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Joint Manpower Process: Limited Progress Made in Implementing DOD Inspector General Recommendations (Letter Report, 09/19/97, GAO/NSIAD-97-229).

Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO assessed the completeness and
adequacy of the corrective actions taken by the Secretary of Defense in
response to the Department of Defense's (DOD) Inspector General's (IG)
recommendations for improving the DOD joint personnel requirements and
management program.

GAO noted that: (1) DOD management concurred with 11 of the DOD IG
recommendations, partially concurred with 5, and proposed alternative
corrective action to satisfy the intent of the remaining recommendation;
(2) one recommendation has been fully implemented and DOD has taken some
action on all but two of the others; (3) however, resolution of most of
the concerns raised by the DOD IG will not be completely accomplished
for some time, if at all; (4) for example, although DOD has drafted or
is developing policies and procedures to address nine of the concerns,
approval is not assured because the policies and procedures are still
being coordinated among the affected organizations; and (5) in addition,
the corrective actions prescribed or planned in some cases may not
adequately address the DOD IG's concerns.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-97-229
     TITLE:  Joint Manpower Process: Limited Progress Made in 
             Implementing DOD Inspector General Recommendations
      DATE:  09/19/97
   SUBJECT:  Inspectors general
             Personnel management
             Military personnel
             Civilian employees
             Military promotions
             Officer personnel
             Military training
             Employee transfers

             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to Congressional Committees

September 1997

JOINT MANPOWER PROCESS - LIMITED
PROGRESS MADE IN IMPLEMENTING DOD
INSPECTOR GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

GAO/NSIAD-97-229

Joint Management Process

(703187)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  CJCS - Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
  DOD - Department of Defense
  IG - Inspector General
  JPME - Joint Professional Military Education
  JSO - Joint Specialty Officer
  OSD - Office of the Secretary of Defense

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-277624

September 19, 1997

The Honorable Strom Thurmond
Chairman
The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd Spence
Chairman
The Honorable Ronald Dellums
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives

In November 1995, the Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General
(IG) reported significant deficiencies in DOD's joint personnel
requirements and management program and made recommendations for
improvement.\1 Section 509 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1997 directs us to assess and report on the
completeness and adequacy of the corrective actions taken by the
Secretary of Defense with respect to the matters covered in the IG's
report.\2 This report responds to that mandate. 


--------------------
\1 Inspection of the Department of Defense Joint Manpower Process,
Department of Defense Inspector General (96-029, Nov.  29, 1995). 

\2 Section 509(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1997, Public Law 104-201, September 23, 1996. 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

In a 1985 study, the Senate Armed Services Committee staff found that
the quality of military personnel assigned to joint duty was
inadequate.  The study's recommendations were grouped into three
categories:  (1) change promotion policies to increase interest in
joint assignments, (2) improve the preparation and experience levels
of officers serving in joint duty assignments, and (3) provide for
improved personnel management of all military officers serving in
joint duty assignments.\3 A 1986 House Armed Services Committee
report contained similar findings.  That report described a weak
joint organizational structure and an unsatisfactory personnel
management system that failed to fill joint positions with officers
that had the required talent, education, training, and experience.\4

The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986\5 was passed as
a result of the significant concerns expressed about organizational
and personnel problems affecting joint U.S.  military operations.\6
Title IV of the act established procedures for selection, education,
assignment, and promotion of joint duty officers. 

In May 1994, the DODIG began its inspection of DOD's joint personnel
requirements and management program.  The inspection objectives were
to evaluate the processes and mechanisms used to determine, validate,
and approve requirements and assign and manage personnel at joint
organizations.  The DODIG found that (1) the processes and
mechanisms used to determine personnel requirements for joint
organizations are inefficient, ineffective, and inadequate; (2) the
processes and mechanisms used to validate and approve personnel
requirements for joint organizations are inadequate; (3) the services
are unable to satisfy the personnel requirements for joint
organizations; (4) support from the Secretary of Defense, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the service secretaries in
monitoring the careers of officers who serve or have served in joint
assignments is inadequate; and (5) joint policy, education, and
training of reserve officers assigned to joint organizations are
inadequate.  The report included 17 recommendations for improving the
program. 


--------------------
\3 Staff of Senate Committee on Armed Services, 99th Cong., Report on
Defense Organization:  The Need for Change, S.  Rep.  No.  99-86, at
179 and 196 (1985). 

\4 H.R.  Rep.  No.  99-700, at 38 (1986). 

\5 Public Law 99-433, Oct.  1, 1986. 

\6 S.  Rep.  No.  99-280, at 4-11 (1986). 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

DOD management concurred with 11 of the DODIG recommendations,
partially concurred with 5, and proposed alternative corrective
action to satisfy the intent of the remaining recommendation.  One
recommendation has been fully implemented, and DOD has taken some
action on all but two of the others.  However, resolution of most of
the concerns raised by the DODIG will not be completely accomplished
for some time, if at all.  For example, although DOD has drafted or
is developing policies and procedures to address nine of the
concerns, approval is not assured because the policies and procedures
are still being coordinated among the affected organizations.  In
addition, the corrective actions prescribed or planned in some cases
may not adequately address the DODIG's concerns. 

Table 1 summarizes our findings by recommendation.  Appendix I
contains a detailed analysis of our position on the completeness and
adequacy of the actions taken on each specific recommendation in the
DODIG's report. 



                                     Table 1
                     
                      Status of the Implementation of DODIG
                                 Recommendations

                                                                          App. I
                                 DOD                                        page
                            concurre                      Effect of       number
Recommendation                 nce\a  Action taken        action               s
--------------------------  --------  ------------------  --------------  ------
1. Issue guidance with       Partial  Guidelines drafted  Too early to        10
criteria for determining                                  tell/not fully
requirements                                              resolved

2. Issue guidance on              No  No action           Too early to        12
military versus civilian                                  tell
requirements and protect
funding of conversions

3. Revalidate personnel          Yes  Guidelines drafted  Too early to        13
requirements                                              tell/not fully
                                                          resolved

4. Develop analysis              Yes  Guidelines drafted  Too early to        14
capability for                                            tell/not fully
reallocating positions                                    resolved

5. Establish plan for        Partial  No action           Too early to        15
service equity                                            tell

6. Develop joint manpower    Partial  Guidelines drafted  Too early to        16
validation guidance                                       tell/not fully
                                                          resolved

7. Bring services on line        Yes  Short-term fix is   Too early to        17
with automation system                planned             tell

8. Designate joint duty          Yes  Board is reviewing  Adequate            19
positions as stated in law            positions           progress not
                                                          made

9. Streamline process for        Yes  Guidelines drafted  Too early to        20
requirements changes                                      tell/not fully
                                                          resolved

10. Publish joint                Yes  Guidelines drafted  Too early to        21
assignment guidance                                       tell

11. Change joint tour        Partial  DOD General         Unable to           21
length calculation                    Counsel's original  tell\b
                                      opinion was
                                      superseded; no
                                      other action taken

12. Issue joint officer      Partial  Partial guidance    Too early to        23
management guidance                   drafted             tell/not fully
                                                          resolved

13. Seek legislative             Yes  Legislative relief  Too early to        26
relief on critical joint              granted\c           tell how
duty positions and                                        relief will be
reporting requirements                                    implemented

14. Report promotion             Yes  Yes                 Fully               28
results as stated in law                                  implemented

15. Identify and exempt          Yes  Guidelines drafted  Too early to        29
certain positions from                                    tell
interruption

16. Conduct revalidation         Yes  \d                  Too early to        30
boards                                                    tell

17. Develop policy               Yes  Working group       Too early to        32
guidance for training of              developing          tell
reserve officers                      guidelines
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Concurrence was based on the official comments of the organization
responsible for taking action. 

