Joint Staff Officers Guide AFSC Pub 1 -- 1997

Deliberate Planning Chapter 6

Concept Development Phase

Plan Development Phase

JOPES ADP Support for Planning

Deliberate Planning



References: Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

Joint Pub 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

Joint Pub 5-03.1, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures. Note: To be published as CJCSM 3122.01

CJCSM 3122.02, Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution

CJCSM 3122.03, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II, Planning Formats and Guidance

CJCSM 3122.04, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II, Supplemental Planning Formats and Guidance (classified)

a. Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms), defines the joint operation planning process as follows:

"A coordinated joint staff procedure used by a commander to determine the best method of accomplishing assigned tasks and to direct the action necessary to accomplish the mission."

The particular procedures we use in joint planning depend on the time available to accomplish them. When time is not a critical factor, we use a process called peacetime or deliberate planning. When the time available for planning is short and the near-term result is expected to be an actual deployment and/or employment of military forces, the planner uses crisis action planning (CAP) procedures. The overall procedures are the same for both deliberate and crisis action planning:

b. The next section of this chapter introduces the entire process of joint operation planning to give perspective to the planning problem. The remaining sections describe deliberate planning procedures. Deliberate planning is discussed from the receipt of the assigned task to the development of a detailed transportation schedule of personnel, materiel, and resupply into the theater of military operations. The chapter also describes the procedures for maintaining the accuracy of plan data. We present the phases and steps of the planning process as sequential and orderly, though in actual practice procedures may vary considerably. Some of the steps may overlap, some may be undertaken simultaneously, and some are iterative.



a. The staff of a combatant command must consider many factors in its planning in order to select the best means of performing a military mission. Understandably, this means that the planning process will be complex; out of necessity the process must be orderly and thorough. The joint operation planning process must be flexible, as well. In peacetime, it may require 12 months or more to completely prepare and fully coordinate a plan; on the other hand, a crisis may demand a product in just a few hours or days.

b. The amount of time available significantly influences the planning process. Two different methods of planning are described in the JCS-published Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), depicted graphically in Figure 6-1.

(1) DELIBERATE or PEACETIME PLANNING is the process used when time permits the total participation of the commanders and staffs of the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). Development of the plan, coordination among supporting commanders and agencies and the Services, reviews by the Joint Staff, and conferences of JPEC members can take many months, possibly the entire two-year planning cycle, to develop a large plan, though continued JOPES Automated Data Processing (ADP) improvements should reduce the time required.

(2) TIME-SENSITIVE or CRISIS ACTION PLANNING (CAP) is conducted in response to crises where U.S. interests are threatened and a military response is being considered. While deliberate planning is conducted in anticipation of future hypothetical contingencies where prudence drives a planning requirement, CAP is carried out in response to specific situations as they occur and that often develop very rapidly. Thus, in CAP, the time available for planning is reduced to as little as a few days. The overall process of CAP parallels that of deliberate planning, but is much more flexible to accommodate requirements to respond to changing events and NCA requirements. CAP procedures promote the logical, rapid flow of information, timely preparation of executable courses of action (COAs), and communication of reports and recommendations

Figure 6-111

from combatant commanders up to the National Command Authorities (NCA) and decisions from the NCA down to combatant commanders.

(3) Both deliberate and crisis action planning are conducted within JOPES. Procedures for both are described in Joint Pub 5-03.1, to be republished as CJCSM 3122.01 (JOPES Volume I) and CJCSI 3122.02. CJCSM 3122.03 JOPES Volume II, and CJCSM 3122.04 describe detailed administrative and format requirements for documenting the annexes, appendixes, etc. of OPLANs, CONPLANs, and functional plans, the products of deliberate planning. The purpose of JOPES is to bring both deliberate and crisis action planning into a single system architecture to reduce the time required to do either, make the refined results of deliberate planning more readily accessible to planners in CAP, and more effectively manage any plan during execution.

c. The view of resources is another method of describing joint operation planning.

