THE ENLARGEMENT OF NATO
"I reaffirmed that NATO enlargement at the Madrid Summit will proceed, and President Yeltsin made it clear he thinks it's a mistake." President Clinton, March 1997 Helsinki Summit
At the December 1996, North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting, the Foreign Ministers announced a Summit meeting in Madrid, on 8-9 July 1997, to "set the course for the Alliance as it moves towards the 21st century, consolidating Euro-Atlantic security. (61) It should be made clear at the onset that the December 1996 NATO announcement is the first phase in the enlargement process which is expected to take two years to complete.(62) New members are not likely to join until April 1999, the 50th anniversary of the signature of the Washington Treaty.
At the Summit, NATO leaders will announce the name of CEE countries invited to start accession negotiations with the Alliance. The most likely candidates for membership are Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. (see Annex B). The US, for reasons of lower cost and ease of US Senate ratification, favours a small intake in the first enlargement wave. On the other hand, Canada supports a wide enlargement to include these three countries, as well as Slovenia, Romania, and Slovakia, with a view to developing a broad transatlantic community. France, along with Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece and Turkey are promoting a "southern enlargement" to balance the "eastern enlargement"by taking in Romania and Slovenia, too. The French-led group argue that NATO should worry about the Mediterranean and the Balkans as well as Central Europe. The issue of the size of the first wave, if not resolved satisfactorily, risks becoming a divisive issue at the Madrid Summit.
The Alliance has now reached the eleventh-hour in the enlargement process. The decision to hold a summit in July firmly commits the Alliance to enlargement. To reverse that decision would be disastrous. For those who believe in NATO, whether or not we believe in the enlargement of the Alliance, managing the enlargement process in the coming months must be our priority. The reasoning on both sides of the enlargement issue is, on the whole, familiar and it is not our intention to "reopen" the debate at this late stage in the process.
Nevertheless, some of these arguments are likely to surface during the ratification process. It is, therefore, important to review the respective positions of the proponents and opponents of NATO enlargement. (63)
Those who favour early NATO membership for the Visegrad Three countries make the following arguments:
History demonstrates that CEE has been traditionally unstable. The area is described by some as a "security vacuum" and by Henry Kissinger as a "no-mans land." Without secure membership in NATO, this region may grow unstable and become a source of contention between Russia and Germany;
Yalta treated these countries unfairly, they suffered for more than forty-five years under Soviet domination, these nations now wish to rejoin the West, and the West, therefore, has a moral obligation to these nations. Enlargement is a noble democratizing mission that NATO is well-equipped to undertake, and the Western public will understand and support such a mission;
NATO needs to enlarge for it to survive. "Not to enlarge is the do-nothing option, achieve nothing option," in the view of Secretary General Javier Solana, "it is the option the Alliance long ago rejected";(64)
Expansion of the European Union (EU), to integrate these nations fully, will take at least ten years, this is considered too long;
For the US, European security organization enlargement must begin with NATO, where the United States is the leading member, the "EU/WEU first," option would not promote United States interests in Europe;
Early NATO enlargement would cement the United States security commitment to Europe for decades to come;
Enlargement would be a hedge against the possibility of a renewed Russian threat; and
NATO enlargement should be done with Moscow's cooperation if possible and in the face of Moscow's opposition if necessary; if Moscow strongly opposes this NATO initiative, enlarging quickly is better for the Alliance, both to show Russia that this matter is settled and to do so before Russia becomes stronger and able to endanger the outcome.
On the other hand, opponents assert that:
The three most likely candidates are young stable liberal democracies with market economies doing relatively well. Historical analogies regarding their future are misleading. Their situation is totally different from the 1930s or 1945. The United States is now the most powerful "European power" providing overall stability in Europe, and Russia's border is now where it was three hundred years ago. Russia is not a threat to CEE, therefore, NATO enlargement should not be hurried;
The centrality of the United States domination of NATO creates a problem for Russia, so expanding the EU would be better. EU expansion would be perceived as less threatening by Russia and, it would force Europeans to address what is seen by some as a European problem. NATO expanding before the EU lets the "latter off-the-hook";(65)
NATO enlargement would alienate Russia, and would draw new lines in Europe, possibly replicating the Cold War division of Europe; it would invite Moscow to dominate nations on the wrong side of the line and especially endanger the sovereignty of Ukraine and the Baltic States, and hostile Russia would make Europe less, not more peaceful and stable; and
While not appropriate at the moment, if a threatening Russia emerged, taking on new members would then be appropriate for NATO.
These wide-ranging arguments for and against enlargement have led, in recent years, opponents and proponents to a wide spectrum of proposed paths ranging from the dissolution of NATO, to a broad-enlargement approach, including Russia. For instance, former US Ambassador Goodby, at the April 97 Symposium on "NATO Enlargement," organized by the Canadian Council for International Peace and Security (CCIPS), posited that Russia would join NATO in the foreseeable future. In response to Ambassador Goodby's suggestion, Dr. Dmitri Trenin, from the Carnegie Moscow Centre, commented that he did not foresee Russia joining NATO.
