This previously undisclosed weapon, carried by the F-117A Nighthawk stealth fighter, was used for the first time on 02 May 1999 as part of Operation ALLIED FORCE strikes against Serbia. Following these attacks lights went out over 70 per cent of the country. The munition was subsequently used on the night of 07 May 1999 to counter Serbian efforts to restore damage caused by the initial attack.
Similar in concept to the "Kit-2" Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile warhead used in the opening days of Operation DESERT STORM, few details of either weapons can be established on an unclassified basis. The missiles, packed with bomblets filled with small spools of carbon-fiber wire, deprived Iraq of 85% of its generating capacity. During the Gulf War Iraq responded to the use of this type of munition by disconnecting electrical power grid circuit breakers. Attacks on Iraqi power facilities shut down their effective operation and eventually collapsed the national power grid. Coalition planners in the theater initially directed that the switching system be targeted, rather than the generator halls. For the first three days, the ATO explicitly contained specific aimpoints for strikes against electrical production facilities. Subsequently the specific aimpoints were only sporadically included. When wing-level planners lacked specific guidance on which aimpoints to hit at electrical power plants, they sometimes chose to target generator halls, which are among the aimpoints listed in standard targeting manuals.
The BLU-114/B detonates over its target and disperses huge numbers of fine carbon filaments, each far smaller than the crude wire spools used in the gulf war. The filaments are only a few hundredths of an inch thick and can float in the air like a dense cloud. When the carbon fiber filaments dispensed from the BLU-114/B submunition contact transformers and other high voltage equipment, a short circuit occurs and an arc is often created when the current flows through the fiber, which is vaporized. The graphite, which is a conductor of electric current, is probably coated with other materials to enhance these effects. At the spot where the electric field is strongest, a discharge is initiated, and electrons rapidly form an ionized channel that conducts electricity. At this stage current can flow and an arc forms. This causes instantaneous local melting of a certain amount of the material at the surface of the two conductors. If the current involved is strong enough, these arcs can cause injury or start a fire. Fires can also be started by overheated equipment or by conductors that carry too much current. Extremely high-energy arcs can cause an explosion that sends fragmented metal flying in all directions.Although specific details remain classified, and the Pentagon has explicitly declined to provide any information on this munition, it is probably the case the unit cost of the munition is comparable to that of the Joint Standoff Attack Weapon or the CBU-97/CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapon -- in the range of several hundred thousand dollars. The relative simplicity of the concept and the potential to utilize components from other munitions probably allowed relatively low development costs. The BLU-114/B designation refers to the special purpose submunition, rather than the entire weapon system. It is certainly the case that this submunition is carried to the target area by some dispenser system, of the sort that typically delivers other such submunitions. The first use of the BLU-114/B submunition was during Operation Allied Force, when it was used to attack Serbian power grid transformer and switching yards. Dropped by the F-117, the munition was dispensed using the SUU-66/B Tactical Munitions Dispenser normally associated with the delivery of the terminally guided BLU-108/B submunitions carried on the CBU-97/CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapon. The unguided used in these systems is typically delivered with a circular error probable of a few hundred feet. Other more precise weapon delivery systems such as the Joint Direct Attack Munition do not appear readily adaptable to existing submunition dispenser systems, though such an application would not constitute an overly challenging engineering problem. The AGM-154A Joint Standoff Weapon [JSOW] is intended to provide a low cost, standoff air-to-surface glide weapon with a modular design which allows several different submunitions, unitary warheads, or non-lethal payloads to be carried. The JSOW is a launch and leave weapon that employs a tightly coupled Global Positioning System (GPS)/Inertial Navigation System (INS), and is capable of day/night and adverse weather operations. The JSOW will be employed on a variety or aircraft, including: F/A-18A/B, C/D, and E/F; AV-8B; F-14A/B and /D; F-16C/D; F-15E; F-117; B-1B; and B-52. JSOW initial introduction to the operational commands was on the Navy/Marine Corps F/A-18 in mid-1998. Certification for carriage on the B-2 was achieved in early 1999, and scheduled for the B-52 in 2000. Block E upgrades to the B-1B to integrates the Joint Standoff Weapon for standoff capability are scheduled to by completed in FY2002. The AGM-154C (Unitary Variant) carries the unitary BLU-111/B 500-pound penetrator warhead. The warhead of the AGM-154A (Baseline JSOW) consists of 145 BLU-97/B submunitions. The warhead for the AGM-154B (Anti-Armor) is six BLU-108/B submunitions from the Air Force's Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW) program. It is possible that another more precise BLU-114/B delivery system, either currently or in the future, would consist of a previously undisclosed AGM-154D variant of the JSOW.