(1) Requirements planning focuses on the combatant commanderís analysis of the enemy threat and assigned task. The planned response determines the level of forces and the support needed to overcome that threat. These required forces and supplies may be more than the level of available resources.

(2) On the other hand, capabilities planning attempts to meet the threat based on the forces and support that have been funded by Congress in the current budget cycle. This level of forces, equipment, and supplies is available now or expected to be available in the planning cycle.

(3) Military solutions may be constrained; a course of action may be limited by available resources or political and diplomatic considerations. Continuing an established trend, the JPEC is moving ever more toward capabilities planning in the post-cold-war era of less explicitly defined and more diverse threats. A regional rather than global focus for deliberate planning allows increased flexibility in apportionment of available combat forces. Anticipation of multiple regional contingencies within the framework of adaptive planning allows effective apportionment of some combat forces to more than one CINC for contingency planning, depending on national priorities and the sequence in which regional contingencies develop. Apportioning supplies is more difficult, but progress continues toward developing capabilities in JOPES to create contingency plans that account for anticipated sustainment availability.

d. Still another way to define planning focuses on command perspective.

(1) Strategic, global planning is done primarily at the JCS/NCA level. Decision-makers look at the entire world situation as it affects, or is affected by, the use of U.S. military forces.

(2) In regional planning, combatant commanders focus on their specific geographic regions as defined in the Unified Command Plan.

(3) Functional planning is conducted by combatant commanders with functional responsibilities, i.e., USSPACECOM, USSTRATCOM, USSOCOM, and USTRANS-COM, and their component commanders. They view their planning problem as not being limited by geography.

(4) The perspective of the command greatly influences both the choice of course of action and the resources made available for planning. Strategic planning for possible sequential or concurrent execution of more than one operation outweighs the regional perspective of any single commander. Likewise, functional planning is subordinate to each supported CINCís concept for the particular theater of operations in order to support that concept.

e. Finally, joint operation planning can be described in terms of its contribution to a larger purpose.

(1) Campaign planning takes a comprehensive view of the combatant commanderís theater of operations and defines the framework in which an OPLAN fits. Campaign planning offers purpose and a common objective to a series of OPLANS.

· · Combatant commanderís strategic intent and operational focus

· · Orientation on the strategic and operational centers of gravity of the threat

· · Protection of friendly strategic and operational centers of gravity

· · Phasing of operations (such as prehostilities, lodgment, decisive combat and stabilization, follow-through, and post-hostilities/
redeployment), including the commanderís intent for each phase

(2) A successful contingency plan involves a wide spectrum of operation. Each element within the spectrum requires special consideration:

Figure 6-222

(3) This guide outlines the entire environment of joint operations and focuses on deployment, with emphasis on the strategic mobility problem. Deployment planning has been the focus of real-world planning efforts in the past and remains so. As JOPES evolves, new ADP applications will be integrated to make possible much more refined mobilization, employment, and sustainment planning.


a. To draw from the many categories we have identified, this chapter describes the planning procedures for

b. This chapter discusses the deliberate planning procedures to build a contingency plan for military action. The plan is based on predicted conditions that will be countered with resources available during the planning cycle. The product is called an operation plan that can be either an OPLAN, CONPLAN, or Functional Plan, depending on the level of detail that is included.

c. Automated Data Processing (ADP) support is essential to the process of creating and maintaining a database of the many available types of combat and support units, describing the units in terms of numbers of passengers and weight and volume of cargo, calculating the vast quantities of specific sustaining supplies needed in each of the various phases of an operation, and simulating the movement of troops and support from their starting location to the point of employment in the theater of military operations.



a. The process of joint deliberate planning is cyclic and continuous. It begins when a task is assigned and is almost identical whether the resulting operation plan is a fully developed OPLAN, CONPLAN, or Functional Plan. Operation plans remain in effect until canceled or superseded by another approved plan. While in effect they are continuously maintained and updated.

