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THE COUNTERAIR COMPANION:

A SHORT GUIDE TO AIR SUPERIORITY

FOR JOINT FORCE COMMANDERS

BY

JAMES MICHAEL HOLMES

A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF

THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES

FOR COMPLETION OF GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES

AIR UNIVERSITY

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

JUNE 1994

This publication was produced in the Department of Defense School environment in the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related concepts. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the United States government.

Major James Michael ("Mike") Holmes completed this study while assigned as a student at the School for Advanced Airpower Studies (SAAS), Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), Alabama. Major Holmes is an F-15 Instructor Pilot, and has flown over 2200 hours during nine mission-ready years in the F-15 A/B/C/D. He has served as a Squadron and Wing Weapons and Tactics Officer, Flight Commander, and Assistant Operations Officer during operational flying assignments in the 71st Tactical Fighter Squadron at Langley AFB, VA, the 44th Tactical Fighter Squadron at Kadena AB, Japan, and the 7th and 9th Fighter Squadrons at Holloman AFB, NM.

Major Holmes' counterair experience includes operations in the Netherlands, Oman, Japan, Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and all over the United States. He has planned and led joint counterair operations with Navy Carrier Battle Groups in the Atlantic, the Pacific, the Caribbean, and the Persian Gulf, Marine Air Wings in Korea and Japan, and Army Air Defense Artillery Brigades in New Mexico. He has flown in over 100 large force employment exercises that linked joint air and surface counterair forces at RED FLAG, COPE THUNDER, and ROVING SANDS.

Major Holmes is a graduate of the Tactical Fighter Electronic Combat Instructor's Course, the F-15 Fighter Weapons Instructor's Course, Squadron Officer's School, and Air Command and Staff College. He holds a bachelor's degree in electrical engineering from the University of Tennessee and a master's degree in history from the University of Alabama. Major Holmes is married to the former Sara Elizabeth Lewis, and they have two children, Rebecca and Wade.

After SAAS, Major Holmes will begin a joint duty assignment in the Current Operations division of the United States European Command (USEUCOM) J-3.

The early proponents of air power believed that with suitable aircraft, and control of the air, airmen would make surface operations impossible and irrelevant. In the years since they made these predictions, aircraft have gained capabilities far beyond those predicted by early advocates. However, airmen are still searching for a strategy that will guarantee the results their predecessors promised. Instead of replacing surface forces, air power has become their indispensable partner. Air power contributes to the security, mobility, and firepower of joint forces, but its primary contribution may be air superiority.

For the last forty years, United states military forces have enjoyed almost total control of the air. Although control of the air doesn't itself destroy or defeat the bulk of enemy forces, it establishes conditions that allow joint military forces to do so by providing freedom of action and strategic flexibility. Air supremacy has provided our surface, sea, and air forces the freedom to operate without fear of significant enemy surveillance or interference. This freedom of action provides strategic flexibility for Joint Force Commanders. With air supremacy, nothing is impossible. Without it, everything is difficult.

American forces have become accustomed to their air supremacy. Has forty years of familiarity bred contempt? Does are superiority still matter in a changing world? Would a reduced American counterair capability impact future joint force success?

This paper is designed to provide future Joint Force Commanders a basic understanding of counterair doctrine, strategy, forces, and issues by demonstrating the continuing importance of rapid air supremacy, identifying problem areas that may limit future counterair effectiveness, and recommending solutions. To accomplish this goal, the author analyzes service and joint counterair doctrine, examines the counterair strategy process, discusses counterair force options, describes current interservice issues that affect counterair forces, and uses service visions of war to show why counterair forces will continue to play a critical role in American joint operations.

By analyzing counterair doctrine, the author shows that, although all the services seek air superiority, each component pursues control of the air for its own purposes. Together, the service doctrines built to fit these different visions contain all the pieces of an effective counterair doctrine, but joint doctrine does not put them together into an effective whole. An effective joint counterair doctrine should provide a unified counterair vision and describe how joint forces should work together to achieve this decisive air supremacy.

The author's examination of the counterair strategy process shows how Joint Force Commanders should balance objectives, the balance of forces, the nature of the theater, and policy limits to build a counterair strategy that links means to ends by choosing methods, targets, and attack timing. A counterair force that fails to achieve an appropriate balance between air and surface elements, or offensive and defensive efforts will limit the Joint Force Commander's strategic options. A balanced counterair force doesn't guarantee command of the air, but it does provide strategic choices and allow commanders to adjust to changing situations. Air defense requires a mix of surface and air systems, but an integrated system employing an effective Joint Engagement Zone will provide adequate air and missile defense while freeing most aircraft for offensive actions. Rapid air supremacy requires offensive attacks on targets that provide short term effects across the enemy system.

The author's discussion of current counterair issues shows that the services appreciate the product (freedom of action for land, sea, and air forces) that control of the air provides, but neglect the process of obtaining it. Current air power disputes emphasize the control and targeting of air resources, and slight the potential impact of these issues on America's future ability to control the air and space.

Reduced defense budgets will force the services to concentrate their efforts and resources on the core capabilities that are essential to service visions of war. This concentration on core interests will eliminate the resource overlap that allowed US forces to enjoy air supremacy without coordinating their counterair forces, and compel the services to rely on joint assistance. No single service possesses all the counterair resources required to defend its forces or gain control of the air; joint integration is essential to continued air dominance. To ensure counterair success, integration must both eliminate redundancy and prevent the elimination of critical joint capabilities. Successful integration will require a common counterair doctrine, a timely modernization plan that stresses service capability and joint compatibility, and continuous joint training.

American forces expect air supremacy, and depend on it. Rapid, decisive control of the air promotes joint force initiative, agility, depth, synchronization, and versatility. Reduced counterair capabilities will increase the time it takes to achieve superiority, or limit the degree of superiority that can be achieved. Reduced superiority will limit, or delay, the Joint Force Commander's options and freedom of action, and may lead to higher total costs, failure to achieve the Joint Force Commander's objectives, or an American reluctance to attempt military action. Integrated joint counterair operations are the key to rapid air supremacy and essential to continued joint force success. Successful integration will depend on how well Joint Force Commanders understand and direct the counterair process.

The early proponents of air power had great expectations for their untested weapons of war. They claimed that air forces would soon bypass the carnage of modern ground war, unmolested by surface forces, to strike directly at the vital centers of enemy nations and eliminate their capability or will to fight. With suitable aircraft, and control of the air, airmen would make surface operations impossible and irrelevant.