Asmus, Kugler, and Larrabee, from the Rand Corporation,(66) identify three broad approaches which have received the most attention: the Evolutionary Expansion path, the Promoting Stability path, ( the option adopted by NATO) and the Strategic Response path. Each path leads to an enlarged NATO, but the rationale, assumptions, timetable, and criteria of each are different. The following paragraphs highlight some of the key elements of each path in order to encourage and facilitate an informed debate during the ratification process.
The Evolutionary Expansion path assumes that the main problems facing CEE are economic and political. It also assumes that CEE states do not face any immediate military threats and that their own reforms are essentially on track. Therefore, the top priority for CEE should be its integration into the European Union (EU) as the best means to address these problems. The EU has recently indicated that new membership discussions should commence in 1998, with the year 2002 as a target date for new members joining. According to this school of thought, membership in NATO, although important, is secondary to membership in the EU. While the ultimate goal is congruent membership in both institutions, the EU is seen as the key driving organization in this process. Proponents of this path see no urgent reason for the Alliance to expand in the immediate future. They emphasize the importance of moving slowly, and using the time to ease concerns in the West and to diminish the risk of new confrontations with Moscow. NATO expansion might take place in some ten years. Some proponents of this option suggest that the stability and security issues, are European issues and, therefore, the EU should take the lead.
The second path, Promote Stability, is the option chosen by NATO. In contrast to the first path, proponents argue that the political situation in CEE is fragile. The collapse of communism and the unraveling of the former Soviet Union not only liberated CEE, but created a new security vacuum between Germany and Russia. That security vacuum threatens to undercut the fragile new democracies in CEE by rekindling nationalism. Proponents of this school emphasize the linkage between democracy and security, CEE countries need a strong security framework to develop into stable democracies. Proponents often draw an analogy with postwar West Germany and note the important role that NATO played in stabilizing German democracy, (This argument forgets that the 1947 Marshall Plan preceded the Alliance, which was only militarized in 1951, some two years after the signature of the 1949 Washington Treaty). In this view, membership in the EU is important, but not sufficient. It does not resolve the geopolitical dilemma facing these countries. Moreover, leaving these countries in a strategic "no man's land," as described by Henry Kissinger, could tempt Russia to try to reassert its influence in the area, as well as create a new strategic dilemma for Germany. NATO, the argument goes, must, therefore, provide the security framework necessary to anchor these countries in the West and stabilize CEE as a whole. Given the risks as well as the consequences of instability in CEE for the continent as a whole, proponents of this path argue that NATO cannot wait until the European Union is ready to expand.
The third path is called the Strategic Response. In this case NATO enlargement would not take place unless and until Russia moves in an authoritarian or expansionist direction and again poses a military threat to CEE countries. Proponents of this path include a group called, "Russia firsters," - those who believe the West's top policy priority should be to stabilize Russia and those who see the Alliance's primary role as a collective defence organization for deterring an attack against its members. The former opposes early expansion because it will provoke Moscow and contribute to a self-fulfilling prophecy - a resurgent Russian threat. The latter fear that enlargement would undercut political and military cohesion in the Alliance. The decision on whether and when to expand would be based purely on strategic criteria and events in Russia. NATO should give Moscow every chance, treating them as true partners, and avoid doing anything to facilitate a turn for the worse in Russia. If a new Russian threat emerges, then the Alliance will enlarge quickly. If no such threat emerges, then NATO may never have to enlarge. Under this option the Partnership for Peace would be seen as an important step in expanding "cooperative security" within the Euro-Atlantic area while the Alliance adopts a wait-and-see attitude towards Russia.
THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES
We can see, from this discussion, that a great amount of reflection has gone into the NATO enlargement issue, albeit largely among academics. Hopefully, national authorities, parliaments and the public will also soon get involved in the debate as the ratification process begins. Once they do get involved, it will surely become obvious to them, as it has to the analysts who have thus far written on the subject, that the arguments for and against enlargement "have been made largely without a revised overarching NATO strategic framework. (67) Small wonder that the enlargement debate seems unfocused at times and somewhat confused.
At the NATO Brussels Summit of January 1994, allied heads of state and government, inspired by the US administration, took the decision, in principle, to open the Alliance to new members. In endorsing the principle of enlargement, they stressed that the admission of new members to the Alliance was not to be an end in itself, rather, it would contribute to Europe's wider stability and security. This in a nutshell, argues John Barrett, "is the strategic objective of NATO enlargement implicit in the Brussels Declaration. (68) Logically, one would have thought that, before taking that momentous decision, NATO governments would have previously engaged in a full analysis and wide debate, of the "why" and of "whether" enlargement was in the interest of the Alliance. However, Barrett suggests that much of the rationale was only explained later, in the 1995 internal study on NATO Enlargement. Stanley Sloan, in a recent NATO Review article, laments the same inconsistencies and argues that the "why" and "how" of NATO's future should have been decided before the allies tackled the "who" and "when" of NATO enlargement.(69) This lack of an overarching framework largely explains why NATO did not fully anticipate the full consequences of the Alliance enlargement.
The very detailed communiqué of the 1996 NAC December meeting addressed outstanding issues related to NATO enlargement. As well in a number of recent speeches, Secretary General Javier Solana highlighted the issues the Alliance needs to focus on before and after the Summit. A communiqué, however, is not a substitute for a concept.