b. Task assignment. The CJCS is responsible for preparing strategic plans and providing for the preparation of joint contingency plans. Strategic planning was discussed in Chapter 5; the contingency planning responsibility of the CJCS is performed through the commanders in chief of combatant commands (CINCs). The task-assigning directive performs several functions: it apportions major combat forces available for planning, and specifies the product document, i.e., an OPLAN, CONPLAN, or Functional Plan, and the review and approval authority for the plan. With this the CINC has the scope of the plan, its format, and the amount of detail that must go into its preparation.

c. Developing the concept. In response to the task assignment, the supported CINC first determines a mission statement and then develops a fully staffed concept of envisioned operations documented in the CINCís Strategic Concept. The CINCís Strategic Concept is submitted to the CJCS for review and, when approved, becomes the concept of operations on which further plan development is based. The concept is also sent to subordinate and supporting commanders, who can then begin the detailed planning associated with plan development.

d. Developing the detailed plan. Subordinate commanders use the CINCís concept and the apportioned major combat forces as the basis to determine the necessary support, including forces and sustaining supplies for the operation. The CINC consolidates the subordinatesí recommended phasing of forces and support and performs a transportation analysis of their movement to destination to ensure that the entire plan can feasibly be executed as envisioned. Next, the Services identify real-world units to take part in the plan, and the sustainment to meet requirements is identified as much as possible. USTRANSCOM, a supporting command, analyzes strategic sea and air transportation. Figure 6-3 illustrates the overall process of this phase: determine the forces and cargo required; describe them in logistic terms of numbers of personnel, volume, and weight; simulate the move using the capabilities of apportioned lift resources; and, finally, confirm that the OPLAN is transportation feasible with the available resources and transportation schedules. This planning phase is over when documentation is prepared for final review.

e. Review of the plan. The review process is more than a single phase in deliberate planning. The Joint Staff has reviewed and approved the CINCís concept before detailed plan development. Now the completed plan goes to the CJCS for review and approval. If all is in order, the plan will be approved (effective for execution, when directed).

f. Preparation of the supporting plans. The emphasis here shifts to the subordinate and supporting commanders, who respond to the tasks identified in the approved operation plan by preparing supporting plans that outline the actions of assigned and augmenting forces.

Figure 6-333


a. The process of planning a joint operation produces a contingency plan for military action. It begins with a national strategy stated by the President, supported with the funding of resources by Congress, and is defined by the task assignments published by the CJCS. The systems that support the translation of national interests into contingency plans are discussed in detail in Chapter 5.

b. Players in the planning process are illustrated in Figure 6-4. They include the NCA, their advisers, supporting executive-level agencies, and a group collectively called the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). The JPEC is defined in Joint Pub 1-02 as the commands and agencies involved in the training, preparation, movement, employment, support, and sustainment of forces in a theater of operations. Examples of those organizations are listed in the definition and include those shown on the lower part of Figure 6-4, i.e., CJCS, supported commanders, etc.

(1) Civilian leadership tops the pyramid in Figure 6-4. The ultimate decision on national policy, detailed development of resource levels, and overall strategic direction of the U.S. Armed Forces is given by the President and Secretary of Defense, referred to as the National Command Authorities (NCA). The NCA are supported by the executive departments, e.g., Departments of Defense and State, and organizations within the Office

Figure 6-444

of the President, such as the National Security Council. The illustration also includes combat support agencies, e.g., Defense Intelligence Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, and Defense Logistics Agency. All these executive-level organizations have a role to play in the preliminary direction of contingency operations and approval of the final plans.

