TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE WALTER B. SLOCOMBE

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

BEFORE THE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE

HEARING ON NATO ENLARGEMENT

17 July 1997



Mr. Chairman, I am honored to appear before this committee to address
current issues in NATO enlargement, the transatlantic relationship,
and the changing European security role. I will also be pleased to
hear your comments and try to answer your questions on these important
security developments.


Nowhere are American concerns more vital, and our efforts more
concentrated, than in Europe. We will maintain our commitment to
Europe in troops on the ground, in capability to reinforce as needed,
and in political engagement in seeking to resolve problems. America
makes this commitment not as an act of altruism, but because the
security of Europe is vital to our own, as events in this century have
repeatedly shown.


And we have a historic opportunity before us. President Clinton said
recently, "Taking wise steps now to strengthen our common security
when we have the opportunity to do so will help build a future without
the mistakes and the divisions of the past, and will enable us to
organize ourselves to meet the new security challenges of the new
century."


Twice before in this century, America had the opportunity to help
build a system of European security. The first time, after WWI, we
foolishly held back from the responsibilities our interests required
we assume. The second time, after WWII, almost exactly 50 years ago,
Western Europe and the United States together chose a path of
reconciliation and reconstruction through the Marshall Plan, and
together moved from terrible destruction to unprecedented prosperity
and security. However, Eastern Europe and Russia did not participate
because of Stalin's paranoia and relentless expansionism.


We now have a third chance -- this time to build a security system for
all Europe that will:


-- Solidify the place of the newly free nations in a secure Europe
linked to the U.S.;


-- Maintain U.S. leadership and engagement;



-- Foster growing European integration;



-- Ensure that Russia will play a constructive role, commensurate with
its importance and weight in European affairs; and


And, unfortunately, we face problems as well as good opportunities.
The end of the Soviet threat, while very welcome, has not meant the
end of threats. Old national and ethnic hatreds, home-grown and
state-sponsored terrorism, threats from unstable regions outside
Europe, the prospect of the spread of weapons of mass destruction --
all pose problems for security in the future.


NATO in the New Europe



In the new European security system we seek to build, the key
instrument is NATO. NATO is the only effective, continuing
multilateral military alliance in the world. It has risen to the
challenge of providing a critical instrument to promote peace in
Bosnia. The best evidence of NATO's continuing relevance is the
eagerness of many countries to join it -- and the determination of its
current members to keep it strong and to shape it to respond to the
new challenges and opportunities we face.


To that end, we have embarked on an historic program to build a new
NATO. NATO enlargement is the most publicized, but not the only, part
of a much broader strategy to help create a peaceful, undivided and
democratic Europe. That strategy has included many other elements:
support for German unification; fostering reforms in Russia, Ukraine,
and other new independent states; assistance to withdrawal of Russian
forces and nuclear weapons from newly independent states; negotiation
and adaptation of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty; and the
evolution and strengthening of European security and economic
institutions, including the European Union, the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe, and the
Western European Union.


NATO enlargement is also part of a much broader series of steps to
adapt NATO to the post-cold War security environment, including
adaptation of NATO's strategy, strategic concept, command
arrangements, and force posture; its willingness to carry out new
missions beyond NATO's territory, as it has in Bosnia; and the
creation and enhancement of the Partnership for Peace (PFP). As part
of this broad series of steps, NATO enlargement aims to help the
United States and Europe erase outdated Cold War lines and strengthen
shared security into the next century.


NATO Enlargement



Assistant Secretary of State Kornblum's statement reviews the
accomplishments of the Madrid Summit. The most prominent feature of
the Summit was the Alliance's impending enlargement.


The impulse for so many of the nations of Central and Eastern Europe
to wish to join NATO stems from their desire for thorough, permanent
inclusion in the broad Atlantic community and for the sense of living
in the secure neighborhood that NATO has brought to its current
members. They want to be irreversibly part of the West, and we want to
help them in this endeavor.