NATO enlargement may be the most critical decision awaiting the Summit but it must not become the single issue of the European security debate. Successful resolution of the following issues will be the key determinant in concluding whether the enlargement of NATO will enhance the security of the Euro-Atlantic area:
the role of Russia in the evolving Euro-Atlantic security architecture;
the need to reconcile the aspirations of new members to the new NATO;
the need to reassure the non-invited countries, particularly Ukraine and the Baltic States;
the aspect of Mediterranean security;
the costs of enlargement; and
the unanimous ratification by the parliaments and assemblies of all member states.
Seen from Moscow, the outcome of NATO enlargement to the East will likely shape the future relationship between Russia and the West. For Russia, the goal is to avoid being isolated from the West. On the other hand, NATO's primary goal is to "enhance stability and security" in the whole Euro-Atlantic area. The two goals are not irreconcilable. To achieve its goal, NATO, and the US in particular, must treat Russia as a valued and respected partner, lest Russia develop a "Versailles Syndrome." This would not be in the long-term interests of the Alliance and Euro-Atlantic security. Brzezinski, an ardent enlargement supporter, argues in favour of including Russia in the development of Euro-Atlantic security process. "If excluded and rejected, they will be resentful and their own political self definitions will become more anti-European and anti-Western. (70) Russia, in conditions of deep economic, political, and military crisis, and after its double imperial collapse needs reassurance.
As a popular issue, NATO enlargement was scarcely mentioned in last year's Russian presidential election campaign. That should not surprise us, as NATO enlargement was barely mentioned in the US presidential election and was not an issue in the recent Canadian federal election. However, as a political elite issue in Russia it is important, as the elites in Russia, whether democrats or nationalists, can make it a popular issue. Alexei Arbatov, a leading democrat, makes the case of the democrats opposed to NATO enlargement. "Had the Communists won the election, people here would have expected NATO expansion, but now that Yeltsin has won, under the banner of democracy, the idea that the West would respond by expanding NATO to isolate Russia would be received here as a sign of some generic mistrust of Russia. (71) The democrats feel betrayed and disappointed. The Soviet Union, and subsequently Russia, has, in their view, behaved in recent years as a responsible power and strategic partner, with the implementation of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the unification of Germany, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Central Europe, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union without any bloodshed, the destruction of thousands of Treaty Limited Equipment, (TLE) in accord with the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and Russia's constructive position during the Gulf War. The West has rewarded Russia for good behaviour, in the democrats' view, by taking advantage of Russia's current weakness and expanding to Russia's border without Moscow's involvement, at least until recently.
"There is a popular consensus in Russia against NATO expansion, not just because it is a threat, but because nobody likes to be excluded, (72) argues Sergey Rogov, Director of the United States-Canada Institute, in Moscow. "Russia has not been invited to join either NATO, or the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (APEC), or the Euro-Asia Summit. So Russia becomes a country in isolation. This is not natural for any big power. (73) Ambassador Blackwill, in his report to the Trilateral Commission, highlights the desire of Russia, "to be great, to be seen as great, and to be treated by others as great," this, in his view, "lies deep in the Russian psyche. (74)
The OSCE is another organization where Russian efforts to gain Western acceptance of its perceived "rightful" position as a major European power have thus far been frustrated. The OSCE, despite its many known deficiencies, represents the most broad-based Euro-Atlantic organization for consensus building, preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention. The OSCE is also the only Euro-Atlantic organization where both Russia and the United States operate as equal members. It is an institution where the West could, with minimum threat or negative impact to its primary interests, recognize Russia as a great European power. The Russian proposal that NATO and the EU be subordinated to the OSCE is not in the Western interest. However, the proposal that the OSCE create a managing/consultative body is worth pursuing as it would show, in a tangible way, that Russia is fully incorporated in the security relationship with the West.
NATO enlargement, if not handled properly, risks poisoning the relationship between Russia and the West for a long time. Some key negative consequences could be: an inward reorientation of Russia; a rebirth of Russia's sphere of influence among the now independent states of the former Soviet Union, with a particularly negative impact on Ukraine and the Baltic States; a weakening of overall Euro-Atlantic security; an unwelcome nationalistic influence on internal Russian politics; encouragement of a new militarism in Russia; a more assertive military doctrine, with deployment of tactical nuclear missiles aboard ships in the Baltic, in Kaliningrad, and possibly in Belarus; and a threat to the security structure established after the Cold War through various arms control agreements.
None of these issues are trivial. The arms control file, for instance, although not as bleak as the public posturing in Moscow would lead us to believe, requires close attention. During the Cold War, the USSR and the US negotiated and implemented many arms control agreements, as it was felt to be in their mutual interest. Recently, with the polarized atmosphere surrounding the enlargement issue, the Russian Duma has withheld ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, (CWC) and the START-II Treaty. At least sixty-eight nations have already ratified the CWC, including the US and, it entered into force in April 1997. The Duma has indicated that it will not ratify the Convention until the Fall of 1997. Nevertheless even if the Duma ratifies the treaty later this year, the Russian authorities will be hard pressed to destroy their large stocks of chemical weapons due to a lack of money, infrastructure, and environmental concerns.