(2) The CJCS and the Joint Staff, who publish the task-assigning documents, review the products and approve the final version of peacetime plans. The supported command, i.e., the combatant command, and its subordinates are the commands principally responsible for developing the deliberate plan and, ultimately, executing it. The Services and their logistics agencies play key support roles within the community. By law, it is the responsibility of the Services to recruit, organize, supply, equip, train, and maintain forces for the combatant commands. The U.S. Transportation Command is shown separately as a supporting player in the JPEC because of its strategic mobility responsibilities and its critical role in assisting the CINCs to develop transportationally feasible plans. The last entry on the figure is titled "Supporting Commands"; it represents all the commands and agencies that supply resources to the supported command.

c. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) details an established, orderly way of translating the contingency planning task assignments into an operation plan or Functional Plan in deliberate planning, or an operation order in crisis action planning. JOPES is directed by DOD to be used as the process for joint planning. JOPES is comprehensive enough to thoroughly prepare a concept of military operations and automated enough to handle the enormous quantities of data involved in military operation planning. The modern computer tools it employs afford reasonable assurance that the plan will work as expected on execution or can be modified during execution to adapt to changing circumstances. The overall system is complex and is best understood through examination of both the process and procedures that make it up.

(1) The process is a particular method of planning for joint operations that involves a number of steps or operations. It is the planning activity from receipt of the task to the preparation of supporting plans by subordinate and supporting commanders. The joint planning process for both deliberate and crisis action planning is described in the references identified at the beginning of this chapter and paragraph 601.a(3).

(2) The procedures are the individual, often interrelated, steps, actions, or methods performed to produce the plan. Each level of command responsible for writing plans may have developed its own procedures to expand or augment JOPES direction. These procedures may vary in certain respects from command to command, so newly assigned staff officers need to adjust to the specifics of their own organizations.

(3) Staff officers should keep the difference between process--the method of planning--and procedures--the steps required to use the process--clearly in mind as they become immersed in joint planning. An abundance of detailed procedures accompanies the actual planning process, yet most of the published guidance seems very general in nature. This publication tries to amplify JOPES guidance.

d. Service Planning Systems

(1) The secretaries of the military departments are responsible for the efficiency of the Services and their preparedness for military operations. Given strategic guidance in CJCS documents and program and budget guidance sent through department channels, the military Service chiefs have developed a series of documents that support, direct, and guide component commanders.

(2) The following documents describe the Service-unique planning systems and have specific application in the development of joint OPLANs:

U.S. Army Publications

FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations

FM 100-5, Operations

FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations

U.S. Navy Publications

NWP 11, Naval Operational Planning

Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan (NCMP)

U.S. Air Force Publications

AF Manual 10-401 Operation Planning and Concept Development

USAF War and Mobilization Plan (WMP)

U.S. Marine Corps Publications

FMFM 2-1, Intelligence

FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action

Marine Corps Capabilities Plan (MCP)

Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan (MPLAN)

U.S. Coast Guard Publications

USCG Capabilities Manual (CG CAPMAN)

USCG Logistic Support and Mobilization Plan (CGLSMP)

(3) The component commanders receive direction and guidance from both the operational chain of command and a Service or functional support chain of command; they are the common link between the two chains. The component commanders support the operational needs of the CINCs to the extent that they are supported through their Service and functional chains of command. The components negotiate the proper balance between requirements planning and capabilities planning.

e. Adaptive Planning. Adaptive planning is a concept for joint operation planning in the context of the post-cold-war world. It is the framework within which the deliberate planning process produces operation plans useful to high-level decision-makers if crises develop. It recognizes that with the more diversified threats to U.S. interests since the breakup of the former Soviet Union, fixed assumptions for warning times and political decisions (force movements, reserve callup, mobilization, etc.) used in deliberate planning will likely be less accurate if the contingency that planners anticipate actually occurs. In short, without a single, well-understood, primary foe with global aspirations and capabilities to plan against, the world is a less predictable place. Adaptive planning also recognizes that key decision-makers are more likely to exploit available response time to deter further crisis development if a menu of response options, gauged to a range of crisis conditions, is available for them to implement rather than an all-or-nothing choice. The "all" would likely be too much and the "nothing" not enough to deter escalation of a crisis early in its development. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) requires the CINCs to use adaptive planning principles to develop a menu of options along the spectrum from "all" to "nothing" in their operation plans for regional contingencies, including flexible deterrent options, deploy-decisive-force options, and counterattack options. JSCP force apportionment facilitates development of this range of options by apportioning some forces to more than one CINC for deliberate planning. This policy is often referred to as "multi-apportionment." In anticipation of the need to respond to multiple, sequentially developing regional contingencies, the JSCP also furnishes planning guidance that prioritizes and deconflicts planned employment of forces that are apportioned to more than one CINC.