The electricity first goes to a transformer at the power plant that boosts the voltage up to 400,000 volts for distribution through extra-high voltage (EHV) transmission lines. When electricity travels long distances it is better to have it at higher voltages since the electricity can be transferred more efficiently at high voltages. High voltage transmission lines carry electricity long distances to a substation. At transmission substations a reduction in voltage occurs for distribution to other points in the system through high voltage (HV) transmission lines. Further voltage reductions for commercial and residential customers take place at distribution substations, which connect to the primary distribution network.Utility transmission and distribution systems [T&D] systems link electric generators with end users through a network of power lines and associated components. In the United States typically the transmission portion of the system is designated as operating at 69 kilovolts (kV) and above, while the distribution portion operates between 110 volts and 35 kV. A further distinction is often made between primary distribution (voltages between 2.4 and 35 kV) and secondary distribution (110 to 600 volt) systems. Industrial and commercial customers with large power demands often receive service directly from the primary distribution system.
Transformers are a crucial link in the electric power distribution system. Utility transformers are high-voltage distribution transformers typically used by utilities to step down the voltage of electricity going into their customers' buildings. Distribution transformers are one of the most widely used elements in the electric distribution system. They convert electricity from the high voltage levels in utility transmission systems to voltages that can safely be used in businesses and homes. Distribution transformers are either mounted on an overhead pole or on a concrete pad. Most commercial and industrial buildings require several low-voltage transformers to decrease the voltage of electricity received from the utility to the levels used to power lights, computers, and other electric-operated equipment.
Transformers consist of two primary components: a core made of magnetically permeable material; and a conductor, or winding, typically made of a low resistance material such as copper or aluminum. The conductors are wound around a magnetic core to transform current from one voltage to another. Liquid insulation material or air surrounds the transformer core and conductors to cool and electrically insulate the transformer. Many different distribution transformer designs are available to utilities, depending on the loading patterns and needs of the end-user. Transformer engineers modify transformer design and vary material depending upon the needs of a particular utility (cost of energy, capacity, etc.).
A blackout is a condition where a major portion or all of an electrical network is de-energized with much of the system tied together through closed breakers. Any area whose tie-lines to the high voltage grid cannot support reasonable contingencies is a candidate for a blackout. System separations are possible at all loading levels and all times in the year. Changing generation patterns, scheduled transmission outages, and rapid weather changes among other reasons can all lead to blackouts. Separations due to dynamic instability are typically initiated by multiple contingencies such as loss of corridors, several transmission circuits, several generating units, or delayed fault clearing.The system just prior to a blackout may not be dynamically unstable but in an overloaded condition. At such loadings, the collapse may come about due to damage to thermally overloaded facilities, or circuits contacting underlying facilities or vegetation. When an overloaded facility trips, other facilities will increase their loadings and may approach their thermal capabilities or relay trip settings. Voltage collapse is the process by which voltage instability leads to the loss of voltage in a significant part of the system. This condition results from reactive losses significantly exceeding the reactive resources available to supply them. Circuits loaded above surge impedance loadings and reduced output of shunt capacitors as voltages decline can lead to accelerating voltage drops. Voltage collapse can look like both a steady-state problem with time to react and a problem where no effective operator intervention is possible. It is very hard to predict the area that will be affected or electrically isolated from the grid.
