OBEY: Well, let me ask a second question of both of you. I must say I have profound concern about the administration's decision to move ahead with the expansion of NATO. We have a lot of talk about stealth technology on this committee. It seems to me that one morning, the American people, most of whom don't pay close attention to these matters, will wake up to discover that there has been -- as far as they're concerned almost a stealthy expansion of commitments to Central Europe. And I think that can have a profound backlash negative effect on the American public's willingness to support legitimate commitments when they need to be made.
My concern is not so much that I think you're going to get a deal with the Russians. But my concern is not so much that you will -- that this is the topic of conversation on the part of every Russian right now; it obviously isn't.
My concern is that future nationalist politicians within Russia will be able to exploit that expansion in order to gin up irrational actions on the part of the Russian government, and to win elections or win support they might not otherwise win if they continue to have additional internal and economic turmoil.
So I guess I would simply you ask two questions. Do either of you really think that the American public will happily buy into the idea that we are taking on apparently a new commitment to meet a military attack on Poland or Hungary or other countries with a military response of our own without having a much more broadly understood debate than we've had to date?
OBEY: And secondly, do you not have any concerns that NATO expansion will make it more difficult to obtain Russian parliamentary approval and ratification of pending arms control agreements or our future contemplated agreements?
COHEN: If I could respond to that first. With respect to NATO enlargement, I made a speech on the other body's floor last year calling attention to the fact that this is an important issue. It ought to be debated publicly with as widely disseminated information as possible. And I still believe that to be the case.
I think this is not something that is going have a stealthy configuration it. It's something that is very important to the security of this country. It's certainly important to the taxpayers as well.
A report will be filed soon -- if it hasn't been filed already -- that will lay out the formal -- in formal terms the case for NATO enlargement. That's just the beginning of the process. There's going to be the meeting in Madrid in July at which time there'll be votes taken in terms of which countries should qualify for admission and will be admitted.
And then about a two -- 18 month to two-year process of seeing to it that that is ratified as such where that process is approved or receives the approval of the various governments involved. So this is no policy that can be slipped through the back door in the middle of the night. This is going to be a very openly -- and should be an openly debated issue.
I think if you lay out the case to the American people and say what we want to achieve is a democratic and undivided and a prosperous Europe to see that those countries in the east enjoy the same benefits as those in the west, that that promotes stability, and there's been instability over the years that has caused two world wars that you can make a very positive case for NATO enlargement.
Are there certain risks involved? And the answer is of course. Those risks are being addressed by Secretary Albright. She just returned last evening. We had a breakfast meeting this morning getting briefed on her conversations with her Russian counterparts.
We have been meeting with our Russian counterparts. We have a series of meetings scheduled in the very near future -- all of which is designed to address some of their concerns.
But I think you have to look at the opposite as well. And if we don't enlarge and leave those countries who are eager to follow our example -- Hungary and Rumania by the way, an example there of how eager they are to come in to the NATO alliance as such, have settled a long-simmering dispute.
Other nations are now reforming their governments with a hope that one day they will qualify as well. So I think that there are some positive aspects to this, which will contribute to the overall stability. To the extent that we can address Russian concerns -- real Russian concerns -- we are undertaking a very forceful forward looking way of attempting to do that.
And so, I think we have to balance it. There are risks involved, but there are also great benefits with the process itself. And that has to be debated in a very public way and very vigorously. And I'm sure that it will.
OBEY: What about the likelihood that it will increase the difficulty of the ratification of arms control agreements?
COHEN: I think that's one of the issues, that it is has that potential for making it more difficult for the Duma to ratify START II, for example. We want START II to be ratified. The Duma may resist that.
We're trying to persuade the Russian leadership that it's in their interest to have that START II ratified. It's in our interest that it be ratified. And -- are there things that we can do, for example, looking forward to START III? Are there levels that we can reasonably accommodate that would ease the burden on the Russians in order to comply with START I and START II levels?
There are things that we can do to ameliorate that, but it's going to take a lot of leadership coming from President Yeltsin. And so, that's the reason why Secretary Albright has spent time...
OBEY: I'm not concerned that President Yeltsin won't be able to -- in the short term -- explain his buying into this operation. I'm concerned about what happens after Yeltsin and the way it will be able to be exploited, or to be exploited by future politicians.
COHEN: That's the case in any event. If it were -- yes. If we were not to go forward with NATO enlargement and President Yeltsin were not to remain in his current position, there is always the prospect that those who are vying for leadership in the future would seek to exploit it by reconstituting the Soviet Union under the flag of Russia. So, that's something that's always going to be there and there is no way to avoid that.
OBEY: General, would you care to comment, or not?
SHALIKASHVILI: I can only tell you that I very strongly second everything that Secretary Cohen has said. I, of course, as a military man am particularly concerned about the issue of START II. And so, I think it is very important that we continue to hold the Russian military support for START II. And they have been supportive of it, as has been the administration in Russia, in Moscow.
Now we have to gain the Duma support. And one of the best ways is -- is really the economic argument that it is much more difficult for them to retain a START I structure than it is for us, as painful as it might be for us. And so, I think there are persuasive arguments. Whether that will overcome the sort of emotional feeling that they might wish to hold up START II no one can tell. But I think we need to -- that's a very strong argument we need to make because we do not wish that to be hung up in the Duma.
OBEY: Well, my time has expired. Let me simply say that an additional concern I have, Mr. Secretary, is that in fact if we have round one of expansion, that in fact has the potential to create a no- man's land between an expanded NATO and Russia with the Ukraine and the Baltic states perhaps under more aggressive Russian pressure than they might otherwise be, if there is in fact a negative Russian reaction eventually to what we do.
And I would simply urge the administration to insist that there is a much broader discussion in this society of what happens before you actually get to July. Because once you put it on the road in July, then we'll be told well now that we've committed we sure -- we certainly can't back off. We're stuck with a fait accompli even if it hasn't been accomplished yet. And at that point, we've got commitments that the American public don't understand.
COHEN: I think this debate should begin in earnest now to avoid the situation you just described.