Index


Force Structure: Opportunities for the Army to Reduce Risk in Executing
the Military Strategy (Letter Report, 03/15/99, GAO/NSIAD-99-47).

Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on the
Army's plans to allocate its end strength to meet the force structure
requirements of its combat and support forces, focusing on: (1)
comparing the Army's 1996 and 1998 reviews to determine if there were
changes in the Army's risk of not having sufficient forces to implement
the national military strategy; and (2) assessing the Army's potential
for mitigating risk by reallocating its existing end strength.

GAO noted that: (1) the Army did not assess risk in its 1998 force
structure review, but GAO's analysis shows that the Army's risk in
implementing the national military strategy increased since its 1996
review; (2) a comparison of both reviews shows that war-fighting
requirements for two wars increased at the same time the Army's forces
decreased, support force shortfalls are higher, and the number of
support forces arriving late has increased; (3) further, risk is higher
in a second war because few active forces are planned to be deployed in
the second war and support force shortfalls are higher in the second
war; (4) the Army's 1998 force structure review was based on the
following best-case assumptions which are consistent with defense
guidance--limited chemical use by the enemy, immediate access to ports
and airfields, and immediate redeployment of forces involved in
contingencies to a major theater war; (5) in contrast, the Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) stated that U.S. forces should be prepared to
encounter adverse conditions such as enemy use of chemical weapons; (6)
support force shortfalls may be higher than Army data indicated because
the Army's analysis did not include all the QDR reductions in reserve
component end strength; (7) the 1998 analysis assumed that the National
Guard will convert nonwar-fighting positions to war-fighting support
forces; (8) shortfalls will be higher if the conversions do not occur as
planned; (9) although the risk of not having sufficient forces to
implement the strategy has increased, the full extent of the increase is
unknown since the Army did not perform all the analyses needed to assess
and quantify its risks; (10) the Army did perform sensitivity analyses
in its 1996 review that concluded additional support forces would be
needed if these best-case assumptions did not occur; (11) the Army's end
strength exceeds its war-fighting requirements, yet the Army has
allocated significant end strength to nonwar-fighting missions; (12) one
option to mitigate risk is its plan to convert nonwar-fighting positions
in two National Guard divisions to war-fighting support forces; (13)
this would reduce shortfalls if implemented as planned; (14) another
option is to analyze the extent to which nonwar-fighting missions may be
performed by civilians or contractors rather than by military personnel;
and (15) if the Army used civilians or contractors to perform more
nonwar-fighting missions, it could then allocate a larger proportion of
military positions to meet war-fighting support requirements.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-99-47
     TITLE:  Force Structure: Opportunities for the Army to Reduce Risk 
             in Executing the Military Strategy
      DATE:  03/15/99
   SUBJECT:  Army personnel
             Mobilization
             Combat readiness
             Defense contingency planning
             Comparative analysis
             Warfare
             Armed forces reserves
             Human resources utilization
             Chemical warfare
IDENTIFIER:  DOD Quadrennial Defense Review
             DOD Bottom-Up Review
             Total Army Analysis Process
             DOD Future Years Defense Program
             Army National Guard Division Redesign Program
             Army Force XXI Initiative
             
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ns99047.book GAO United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Committees

March 1999 FORCE STRUCTURE Opportunities for the Army to Reduce
Risk in Executing the Military Strategy




GAO/NSIAD-99-47

  GAO/NSIAD-99-47

United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548
Lett er

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

GAO

National Security and International Affairs Division Lett er

B-281688 March 15, 1999 The Honorable John Warner Chairman The
Honorable Carl Levin Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed
Services United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd D. Spence Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House of
Representatives

The fiscal year 1996 National Defense Authorization Act requires
us to annually assess, through 2001, the Army's plans to allocate
its end strength to meet the force structure requirements of its
combat and support forces. 1 This is the third in a series of
reports to respond to this congressional

mandate. 2 The Army's force structure requirements are based on
the national military strategy to fight and win two nearly
simultaneous major theater wars. In 1996, the Army completed its
biennial force structure review and

concluded that it faced a moderate risk in carrying out the
strategy because of significant shortfalls in support forces. 3
This report addresses the Army's risks after completing its 1998
force structure review. To respond to the act's requirement, we
(1) compared the Army's 1996 and 1998 reviews to determine if
there were changes in the Army's risk of not having sufficient
forces to implement the national military strategy and (2)
assessed the Army's potential for mitigating risk by reallocating
its existing end strength. To assess risk for the 1998 review, we
considered factors that 1 End strength is the total number of
positions authorized annually by Congress. Force structure is the
Army's organization of its forces into units.

2 Our two previous reports were Force Structure: Army Support
Forces Can Meet Two- Conflict Strategy With Some Risk (GAO/NSIAD-
97-66, Feb. 28, 1997) and Force Structure: Army's Efforts to
Improve Efficiency of Institutional Forces Have Produced Few
Results (GAO/NSIAD-98-65, Feb. 26, 1998). 3 Support forces deploy
to sustain combat forces in wartime and include specialties such
as chemical, engineering, quartermaster, and transportation.

B-281688 Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

the Army used to measure risk in its 1996 review, including
support force shortfalls, the number of support forces not
expected to arrive on time, and challenges expected if a second
war were to occur. We also assessed the Army's underlying
assumptions for determining its war- fighting requirements using
available criteria such as the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

Results in Brief The Army did not assess risk in its 1998 force
structure review, but our analysis shows that the Army's risk in
implementing the national military strategy increased since its
1996 review. A comparison of both reviews shows that war- fighting
requirements for two wars increased at the same time the Army's
forces decreased; support force shortfalls are higher; and

the number of support forces arriving late has increased. Further,
risk is higher in a second war because few active forces are
planned to be deployed in the second war and support force
shortfalls are higher in the second war.

The Army's risk may be even higher than this comparative analysis
indicates for two reasons. First, the Army's 1998 force structure
review was based on the following best case assumptions which are
consistent with defense guidance limited chemical use by the
enemy; immediate access to ports and airfields; and immediate
redeployment of forces involved in contingencies to a major
theater war. In contrast, the (QDR) stated that U. S. forces
should be prepared to encounter adverse conditions such as enemy
use of chemical weapons. Second, support force shortfalls may be
higher than Army data indicates because the Army's analysis did

not include all the QDR reductions in reserve component end
strength. Finally, the 1998 analysis assumed that the National
Guard will convert nonwar- fighting positions to war- fighting
support forces. Shortfalls will be higher if the conversions do
not occur as planned.

Although the risk of not having sufficient forces to implement the
strategy has increased, the full extent of the increase is unknown
since the Army did not perform all the analyses needed to assess
and quantify its risks. According to defense guidance, Army
components are encouraged to conduct analyses to explore the
implications of different assumptions. Such analyses may assist
the Army in identifying and reducing the risk

involved in carrying out the strategy. The Army did perform
sensitivity analyses in its 1996 review that concluded additional
support forces would be needed if these best case assumptions did
not occur.

B-281688 Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

The Army has several options to mitigate its risks. The Army's end
strength exceeds its war- fighting requirements, yet the Army has
allocated significant end strength to nonwar- fighting missions.
One option to mitigate risk is its plan to convert nonwar-
fighting positions in two National

Guard divisions to war- fighting support forces. This would reduce
shortfalls if implemented as planned. Another option is to analyze
the extent to which nonwar- fighting missions may be performed by
civilians or contractors rather than by military personnel. If the
Army used civilians or

contractors to perform more nonwar- fighting missions, it could
then allocate a larger proportion of military positions to meet
war- fighting support requirements. Lastly, if the Army had more
current data on the type and availability of host nation support,
it could use such resources to reduce shortfalls.

