Joint Staff Officers Guide AFSC Pub 1 -- 1997

Crisis Action Planning Chapter 7

Single-Crisis Environment 7-9

Multiple-Crisis Environment 7-30

Crisis Action Planning



a. Overview. In peacetime, deliberate planning procedures are used to evaluate anticipated future situations to which the United States must be prepared to respond militarily. These situations are hypothetical predictions of regional conditions and scenarios that are considered so critical--because of their relative probability, importance to U.S. national security, and difficulty in scale of military response required to resolve them--that plans to respond to them must be prepared before they occur. Twelve months or more may be required to identify adequate responses, conduct the evaluation to select the best course of action, and prepare a feasible OPLAN. It is noteworthy that these potential situations are based on the best available intelligence, but are still hypothetical to the extent that not all conditions can be predicted, and, even if all variations of a future situation could be anticipated, they could not all be planned for. Further, in deliberate planning, resources are apportioned for planning. Even though forces, sustainment, and transportation resources apportioned to a plan may be sourced to that planís requirements in anticipation of the event, the actual situation with respect to those particular resources may prevent them from being allocated by the NCA to a real-time crisis response derived from that plan.

(1) While deliberate planning is conducted in anticipation of future events, there are always situations arising in the present that might require U.S. military response. Such situations may approximate those previously planned for in deliberate planning, though it is unlikely they would be identical, and sometimes they will be completely unanticipated. Usually, the time available to plan responses to such real-time events is short. In as little as a few days, a feasible course of action must be developed and approved, and timely identification of resources accomplished to ready forces, schedule transportation, and prepare supplies for movement and employment of U.S. military force. In such crisis or time-sensitive situations, the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) uses Crisis Action Planning (CAP) procedures, prescribed in Joint Pub 5-03.1 (to be published as CJCSM 3122.01), JOPES Volume I.

(2) In a crisis, the situation is dynamic, with the body of knowledge growing hour by hour from the latest intelligence reports. An adequate and feasible military response in a crisis demands flexible procedures keyed to the time available, to communications that are rapid and effective, and to the use of previous planning, whenever possible. The principal players need to know what others are doing, and they need to know what is expected of them.

(3) Crisis Action Planning procedures are used by the JPEC to plan for and execute deployment and employment of U.S. military forces in time-sensitive situations.

These procedures ensure

(4) The system is divided logically into separate phases illustrated in Figure

7-1; each has a definite start, a finish, and actions to be performed. The roles of the key members of the JPEC are described both for use as a checklist and for other community members to view the overall process. The procedures begin when the situation develops; the theater commander recognizes the potential significance of the event and reports it, along with his assessment, to the National Military Command Center. The NCA assess its diplomatic, economic, and informational implications and decide that a possible military response should be prepared. The CINC develops courses of action in response to the situation. The NCA select the COA. By direction of CJCS, the CINC prepares the detailed operation order (OPORD) to support the selected COA. At the direction of the NCA, the CINC executes the OPORD. This is an academic description, of course. In reality, the process is flexible; it permits the steps to be done sequentially or concurrently, or skipped altogether. The exact flow of the procedures is largely determined by the time available to complete the planning and by the significance of the crisis.

(5) Members of the JPEC are busy during the accelerated planning of a military response to a crisis. Figure 7-2 illustrates the primary responsibilities of the Joint Planning and Execution Community during crisis action.




Phase I

Phase II

Phase III

Phase IV

Phase V

Phase VI



Crisis Assessment

Course of Action Development

Course of Action Selection

Execution Planning



  • Event occurs with possible national security implications
  • ASSESSMENT received

  • CJCS presents refined and prioritized COAs to NCA
  • NCA decide to execute OPORD
  • Action

    • Monitor world situation
    • Recognize problem
    • Submit CINCís ASSESSMENT
  • Increase awareness
  • Increase reporting
  • JS asseses situation
  • JS advises on possible military action
  • NCA-CJCS evaluation
  • Develop COAs
  • CINC assigns tasks to sub-ordinates by evaluation request message
  • CINC reviews evaluation response messages
  • Create/modify TPFDD
  • USTRANSCOM prepares deployment estimates
  • Evaluate COAs
  • CJCS advice to NCA
  • CJCS may send PLANNING ORDER to begin execution planning before formal selection of COA by NCA
  • CINC develops OPORD
  • Refine TPFDD
  • Force preparation
  • CJCS sends EXECUTE ORDER by authority of SECDEF
  • CINC executes OPORD
  • JOPES data-base main-tained
  • JPEC reports execution status
  • Begin redeployment planning
  • Outcome

    • Assess that event may have national implications
    • Report the event to NCA/ CJCS
  • NCA/CJCS decide to develop military COA
  • CINC sends Commanderís Estimate with recommended COA
  • NCA select COA
  • CJCS releases COA selection by NCA in ALERT ORDER
  • CINC sends OPORD
  • Crisis resolved
  • Redeployment of forces
  • Figure 7-1

    (6) Military planners facing time-sensitive planning requirements must understand that the NCA are considering diplomatic, informational, economic, and military options. The military option may initially be the least desirable option, and a decision to execute it may be made only after other, less severe options have been judged unsuitable. In reaching a decision to develop a military solution, the NCA may consider the possible range of flexible deterrent options, as described in Chapter 6, pages 6-15 through 6-19. Ultimate responsibility and authority in a crisis rest with the NCA, who must approve a COA and authorize the major actions to be taken, including the deployment, employment, or redeployment of forces.




    • Approve the COA
    • Direct that major actions be taken, e.g., change deployment status, deploy forces
    • Authorize conduct of military operations against a potential enemy


    The Joint Staff

    • Manage planning process:

    review & analyze reports,

    resolve conflicts & shortfalls

    monitor deployment or employment

    • Offer options and recommendations to the NCA
    • Convey NCA decisions



    • Responds to a crisis
    • Prepares Commanderís Estimate
    • Develops COAs
    • Develops Operation Order for deployment or employment



    • Determines the force and resource requirements
    • Develops employment plan



    • Generates and sources force and support requirements
    • Makes deployment estimates for organic lift assets


    • Coordinates deployment planning & execution
    • Makes deployment estimates
    • Develops transportation-feasible schedules
    • Optimizes use of transportation capability
    • Reports progress of deployment to CJCS and supported commander


    • Furnish additional support forces through subordinate component


    • Identify and prepare reserve forces

    Figure 7-2

    b. Definition

    (1) Joint Pub 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, and Joint Pub 5-03.1 (to be published as CJCSM 3122.01), JOPES Volume I, define a crisis within the context of joint operation planning and execution as "an incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of U.S. military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives."

