NATO ENLARGEMENT James Baker Former Secretary of State Senate Budget Committee October 29, 1997


NATO ENLARGEMENT
 
James Baker
Former Secretary of State


Senate Budget Committee 

October 29, 1997




Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this committee:



My reasons for appearing before you today are simple. As Secretary of
State from 1989 to 1992, I see NATO enlargement as a logical if
overdue extension of the Bush Administration's outreach to the former
Warsaw Pact countries embodied by the North Atlantic Cooperation
Council.


And, as a private citizen still keenly interested in foreign policy, I
view enlargement as an historic opportunity to advance America's
interests and values in Europe.


Let me begin with three short propositions:



(1) Enlarging NATO is good for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic;


(2) It is good for our allies in Western Europe;



(3) And, most importantly, it is good for the United States.



From the point of view of the Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic,
NATO membership confers important advantages. Most obviously, it
protects them from foreign aggression. True, these countries today do
not confront any direct external threat. But such a threat, notably
from a resurgent Russia, may arise in the future.


Simple prudence dictates that the Central Europeans take steps now,
before a possible crisis occurs, to assure that any such threat will
be successfully averted. In a real sense, NATO membership represents
an insurance policy for the countries of Central Europe -- one that
can be acquired today at far low financial and political cost than
later.


But NATO membership represents much more than a security guarantee for
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. It also serves an important
political function. Opponents to NATO enlargement consistently ignore
the decisive political role that the alliance has played from the very
beginning. NATO was instrumental, for instance, in the emergence of a
prosperous, democratic Germany at peace with her neighbors.


NATO can play a similar role in Central Europe. There, NATO membership
will serve to consolidate the significant progress already made
towards democratic government and free markets. And it will help
encourage cooperation, rather than competition, between the new member
states.


From the point of view of Western Europe, the stakes in NATO
enlargement are also high. If the history of this century has taught
one cruel lesson to the Western European it is this: They cannot
isolate themselves from events to their East.


World War I, World War II and then the Cold War were all inextricably
bound up with developments in Central and Eastern Europe. More
recently, the break-up of Yugoslavia has prompted the largest armed
conflict on European soil since 1945. Instability in Central Europe
remains a possible threat to broader European security. Today, that
region is at peace. By NATO enlargement it can be kept that way.


Let me mention here that NATO enlargement is by no means the only way
that the Western Europeans can enhance stability in Central Europe.
Indeed, I would argue that EU membership is just as important as
membership in NATO for the countries involved.


Western Europe, consumed by monetary union, has been less than
forthcoming when it comes to opening its markets to the East. Even as
the United States moves forward with its Western Allies on NATO
enlargement, we must press them to reach out to Central Europe through
trade and investment. We must make it clear that NATO membership for
the countries of Central Europe is not a substitute for closer
economic ties to the EU.


From the point of view of the United States, I have already mentioned
this century's three major European wars and their links to
developments in Central and Eastern Europe. All three were America's
wars as well. Washington, no less than London or Paris, ignores the
East to its peril. NATO enlargement reflects this simple strategic
fact. The argument is simple: Enlargement enhances stability in
Central Europe.


That stability in turn improves general security in Europe. And
security in Europe is a vital American national interest. Some say
that by enlarging NATO, we commit ourselves to intervening in a future
Bosnia-type situation in Central Europe. Nothing could be further from
the truth. By enhancing stability, NATO enlargement will help
guarantee that similar situations do not develop in Central Europe.


NATO enlargement will not only advance America's national interests.
It will also promote our values. NATO is not just a defensive
alliance. It is also a community of shared values. And, since its
inception, it has not just defended borders, but ideals. The fall of
the Berlin Wall was not just a victory for NATO; it was also a victory
for values that Americans hold dear. By extending NATO to the new
democracies of Central Europe, NATO can help ensure that those values
take firm root. NATO enlargement truly conforms to the highest
standards of American foreign policy. It is grounded in both a
realistic assessment of our interests and an idealistic commitment to
our values.


Before I conclude, let me address two other issues:



The first is the question of cost. This is an area where on specifics
I defer to defense experts. Clearly, however, the sums involved with
enlarging NATO are considerable. And negotiating burden-sharing among
NATO members, both new and old, will no doubt be contentious. But I am
also convinced that neither of these problems is insuperable. By most
estimates, the cost to the United States of NATO enlargement will
represent only a modest fraction of our overall defense expenditures.
And, given the stakes involved for all concerned, some satisfactory
formula for burden-sharing can likely be developed.


My basic point is this: Haggling over costs should not be permitted to
scuttle the move to enlarge NATO. This would truly be throwing the
baby out with the bath water.


The second additional issue is the question of Russia's response to
NATO enlargement. I mentioned earlier that some opponents to NATO
enlargement stress NATO's military aspects to the exclusion of its
political role. But some of enlargement's supporters also fall into
the same error by casting enlargement as an effort to contain Russia
militarily. It is true that NATO enlargement protects the states of
Central Europe against a possible revival of Russian expansionism at
some future point in time.


And, given the region's history, this only makes sense. But by
bolstering cooperation in the region, NATO enlargement also promotes
Russia's own interests in Central European stability -- a fact often
overlooked by those on both sides of the debate.


Moreover, the political logic for NATO enlargement also extends to
Russian membership as well. We should make it plain that Russia, too,
can expect consideration of possible eventual membership in NATO
should Moscow meet the necessary criteria and choose to apply. Such a
dual approach -- of enlarging NATO now while holding out the
possibility of future Russian membership -- would accomplish two
important goals.


It would send a clear warning to Russian reactionaries who might in
the future seek to reassert Moscow's hegemony in Central Europe. At
the same time, however, it would reinforce the efforts of Russian
reformers to anchor their country's future more firmly in the West.


In conclusion, let me stress the vital importance of NATO enlargement.
In this age of relentless media hype, the word "historic" is used so
often and so loosely that it seems sometimes to have lost its meaning.
It assuredly has not. The decision before the Senate on whether to
enlarge NATO is, indeed, historic in the truest sense of the word. It
deserves the Senate's fullest and most mature consideration.


And it demands that all of us, like our predecessors during that
earlier NATO debate of 1949, rise above our partisan differences in
common dedication to our national interests and values.


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