\b We were unable to verify the validity of the substitute DOD
General Counsel opinion, as no written rationale to support this
change has been provided. 

\c Public Law 104-201, Div.  A, Title V, sec.  510, Sept.  23, 1996. 

\d The Marine Corps and the Air Force say they have no need for
boards.  The Navy and the Army are considering holding boards. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

DOD provided oral comments on a draft of this report and generally
concurred with its findings.  DOD stated that our report accurately
portrayed DOD's actions regarding implementation of the DODIG's
recommendations.  DOD further commented that, in its view, the report
understates the progress DOD has made toward improving the joint
manpower process.  DOD believes that its improvements will correct
problems in all areas of joint manpower, including areas in which it
did not concur with the DODIG report. 


   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

We examined the November 1995 DODIG report and supporting DODIG
workpapers and discussed the report with DODIG officials.  We also
discussed progress and problems in this area with manpower and
personnel officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
Joint Staff, other joint organizations, and the services. 

To determine the status of actions to implement the 17 DODIG
recommendations contained in the DODIG report, we reviewed DOD's
April 1997 report to Congress on improvements to the joint personnel
requirements and management program and verified and updated the
status through interviews and analysis of supporting documentation. 

To determine whether completed actions appear to have resolved the
concerns raised by the DODIG, we reviewed documentation of any
changes made and analyzed the effect of those changes. 

To determine whether actions planned but not completed appear likely
to resolve the concerns raised by the DODIG, we reviewed and
analyzed plans and draft directives and instructions and considered
the views obtained from officials of the involved agencies and
organizations. 

We conducted our review between February and July 1997 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

On September 9, 1997, DOD Directive 1300.19 received final approval
and became effective immediately.  At that time, however, this report
was already in the final stages of publication.  Consequently, we
were not able to assess the completeness and adequacy of the final
directive for correcting the problems identified in the DODIG report
and still meet the mandated reporting date. 


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1

We are sending copies of this report to other appropriate
congressional committees; the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the
Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant, Marine Corps; the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Director, Office of Management
and Budget.  Copies will also be made available to others on request. 

Please call me at (202) 512-5140 if you or your staff have any
questions on this report.  Major contributors to this report are
listed in appendix II. 

Mark E.  Gebicke
Director, Military Operations and
 Capabilities Issues


STATUS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR
GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS
=========================================================== Appendix I

RECOMMENDATION 1

The November 1995 Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General (IG)
report recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel
and Readiness develop, coordinate, and submit for approval a DOD
Directive on Joint Manpower Management that incorporates a baseline
methodology and criteria for joint organizations to determine
military and civilian manpower requirements against standardized
processes. 


      DODIG FINDINGS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:0.1

According to the DODIG report, the personnel requirements
determination process is the basis for an organization to determine
the number and skill level of personnel resources necessary to
effectively and efficiently accomplish its mission.  The DODIG found
that a lack of definitive guidance from the Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD) or the Joint Staff resulted in wide variations in
the processes used by joint organizations to determine requirements. 

Most organizations used an ad hoc process to respond to events such
as major mission changes, reorganizations, or staff reductions.  The
DODIG reported two key deficiencies with using an ad hoc process. 
First, the use of such a process makes it difficult to ensure
consistency across organizations in their assessments of the
personnel required to perform similar functions.  Therefore, the
DODIG concluded that no sound basis existed for OSD and the Joint
Staff to use in comparing competing demands among joint
organizations, setting priorities, or determining whether guidance
was being followed.  Second, the lack of documentation of criteria
used and data relied on to determine requirements made it difficult
to respond to future demands for personnel. 


      STATUS OF ACTION ON THE
      RECOMMENDATION
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:0.2

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness partially
concurred with the recommendation, agreeing that some standardization
of operational processes was needed for consistency in managing
requirements.  However, the Under Secretary noted that the diverse
missions of the joint organizations make a single requirements
determination methodology impractical. 

DOD Directive 1100.XX and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(CJCS) Manual 1600.XX addressing the DODIG findings have been
drafted.  They have not been approved and, because they are still
being coordinated among the affected organizations, may be changed
considerably before approval or not be approved at all.  As currently
drafted, however, the January 2, 1997, draft of the DOD directive
designates the CJCS as responsible for developing guidelines and
criteria for determining, validating, and prioritizing joint
requirements and requires the joint organizations to comply with the
CJCS guidelines.  In addition, the June 20, 1997, draft of the CJCS
manual states that each joint activity will establish its own
internal system to determine joint requirements, lists several
methods for doing so, and requires each joint activity to document
its validation process. 

OSD and Joint Staff officials told us that the main problem in
approving these documents concerns DOD's proposal to make the CJCS
responsible for developing the guidelines and criteria for personnel
requirements in all joint organizations.  Currently, many joint
organizations report to OSD rather than through CJCS for approval of
personnel requirements.  The officials told us that some of the
organizations that do not currently report through the CJCS do not
want to be bound by the CJCS guidance, since the guidance represents
a change in the structure for requesting and obtaining personnel
resources.  Joint Staff officials told us that, if the DOD directive
will not be signed or will be delayed for some time because of these
concerns, they will issue a CJCS manual that will apply only to the
joint organizations that already report through the CJCS.  The
officials also said that, even if both documents are approved as
currently drafted, the Joint Staff would not be able to implement the
manual immediately at all joint organizations.  The officials plan to
implement the manual first at the organizations that report through
the CJCS and then start implementation at the other joint
organizations. 


      OUR ASSESSMENT
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:0.3

We believe that the current draft DOD directive and CJCS manual offer
the opportunity to implement the DODIG's recommendation.  The
documents allow joint organizations the flexibility to employ
requirements determination methods appropriate for them while
requiring that the process used be documented so that independent
assessments of requirements can be conducted.  However, the documents
have not been approved.  Moreover, if the CJCS manual is issued and
applied only to the joint organizations reporting through the CJCS,
the guidance, procedures, and processes for implementing the DODIG's
recommendation will be in place for only those organizations.  As a
result, this recommendation has not yet been implemented, and it is
too early to tell whether it eventually will be implemented. 