In the intervening years, aircraft have gained capabilities far beyond those predicted by the early proponents. Nuclear armed intercontinental bombers and missiles seemed to make surface forces obsolete. The recent marriage of modern stealth attack craft and precision guided munitions created a potent weapon that can penetrate almost any current defense and destroy almost any target. As a result, aircraft have assumed an increasingly important and independent role in modern warfare.

However, airmen are still searching for a strategy that will guarantee the results promised by their predecessors. Surface forces have not become irrelevant, and armed with their own integrated aircraft and air defenses, continue to perform their traditional missions of controlling the surface by occupying it.

Instead of replacing surface forces, air power has become their indispensable partner. The US Army, Navy, and Marine Corps have all integrated their own aviation and air defense elements into their forces and doctrine. The growth of modern air power has not eliminated the surface forces, but joint forces have become so dependent on its contributions that war has become unthinkable without it. Air power contributes to the security, mobility, and firepower of joint forces, but its primary contribution may be air superiority.

For the last forty years, United States military forces have enjoyed almost total control of the air. Although control of the air doesn't itself destroy or defeat the bulk of enemy forces, it provides the freedom of action and strategic flexibility that allow joint military forces to do so.

Air supremacy has provided our surface, sea, and air forces the freedom to operate without fear of significant enemy air surveillance or interference. This freedom of action allows surface forces to maneuver in large, concentrated formations, gather and supply the resources required for offensive operations, and employ their organic aviation components without interference. It allows sea forces to operate when and where they choose, to employ their great firepower and resources offensively, and project rapid, sustainable national power. It allows air forces to use their range and speed to conduct independent and integrated air attacks, operate safely from vital air bases, and deliver and supply surface forces through the air.

This freedom of action provides joint force commanders with strategic flexibility. With air supremacy, joint force commanders can seize the initiative. The Joint Force Commander's maneuver options are only limited by space, time, and resources, while enemy options are restricted by friendly air operations. With air supremacy, joint forces acquire the agility required to react faster than the enemy, concentrate forces, and achieve overwhelming force ratios at the point of attack. With air supremacy, American firepower can be unleashed to limit the enemy's security, mobility, and firepower across the depth of his positions. Joint force commanders can aggressively synchronize combat forces with the supporting surveillance, electronic warfare, and firepower that multiply the effectiveness of all American forces. With air supremacy, versatile air, sea, and surface forces can shift from counterair roles to surface targets and concentrate in support of the Joint force Commander's ultimate objectives. Air supremacy provides strategic options for joint force commanders. With air supremacy, nothing is impossible. Without it, everything is difficult.

American forces have become accustomed to their air supremacy. Has forty years of familiarity bred contempt? Does air superiority still matter in a changing world? Would a reduced American counterair capability impact future joint force success?

Each service possesses a core vision of the nature of war and the place of their service in it. Current service visions were developed under the umbrella of American air supremacy, and the pervasive air dominance that has become "an American birthright" influences service strategies, doctrine, and force structure.

Joint operations depend on integrating forces designed to fit these separate service visions. Air superiority, like other aspects of joint operations, is not the product of any one service's vision. Each service fields significant counterair resources, and continued American air supremacy depends on the maintenance and modernization of service counterair capabilities and the successful integration of these service capabilities into a joint force. This joint counterair force is threatened by past successes, changing and uncertain threats, and reduced budgets.

American counterair forces have a history of success. US forces began to learn the importance of air superiority in World War I, and they achieved air supremacy over the Germans and Japanese in World War II after a long and costly struggle. Aggressive offensive air operations forced North Korea and North Vietnam to operate defensively. Although Korean and Vietnamese air defenses extracted a significant cost in aircraft and aircrews, they were not able to pose significant air threats to American surface forces. In the long cold war with the Soviet Union, US counterair forces expanded on their past lessons and fielded improved air superiority aircraft and deployed, for the first time, sophisticated surface-to-air missiles. Most recently, US counterair forces achieved total supremacy against Iraqi aircraft in a matter of hours and decimated enemy surface-to-air defenses in a few days. Indeed, US forces have become accustomed to air supremacy. If familiarity with air supremacy breeds contempt for the details of the counterair process, changing air threats and reduced defense budgets may limit future joint force success.

The demise of the Soviet threat and the appearance of Iraqi Scuds signaled contradictory changes in counterair threats. The collapse of the Soviet Union eliminated the planning model that American forces had used to define future requirements, and mandated corresponding cuts in American force structure. However, sophisticated Soviet weapons systems still exist, and together with exported US and European systems, they are joining third world forces in increasing numbers. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and cruise and ballistic missile delivery systems introduced new air threats, as well, and new requirements for American counterair forces. Superiority over air threats is no longer enough; counterair forces must now control the air and space. These new counterair requirements collide head-on with the reality of reduced defense budgets.

Reduced defense budgets will affect all the services by limiting force size, readiness, and modernization, and the services' counterair forces reflect these limits. Reduced budgets may also lead to interservice disagreements as the services vie to maintain their share of declining resources or maintain control over the forces they consider essential to their success. These struggles for control rarely address counterair forces directly, but may have unexpected effects on American counterair capabilities.

If reduced budgets limit American counterair capabilities, the counterair forces may not be able to satisfy the air superiority requirements specified by the service visions of war. A prolonged counterair campaign, or a campaign that fails to gain the degree of air superiority required by service visions, may result in reduced strategic flexibility, higher costs, or failure to achieve the Joint Force Commander's (JFC's) objectives. If enemy air or missile forces can interfere with the movement or supply of joint forces, they will reduce the options available to Joint Force Commanders. With limited options, the JFC may have to choose courses of action that increase the human and materiel costs of the campaign. Increased costs may lead to a reluctance to commit US forces and a failure to attempt military operations or achieve national objectives.

Counterair forces play a critical role in American joint operations, and Joint Force Commanders must be prepared to effectively direct counterair forces to obtain the air supremacy American forces depend on. This paper is designed to provide a basic understanding of counterair doctrine, strategy, forces, and issues for Joint Force Commanders by demonstrating the continuing importance of rapid air supremacy, identifying problem areas that may limit future counterair effectiveness, and recommending solutions. In the next chapter, I'll examine American counterair doctrine and show that the pieces of an effective doctrine are present, but they have yet to be put together. In Chapter 3, I'll discuss the factors that influence the counterair strategy process. In Chapter 4, I'll discuss the forces required to ensure continued American control of the air and space. In Chapter 5, I'll show that the US military understands the importance of air superiority, but current interservice issues neglect the process of attaining it. In Chapter 6, I'll show the continued importance of rapidly achieved air supremacy by describing the counterair requirements needed to execute the services' visions of war, the current problems that may limit counterair effectiveness, and the growing importance of a joint approach to counterair operations. In the final chapter, I'll provide recommendations and a summary.