Background The 1993 Bottom- Up Review and the 1997 QDR require
that U. S. forces be able to fight and win two nearly simultaneous
theater wars. The QDR also determined that this strategy could be
implemented with a smaller force at an acceptable level of risk
and, for the Army, recommended reductions of 60, 000 military
positions. Accordingly, the Army plans to eliminate 35, 000

positions by fiscal year 2000: 15, 000 active, 17,000 National
Guard, and 3,000 Army Reserve positions. These reductions will
bring the Army's end strength to 1,035, 000. The remaining 25,000
reductions will be allocated to the National Guard and Army
Reserve as part of the Army's next force

structure review, Total Army Analysis (TAA) 2007, which will be
completed in November 1999.

The Army performs TAA every 2 years to determine the number and
types of support forces needed by combat forces and to allocate
end strength to these requirements. The TAA process focuses on
support forces because combat forces are defined in defense
guidance and allocated 100 percent of their end strength
requirements. 4 The combat and support force structure

is projected to be maintained within the resources available in
the Department of Defense's (DOD) Future Years Defense Plan. The
TAA force structure drives development of the Army's Program
Objective Memorandum (POM), which is the Army's input into the
Future Years Defense Plan.

4 The combat force is defined in defense and Army guidance and
consists of 10 active Army divisions, 2 active cavalry regiments,
and 15 National Guard enhanced brigades.

B-281688 Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

In its TAA, the Army uses a series of models to simulate the two
nearly simultaneous major theater wars described in the national
military strategy. The defense guidance describes the various
phases of the campaign, including the buildup of support forces,
launching the counteroffensive, and post- hostility stability. The
models also include assumptions about campaign conditions (see
app. I). The Army models project support force

requirements based on the simulated campaigns and the defined
combat force. The Army then matches existing force structure units
to the requirements until the inventory is exhausted. Shortfalls
occur when the requirements exceed the available inventory. The
Army calls these shortfalls unresourced requirements. According to
defense guidance, Army components are encouraged to conduct
analyses to explore the implications of different assumptions.
Such analyses may assist the Army in identifying and reducing the
risk

involved in carrying out the strategy. The Army made the following
"best case" assumptions which are consistent with defense guidance
limited chemical use by the enemy; immediate access to ports and
airfields; and immediate redeployment of forces involved in
contingencies to a major theater war. In its 1996 force structure
review, the Army performed various

analyses that identified the effects on support force requirements
if these assumptions changed.

The Army completed its most recent TAA (TAA 2005) in March 1998
and projected total combat and support war- fighting requirements
of 747,000 positions through fiscal year 2005 for a two- war
scenario. The Army initially projected support force shortfalls of
91, 300 positions but reduced them to 72,500 because it plans to
convert almost 19, 000 nonwar- fighting

positions in National Guard divisions by 2005 to meet war-
fighting support requirements. The Army plans to convert an
additional 26,000 nonwar- fighting positions in National Guard
divisions by the end of fiscal year 2009, for a total of 45,000
converted positions.

The Army's Risk Has Increased The Army's risk in its ability to
implement the national military strategy has increased since its
force structure review in 1996, when the Army assessed

its risk as moderate. Risk increased for the following reasons:
Army war- fighting requirements increased at the same time that
the QDR planned significant force reductions.

B-281688 Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

 Army requirements would have been even higher had the Army
included requirements for all campaign phases and accounted for
adverse conditions such as enemy use of chemical weapons.

 Army support force shortfalls have increased since the 1996
review and may increase further if the conversion of National
Guard nonwar- fighting positions to war- fighting support
positions does not take place as planned.

 The number of support forces arriving late in the first 30 days
of the first war has increased since the 1996 review.

Further, risk is higher in a second nearly simultaneous war
because fewer active forces are planned to be deployed in the
second war and support force shortfalls are higher in the second
theater. Despite these indicators, the full extent of the Army's
risk is not known because the Army has not performed all the
analyses needed to assess and quantify risk. A risk assessment
should include analyses of adverse conditions to determine their
effect on requirements and analyses of effects on war- fight
timelines under more severe conditions than those

identified in defense guidance. Requirements Increased as the
Force Decreased

The Army's war- fighting requirements increased by 75,000
positions from 672,000 in the 1996 analysis (TAA 2003) to 747,000
in TAA 2005. At the same time, the Army began implementing QDR
reductions, which

decreased its end strength by 35, 000. The growth in requirements
is mostly attributable to defense guidance changes and increases
in the Army's requirements to support other services. For TAA
2005, defense guidance directed the Army to include all the
National Guard enhanced brigades, which added about 40,000 combat
positions. In addition, Army requirements to support other
services increased by about 25, 000 positions, including 13,000
positions to provide chemical decontamination for the Navy and the
Air Force. In response to theater commander plans and

defense guidance, the Army included four corps 5 in TAA 2005
compared with three in TAA 2003. Although some support decreased,
6 the net change

5 Some support forces are assigned to a corps that provides
nondivisional support for two to five divisions. Each theater is
assigned two corps. 6 Support requirements for medical, equipment
use, and some classes of supply decreased but, overall, support
requirements increased.

B-281688 Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

from TAA 2003 to TAA 2005 was an increase in combat and support
requirements of 75,000 positions as shown in table 1.

Table 1: Army War- Fighting Requirements

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

In fiscal year 1998, the Army's congressionally authorized end
strength was 1,070,000 and consisted of 495, 000 active, 367,000
National Guard, and 208,000 Army Reserve. In TAA 2005, the Army
assumed an active end strength reduction of 15,000 and a decrease
in reserve component end strength of 20, 000 by fiscal year 2000.
Assuming Congress authorized an

end strength consistent with the QDR recommendations to reduce
Army end strength by a total of 60,000 positions, the Army will
need to allocate an additional 25, 000 reduction to the reserve
components.

The QDR asserted that the Army would be able to implement these
reductions because of more efficient support through the redesign
of its heavy divisions and implementing "just in time" logistics.
But until Army

doctrine is revised and TAA models are updated to reflect the new
concept of operations, no estimate can be made of future support
force efficiencies. TAA 2005 modeling did not include redesigned
divisions or corps as

envisioned in Force XXI, 7 even though two divisions and one corps
will be redesigned by 2005. The two digitized active divisions
will save only about 2,500 active combat positions, but the active
force will be reduced by 15, 000 positions by the end of fiscal
year 1999. According to an Army official, the full effect of
digitization on Army force structure may not be known until TAA
2011, since the Army will be in various stages of transition until
then.

TAA 2003 TAA 2005 Increase

Combat 199,031 240, 006 40, 975 Support 440,850 449, 723 8, 873
Support to other services 32, 119 57, 447 25, 328

Total 672, 000 747,176 75, 176

7 Force XXI is the Army's reorganization of its divisions to
incorporate new operational and organizational concepts.

B-281688 Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

TAA Assumptions Limited Support Force Requirements

War- fighting support force requirements would have been higher
had the Army included all the campaign phases of both theaters and
accounted for adverse conditions. For example, the Army did not
calculate or include additional support forces that would be
required if opponents use chemical weapons. Also, the Army did not
assess the effects on support force requirements of U. S. forces
being denied immediate access to ports and airfields. Finally, the
Army assumed that forces deployed in ongoing contingency
operations would be available immediately for redeployment to a
major theater war and did not assess the effects on support force

requirements if this were not the case. The Army Did Not Include
Requirements for Two Campaign Phases

During TAA 2005, the Army modeled requirements for only three of
five campaign phases. Army officials stated that defense guidance
does not clearly require the Army to identify requirements for the
last two campaign phases. Army officials believe the defense
guidance is very vague on the

fifth phase and that the extent of the Army's role and involvement
in this phase is unclear. The Army therefore never attempted to
identify requirements for the final phase. The Army did calculate
14, 000 support force requirements for the fourth phase but,
consistent with its interpretation of the guidance, did not
include them in the total requirement for 747, 000 war- fighting
positions. By not incorporating requirements for all five campaign
phases for both theaters, the Army does not know its total
requirements and cannot fully assess its risks in implementing the
strategy. Theater commanders, on the other hand, develop war-
plans for the entire campaign. We found that one theater commander
had identified

requirements for nearly 30, 000 additional support positions
needed in the last two phases. Most of these spaces were for the
engineering, field artillery, medical, and transportation
specialties.