RECOMMENDATION 2

The DODIG recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness issue additional, more instructive guidance
on military and civilian requirements determination criteria and
procedures and take action to protect the funding of positions
identified for conversion of military positions to civilian
positions. 


      DODIG FINDINGS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:0.4

The DODIG found that joint policy governing civilian personnel
requirements was fragmented and that the guidance that was available
was incomplete and ambiguous.  In the absence of any DOD-wide
guidance for requirements determination for civilians, the commands
followed the supporting host service regulations for determining
civilian personnel requirements. 

As the services downsize, greater emphasis is being placed on
converting military personnel in support positions to civilian
personnel.  The DODIG noted that DOD provides general guidance but
does not define any criteria for determining the appropriate military
and civilian mix for a joint organization.\1 The DODIG reported that
commanders and managers of joint organizations could not see the
advantage of converting military positions to civilian ones unless
they had some assurance that their civilian end strength would be
increased and necessary funding could be guaranteed. 


--------------------
\1 Our recent study, DOD Force Mix Issues:  Converting Some Support
Officer Positions to Civilian Status Could Save Money
(GAO/NSIAD-97-15, Oct.  23, 1996), found that DOD could save as much
as $95 million annually by converting about 9,500 military positions
to civilian status. 


      STATUS OF ACTION ON THE
      RECOMMENDATION
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:0.5

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness did not
concur with the recommendation.  The Under Secretary noted that it is
not in DOD's best interest to fence payroll dollars from the effects
of general budget adjustments because this action would encourage a
less productive and efficient mix of labor and capital.  In
evaluating these comments, the DODIG reported that the Under
Secretary's staff said that they were working with the Joint Staff to
develop a systematic process for determining the requirements of the
unified commands and Joint Staff activities.  The Under Secretary's
staff also said that, once the process had been refined and tested,
it could be adopted for use at all activities that employ joint
personnel.  The DODIG concluded that this proposed action satisfied
the intent of the recommendation. 

The guidelines for determining whether a joint position should be
military or civilian are the same as they were when the DODIG
conducted its work.  In addition, an OSD official told us that
although about 3,000 DOD positions had been converted from military
to civilian during fiscal year 1996, none of these positions were in
joint organizations.  Furthermore, OSD officials told us that they do
not plan to take any specific action on this recommendation.  The
officials believe that this issue will adequately be addressed by the
process being developed in response to
recommendation 1. 


      OUR ASSESSMENT
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:0.6

No specific action has been taken to implement this recommendation. 
It is too early to tell whether the process being developed in
response to recommendation 1 will adequately address this issue. 

RECOMMENDATION 3

The DODIG recommended that the Commanders in Chief of the unified
commands and directors of the defense agencies revalidate manpower
requirements using the methodology established by the Under Secretary
of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. 


      DODIG FINDINGS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:0.7

The DODIG found that the various requirements determination
processes used by the DOD activities they visited were fragmented and
inefficient.  The processes ranged from a subjective analysis to
in-house board of director reviews, to contracted studies.  The
DODIG reported that the results of those processes were not
supported by documented evidence of any quantitative or objective
measurement criteria. 

The DODIG recognized that the development of quantitative approaches
to validate requirements may be costly, labor intensive, and
time-consuming but noted that, in DOD's current downsizing
environment, joint activities are challenged to accomplish increased
missions with less funding and fewer personnel.  The DOD IG concluded
that, under these conditions, relevant and objective analyses were
necessary to ensure that the highest priority needs were met. 


      STATUS OF ACTION ON THE
      RECOMMENDATION
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:0.8

The three Commanders in Chief of the unified commands who responded
to this recommendation concurred with it.  However, implementation of
this recommendation requires using the methodology and criteria
developed to implement recommendation 1.  Although DOD
Directive 1100.XX and CJCS Manual 1600.XX have been drafted, they
have not yet been approved.  Because the guidance is still being
coordinated among the affected organizations, they may be changed
considerably before approval or not approved at all.  In addition, as
discussed in recommendation 1, consideration is being given to
applying the manual only to those joint organizations which report
through the CJCS. 


      OUR ASSESSMENT
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:0.9

Implementation of this recommendation depends on the approval of the
guidance developed to implement recommendation 1.  Because that
guidance has not been approved, this recommendation has not yet been
implemented and it is too early to tell whether it will be. 

RECOMMENDATION 4

The DODIG recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness and the Joint Staff Manpower and Personnel
Directorate develop a comparative analysis capability of unified
command and defense agency missions, priorities, funding, and
manpower levels for use in aiding the decision-making process for
reprioritizing and reallocating limited joint manpower assets. 


      DODIG FINDINGS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.10

To help ensure that joint activities are able to accomplish mission
objectives, quantitative or objective measurement criteria are needed
to help identify priority needs within an environment of reduced
funding and reduced personnel strength.  The DODIG, acknowledging
that each joint organization has a unique mission with unique
requirements, stated that the requirements determination process
should be measured against proven criteria that are consistently
applied.  The DODIG found that the lack of comprehensive
requirements determination guidance makes it difficult for the Joint
Staff to meet its responsibility of validating the joint
organizations' requirements in a consistent and comparable manner. 


      STATUS OF ACTION ON THE
      RECOMMENDATION
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.11

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness partially
concurred with the recommendation, agreeing that it is appropriate
for the Joint Staff to advise the CJCS regarding resource allocations
for those activities under his cognizance.  The Joint Staff concurred
with the recommendation. 

The June 20, 1997, draft of CJCS Manual 1600.XX describes a
methodology for predicting and validating requirements of the unified
commands by comparing their staffing levels for common functions. 
Joint Staff officials told us that, once the manual has been
approved, this comparative analysis will be used to resource new
requirements by reallocating resources among the unified commands and
requesting additional manpower from the services only by exception. 
OSD and Joint Staff officials said that if the manual is issued
applying to all joint organizations, this methodology, once it has
been applied successfully to the unified commands, will be modified
and used for the defense agencies. 


      OUR ASSESSMENT
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.12

We believe that the current draft CJCS manual offers the opportunity
to implement this recommendation.  However, it has not been approved. 
Therefore, this recommendation has not yet been implemented and it is
too early to tell whether it will be. 

RECOMMENDATION 5

The DODIG recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness, with the advice of the CJCS, establish a
time-phased plan to realign military service contributions to joint
manpower.  The plan should place military service "equity" in the
context of requirements and ability to meet those requirements,
rather than a simplistic "proportionate share analysis." In that
regard, the following elements should be evaluated: 

(a) which positions must be filled with service-unique specialists;

(b) of the remaining positions, what specialty and rank is required;

(c) for each specialty and rank identified, what distribution, among
the four services, of personnel meet those criteria; and

(d) whether proportionate distribution among the services of
requirements by specialty and rank results in critical shortages of
personnel to meet in-service requirements. 