    (2) Several characteristics of a crisis can be given: it may occur with little or no warning; it is fast breaking and requires accelerated decisions; and, sometimes, a single crisis may spawn another crisis elsewhere. Whatever the nature or perceived magnitude of the situation, a commitment of U.S. military forces and resources is being considered as a solution. In the U.S. defense establishment, the use of military force requires a decision by the NCA.

    c. Available guidelines. The procedures in Joint Pub 5-03.1 (to be published as CJCSM 3122.01), JOPES Volume I, are used to outline a military response in a crisis. The six phases of CAP are a logical sequence of events that lead to the timely preparation of a COA for a military response. Further, the procedures describe the flow of information from the combatant commander; the integration of CJCS military advice in the analysis of military options; the decision process by which the NCA begin detailed military planning, change deployment posture of the identified force, and execute the military option; and the mechanisms for monitoring the execution of the eventual operation order.

    d. Communications. Timely, accurate communications are essential in exchanging information and transmitting directions during a crisis. Several means are available: oral transmission confirmed with record copy as soon as possible; narrative text messages to transmit the initial report, situation updates, CINCís assessment of the situation, and orders, including decisions of the NCA; and deployment data transmitted via the Global Command and Control System (GCCS). Only through rapid, accurate, and secure communication can the military response to a crisis be managed. Today, several means exist to heighten overall operations security of the planning and management of CAP: special category (SPECAT) messages and close-hold procedures for GCCS and data transfer procedures, and limited access to the JOPES database. The reporting procedures to be followed in crisis action planning are defined in the Joint Pub 1-03 series, Joint Reporting Structure, and Joint Pub 6-04, Joint Doctrine for Message Text Formatting. CAP uses the OPREP-3 PINNACLE COMMAND ASSESSMENT (OPREP-3PCA) format for the immediate reporting of serious incidents and events by the cognizant CINC. These reports establish the basis for crisis recognition and for the initiation of CAP.

    e. Available ADP support. The rapid development of an adequate and feasible military response is the purpose of crisis planning. The planner must quickly evaluate the adequacy of proposed COAs, rapidly build a force list and calculate sustainment, and effectively determine transportation feasibility. Crisis action procedures use the same ADP that supports deliberate planning in JOPES. Using JOPES ADP, the crisis action planner may build a TPFDD through access to plans prepared in deliberate planning.

    f. Differences between deliberate & crisis action planning. Figure 7-3 illustrates the significant differences between the deliberate planning procedures discussed in Chapter 6 and the CAP procedures discussed here.



    Crisis Action Planning

    Deliberate Planning

    Time Available to Plan

    Hours or days

    18-24 months

    JPEC Involvement

    For security reasons, possibly very limited using close-hold procedures

    Participates fully


    6 Phases from Situation Development to Execution

    5 Phases from Initiation to Supporting Plans

    Document Assigning Tasks

    WARNING ORDER to CINC; CINC assigns tasks with EVALUATION REQUEST message

    JSCP to CINC: CINC assigns tasks with planning or other written directive

    Forces for Planning



    Early Planning

    Guidance to Staff


    Planning Directive issued by CINC after planning guidance step of concept development phase

    Commanderís Estimate

    Communicates recommendations of CINC to the CJCS/NCA

    Communicates the CINCís DECISION to staff and subordinate commanders

    Decision on COA

    NCA decide COA

    CINC decides COA with review by CJCS

    Execution Document


    When an operation plan is implemented, it is converted to an OPORD, and executed with an EXECUTE ORDER


    Campaign plan (if required) with supporting OPORDs, or OPORD with supporting OPORDs

    OPLAN, or CONPLAN or FUNC-TIONAL PLAN with supporting plans

    Reference: Joint Pub 5-03.1 (to be published as CJCSM 3122.01), Figure 7-3
    JOPES Volume I


    a. Concept. Since each crisis is unique, it is not reasonable to expect to use a rigid set of rules in response to every situation. JOPES Volume I defines a coordinated process that includes people, procedures, communications, and ADP hardware and software, and that produces a detailed plan to best accomplish the military mission.

    (1) Crisis Action Planning procedures give the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs procedures for getting vital decision-making information up the chain of command to the NCA; they allow the NCA to communicate their decisions accurately through CJCS down the chain of command to the CINC and subordinate and supporting commanders, the Services, and supporting defense agencies; and they permit the key players in the JPEC to exchange essential deployment data rapidly and accurately.

    (2) The result is an ability to develop an adequate and transportation-feasible military response during a time-constrained planning period. In addition, JOPES ADP offers the JPEC the capability to monitor strategic movement during execution of the plan.

    (3) The procedures accommodate the need for different degrees of detail, given the different amounts of time available for planning among the many command levels. They describe actions to be performed by the JPEC from the beginning of a crisis either through the commitment of U.S. military forces or to the point where the need for military force ends and military activity is canceled.

    b. Phases. The procedures are categorized into six phases. Each phase of CAP begins with an event, such as the receipt of a report or order, and ends with a decision or resolution of the crisis. When the process moves into a new phase, the primary responsibility for taking action shifts between the NCA and CINC.

    (1) Before beginning a full examination of CAP, it is important to understand that the time-sensitivity of certain critical situations may require so rapid a response that the normal procedural sequence may be altered significantly, i.e., CAP phases may be compressed, repeated, carried out concurrently, or eliminated. While there are detailed procedures to be followed in the process, circumstances may dictate that they be abbreviated, that is, decisions may be reached in conference and initially communicated orally. The amount of time spent in each phase depends on the tasks to be done and the time available.

    (2) Within the CAP sequence of events, there are several points where decisions must be made for planning to continue, further actions are placed on "hold," or planning reverts to a previous phase. Following each major decision reached by the NCA, CJCS issues a formal order implementing that decision. (NOTE: Chart 4 in Appendix K illustrates the crisis action procedures in an expanded diagram.)



    Reference: Joint Pub 5-03.1 (to be published as CJCSM 3122.01), Planning Policies and Procedures (JOPES Volume I)



    a. Phase I

    (1) Introduction. As a matter of routine, organizations of the U.S. Government monitor the world situation. In the course of that monitoring, an event may occur that has possible security implications for the United States or its interests. Monitoring organizations recognize the event, analyze it to determine whether U.S. interests are threatened, and report it to the National Military Command Center (NMCC). Crisis Action Planning procedures generally begin once the event is reported to the NMCC. The situation development phase contains four related variables--the day-to-day situation is monitored, an event occurs, the event is recognized as a problem, and the event is reported.