(1) Regional focus. Regional contingencies are the focus of U.S. conventional planning. Anticipated regional contingencies for which deliberate planning is conducted are classified as either Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs) or Lesser Regional Contingencies (LRCs). An MRC is a regionally centered crisis based on a significant threat to U.S. vital interests in a region that warrants the deployment of significant forces (i.e., greater than division-wing combinations). An LRC is a regionally centered crisis based on a less compelling threat than in an MRC. LRC missions range from conflict to the lower end of the combat spectrum. Through the JSCP, combatant commanders are assigned tasks of developing operation plans or Functional Plans for specific MRCs and LRCs anticipated as future possibilities in their geographic areas of responsibility (AORs).

(2) Range of options. The adaptive planning concept calls for development of a range of options during deliberate planning that can be adapted to a crisis as it develops. Where the crisis builds slowly enough to allow it, appropriate responses made in a timely fashion can deter further escalation or even defuse the situation to avoid or limit conflict. Where such options fail to deter or there is not time enough to execute them, a stronger response may be required to protect vital U.S. interests. The eventuality of attack without prior warning must also be considered. Figure 6-5 amplifies the options discussed.

(a) Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs). FDOs underscore the importance of early response to a crisis. They are deterrence-oriented and carefully tailored to avoid the response dilemma of too much too soon or too little too late. Military FDOs are intended to be used in concert with diplomatic, economic, and informational options to give the NCA a wide array of deterrent options integrating all elements of national power. All regional operation plans have FDOs, and CINCs plan requests for appropriate diplomatic, economic, and informational options as they develop their plans. Examples of FDOs from all four elements of national power are listed in Figures 6-6 through 6-9. In general, plans for FDOs use Active Component, in-place forces of approximately brigade,

Figure 6-5

squadron, or battle group size, intratheater lift assets, and predominantly Active Component support forces.

(b) Deploy decisive force. If decision-makers elect not to make a response to crisis indications, or an adversary is not deterred by FDOs that are executed, CINCs must plan for later actions (less timely from a deterrence perspective) to respond to unambiguous warning. Unambiguous warning occurs when the President decides, based on intelligence he receives, that a hostile government has decided to initiate hostilities. Deploy-decisive-force options involve early deployment of sufficient supportable combat forces, possibly including some Reserve forces, to the crisis region to defend U.S. interests, followed by decisive force to quickly end the conflict on terms favorable to the United States. Deploy-decisive-force options are the focus of deliberate planning. They are the options for which detailed force and resource planning is conducted and for which transportation-feasible TPFDDs are developed for OPLANS. Though crises for which deploy-decisive-force options are appropriate may still be deterrable, planners assume that deterrence will fail and that conflict will erupt.

(c) Counterattack. There exists the possibility that crises could begin with no-warning attacks against U.S. forces or vital interests, or without prior deterrent moves having been made. U.S. force deployments would not begin until after conflict

Figure 6-6

had been initiated. CINCs include concepts for a counterattack option in MRC operation plans for deployment and employment of assigned and apportioned forces to achieve U.S. objectives.

