albright, we've had the discussion today, which has been excellent. We've affirmed that the genesis for the creation of NATO was to counter the threat of the Soviet Union.
I wonder how Russia then can view expansion of NATO as anything but anti-Russian. We've had the discussion where you've pointed out that we need to assure them and show them that it's a new NATO, that it has changed.
But if NATO is not anti-Russian, then what is it? Who is the alliance defending against?
ALBRIGHT: Senator, I think there are several aspects to -- answers to this question.
First of all, we have both -- Secretary Cohen and I have spoken about that it is not defending as much any more against an external enemy. And NATO itself made that decision in 1991. It readjusted its doctrine because it had made a decision that at the end of the Cold War, there was not the Soviet threat.
The threat is basically, as we have said, the instability within the region and which has in fact created two world wars. But there is also the possibility of an outside threat. There is a possibility of threats from various parts outside the region, to the south, we have to guard against.
And, on the off chance that in fact Russia does not turn out the way that we are hoping it will and its current leadership wants, NATO is there.
ALBRIGHT: So this is not an easy issue to deal with, because Russia is in the process of changing and one can admittedly understand why exactly the way you posed the question. Since NATO was created against them, isn't it hard for them to understand this is a new NATO?
We are trying to explain that. I mean, I think that is -- for them, they need to understand the fact that they don't exist as their old Soviet Union, means that NATO can in fact readjust. But it is a perception plus problem.
But I do think that we have to understand that NATO will continue to maintain itself in a way that it can deal with an outside threat, even though what we are talking about now are primarily these internal threats that are due to instability and problems created by ethnic tensions within those areas.
COHEN: Could I add just a footnote to that, Senator Kempthorne?
When Mikhail Gorbachev voiced strong objection, he said a united Germany cannot be part of NATO. That would constitute too great a threat to Russia's existence.
And we assured him that that was not going to be the case, that a united Germany indeed was going to be part of NATO, and it has functioned very well. In fact, who his one of the strongest proponents of having a better relationship with Russia than Chancellor Kohl?
So we have structured it in a way that our forces will not move eastward. It would not pose an offensive threat to Russia. And I think you have a very close relationship now between Germany and Russia, so it can be done. It just takes, as Secretary Albright said, a good deal of hard work.
KEMPTHORNE: Perhaps the united Germany was too great a problem for Mikhail Gorbachev.
COHEN: It's not too great a problem for President Yeltsin.
KEMPTHORNE: Let me ask you this.
Secretary Cohen, you made it very clear in your opening comment that NATO is a military alliance.
COHEN: Essentially.
KEMPTHORNE: Now that means, as I understand it, that an attack on a NATO member is to be considered an attack on the United States of America.
COHEN: On all members.
KEMPTHORNE: On all members, right.
And I appreciate, Secretary Albright, your comment that what message do we send to these new forming democracies? If we don't allow them into NATO, don't we want to foster democracy?
I'm wondering if NATO is the right vehicle to foster the democracy since it is a military alliance. We have had the discussion about the Russian army, that it does not have the capability today that it once had. In fact, that raises new concerns for our military, ironically, that you may have a Russian army that does not have the ability that it can deal with it in a conventional mode and therefore may be put in a corner and resort to its nuclear capability, bringing a real threat into the equation.
We have discussed this whole idea about what's going on in Russia today, the fact that you have nationalists that are trying to stir the waters. You have demagogues. You have members of the military that resent what has happened to what was a former world power.
KEMPTHORNE: The former chairman of this committee, Sam Nunn, stated in 1995 if NATO enlargement stays on its current course, reaction in Russia is likely to be a sense of isolation by those committed to democracy and economic reform with varying degrees of paranoia, nationalism and demagoguery emerging from across the current political spectrum.
What I'm wondering, with this posture, could we inadvertently by expanding NATO be setting up a situation that we will have to defend these new members because we've inadvertently caused this since of isolation with the very country and the only other country -- the only country in the world -- that still has the capability of destroying the United States of America?