The US military pursues competing visions of war. Each vision is advocated by a military service, and emphasizes the importance of that service's primary medium (air, land, or sea) or mission. The services then develop the doctrine and forces required to execute these visions. For example, the Air Force believes the control and exploitation of air and space provide the key to success, and its doctrine and acquisition priorities stress air forces capable of achieving this control and exploitation through independent actions. The Army thinks that the successful execution of the land campaign is the decisive element, and directs its efforts toward perfecting the Corps' battle. The Navy and Marine Corps have put their faith in maneuver from the sea, and are building a new doctrine that stresses littoral warfare via sea control and power projection. In an attempt to reconcile these service visions, the Joint Staff provides doctrine and structure to integrate these competing views into a unified vision of joint warfare.

Competing views also divide joint visions. In one view, each service provides unique capabilities aligned with their service vision, but the broad range of capabilities maintained by each service may generate significant overlap between forces. In this specialized view, joint commanders choose a capability they need to meet their objectives, and designate a single service to lead in the execution of that mission. The other services provide support as required. This approach requires minimum joint coordination or training, and allows the services to function through service command structures with little interference. It may, however, encourage the services to pursue independent operations for independent objectives, forfeiting the cost and effectiveness benefits of cooperation.

The second approach stresses the synergy of integrated operations. Joint commanders identify a required capability, and each service provides the appropriate elements from its forces. The service forces are then combined, under a joint command, to produce the desired effect. This approach provides unity of effort and should ensure the coordination of forces toward common goals. But taken to an extreme, it may compromise combat effectiveness if the desire to include each service in the solution becomes more important than choosing the most appropriate solution.

The services all favor both approaches from time to time, and they often shift their advocacy from position to position based on whether or not they are the dominant service in a particular mission area. For example, the Air Force believes it should lead in theater air operations but advocates a synergistic approach to surface warfare. The Army thinks the Corps commander should lead in all land targeting decisions, but takes a team approach to theater air defense. The Navy believes that a naval commander must control maritime air power, but still wants to play in offensive land strikes.

Service visions, and their approach to joint operations, affect joint warfare by influencing the service doctrine and forces that provide the building blocks for joint operations. In this chapter, I'll examine current counterair doctrine as expressed in the appropriate joint and service doctrine publications.

Why Doctrine? Doctrine provides a record of what organizations declare they believe about the best way to accomplish their missions and objectives. Although the meaning and use of doctrine varies from service to service, written doctrine provides a way to examine the ideas of the individual services and compare and contrast their views. Joint Force Commanders must understand counterair doctrine to know how the services hope to achieve air superiority, and why they want to do it their way.

Examining this doctrine is difficult because much of current US doctrine is being revised as a result of rapidly changing international and domestic circumstances. The end of the cold war and the ascent of regional strategies have prompted the services to re-examine their doctrine in light of changing threats and shifting emphasis. In addition, rapidly shrinking defense budgets have produced a shrinking force, and current doctrine must also change to fit the new force structure. Finally, current service and joint doctrine must also reflect the increasing emphasis on joint planning and operations.

Definitions

Definitions play an important part in joint and service doctrine. These definitions are shared by all the services and provide a common language for debate and discussion. Joint definitions affect military actions by shaping the debate and forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) define air superiority as "that degree of dominance of one force over another which permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force." Although the enemy can still resist, air superiority provides the freedom of action that allows the Joint Force Commander (JFC) to operate air, land, and sea forces when and where he chooses. The JCS define air supremacy as "that degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective interference." With air supremacy, friendly forces are free to operate without fear of air attack.

Both of these definitions relate air effectiveness to the friendly forces' ability to operate, and only discuss opposing air operations in terms of the enemy forces' ability, or inability, to interfere with friendly operations. With air superiority, the enemy may still be able to oppose friendly air operations in a limited area, at limited times, or at limited altitudes. With air supremacy, enemy air operations may be disregarded all the time, everywhere. The relative difference in the enemy's ability to interfere is the key distinction between definitions.

These definitions can be expanded to include the enemy's ability to mount his own air operations in the face of friendly opposition. With this extended definition, air superiority allows friendly forces to conduct operations with minimal air resistance, while at the same time, denying the enemy the ability to conduct his own effective air operations. Extending this same consideration of enemy abilities to the air supremacy definition, when friendly forces possess air supremacy, the enemy can't resist friendly air operations or mount air operations of his own.

Changes in the nature of the modern air battle make a further look at these definitions necessary. Which systems are included in this air dominance? Does air superiority only include manned aircraft? Does it extend to the unmanned reconnaissance, surveillance, and attack assets that are proliferating on the battlefield? Does it only include atmospheric threats or does it extend to ballistic missiles and space systems? These new problems challenge the old definitions and concepts of the counterair battle. Joint Force Commanders expect the freedom promised by the JCS' air supremacy definition. To provide it, future counterair forces must be prepared to counter all the systems that move through the air and space.

In addition to the degree of control required, and the types of systems that must be countered, the time required to establish control of the air adds a final distinction between air dominance conditions. By rapidly establishing air superiority, in contrast to a gradual conquest of the air, friendly forces may gain significant leverage. A well trained and equipped counterair force can achieve an important attrition rate advantage over a less prepared force in the confused opening moments of a campaign. In addition, the impact of shock and dislocation may magnify physical efforts and further decrease the enemy's effectiveness.

This initial advantage can eliminate the reaction time that would allow enemy forces to re-group and develop the countermeasures required to reverse the situation. In addition, if the enemy's plans depended on a successful challenge to initial friendly air dominance, the rapid loss of his air options may threaten his entire military strategy. If air supremacy is achieved rapidly, multimission aircraft may be re-tasked to accelerate progress toward other joint force objectives. Rapidly acquiring control of the air will increase the effectiveness of other air missions, and provide flexibility across the entire theater of operations.

By combining definitions of the degree of air dominance established, and the time required to establish it, I'll propose a new term -- decisive air supremacy -- and define it as: the ability to rapidly establish the control of the air and space required to conduct friendly air, sea, and land operations without significant interference, and the ability to rapidly prevent the enemy from conducting his own effective air and space operations. Essentially, decisive air supremacy delivers strategic flexibility and freedom of action to Joint Force Commanders very rapidly.