(3) Force apportionment and multiple contingencies. Adaptive planning, centered on regional contingencies, is a framework for deliberate planning using force levels reduced from those needed to meet a global threat. Apportionment of some forces from these reduced force levels to more than one CINC for planning is required to generate decisive force in some regional contingencies. In addition, U.S. military strategy requires maintaining the capability to respond to two concurrent, sequentially developing regional contingencies. The purpose of this requirement is to deter potential adversaries from deciding that U.S. commitment of decisive force to one contingency might present a window of opportunity to successfully attack U.S. interests elsewhere. Adaptive planning minimizes conflict between the need to apportion some forces to more than one CINC for deliberate planning, and the need to plan responses to concurrent contingencies. While employment of some of the same forces may be planned by different CINCs for

Figure 6-7

Figure 6-8

each of two concurrent contingencies, those forces cannot be simultaneously employed in both. The JSCP gives planning guidance that prioritizes apportioned forces into four cases for all MRCS. MRCs are the most demanding operation planning scenarios, and the OPLANs developed to respond to them will therefore be most dependent on those forces apportioned to more than one CINC. Even though the forces in all four cases are available to the CINCs for development of OPLANs, forces in some of the cases may not be available at execution of a response to one of two sequential, concurrent contingencies. The four cases are related to the range of options previously discussed.


Figure 6-9

(a) Case 1 Forces (FDOs). Case 1 forces are primarily in-place and augmentation forces from the Active Component appropriate for an array of FDOs the CINC might develop for use during a period of ambiguous warning. Augmentation forces are rapidly deployable and relatively small, as previously described. The augmentation force may contain subunits of a larger force from Case 2.

(b) Case 2 Forces (Early Deployers for Deploy-Decisive-Force). Built on Case 1 forces, the Case 2 forces include Active and that portion of the Reserve forces needed to move and sustain a major force deployment from CONUS. They give the CINC a significant level of force that would be used in the early stages of a Deploy-Decisive-Force option.

(c) Case 3 Forces (Deploy-Decisive-Force). Built on Case 1 and Case 2 forces, the Case 3 forces are apportioned based on unambiguous warning in which the enemy initially may not have completed preparation for war. They include Presidential Selected Reserve Callup (PSRC) and partial mobilization reinforcements, and are the forces available to the CINC during OPLAN development.

(d) Case 4 Forces (Counterattack/Decisive Force). The Case 4 forces build on Case 1, 2, and 3 forces and comprise additional Active units and Reserve forces required and made available under partial mobilization. Case 4 forces are phased into the OPLAN to support the concept with the decisive force needed to quickly end a regional conflict on terms favorable to the United States.

(e) Concurrent Contingencies. The purpose of dividing MRC force apportionment into the four cases is to deconflict planned employment of forces apportioned to more than one CINC for planning in anticipation of concurrent contingencies. If an MRC is the first of two sequentially developing contingencies, not all of its Case 4 forces, even though phased into the OPLAN, may be available at execution, as those units could be allocated to a second contingency. In the case of the second of two sequentially developing contingencies where significant forces have been committed to the first, in-place Case 1 forces may be the only forces available for planning an initial response. Other later deploying (Case 4) forces are apportioned for the purpose of counteroffensive operations should deterrence fail. CINCs receive tasks in the JSCP to produce plans that outline how they will deal with such eventualities. It must be remembered that these force apportionment parameters are set forth in the JSCP to furnish the guidance necessary to conduct coordinated contingency planning. The NCA will determine priorities between actual concurrent contingencies and the actual major forces deployed to respond to them at execution.