The US News and World Report of 6 January, 1997, reported that the START-II Treaty might, in fact, soon be ratified by the Duma despite Moscow's posturing that the Treaty's prospects are dim in light of NATO's decision to enlarge. According to this article, Russian generals are putting considerable pressure on parliamentarians to ratify the treaty. The reason being that Russia's strategic missiles are aging rapidly and the military lacks funding to maintain such a large arsenal properly. Thus, treaty or no treaty, Moscow's nuclear arsenal will begin to shrink years earlier than planned as its missiles become unfit for service.
At the March 1997 Helsinki Summit, President Yeltsin agreed to press the Duma to ratify the stalled START-II Treaty. The Duma, however, indicated in mid-May it would indefinitely delay favourable consideration of START-II. Ratification will likely be delayed until the Fall of 1997, to decouple the issue from the unpopular NATO enlargement issue. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin also agreed that upon ratification of START-II, talks would begin for deeper cuts to a level of 2,000-2,500 warheads under a START-III agreement. Negotiations to update the treaty governing Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), are underway and a framework agreement may be completed by the July Madrid Summit. The updated agreement with much reduced equipment ceilings, will likely be accompanied by specific confidence building measures (CBMs), and intrusive verification measures. It will seek ensure that there is no destabilizing concentration of military equipment anywhere in Europe, with particular emphasis in Central Europe. By permitting national quotas rather than the original bloc ceilings, which no longer reflect the reality of current European security, the parameters for negotiations go a long way in meeting Russia's security concerns. An adapted CFE regime along these lines would truly be the "cornerstone" of Euro-Atlantic security.
NATO was slow to realize that its enlargement to the east would not be successful without the active participation of Russia in the development of a Euro-Atlantic security architecture. The NATO-Russia strategic relationship, except the successful Russian participation in IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia, has, until recently, been an empty box. To meet the July Summit deadline, NATO has, in recent months, embarked in earnest on a "two-track strategy" combining the enlargement of NATO to certain CEE countries with the building of a strong and, hopefully, enduring security partnership with Russia. Dmitri Trenin and Andrew Pierre argue that this security partnership must be "commensurate with Russia's dignity and importance and NATO's aims and ideals. Such a new relationship could then provide the much needed political ballast for enlarging NATO. (75)
Moscow in recent months, also pursued a two-track approach. On the one hand, the Russian government continued to voice opposition to enlargement. At the Helsinki Summit, President Yeltsin called NATO enlargement "a serious mistake." On the other hand, President Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Primakov were engaged in difficult negotiations, with the United States, Germany, other key allies and NATO Secretary General Javier Solana. These negotiations sought to balance two seemingly incompatible goals: protecting the rights of the Alliance's prospective new members while preserving the West's cooperative relationship with Russia. An agreement on a NATO-Russia strategic partnership was reached on 14 May.
The NATO-Russia strategic partnership was codified in a "NATO-Russia Founding Act," signed by NATO leaders and the Russian President at a Paris Summit on 27 May. The agreement establishes clear principles and arrangements for a NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council for regular consultation on issues of common interests, such as: conflict prevention, joint action in peacekeeping, nuclear and conventional military doctrines, nuclear safety, theatre missile defence (TMD), and non-proliferation of WMD. The Joint Council will give Russia a voice although not a veto, a chance to work in partnership with NATO, not within NATO. The Act also covers the military dimension of the NATO-Russia relationship, particularly the thorny issue of nuclear weapons and conventional forces' deployments on the territory of the new NATO members. Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy welcomed the agreement in the following terms: "The new NATO-Russian relationship marks an important stage in the evolution of the post-Cold War European security structure."
A broader strategy toward Russia - separate from the NATO enlargement issue - reflecting political and economic issues, is also being pursued. At the Helsinki Summit, Yeltsin received a promise of support for Russia's membership in key international economic institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), with an increased role at the G-7 annual meeting, which in the future, will be known as the Summit of the Eight. In this vein, Trenin and Pierre maintain that, "ending the current subordinate status of the NATO-Russian relationship to the enlargement issue is a key prerequisite for turning it into a positive factor in the European security situation. (76)
Substantive progress has been achieved in recent months on a number of issues of common interest to Russia, the US, and NATO. The results, however, are perceived as a tactical damage limitation operation to meet the artificial Madrid Summit deadline. President Yeltsin praised the 14 May agreement on the "Founding Act," but the then Defence Minister Rodionov said that, "despite the agreement reached in Moscow . . . Russia-NATO problems have not disappeared," reported Interfax News Agency. Indeed a long-term strategy encompassing security, political and economic issues of interest to Russia and Alliance members, separate from the NATO enlargement issues, will be required.
New members will be joining a different Alliance from the one that existed during the Cold War. They will be joining a "new NATO" adapted to the twenty-first century. While this new NATO retains its core collective defence obligations and capabilities, it has also embraced new missions, moving away, on a day-to-day basis, from collective defence and resistance to armed attack - to non-Article V cooperative security missions of crisis management and peacekeeping. An important facet to this "softer" NATO approach to Euro-Atlantic security involves a deepened NATO-Russia cooperation, as seen from the recently agreed "NATO-Russia Founding Act." Many of the countries wishing to join, however, are looking at NATO in terms of what it has been in the twentieth century. They wish to join NATO for the "hard" security guarantees implicit in Article V of the Washington Treaty.(77) Those security guarantees, in their view, best meet their historical security concerns vis-a-vis their Russian neighbour. The softer security dimension of NATO is already available to them through the PfP programme.