I'll evaluate current counterair doctrine by determining how joint and service doctrines answer six questions. The first four questions are derived from the definition of decisive air supremacy:

1. What is the goal of air superiority?

2. What degree of air superiority is required?

3. How fast should air superiority be achieved?

4. What are the threats to air superiority?

The last two questions investigate how the services think decisive air supremacy should be achieved:

5. What is the best way to establish decisive air supremacy?

6. What forces should be used?

In the following sections, I'll compare the answers suggested by the proposed decisive air supremacy (DAS) definition to the answers joint and service doctrine provide for each question. By examining these questions and answers, I'll find out how well each service's doctrine answers the counterair questions, and show how each service's doctrine reflects and emphasizes a service vision of war. Finally, I'll show that current counterair doctrine is fragmented and incomplete.

Source: Joint Pub 3-0, AFDD-10, FM 100-5, ...From the Sea, and FMFM 5-5.

The decisive air supremacy definition addresses both halves of enemy air capabilities: the enemy's ability to interfere with friendly air, land, and sea operations, and the enemy's ability to conduct his own air operations. The answers provided by joint and service doctrine all reflect the current JCS air superiority definition, and address only friendly freedom of action and enemy interference.

The underlined passages in each definition highlight the service counterair goals that reflect service visions of war. Each service wants to gain and maintain the air superiority required to accomplish their service mission and make their vision a reality.

What Degree of Air Superiority is Required?

Source: AFM 1-1, FM 100-5, ...From the Sea, FMFM 5-5.

The decisive air supremacy definition requires counterair forces to prevent significant enemy air or space interference, and deny effective enemy air or space operations. None of the military doctrines, however, match these requirements. Joint doctrine does not explicitly specify a desired degree of superiority. The Air Force advocates "absolute control of the environment", and this goal reflects the Air Force's theater, offensive counterair perspective and forces. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps seek air dominance as well, but their doctrine stresses the likelihood of limited air superiority because their counterair vision and forces emphasize counterair contributions to service missions in limited areas (the corps commander's battlespace and littoral areas). These area counterair operations are unlikely to produce total air control. Air Force airmen plan to eliminate the opposing air force offensively. Soldiers, sailors, and marines prepare to fight the enemy air force when it comes to them.

Table 3

How Fast Should Air Superiority Be Achieved?

Source: FM 44-100.

Only Army doctrine explicitly calls for rapid air superiority. The other services recognize the benefits associated with a quick counterair victory, and contribute to the forces required to realize it, but fail to clearly express the idea in their doctrine.

What are the Threats to Air Superiority?

Source: Joint Pub 3-01.2, AFM 1-1, FM 44-100, NWP-32, FMFM 5-5.

The decisive air supremacy definition recognizes air and surface threats to air superiority. The Air Force, and the joint counterair doctrine written by the Air Force, emphasizes air threats and the ballistic and cruise missile threats that threaten large, fixed surface bases. Current Navy and Marine Corps doctrine emphasizes the aircraft and cruise missiles that threaten surface ships and amphibious operations. The Army adds the surface artillery, special operations, and maneuver elements that it can use to threaten enemy air operations. Each service emphasizes the enemy systems that threaten its own service vision, or the enemy systems that are most like its own capabilities.

Source: Joint Pub 3-01.2, AFM 1-1, FM 100-5, FM 44-100, NWP 32, FMFM 5-5.

All the doctrines recognize the need for offensive and defensive counterair actions, and the role of the commander in selecting the proper balance to fit specific conditions. However, the services take two different approaches to achieving this balance. The Air Force and Army group offensive and defensive actions together in theater or corps counterair operations.

The Navy and Marine Corps separate offensive and defensive counterair efforts. Defensive counterair actions are part of antiair warfare. Antiair warfare, in turn, is directed by a Composite Warfare Commander as a part of his mission to gain and maintain control of the sea (surface warfare), the air (antiair warfare), and the water below the surface (antisubmarine warfare). Offensive counterair actions are grouped with other offensive air actions in strike warfare. Joint doctrine recognizes these different views by publishing separate Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations and Joint Maritime Operations (Air).

Source: Joint Pub 3-01.2, AFDD-10, FM 44-100, ...From the Sea, FMFM 5-5.

All the services recognize the potential counterair impact of air, sea, and surface forces. Although the Air Force doesn't own surface forces, it includes the surface systems that can help secure its vision. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps all possess air and surface forces, and each service emphasizes its own contributions to counterair forces.

Service Doctrine

The answers to the air superiority doctrinal questions are a reflection of the service differences that remain in spite of joint doctrinal "agreement." Service doctrines describe war as each service sees it, the best way for that service's forces to operate in that war, and how the individual service's forces should be integrated into the joint world. Much of this service doctrine is currently being created, re-written, or revised, and the new doctrine may resolve some old differences, or contribute to new ones. In this section, I'll summarize the service and joint counterair doctrines, and the visions they describe and support.

Air Force doctrine is based on control and exploitation of the air and space to achieve both independent air and integrated surface objectives. Basic Air Force doctrine is depicted in the two volumes of AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force. The mechanics of how to accomplish air superiority are described in AFM 2-1, Tactical Air Operations: Counterair, Close Air Support, and Air Interdiction. AFM 2-1 was written in 1969, and the Air Force is currently creating a new set of doctrinal publications. Air Force counterair doctrine stresses the goal of complete air supremacy and emphasizes an offensive, theater solution to counterair problems.

Army doctrine links the air superiority battle directly to the ground battle. FM 100-5, Operations, describes Army basic doctrine, emphasizing the Army as a power projection weapon and the primacy of the corps commander. FM 44-100, US Army Air Defense Operations, provides expanded counterair guidance, focus, and objectives for all levels of Army counterair forces from the theater down to division. These objectives include both control of the air and protection of resources, but the focus shifts incrementally from control of the air toward protection of resources as the echelon shifts from theater, to corps, then division. Army counterair doctrine emphasizes the synchronization of joint offensive and defensive counterair resources to deliver operational and tactical flexibility to ground commanders.