The Army Did Not Include Requirements for a Chemical Environment

Support force requirements would also have been higher had the
Army included the additional forces required in a chemical
environment. However, TAA 2005 assumed enemy forces would employ
only limited use

of chemical weapons in both theaters and thus did not increase
war- fighting requirements. The Army later modeled more intense
chemical use in one theater but did not identify or include
additional support requirements in TAA 2005 results. According to
Army officials, the chemical analysis was not completed until
after the TAA requirements phase, and the Army did not accomplish
all of the study goals. The Army

B-281688 Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

did not complete this analysis sooner because it redirected its
resources toward performing QDR analyses. Even though the Army
followed defense guidance, the QDR stated that U. S. forces must
plan to fight and win theater wars in which adversaries use
chemical or biological weapons because this is a likely condition
of future warfare. The QDR also stressed the importance of
increased investment in

capabilities to prevent and defend against the use of chemical and
biological weapons.

The Army Did Not Include Requirements Needed if U. S. Forces Are
Denied Immediate Access to Ports and Airfields

In TAA 2005, the Army assumed that U. S. forces would have
immediate and unobstructed access to ports and airfields in both
theaters. The Army did not identify the effects on support force
requirements if access were denied, although it initially planned
to do so. Army officials said they did not have time to perform
this analysis. As a result, TAA 2005 requirements do not include
forces that may be needed if the U. S. does not have access to
primary ports and airfields. In TAA 2003, the Army did assess the
effects on support force requirements if U. S. forces were denied
immediate access to primary ports and airfields

in a one theater war. The results showed a requirement for
additional positions above that needed for two nearly simultaneous
wars. Ninety percent of the increase was in the transportation and
quartermaster specialties.

Officials at one theater command stated that their current war-
plans are consistent with defense guidance the plans assume
immediate access to primary ports and airfields. However, the
officials recognized there could be significant effects if U. S.
forces are denied access. In a 1997 memo, the

theater commander stated that the use of weapons of mass
destruction against airports or seaports would delay the buildup
of forces and would severely impede the ability to blunt an
initial attack. As a result, the

command is planning analyses to identify the impact of such events
on U. S. forces. Army Assumed Forces Can Be

Redeployed Immediately From Contingency Operations

In TAA 2005, the Army initially planned to analyze the effects
that redeploying forces from a contingency operation to a major
theater war would have on requirements, but, according to
officials, the Army did not complete this analysis because it
redirected its efforts to support the QDR.

The assumption that forces involved in contingency operations can
be immediately redeployed to a major theater war is consistent
with defense guidance. However, we reported in 1997 that this
assumption is risky

B-281688 Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

because the critical support forces needed in the early stages of
a major theater war are needed to facilitate the redeployment of
military forces from the contingency operation. 8 DOD agreed that
the assumption used in TAA 2003 that made all units involved in
contingencies immediately

available for war- fighting is flawed and overly optimistic. One
Army study on strategic risks assumed that 20,000 Army active
component resources would be committed to one or more contingency
operations and would not be available to participate in the two-
war scenario. The Army does not know how many additional support
forces would be required to extract forces from a contingency
operation and redeploy them to a major theater war or how such a
redeployment would affect war- fighting timelines, according to
Army and theater command officials. The European Command Deputy
for Operations has estimated that it would take 90 days to
disengage forces from Bosnia and redeploy them to a

major theater war. Further, the President's 1998 National Security
Strategy for a New Century and defense guidance state that U. S.
forces must be prepared to withdraw from contingency operations to
deploy to a major theater war. Support Force Shortfalls

Increased but May Be Understated

The Army's estimate of its support force shortfalls 9 increased by
14,000 to 72, 500 positions since TAA 2003 but may still be
understated. The Army has accepted most of its risk in three
support specialties transportation, quartermaster, and chemical
which account for 75 percent of the shortfalls. 10 For example,
TAA 2005 includes a requirement for nearly 13, 000 spaces for the
Army to provide chemical support to other services. This resulted
in a requirement for 110 chemical decontamination

companies, but the Army allocated end strength to only 36 of these
units. Therefore, the Army's overall chemical support requirement
is significantly under resourced, with only about 12,300 of 23,600
required positions

allocated end strength during TAA 2005. 8 Force Structure: Army
Support Forces Can Meet Two- Conflict Strategy With Some Risks
(GAO/NSIAD-97-66, Feb. 28, 1997). 9 Shortfall refers to units that
are not allocated any end strength and exist only on paper. 10
Appendix II shows the number of positions the Army requires in
each specialty in a two- war scenario and the end strength
allocated to each speciality.

B-281688 Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

TAA 2005 support force shortfalls of 72,500 positions may be
understated for two reasons. The Army had initially estimated
shortfalls of 91, 300 but then reduced the estimate because it
plans to convert 19,000 nonwar- fighting positions in National
Guard divisions to war- fighting support positions. However,
similar conversion plans that were part of TAA 2003 (66,400 active
and reserve positions were supposed to be converted to higher
priority support units) were never implemented. Army

officials said the conversions did not take place because the
National Guard announced it would convert combat positions to
support positions. If the conversions planned in TAA 2005 are
delayed, shortfalls will increase. Second, the Army allocated end
strength as of 2000, not 2005 when the Army expects it will have
completed the QDR reductions. By not including the remaining
25,000 reductions in TAA 2005, the Army has allocated 25, 000 more
positions than DOD plans to request in congressional end strength
authorizations for fiscal year 2005. Implementing these reductions
will increase support shortfalls if the cuts are allocated to the
National Guard

and Army Reserve war- fighting support force structure. In
contrast, allocating the reductions to the reserve components'
228,000 position nonwar- fighting structure will not increase war-
fighting support force shortfalls. If Congress chose not to reduce
reserve force levels further, the Army would not necessarily have
more support forces because it would still have to convert nonwar-
fighting positions to war- fighting support positions.

The Army relies heavily on reserve components for support force
structure. As table 2 shows, over 70 percent of the resourced war-
fighting support force requirement is met with reserve end
strength allocations in the civil affairs, public affairs,
quartermaster, transportation, chemical, ordnance, and engineering
specialities.