      DODIG FINDINGS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.13

The DODIG noted that the issue of service equity was not adequately
considered within the joint personnel requirements determination
process, given that the obligation to fill joint positions can have
an impact on the services' ability to meet their internal demands for
personnel.  The DODIG looked at actual service contributions for
fiscal year 1994 and found that they differed from Joint Staff goals
for service contributions.  For example, the Air Force contribution
was 37 percent and the goal was 26 percent.  Requirements and
personnel officials in each of the services wanted the matter of
service equity addressed and resolved. 


      STATUS OF ACTION ON THE
      RECOMMENDATION
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.14

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness partially
concurred with the recommendation, stating that a plan to realign
service contributions was not needed and that changing work force
incentives was a more desirable way to effect realignment.  The
Director of the Joint Staff concurred with the recommendation
commenting that they would coordinate with the Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness to implement the recommendation
through the methodology for revalidating requirements that was being
developed to implement recommendation 1. 

OSD and Joint Staff officials told us that no particular action has
been taken to implement this recommendation.  However, the officials
also said that actions taken to implement recommendation 1 may result
in a change in the relative contributions of the services. 


      OUR ASSESSMENT
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.15

No specific action has been taken to implement this recommendation. 
It is too early to determine whether actions taken by DOD to
implement recommendation 1 will resolve this issue. 

RECOMMENDATION 6

The DODIG recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness ensure that the DOD Directive on Joint
Manpower Management contains joint manpower validation guidance that
would

(a) ensure consistency in approving manpower authorizations to joint
organizations,

(b) establish effective and consistent joint manpower validation
criteria for both military and civilian positions, and

(c) effectively prioritize competing demands for joint manpower by
joint organizations. 


      DODIG FINDINGS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.16

The DODIG concluded that the processes and mechanisms for validating
and approving joint organizations' personnel requirements are
inadequate.  According to the DODIG report, the mechanisms used to
validate requirements are intended to be a check and balance for the
requirements decisions made by joint organizations and therefore
should be separate and distinct from the processes used for
determining the requirements.  The DODIG found that joint
organizations used ad hoc validation processes that did not consist
of two separate and distinct functions.  Rather, the IG found that
the two functions were generally part of a single process.  The
report cited the following problems related to this area: 

  -- The roles and responsibilities of the CJCS and the Under
     Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness for validating
     and approving joint personnel requirements are not clearly
     defined. 

  -- The processes and mechanisms in place to review and validate
     joint personnel requirements at the local or Joint Staff level
     were not adequately defined as separate and distinct from the
     requirements determination process. 


      STATUS OF ACTION ON THE
      RECOMMENDATION
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.17

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness partially
concurred with this recommendation.  The Under Secretary agreed that
he and the CJCS should work together to provide some standardization
of processes as discussed in recommendation 1.  DOD Directive 1100.XX
and CJCS Manual 1600.XX addressing the DODIG findings have been
drafted.  The January 2, 1997, draft of the DOD directive defines the
organizations responsible for validating and approving joint
personnel requirements, and the June 20, 1997, draft of the CJCS
manual includes guidance on the process and criteria for determining
and prioritizing requirements. 


      OUR ASSESSMENT
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.18

We believe that the current draft DOD directive and CJCS manual offer
the opportunity to implement this recommendation.  However, as
discussed in recommendation 1, the documents are still being
coordinated among the affected organizations.  They may be changed
considerably or not be signed at all.  As also discussed in
recommendation 1, there is some question as to whether a CJCS manual
applying to all joint organizations will be approved.  If the manual
is issued and applied only to the joint organizations reporting
through the CJCS, the guidance, procedures, and processes for
implementing this recommendation will not be in place for those joint
organizations that do not report through the CJCS.  Because
guidelines have been drafted but not approved, this recommendation
has not yet been implemented, and it is too early to tell whether it
eventually will be implemented. 

RECOMMENDATION 7

The DODIG recommended that the Joint Staff Manpower and Personnel
Directorate and military service personnel centers work together and
set milestones for upgrading the capabilities of the Joint Manpower
Automation System to bring all the military services on line prior to
publication of the next Joint Duty Assignment List.  The Joint Staff
could then update the approved Joint Duty Assignment List, providing
the military services access for verification and enhancing
assignment accommodation (fill) for the unified commands and other
joint organizations. 


      DODIG FINDINGS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.19

The DODIG concluded that the automated data processing system used
for coordinating and validating joint manpower requirements was
inefficient and ineffective and contributed to lengthy delays in
making changes to joint manpower requirements.  These delays
negatively impacted the services' ability to provide the personnel
the joint organizations needed and created some staffing gaps of
several months. 

The automated information system used to produce requirements
documents for joint organizations that report to or through the Joint
Staff was called the Joint Manpower Automation System.  Since the
services did not have on-line access to this system, the validation
process for changes to requirements relied on manual coordination
efforts, often resulting in delays of 1 year or more in processing
the requests. 


      STATUS OF ACTION ON THE
      RECOMMENDATION
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.20

The Director of the Joint Staff concurred with the recommendation. 
According to Joint Staff officials, the Joint Manpower Automation
System has been enhanced and is now called the Joint Manpower and
Personnel System.  The officials told us that this system does not
fully satisfy the
DODIG recommendation in that the services still do not have on-line
access to the system.  However, a recent upgrade to the system is
expected to allow the Joint Staff to periodically provide the
services an updated joint requirements file that they can use with
their systems.  Joint Staff officials told us that each service will
have to create a program to make the file compatible with its own
programs.  They said that, because changes are made to the database
once a month, the services will be sent an updated file each month. 

Joint Staff officials told us that they plan to replace the Joint
Manpower and Personnel System because of major inadequacies.  They
are currently planning to identify the requirements for an improved
system and plan to field the new system by mid-fiscal year 1999 if
funding is available.  They said they expect that the services will
have on-line access to the new system. 


      OUR ASSESSMENT
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.21

We believe the action taken by the Joint Staff is a reasonable
short-term action.  However, it is too early to determine if, in the
longer term, this recommendation will be implemented. 

RECOMMENDATION 8

The DODIG recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness, with the assistance of the CJCS revise the
Joint Duty Assignment List to correspond with congressional intent
that joint duty assignments be designated based on the level of
experience in joint matters required by each position rather than on
the organization in which the billet is located.  The use of "100
percent" and "50 percent" organization quotas for joint duty credit
should be eliminated. 