The Navy began to focus its interest in a new direction with the publication of ...From the Sea in September, 1992. The new Navy shifted its emphasis from blue water war at sea against the Soviet Navy to brown water littoral war in regional conflicts. This new emphasis on naval contributions to joint, maneuver warfare has inspired the creation of new doctrine which is currently being developed by a new Naval Doctrine Command. Current doctrine is limited to the ideas suggested in ...From the Sea and NWP 32, Antiair Warfare. ...From the Sea provides a broad look at the Navy's new direction, while NWP 32 describes the tactical details of blue water antiair warfare. Navy doctrine emphasizes the composite, integrated relationship between air superiority and air, surface, and subsurface battlespace dominance, force protection through defense in depth, and the separation between defensive counterair (antiair warfare) and offensive counterair (strike warfare).

Marine Corps counterair doctrine closely resembles the doctrine of its sister naval service, but it has been adapted to emphasize amphibious operations. A rewrite of FMFM 1, Warfighting, directs Marine doctrine toward maneuver warfare, emphasizing requirements to shape the battlefield by creating conditions which resolve the issue before the engagement. Current Marine aviation doctrine defines and describes the capabilities of the six functions of Marine aviation (air reconnaissance, air defense, assault support, offensive air support, electronic warfare, and control of aircraft and missiles) in support roles, but does not fit air doctrine into the scheme of maneuver described in FMFM-1. Marine aviation doctrine is also currently being rewritten. Marine doctrine emphasizes defense in depth against an aircraft and missile threat to achieve air superiority for a limited time, in a limited place, to secure amphibious operations.

Joint Doctrine should describe how the services work together by providing general guidance for joint military operations. However, joint doctrine may fall short of this ideal. It can also be a battle ground where unique service ideas and concepts are brought together to be consolidated, ironed out, or watered down until they can be packaged in a joint product acceptable to all sides. Joint counterair doctrine provides a broad description of counterair missions, and most of the joint answers about how to accomplish air superiority, but it also demonstrates how joint doctrine can become a common denominator that compromises between competing service concepts instead of melding or deciding between them.

Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfighting, can be summarized as "joint warfare is team warfare." Joint Pub 1 emphasizes the benefits of teamwork between the services and provides examples of the contributions of each service component to the joint team. Historical air superiority contributions are singled out in General MacArthur's Island hopping campaign in the Pacific, the OVERLORD invasion of Europe, and Desert Storm.

Although Joint Pub. 1 highlights the importance of air superiority, Joint Pubs 3-0, 3-01.2, and 3-04 are the primary counter-air volumes. 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations is the "keystone document of the joint operations series" and "offers a common perspective from which to plan and operate and fundamentally shapes the way we prepare for conflicts and other operations. It provides the bases that guide the employment of the joint air, land, sea, and space team." While 3-0 provides a broad description of counter air missions, 3-01.2, Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations, and 3-01.4, Joint Maritime Operations (Air), provide the joint answers about how to accomplish air superiority. The joint counterair doctrine publications are being revised and rewritten.

The joint publications provide an organizational model for theater forces, and general guidelines, but very little specific guidance. In addition, 3-01.2 and 3-04 arbitrarily disconnect air doctrine at the beach, an artificial boundary that divides surface media and service philosophies, equipment, and influence. This disconnect may have been appropriate when the Navy contemplated independent, blue-water operations, but land, sea, and air forces must be integrated to gain and maintain theater air superiority in a joint littoral campaign. Joint counterair doctrine accommodates competing service concepts instead of melding them into a coherent whole.

Together, joint and service doctrines provide adequate answers to the counterair questions suggested by the decisive air supremacy definition. However, although the pieces of an effective counterair doctrine are present, they have yet to be put together into a complete joint publication. To improve joint counterair doctrine, the joint definitions of air superiority and air supremacy should be modified and expanded, and joint doctrine should describe how service counterair forces should work together to achieve decisive air supremacy.

Joint definitions shape joint and service doctrine by framing debates and discussions. The current joint definitions of air superiority and air supremacy emphasize safeguarding friendly operations from air-breathing threats, and do not specify a desired time frame. These definitions should be expanded to include ballistic missile and space threats, enemy offensive operations, and rapid air counterair actions.

Joint doctrine should provide a framework for integrating service air, land, and sea forces to achieve the Joint Force Commander's objectives. Although the service doctrines reach a general agreement that air superiority is vital to successful US military operations, each doctrine pursues air superiority to enable specific service visions. The Air Force pursues control of the air to allow exploitation by air forces. The Army wants to control the airspace above the battlefield to allow the ground commander to execute his operational plans. The Navy and Marines seek battlespace dominance to protect the fleet and permit effective entry of equipment and re supply from the sea.

These divergent visions of war, and the air superiority requirements that support them, lead to a compartmentalization of doctrine and forces that may hinder counterair integration and lead to compartmentalized execution, as well. The joint doctrine provides definitions and basic ideas, but not the specific guidance required to successfully integrate these stove-piped service visions and weapons systems into an effective counterair process. This lack of specific guidance creates a vacuum for Joint Force Commanders, or their component commanders, to fill. Understanding the service visions and doctrine described in this chapter is one half of the information Joint Force Commanders need to integrate joint counterair actions. Understanding basic counterair strategy, targets, and forces is the other half. In the next chapter, I'll attempt to provide the specific details Joint Force Commanders need to understand about the counterair process.

In this chapter, I'll examine the process of gaining and maintaining air superiority. Understanding the strategy, targets, and forces that make up the counterair process will help Joint Force Commanders build the right mix of counterair forces, and competently monitor, and if required, direct the air superiority process. I'll start with a brief discussion of the elements of the counterair system. Next, I'll show how counterair strategy relates the counterair forces' means to the Joint Force Commander's ends by considering basic strategic considerations and methods. I'll then use the results of the strategy discussion to suggest profitable counterair targets and attack timing. Finally, I'll make some conclusions about the counterair process.

Counterair operations employ a large fraction of the total joint force, and test the broad capabilities of the entire nation. Achieving air dominance over a modern threat requires a combination of sophisticated weapons delivery and control systems and trained people. Designing, developing, and deploying this system requires a significant investment of time, money, and effort. The counterair process is not just airplanes -- its a system.