But enlargement will also serve the common vital interest of all
current NATO members. Adding nations to the Alliance in a gradual and
careful way as they meet the standards for membership will:


-- foster stability throughout Europe;



-- make NATO stronger by creating a larger circle of like-minded
nations devoted to collective defense;


-- improve relations among the region's states as in the historic
reconciliation of Germany and the Czech Republic and of Hungary and
Romania;


-- broaden burden-sharing within NATO;



-- create a better environment for trade, investment, and economic
growth in Central and Eastern Europe;


-- help secure the historic gains of democracy in Central and Eastern
Europe by providing the security in which their free societies can
flourish and the hatred of the past be permanently buried, just as it
did for Western European nations such as Germany, Italy, and Spain;


-- and help all of Europe become a stronger partner for the United
States in political, economic, and security affairs. This will serve
American interest and American principles, just as it will serve those
of all of Europe, both old and new members and states inside and
outside the Alliance.


The Process of Enlargement



Of course, the process of enlargement must be gradual and carefully
prepared. Formal membership in NATO carries with it both political and
military obligations of a special character -- what President Clinton
has called "the most solemn security guarantees." The current members
-- through each of their parliaments -- must agree that all are ready
to accept these obligations. The broader context of European security,
including impact on Russia, on Ukraine, and on nations that remain
outside NATO, must be taken into account.


Nor is sincere aspiration to join enough for membership. New members
must demonstrate a commitment to democracy and the rule of law, to an
open market economic system, to civilian constitutional control of
their militaries, to peaceful resolution of disputes with neighbors,
to respect for human rights and the rule of law, and to a gradual
development of military capabilities that are congruent and
interoperable with NATO systems.


After extensive discussion with allies, with candidate countries, with
members of Congress, and within the Administration, the President
decided that the US would support Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic for first round invitations. Last week in Madrid, NATO
invited these three new democracies to begin accession talks to join
the Alliance. The three invitees -- Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic -- have made sufficient progress on military, political,
economic, and social reforms. They are clearly ready to take the next
steps to becoming full members, accepting all the rights and
responsibilities of membership.


Nine other European states had declared their desire to join NATO, and
many of them are making excellent progress in preparing themselves for
membership. The United States and the Alliance recognized the
arguments in favor of several other candidate countries, including
Slovenia and Romania. We concluded, however, that the alliance should
extend an invitation now only in the clearest cases, where there is a
broad consensus that the candidate countries have already demonstrated
readiness for membership on all relevant standards. Inviting accession
is a highly important action, which carries heavy obligations both for
new and old members. It is, for all practical purposes, irreversible.
Where there is reasonable doubt about whether a nation has yet made
sufficient progress, the prudent course is to defer invitations -- not
refuse them permanently. This approach is all the more appropriate,
given that the door to membership will remain open, so that there will
be ample opportunities to invite additional members.


The key non-selects -- Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, and the Baltic
states -- have all expressed disappointment at their non-selection.
But all have also indicated that, far from abandoning the course of
integration, NATO membership will remain a top foreign policy goal.
They are committed to continuing and accelerating reforms. They are
prepared to make the necessary sacrifices. In addition, all aspirants
have expressed their intentions to participate in enhanced PFP and the
EAPC.


At Madrid, the Alliance agreed that it expects to extend further
invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the
responsibilities and obligations of membership. Heads of State also
agreed that:


-- NATO will maintain an active relationship with those nations that
have expressed an interest in membership;


-- NATO will continue to consider applicants not accepted at Madrid;
and


-- No European democratic country whose admission would fulfill the
objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from consideration.


In sum, the nations that were invited to join NATO at the Madrid
Summit will not be NATO's only new members. The process will continue
and will be reviewed at the next NATO summit in 1999. The standards
for membership will not change. No nation will be excluded by
geography or history. Our vision is that as the nations of Europe
develop their democracy and their capacity to contribute to NATO's
purposes, they will become members of the Alliance in a steady, but
gradual process that reflects their own development -- and NATO's
ability to assimilate new members without weakening its military
effectiveness.