B-281688 Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

Table 2: Support Specialties Predominately in the Reserve
Components

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Support Forces Required in the First 30 Days Arrive Late,
Increasing Risk Defense and Army guidance stipulate that support
units needed in the first 30 days of the first theater war should
be predominately active forces. Army officials stated that they do
not expect most reserve component units to be able to begin moving
to the theater until about 30 days after they are

mobilized because of the time needed to call up, train, and begin
moving forces. The Army estimated in TAA 2005 that over 105, 000
support forces would not arrive in the first 30 days as required.
This estimate is higher than the 79, 000 support forces that TAA
2003 estimated would arrive late. Furthermore, the requirements
for several support specialties will probably

not be met within the first 30 days because significant portions
of these forces are in the reserve components. For example, about
71 percent of engineering forces, 58 percent of ordnance forces,
57 percent of quartermaster forces, and 54 percent of the
transportation forces needed in the first 30 days are in the
reserve components. We compared one theater commander's
requirements to execute the first 30 days of the campaign, against
the Army's TAA requirements for the same

theater. The theater commander's requirements for the first 30
days were less than the TAA requirements and were met mostly with
active forces. The commander's support force requirements were
about 37,500 positions, of which 80 percent were active Army. In
contrast, the TAA 2005 requirements for this theater, were about
177,000 positions of which only

about 40 percent were active Army. Whereas TAA uses the
doctrinally correct force flow the number, mix, and sequencing of
forces needed to support combat forces the theater commander may
stagger the flow of forces and plan to have some support forces
arrive after the first 30 days.

Active component Reserve components Specialty End strength

allocation Percent End strength allocation Percent

Civil Affairs 131 2. 49 5, 139 97. 51 Public Affairs 108 7. 61 1,
312 92. 39 Quartermaster 6, 757 16. 79 33, 482 83. 21
Transportation 12, 206 20. 91 46, 173 79. 09 Chemical 3, 356 27.
25 8, 961 72. 75 Ordnance 12,186 27.96 31, 405 72. 04 Engineering
20,764 28.90 51, 077 71. 10

B-281688 Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

Theater command officials stated that, given limitations in lift,
the priority in the first 30 days is to move combat forces into
the theater. However, both the TAA models and the theater
commander's plans achieve sufficiency of support forces at about
the same time.

Risks in the Second Theater Are Higher

Risks in implementing the national military strategy are higher in
the second of two theaters because shortfalls are higher and the
proportion of active support forces is significantly less in the
second theater. TAA 2005 showed that support shortfalls are 11,500
spaces higher in the second

theater than the first. Also, active forces comprise only 15
percent of the total required support forces in the second theater
compared with 36 percent in the first. Fewer active forces in the
second theater increases risk if the mobilization of reserve
forces is delayed or if the second war occurs with little warning
time. The significance of the second theater was highlighted by
the QDR, which asserted that maintaining forces capable of winning
two nearly simultaneous wars is essential to the credibility of
the

overall national security strategy. The QDR also stated that a one
theater war capacity would undermine the deterrence and
credibility of U. S. commitments. Another indication that risk in
the second theater is higher came from one theater commander who
estimated higher shortfalls if his forces are involved in the
second of two wars. The theater commander stated that if his
theater was second, he was concerned about the lack of support
forces

to sustain the fight and delays in execution that may be caused by
support force shortfalls. Full Extent of Army's Risk Is Not Known
The Army does not know the full extent of its risks in
implementing the national military strategy because it did not
perform a risk assessment in TAA 2005. Even though TAA 2005 used
assumptions that were generally consistent with defense guidance,
the guidance also encourages analyses to identify risks under
conditions different from these best case

assumptions. In TAA 2003, the Army performed sensitivity analyses
that concluded additional support forces would be needed if (1) an
adversary used chemical weapons, (2) access to ports and airfields
was denied, and (3) forces deployed in a contingency operation
were not immediately available. Officials at one theater command
stated they routinely perform analyses to identify the effects of
worst case conditions. The Army planned to perform some of these
sensitivity analyses in TAA 2005 but, according to Army officials,
did not do so because resources were shifted to support

B-281688 Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

QDR analyses. As a result, the Army does not know the full extent
of its risk. We believe sensitivity analyses are essential in
assessing risk. Without them, the Army cannot specify the
additional support forces required under adverse conditions.

For example, in TAA 2005, the Army did not run the transportation,
campaign, and support models with the resourced force 11 to
determine the impact of support force shortages on war- fighting
timelines. The Army did

run the transportation and support models with the TAA 2005
required forces and, according to Army officials, determined that
there was no significant change in combat and support unit arrival
dates and therefore, the Army did not re- run the campaign models.
While this "relook" analysis is a positive change from TAA 2003,
re- running the transportation model using the required force does
not assess the effects on war- fighting timelines or identify
risks resulting from support force shortfalls that could be
assessed if the Army re- ran the campaign models with the
resourced force. As many as 72, 500 support force positions are
unresourced with many shortages falling in specialities such as
transportation, quartermaster, and chemical. Re- running the
models with the resourced force would identify any effects on war-
fighting timelines because the models' transition

to counteroffensive is based on the level of support forces in the
theater. Also, re- running the campaign models with the resourced
force would enable the Army to better assess risks of shortages in
specific specialties such as transportation, quartermaster, and
chemical.

Army officials stated that the objective of TAA modeling is to
identify the required forces. While the Army has modeled
deployments with the resourced force on special requests from the
theater commanders, it has not included such analyses in TAA. Army
officials agreed, however, that re- running TAA models with the
resourced force would improve the Army's ability to assess risk.

Options to Mitigate Risk

The Army has several opportunities to mitigate its risks in
executing the national military strategy. The Army's total end
strength exceeds its requirements to fight two wars, but the Army
has allocated 417,000 end strength positions to force structure
that does not have a war- fighting mission, such as for
institutional or unique positions. In TAA 2005, the

11 The resourced force is that portion of the required force for
which the Army allocated end strength.

B-281688 Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

Army did not determine whether the military end strength allocated
to institutional or unique force structure was essential. If this
structure could be filled with civilians or contractors, then more
military end strength would be available to meet war- fighting
requirements. The Army could also reduce shortfalls by converting
military positions that do not have a warfighting mission to war-
fighting support positions. If implemented, the Army's National
Guard Division Redesign Program will convert 45, 000 positions in
two National Guard divisions to war- fighting support positions

by 2009. But, the conversion program is not effectively managed.
Finally, the Army could consider support from host nations to help
meet its warfighting requirements, but theater commanders will
need to provide more current data on how much support will be
available and when.

Significant Portion of End Strength Does Not Have War- Fighting
Mission

The Army's congressionally authorized end strength exceeds war-
fighting requirements, yet the Army still has support force
shortfalls because a significant portion of its end strength is
allocated to nonwar- fighting missions. In TAA 2005, the Army
projected its end strength in fiscal year 2000 would total
1,035,000, which exceeds the war- fighting

requirement of 747,000. For purposes of TAA, the Army actually
allocated 1,073,000 spaces, which includes additional spaces for
the National Guard. But the Army has allocated about 417, 000 end
strength spaces to nonwar- fighting structure, leaving 656, 000
spaces to allocate to war- fighting

requirements. The nonwar- fighting structure includes
institutional positions, National Guard divisions, trainees,
transients, holdees, students, uniques, and uncommitted forces
(see table 3). As a result, the Army initially projected 91,300
unresourced positions before accounting for the National Guard
conversions. Table 4 shows how the Army allocated end strength in
TAA 2005.

B-281688 Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

Table 3: End Strength Allocated to Nonwar- Fighting Force
Structure

a The Institutional force is generally nondeployable and supports
Army infrastructure activities such as training, doctrine
development, base operations, supply, and maintenance. b TTHS =
trainees, transients, holdees, and students. TTHS make up the
portion of the active force in temporary status. c The uncommitted
force structure, consisting primarily of engineering units, is not
required for war- fighting.

d Force structure that did not match war- fighting requirements
but that the Army has retained to meet nonwar- fighting needs such
as joint, DOD, and alliance commitments. Source: GAO analysis of
Army data.