Enlargement under this scenario may be one of the Alliance's most serious challenges in the months and years ahead, as it could undercut its political and military cohesion and saddle NATO with a group of new members who could be out-of-step with current NATO thinking on Euro-Atlantic security, particularly on the need for the Alliance to have a closer cooperative relationship with Russia. Managing an Alliance that includes one set of difficult partners (Greece and Turkey, without the focus of the Cold War, are again quarreling publicly over Cyprus) is difficult enough, but if the 3-5 new CEE members cannot overcome their historical anxiety toward Russia, the development of a consensus within the Alliance - traditionally its strength - may not be possible.
The NATO enlargement debate has primarily focused on the countries to be offered membership and on the type of "strategic relationship" that needs to be developed with Russia to make enlargement more palatable to Moscow. Yet, equally important, is how the Alliance deals with countries left out of the first wave of enlargement. If NATO is to achieve its post-Cold War goal of "stability and security" in the Euro-Atlantic area, it must formulate a clear strategy toward these countries, many of which are unstable democracies with struggling market economies, such as Bulgaria, Albania, Ukraine, and the Baltic States.
Despite NATO's denial, the enlargement of NATO is likely to create new dividing lines in Europe. At a minimum, these will be institutional dividing lines. On the West side will be NATO members, current and new, who, under Article V of the Washington Treaty will receive nuclear and conventional security guarantees. On the other side of that institutional line will be those European nations not invited to join the Alliance. Their perceived exclusion could produce a sense of alienation reminiscent of the former division of Europe. Ukraine, in particular, is worried that enlargement would result in a new division of Europe.
That being said, those not invited in the first wave will not totally deprived of security guarantees. PfP has provided, and will continue to provide, a cooperative security regime that includes provisions for consultation in times of crisis, similar to those in Article IV of the Washington Treaty. The PfP, however, will need enhancement to meet the increased needs of those countries, such as a broader Planning and Review Process(PARP), and Partner involvement through CJTFs in the planning and training of multinational forces for non - Article V operations. The establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) will provide an inclusive forum bringing all political, defence and military areas of cooperation between Partners and the Alliance closer together and will give Partners a stronger voice in their cooperative effort with the Alliance. This new structure could become a vital element of Euro-Atlantic security. Leaving aside the important security role of the PfP programme, non-invited countries will still remind NATO that PfP is not an alternative for full membership in the future.
Nevertheless, the enlargement of NATO, even accompanied by a positive resolution of Russia's concerns, will create new problems for these non-invited countries. The most important problem will likely be the status and security of Ukraine. That country does not wish to become a forgotten gray zone between Russia and a new Western bloc. This also applies to the Baltic States. Kiev has not shown an interest in joining NATO at this time but has repeatedly stated that NATO should not undertake the enlargement process without considering the interests of Ukraine and the Baltic States. The three Baltic States are interested in joining NATO but are unlikely to be invited. All four countries are very interested in joining the EU.
For a millennium, Russian history has been deeply entangled with the area now comprising the territory of Ukraine. The origins of the Russian and Ukranian states are found in Kievan Rus' in the 9th century. Russia believes that the inhabitants of this area are their kith and kin ever since the Cossacks, in 1654, approached the Tsar for protection against the Poles. This is not a view shared by Ukraine.
Ukraine's future security orientation will have a critical impact on NATO enlargement. Poland, Hungary, and Romania, share a border with Ukraine. Ukraine is in a position of weakness, being heavily reliant on the West for economic assistance. Ukraine is the third largest recipient of US aid, after Israel and Egypt. Canada also has a substantial aid program in this country. Economic assistance from Western governments such as Canada, the United States, and Germany, and international organizations, has been, and will continue to be essential for Ukraine's future well-being and stability. As well, Russia has three powerful levers: the close ties between Russian and Ukranian industries, Ukraine's dependence on Russian resources, such as oil and gas, and the presence of some twelve million native Russians (more than 20% of the population) within the borders of Ukraine. If Russia considers itself isolated from the Euro-Atlantic community, it may feel the need to strengthen its historical sphere of influence. An enhanced security relationship between NATO and Ukraine must, therefore, accompany the enlargement of the Alliance. Otherwise, Ukraine's freedom of manoeuver, as an independent nation could be seriously limited.
With the exception of two decades of independence after the First World War, Russia has controlled the Baltic States for the past two centuries. The Baltic States were occupied by the Soviet Union in 1940 and again in 1944, and local populations were moved to Siberia by the hundreds of thousands as Russians were encouraged to settle the region. Estonia and Latvia still have large Russian minorities. The Baltic States chose not to be included in Russia's Commonwealth of Independent States, (CIS) and many Russians regret the loss of these gateways to the Baltic Sea. It is no surprise, therefore, that there is a high degree of anxiety in the Baltic States about their ability to retain their independence, sovereignty, and western orientation.