The weapons delivery component of a counterair system includes weapons, the systems that deliver them, and the resources required to support them. A weakness in any one of these elements can render the weapons delivery component of the system ineffective. Counterair weapons include air-to-air, surface-to-air, and surface-to-surface missiles, air-to-air and surface-to-air guns, anti-radiation missiles, and conventional precision and area weapons. Modern weapons deliver significant improvements in lethality and accuracy, but even the best weapons require effective delivery systems. Air and surface delivery systems can transport and orient weapons for successful attacks, help weapons penetrate enemy defenses and defeat enemy countermeasures, and link the counterair weapons to the command and control system that directs them. The effectiveness of these weapons delivery systems is enhanced by support aircraft and systems. Air and space based sensors provide reconnaissance, surveillance, and warning. Tankers extend aircraft range and station time. Electronic warfare systems exploit or jam enemy communications and emissions. Air and space based command, control, and communications systems make counterair forces more responsive and flexible. Both weapons delivery and support systems require maintenance support and the steady supply of the spare parts, fuel, and other resources that make sustained counterair operations possible.

Command and control elements provide intelligence, warning, and communications, and a successful system must meet the needs of both counterair system operators and their commanders. Intelligence provides an understanding of the enemy's capabilities and intentions. Warning, surveillance and reconnaissance build knowledge of current enemy operations. Communications allow commanders to receive and disseminate this information and control their forces.

A command and control system also ensures cooperation and integration between system components by establishing common counterair procedures and doctrine. Established procedures and doctrine are the score commanders provide to orchestrate the counterair system. This score allows system operators to understand the function of the entire system, and their part in it. The process of developing, coordinating, and institutionalizing doctrine and procedures can resolve struggles over ideas and functions, and coordinate the activities of all the components of the system. Command and control systems provide the link between the weapons delivery hardware and the people who operate the counterair system.

Finally, a counterair system requires skilled, trained people in both leadership and operator roles. Recruiting, training, and retaining quality people is a challenge, and skilled operators and leaders aren't developed overnight. The basic skills of running the components take years to master, and developing competent leadership requires additional time. Effective training is also costly. Initial training costs can run into millions of dollars, and recurrent training in expensive air control systems is a large part of annual budgets. There is, however, no substitute for this constant training. The air battle may be won or lost in the first few days, or hours. The ability of the weapons systems, command and control components, and the people who operate them to work together will determine the results of those first few hours of war.

A capable counterair system, equipped with appropriate technology and manned with competent people, does not guarantee air superiority. These systems, for all their sophistication and complexity, require an appropriate strategy to gain a successful outcome. Some basic considerations for developing an air superiority strategy include campaign objectives, the relative balance between friendly and enemy forces, the nature of the theater, and any policy restraints.

Developing a strategy begins with determining objectives, and the objectives of the air superiority battle do not exist in a vacuum. Air superiority objectives should be tied to campaign objectives. Why does the Joint Force Commander need air superiority? How much does he need? For how long? How important is air superiority to joint campaign success? Answering these questions will link the air superiority battle to the joint campaign, and the answers should provide a framework for examining the other strategic considerations.

Once counterair objectives are established, consider the relative balance of forces. What are the limits of friendly counterair resources? How well are these forces equipped and trained? Are forces optimized for the counterair battle, or required to perform multiple roles? What is the balance between offensive and defensive capabilities? Are all existing resources available or will some be held back in reserve? Will the counterair commander have centralized control over all counterair resources or share control with other commanders?

By answering these questions, the counterair commander can determine how friendly counterair resources compare with enemy forces. What is the over-all balance? Does either side possess a clear advantage in numbers of systems? In the quality of systems, weapons, or training? In the ability to control or exploit the electromagnetic spectrum? In range or on-station time? In night or adverse weather capabilities? In the number or quality of support systems? In generation rates or weapons stocks? Are there mission areas that present a clear advantage or disadvantage? Are there cultural factors that will limit or emphasize the importance of any physical factors? Will new production or reinforcements change the balance in the future or will it remain stable? Does the balance of counterair forces favor a particular joint force strategy?

With a clear view of the objectives and relative forces, counterair commanders are ready to examine the nature of the theater. Theater characteristics are defined by time and space. First, time impacts the battle in several ways. How fast must friendly forces achieve the desired level of air superiority to meet campaign objectives? How fast can they do it? How long must they maintain this desired level? Does the Joint Force Commander have a long or short term strategy? Does he plan a decisive stroke or a battle of attrition?

Space is the second theater consideration. How big is the theater of operations? How much of it must counterair forces protect? How much enemy space must they control? Will there be a surface battle? Is the desired area limited by geography or altitude? What impact will weather or the seasons have on the campaign? Does either side possess a sanctuary where they can't, or won't, be attacked? Is there a mature theater logistic infrastructure, or will forced entry require a rapid build-up coincident with initial counterair operations?

Political restraints to counterair operations are the final basic consideration for counterair strategy. National policy provides a framework for all military operations, including counterair operations. Policy considerations may dictate limits to counterair strategy based on a desire to limit the intensity of a campaign, to prevent the war from spreading to a larger area, or to limit the impact of the war on other areas or interests. These policy restraints may also dictate limits in the choice of weapons or weapons systems, and limit the choice or timing of targets. Commanders define these limits in rules of engagement.

Strategy provides a link between the means (counterair force structure) and the ends (joint force objectives). It creates the answers to how and why means are translated to ends. How has been the focus of strategy for centuries, and describes the ways power will be applied to fulfill objectives. Why provides a mechanism, or reason, why we expect our actions to produce changes in the enemy. The counterair strategy should identify how and why the available means will achieve the desired ends in light of the basic considerations described in the last section.

Enemy counterair systems can be defeated in a variety of ways. Air commanders can attack them in the air, on the ground, or in the factory. They can prevent the flow of resources to factories and bases, or eliminate the people who lead and operate the system. They can also apply these methods in sequence or combination.

The enemy counterair force can be eliminated in the air by air-to-air or surface-to-air weapons. Air-to-air combat is glamorous and exciting, but surface-to-air systems usually account for more aircraft kills. An integrated system, that employs air and surface systems together, poses the greatest threat to enemy forces. The Patriot surface-to-air missile has demonstrated some capability against ballistic missiles, and both surface-to-air weapons and aircraft have limited capabilities against cruise missiles, but both types need significant improvements before they will seriously threaten ballistic missiles or stealthy cruise missiles and aircraft.

Counterair commanders should emphasize killing the enemy in the air if they enjoy a weapons advantage, operator advantage, or command and control advantage that guarantees a favorable exchange ratio. However, commanders must always prepare for air battles because the enemy commander may force the issue at any time. A strategy that relies on air battles alone kills aircraft one at a time, resulting in bloody, lengthy struggles -- the modern equivalent of WW1's trench warfare. Commanders will need to attack the enemy counterair system on the ground to achieve decisive air supremacy.