    (a) Situation monitoring is the continuous review and analysis of events occurring worldwide. Many available resources are used, ranging from strategic intelligence sources, to routine observations by a member of the military attaché staff, to television news broadcasts. So diverse are the sources of observation that the report could come up through the chain of command from observer to supervisor to senior military officer to component command to unified command watch officer. Just as likely, though, an event may be first seen in the Pentagon by a watch team member monitoring a cable news report. An event comes to the attention of a U.S. official through situation monitoring.

    (b) An event is an occurrence assessed to be out of the ordinary and viewed as potentially having an adverse impact on U.S. national interests and national security.

    (c) The recognition of the event as a problem or potential problem follows from the observation.

    (d) A report of the event may come from various sources, e.g., CINC, subordinate unit such as an activity or unit commander, TV news, etc. However, regardless of the source, the focal point for reporting information crucial to the national security is the NMCC in Washington, D.C. Figure 7-4 illustrates the diversity of information sources that report to the NMCC. Joint Pub 1-03 series, Joint Reporting Structure, is the source of detailed instructions for reporting an event through military channels. Events may be reported initially to the NMCC by any means available, but the two most common means are the Critical Intelligence Report (CRITIC) and the OPREP-3 PINNACLE (OPREP-3P). Sample OPREP-3 reports are contained in JOPES Volume I as well as Joint Pub 1-03.6. Receipt of an OPREP-3 PINNACLE at the NMCC from a CINC is a likely way for CAP to be initiated. However, in this day of instant worldwide communications, it is realistic that the theater may learn of a crisis by means of a phone call from Washington.

    Figure 7-4

    (2) Actions taken during situation development

    (a) In Phase I the focus is generally on the CINC who is responsible for the U.S. military action that may be taken within a theater. The activities of the JPEC during Phase I are summarized in Figure 7-5. The major occurrences in the combatant command include the following:






    The Joint Staff

    • Monitor situation
    • Evaluate incoming reports
    • Evaluate actions of CINC



    • Reports significant event to NMCC
    • Publishes CINCís assessment:

    nature of crisis

    forces available

    major constraints

    action being taken

    COAs being considered

    Subordinate &



    • Gather intelligence information
    • Furnish information and support


    • Monitors developing crisis


    • Monitor developing crisis

    Figure 7-5

    (b) The Joint Staff monitors the situation, requests a report from the geographic CINC, evaluates the CINCís actions being taken under the rules of engagement, orders additional intelligence gathering, if necessary, and advises the NCA as the situation develops.

    (c) If possible, other members of the JPEC collect information on the situation and develop an accurate picture of the crisis.

    (3) Exchange of reports during Phase I. The initial report of the event, which any individual can make, must be timely and accurate. The CRITIC or OPREP-3 PINNACLE reports are normally used. They can be issued orally with a record copy to follow. Any commander may issue OPREP-3 PINNACLE (general) to report any incident or event where national-level interest is indicated. The commander of a combatant command may issue OPREP-3 PINNACLE/CINC ASSESSMENT to report the commandís assessment of a developing or potential crisis. If the CINC does not make the initial report of an event, the NMCC will make every effort to establish communications with the CINC and request a report. In this instance, the CINC will normally send an OPREP-3 PINNACLE/CINC ASSESSMENT that would include the following information described in Joint Pub 1-03.6:

    by the commander, as appropriate

    (4) ADP support. During this phase the CINCís staff reviews applicable contingency plans. The JOPES database holds all the files for current complete plans, and the CINC reviews plans through access to GCCS. If circumstances warrant, a GCCS Teleconference (TLCF) may be established to allow a rapid exchange of information.

    (5) Conclusion of Phase I. The situation development phase ends when the event is reported and the CINCís assessment is submitted to CJCS and NCA through the NMCC.



    b. Phase II. In this phase, the NCA and Joint Chiefs of Staff analyze the situation to determine whether a military option should be prepared to deal with the evolving problem. The phase is characterized by increased information gathering and review of available options by the NCA.

    (1) Introduction. The phase begins with the receipt of the CINCís report and assessment of the event. The CINC has categorized the event as a problem of potential national concern. The detail and frequency of reporting increase to give the Chairman and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff information that is needed to evaluate developments and allow them to offer sound military advice to the NCA.

    (2) Actions taken during crisis assessment. The focus of Phase II is on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the NCA.

    (a) The NCA identify the national interests at stake; the national objectives related to those interests; and possible diplomatic, political, economic, and military options to achieve the objectives. The NCA decide that a crisis exists and that military COAs will be developed by the CINC.

    (b) CJCS assesses the situation from the military point of view including operations, logistics, and command and control implications, and reviews current strategy and existing OPLAN data in JOPES. The Joint Staff reviews and evaluates reports from the CINC. CJCS may recommend to the NCA that orders be published to prepare to deploy or to deploy forces, and may establish or direct the establishment of a crisis GCCS TLCF if the CINC has not already done so.

    (c) Having reported the event and offered an assessment of the situation in Phase I, the CINC continues to issue status reports, assesses the disposition of assigned and available forces, and takes appropriate military action under current rules of engagement.

    (d) The other members of the JPEC continue to monitor the situation: the Services may improve readiness and sustainability of forces that could be used and identify possible Reserve components; USCINCTRANS improves the disposition and readiness of strategic lift assets, etc. Figure 7-6 summarizes the activities of the JPEC.

    (e) Because crisis action procedures are flexible, the NCA and CJCS have the latitude to either remain in this phase, increase reporting, and gather additional information for study; return to Phase I and continue to monitor the situation without further planning action; or progress to the next phase of CAP.

    (3) Crisis response organizations. During the crisis assessment phase, special teams are assembled at all levels where the problem and its resolution are being developed. These teams vary in size and composition, as well as in name. They may be called crisis action teams, crisis response cells, battle staffs, emergency response teams, operations action groups, or operation planning groups. Specially constituted crisis action organizations generally include representatives from all command staff divisions and may include representatives from a wide range of involved organizations. Figure 7-7 illustrates the variety of organizations that respond to crises.