      DODIG FINDINGS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.22

Officers must complete a joint duty assignment to be eligible for
flag rank.  The DODIG reported that, although the Goldwater-Nichols
Act limits the joint duty assignment designation to those positions
in which the officer gains significant experience in joint matters,
in practice the designation is not based on the duties performed and
skills required for a particular position but on the mission of the
organization in which the position is located.  The DODIG found that
certain organizations (OSD, the Joint Staff, and the unified
commands), because of their involvement in planning and directing the
integrated employment of joint forces, were referred to as
100-percent joint organizations and that all positions for major or
lieutenant commander and above in those organizations were designated
joint duty assignments. 

All of the defense agencies, however, were referred to as 50-percent
joint organizations, and the number of joint duty assignments they
were allowed was limited to no more than 50 percent of their total
positions for major or lieutenant commander and above.  Furthermore,
the DODIG reported that the 50-percent organizations had not been
provided guidance on how to allocate their share of joint duty
assignments.  The DODIG found some officers were receiving credit
for a joint duty assignment, whereas other officers within the same
organization who performed the same basic functions did not receive
credit.  In addition, the DODIG reported the results of a
congressionally directed study.  That study indicated that not all
joint duty assignment positions provided significant joint
experience, whereas some non-joint duty assignment positions provided
this experience. 


      STATUS OF ACTION ON THE
      RECOMMENDATION
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.23

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the
Director of the Joint Staff concurred with the recommendation. 
Review and validation of joint duty assignments is currently
underway.  The Joint Duty Assignment List Validation Board,
established in June 1996, is tasked with reviewing all positions in
joint organizations at the level of major or lieutenant commander and
above (about 15,000 positions) using specific criteria, including
consideration of duties associated with each position and the mission
of the organization in which each position is located.  As of June
1997, the Board had considered 1,100 (7 percent) of the positions. 


      OUR ASSESSMENT
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.24

Although it appears that the approach being taken by the Board
addresses the problems found by the DODIG, at the current pace of
deliberations, it will take many years to review and validate all of
the current joint duty assignments.  Given the importance of this
effort and the fact that progress in implementing recommendations 12
and 13 relies on the validation effort, we believe that adequate
progress is not being made. 

RECOMMENDATION 9

The DODIG recommended that the Joint Staff Manpower and Personnel
Directorate in conjunction with each military service headquarters,
establish a process action team to review and streamline the Joint
Manpower Program change process with emphasis on updating service
manpower documents. 


      DODIG FINDINGS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.25

Having the right personnel available to fill assignment vacancies
when they occur depends partly on sufficient notice of changes to
personnel requirements.  The DODIG found that lengthy procedures for
documenting, approving, and transmitting to the services changes to
requirements contributed to assignment gaps and shortages of officers
with the necessary skills. 


      STATUS OF ACTION ON THE
      RECOMMENDATION
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.26

The Director of the Joint Staff concurred with the recommendation.  A
joint working group formed in August 1995 proposed changes to the
process for updating service requirements documents.  These changes
are included in the June 20, 1997, draft CJCS Manual 1600.XX that is
currently being coordinated with the affected organizations. 


      OUR ASSESSMENT
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.27

Although guidelines have been drafted, this recommendation has not
yet been implemented and it is too early to tell whether it will be. 

RECOMMENDATION 10

The DODIG recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness, with the advice of the CJCS, publish joint
personnel assignments guidance for all joint organizations. 


      DODIG FINDINGS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.28

The DODIG found that service guidelines and procedures did not cover
some personnel actions and other aspects of the joint assignment
process that applied only to joint duty assignments.  The DODIG
concluded that additional guidance from above the service level was
needed to preclude unnecessary conflict with the assignments process. 
Examples of topics on which additional guidance was needed included
attendance at joint professional military education (JPME), early
release from joint tours of duty, and tour length requirements. 


      STATUS OF ACTION ON THE
      RECOMMENDATION
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.29

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness concurred
with the recommendation.  The November 22, 1996, draft of DOD
Directive 1300.19 and DOD Instruction 1300.20 addressing these topics
have been coordinated among the affected agencies.  On September 9,
1997, the directive was approved, clearing the way for release of the
instruction. 


      OUR ASSESSMENT
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.30

Because various drafts of this directive have been proposed for over
10 years without approval, there is no assurance this directive will
be approved.  Therefore, it is too early to tell whether this
recommendation will be implemented. 

RECOMMENDATION 11

The DODIG recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness immediately stop including the temporary duty
and return period of Phase II of JPME in calculating joint tour
length and modify the Joint Duty Assignment Management Information
System data base to reflect that change.  The DODIG further
recommended the following: 

(a) The Secretary of Defense inform Congress of the General Counsel,
DOD interpretation and the impact on previously reported tour length
averages. 

(b) The Secretary of Defense process tour length curtailment waivers
for those officers that completed previous Joint Duty Assignments
with attendance at Phase II of JPME in a temporary duty and return
status. 

(c) The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, along
with the Joint Staff and the military departments, determine whether
the impact of the General Counsel interpretation on joint officer
management warrants a statutory change.  Alternatives that should be
considered include exclusion of Phase II of JPME from the definition
of assignments for training and education, effectively reversing the
General Counsel opinion; a change to the duration and location of
Phase II of JPME; or a change in the statutory minimum tour length. 


      DODIG FINDINGS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.31

The Goldwater-Nichols Act prescribes specific average tour lengths
for joint duty assignments\2 and specifies that such assignments
"shall exclude .  .  .  assignments for joint training or joint
education."\3 As required by
10 U.S.C.  667, the Secretary of Defense reports the average tour
length to Congress each year.  The DODIG found that, although the
Secretary of Defense reported to Congress that DOD met the statutory
requirements for tour length averages, the method used to calculate
tour lengths was incorrect.  When officers attended the 12-week Phase
II JPME program during their joint duty assignment, that 12-week
period was included in the average tour length.  The DODIG based its
finding on an opinion of the DOD General Counsel. 


--------------------
\2 See 10 U.S.C.  664(a). 

\3 See 10 U.S.C.  668(b)(1). 


      STATUS OF ACTION ON THE
      RECOMMENDATION
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.32

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness partially
concurred with the recommendations, stating that the DOD General
Counsel had been asked to provide further review of the issue and
that appropriate action would be taken based on the results of that
review.  Since the DODIG report was released, the DOD General
Counsel has withdrawn its earlier opinion and replaced it with one
that purports to support the way DOD has been handling temporary duty
for JPME in calculating joint tour length.  However, the General
Counsel has not provided any detailed support for its current
position.  Without a written rationale to support this change, we are
unable to verify the validity of the second opinion. 


      OUR ASSESSMENT
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.33

Without a written rationale to support this change, we are unable to
verify the validity of the DOD General Counsel's second opinion. 

