Statement of Peter W. Rodman Director of National Security Programs Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee: Now that all the governments of the North Atlantic Alliance have committed themselves to admitting new members -- and at American urging -- the political costs of a "no" vote by the U.S. Congress have clearly increased: Rejection of this initiative would be a severe blow to American credibility and Alliance cohesion. It is equally clear, however, that the North Atlantic Treaty (in Article 11) has always recognized, from the beginning, the importance of each ally's observance of its constitutional procedures. And there surely must be substantive arguments for proceeding down this road, other than that the President has made a commitment. It is proper, therefore, that the great national debate over this issue begin now, and that it begin with first principles. We need to remind
ourselves why this policy was undertaken, why it was necessary -- and why the failure to undertake it would have been a blunder of historic
proportions. The Structural Problem of European Peace In my view, the case for NATO enlargement begins with a look at recent European history. From the beginning of this century, from the breakup of empires and the Versailles settlement of 1919, we have had a belt of small, weak, vulnerable states in the heart of Europe. And for the entire 20th century, this has been the weakest part of the structure of peace in Europe. Three times in this century, the entire Continent was thrown into upheaval because of instability and a vacuum of power in this part of Europe. Two World Wars and the Cold War can, in one sense or another, be said to have started there. Three times in this century, America was forced to intervene with its own troops to restore stability after a crisis in this part of Europe. The fate of Western Europe, the fate of the whole Continent, clearly hinges on the stability or instability of Central and Eastern Europe. And our own vital interest in the security of Europe as a whole is inescapable. We have learned all this the hard way, three times. The idea that this stability is today automatic, because Soviet Communism has been defeated and we have various arms control treaties, is ahistorical, an illusion, and (ultimately) dangerous. The laws of history and geopolitics have not been repealed. NATO enlargement is therefore a policy to stabilize Europe. What we are talking about is a Western security guarantee in order to foreclose, once and for all, future competition or partitions or power vacuums, to put an end to any ambiguity about the status of Central Europe -- an ambiguity which has in the past proven decidedly unhealthy for the peace of Europe as a whole. Clarity will only deter challenges; lack of clarity will invite them. NATO enlargement is a way to make clear that the Revolution of 1989 (and 1991) -- that is, the liberation of these countries -- is irreversible. It is crisis prevention with respect to Central Europe the way NATO's creation was crisis prevention with respect to Western Europe. While the Soviet Union and its East European empire have collapsed -- and two-thirds of U.S. troops have been able to come home from Europe -- the structural problem of European peace has not entirely gone away. First of all, Russia, even in its truncated state, remains a disproportionate factor of power on the Continent. It still possesses 23,000 nuclear warheads; it is still spending 8 percent of its GDP on what is the world's second largest defense budget, even though this budget has declined significantly since 1992. Russia's military capabilities still dwarf those of any other nation in Europe. In addition, Russia has been a clumsy and erratic factor in European politics for centuries, long antedating the Bolsheviks and nuclear weapons. As this century ends, substantive differences persist over issues inherited from the Cold War (e.g., war criminals in Bosnia; treatment of the Baltic States; some arms control disagreements) and over some new issues that have emerged since the end of the Cold War, including Russia's claim of a "special responsibility" to keep order in its immediate neighborhood, which seems to mean the entire sphere of the former USSR.There are definitely elements in the Russian elite -- especially in the Duma -- who have not reconciled themselves to the loss of their former sphere of dominant influence. In short, even with an optimistic view of Russia's evolution, there is no natural counterweight to this disproportionate Russian power without an American military presence in Europe, and even the most positive future relationship between Russia and the West depends on this. Maintaining this balance of power remains a crucial function of NATO. There is also a German dimension of European geopolitical stability. Germany has been a faithful democratic ally for over 40 years, especially since it formally joined NATO in 1955. But Germany is also the dominant political and economic power in Western Europe, all the more so since unification in 1990. Another traditional function of NATO has been to integrate Germany into the Western security structure, so that Germany's economic dominance has no security implications. This, of course, is another success story and another reason why the continuation of NATO remains a key to European peace. Without NATO and the American military presence, even the harmony of Western Europe -- and the process of Western European integration -- are likely to become unhinged. None of the preceding is meant as an ethnic slur on the moral qualities of Russians or Germans. Rather, it is designed to point to, and define, a
structural problem. Stability and peace of mind are easier to achieve when disproportionate power is counterbalanced; an underlying
equilibrium is the surest basis for benign relations. The need has not disappeared. The North Atlantic Alliance has always been the vehicle for
America's military role in Europe, serving these various security and political purposes. These traditional NATO purposes remain its principal
purposes. Whatever new common objectives develop -- such as out-of-area peacekeeping, or cooperation with non-allied countries -- the
traditional functions of the Alliance remain fundamental. The Administration has only muddied the case for NATO enlargement by its apparent