The enemy counterair force can be destroyed on the ground by air-to-surface attacks or surface forces. Air attacks on enemy air bases, command and control systems, and logistics have become a standard element of offensive counterair campaigns. Aircraft in the open make attractive targets, and one attack aircraft can destroy many aircraft parked in the open. However, modern air defenses and redundant, survivable bases make air base destruction a difficult and time consuming task.

Fortunately, these fixed bases, air defenses, and command and control centers also make excellent targets for the surface forces' long range tube artillery, the multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), or the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), and may also be vulnerable to direct attacks by surface forces or helicopters. Special operations forces can eliminate aircraft, air defenses, or the key elements that allow the enemy counterair system to function. Conventional surface forces can provide the ultimate offensive counterair by taking and holding enemy air defenses, command and control centers, and air bases.

In a long conflict, the enemy's ability to reinforce and renew his counterair forces can be destroyed by attacks on factories. Factories, like the air bases, are static. Both air and surface forces can destroy aircraft, surface-to-air systems, and the weapons and command systems that help them function before they join fielded forces. These attacks can have a great long term influence on the future performance of enemy air forces, but will probably not generate a short term effect in a campaign designed to achieve rapid air superiority.

No matter where counterair commanders choose to destroy the enemy counterair system, their strategies will probably include both offensive and defensive components. Counterair battles require a balance between the military principle of security (and the defensive requirements that are associated with it) and the maritime principle of command of the seas (which is extrapolated to command of the air for air forces). Commanders must establish a balance between the requirement to safeguard their forces from possible enemy actions, and the desire to seize the offensive initiative and eliminate the threat posed by enemy forces before they can act. Technology can also affect the offensive-defensive balance by providing a relative advantage to one method or the other. For example, the apparent advantages that sophisticated surface-to-air defenses once held are currently countered by stealth technology. However, another generation of improved defenses will probably develop counters to stealth, completing the technological cycle.

A defensive strategy may be appropriate for an air commander who possesses inferior forces. By safeguarding his key responsibilities and husbanding his resources, he can remain in the game until reinforcements or attrition change the balance of forces in his favor. A defensive strategy may also be appropriate against an enemy with a very sophisticated air defense system and well-protected air bases and infrastructure. By waiting for enemy aircraft to fight over friendly territory, the counterair commander can use all of his own air defense system and may be able to gradually reduce enemy forces until they can no longer challenge his air defense system.

Counterair commanders can employ both point and area approaches in a defensive strategy. The point defense strategy only defends key friendly points. By concentrating around a few points, defenses should be able to extract a substantial cost from any attacking force. However, a point defense strategy can not threaten the survival of the enemy counterair forces or extend air superiority beyond the range of the point defense systems.

An area defense expands point protection to prevent the enemy force from operating in a designated area. An area defense can provide advantages based on the depth of the defensive system. A defense in depth confronts enemy forces with a layered system that extracts a toll of effort or loss at each layer. This layered defense may employ active and passive techniques. Surface to air missile launches and fighter intercepts are the most easily identified active defensive measures, but active defense also includes the electronic emissions associated with warning and communications. Passive measures include attempts to limit damage through camouflage and decoy techniques and passive (receive only) electronic information gathering.

Airborne defenses, or Combat Air Patrols (CAPs), are also effective, but can become thirsty drains on air resources. A 24 hour CAP requires at least two aircraft for every one aircraft in the CAP, so extensive CAP requirements reduce the number of aircraft available for offensive missions. Ground alert aircraft can reduce CAP requirements, but they need extensive warning systems to get them airborne and in the right place in time to affect the attack.

Surface-to-air systems provide more efficient point and area defensive coverage. Unless friendly forces possess a surplus of air superiority fighters, ground alert aircraft and airborne CAPs should be used sparingly as added protection for high value assets, as a way to concentrate air defenses against expected attacks, or to fill gaps between surface-to-air systems. A coordinated area system that combines air-to-air and surface-to-air weapons is difficult to coordinate, but it is also more difficult to concentrate against, flank, or envelop than a system that relies on just air or surface defenses.

No matter how superior they feel, joint forces will almost certainly maintain a defensive counterair system. Even an injured enemy can mount limited offensives. A strictly defensive strategy will not, however, gain air superiority over enemy territory, or gain air superiority anywhere in a short time. Rapid air superiority requires an offensive strategy.

An offensive strategy allows counterair commanders to maintain the initiative, forces the enemy counterair system to react, and reduces enemy decision time. Offensive actions allow friendly forces to attack or threaten all the parts of the enemy system, and force counterair battles to occur over enemy territory and away from friendly forces. Offensive attacks also provide commanders a range of options, from limited precision attacks to saturating enemy defenses with overwhelming numbers.

Offensive strategies are especially attractive for commanders with qualitative or quantitative advantages. They may also help commanders with inferior forces by inducing the enemy to keep some of his aircraft at home to defend against attacks. Offensive air attacks against sophisticated defenses require significant support operations, particularly Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD). Stealth aircraft can make successful offensive attacks with much less support.

These offensive strategies include lethal and non-lethal actions. Attempts to confuse or disrupt the enemy, without destroying his capabilities, may complement direct attacks designed to eliminate enemy forces. For example, electronic jamming of enemy surveillance and warning radars does not damage them, but it makes lethal attacks on surface-to-air systems easier by forcing individual surface-to-air systems to operate autonomously without advance warning. A combination of lethal and non-lethal means may achieve a synergistic degrading of enemy counterair capabilities that allows decisive air superiority to be achieved rapidly.

A similar balance should be achieved between direct and indirect attacks. Direct attacks destroy the enemy's combat forces and eliminate them from the battle. Indirect attacks are aimed at the logistics and command and control systems that support combat forces. Well planned and executed indirect attacks may make direct attacks more effective by isolating or limiting enemy combat systems. Indirect attacks may limit friendly losses by avoiding the enemy combat forces and may, in rare cases, make direct attacks unnecessary. However, indirect attacks will usually limit enemy capabilities, but not eliminate them. Support systems are usually resilient and elastic, and a capable commander will find alternative ways to continue to support his forces.

The fast transient attack is a variation of the indirect approach based on John Boyd's description of the "O-O-D-A (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) loop" decision process. It aims to slow the enemy decision cycle while enhancing the friendly process, hoping to gain a cumulative advantage based on repeated faster, better decisions. A fast transient approach usually depends on attacks on the enemy command and control system, particularly information gathering and distribution systems and leadership.