The recent "reunification" agreement between Russia and Belarus, although symbolic, will further add to the Baltic States concerns about their future freedom of action. Baltic leaders are realistic about their prospects for joining NATO in the first wave. They are concerned that their security would be undercut should the NATO enlargement process appear to stop after an initial enlargement. Closer association with the EU is also crucial for the Baltic states as it would tie them economically and politically to Europe. Some form of security guarantees from the United States would help alleviate their perceived security limbo after enlargement.
A firm NATO commitment that membership will remain an option for those nations not included in the first wave, particularly for Ukraine and the Baltic States, will be a requirement of the Summit Declaration.
As the Alliance prepares to enlarge into Central Europe, defence planners say the gravest risks of future conflict spring from myriad forces of instability along NATO's southern flank. For that reason the enlargement of NATO for countries like Spain, France, Italy, Turkey, and Greece is not as high on their agenda as it is for Germany, for instance. The first three, Spain, France, Italy, are very concerned by the unstable situation in North Africa that could lead to possible mass migration and an export of terrorism to their countries. In a 3 March interview in the newspaper, Le Monde, Hervé de Charette, the former French Foreign Minister, stated that: "Dorénavent les priorités de sécurité de la France seront au Sud." The instability of Albania also concerns Italy and Greece. It could lead to mass migration and the spreading of conflict to Kosovo. As well, within a decade, if not sooner, it is likely that every capital in Southern Europe will be within range of ballistic missiles based in North Africa and the Middle East. The spread of long-range missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is of vital concern to the Euro-Atlantic community. Admiral Lopez, Commander-in-chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, shared these concerns in a recent interview. "The next war," he said, "could grow out of any number of explosive factors: economic difficulties, water shortages, religious fanaticism, immigration, you name it. There are many different forces of instability, and they all seem to be prevalent in the southern region. (78) NATO Secretary General Javier Solana recently highlighted this priority issue for NATO: "Security in Europe," he maintains, "is closely linked with security and stability in the Mediterranean, and the Mediterranean dimension is one of the various security components of the European security architecture. (79)
Finally, Turkey and Greece, without the Cold War as a stabilizing factor, are again publicly quarreling about Cyprus. Both countries have threatened to veto the admission of new members to NATO, over the conditions under which Cyprus would be admitted to the EU. Turkey has also asked to join the EU, but cannot pry the door open. Klaus Kinkel, the German Foreign Minister, during his March visit to Turkey, made it abundantly clear that: "Turkey will not become a member of the European Union in the foreseeable future." He said that Turkey did not qualify because of its record in "human rights, the Kurdish question, relations with Greece, and, of course, very clear economic reasons. (80) The leaders of the European Christian Democrat parties, at their March 1997 meeting, also stated that there was no place for Turkey in the EU due to cultural and religious reasons.(81) To further complicate matters for Turkish authorities, the CEE countries most likely to join NATO will be ahead of Turkey on the EU membership waiting list.
NATO enlargement will be at the top of the July 1997 Madrid Summit agenda, however, the Alliance leaders must complement that priority with a greater awareness of the importance of the Mediterranean area to the Euro-Atlantic security.
What will it cost to enlarge NATO? The short answer may be as little or as much as the Allies are willing to spend. For Canada, enlargement must remain affordable. The Canadian contribution will likely be much smaller than the annual increase of C$50 million reported in
The Globe and Mail of 25 February 1997. Canada currently contributes, on a yearly basis, some C$150 million to NATO infrastructure and has been reducing its contribution in recent years.
Nevertheless, the question of costs, has been the subject of intense discussions at NATO Headquarters in Brussels and is moving to the forefront of the enlargement debate as the Alliance prepares for the July Summit. Proponents claim that the costs are affordable. Secretary General Javier Solana in his 4 March speech at Chatham House criticized think tanks for cost figures that were, in his view, "grossly exaggerated and based on arbitrary and unrealistic assumptions." The US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, in The Economist, acknowledged that NATO enlargement "will involve real costs, to the United States, its allies, and its partners." "Nevertheless, the costs are reasonable," she argued, "and many would arise whether NATO expands or not." (82)
The studies to which the Secretary General of NATO alluded were conducted by Rand researchers, Asmus, Kugler, and Larrabee, and by the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO).(83) For illustrative purposes, both analysis assumed that the Visegrad Four (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) would be invited to join NATO in the first wave. The notional costs were for a 10-15 year period. The Rand enlargement study speculates that the budget cost for the entire Alliance, new and current members, over a 10-15 period, could be as low as US $10 billion, depending on the defence posture chosen. The low end would involve a self-defence posture for new members, with some new infrastructure. The high end involves a forward defence posture, inferring allied military deployment in these countries. The Rand study speculates that an enlarged NATO could meet its requirements by upgrading CEE defences and by preparing current NATO forces for projecting power to the region in time of crisis. Such a posture could be implemented within a package costing approximately US $42 billion.