Voltage collapse is an event that occurs when an electric system does not have adequate reactive support to maintain voltage stability in which the sustained voltage level is controllable and within predetermined limits. Voltage Collapse may result in outage of system elements and may include interruption in service to customers. Apparent Power, the product of the volts and amperes, comprises both real and reactive power, usually expressed in kilovoltamperes (kVA) or megavoltamperes (MVA). Real Power is the rate of producing, transferring, or using electrical energy, usually expressed in kilowatts (kW) or megawatts (MW). Reactive power is the portion of electricity that establishes and sustains the electric and magnetic fields of alternating-current equipment. Reactive power must be supplied to most types of magnetic equipment, such as motors and transformers. It also must supply the reactive losses on transmission facilities. Reactive power is provided by generators, synchronous condensers, or electrostatic equipment such as capacitors and directly influences electric system voltage. It is usually expressed in kilovars (kvar) or megavars (Mvar).
The system restoration sequence and timing will be directly impacted by the various sizes, types, and state of operation of the system generating units prior to the blackout. After a system has blacked out, the system operators perform a survey of the system status. Circuit breaker positions will not provide a reliable indication of faulted versus non-faulted equipment. Breakers can be found in the closed position, but the associated transmission facility is faulted. If the system blackout is storm-initiated, this condition is quite possible. The storm can continue to damage equipment after the system is de-energized. Also, equipment with neutral connections, such as reactors, transformers, and capacitors, may be locked out from the neutral overcurrent conditions during system shutdown. These facilities may be in perfectly serviceable condition. Most relay systems will remain reliable and secure during restoration, provided there is adequate fault current available to activate the relaying. The most questionable relay reliability issues come from reclosing relays.A power generating unit separated from the may have islanded and continue to generate power for its station auxiliary load. With no system load on the generators, the station auxiliary demand will be quite small, and the steam generators output may be difficult to control. Immediate load addition may be required to keep the steam generator from tripping or having the steam turbine trip out on overspeed. Other units may be able to operate indefinitely on their auxiliary load.
An electrical utility which experiences an operating capacity emergency seeks to balance its generation to its load to avoid prolonged outages of service. The emergency reserve inherent in frequency deviation may be used as a temporary source of emergency energy. A utility unable to balance its generation to its load removes sufficient load to permit correction of the outage. In the event of a capacity deficiency, generation and transmission facilities are used to the fullest extent practicable to promptly restore normal system frequency and voltage. If all other steps prove inadequate to relieve the capacity emergency, the system may take immediate action which includes but is not limited to manual load shedding. Unilateral adjustment of generation to return frequency to normal may jeopardize overloaded transmission facilities. Voltage reduction for load relief is made on the distribution system. Voltage reduction on the subtransmission or transmission system may effective in reducing load; however, voltage reduction would not be made on the transmission system unless the system has been isolated from other interconnected systems. If the overload on a transmission facility or abnormal voltage/reactive condition persists and equipment is endangered, the affected system or pool may disconnect the affected facility. shutdown. If abnormal levels of frequency or voltage resulting from an area disturbance make it unsafe to operate the generators or their support equipment in parallel with the system, their separation or shutdown would be accomplished in a manner to minimize the time required to re-parallel and restore the system to normal.After a system collapse restoration begins when it can proceed in an orderly and secure manner. Restoration priority is normally given to the station supply of power plants and the transmission system. Even though restoration is intended to be expeditious, system operators seek to avoid premature action to prevent a re-collapse of the system. Customer load is normally restored as generation and transmission equipment becomes available, since load and generation must remain in balance at normal frequency as the system is restored. When voltage, frequency and phase angle permit, the system operator may resynchronize the isolated area with the surrounding area. In order to systematically restore loads without overloading the remaining system, opening circuit breakers may isolate loads in blacked-out areas. Reenergizing oil-filled pipe-type cables must be given special consideration, especially if loss of oil pumps could cause gas pockets to form in pipes or potheads. After determining the extent of the blackout and assessing the status of system equipment, the switching operations necessary for system reintegration represent a significant portion of the restoration process. Depending on the specific utility's requirements, there are two general switching strategies which may be used to sectionalize the transmission system for restoration. The first is the "all open" approach where all circuit breakers at affected (blacked out) substations are opened. The second strategy is the "controlled operation" where only those breakers necessary to allow system restoration to proceed are opened.