    • Decide to develop the military COA

    CJCS, The Joint Staff

    • Give military assessment to NCA
    • Advise on possible military COAs
    • Review existing OPLANs & CONPLANs for suitability
    • Review & evaluate reports from CINC & other sources
    • Establish crisis TLCF as required



    • Continues to report status of situation
    • Evaluates event
    • Reviews existing OPLANs & CONPLANS for applicability
    • Evaluates disposition of assigned and available forces
    • Evaluates status of theater transportation assets

    Subordinate &

    Supporting Commands

    • Continue to monitor the crisis


    • Reviews status of strategic lift assets
    • Improves disposition & readiness of strategic lift assets


    • Evaluate available military force
    • Act to improve force readiness & sustainability
    • Identify Reserve component requirement

    Figure 7-6

    (4) Exchange of reports during Phase II. At any time during CAP, the NCA may find it desirable to prepare selected units for possible military action. They increase unit readiness by designating alert conditions or ordering a specified deployability posture (see Figure 7-8) to reduce the response time of selected forces. Increased readiness actions may be taken during any phase. Deployment Preparation Orders and Deployment Orders are used to increase or decrease deployability posture, deploy or redeploy forces, establish or disestablish joint task forces and their headquarters, or signal U.S. intent to undertake or terminate action. Changing the deployment posture of a unit is a strong statement that the United States is beginning action to conduct military operations. Both orders are issued by CJCS and specifically authorized by the Secretary of Defense. The stage of a unitís readiness is defined by the deployability posture.

    (a) The Deployment Preparation Order and the Deployment Order are adressed to all combatant commanders and the National Security Agency/Central Security Services. The Secretary of State, the White House Situation Room, and appropriate others receive copies.





    Composition of

    Response Element

    Office of


    of Defense


    Coordinating Group

    • Disseminates crisis information in a timely fashion
    • Facilitates coordination within OSD
    • Draws on parent offices for support, guidance, and information
  • Chaired by DUSD(P)
  • Staffed with representatives of principal OSD staff officers, military departments, combat support agencies, & Department of State
  • National




    Operations Team (OT)




    Operations Team

    • Monitors operational activities worldwide
    • Gathers information on developing situations
    • Performs 24-hour monitoring of particular situations
  • Assigned NMCC personnel


    • OT augmented as necessary with staff personnel

    CJCS, The Joint Staff










    (activation based on level of crisis)

    Response Cell (RC)








    Crisis Action Team (CAT)





    Planners Group (OPG)

    • Staffed full time by qualified personnel
    • May occupy normal workspaces
    • Reviews current strategy & applicable OPLANs/CONPLANs
    • Gathers intelligence
    • Reviews status of forces
    • Develops broad COAs
    • Assembles Situation Books
    • Activated by the Director, Joint Staff, or J-3
    • Handles matters that exceed the operational capability of the RC
    • Proposes COAs
    • Coordinates with response cells in Joint Staff Directorates, Services, and combat support agencies

    Makes decisions to be forwarded to CJCS

    • Formed by J-3
    • Team Chief is an 0-6
    • Assigned representatives from Joint Staff directorates
    • Usually does not contain Service reps
    • Specific manning is tailored to fit the situation



    • Team Chief is an 0-6
    • Augmented RC with Service reps, combat support agencies


    • Chairman is J-3, Director for Operations
    • Flag/general officer is vice chairman

    Staffed with 0-6-level planners, not action officers


    Command Staff

    Battle Staffs


    Crisis Action Teams

    • Generate, exchange, and receive information
    • Develop military options, COAs, and concepts of operations
  • Regularly assigned and augmenting personnel
  • Special response centers for Intelligence, Logistics
  • Nuclear operations
  • Special operations

    Crisis Action Team

    • Orchestrates and monitors deployment
  • Deployment Directorate personnel
  • Figure 7-7

    Figure 7-8

    (b) The format for both of these orders is in JOPES Volume I. They include all necessary information to deploy the forces, if it is not already given in other planning guidance documents from CJCS. The order takes the following overall outline:

    (c) Note that, while these orders are designed to increase deployability posture, positioning forces or taking preparatory actions may signal U.S. intent to conduct military operations. This may not be the desired message, and the CJCS and NCA may consider the requirements for secrecy and surprise, and balance them against the need to notify selected Armed Forces for possible action. Operations security is vital and is practiced.

    (5) ADP support. A GCCS TLCF should be established between crisis participants. The JPEC may review available JOPES deployment databases.

    (6) Conclusion of Phase II. The crisis assessment phase ends with the decision by the NCA to have military options developed for their consideration. These are added to the full spectrum of possible U.S. responses. The NCA decision may also include specific guidance on COAs to be developed. For this reason, the CINCís initial assessment has great influence. That assessment is an early, professional recommendation from the scene; lack of time may make the CINCís assessment the only alternative considered.



    c. Phase III. Following the decision of the NCA to develop military options, CJCS publishes a Warning Order directing the development of COAs in response to the situation. The COA development phase shifts emphasis to the CINC, who develops and submits recommended COAs to CJCS and the NCA. The CINC includes the COAs in the Commanderís Estimate, an abbreviated version of the type of information in the Commanderís Estimate prepared during the concept development phase of deliberate planning.

    (1) Introduction. Phase III begins when the NCA decide to develop possible military solutions to the crisis. The military response may be only one of many available options open to the NCA. In fact, the initial reluctance to use military forces may substantially alter the situation and thus limit the available military options when a decision to use military force is finally made.

    (2) Actions taken during COA development. As Figure 7-9 illustrates, the center of activity shifts to the supported commander:

    (a) CJCS publishes a Warning Order to give initial guidance to the JPEC and requests that the CINC respond with a recommended COA to meet the situation.

    (b) The supported commander develops COAs; this involves the subordinate and supporting commanders. With the Evaluation Request Message the CINC assigns those commands the task of identifying the forces and resources for the COAs being considered. If time and security considerations permit, subordinate evaluation of tentative COAs is valuable. Existing OPLANs and CONPLANs may prove useful in the rapid development of the COAs. The databases that outline the flow of forces and sustainment can be made available to the JPEC by the supported commander. Finally, the CINC prepares the Commanderís Estimate, the recommended COA.

    (c) The subordinate and supporting commanders respond to the CINC with an Evaluation Response Message. Alternative COAs are evaluated and forces are identified to support the operation. Existing plans in the JOPES database can be used; a force list for this operation can be created in the JOPES database. Sustainment planning begins with coordination between the Service headquarters and the theater components. The Services monitor deployment planning and force readiness.