Nonwar- fighting force structure Active National Guard Army

Reserve Total Army

Institutional a 115,000 36,000 63,000 214, 000

TTHS b 61, 000 0 0 61, 000

Guard divisions (strategic reserve) 0 112,517 0 112, 517 Subtotal
176,000 148,517 63,000 387, 517

Uncommitted c 0 2,719 0 2, 719

Uniques d 12, 932 10,853 3,103 26, 888 Total 188,932 162,089
66,103 417, 124

B-281688 Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

Table 4: Army Force Structure Allocations

a The Army assumed end strengths as of fiscal year 2000. However,
in the case of the National Guard, the Army allocated 388,000
force structure Guard spaces rather than the 350,000 assumed end
strength. b The Army has units that are under resourced, i. e.,
the units are not allocated all required positions. However, when
mobilization occurs, the Army fills these vacancies using the
Individual Ready

Reserves or recruits. c These shortfalls should be reduced by
converting positions in two National Guard divisions to
warfighting support positions. Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
Army Process for Allocating End Strength Is Not Consistent With
Defense Guidance

The Army's process for allocating 417,000 spaces to nonwar-
fighting functions is not consistent with defense guidance.
Defense guidance states that the services should reduce forces not
required to support missions

envisioned by the national military strategy and minimize the
number of military personnel assigned to support organizations.
The guidance further states that positions that do not meet
military essential requirements will be eliminated or converted to
civilian positions. The QDR also addressed this topic, stating
that DOD should improve the efficiency of support activities and
consider nonwar- fighting support functions as candidates for

outsourcing. Army officials stated they did not assess, as part of
the TAA 2005 process, whether civilians or contractors could
perform the functions of institutional or unique military forces.
Army institutional functions in

particular have received increasing scrutiny in recent years
because the Army has been unable to support requirements based on
workload and ensure that these functions are carried out in the
most efficient and cost- effective manner. As shown in table 3,
214,000 military positions are

Active National Guard Army

Reserve Total

End strength (as of fiscal year 2000) 480,000 388,000 a 205,000
1,073, 000

Minus nonwar- fighting force structure 188,932 162, 089 66,103
417, 124

Force structure available for war- fighting requirements 291,068
225, 911 138,897 655, 876

Minus war- fighting requirements 747, 176

Initial support force shortfalls b 91, 300 c

Minus National Guard conversions by 2005 18, 846

Remaining shortfalls 72, 454

B-281688 Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

allocated to institutional functions. A previous GAO report found
that the Army's efforts to establish workload- based requirements
and redesign institutional functions had not been very successful.
12

If the Army reduced the number of military institutional forces,
then more would be available to meet war- fighting requirements.
The Force XXI Institutional Army Redesign Pamphlet 100- 1,
published in March 1998, acknowledged the potential benefits of
reducing military forces that perform institutional functions. The
pamphlet states that many of the services currently being
performed at all levels of the institutional force, "support
military missions, but, are not uniquely military in nature." It
states that privatization on an Army- wide basis, if done with
proper analysis, could achieve the objective of greater cost
savings for more efficient operations. Army Could Reduce
Allocation of Military Positions to

Nonwar- Fighting Unique Structure

According to Army officials, there were nearly 27,000 unique force
structure positions left after TAA 2005 matched the existing
structure with war- fighting requirements (excluding the strategic
reserve). The officials stated that much of the 27,000 unique
structure is required to meet joint, DOD, and alliance
commitments. However, they acknowledged that they

have not assessed this structure to determine whether unique
positions require military personnel or could be filled by
civilians or contractors. The Army could reduce unfilled war-
fighting support requirements by

allocating unique force structure to war- fighting missions. Some
of the unique structure is in the same specialty as unfilled war-
fighting requirements, although it does not provide the same
capability. For example, unique structure in the transportation
specialty contains minimum equipment, and its units contract for
port services. In contrast,

some of the unresourced transportation requirements are for units
with heavy equipment such as cranes and forklifts. The Army has
not identified the additional training or equipment modifications
that would be needed in order to convert these units to fill war-
fighting requirements. Table 5 shows Army unique force structure
by component.

12 Force Structure: Army's Efforts to Improve Efficiency of
Institutional Forces Have Produced Few Results (GAO/NSIAD-98-65,
Feb. 26, 1998).

B-281688 Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

Table 5: Army Unique Force Structure

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Potential Exists to Apply Nonwar- Fighting National Guard Division
Assets to Meet War- Fighting Support Requirements

The Army may be able to reduce its support shortfalls and thus its
risk by using resources in the National Guard divisions to meet
war- fighting requirements. In 1997, we recommended that the Army
determine whether war- fighting support missions could be assigned
to the National Guard

division force structure. 13 As a result, in TAA 2005 the Army
assigned war- fighting missions to a few units in National Guard
divisions that did not previously have a war- fight mission. These
units totaling about 3, 600

spaces consist of two National Guard division aviation companies,
one attack helicopter battalion, seven chemical companies, and
three field artillery battalions.

In addition, the National Guard gave us a list of about 21, 800
Guard division spaces that are currently on theater commanders'
deployment rosters. These represent the theater commanders'
assessment of the units needed for war- fighting. We compared this
list to the TAA 2005 unresourced requirements and found over 1,800
spaces in 11 aviation units that closely

or exactly matched the 2,400 space aviation war- fighting
shortfall. This illustrates the potential for the Army to further
reduce its unresourced requirements by assigning war- fighting
missions to units in National Guard divisions.

National Guard Conversions Can Reduce Support Shortages, but
Program Is Not Effectively Managed

As part of the National Guard Division Redesign program the Army
plans to convert about 45, 000 positions in two Guard divisions
from nonwar- fighting missions to war- fighting support between
2000 and 2009. If the program is successful, it will halve the TAA
2005 support force shortfall from 91, 300 to

Force structure Unique spaces Percentage of total

Active 12, 932 48. 1

National Guard 10, 853 40. 4

Army Reserve 3, 103 11. 5 Total 26, 888 100.0

13 Force Structure: Army Support Forces Can Meet Two- Conflict
Strategy With Some Risks (GAO/NSIAD-97-66, Feb. 28, 1997).

B-281688 Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

46, 300 spaces by the end of fiscal year 2009. 14 Even though
about 68 percent of the spaces will convert to specialties with
the largest number of unresourced requirements transportation,
quartermaster, and

chemical-- only 25 percent are planned to convert by 2003.
Further, the program's success will depend on buying new equipment
according to Army officials. In 1997, the Army estimated the
program to cost about $5 billion, which does not include costs to
upgrade facilities. However, only $1. 9 billion are programmed in
the Army's fiscal year 2000- 05 POM, most of it (66 percent) is
programmed for fiscal years 2004- 05. Army

officials stated that they have not updated the program's costs
since 1997 when they prepared the 1999- 2003 POM, and do not have
a current estimate of how much money will be needed to convert all
45,000 positions.

Most Spaces to Convert After 2003

About 75 percent (almost 34, 000) of the conversions are planned
to take place in 2004 or later. Table 6 shows near- term and long-
term planned conversions by support specialty.

14 In 1996, we reported that the National Guard combat divisions
were not needed for the two- war strategy and recommended that
some be converted to support roles or eliminated if the forces
exceeded validated requirements.

B-281688 Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

Table 6: Planned National Guard Conversions

a According to Army officials, the conversions planned for fiscal
years 2006- 09 may change as a result of subsequent TAAs and POM
programming decisions. Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

The Army's fiscal year 2000- 05 POM shows the planned conversion
of 18, 846 spaces from six brigades. However, as of December 1998,
the Army had identified only three of the six brigades and only
about half the spaces it budgeted to convert in the POM. Army
officials stated that the next three brigades may be identified in
February 1999.

