4-1. PURPOSE. The purpose of this chapter is to outline the requirements to preposition watercraft and to identify the follow-on flow of CONUS-based watercraft to the theater. Prepositioning and follow-on deployment of Army watercraft are addressed in terms of where we are, where we’re going, and how we’ll get there.

4-2. PREPOSITIONING — WHERE WE ARE.

A. The purpose of prepositioning is to locate sufficient Army watercraft overseas, either afloat, area prepositioned, or forwarded stationed, in order to meet reaction times required by the ASMP. In March 1993, the need to preposition Army watercraft was briefed to and approved by the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA). Today, the prepositioned fleet of watercraft does not meet ASMP requirements.

2. Craft are currently prepositioned using four methods - afloat aboard the heavy lift ship American Cormorant, six leased pusher tugs aboard the LASH ships, stored vessels at the maintenance facility in Hythe, England, and 2 LSVs forward stationed in Hawaii. Table 4-1 (p. 4-2) identifies the location and type of all of the craft considered part of the prepositioned fleet as of 1 October 1996.

Table 4-1. Status of Prepositioned Army Watercraft as of 1 Oct 96

A description of the contents of each column is provided below.

1) American Cormorant (Nov 95). There is currently one afloat preposition ship loaded with Army watercraft. Vessels were loaded aboard American Cormorant in November 1995.

2) Hythe, U.K. Storage Depot. Vessels in storage at the Hythe, U.K. depot. These vessels make up the follow-on load for the American Cormorant.

3) Leased and aboard LASH ships. Leased pusher tugs are prepositioned afloat aboard LASH ships.

4) Forward stationed. The two LSVs forward stationed in the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) AOR are part of the prepositioned fleet. The craft are crewed and operational.

5) Vessels currently in prepo. Reflects the sum of all previous columns.

4-3. PREPOSITIONING — REQUIREMENT. The foundation of the preposition requirement is the off-loading of the afloat heavy brigade in six days. Review and analysis of the existing prepositioned fleet revealed it is not adequate to accomplish the required mission.

A. A computer-based optimization model of the JLOTS process was used to determine the most economical mix of watercraft required to complete the off-load of the afloat heavy brigade in six days (see chapter five for description of the model). The model includes many aspects of the LOTS process, however, certain assumptions were required to allow selection of the optimum mix of craft. The assumptions that guided the modeling process and final selection of the preposition set were:

1) The heavy lift prepositioned ship(s) (HLPS) must be off-loaded two days prior to commencement of LOTS.

2) The afloat heavy brigade and AWR-3 will arrive not later than (NLT) C+6.

3) The operation will begin with an instream discharge of the Army heavy brigade afloat.

4) Capability will exist to work two LMSRs simultaneously, consisting of four RO/RO and two lift-on/lift-off (LO/LO) lanes on one ship, and two RO/RO and two LO/LO on another. This assumes that three RRDFs will be available.

5) The ASMP requires the afloat heavy brigade ashore NLT C+15 (four LMSR ships).

6) Partial fixed-port operations will be available by C+20.

7) Some ships may require instream discharge regardless of available port facilities due to service draft limitations.

8) AWR-3 prepositioning will be augmented by watercraft deployed from CONUS to support CINC requirements as necessary.

9) AWR-3 watercraft will support follow-on CINC JLOTS, to include intracoastal main supply routes (IMSR) requirements.

10) A second float-on/float-off (FLO/FLO) ship (at least as capable as the American Cormorant) and a Tactical-Auxiliary Crane ship (T-ACS) will be procured.

11) Prepositioned watercraft will be deployed in unit sets.

12) Expected Operational Readiness (OR) rate of 75 percent.

13) Personnel and materials handling equipment (MHE) are available.

B. Development of the preposition requirements was based on the deployment of watercraft in unit sets. This is in accordance with Army policy and ensures that Headquarters and support elements necessary for operation of individual craft are also included. The unit sets required to support prepositioned watercraft for a single geographical location are depicted in Table 4-2 (p. 4-4). This mix of transportation units will provide the ability to accomplish any type of Army watercraft mission in any location.

Table 4-2. Unit Requirements for Prepositioning

C. A total of 35 craft are required to support the unit sets listed in Table 4-2. The preferred method of prepositioning is loading all 35 craft aboard HLPS that are capable of responding to any location throughout the world. Today, the American Cormorant is the only HLPS ship contracted to deliver Army preposition watercraft. Efforts are in progress to obtain a second HLPS ship with at least the same capacity as the American Cormorant. However, the cargo capacity of two HLPSs is not adequate to load all 35 watercraft. The lack of adequate HLPS cargo capacity necessitates an alternative preposition strategy be followed. The most economical approach is to use a combination of two HLPSs, area prepositioning and forward stationing of crewed craft. This combination strategy will provide a preposition force that is capable of executing and accomplishing ASMP objectives. However, it does result in an increase in the total number of craft that are prepositioned from 35 to 45. The quantity, type, and preposition strategy of each craft is shown in Figure 4-1 (p. 4-5). The majority of the required capability, 25 craft, is loaded aboard two HLPS. The modular causeway systems are stored and transported aboard the LMSR or SEABEE ships. This plan only includes watercraft necessary to support a single contingency, but it does provide the ability to cover either of two geographical areas. This is accomplished by forwarding stationing and area prepositioning in locations most likely to experience hostilities. The mix of craft chosen for loading aboard the HLPS was selected to optimize the limited loading space and provide a mix of capability, i.e. cargo capacity, tug capability, and lift capability, in the event the vessels were deployed to a location where area prepositioned craft are not available. The location of the forward stationed and area prepositioned craft will be determined based on the location of the most likely contingencies. The forward stationed LSVs will be crewed and in service. The area prepositioned craft will be dry or wet stored.

