COATS: Welcome to both of our witnesses. From all reports, you both are off to a very positive start. I think we all know that the real tests lie ahead.
There's sufficient evidence to think that you both have the stuff to meet those tests, and I trust that you do. We do have some very critical decisions ahead.
I want to just reiterate my concern that has been already raised by other members about the kinds of messages that are sent following the Madrid conference. Obviously, some nations will be in and some won't be. And despite our best efforts at assuring those that didn't make the first cut, there will be a lot of anxiety over that.
Expectations have been high in some countries. There have been some late entries to the race for the first tier. Romania is a good example -- dramatic changes there in their government in just this past election, and extraordinary efforts I think on their part to try to catch up in the process, and probably some pretty high expectations. Slovenia falls in that category and so forth.
COATS: I just -- you've addressed the question -- I just would hope that very, very serious attention is given to how we communicate, how we work with, how we establish a process so that those nations that have those expectations and are moving toward meeting the criteria don't end up in a situation where the decision promotes instability rather than stability, political instability in particular.
I just think that that's a very large concern. I know you both share that concern. I'm really not asking you to comment on that.
Secretary Cohen, how important is the current status of the military development within the countries to be considered for NATO inclusion, and their progress in meeting that goal? How important is that in the decision in your opinion?
COHEN: It's very important. Secretary Albright has outlined the various criteria we look to as far as democratic form of government, civilian control, democratic principles, ideals, respecting one's neighbors, et cetera.
But the ability of these countries who would gain admission, the ability to measure up to Article 5 is critical. An assessment has to be made as to whether they have it within their capability to make the kind of changes to restructure their military, to modernize their military, to make the infrastructure improvements that will allow them to become interoperable. All of those will be critical as far as the judgment of the NATO defense ministers.
COATS: Realistically, what kind of a time frame are we looking at to bring those Eastern European military structures up to par with the current NATO countries?
COHEN: I think we're looking at it will vary from country to country, but it will vary over roughly a ten year period. Actually, about a 10-11 year period before they're fully mature and capable of being on a comfortable basis.
COATS: Having served on this committee, I think you understand the extraordinarily complex and difficult task of providing interoperability between the United States forces and NATO forces.
And now we're talking about countries that have developed their militaries under completely different doctrine, completely different command and control structure that lags significantly in
communications capabilities. That is going to be an extraordinarily difficult process.
COHEN: That's one of the reasons this PFP process has been very helpful. The combined joint task force concept also is something that's going to be instrumental.
We have an example of that in Bosnia today, where you have a multi-national force that is in Bosnia operating very effectively from a military point of view. And that's a concept that's going to be developed even further in terms of how we prepare countries, not only in this tranche that come in, but those in the future.
So Partnership for Peace is a pathway for future entrance, and we've made a good deal of progress as far as the countries that are the most likely to gain accession in terms of their participation in these military operations and exercises.
COHEN: And so there's a recognition on their part they have a great deal to do to become interoperable.
COATS: What are those countries that you feel we've made a great deal of progress in?
COHEN: Well, I think they -- if I start to name them, then I'm going to get into the problem of those that are excluded. So I think that there are generally.
COATS: Getting back to my problem of sending the wrong message -- I won't press you on that.
COHEN: But I think it's also important to point out that most of the nations who are suddenly rushing to the gateway understand that they have not made the changes necessary that would qualify them for membership.
What we hope to do -- and I think this is what Senator Levin pointed out -- how we accomplish this is just as important as whether it is expanded. And by indicating that: Yes, the door isn't closed. The door is open. You have a number of things you must do in order to get your ticket of admission into this great organization and that we intend to help you. We intend to have an enhanced PfP. We intend to bring you -- to make you future candidates and to realize that as soon as possible.
So it's going to be on the one hand, bringing members in who have achieved that level of accomplishment, and reaching with the other hand, and saying, we're going to help bring you in as soon as possible.
COATS: So defining the criteria in the process and defining what our cooperation is going to be in the existing NATO countries' cooperation, I think probably, at least in my opinion, are three very important elements of all this.
Given all that we know about the difficulty and the cost of bringing NATO from a military standpoint to where it is now, is it realistic to think that the cost estimates that we're looking at are close to the mark of where we are going to need to be? Or do we think that, realistically, we're going to probably end up either spending more either through their own countries' budgets or NATO's budget or the United States' contribution?
COHEN: I think the pressure will always have to be on to force, even existing NATO members, to measure up to what they have to do, because we are democracies and because the pressure was always to cut back on defense spending. There will always be that pressure.
These are the best estimates that we have right now. There is another proposal, another examination of the issue by the RAND Corporation. It depends on your assumptions.
CBO, for example, has assumed the worst-case scenario; namely, we have a resurgent Russia -- highly militaristic, highly nationalistic, highly antagonistic -- that poses an immediate threat to an enlarged NATO. What will be involved?
Well, obviously, that changes the concept at that point. I can see, coming before the committee and testifying -- requesting quite a different budget than I might if we had a different assumption. So a lot depends on what you assume to be the nature of the threat. The figures that I have given to you appear to be reasonable. They seem to coincide with the RAND study as well. But a lot will depend upon the assumptions made.
COATS: Thank you. My time has expired, Mr. Chairman.