RECOMMENDATION 12

The DODIG recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness incorporate comprehensive policy guidance in
DOD Directive 1300.19, "Joint Officer Management Program," that
includes as a minimum: 

(1) criteria for designating the appropriate joint duty billets as
critical positions requiring assignment of officers who hold the
joint specialty designation,

(2) more stringent requirements on movement of established critical
joint billets to provide the military services with a stable target
to program the development of appropriately qualified Joint Specialty
Officers (JSO),

(3) career guidelines for military officers that address the timing
of joint duty assignments and the impact of those assignments on
service career advancement,

(4) a limitation on the designation of Lieutenant Colonel and
Commander joint critical positions to the minimum needed to meet
operational requirements so that appropriate time is available for
in-service officer career development assignments at those ranks,

(5) a time-phased plan for reducing the number of waivers granted for
filling critical joint positions with officers who are not JSOs,

(6) more stringent criteria for the CJCS to use in granting waivers
for the assignment of non-JSOs to critical joint positions,

(7) criteria related to future JSO requirements for use in
identifying officers selected to attend Phase II of JPME, and

(8) uniform JSO selection criteria for use by the military service
JSO selection boards. 


      DODIG FINDINGS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.34

The Goldwater-Nichols Act requires the Secretary of Defense to
establish policies, procedures, and practices for the effective
management of active duty officers who are trained in, and oriented
toward, joint matters.  The central purpose for the joint officer
management provisions was to develop a pool of qualified JSOs to draw
upon for future Joint needs, especially for assignment to critical
joint duty assignments.  The DODIG found problems in the
identification of critical joint duty assignment positions that are
required to be filled by JSOs and in the management of these
officers.  These problems were as follows: 


         FINDINGS 1 AND 2
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:0.34.1

DOD had not established a standardized approach or adequate guidance
for identifying and designating critical joint duty assignment
positions.  Joint organizations were given wide latitude to select
which positions to designate as critical.  Joint organizations were
moving the critical designation to accommodate JSO availability
rather than basing the designation on the work performance
requirements of the particular position.  Instability in the
management of JSOs resulted.  The services could not program for
development of officers with specific skills and backgrounds because
the critical joint position designation continually moved from one
position to another. 


         FINDINGS 3 AND 4
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:0.34.2

Although each service had established career paths for officers, with
expectations regarding the type of assignments, education, and other
duties that officers should successfully complete to be competitive
for promotion, the Goldwater-Nichols Act added joint duty and JPME to
those career paths.  The DODIG found that the career path models can
accommodate the joint requirements but that timing of initial and
subsequent critical joint assignments is crucial for an officer to
stay competitive for promotion to the next higher grade. 


         FINDINGS 5 AND 6
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:0.34.3

Too many waivers were being granted allowing non-JSOs to serve in
critical joint positions.  The waivers were being granted as a direct
result of the services' inability to develop sufficient numbers of
JSOs, combined with ineffective procedures for designating
appropriate critical joint billets and competing in-service demands
for quality officers normally selected for JSO designation.  The
DODIG reported that waivers had been granted for 11.9 percent of
filled critical joint positions.  OSD officials told the DODIG that
Senate Committee staff said that the number of waivers granted should
not exceed 5 percent of the filled joint positions. 


         FINDINGS 7 AND 8
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:0.34.4

The DODIG found that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel
and Readiness and the Joint Staff had not developed objective
criteria for use in identifying, nominating, and selecting officers
for joint duty assignments and for JSO designation, which could be
used in identifying officers permitted to attend JPME.  Given the
limitations on the number of seats available for JPME, this action
negatively impacted the development of JSOs. 


      STATUS OF ACTION ON THE
      RECOMMENDATION
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.35

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness partially
concurred with the recommendation.  The Under Secretary noted that a
draft DOD directive and instruction, which were being coordinated
with the affected agencies, would be comprehensive and enable the
services and CJCS to comply with legislative mandates and foster
sound management practices to achieve the objectives set forth in the
Goldwater-Nichols Act. 

The draft DOD Directive 1300.19 was in process for over 10 years and
was just approved on September 9, 1997.  DOD Instruction 1300.20,
which provides more detailed guidance than the directive, has been
approved, and can now be released.  The status of action on the
particular parts of the DODIG recommendation is as follows: 


         FINDINGS 1 AND 2
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:0.35.1

The DOD instruction provides general guidance to use in designating
critical joint duty assignments.  However, OSD and Joint Staff
officials told us that implementation of the guidance as it relates
to designating critical joint assignments is related to the Joint
Duty Assignment List Validation Board's review of joint assignments. 
This review (discussed in recommendation 8) will probably take
several years to accomplish.  The officials told us that actions to
improve the designation and stabilization of critical joint positions
will not occur until the Board's effort is completed and the universe
of joint positions has been established.  However, officials of the
Joint Staff predicted that it will continue to be necessary for joint
organizations to designate many positions as critical based on the
skills of available JSOs.  It is too early to tell whether the
management of critical joint positions will solve the problems
identified by the DODIG. 


         FINDING 3
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:0.35.2

The DOD instruction assigns the Joint Staff responsibility for
establishing career guidelines that address the timing of joint
assignments for military officers.  However, Joint Staff officials
told us they have not taken action on this item and have no plans to
do so at this time, choosing instead to let the services develop
their own career guidelines.  Air Force, Army, Navy and Marine Corps
officials told us they have no plans to develop new career guidance. 
Therefore, this part of the recommendation has not been implemented. 


         FINDING 4
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:0.35.3

The DOD guidance does not direct the joint organizations to limit the
number of Lieutenant Colonel and Commander critical joint positions
to the minimum needed to meet operational requirements.  OSD and
Joint Staff officials pointed out that, if requirements have been
accurately determined and critical positions have been appropriately
identified, the number of Lieutenant Colonel and Commander joint
critical positions will have been kept to the minimum needed to meet
operational requirements.  We agree.  However, there is no assurance
that requirements have been accurately determined, and critical
positions have not been appropriately identified.  Therefore, this
part of the recommendation has not been implemented, and it is too
early to tell whether improvements to the requirements determination
process will be implemented and whether they will solve the problem
identified by the DODIG. 


         FINDINGS 5 AND 6
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:0.35.4

The DOD guidance does not include a time-phased plan for reducing the
number of waivers granted for filling critical joint positions with
non-JSOs or criteria for the CJCS to use in granting such waivers. 
OSD and Joint Staff officials told us that they have no plans to
create the plan or criteria.  Therefore, this part of the
recommendation has not been implemented. 


         FINDING 7
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:0.35.5

The DOD guidance also does not include criteria for selecting
officers to attend Phase II of JPME.  OSD and Joint Staff officials
noted that the problem of JPME course capacity may be resolved by the
Joint Duty Assignment List Validation Board.  If the actions of the
Board result in a much smaller list of joint positions, as expected,
fewer requirements for officers who have attended the course will
exist, and the capacity problem may be resolved.  Therefore, no
action has been taken to specifically implement this recommendation,
and it is too early to determine whether other actions being taken
will solve the problem identified by the DOD IG. 


