Medium Armored Vehicle




a. This Annex describes those items considered in the general category of preplanned product improvements for the Family of Medium Armored Vehicles (MAV). It recognizes that the urgency of obtaining solutions envisioned by the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) and Organizational and Operational (O&O) Concept will most likely result in off-the-shelf solutions. The P3I requirements described below represent capability growth via technology insertion. MAV adaptability will ensure the MAV-equipped brigade remains dominant across the spectrum of conflict.

b. The appendices describe P3I requirements for the corresponding variant or configuration.

Appendices to Annex D:

Infantry Carrier Vehicle Appendix 1 NONE

Mortar Carrier Appendix 2 NONE

Antitank Guided Missile Vehicle Appendix 3

Reconnaissance Vehicle Appendix 4

Fire Support Vehicle Appendix 5

Engineer Squad Vehicle Appendix 6 NONE

Commander's Vehicle Appendix 7 NONE

Medical Evacuation Vehicle Appendix 8

NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle Appendix 9

Mobile Gun System Appendix 10

MAV Howitzer Appendix 11

2. Common MAV P3I requirements. (Following paragraph numbering corresponds to MAV ORD.)

4. Capabilities Required.

a. System Requirements.

(1) Accept ABCS and communications systems upgrades as needed.

Rationale: To operate in urban and complex terrain, enhancements will be needed that will overcome line of sight limitations. Additionally, communications systems undergo normal cyclic upgrades which may affect space and integration requirements.

(16) MAV must provide overhead crew protection against 152mm HE airburst at (Classified) meters.

Rationale: Armed with its networked information capability, the IBCT selects when and where to go on the battlefield, providing advanced warning and standoff from the threat. These capabilities provide the protection levels required for each system when the decision is made to engage in the close fight. Because of the proximity of small arms engagements, (Classified) meters is needed for all around small arms protection. RPGs and 14.5mm heavy machine guns are proliferated throughout the world and are expected to be among the "weapons of choice" for opposing forces. In close-in terrain, during the assault, dismounted infantry and situational understanding will provide standoff. The IBCTs scale able protection requirement provides the platforms the ability to support add-on armor packages capable of defeating hand-held weapons and eliminating "cheap kills." Vulnerability to enemy artillery fire has been convincingly demonstrated in simulation-based wargaming. To provide overhead protection during movement and while supporting dismounted assaults, (Classified) meters of overhead standoff is necessary.

(18) MAV must provide all around crew protection against the blast and overpressure effects of mines containing up to 7.5kg of explosives. This does not include shaped-charges or an explosively formed penetrator exploding under the entire length of a vehicle with mine protection.

Rationale: Worldwide proliferation of mines is a major threat to movement of maneuver forces. The amount of explosive materiel required to disable an armored vehicle is 7.5kg and is what is found in most anti-vehicular mines. This level of protection is an essential capability for medium or high tempo operations described in the O&O concept.

(23) A fuel transfer pump permitting MAV-to-MAV refueling is required.

Rationale: A fuel transfer pump on each MAV permits the field commander tactical flexibility to use captured fuel, de-fueling for air transport, cross leveling/scavenging fuel and provide operational flexibility should resupply be delayed.

(21) MAV must be capable of towing fully loaded Palletized Loading System (PLS) trailers and supporting 4000 pounds of weight from the tongue of a trailer to the towing pintle.

Rationale: Towing trailers allows the combat systems to move forward carrying critical supplies. This capability will offset inherent risk in the unit design due to the limited available assets for transportation, particularly for sustained operations. The greatest requirement for tongue weight on the towing pintle comes from the potential field artillery requirement to tow a M198 Howitzer which applies 4000 pounds weight from the tongue of the trailer.

(25) MAV must provide onboard electrical power and installation space configured for required systems. The MAV intercom system provides crew and occupant access to multiple external platform communications systems.