    Give guidance to CINC via CJCS

    CJCS, The Joint Staff

    • Publish Warning Order

    · · establish command relationships

    · · define tasks, objectives, constraints

    · · either allocate forces & lift or request CINC requirements

    · · set tentative C-day & L-hour

    · · direct CINC to develop COAs and submit

    • Commanderís Estimate
    • Monitor COA development with JDS
    • Review Commanderís Estimate



    • Responds to Warning Order
    • Develops and evaluates COAs using JOPES ADP
    • Coordinates involvement of subordinates
    • Releases Evaluation Request Message
    • Reviews existing OPLANs for applicability
    • Prepares & submits Commanderís Estimate to CJCS

    Subordinate &



    • Respond to Evaluation Request Message
    • Analyze COAs, as directed
    • Identify C, CS, CSS forces and generate movement requirement estimates
    • Create deployment database in JOPES for each COA
    • Coordinate sustainment calculations & movement requirements
    • Prepare Evaluation Response Message


    • Reviews CINCís COAs
    • Activates Crisis Action Team
    • Assists in refining requirements
    • Prepares deployment estimate for each COA
    • Sends deployment estimate to supported commander


    • Monitor COA development
    • Plan for sustainment
    • Monitor force readiness

    Figure 7-9

    (d) USCINCTRANS reviews the proposed COAs for supportability and prepares deployment estimates for each COA to send to the supported commander. As time permits, and as directed by the supported commander, JOPES data are used to develop a preliminary force deployment estimate and closure profile.

    (3) Exchange of reports during Phase III. Several orders or messages may be published during this phase.

    (a) Following the decision of the NCA to plan a military response, CJCS normally authorizes the release of a Warning Order. If it contains force deployment preparation or deployment orders, Secretary of Defense approval is required. The Warning Order equates to a planning directive in the deliberate planning process; an example is illustrated in JOPES Volume I. This message should

    The order will definitely request that the CINC develop COAs for review and approval by the NCA. In a fast-breaking crisis, the initial Warning Order could be communicated by a telephone conference with a follow-on record copy to ensure that the JPEC is kept advised. Messages referring to this initial order transmit additional information and guidance. The order may also discuss and focus the CINCís attention toward COAs that have already been identified or considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and NCA. However, the CINC has flexibility to determine how to carry out the assigned tasks. If the NCA have already selected a COA, they may issue direction to begin execution planning (Phase V of CAP).

    (b) The basic Operations Planning Report (OPREP-1) describes the formats of four messages exchanged in this phase: Commanderís Evaluation Request, subordinate/supporting commandersí Evaluation Response, USTRANSCOMís Deployment Estimate, and the Commanderís Estimate. Joint Pub 1-03.8, JRS Situation Reporting, discusses a general format for the OPREP-1. The recommended format is flexible; listed sections can be omitted or other paragraphs can be added to meet the situation.

    (c) If time permits, the CINC issues a Commanderís Evaluation Request in OPREP-1 format to subordinate and supporting commanders. This communicates necessary planning guidance and assigns to members of the JPEC the task of evaluating the proposed COA, submitting force and support requirements, or supporting the CINCís recommended COA. This communication includes the following:

    COAs, enemy capabilities, concept of operations, operational constraints


    tion in the JOPES database

    (d) The subordinate and supporting commanders reply with a componentís course of action Evaluation Response message. The format is similar to the OPREP-1 reports already discussed: description, narrative, objective, and remarks.

    (e) In addition, if time permits, USTRANSCOM sends the preliminary Deployment Estimate to the supported commander. It is in OPREP-1 format and may include the following:

    hours for each COA


    (f) The final product of Phase III is the Commanderís Estimate prepared by the CINC. Its purpose is to give the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff information for the NCA to consider in their selection of a military COA. It is the CINCís analysis of the COAs that were considered. Contents of the message vary, depending on the situation. Joint Pub 1-03.8, Joint Reporting Structure, details a recommended format for the report. It is an abbreviation of the CINCís total staff work and may have been developed in a matter of hours. The abbreviated guidelines are also found in JOPES Volume I; it should contain the following:


    Volume I: mission, situation and COAs, analysis of opposing COAs (enemy capabilities), comparison of own COAs,

    and recommendation

    reporting the information

    force list may be found, etc.

    (4) ADP support. Time available to the CINC is a most critical variable during this phase. Vast amounts of planning data must be transferred rapidly among JPEC participants. The GCCS and the JOPES deployment database maintained by the Joint Staff are the primary means for exchanging detailed planning information. The planning tasks to develop tentative COAs, evaluate the adequacy of each COA, create force lists and support packages, estimate transportation feasibility of each COA, and begin to prepare deployment estimates for the recommended COA require much time. Fortunately, there is ADP support to help the crisis action planner take advantage of previous planning efforts that are already in the JOPES database, or to rapidly develop a plan from scratch.

    (a) Develop tentative COAs. An existing OPLAN may have been built that can be modified. An existing CONPLAN may be available that can be fully developed beyond the stage of an approved concept of operations. Both of these formats are stored in the JOPES database and are available for planner review. For situations that have not been considered by prior planning, a "NOPLAN" situation is said to exist; timely creation of a concept of operations and the time-phasing of forces and support are required.

    (b) Determine adequacy of each proposed COA. An objective, comprehensive evaluation of proposed COAs is difficult even without time constraints. Some combatant commands are developing computer simulations to assist in measuring sensitivity of COAs to key parameters.

    (c) Develop force lists and support packages. Using the force modules in JOPES, the planner can rapidly build an effective combat force, add support forces, and calculate sustainment. Using force modules from current OPLANs reduces the planning time, because these force modules are already "sourced" with actual Army and Air Force units and some Sea Service units.

    (d) Prepare deployment estimates. The USTRANSCOM components begin to build the deployment estimates from information exchanged through the GCCS. USTRANSCOM integrates the deployment estimates and furnishes a consolidated deployment estimate to CJCS and the CINC via GCCS and OPREP-1 message.

    (5) Conclusion of Phase III. Course of action development concludes with the release of the CINCís Commanderís Estimate. Emphasis once again shifts to CJCS and the NCA for the selection of a COA.



    d. Phase IV. In this phase, CJCS in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviews and analyzes the Commanderís Estimate and deployment estimates and, ultimately, presents COAs in order of priority to the NCA for their decision. The activities of the JPEC are illustrated in Figure 7-10.




    • Select COA
    • Direct execution planning

    CJCS, The Joint Staff

    • Review and evaluate Commanderís Estimate
    • Develop additional COAs, as necessary
    • Present COAs and recommend COA to NCA
    • Issue Planning Order to begin formal execution planning before NCA decision (if necessary)

    · · allocate forces and lift

    · · identify C-day & L-hour

    • Announce NCA decision
    • Issue Alert Order

    · · describes COA

    · · changes, amplifies guidance in Warning Order

    · · directs execution planning to begin



    • Initiates execution planning on receipt of JCS direction
    • Refines estimates and resolves identified shortfalls

    Subordinate &



    • Continue planning
    • Monitor situation


    • Continues planning
    • Monitors situation


    • Continue planning
    • Monitor situation

    Figure 7-10

    (1) Introduction. Phase IV of CAP begins when the recommended COAs are presented to the NCA. CJCS has received the Commanderís Estimate from the CINC. The Joint Staff has evaluated the recommendation; the COAs may have been refined or revised, or new COAs may have been developed in light of a changing situation. In fact, when there is no clearly superior COA, a ranked list of recommendations may have to be given to the NCA.