         FINDING 8
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:0.35.6

Policy guidance for use by the military service JSO selection boards
is included in DOD's draft guidance and is addressed in CJCS
Instruction 1332.01, dated June 15, 1997.  Action on this part of the
recommendation is complete. 


      OUR ASSESSMENT
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.36

Guidance has been issued to implement one of the eight areas
specified in the DODIG recommendation.  DOD has no plans to issue
guidance to implement four of the areas.  The November 22, 1996,
draft of DOD Directive 1300.19 and the approved DOD Instruction
1300.20 provide guidance that addresses three of the eight areas but
implementation of the guidance may not occur.  Therefore, actions
taken to date and planned will not fully implement this
recommendation. 

RECOMMENDATION 13

The DODIG recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness, along with the CJCS, develop a legislative
proposal to

(a) seek legislative relief from the requirement that DOD maintain an
arbitrary minimum of 1,000 critical joint duty positions set forth in
10 U.S.C.  661(d)(2)(A) and

(b) seek legislative relief from the semiannual promotion reporting
requirement set forth in 10 U.S.C.  662(b). 


      DODIG FINDINGS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.37

The Goldwater-Nichols Act requires DOD to maintain a minimum of 1,000
critical joint duty assignments.\4 The DODIG found that DOD had not
established a standardized approach or adequate guidance for
identifying and designating critical joint duty assignment positions. 
Joint organizations were given wide latitude to select which
positions to designate as critical.  Joint organizations moved the
critical designation to those positions for which JSOs were available
rather than base these designations on the actual requirements of the
positions.  That action led to instability in the management of JSOs,
as the critical joint position designation continually moved from one
position to another and the lack of firm requirements for critical
joint positions made it difficult for the services to identify the
skills and backgrounds to provide future JSOs. 

The DODIG reported that the 1,000 minimum critical positions were
regarded as arbitrary and that officials at each joint organization
they visited expressed the opinion that DOD should seek legislative
relief from the requirement to designate a minimum of 1,000 joint
duty assignment positions as critical. 

The Goldwater-Nichols Act also required the Secretary of Defense to
submit semiannual reports to Congress on promotion results for
officers who are serving in or have served in joint duty
assignments.\5 Because military promotion boards convene only on an
annual basis, the DODIG concluded that the reporting of promotion
data on a semiannual basis appeared to be excessive. 


--------------------
\4 Public Law 99-433, sec.  401, Oct.  1, 1986. 

\5 Id. 


      STATUS OF ACTION ON THE
      RECOMMENDATION
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.38

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the
Director of the Joint Staff concurred with the recommendation. 

(a) Legislation amending 10 U.S.C.  661(d)(2)(A) to reduce the number
of required critical joint positions from 1,000 to 800 was included
in section 501 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1996.  However, OSD and Joint Staff officials told us that
implementing the lower minimum is tied into the actions of the Joint
Duty Assignment List Validation Board (see recommendation 8) and that
once the Board has completed its review of all joint positions
(estimated to take many years), OSD and the Joint Staff will consider
how to implement the lower minimum for critical positions.  Moreover,
Joint Staff officials told us they believe it is unlikely that the
services will have sufficient numbers of JSOs with the right skills
to fill even 800 fixed critical positions.  Consequently, the
officials predicted that, to meet the legislative numerical
requirement, it will continue to be necessary for joint organizations
to designate as many as 400 positions as critical based on the skills
of available JSOs, a process the DODIG referred to as arbitrary. 

OSD and the Joint Staff sought and have been granted the legislative
relief recommended by the DODIG.  However, it is too early to tell
whether they will implement the requirement for 800 critical joint
positions in a manner that will solve the problems identified by the
DODIG. 

(b) The requirement in 10 U.S.C.  662(b) for semiannual reporting on
joint officer promotions was changed to an annual requirement in
section 510 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1997.\6 This part of the recommendation is complete. 


--------------------
\6 Public Law 104-201, Sept.  23, 1996. 


      OUR ASSESSMENT
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.39

Legislative relief has been granted.  However, it is too early to
tell if its implementation by DOD will resolve the problems
identified by the DODIG. 

RECOMMENDATION 14

The DODIG recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness report JSO promotion results consistent with
requirements set forth in 10 U.S.C.  662(b) and 10 U.S.C.  667(5). 


      DODIG FINDINGS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.40

The Goldwater-Nichols Act requires the Secretary to report promotion
rate data to Congress.\7 When the data shows a ".  .  .  significant
imbalance between officers serving in Joint Duty Assignments or
having the joint specialty and other officers, a description of what
action has been taken (or is planned to be taken) by the Secretary to
correct the imbalance" must be included in the report.\8

The DODIG found that, even though each service has had problems in
achieving the statutory promotion objectives, the Secretary's annual
report to Congress does not highlight these unfavorable promotion
results and provide corrective actions to improve joint officer
promotion imbalances.  More specifically, the DODIG found that,
starting with the fiscal year 1993 report, OSD discontinued providing
complete promotion statistics for all categories of officers.  DOD
did not provide promotion statistics to indicate whether officers who
were serving in or have served in joint duty assignments were
promoted at a pace that was equal to, earlier than, or later than
their peers. 


--------------------
\7 10 U.S.C.  662(b). 

\8 10 U.S.C.  667(13). 


      STATUS OF ACTION ON THE
      RECOMMENDATION
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.41

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness concurred
with the recommendation.  CJCS Instruction 1330.02A, dated May 1,
1997, contains guidance on reporting JSO promotion results in
accordance with this recommendation.  Joint Staff officials told us
that the annual report to Congress for fiscal year 1997 will reflect
these changes. 


      OUR ASSESSMENT
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.42

Action on this recommendation is complete. 

RECOMMENDATION 15

The DODIG recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness encourage joint commanders and heads of other
joint organizations to

  -- identify key positions that are adversely affected by
     interruption of a joint duty assignment to attend the Armed
     Forces Staff College and

  -- designate those positions as "JPME Exempt," precluding
     interruption of a joint duty assignment to attend the Armed
     Forces Staff College. 


      DODIG FINDINGS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.43

The DODIG found that some joint organizations could make better use
of an available tool to limit the disruption of certain key functions
caused when a joint duty officer's tour is interrupted to attend
Phase II of JPME at the Armed Forces Staff College.  Because of the
limited capacity of the school and the number of officers who attend
but are not going to joint duty, only about one-third of the officers
who attended could do so before reporting to their joint
organization.  Thus, joint organizations frequently released officers
for a 12-week period to attend the school. 