Costs of Enlargement



Of course, NATO enlargement carries costs.  Security is not free.



The most important costs -- like the most important benefits -- are
non-financial. The United States and its allies will, by enlargement,
extend solemn security guarantees to additional nations, and NATO
members must provide the capability, with that of the new members, to
back those guarantees. The Madrid Statement acknowledges that the
Alliance will need to find the needed resources.


Analysis of the financial costs of enlargement can be broken into
three components:


-- What will it cost the new members to be able to make an appropriate
military contribution to their own defense, to joining in NATO defense
of other members, and to helping perform other NATO missions?


-- What will it cost current members to be able to meet the new
obligations entailed in having additional nations within NATO's
security guarantee?


-- What are the costs to new and old members alike of integrating new
members into NATO -- of linking them to NATO's command and control,
military structure, air defense system, reinforcement strategy, and
the like?


Strictly speaking, it is only the third category that is an
incremental cost of enlargement, in the sense of measuring costs that
would not be incurred without enlargement. Old and new members would
have to pay the other two classes of costs -- and probably more -- to
achieve necessary levels of security if NATO did not expand. But it is
also true that enlargement will require the capabilities these costs
will provide, so they can fairly be considered part of the cost of
enlargement.


New Members. New members will need to meet the responsibilities of
membership -- of being producers and not merely consumers of security.
To this end, new members must rebuild, re-equip, and retrain their
military forces so they can operate effectively with the forces of
other NATO nations. This require fundamental reform of their national
militaries, with smaller but better equipped, better supported, better
trained, better led forces to replace the old Warsaw Pact-style forces
inherited from Communism. It will, specifically, require that they
acquire NATO-compatible command structures, communications, air
defenses, doctrine, logistics systems, and establish quality
personnel, including a professional NCO corps and a modern,
non-political officer corps.


NATO's current European members. They must ensure that their military
forces are able to meet the responsibilities that come with added
members. Almost entirely, this means actually doing what the current
members are already committed to do to improve their forces' mobility,
deployability, interoperability, and flexibility. NATO's military
doctrine has, since 1991, already shifted from positional defense
against a known enemy on known lines of attack, with heavy reliance on
stationed forces, to a more mobile, flexible capability to respond to
problems when they arise. Efforts by our European allies to build the
needed capabilities for this new doctrine have already begun (and
would have to continue whether or not NATO added members). The UK, for
example, already has the capability to deploy and sustain a
division-sized force of 20,000-25,000 personnel in a Gulf War-style
scenario. The French are establishing a Rapid Action Force (FAR)
designed for rapid response in both European and overseas
contingencies. The Italians (as Albania has indicated) are upgrading
their ability to project forces to areas of need. Germany also is
currently increasing its capability to deploy forces; a 50,000-man
Crisis Reaction Forces (CRF) unit is being formed, with the first
10,000 troops to be ready by late 1997. (Germany has 2,500 troops in
Bosnia, the first time it has deployed troops outside its territory
since the founding of NATO.)


The key need now is to proceed with these efforts. For we cannot let
enlargement dilute the military effectiveness of the alliance, and
these steps -- although mostly already agreed, already begun, and
needed in any event -- are all the more essential with the addition of
new allies.


Direct cost of integration of new members. With regard to direct cost
of integration of new members into NATO, there will be relatively
modest costs that are directly attributable to such things as
interoperability of the forces of new and old members and for
extending NATO's integrated command, communications, and air defense
surveillance systems.


The spending needed in all these categories, while substantial, is
modest relative to current spending levels. DOD estimates that the
total cost of all three categories will be in the range of $27-35
billion through 2009, the first decade after formal accession of the
initial new members in 1999. This will be divided roughly one-third to
each of the three categories.