Rationale: MAV-hosted C4ISR systems support the requirement for highly mobile, multiple security level, digital, voice, and video capabilities that provide highly reliable, real-time, accurate, voice and data message delivery. The MAV hosted data and voice systems provide network access for dismounted soldiers. The MAV intercom system permits each of the operating stations to selectively monitor the intercommunications system and operate up to four radios.

(26) All MAV configurations, less the NBC MAV, will have an integrated NBC Sensor Suite to provide detection of chemical, biological agents, and toxic industrial materials, and to provide immediate warning to personnel inside the vehicle, personnel near the vehicle, and by broadcast to personnel separated from the vehicle. Suite will also provide digital data that can be passed back by the MAV's C2 suite into the cooperative NBC defense network. Joint Chemical Agent Alarm(JCAD) is to be the first sensor to be integrated into the NBC Sensor Suite. Biological detection sensor, as well as more advanced and smaller chemical and radiological detectors, will leverage developments in NBC unmanned ground sensor R&D. Dismounted soldiers will be provided small, multifunctional NBC/TIM detection capability to provide force protection for soldiers with no access to vehicle mounted systems, such as soldiers operating inside buildings or underground.

(27) Combat Identification. This capability must be interoperable with allied/coalition force platforms. MAV shall use input from and provide data to an existing C4ISR/SA multi-level system of systems network for CBT ID to reduce fratricide to a negligible level. ID shall be positive (>98% Correct ID) and real-time, within engagement timelines.

Rationale: The objective capability to reduce the risk of fratricide and augment situational awareness through combat identification must also ensure the safety of our allied/coalition force platforms for the same reasons our force requires this capability. Combat identification will improve combat effectiveness in the joint and coalition environment but will require a greater effort to attain. MAV must be capable of positive ID of Friend, Foe, and Neutrals/Noncombatants on the battlefield. In the objective state ID must come from a multi-level system of systems to optimize future SA information and improved onboard ID capabilities. ID and SA capabilities must be combined so as to avoid single point failure and to allow ID from the platform in the case of isolation from the SA network.

4. c. Logistics and Readiness.

(6) MAV configurations must be equipped with embedded interactive electronic technical manuals. The operator tasks should be embedded on system and integrated with an on-board diagnostics interface into the Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS-A).

Rationale: The Army requires that all technical manuals be produced in the digital format. This will eliminate the space requirement for all of the paper technical manuals. A requirement under the Army Diagnostics Improvement Program (ADIP) is to provide technical and diagnostic information to the system operator, automate the work order process, and transmit those requests to GCSS-A. By embedding the electronic technical manuals, the operator/maintainer has permanent access to the technical data without requiring a hard copy.

(11) All MAV variants must incorporate the capability to easily accept Automated Information Technology (AIT) such as Smart Card authorization for operation of vehicle, etc.

Rationale: AIT and automated personnel accountability will be mandated on the modern battlefield. The capability for this technology insertion needs to be accommodated in the initial design and incorporated in construction of the MAV.

4. d. Other System Characteristics.

(1) (a) Decontamination to negligible risk levels following thorough decontamination is desired. P3I MAV must provide crew and passengers additional NBC protection through an overpressure system.

Rationale: MAV will be utilized as mission critical/essential equipment where the loss of MAV theater-wide due to HEMP or localized due to NBC will have an effect on its mission. By regulation, but more importantly, for the protection of the crew and passengers, MAV needs to be operable in these threat environments. Above wording provides for requirements that will provide protection for the crew, but at reasonable cost and realistically achievable by the PM. The Army’s "front-line-shooters" must be survivable to initial nuclear weapons effects. Soldiers who survive the initial NBC environment can continue the fight, assuming an offensive and self-preservation function exists. According to the O&O concept, MAV forces are intended to be an initial entry force and therefore will be a primary target for nuclear weapons. Current threat projections and intelligence confirm that nuclear weapons are proliferating and are still a viable threat against our tactical forces.

5. Program Support.

d. Computer Resources. The mission planning system must interface with the Maneuver Control System (MCS). Computing systems must include GPS/PosNav capability.