The CBO estimates are higher than Rand's. They vary from a low of US $60 billion, ( US $42 billion as costs to new members), to a high of some US $125 billion. The estimates were based on two different approaches. Whereas the Rand study is postulated on goals and capability, the CBO estimates were mostly driven by a NATO strategy of preparing for war against Russia. The first and the least costly option explored by the CBO might provide a new member state with a defence posture to defend itself against a border skirmish or limited attack by a regional power. This often raises the question where the Visegrad countries will find that sort of money. CBO's other four more ambitious and costly options focus on the greater threat of a resurgent Russia. These four illustrative scenarios are worrisome in that they give the impression that the enlargement debate in the United States could be driven by "whipping-up anti-Russian hysteria, which could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. (84)
More recently, cost estimates were included in the 24 February 1997 Clinton Administration Report to the US Congress on the enlargement of NATO. (85) The Report estimates that the costs associated with enlargement, from 1997 to 2009, will be about US $27 to US $35 billion, (in the same ballpark as the Rand study). The costs are divided into three categories: new members' costs for military restructuring; NATO's regional reinforcement capabilities, (some US $8-10 billion), and direct enlargement costs. These direct enlargement costs will total approximately US $9-12 billion; (average of $700-$900 million annually). About 35% of these costs would be absorbed by the new members, the United States would absorb some 15%, and the other current NATO members would absorb about 50%.
The US Administration Report acknowledges that the cost estimates for NATO enlargement are speculative and highly dependent on a host of assumptions. The assumptions include: the specific new members admitted, the nature of the projected threat environment; the strategy that NATO adopts to carry out the conventional and security guarantees codified in Article V and its associated force posture; the reform of NATO command structure; the criteria used for allocating costs among the countries involved; and the scope of defence effort those current members would take without enlargement.
NATO has yet to decide most of these issues and speculating on an exact cost estimate is presumptuous at this stage. Suffice to say that establishing the cost of NATO enlargement is not just a financial matter, but also a political and strategic one. Across the Alliance elected officials are starting to probe what enlargement will cost to the taxpayers whether they be Canadian, American, British, Czech, or Polish. Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy on 20 March 1997, in his statement to the Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Foreign Affairs and International Trade informed the members that the costs could not be estimated at this time. Canada, however, wishes to keep them at a minimum. He promised to inform Parliament when these costs are known.
At the July Madrid Summit, once Alliance leaders decide which countries will be invited, NATO will need to address this matter seriously before the ratification process gets under way in the Alliance's parliaments and national assemblies.
At the July Summit, NATO leaders will invite some countries to begin accession negotiations. The invitation is consequential. NATO's glue remains the commitment of its members to treat any attack on one, as an attack on all. By extending the Article V nuclear and conventional security guarantees, to these newly independent nations, NATO expands its sphere of
influence and commits its members, including Canada, to "take such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security" and integrity of these new members.
The NAC will likely sign, in December 1997, the protocols of accession resulting from the consultations with new members. The ratification of these protocols, in 1998, could take up to one year in some countries. The ratification process is likely to be easier in countries with parliamentary systems, such as Canada, where ratification involves the issuance of an Order-in-Council authorizing the Minister of Foreign Affairs to sign an instrument of acceptance of the protocols of accession.
Given the importance of the subject, Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs should submit the issue to Parliament for debate as he promised the Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The Committee has already held several meetings on the issue in recent months where Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, and, several NGOs such as the Canadian Council for International Peace and Security (CCIPS) have presented briefs. The future involvement of these two Committees, and Parliament are essential components in allowing informed debate in Canada.
There will be increasing focus on whether unanimous agreement can be reached on the ratification of the protocols of accession to the Alliance of these new members. The unanimous ratification by all sixteen NATO members is not a certainty. The recent threats by Greece and Turkey to veto the accession of new members to NATO over the possible accession of Cyprus to the EU are one indication. In the US, ratification must overcome very serious hurdles. The US needs a two-thirds vote from its traditionally independent Senate in order to ratify the protocols. In the 23 January 1997 edition of the International Herald Tribune, Senator Biden, a key Democratic member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated "that none of this has been debated by the United States public and Congress and until it is, anyone who assumes that Congress is on board for this, is making a big mistake." He repeated his warning during a March visit to Prague where he said that "achieving the two-thirds vote required in the United States Senate may be difficult."
Adding new members to NATO will, in the United States, require ratification of the protocols of accession by the Senate and approval by both Chambers of Congress for resources needed to carry out this initiative. Many pointed questions are likely to be raised by inquisitive US Senators and Representatives during the ratification process. These are likely to include: Why are we still in Europe and what are we getting for it? What will be the cost and who will pay? Will current and new members be ready to pay their share? Have we conceded too much to Russia? Will enlargement really produce greater stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area? And by extension, why should the United States provide nuclear and conventional guarantees, when there is no clear and present Russia military threat to these countries? Such a debate in the US Senate could easily turn into a far-reaching referendum of the entire array of worldwide United States commitments. A positive vote in the Senate will mean that the United States will carry on playing a positive role in the world overall, but especially in the Euro-Atlantic area, into the twenty-first century.
In the end, the key determinant of the fate of NATO enlargement's ratification in the United States is likely to be the White House. The US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has already taken the lead in developing public awareness with a major pro-enlargement article in the 15 February 1997 edition of The Economist. Jeremy Rosner argues in a recent edition of NATO Review that if, "the Clinton administration's advocacy of NATO enlargement is active and bipartisan, the Senate will produce the two-thirds vote that is required. (86)
Clearly, a major campaign to sensitize the public, parliaments, and the media as to the why of enlargement must be undertaken as a matter of priority in all Alliance countries (in Canada and in the United States, two influential newspapers, the Globe and Mail and the New York Times, have taken an anti-enlargement editorial position). Unanimous agreement by all sixteen member nations, without which enlargement cannot take place, is not a foregone conclusion.