The Army Did Not Convert 66,000 Positions as Planned in TAA 2003
Prior Army efforts to reduce support force shortfalls have not
been

implemented as planned. In February 1997, when we reported on the
results of TAA 2003, the Army had two major plans to significantly
reduce unresourced requirements. The first was to shift 66, 000
active and reserve positions from support units excess to the war-
fight to higher priority support units. Converting these positions
was estimated to cost

$2. 6 billion. The second plan was to convert 42,700 positions in
National Guard divisions from combat to support. This plan was
estimated to cost an additional $2.8 billion. In total, both plans
would eliminate 108, 700 unresourced requirements and cost $5. 4
billion. We also reported in January 1997 that procurement for
converting the 66, 000 spaces was to be fully funded before any of
the National Guard redesign would be undertaken. However, Army
officials stated that none of the 66,000 spaces have been
converted and that the Army currently plans to implement only

Specialty Fiscal years 2000- 03 Fiscal years

2004- 09 a Total

Air Defense 406 4, 488 4,894

Army- level headquarters 32 0 32

Aviation 0 1, 448 1,448

Chemical 720 3,021 3,741

Engineer 92 1, 008 1,100

Field Artillery 0 1, 305 1,305

Military Police 647 0 647

Ordnance 965 1, 330 2,295

Quartermaster 3, 628 8, 810 12, 438

Signal 624 2, 131 2, 755

Transportation 4, 196 10,113 14, 309 Total 11,310 33, 654 44, 964

B-281688 Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

the National Guard division redesign. Table 7 shows the changes in
the Army's plans.

Table 7: Changes in Army Plans to Reduce Support Shortfalls

a Total cost unknown. This amount does not include all equipment,
training, and facilities costs expected during fiscal years 2006
through 2009. Source: GAO analysis of Army data. Total Cost for
National Guard

Redesign Program Is Unknown The total program cost is unknown
because the Army's fiscal year 2000- 05

POM did not include an estimate for facilities costs, and Army
officials said that procurement costs for fiscal years 2006- 09
have not been updated. However, the Secretary of the Army in
August 1997 wrote that the Army was committed to the conversions
and that meeting this objective would require about $586 million
per year through 2007 to buy equipment. If funding is provided at
this level, procurement costs would add $1.17 billion to the $1. 9
billion programmed in the POM. However, Army officials stated that
the costs for the years beyond the POM can change depending on how
the composition of unresourced requirements is changed by
subsequent TAAs and which brigades are identified for conversion.
For example,

converting a unit to aviation (combat support) is much more
expensive than converting a unit to quartermaster. Although the
largest cost is for equipment procurement, the conversions will
also require funding for training and facilities. But the Army's
most recent POM did not include any funding for facilities.
Military construction

to upgrade facilities will be needed to support the change in
units. For example, Army officials stated that an armor unit may
not have the facilities or infrastructure needed to support an
aviation or truck company. The National Guard has estimated that
facilities costs for converting the first 3 brigades would total
$130 million and that facilities costs for all

12 brigades could be as high as $590 million. However, National
Guard officials cautioned that, because only the first three
brigades have been identified, facilities cost estimates for the
remaining nine brigades are very

Plan as of TAA 2003 Plan as of TAA

2005 Difference

Spaces to convert 108, 700 45, 000 63, 700 Conversion cost $5. 4
billion $1. 9 billion through fiscal year 2005 a $3. 5 billion

Conversion timeline 1998- 2012 (15 years) 2000- 2009 (10 years) 5
years

B-281688 Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

preliminary. Estimates can change depending on units selected and
the type of units to which they are converting.

The POM shows a total training cost estimate of $85.5 million, of
which $76.7 million has been programmed. The Army estimates that
training costs for fiscal years 2006- 09 will total $214 million,
which means that the POM only funds 26 percent of the total
estimated training cost.

Redesign Program Not Effectively Managed

It is difficult for the Army to monitor the program's progress
because no office provides consolidated, periodic reporting on the
program's status. For example, Army officials agreed that no
office is responsible for monitoring or reporting periodically on
all program costs, including for

equipment, training, and facilities expected between 2000- 09;
unfunded requirements; comparisons between planned converted units
and unresourced requirements to show whether the most critical
shortfalls are being addressed first; risk assessments if
conversions are delayed; and comparisons between actual
conversions and conversion plans to assess progress.

The only current program oversight is provided by a Process Action
Team, which has been tasked with identifying total resource
requirements through 2009. 15 The Secretary of the Army approved
the redesign program

in May 1996, yet the team has only met three times since then and
has not yet identified the total resource requirements. According
to Army documents, the team agreed that it would be prudent to
give visibility to the total program costs to avoid giving the
impression that the POM will cover all the costs. However, because
there is no separate budget line item or project code for the
program, the program's costs can not be identified in

the POM, according to Army officials. Further, fragmentation of
program oversight among the many different offices that have
representatives on the team creates ambiguity concerning who is
responsible for program implementation issues such as ensuring
that the most urgent conversions take place first. For example,
only

8 percent of the total program spaces are in the chemical
specialty, even though 48 percent of the chemical war- fighting
requirement is unresourced.

15 An Army Headquarters office chairs the team, which consists of
32 members representing 10 different offices.

B-281688 Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

Host Nations Can Provide Some Support, Potentially Reducing Army
Shortfalls

Both Army and theater command officials agree that host nations
can provide some types of war- fighting support, potentially
helping to reduce Army support force shortfalls. According to Army
guidance, the Army should consider the availability of host nation
support to reduce unmet requirements. However, Army officials told
us that theater commanders

had not provided updated host nation support data for use in TAA
2005 because agreements were still being negotiated. As a result,
the Army only matched 1, 300 spaces of host nation support against
its war- fighting requirements, although Army "best estimates"
suggest as many as 30,000 spaces of host nation support could
potentially be available in the two theaters. According to Army
officials, since the end of the Cold War, theater commanders have
found it difficult to determine how much host nation

support would be available in their theaters and when. For
example, the Secretary of Defense has repeatedly told Congress
that at least one theater commander has had significant problems
with the host nation support program because the command has few
assurances that host nation support will be available when or
where it is needed. The theater commander has begun to review host
nation capabilities, but command

officials told us that validating available resources from host
nations will be a long- term process.

Conclusions The Army's risk in carrying out the national military
strategy has increased since the Army's TAA 2003 force structure
review because requirements have increased, optimistic assumptions
about war- fighting conditions have

limited requirements, and support force shortfalls have increased.
In addition, a higher number of support forces would not be
expected to arrive at a major theater war within the first 30 days
as required, and few

active support personnel would be available to deploy to the
second war. The Army does not know the full extent of its risk
because it did not perform the analyses needed to do so. For
example, the Army did not re- run its models with the resourced
force. Doing so would provide the Army information on how force
structure decisions affect the war- fighting, including the
availability of support forces and how the late arrival of support
units affects war- fighting timelines. Another reason the Army
does not know the full extent of its risk is because the Army did
not include

requirements for all campaign phases and did not identify what
effects varying war- fighting conditions contained in defense
guidance would have

B-281688 Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

on requirements. For example, the Army did not identify
requirements in cases where the adversary uses chemical weapons or
for the redeployment of forces from a contingency operation to a
major theater war, even though the guidance encourages such
analyses. It is important to quantify the effects of including all
phases and adverse conditions on support requirements since this
data could influence Army force structure decisions and could be
used to modify future defense guidance and modify force structure
decisions to mitigate risk.