The U.S. share will be modest indeed -- about $150-200 million
annually for our share of NATO common budgets, plus whatever we decide
to spend on helping the new members restructure their forces. (We now
spend about $100 million on PFP support for all PFP countries.)
Because the United States already has the world's pre-eminent
deployment capability, and substantial forces forward deployed in
Europe, there will be no need for additional U.S. forces.


For our current allies, the cost of adapting their forces to the needs
of the new strategy are modest compared to their overall budgets --
which collectively total about $180 billion per year. Current European
NATO members are already investing in improved capabilities to operate
beyond their borders.


For new members, the costs of NATO enlargement will be a manageable,
though larger, percentage of their current military budgets. Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic are already investing in modernizing
and restructuring their forces. The costs can be met by a combination
of modest increases in the percentage of GDP devoted to defense to
bring them into line with NATO averages, a growing GDP base as growth
advances, and probably most important, reduction in the size of their
manpower base.


The day after the Madrid Summit's invitation to the three new members,
Secretary Cohen met with the Defense Ministers of each of these
countries. Each stated the determination of his country to act as an
ally even before 1999 and to do all that needs to be done to make
their country a productive member of NATO. The determination was
reiterated by the Poles to the President during his visit, by the
Czechs to the Secretary of State, and by the Hungarians to the
Secretary of Defense.


The new members understand what is expected of them. For example,
during Secretary Cohen's visit to Hungary after the Madrid Summit,
Hungarian officials estimated that 1.8% of their GDP this year will go
to defense, and that this will grow steadily to between 2.1-2.2% by
2000. Hungary will continue to fully participate in PFP/EAPC, and step
up its regional cooperation efforts.


The Polish Defense Minister told Secretary Cohen, during their meeting
on the sidelines of the Madrid conference, that using the NATO DPQ as
a guide, Poland is building a 15-year plan to modernize its military
and make it interoperable with NATO. The initial areas of focus will
be communications, airspace surveillance, and command structures. They
will fund the initiative by cutting back on unneeded infrastructure,
and gradually increasing the Polish defense budget, pledging to boost
it by 3% annually above changes in the overall Polish budget for the
first 5 years. Reflecting the shift from manpower to modernization,
they have set as a target to devote 40% of their defense spending to
procurement. The Polish Minister noted that these are not strictly
costs of accession to NATO, but of having a modern defense of Poland;
however, prospective accession makes them more acceptable to the
Polish public.


The Czech Minister of Defense made similar commitments. He noted that
the Czech public had accepted the government's decision to maintain
defense spending, even as social programs and domestic budgets were
being cut to meet new economic targets. Like his colleagues, he made
the point that a sound defense would cost more outside NATO than
within it.


It is important to understand that these estimates of the cost of
enlargement -- and of keeping NATO capable in new conditions -- relate
to the capabilities required in the European security environment that
we in fact foresee -- one in which nations need serious defense
capabilities, but in which there is no threat of large-scale military
conventional aggression and where any such threat would take years to
develop. Of course, a fundamentally different -- and far more
demanding -- set of defense requirements would arise if trends
developed in such a way as to renew a direct territorial threat to
NATO members. Such a threat does not exist nor is there an expectation
that it will reemerge. Moreover, the United States and its allies
would have considerable warning and preparation time in the very
unlikely event such a dramatic change in the European security
environment were to occur.


Because such a threat is hypothetical, it is not possible to estimate
with any precision the costs of meeting it. But there can be no
question that the cost of responding to such a threat would be
substantial. Just ten years ago, for example, the United States and
most of its Allies were spending nearly twice as much of GDP on
defense as today.


There can, however, be no question that, if we had to meet such a
threat, we could do so more effectively and less expensively in an
expanded alliance than in a Europe still divided along Cold War lines.
In such circumstance, the added manpower, military capability,
political support, and strategic depth afforded by NATO enlargement
would amply justify whatever additional cost there were in having
additional members in the Alliance.