ALBRIGHT: Sir let me start and -- I think this is the question that is kind of the core of this discussion. And it is the reason that we believe that the NATO-Russia charter is so important, because it is the method whereby Russia becomes a part of Europe rather than being isolated on the sidelines. And it is being negotiated very carefully in order to, again as I said, thread this needle so that Russia does in fact feel very much a part of Europe, that it is not left out in the cold, and that it senses that we care about its evolution towards democratic systems.
I think that if we were not to go forward at this stage, that we would in fact be giving solace to those forces in Russia to think that, mainly by them threatening, that the U.S. and the West would desist from what is obviously a useful path to enlarge the scope of democratic nations in Europe.
And so I think we are following a very careful path here of enlarging NATO with the countries that deserve to be a part of it, holding out the possibility; and also already active relationships with the Partnership for Peace countries, one of which is Russia; then also to hold out a way for Russia to play a very constructive role in the overall evolution of Europe.
A lot is going to depend on how we present the case and how we deal with our Russian counterparts -- how NATO deals with the Russian counterparts is, after all, a NATO negotiation -- how we deal with other parts of our relationship with Russia.
President Clinton is very conscious of what you have been saying. And it is for that reason that he has -- the U.S. is the host of the G-7 this year. And he -- it is going to take place in Denver, and it's going to be called the Summit of the Eight.
Russia will be much more a part of the discussion. We are in favor of Russia becoming a part of a variety of other international organizations -- the World Trade Organization if it can be done on commercial acceptable basis -- basically drawing them in to our set of structures.
ALBRIGHT: This is a long -- going to be a long process. They were in existence as a dictatorial power -- communist dictatorial power -- for over 70 years. It's going to take us a while to do this. But I think it behooves us to do it and obviate the arguments of those who say that this creates a more aggressive Russia. On the contrary, we think this is the way to engage them and draw them in.
COHEN: If I could just add -- there's some irony in this entire debate, because you've cited Senator Nunn, who I think, has some concerns about NATO expansion.
Also you said former Secretary Kissinger has expressed opposition to the way in which the administration is proceeding. He thinks that the administration has been too solicitous of the Russians, that we should be expanding without regard to their concerns.
And so President Clinton and Secretary Albright have been trying to negotiate a middle road here. Namely, yes we're going to have expansion, but we're going to be sensitive to the legitimate concerns on the part of the Russian government. And so there's some irony in -- on the part of those who are being cited today.
Let me say there's another irony involved -- that I think the fear that you've expressed that namely if the Russians feel that they are under some sort of -- in a corner as such, they might resort to nuclear weapons in order to defend themselves.
That's precisely the position that NATO had for years. That's precisely the posture that we were in when the Russians were on the East German boarder as such; and that we said: We'll be overwhelmed. Therefore don't ever cross the line, because we'll have a nuclear response.
So I don't see this as particularly threatening. They have nothing to fear because we're not going to be attacking Russia as such. And ordinarily, if they felt that they couldn't handle it on a conventional basis, their tactics might very well be or their doctrine might be use of nuclear weapons.
We had precisely the same policy for years in NATO. So I don't think we should look at that as a threat, but rather as a reality. We will never, NATO has no intent of invading Russia. We have no intent of trying to destabilize Russia as such.
Contrary -- to the contrary, we have a policy we're trying to engage them. As Secretary Albright has said, bring them in to the G-7 or G-8 now, to have the Gore-Chernomyrdin commission, to do a number of things -- including the NATO-Russia charter -- to say that no, we're going to work with you. We're not treating you as the enemy. We're going to work with you on a partnership basis.
So I think we're handling it in precisely the right fashion, understanding that there are legitimate concerns on the part of the Russians. We will deal with the legitimate concerns. We will not try to in any way accommodate the illegitimate ones that are being stirred up by either nationalists or those who are at the extreme fringe elements.
KEMPTHORNE: I thank you both for the discussion.
COHEN: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.