Since the Army still has substantial forces in excess of its war-
fighting requirements, it can mitigate risk by converting
positions from nonwar- fighting to war- fighting structure without
increasing the force. Converting the two National Guard divisions
from nonwar- fighting structure to war- fighting support positions
as planned is a sound concept that would increase the proportion
of end strength performing war- fighting

missions and help reduce shortfalls. However, the program requires
careful management, and the Army has not yet identified the total
cost. Also, the Army could further mitigate risk by assessing
whether other nonwar- fighting structure such as institutional and
unique must be filled by military personnel. If these positions
were filled by civilians or contractors, more military structure
could be used to reduce support force

shortfalls. Lastly, as theater commanders develop more current
data on the availability of host nation support, the Army could
consider such support when filling war- fighting requirements, as
called for in Army guidance.

Recommendations To improve the Army's ability to accurately
determine war- fighting requirements, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense clarify

guidance to require that the Army include all campaign phases in
determining its war- fighting requirements. To determine the risks
in implementing the national military strategy, we recommend that
the Secretary of the Army include the following as part of the
next TAA:  an analysis of the number of support forces needed
under a range of

conditions such as the small, medium, or large use of chemical
agents by an adversary;  a re- run of TAA models using the
resourced force to assess the effects of

end strength allocation decisions on war- fighting, including the
late arrival of critical support forces;

B-281688 Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

 an assessment of the differences between TAA models and theater
commanders' plans in support force requirements in the first 30
days of a conflict; and

 an analysis of the support forces required to extract forces from
ongoing contingency operations and redeploy them to a major
theater war and the effects of such redeployment on war- fighting
timelines. To improve the Army's ability to effectively monitor
the progress of its National Guard Division Redesign program, we
recommend that the

Secretary of the Army require the Process Action Team to prepare a
periodic report on the program that includes: (1) total program
costs (including equipment, training, and facilities); (2)
unfunded requirements;

(3) a comparison of planned converted units with unresourced
requirements to determine whether the most critical shortfalls are
being addressed first; (4) an assessment of the risks arising from
delays in conversion; (5) a comparison of actual conversions with
plans; and (6) identification of obstacles. To allocate end
strength to nonwar- fighting force structure consistent with

defense guidance, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army
identify which nonwar- fighting positions could be filled by
civilians or contractors, fill them with either civilians or
contractors, and allocate the military positions saved to reduce
war- fighting support force shortfalls. To more accurately
identify support force requirements, we recommend that the
Secretary of the Army expedite the incorporation of Force XXI
concepts into doctrine that would provide the necessary
information to update TAA models.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with
the report and indicated that the Army plans to incorporate
several of our recommendations in the ongoing TAA 2007. Overall,
DOD said it was

confident that the Army's initiatives would yield the right mix of
trained and fully equipped ground forces to support the national
strategy. DOD's comments are reprinted in full in appendix IV.

In response to our recommendations relating to TAA requirements
determination and risk analysis, DOD stated that the Army plans to
capture the projected land force requirements generated in all
phases of both campaigns for inclusion in TAA 2007 requirements.
DOD also stated that the Army would focus its efforts on the most
likely weapons of mass

B-281688 Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

destruction employment case in TAA 2007, based upon the best
available intelligence estimates of enemy capabilities. We believe
this will be an improvement over TAA 2005, but continue to
recommend that the Army conduct additional analyses to better
assess the risks of war- fighting conditions that are different
than expectations. DOD also said the Army plans to implement our
recommendation to rerun TAA models with the resourced force to
assess the effects of available end strength on warfighting. The
Army will also assess the differences between theater commanders'
and Army support force requirements. In conducting this analysis,
we encourage the Army to fully consider the theater commanders'
war- plan troop lists to ensure, for example, that the Army is
able to

resource, with predominantly active forces, the theater
commanders' requirements for early arriving support forces. Last,
DOD noted that TAA 2007 will consider the forces required to
disengage from on- going contingencies and redeploy forces to a
major theater war.

DOD also concurred with our recommendation to improve the Army's
monitoring of the National Guard Division Redesign program and
stated the program will be focused on determining the total costs
and benefits of this effort. To ensure the conversion program is
successful, we believe it is imperative that the Army implement
our recommendation immediately, to include identifying total costs
through fiscal year 2009, identifying

unfunded requirements, and assessing risks if the program is
delayed. DOD also noted that the Army is participating in a
rigorous program to identify military positions for potential
conversion to civilian or contractor positions. A successful
conversion program could make more military personnel available to
alleviate support force shortfalls; however, at the

time of our review, the Army was unable to tell us how many
military positions were candidates for conversion. With respect to
updating Army models to reflect Force XXI concepts, DOD stated
that the Army is continuing to develop doctrine and to design the
force structure necessary to support the Force XXI digitized
division and corps organizations and that this work is proceeding
in a disciplined manner. We recognize that updating Army doctrine
to incorporate Force XXI concepts is a challenging process but
note that the intent of TAA is to focus on the Army's future force
structure requirements (i. e., 2005) and any delays in
incorporating

Force XXI logistics or war- fighting concepts will result in a
force structure that is linked more to past concepts than to the
Army's future direction. DOD further noted that, according to the
Joint Staff, theater commanders are responsible for assessing the
availability and appropriate use of host nation support to offset
a portion of the Army's requirement. We agree that

B-281688 Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

theater commanders are responsible for validating host nation
support and for assessing the potential risks of host nation
support offsets to war- fighting. But as our report notes, neither
theater commander has been able to provide the Army with current
host nation support data for use in TAA and one theater commander
has reported significant deficiencies in his host nation support
program. According to TAA guidance, the Army

should consider host nation support during its resourcing process,
and the Army has attempted to do this to some extent in both TAA
2003 and TAA 2005, despite shortcomings in the data.

Our scope and methodology are described in appendix III. We
conducted our review from April to December 1998 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. We are
providing copies of this report to Senator Wayne Allard, Senator
Robert C. Byrd, Senator Max Cleland, Senator Pete V. Domenici,
Senator

Daniel K. Inouye, Senator Frank R. Lautenberg, Senator Joseph I.
Lieberman, Senator Ted Stevens, and Senator Fred Thompson, and to
Representative Neil Abercrombie, Representative Rod R.
Blagojevich, Representative Dan Burton, Representative Stephen E.
Buyer, Representative John R. Kasich, Representative Jerry Lewis,
Representative

John P. Murtha, Representative David R. Obey, Representative
Christopher Shays, Representative John M. Spratt, Jr.,
Representative Henry A. Waxman, Representative C. W. Bill Young in
their capacities as Chair or Ranking Minority Member of Senate and
House Committees and Subcommittees. We are also sending copies of
this report to the Honorable William Cohen, Secretary of Defense;
the Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army; and the
Honorable Jacob Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget.
Copies will also be made available to others upon request.

B-281688 Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report,
please contact Gwendolyn Jaffe at (202) 512- 4691. Major
contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.