Perhaps the most important point to be made about the costs of
enlargement is that there would be greater costs and risks to not
enlarging. If we fail to seize this historical opportunity to help
integrate, consolidate, and stabilize Central and Eastern Europe, we
would risk a much higher price later. The most efficient and
cost-effective way to guarantee stability in Europe is to do so
collectively through NATO. Alliances save money. Collective defense is
both cheaper and stronger than national defense. A decision to defer
enlargement, much less to withhold it altogether, would send the
message to Central and Eastern Europe that their future does not lie
with NATO and the West. It would falsely validate the old divisions of
the Cold War. The resulting sense of isolation and vulnerability would
be destabilizing in the region and would encourage nationalist and
disruptive forces throughout Europe. NATO would remain stuck in the
past, in danger of irrelevance, while the U.S. would be seen as
inconstant and unreliable in its leadership and withdrawing from its
responsibilities in Europe and the world.


Partnership for Peace



As the process of enlargement goes forward, security for all, not just
NATO members, old or new, must be preserved. For this reason, we
attach great importance to implementing the measures the Alliance has
planned to strengthen the links between NATO and Partner countries,
whether they are seeking membership or not, including enhanced PFP and
the EAPC. A key instrument to that end is the Partnership for Peace,
which will be a permanent part of a broad, inclusive security
framework for Europe as a whole.


Already, strong bonds of security and cooperation are being formed
throughout Europe through the PFP. The Partnership has, in only three
years, become a dynamic force for building trust and cooperation among
the nations of Europe. An example of PFP's contribution is the Baltic
Challenge exercise, currently underway and involving forces from the
U.S., Norway, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania.


The Madrid Summit and prior NATO decisions made clear we will go
farther and build on the strong foundation already laid. NATO has, for
example, agreed to give a stronger and more institutional voice to
Partners by forming a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council to serve as
the forum for broad security consultations and cooperation. It is also
proceeding with various PFP enhancements. These include:


-- broadening PFP missions to include peace enforcement;



-- increasing Partner participation in exercise and contingency
planning;


-- establishing Partner Staff Elements in appropriate NATO military
headquarters; and


-- reforming the PFP Planning and Review Process, thus better helping
partners to prepare for military operations with NATO.


For those Partner countries that are embracing PFP as a path to NATO
membership, these enhancements are a key to opening that door. But
those countries that do not aspire to NATO membership, as well as
those that are not among the first new members, will realize many of
the same political and security gains from active participation in
PFP. PFP is, in fact, helping to create a new zone of security and
stability throughout Europe. Far from fading, PFP will assume even
greater importance as the enlargement process goes forward.


ESDI within NATO



A key element of NATO's internal adaptation is the continued
development of a European Security and Defense Identity within NATO. A
great deal has been accomplished since the debates of the early 90's
on European defense arrangements, and even since the decisions of the
Brussels and Berlin ministerials last year.


NATO has agreed on and begun to implement practical mechanisms by
which NATO assets and capabilities can be employed in WEU-led
operations. Steps have been taken to develop command arrangements
within NATO to prepare, support, command, and conduct WEU-led
operations using NATO assets and capabilities. The Deputy Supreme
Allied Commander Europe, who is a British general, has been given
specific responsibilities in an ESDI context. The NATO defense
planning process has been revised to ensure appropriate support for
the conduct of WEU-led operations. These operations will be exercised
and will incorporate practical arrangements for the release,
monitoring, and return of NATO assets and the exchange of information
between NATO and the WEU. The end result will be the creation of
militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under
the political control and strategic direction of the Western European
Union (WEU).


However, ESDI is not -- and is unlikely to become -- a substitute for
U.S. involvement in NATO and European security. This is so, not simply
because of the familiar obstacles to European-only action across the
full spectrum of security problems, but because our own interests
require that we continue to take the lead on European security
questions.


NATO-Russia Relationship



Central to the prospects for the European security system we seek is
Russia's development, both internal and external. Russia has been a
major player in European security for 300 years, and it will continue
to be one. Current conditions, for all their uncertainty, present a
historically unmatched opportunity to foster a positive and
constructive role for Russia in Europe and the world.


