BINGAMAN: Madame Secretary, in your testimony on page 4, you say that if we don't enlarge NATO, we will be validating the dividing line Stalin imposed in 1945. I guess I'm concerned that the course we're on here may -- rather, obviously, it doesn't validate that dividing line, but it does validate the notion that there is going to be a dividing line. And instead of eliminating the dividing line, it essentially sets out to move it.
And we are saying that -- we are putting the emphasis on moving the dividing line rather than on eliminating it, and that concerns me. I don't know -- I mean, Secretary Cohen, you indicated that the real threat that the new nations seeking membership are concerned with is instability. If that's true, why don't we let Russia become a member?
BINGAMAN: They have an instability problem just like eastern Europe has an instability problem. So, I, I'm just concerned that our policies seem to assume there's going to be a dividing line between Europe and the former members of the Soviet Union as such, and is that an appropriate assumption for us to be making?
ALBRIGHT: Senator, I think in listening to you and also to Senator Coats, there is no question that we have a very difficult job ahead of us. This is threading a needle, and trying to make really clear that we don't want to weaken the prime alliance that has existed throughout modern history. And at the same time we don't want to have people left out. We don't want to send the wrong messages. We know that the structure we have now is going to be, if it is not already, obsolete, in terms of what the needs of the next century are.
And we are embarked, as I said, on a major change in the way that we are looking at relationships within Central and Eastern Europe and with Russia itself. So, I think we know that we've got a very difficult and delicate job ahead of us.
I would argue, though, that we are not creating a new dividing line. First of all, we have said and we will continue to say that this is indeed a dynamic process, and that the first shall not be the last, and that NATO is open to all democracies, which does mean in a sense that it is open to Russia, although all the discussions that one has had would indicate that that is not their interest at this stage, nor is it something that is in the cards. Therefore, it is also important for us to develop special relationships with the countries that for one reason or another are not likely to be in the first tranche.
The NATO-Russia relationship, which is one that is being negotiated by NATO, Secretary-General Solana, is one in which there is an attempt to make sure that Russia does not feel excluded, that there is not a line there, that they will in fact be at the table, though not have a veto, in a lot of discussions that have to do with common issues in Europe.
We also are developing a special relationship with Ukraine, and a charter there that is being negotiated. There is a Baltic action plan. We have a variety of ways that we are being creative in order to make sure that there is not a dividing line. But I do think that you would all agree that there is a basic injustice to perpetuating a dividing line down the center of Europe which was created by force and where the countries that were a part of it never voted for being in the Warsaw Pact, and that they now as sovereign nations, have the right to choose their security alliance, as do all the countries, a statement that we embedded in one of the joint communiques at Helsinki.
So, we are not in any way underestimating the difficulties here. But we are aware that we have to deal with the right messages and the right process.
BINGAMAN: Let me ask about the Baltics. You mentioned a Baltic action plan. If the Baltic countries want to be part of NATO, as they obviously do, should we proceed to admit them?
ALBRIGHT: Again, we are not going to name names at this stage. We have said that NATO is open to membership to democracies that fulfill the number of these criteria that both Secretary Cohen and I have mentioned.
BINGAMAN: But as you, at least your view is, that that should include not just European countries as traditionally defined, but Russia should be eligible for membership in NATO at some date in the future.
ALBRIGHT: I am not saying that they should be. I'm just saying that the logic of what we are saying is that NATO is open for membership. European countries that qualify according to the criteria we have mentioned. And also frankly the desire of the people to be a part of it.
And there is no indication that Russia would like to be a part of NATO. There is an indication that they would like to have a relationship with NATO such as the one that is being negotiated currently.
BINGAMAN: Is it in our interest to be promoting increased expenditures on military modernization through many of these countries? They have internal problems, shortness of revenues, shortness of resources that will be focused and diverted to this modernization that's required by NATO. Is that in our interest, Secretary Cohen?
COHEN: I think it's in their interest. They would have to do this whether or not they joined NATO unless they're willing to give up their military altogether. And I doubt very much from a historical point of view whether any of the individual countries are saying simply abandon our military.
Their militaries are not modern. They do need to be restructured. They do need to have the modern equipment. And they would be required to do that if they intend to maintain a military capability for their own national security interest.
What we have is an opportunity to reduce those costs, that you have alliances are less expensive than nationalistic approaches to it. So it's an effort to help them modernize and save money and be secure as well.
BINGAMAN: My time is up, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.