    (2) Actions taken during COA selection. The focus of activity is with CJCS and the NCA:

    (a) CJCS performs his role as principal military adviser to the NCA, eval-uating the COAs recommended by the CINC in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Depending on the recommendation to the NCA, CJCS may choose to issue guidance to the CINC and the JPEC with a Planning Order; this is used to speed up the execution planning and does not replace formal NCA approval of a COA.

    (b) The NCA select a COA and direct that execution planning begin. On receipt of an NCA decision, CJCS issues an Alert Order to the CINC advising of the selected COA. With the authority of the Secretary of Defense, CJCS may issue a Deployment Preparation Order or Deployment Order.

    (c) The CINC and the other members of the JPEC are continuing deployment and employment planning with the knowledge they have of the pending decision.

    (3) Exchange of reports during Phase IV. Depending on the situation, either of two communications may be exchanged in this phase:

    (a) CJCS issues the Planning Order before the NCA make a decision. The intent is to expedite execution planning and permit flexibility in responding to fast-breaking events as the crisis develops. It may be issued orally, by WIN message, or by AUTODIN to the CINC with copies to all members of the JPEC. It is conceivable that the Planning Order could be the first record communication between CJCS and the JPEC on the crisis. In this situation, vital planning information would be exchanged now. However, it is desirable to use this message merely to update CJCS guidance that has been given earlier. The contents of the Planning Order may vary depending on the situation, but it should

    JOPES Volume I outlines an example of a Planning Order that illustrates a standardized format patterned after the OPREP-1 message in Joint Pub 1-03.8. The JOPES Volume I example includes a multisection narrative detailing situation, mission, details about the COA to be executed, resources allocated, and guidance for administration, logistics, PSYOP, public affairs, etc.

    (b) On receiving the NCA decision on the course of action, CJCS publishes an Alert Order. The order is a record communication that the NCA have decided to develop in detail a military solution to the crisis. The contents of an Alert Order may vary, and sections may be deleted if the information has already been published. The contents are similar in format to the Planning Order, except that the operation description clearly states that the message is an Alert Order, and execution planning for the selected COA has been authorized by the Secretary of Defense.

    (4) Conclusion of Phase IV. This phase ends with the NCA selection of a COA and the decision to begin execution planning. The Alert Order publishes that decision.


    e. Phase V. In the execution planning phase, the supported commander transforms the NCA-selected COA into an operation order (OPORD). Phase V is similar in function to the plan development phase of the deliberate planning process. In this phase the necessary detailed planning is performed to execute the approved COA when directed by the NCA. The actual forces, sustainment, and strategic transportation resources are identified, and the concept of operations is described in OPORD format.

    (1) Introduction. The NCA select the military course of action that will be further developed. Execution planning begins when the CINC and members of the JPEC receive the Planning Order or the Alert Order.

    (2) Actions taken during execution planning. The execution planning stage encompasses three major tasks: execution planning, force preparation, and deployability posture reporting.

    (a) Emphasis during the phase, particularly during the task of execution planning, rests with the CINC and subordinate and supporting commanders, as summarized in Figure 7-11. They review the Planning or Alert Order to get the latest guidance on forces, timing, constraints, etc. They update and adjust planning done in Phase III, COA development, for any new force and sustainment requirements, and source forces and lift resources. All members of the JPEC act to identify and resolve shortfalls and limitations. The Services and the CINCís component commanders are sourcing the




    • Decide to authorize Deployment Preparation/Deployment Order

    CJCS, The Joint Staff

    • Monitor execution planning
    • Publish Deployment Preparation or Deployment Order, as directed
    • Evaluate situation and furnish guidance to continue CAP
    • Resolve conflicting materiel priorities & transportation shortfalls



    • Converts approved COA into OPORD
    • Reviews force and unit-related support requirements
    • Confirms first increment of movement requirements
    • Resolves shortfalls and limitations
    • Notifies JPEC that force requirements are ready for sourcing
    • Publishes TPFDD LOI

    Subordinate & Supporting Commands

    • Identify early-deploying forces, assign tasks
    • Generate movement requirements
    • Develop supporting OPORDs
    • Begin SORTS reporting
    • Identify forces
    • Schedule movement for self-deploying forces
    • Identify shortfalls


    • Ensures that adequate transportation is available to support approved COA
    • Develops feasible transportation schedules
    • May have to focus on first increment of movement
    • Coordinates changes caused by conflicts and shortfalls


    • Determine mobilization requirements
    • Request authorization to mobilize, if necessary
    • Calculate sustainment
    • Identify shortfalls
    • Furnish augmentation forces
    • Schedule organic movements
    • Improve industrial preparedness
    • Begin SORTS reporting for identified forces

    Figure 7-11

    forces identified for planning. Planning concentrates on the earliest deploying units. Execution planning results in the preparation of the OPORD by the CINC. The subordinate and supporting commanders prepare supporting OPORDs.

    (b) CJCS monitors the development of the CINCís OPORD in JOPES and resolves shortfalls that are presented. CJCS also reviews the final product for adequacy and feasibility and gives military advice to the NCA on the status of the situation.

    (c) USTRANSCOM furnishes effective air, land, and sea transportation to support the approved COA or OPORD by applying transportation assets against the transportation requirements identified by the supported commander. Air and sea channels for movement of nonunit sustainment and personnel are established, and schedules for air and sea are created. Concentration is on the initial increment of movements, i.e., 7 days by air and 30 days by sealift.

    (3) Exchange of reports during Phase V. The Planning/Alert Order is sent to the CINC as action addressee and also forwarded to subordinate commanders for their planning guidance. In addition, two important communications are exchanged in this phase.

    (a) The supported commander publishes a TPFDD Letter of Instruction (LOI) that furnishes procedures for deployment, replacement, and redeployment of forces. The LOI gives instructions and direction to the components, supporting commands, and other members of the JPEC concerning lift allocation, reporting and validation requirements, and management of TPFDD data in general. JOPES Volume I gives an example of a TPFDD LOI.