Offensive action can destroy or disrupt air and ground elements of the enemy counterair system. Air superiority fighters destroy enemy aircraft in the air by performing fighter sweeps and force protection missions. Fighter sweeps are the most flexible of these offensive air operations. Sweeps allow friendly air superiority fighters to seek out enemy aircraft and challenge them wherever they fly -- to fight when and where they choose. However, if the enemy recognizes and avoids the sweeping aircraft, friendly counterair forces may have to attack important enemy targets to induce the enemy air force to attempt a defense. On these missions, air superiority aircraft destroy enemy fighters while they protect friendly air-to-surface attack aircraft. The effectiveness of these offensive counterair actions is multiplied by specialized support assets that make hostile territory more friendly; assets that suppress enemy surface-to-air defenses, assist with command and control, jam and exploit enemy communications and warning systems, and locate and recover downed crew members. Aircraft, missiles, and surface forces can also destroy or disrupt surface elements of the enemy counterair system.

On the Surface

Hardened aircraft shelters, although vulnerable to precision, penetrating munitions, make the systematic destruction of enemy air on the ground a time consuming task. These "shelter busting" operations can't be accomplished in significant numbers without suppressing enemy air and surface defenses. Ballistic and cruise missile preparation and launch areas are attractive targets, but hardened storage and launch facilities and mobile launch platforms make missile destruction time consuming and costly, as well.

Indirect attacks on the enemy's ability to support his counterair force can disable aircraft and missiles without destroying them. Without fuel, oxygen, or weapons, a counterair force is a paper shell. These support targets are usually large, static, and easily identified. Air base complexes are spread over several square miles, and the runways make them easy to find. Because these targets don't move, they make ideal targets for unmanned weapons like cruise and ballistic missiles. Although air forces have expended a lot of effort and resources on the precision penetrators and anti-runway weapons designed for air base attack, a hardened and well-defended air base is not an easy target. Modern experience shows that air bases may be degraded, or temporarily shut down, but their size and redundancy make them difficult to eliminate from the air.

Enemy counterair forces also depend on specialized support systems. Destroying the opposing force's tankers, AWACS, and electronic warfare aircraft can drastically reduce enemy offensive potential and pay great dividends on limited investments of counterair effort.

Command and control facilities are also rewarding targets. Disrupting a hardened command and control center requires a concentrated effort with penetrating precision and anti-radiation weapons, but even a partial success can generate effects that ripple all the way through an air defense system. Larger elements of the enemy air defense system, like radars and strategic surface-to-air missiles, are also relatively static and make good targets for friendly aircraft, missiles, and surface forces.

The counterair commander can also destroy the resources used to build and support counterair systems before they reach the factory or base. By destroying long lead time items that are essential to aircraft manufacture, enemy replacements may be eliminated months, or years, before they are needed. By destroying fuel resources at their source, or eliminating the transportation required to get them to where they are needed, an air force can be effectively eliminated without direct attack.

Finally, an enemy air force can be destroyed by eliminating the people who operate the components. Without the people who operate and support the counterair system, the machine can't function. The people can be removed from the system by killing them in direct attacks, disrupting or limiting their training, forcing an operations tempo that exhausts them over time, or discouraging them from coming to work. Targeting the system leadership for death or capture requires highly accurate and timely intelligence, but may reduce short term effectiveness.

The counterair commander's strategy should describe how and why the means (the counterair forces) are applied to achieve the ends (the Joint Force Commanders' objectives). The counterair commander will probably choose more than one of these methods for destroying the enemy air force to build a strategy that fits the Joint Force objectives, the balance of forces, the nature of the theater, and any political restraints. Choosing targets begins to transform strategy from a mental exercise to a physical act. The targets should be selected, consistent with the counterair strategy identified by the air commander, to provide a mechanism that will achieve the level of air superiority required by the Joint Force Commander in the time frame he specified.

Target choices should flow from the counterair commander's strategy decisions. A list of possible counterair target systems appears in Table 7.

Table 8 relates strategy to target effects.

Table 8 shows how strategic choices affect target choices. For example, a force attempting a defensive strategy can only attack two target sets, and then only at the discretion of the enemy. A direct strategy ignores the potentially lucrative targets provided by the command and control and support systems. Attacks on the "indirect" target set will eventually affect the direct target set as well. Many of the targets can be attacked with both lethal and non-lethal means, and non-lethal methods like electronic warfare systems can complement lethal attacks, or multiply results by allowing the air commander to concentrate lethal force in some places and non-lethal force in others. Training, production, and research and development have almost no short term effects, and should be attacked only for long term benefits. Finally, Table 8 shows that the rapid, parallel destruction of the enemy counterair system will usually require extensive active, lethal, offensive counterair efforts while defensive forces provide force security.

Table 9 provides another way to look at targeting choices by comparing the possible targets to some of the essential counterair processes. First, Table 9 highlights the importance of logistic and support systems in all the counterair processes. Second, it shows why the proponents of information warfare concentrate on the potentially paralyzing effects that may be generated across the spectrum of counterair processes by concentrating on information, communications, and people. Without current, appropriate information, the systems that communicate this information to the right places (feedback loops), and the people who interpret it, all the counterair processes will be degraded, and may eventually fail.

Attack timing choices return the strategy process back to the basic considerations (objectives, forces, the theater, and policy limitations) that framed this chapter's initial strategy discussion. Choosing attack timing is the final step in the counterair strategy process, and provides a framework that turns strategy and targeting ideas into Air Tasking Orders (ATO).

Commanders can choose between, or combine, graduated, sequential, cumulative, or parallel attacks. In a graduated strategy, counterair commanders attempt to convince the enemy to stop fighting to avoid future consequences. To execute this strategy, counterair forces make one attack, or a short series of attacks, on elements of the enemy counterair system, and then pause to allow the enemy to consider the threat of future attacks. If the enemy continues to resist, attacks would continue against increasingly important targets. This method is most often selected in limited campaigns in pursuit of limited objectives. It depends on a credible threat of escalation and the air commander's ability to put something the enemy holds dear at risk. If the enemy values his counterair system more than his objectives, he may respond. It may not be effective against an enemy willing to suffer pain to achieve his goals.

A sequential strategy pursues individual steps or phases that lead to a final objective. Each phase depends on the successful accomplishment of the previous phase. A sequential strategy allows concentration of forces against a specific objective until that objective is accomplished. Sequential attacks may be appropriate when the balance b