The current number and mix of craft in the Army inventory is not adequate to execute this prepositioning strategy. Limited procurement of LSVs and LCU-2000s is required before the necessary prepositioned watercraft capability can be deployed.

Figure 4-1

4-4. PREPOSITIONING — HOW WE’LL GET THERE. In order to implement our prepositioning strategy, we have identified objectives that are both aggressive and challenging. Specifically, we will:

A. Build a prepositioned Army watercraft package that will be able to accomplish ASMP objectives using a combination of afloat prepositioning, area prepositioning, and forward stationed craft. Afloat prepositioned craft will deploy to the contingency area to join the forward stationed fleet already in the region.

1) Vessels forward stationed will be wet or dry stored. Only LSVs will be crewed; all others will be maintained as Army war reserve stocks.

2) Vessels prepositioned afloat (AWR-3) will be loaded aboard HLPSs, LMSRs, SEABEEs, and/or LASH ships.

3) The afloat prepositioned set will link up with either set of the area prepositioned and forward stationed craft to accomplish off-load of the afloat heavy brigade.

4) After downloading, AWR-3 ships will return to CONUS and upload TOE craft and return with the follow-on craft necessary to satisfy identified CINC sustainment and intracoastal MSR requirements.

B. Identify unit sets by SRC

C. Continue to support the acquisition of an additional HLPS (FLO/FLO) with capacity equal to or greater than the current vessel, the American Cormorant.

D. Pursue avenues to make available for Army use existing AWR-3 sealift assets for afloat prepositioning of Army watercraft.

E. Require sufficient sealift assets to preposition AWR-3 watercraft that will deploy to a contingency area to join the area prepositioned and forward stationed fleet already in the region. The addition of a SEABEE ship may provide an economical and operationally efficient way to provide additional lift capability for a portion of the remaining prepositioned watercraft requirement. SEABEE ships can be used to transport assembled causeways that cannot fit onto T-ACS, preloaded LARCs, preloaded LCMs, and barges (fuel and cargo). Preassembled modular causeway systems (MCSs) will not fit on the deck of a T-ACS, but will fit on the deck a SEABEE. In order to identify all possible transport options and ensure the most efficient use of strategic sealift assets, we will generate a stow plan for MCSs.

F. Maximize space available for watercraft and MHE aboard AWR-3 ships.

G. Develop a plan to upload HLPSs with CONUS-based TOE craft immediately following download at a contingency.

H. Endeavor to add Army watercraft to PACOM and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Army war reserve stocks for accountability and maintenance.

I. Review AWR-3, area prepositioned, and forward stationed watercraft cyclic maintenance schedules and locations.

J. Review potential contract augmentation and host-nation support contracts that may change the stated requirements.

K. Solicit input from Army components to validate the Army capability required in CINC AOR and highlight watercraft units for inclusion on in CINC time phased force deployment data (TPFDD).

L. Recommend changes to doctrine and realignment of structure to support Army Strategic Mobility and Unified Command watercraft requirements.

M. Maintain a capable fleet of Army watercraft by executing our Modernization Strategy (see Chapter Six).

4-5. FOLLOW-ON DEPLOYMENT

A. The craft required for prepositioning were selected to off-load the afloat heavy brigade in six days. The quantity and capability of the prepositioned craft are not adequate to satisfy CINC throughput requirements or perform intracoastal MSR missions that will exist throughout the duration of the campaign. Analysis of CINC and ASMP requirements identified the need for additional CONUS-based craft to perform LOTS, intracoastal missions, and utility functions. The throughput requirements were translated into required watercraft capability through the use of a LOTS computer model (see paragraph 5-4 for description of model). The craft totals resulting from the mission analysis were translated into unit sets. The time phased arrival of each unit, prepositioned and CONUS based, required to support the most demanding CINC requirement is shown in Figure 4-2. Arrival time of CONUS craft will depend on the time notification to deploy is received, distance to the contingency, weather encountered in route, and type of craft.

B. Deployment of CONUS-based follow-on craft will be accomplished by a combination of self-deployment and a second load on the HLPSs. The first craft arriving in the theater after those prepositioned, will self-deploy. In order for these craft to arrive in the required timeframe, a decision to deploy must be made prior to C day to allow the craft to sail on or before C day. With the exception of the LSV, the remaining craft necessary to support CINC requirements would be transported as a second HLPS load. This final group of craft is required to support the second workload peak experienced during the counteroffensive phase.

4-6. SUMMARY. The foundation of our prepositioning strategy is off-loading the afloat heavy brigade in six days. As such, we will employ a combination strategy of afloat preposition, area preposition, and forward stationing. This strategy will ensure that adequate watercraft capacity is available to support JLOTS and intracoastal MSR requirements in either of two geographical locations. We have built a prepositioning capability that focuses on the most demanding early entry watercraft mission — Logistics Over-the-Shore. As reception of the force proceeds, and infrastructure improvements are made, we expect to quickly transition to fixed-port operations with LOTS/JLOTS augmentation. Follow-on craft, deployed from CONUS, will provide the additional capacity necessary to meet the identified throughput requirements. Follow-on deployment will include self deploying craft and a second HLPS load. The existing Army watercraft fleet is not adequate to implement the required prepositioning strategy or capable of providing the necessary follow-on craft. Procurement of additional LSVs and LCU-2000s must be accomplished before this plan can be fully executed.