    (b) The OPORD is the product of the execution planning phase. Joint Pub 1-02 defines it as "a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for effecting coordinated execution of an operation." Joint Pub 1-03.8 gives the format for this OPREP-1 report, and Joint Pub 5-03.1 (to be published as CJCSM 3122.01), JOPES Volume I shows an abbreviated example. See Appendix H of this publication for a more detailed description of the contents of an OPORD. The supported commanderís OPORD is published with a major force list, instructions for the conduct of operations in the objective area, and the logistics and administrative plans for support of the operation. Movement data and schedules are entered into the JOPES database for access by all members of the JPEC. Subordinate and supporting commands develop supporting OPORDs as required by the CINC. They transmit copies of their completed OPORDs by GENSER to CJCS to review for adequacy and feasibility. If an OPORD is contrary to the guidance contained in the CJCS Alert Order, or if circumstances change, requiring an adjustment in the OPORD, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff informs the CINC of the differences.

    (4) ADP support. GCCS and JOPES ADP take on greater significance during this phase of the crisis: JPEC participants continue to use GCCS for communicating among themselves; GCCS allows rapid, accurate, and secure data transfer and offers access for file updating. The JPEC uses JOPES procedures and guidance furnished in the TPFDD LOI to build and refine the TPFDD. When planning participants do not have access to the JOPES computer files, they can use secure voice systems or AUTODIN communications to exchange essential force and deployment data.

    (5) Conclusion of Phase V. The phase ends when the NCA decide to execute the OPORD, place it on hold, or cancel it pending resolution by some other means.

    (6) Phase timing. The procedures in the preceding discussion have been described as occurring sequentially. During a crisis they may, in fact, be conducted concurrently or even eliminated, depending on prevailing conditions. For example, the CINCís ASSESSMENT in Phase I may serve as the recommended COA in the Commanderís Estimate normally developed in Phase III. In some situations, no formal JCS Warning Order is issued, and the first record communication that the supported commander receives is the CJCS Planning Order or Alert Order containing the COA to be used for execution planning. It is equally possible that an NCA decision to commit forces may be made shortly after an event occurs, thereby compressing greatly Phases II through V. To appreciate fully the usefulness of CAP, it is important to recognize that no definitive length of time can be associated with any particular phase. Note also that severe time constraints may require crisis participants to pass information orally, including the decision to commit forces. In actual practice, much coordination is done over secure telephone throughout the JPEC during the entire CAP process.



    f. Phase VI. The execution phase starts with the NCA decision to choose the military option to deal with the crisis and execute the OPORD. The Secretary of Defense will authorize CJCS to issue an Execute Order that directs the CINC to carry out the OPORD. The CINC then executes the OPORD and directs subordinate and supporting commanders to execute their supporting OPORDs.

    (1) Introduction. The Execute Order is a record communication that may include further guidance, instructions, or amplifying orders. During execution, the supported and supporting commanders, Services, and defense agencies update information in the JOPES deployment database. USTRANSCOM monitors and coordinates the deployment per the supported commanderís force and sustainment priorities. Members of the JPEC report movement of forces in the deployment database.

    (2) Actions taken during execution. During the execution phase, changes to the original plan may be necessary because of tactical and intelligence considerations, force and nonunit cargo availability, availability of strategic lift assets, and POE and POD capabilities. Therefore, ongoing refinement and adjustment of deployment requirements and schedules, and close coordination and monitoring of deployment activities, are required. The JOPES deployment database should contain at least the following information at the time of OPORD execution: first, sourced combat, combat support, and combat service support requirements for assigned and augmentation forces; second, integrated critical resupply requirements identified by supply category, POD, and LAD; and third, integrated nonunit personnel filler and casualty replacements by numbers and day. Practical considerations require that planning concentrate on the first 7 days of air movement and the first 30 days of surface movement. Major changes to deployment plans with effective dates more than about seven days or so in the future will have very little impact on the scheduling process; however, changes with effective dates of seven days or less may adversely affect the timely development of the airlift flow schedule. Adding requirements within those management windows may cause delays in other scheduled movements.

    (a) CJCS publishes the CJCS Execute Order that defines D-day and the resource allocation and directs execution of the OPORD. Throughout execution, the staff monitors movements, assesses achievement of tasks, and resolves shortfalls as necessary.

    (b) The CINC executes the order and transmits his own guidance to subordinates and supporting commanders. The CINC also monitors; assesses and reports achievement of objectives; ensures that data are updated in the JOPES database; and replans, redeploys, or terminates operations as necessary.

    (c) The subordinate and supporting commanders execute their CINC-directed OPORDs, revalidate the sourcing and scheduling of units, report movement of organic lift, and report deployment movements on the JOPES database. These commanders conduct the operation as directed and fulfill their responsibilities to sustain their Service forces in the combat theater. USTRANSCOM components validate transportation movement planned for the first increment, adjust deployment flow and reschedule as required, and continue to develop transportation schedules for subsequent increments. Both status of movements and future movement schedules are entered in the JOPES database. Figure 7-12 summarizes the activities of the JPEC during this phase of CAP.

    (3) Exchange of reports during Phase VI. Two communications are exchanged in this phase: the CJCS Execute Order addressed to the CINC with copies to the other members of the JPEC and the CINCís Execute Order addressed to subordinates and supporting commanders.

    (a) CJCS Execute Order is the authorization by the NCA to execute the military operation, i.e., the NCA-selected course of action detailed in the CINCís OPORD. Ideally, the execution will follow the procedures outlined in the preceding phases of CAP: information will have been exchanged in OPREP-1 CINC Assessment Reports and Commanderís Estimates, guidance will have been received via the CJCS-published Warning and Planning Orders, preparation will have been permitted using the Deployment Preparation/Deployment Orders, and formal NCA direction will have been received in the Secretary of Defense-authorized Alert Order. Following these procedures, the most current guidance will have been given, periodic updates will have been received, and modifications reflecting changing conditions will have been issued as necessary. This is the preferred exchange of information.