confusion about the basic functions that the Alliance is there to perform. Implications for Central Europe The implications of all this for Central Europe are not hard to imagine. Fate and geography have placed the small countries of Central and Eastern Europe between Germany and Russia, the two dominant powers of Europe, and history suggests that this is not the most comfortable place to be. It is recent history that suggests this, mind you. They have only recently emerged from a half-century of unadulterated hell -- brutal domination first by the Nazis, then by the Soviets. The Central and Eastern Europeans therefore know in their bones that they need to be serious about security policy. They know there is nothing automatic about their national survival. The history of this century is that their region has been a power vacuum between Germany and Russia, and that they have been the victims either of Russo-German competition or of Russo-German collusion. As sovereign states, and democracies, they now strive to fashion a policy that secures their independence for the long term. Their (natural) conclusion is that they need allies, and they want a commitment from the West that the West feels a stake in their survival -- a commitment up front, so that it is not ambiguous and hesitant like 1938-39, and not too late, as in 1944-48. They are eager most of all for an American connection. Given their geography and their history, they see their link with America as their lifeline -- their guarantee against a recurrence of the fate that earlier befell them. NATO membership represents all these things. It goes without saying that membership in the European Union is no substitute for this (though EU membership would certainly help bolster their internal economic prospects). And I fully expect the Central Europeans to be among the most constructive members of the Alliance. Because of their history and their geography, they are less susceptible to illusions about defense issues than are some of the present Western members of the Alliance, and they are likely to be among the most responsive to American leadership. So, the fears of "diluting" the Alliance are misplaced. It is no coincidence, moreover, that Germany is itself a strong advocate of NATO enlargement. The Germans intend to be active politically and
economically in Central Europe, and they are wise enough to know that it is a lot healthier if it is a collective Western presence, and if NATO
makes a collective commitment to ensure Central European security. What If We Say No? What would it mean if NATO said no? It would be, in short, an invitation to the future destabilization of Europe. In 1989, we all cheered when the Wall came down and all these countries were liberated from the Soviet empire -- Solidarity in Poland, the "Velvet Revolution" in Prague, and so on. In 1991, the Baltic states, Ukraine, and others were liberated. They are now free, independent, democratic, sovereign nations. Several of them now turn to the West and ask: "Are you (the West) prepared to guarantee our continued survival as independent states? Do you value the happy outcome of that period enough to want to make it irreversible? Is the new status quo sufficiently attractive that you are willing to incur a modest cost and risk to defend it?" And we have to answer: yes or no. Maybe it would be more convenient if the question had not arisen. But a little bit of historical memory guaranteed that they would ask the question. And if the West decides that it is not willing to give a security guarantee, this will be a political event in itself that will have profound consequences. The Russians, of course, are saying: "No way. You're taking away our 'buffer zone'." That's exactly how former Defense Minister Oleg Rodionov put it in December: NATO enlargement, he said, would "remove our buffer zone and create dangerous new conditions. ..." So for the West to say no to the Central Europeans is to say: "Sorry. Sure, we were delighted by 1989 and all that, but don't expect us to guarantee it. You may have thought you were free to rejoin the civilization of the West. But -- sorry -- you're in Russia's 'buffer zone.' We're not going to take the risk." That is the worst possible message to send to the hardliners in Moscow; it will only create temptations, or at least reopen questions in Moscow that we should be trying to prevent from being reopened. And if the West says no, the Central Europeans will have no choice but to slide back gracefully into Russia's sphere of influence. That is how they will react. Their foreign policy will adjust accordingly, and Russia will perhaps reacquire influence in areas of their domestic policy. It will be the "Finlandization" of Central Europe -- the partial reversal of the liberation of 1989. I, for one, would find that a grotesque result. And if the West, at some point, decides it doesn't like this evolution, or if the Russians are heavyhanded (neither of which is unlikely), a new period of instability and possible crisis in Central Europe is upon us. Perhaps it's a moral argument as well as a strategic one. These countries want to rejoin European civilization, which is now embodied in the Atlantic community. For us to say no is to say: "Sorry, we don't want to 'draw a new line' in Europe, so we'll stick to the old line -- the 1945 line, the Yalta line -- and you're just on the wrong side of it." I find that an appalling answer. Similarly, with respect to the Balts, and others formerly absorbed by force not only in the Soviet empire but in the Soviet Union itself, to exclude them a priori from the Atlantic Alliance is to enshrine the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact as the guiding principle of American foreign policy. We never did this before; why should we do it now? Russia is not threatened by any of this. Two-thirds of American troops are already home from Europe. Russians know there is no offensive threat from NATO. There are many reassurances we can give to Russia -- indeed, they have already been given. Qualitative changes have been made in NATO to demonstrate that it cannot possibly threaten Russia, and any future Russian complaints have even less basis than the original ones. The door should be open to Russia to enjoy the most cooperative and friendly relationship with the West. That depends on Russia's own internal evolution more than anything else (and perhaps also on the future growth of China). But when the question is asked now: "Are we (the West) prepared to guarantee the security and the freedom and the independence of the key
states of Central Europe?" the answer has to be, "Yes." Endnotes Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington: DC: Department of Defense, April 1997), p. 207. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1996/97 (London: Oxford/IISS, 1996), p. 107. See, e.g., President Boris Yeltsin's address to the State Duma, February 24, 1994; Yeltsin's address to the Council of CIS heads of state, Moscow, March 28, 1997. Rodionov quoted in William Drozdiak, "Russian Defense Chief Blasts NATO's Plans," Washington Post, December 19, 1996, p. A29, and
ITAR-TASS report by Aleksandr Mineyev, December 18, 1996, in FBIS-SOV-96-245, 18 December 1996. Federal Grant Information (per Rule XI, Clause 2g of the Rules of the House of Representatives): The Nixon Center is the recipient of a grant of $20,000, for the period April 1, 1997, to March 31, 1998, from the United States Institute of Peace (ref: USIP-061-96F), in support of Peter W. Rodman's strategic assessment project, "Broken Triangle: China, Russia, and America after 25 Years." |