NATO is now embarking on a new dialogue with Russia. While retaining
fully its freedom of action, the Alliance has set up the mechanism to
engage Russia on a broad range of issues of mutual concern. Through
the Founding Act signed in Paris on May 27 and the NATO-Russia
Permanent joint Council it created, NATO and Russia will endeavor to
consult and, where possible and desirable, to cooperate to forward the
cause of peace and security in Europe.


Contrary to the concerns of some, NATO's dialogue with Moscow will not
give Russia a role in internal NATO issues like mutual defense
planning or enlargement, nor will it give Russia a veto over NATO
reaching independent decisions as it deems fit. The Founding Act is
entirely explicit on this point.


By this step with Russia, we have begun a dialogue with Russia about
its role in European security, and its relationship with NATO. The
Founding Act promotes between NATO and Russia a future, not of
confrontation, but of consultation on mutual interests and mutual
concerns.


Of course, Russia will even under the most optimistic assumptions,
continue to have its own interests and its own approaches to problems,
which will not always match -- and may conflict with -- ours. But in
dealing with Russia, as for others, the right course is to seek to
resolve those differences by dialogue and not by confrontation. The
arrangements for institutionalizing that dialogue -- which would in
some form take place anyway -- will ensure taking each other's views
and interests into account. They would not give the Russians either a
voice in NATO's internal decisions, nor a veto over NATO's independent
decisions and actions.


Of course, Russia continues to oppose NATO enlargement in principle,
even as its government acquiesces in its initial stages. But in the
long run, real Russian interests are served by acceptance of
enlargement as an element in a European security system that will:


-- Keep the United States firmly and fully engaged in European
security;


-- Ensure that the nations of Europe continue to cooperate as part of
an integrated security structure, not pursue independent national
security policies;


-- Build stability and confidence in Central and Eastern Europe;



-- And, most important, rather than isolating Russia, allow her to
participate fully, on a scale and in a manner commensurate with
Russia's inherent might and power in Europe.


Our task is to work with Russia to build confidence that the new NATO
is no threat to Russia's legitimate role as a leading European and
world state -- nor to any nation that does not make itself a threat to
NATO. The task with Russia is not without promise. Even as NATO and
Russia have been debating NATO enlargement, Russian participation in
NATO's military operations in Bosnia has served as a positive example
of the potential for a sound NATO-Russia relationship. NATO and Russia
have a special relationship today in Bosnia, and Russia is
demonstrating its capacity to participate in the future security
architecture of Europe -- as NATO is demonstrating its will to secure
that cooperation.


NATO-Ukraine Relationship



Ukraine is a country of great importance to the U.S. We have a real
stake in ensuring the Ukraine remains a strong, stable and independent
state. NATO continues to support the reform process in Ukraine as it
develops democratic institutions with a market economy.


The NATO-Ukraine Charter, signed in Madrid, will move NATO-Ukraine
cooperation onto a more substantive level, offer new potential for
strengthening our relationship, and enhance security in the region.


The opening of the NATO Information Office in Kiev is another step in
building a strong and enduring relationship. Ukraine's participation
in IFOR and SFOR bodes well for the increased practical cooperation
between Ukraine and the Alliance. We saw a concrete example of this
cooperation when Secretary Cohen attended the closing ceremony of the
PFP exercise Cooperative Neighbor, in which Ukraine hosted troops and
representatives from the U.S., NATO allies (Greece, Italy, Germany,
The Netherlands), Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, for an exercise with
troops from the Czech Republic, Moldova, Romania, and Slovakia.


Conclusion



From NATO's enlargement and internal adaptation, to relations with
Russia, Ukraine and the other nations of the Partnership for Peace,
the years ahead will be challenging ones in European and Transatlantic
security. The task is no more than well begun, but it is well begun,
and we mean to see it through.


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