Henry L. Hinton, Jr. Assistant Comptroller General

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

Contents Letter 1 Appendix I Key TAA 2005 Assumptions

31 Appendix II Army Requirements for Two Wars, Resourced and
Unresourced

32 Appendix III Scope and Methodology

33 Appendix IV Comments From the Department of Defense

35 Appendix V Major Contributors to This Report

39

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

Tables Table 1: Army War- fighting Requirements 6 Table 2: Support
Specialties Predominately in the Reserve

Components 11 Table 3: End Strength Allocated to Nonwar- Fighting
Force Structure 14 Table 4: Army Force Structure Allocations 15
Table 5: Army Unique Force Structure 17 Table 6: Planned National
Guard Conversions 18 Table 7: Changes in Army Plans to Reduce
Support Shortfalls 20

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense QDR Quadrennial Defense Review POM
Program Objective Memorandum TAA Total Army Analysis TTHS
Transients, Trainees, Holdees, and Students

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

Appendix I Key TAA 2005 Assumptions Appendi x I

TAA 2005 Assumption Army Rationale

By fiscal year 2000, Army end strengths will be 480, 000 active,
205,000 Army Reserve, and 350,000 National Guard. These end
strengths reflect QDR reductions of 15, 000 active and 20, 000
reserves. TAA 2005 did not include 25,000 reductions recommended
by the QDR for reserve components because the Army had not decided
how the reductions would be apportioned between the National Guard
and Army Reserve.

The Army will deploy all 10 of its active divisions and make
available all enhanced brigades in the two- war scenario. Army
force structure will also contain eight National Guard divisions
as strategic reserve. Consistent with defense guidance, all 10
active divisions and all 15 enhanced brigades will flow into the
two- war scenario. Previously, the Army only deployed those
enhanced brigades that could arrive before cessation of
hostilities. The National Guard divisions are a

strategic reserve to respond to adverse situations. The Army will
employ four corps-- two in each theater. Each corps will have a
doctrinal war- fighting mission. The Army will source the

4th corps as much as possible in accordance with doctrine. Defense
guidance lists four corps.

Presidential Selected Reserve Callup occurs on the day of
unambiguous warning of the first war. This is consistent with
defense guidance. The Army will have immediate access to ports and
airfields in the theaters of operation. This is consistent with
defense guidance.

There will be limited use of chemicals by adversaries consisting
of both persistent/ nonpersistent agents which will have limited
operational/ tactical effects.

Defense guidance contains conflicting statements about the level
of enemy chemical use U. S. forces can expect. Army interpretation
of defense guidance was "limited use" which meant that no force

structure was added to the 747, 000 war- fighting requirement.
Army requirements will be based on the first three phases of the
campaign. Army interpretation of defense guidance is not to add
requirements for the last two phases of the theater campaign.

Units due to arrive in the first 30 days of the first war will be
composed predominately of active forces. This is consistent with
defense and Army guidance. The Army determined that time delays
associated with the mobilization of reserve forces generally
preclude their arrival in the first 30 days. The Army will begin
the counteroffensive of a major theater war when adequate support
forces arrive in the theater. Army models and one theater
commander's plans are consistent in their estimate of when
adequate support forces would arrive.

There will be no delays or degradation of capability resulting
from the transfer of support forces from a contingency operation
to a major theater war.

Defense guidance assumes that U. S. forces assigned to a
contingency operation are immediately available to redeploy to a
major theater war.

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

Appendix II Army Requirements for Two Wars, Resourced and
Unresourced Appendi x I I

a Resourced units are those allocated end strength and the Army
assumes in TAA that these units are at 100 percent of wartime
strength. During peacetime, some support units are authorized
fewer positions than required. In TAA 2005, these shortfalls
totaled 17,843 positions. b These are positions in units that are
not authorized end strength and exist only on paper. The shortages
in this column assume successful conversion of 18,846 nonwar-
fighting spaces in National Guard divisions between fiscal year
2000 and 2005.

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Specialty Required Resourced a Unresourced b Percent resourced

Logistics 45,136 45, 136 0 100. 00 Public Affairs 1, 420 1,420 0
100. 00 Army Level Headquarters 4,538 4, 538 0 100. 00

Brigade & Division Headquarters 7,693 7, 693 0 100. 00 Civil
Affairs 5,270 5, 270 0 100. 00 Psychological Operations 2,556 2,
556 0 100. 00

Armor 37,965 37, 965 0 100. 00 Infantry 71,116 71, 116 0 100. 00
Medical 39,352 39, 154 198 99. 50 Military Police 35,606 35, 425
181 99. 49 Personnel Service Support 17,617 17, 501 116 99. 34

Special Operations Forces 4,719 4, 677 42 99. 11 Field Artillery
69,337 68, 032 1, 305 98. 12 Military Intelligence 16,122 15, 704
418 97. 41 Engineering 75,104 71, 841 3, 263 95. 66 Aviation
41,551 39, 125 2, 426 94. 16 Signal 34,235 31, 840 2, 395 93. 00
Ordnance 46,932 43, 591 3, 341 92. 88 Air Defense 25,285 21, 203
4, 082 83. 86 Quartermaster 57,289 40, 239 17, 050 70. 24
Transportation 84,749 58, 379 26, 370 68. 88 Chemical 23,584 12,
317 11, 267 52. 23

Total 747,176 674, 722 72, 454 90. 30

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

Appendix III Scope and Methodology Appendi x I I I

To determine if there were changes in the Army's risk of not
having sufficient forces to implement the national military
strategy, we compared the Army's 1996 and 1998 force structure
reviews. We obtained and reviewed the Army's documentation on its
Total Army Analysis (TAA) processes, assumptions, and results at
Department of Army Headquarters,

Washington D. C.; Concepts Analysis Agency, Bethesda, Maryland; U.
S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, and
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; Army National Guard Bureau; and Office
of the Chief

of Army Reserve. To better understand how the requirements of the
joint war- fighting commands are considered in the TAA process and
how theater commands are affected by TAA results, we requested
information from the Commanders in Chief of the U. S. Central
Command and the U. S. Pacific Command.

Our review of TAA 2005 included analyses of the risks associated
with the number and type of active and reserve support forces
allocated to support war- fighting requirements including
comparisons with TAA 2003 results and theater commander war-
plans; the Army's assumptions compared with those in defense
guidance, TAA 2003, theater commander war- plans, and more recent
Department of Defense (DOD) assessments; and the major assumptions
used in TAA and how they affect force structure outcomes
(including measures of risk). We did not evaluate logistical data
used in the TAA process, however, prior GAO recommendations to
establish valid and consistent data have been implemented.

We compared the Army's TAA 2005 reported results with automated
data from the Army's MERLIN system. MERLIN is an analytical tool
that allows programmed resources to be aligned against war-
fighting requirements.

The programmed resources are imported from the Army's official
force structure data base (SAMAS). Based on our analysis, we were
satisfied that the Army's automated data and reported results were
in substantial agreement. We did not test the Army's management
controls over its

automated system. To assess the Army's potential for mitigating
risk by reallocating its existing end strength, we obtained the
Army's justification for its nonwar- fighting force structure,
including institutional forces; transients, trainees, holdees, and
students; and National Guard divisions (strategic reserve). We
considered the Army's recently reported material weakness and
corrective action plan to determine if the plan included steps to
ensure that the Army's institutional force is efficiently
organized and comprises the minimum number of personnel. We also
reviewed Army Pamphlet 100- 1, which

Appendix III Scope and Methodology

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

provides the redesign objectives for the institutional force. We
also ascertained whether the Army determined that these
institutional forces, as well as other support forces such as its
unique force structure, are military

essential.

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

Appendix IV Comments From the Department of Defense Appendi x I V

Appendix IV Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

Appendix IV Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

Appendix IV Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-99-47 Force Structure

Appendix V Major Contributors to This Report Appendi x V

National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington,
D. C.

Gwendolyn R. Jaffe, Assistant Director Irene A. Robertson, Senior
Evaluator Kenneth W. Newell, Senior Evaluator

Norfolk Field Office Brenda M. Waterfield, Evaluator- in- Charge
Dawn R. Godfrey, Senior Evaluator

(701140) Let t er

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