    • Authorize release of Execute Order

    CJCS, The Joint Staff

    • Publish Execute Order to

    ? direct deployment & employment of forces

    ? set D-day & H-hour (if necessary)

    ? convey essential information not contained in the Warning & Alert Orders

    • Monitor deployment & employment of forces
    • Resolve or direct resolution of conflicts



    • Executes OPORD
    • Monitors force deployment
    • Validates movement requirements in increments
    • Resolves, reports shortfalls
    • Controls employment of forces
    • Issues Execute Order to subordinates
    • Updates deployment status on JDS

    Subordinate & Supporting Commands

    • Execute supporting OPORDs
    • Continue to furnish forces
    • Report movement requirements


    • Manages common-user transportation assets for transportation of forces and supplies
    • Reports progress of deployment to CJCS and CINC
    • Reports lift shortfalls to CJCS for resolution


    • Sustain forces

    Figure 7-12

    (b) Unfortunately, in a fast-developing crisis the CJCS Execute Order may be the first record communication generated by CJCS. The record communication may be preceded by a voice announcement. The issuance of the Execute Order is time-sensitive; the format may differ depending on the amount of previous record correspondence and applicability of prior guidance. Annex H to JOPES Volume I contains the format for the CJCS Execute Order. Information already communicated in the Warning, Planning, or Alert Orders is not repeated. Under these conditions, the Execute Order need only contain the authority to execute the operation and any additional essential guidance, such as the date and time for execution. The broad outline of information that has already passed to the JPEC in the preceding Warning, Planning, or Alert Orders includes the following:

    nating instructions, C-day and D-day, expected dura-

    tion, PSYOP guidance, deployability status, OPSEC,

    deception guidance, etc.

    logistics logistics factors, public affairs guidance, etc.

    and signal and signal

    (c) The recommended format for the CINCís Execute Order to subordinates and supporting commanders is in JOPES Volume I. This follows the receipt of the CJCS message; it may give the detailed planning guidance resulting from updated or amplifying orders, instructions, or guidance that the CJCS Execute Order does not cover.

    (4) ADP support. During execution the rapid exchange of information is necessary to allow a timely response to changing situations. GCCS permits communication of deployment schedules and rapid information update, and gives the JPEC the ability to monitor and report resource movement.

    (5) Conclusion of Phase VI. The execution phase continues until the operation is completed or canceled.



    Reference: Joint Pub 5-03.1 (to be published as CJCSM 3122.01), JOPES Volume I

    a. Definition. Multiple-crisis procedures apply when these conditions are met:

    b. Guidelines. The possibility exists that multiple crises that have a conflicting impact on national security issues can occur either within a single supported commanderís theater of operations or in separate theaters that involve two or more CINCs.

    c. Procedures. JOPES Volume I discusses multiple-crisis guidelines to supplement the CAP single-crisis procedures. The procedures unique to multiple-crisis situations follow:

    (1) Phase I -- Situation Development. There are no unique procedures in observing and reporting multiple crises.

    (2) Phase II -- Crisis Assessment. The exchange of information between members of the JPEC is essential early in the planning process when elements are exploring responses to dynamic situations. When crises occur in two or more theaters, initial reports and subsequent status reports will be furnished to all the supported commanders involved.

    (3) Phase III -- COA Development. The Warning Order for each crisis allocates combat force and lift resources to supported commanders. CJCS has established mechanisms for resolving conflicts over resources, such as the Joint Transportation Board (JTB) and Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board (JMPAB). Support forces generally will be allocated by the Services in rough proportion to the allocation of combat forces. The planning in Phase III can identify and resolve shortfalls and limitations early.

    (4) Phase IV -- COA Selection. In recommending COAs to the NCA, CJCS will include the impact of each COA on other COAs approved or contemplated. If necessary, CJCS will recommend plan priority, and that resources be allocated according to that priority.

    (5) Phase V -- Execution Planning. Conflicts between CINCs in satisfying resource requirements are resolved at the CJCS level. The JTB and JMPAB may be convened. Force and nonunit cargo requirements are sourced, conflicts from units assigned multiple tasks are resolved, and shortfalls from unfilled requirements are identified. USTRANSCOM will develop and integrate transportation movement schedules.

    (6) Phase VI -- Execution. The recognition during the execution of one OPORD of new threats from multiple crises may require the reallocation of resources, even though existing deployments may need to be halted or redirected.

    d. Summary. The planning and execution of simultaneous military operations requires early identification of conflicts and shortfalls. Early resolution permits alternative COA development, earliest possible identification of allocated resources, and effective coordination between members of the JPEC. Mechanisms exist within supported commands and at the CJCS level to resolve resource allocation problems. Guidance from the NCA or the CJCS will ultimately establish priorities and determine allocations for overcommitted forces or resources. Late resolution may result in revising the mission statements and replanning or amending existing OPORDs.

    704. JOINT PLANNING SUMMARY. Figure 7-13 illustrates the relationship between deliberate planning and Crisis Action Planning. Operation plans developed in deliberate planning are entered into the JOPES deployment database, where the data are maintained to keep them current. That information is always available to the JPEC for developing COAs and OPORDs in response to crises as they occur.

    a. Deliberate Planning. During peacetime, joint planners use the deliberate planning process to develop Concept Summaries, CONPLANs, and detailed OPLANs for contingencies as assigned in the JSCP. OPLANs are completed in detail, including a transportation-feasible TPFDD, to furnish some assurance that such major contingencies could be responded to in a timely manner should they arise. The development of an OPLAN with its detailed identification of force and sustainment requirements and their necessary phased introduction into theater can take 18 months or more. Once developed, the information is maintained in the JOPES deployment database to permit rapid retrieval and modification to meet a crisis.

    Figure 7-13

    b. Crisis Action Planning. In a crisis, the luxury of time available for lengthy detailed planning does not exist. For a contingency considered in the JSCP, the JPEC may build an OPORD using or adapting an existing OPLAN or CONPLAN. For contingencies not anticipated by deliberate planning, joint planners and operators are likely to be in a NOPLAN situation. They must develop COAs, a concept of operations, and a deployment database without the months of previous planning for the contingency. However, even though the crisis at hand may not resemble existing operation plans in detail, there are probably aspects of one or more plans in the database that could be adapted to the situation, speeding up the CAP process. Even if the response to a crisis has to be completely developed without adapting plans or parts of plans in the database, the process of developing the database in deliberate planning is what keeps the JPEC familiar with the procedures, policies, and JOPES ADP capabilities that make rapid development of OPORDs possible. Throughout the CAP process, planning information is exchanged over the GCCS, on secure phone, and by OPREP messages. The product of CAP is an executable OPORD published by the supported commander. The NCA exercise the ultimate authority over selection of the COA and execution of the OPORD.

    c. The role of JOPES. The framework of policies, procedures, processes, and ADP capabilities within which the JPEC carries out both deliberate and crisis action planning is JOPES. Figure 7-14 depicts the relationship to both forms of planning of the functions of JOPES, discussed in Chapter 5. As can be seen, JOPES is an entire system for conducting joint contingency planning in both the deliberate and crisis response modes; it encompasses but is not limited to the ADP capabilities that joint planners use as tools to get the planning job done.

    Figure 7-14