The personnel requirements and management officials that the DODIG
interviewed at all 17 joint organizations expressed concern about the
impact of losing these officers for 12 weeks on the mission of the
joint organization.  The DODIG also found that the Director of the
Joint Staff addressed this problem in a July 1989 memorandum that
told managers to screen their joint duty assignment positions;
identify those jobs that were one-of-a-kind, key, and essential or
that had direct mission impact; and specify that the officers in such
positions be exempted from attending JPME while in that position. 
The exemptions each organization could establish was limited to no
more than 15 percent of its joint duty assignments.  The DODIG found
that this exemption provision was not being used consistently, and
some commands were not using it at all. 


      STATUS OF ACTION ON THE
      RECOMMENDATION
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.44

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness concurred
with the recommendation.  DOD Instruction 1300.20 provides guidance
on designating positions to be exempt from lengthy temporary duty
assignments, such as for JPME.  The instruction has been approved but
is awaiting final approval of the directive before it will be
formally released.  Various drafts of this directive have been
proposed for over 10 years without approval. 


      OUR ASSESSMENT
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.45

Although the OSD guidance addresses this issue, it is too early to
tell whether it will be approved and, if approved, whether the joint
organizations will effectively follow the guidance. 

RECOMMENDATION 16

The DODIG recommended that the secretaries of the military
departments hold JSO Revalidation Boards for the purpose of
identifying those transition-era JSOs who do not qualify for future
joint duty assignments and recommending withdrawal of JSO designation
where appropriate. 


      DODIG FINDINGS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.46

The Goldwater-Nichols Act established promotion objectives for
officers who are serving in or have served in joint positions. 
According to the act, these officers are expected, as a group, to be
promoted to the next higher grade at a rate not less than the rate
for other officers in their respective peer groups. 

The DODIG found that each service has had problems achieving the
statutory promotion objectives.  Military service officials told the
DODIG that the inability to meet the joint officer promotion
objectives was because many officers were designated JSO status under
transitional guidelines in effect from 1987 to 1989.  The criteria
for designating those transition-era JSOs were less stringent than
current criteria and did not encompass an assessment of each
officer's competitiveness for future promotion. 

The Air Force and the Army requested and received approval from the
Secretary of Defense to hold JSO revalidation boards to take the JSO
designation away from those officers who would not pass current
criteria for a joint duty assignment.  The Navy and the Marine Corps
did not identify a need to conduct such boards.  As a result of the
boards, the JSO designation was withdrawn from 315 Air Force officers
and 65 Army officers.  On the basis of its analysis of joint officer
promotion results and the actions of the Air Force and the Army
revalidation boards, the DODIG concluded that the Army did not take
sufficiently aggressive steps to address its JSO promotion problem or
improve its subsequent JSO promotion rates. 


      STATUS OF ACTION ON THE
      RECOMMENDATION
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.47

The Army and the Navy concurred with the recommendation.  The Air
Force did not comment on it.  Air Force and Marine Corps personnel
officials told us they have no current need to conduct JSO
revalidation boards because most transition-era JSOs have either left
or are leaving the service.  Navy officials told us they are
considering holding JSO revalidation boards during fiscal year 1998
but have not made a decision yet because the natural attrition of
transition-era JSOs may resolve the situation. 

The Army's request to hold a JSO revalidation board in 1996 was
denied by OSD.  An OSD official told us the request was denied
because the Army wanted to reconsider the JSO status of not only
transition-era officers but other JSOs as well.  This action was
viewed by OSD as an attempt to revoke JSO status from
non-transition-era officers who were not promotable to help the Army
meet the statutory promotion objectives.  The OSD official said that
such an action would not be in keeping with the intent of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act--that the services should (1) provide quality
officers for joint duty who are competitive for promotion at a rate
at least equal to that of officers in their peer group and (2)
provide these officers when not on joint duty status with career
opportunities and roles that will allow them to be competitive for
promotion with their non-JSO peers. 

The OSD official stated that to allow the Army to revoke the JSO
status from non-transition-era officers would in effect bail the Army
out of a situation in which it either did not provide the right
officers for JSO designations or failed to provide adequate career
opportunities to those officers.  The official said that the Army
still has the option of requesting permission to conduct a
revalidation board for transition-era JSOs. 


      OUR ASSESSMENT
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.48

Until the Army and Navy finish assessing the need for withdrawal of
JSO designation from some of their transition era JSOs, it is too
early to tell if the problems identified by the DODIG have been
resolved. 

RECOMMENDATION 17

The DODIG recommended that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Reserve Affairs, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Force Management Policy and the Joint Staff Director for
Operational Plans and Interoperability, develop policy guidance that
provides for the necessary training and education of reserve
component officers assigned to joint organizations. 


      DODIG FINDINGS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.49

The Goldwater-Nichols Act requires the Secretary of Defense to
establish personnel policies emphasizing education and experience in
joint matters for reserve officers not on the active duty list.\9

The act also specifies that such policies for the reserve component
should be similar to those required by the act for the active
component, to the extent practical.\10 The DODIG found that,
although some reservists perform duties similar to their active duty
counterparts within joint organizations, there was no published DOD
guidance regarding joint education or training for reservists and
there were no provisions for the education and training necessary to
prepare these officers to meet joint qualification standards. 


--------------------
\9 Public Law 99-433, Title IV, sec.401(a), Oct.  1, 1986, 10 U.S.C. 
666. 

\10 Id. 


      STATUS OF ACTION ON THE
      RECOMMENDATION
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.50

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness concurred
with the recommendation.  A reserve joint officer management working
group has been established to develop policy guidance to govern the
education and personnel management of reserve officers who serve in
joint positions.  However, officials in the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and OSD told us many details
need to be resolved with this issue.  For example, they said that,
since reservists typically perform military duties on an intermittent
or part-time basis, it is difficult for reservists to find the time
to attend the 12 week JPME, Phase II, course.  Reservists also cannot
readily be assigned to locations outside their reserve unit area,
thus limiting their availability for joint training.  Also, an OSD
official told us that if the education and experience requirements
for reservists are too stringent, the available pool of reservists
who can meet them will be limited, thereby denying joint duty
assignments to many highly qualified reserve personnel. 

Because the issues concerning reservists are so complex, Reserve
Affairs officials said that they do not anticipate that any guidance
will be issued during calendar year 1997. 


      OUR ASSESSMENT
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:0.51

Although a working group is developing guidance on the education and
management of reserve officers in joint positions, it is too early to
determine if this recommendation will be implemented. 


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix II

NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Sharon Cekala, Associate Director
William E.  Beusse, Assistant Director

NORFOLK FIELD OFFICE

Janet Keller, Evaluator-in-Charge
Lynn Johnson, Senior Evaluator
Janine Cantin, Evaluator


*** End of document. ***




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