61. 61. Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), December 1996.
62. 62. For the full details on the modalities of the enlargement process, see Chapter 6 of the "NATO Enlargement Study," September 1995.
63. A myriad of articles, for and against NATO enlargement, have been written. Two volumes contain a number of excellent articles on the subject. Will NATO Go East? - The Debate Over Enlarging the Atlantic Alliance, D. Haglund, ed. (Kingston, Ontario: Queen's University Centre for International Affairs, 1996), and NATO's Transformation, The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance, Philip Gordon, ed. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1997). For a Canadian perspective on the issue see Albert Legault and Allen Sens, "Canada and NATO Enlargement, Interests and Options," Canadian Foreign Policy, vol. 4, no. 2, (Fall 1996), pp.88-93.
64. 64. Javier Solana, "Secretary General's speech at the CSIS," Brussels, 21 February 1997.
65. 65. T.Friedman, "NATO Expansion As a Crafty Consolation Prize," International Herald Tribune, 23 January 1996, p. 9.
66. 66. R. Asmus, R. Kugler, F. Larrabee, "NATO Enlargement: A Framework for Analysis," NATO's Transformation, The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance, Philip Gordon, ed. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1996), p. 93.
67. 67. Jeffrey D. McCausland and Robert Dorff, "Forword" "Will NATO Go East? - The Debate Over the Enlarging the Atlantic Alliance", D. Haglund, ed. (Kingston, Ontario: Queen's Centre for International Affairs, 1996), p. vii.
68. 68. J. Barret, "NATO's Year of Study: Results and Policy Implicatjions," p. 95.
69. 69. S. Sloan, "Negotiating a New Transatlantic Bargain," NATO Review, vol. 44, no. 2, (March 1996), p. 19.
70. 70. Z. Brzezinski, "A Plan for Europe," Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, no. 1, (Jan/Feb 1995), p. 31.
71. 71. T. Friedman, "Sucked Into the Wrong Vacuum," New York Times, 14 July 1996.
72. 72. It is not clear whether a popular consensus against NATO enlargement exists in Moscow. Recent polls conducted in Russia offer no definite answer. A poll by the newspaper, Moskovskiye Novosti, found that 51% of Russians viewed NATO expansion as a "serious threat" to Russia; only 14% disagreed. A poll by the respected Russian Centre for Public Opinion found a similar majority "unreservedly negative" on the proposed changes in the Alliance, see Christian Caryl, "Ivan O Public Speaks: No to NATO," US News and World Report, 24 March 1997, p. 42. On the other hand, an article in the May/June issue of NATO Review offers the results of two other polls where only 30% of the respondents felt that NATO enlargement ran counter to Russian interests, see Tatiana Parkhalina, "Of Myths and Illusions: Russian Perceptions of NATO Enlargement," NATO Review, no. 3, (May/June 1997), pp. 11-15.
73. 73. T. Friedman, "Sucked Into the Wrong Vacuum," NewYork Times, 14 July 1996.
74. 74. Robert Blackwill, Rodric Braithwaite, Akihikv Tariaka, Engaging Russia - A Report to the Trilateral Commission, (New York, 1997), p.4.
75. 75. J. Andrew Pierre, Dmitri Trenin, "Developing NATO -Russian Relations," Survival, vol. 39, no. 1, (Spring 1997), p. 7.
76. 76. J. Andrew Pierre, Dmitri Trenin, "Developing NATO - Russian Relations," Survival, vol. 39, no. 1, (Spring 1997), p. 7.
77. 77. The key article in the Washington Treaty, Article V, calls for each of the members to consider an attack on one to be an attack on all, and to render assistance to "the party or parties so attacked." NATO members, however, are only obligated to employ "Such action as they deem necessary." Hence, the "hard" security guarantees codified in Article V are implicit.
78. 78. William Drozdiak, "Is NATO's Southern Flank Exposed?" International Herald Tribune, 20 May 1997.
79. 79. Javier Solana, "Secretary General's Speech to the Royal Institute of International Relations," Brussels, 14 January 1997.
80. 80. Stephen Kinzer, "Kinkel Tells Turkey It's Not Ready for EU," International Herald Tribune, 27 March 1997, p. 1.
81. 81. Turkish Daily News, 14 March 1997, Internet.
82. Madeleine Albright, "Enlarging NATO -Why Bigger is Better," The Economist, February 1997, pp. 21-23.
83. 83. R. Asmus, R. Kugler, S. Larabee, "What Will NATO Enlargement Cost?" Survival, vol. 38, (Autumn 1996), pp. 5-26, and Congressional Budget Office,(CBO), The Costs of Expanding the NATO Alliance, (Washington, D.C., March 1996).
84. 84. Z. Brzezinski, "A Plan for Europe," Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, no. 1, (Jan/Feb 1995), p. 26.
85. Report to the Congress on the Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale, Benefits, Costs, and Implications. Released by the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, US Department of State, 24 February 1997.
86. 86. Jeremy Rosner, "Will Congress Back Admitting New Members?" NATO Review, vol. 45, no. 1, (January
1997), p. 14.