605. PHASES OF DELIBERATE PLANNING. The five formal phases of the deliberate planning process begin when a commander receives a task assignment and end when supporting plans have been approved by the supported commander. However, from the supported commanderís perspective, deliberate planning never stops. Regular updating of plan information is required to ensure that plans are as accurate as possible. Maintenance of large plans may require planners to continually update elements of information. The products of deliberate planning are operation plans and Functional Plans. Operation plans are either OPLANs or CONPLANs. The process is the same for development of both, but CONPLANs are less fully developed (only require, as a minimum, annexes A through D, J, and K), especially in the area of detailed resource planning, and generally will not contain a TPFDD. Functional Plans, like CONPLANs, require annexes A through D, J, and K. Operation plans are developed using all phases of the deliberate planning process. Approved plans remain in effect and must be maintained until canceled

or superseded by another plan. Figure 6-10 shows the five formal phases of the deliberate planning process.

a. In the initiation phase planning tasks are assigned, major combat forces and strategic transportation assets are apportioned for planning, and the groundwork is laid for planning to begin.

b. Several things happen during the concept development phase. The combatant commander derives the mission from the assigned task, issues planning guidance to his staff and subordinate commands, and collects and analyzes information on the enemy. From this, the staff proposes and analyzes tentative courses of action (COAs), the combatant commander selects the best COA, and the staff develops that COA into a complete concept of operations. The concept of operations, documented as the CINCís Strategic Concept, is forwarded to the CJCS for review. By authority of the CJCS, the Joint Staff reviews the CINCís Strategic Concept and, when approved, it becomes the concept of operations for the plan.

c. In the plan development phase the combatant commanderís staff, the staffs of subordinate and supporting commands, and other members of the JPEC develop the operation plan to the level of detail and in the format required by CJCSM 3122.03 (JOPES Volume II). If the CINC considers it necessary, a CONPLAN or Functional Plan can be developed in more detail than JOPES requires. For all OPLANs and some designated CONPLANs, a detailed transportation-feasible flow of resources into the theater is developed to support the concept of operations. Forces are selected and time-phased, support requirements are determined and time-phased, and the strategic transportation flow is computer simulated. The information required for the plan, i.e., the combat and support units along with the equipment and supply support, is collected in the Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) file using JOPES ADP. This phase ends when the fully documented plan, including TPFDD when required, is forwarded to the CJCS for final review and approval.

d. The plan review phase is a formal element of the deliberate planning process. The CINC submits all elements of the now fully developed plan to the JPEC for review and CJCS approval.

e. In the supporting plans phase, each subordinate and supporting commander who is assigned a task in the CINCís plan prepares a supporting plan. The subordinate and supporting commanders submit these plans to the supported commander for review and approval. The planning process continues through development of supporting employment and deployment plans that further ready the CINCís plan for implementation.

Figure 6-10

f. The planning cycle for the deliberate planning process is defined by the principal task-assigning document, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The approved operation plans prepared as directed by the JSCP are considered effective until superseded. The CJCS publishes the schedule for document submission dates, dates for the TPFDD refinement conferences held late in the plan development phase, and dates for the TPFDD maintenance conferences. The CINCs play a key role in establishing the administrative schedules as well as recommending to the CJCS whether current operation plans remain valid, need updating, or should be canceled.




a. Background

(1) Military action is not the only possible response to situations that threaten U.S. national interests. All elements of national power--the military, diplomatic, economic, and informational elements--are considered in the formulation of national policy. Military plans developed through the deliberate planning process also consider diplomatic, economic, and informational options. In fact, CINCs must explicitly relate military Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs) to FDOs under the other elements of national power as they develop their operation plans according to adaptive planning principles. Several examples of deterrent options are listed in Figures 6-5 through 6-8.

(2) The nationís strategic direction is developed by the President and his advisers. The National Security Council (NSC) staffs and prepares the national strategy. One administration published this strategy as a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) signed by the President; the exact title of the Presidentís decision document may vary from one administration to another. After the national strategy is published, the CJCS translates the worldwide military strategy into specific planning requirements.

b. Task-assigning documents

(1) The CJCS outlines the nationís military strategy in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), which assigns preparation of specific contingency plans to the combatant commanders.

(a) The JSCP assigns the CINCs the tasks of preparing operation plans in complete format (OPLANs), in concept, or abbreviated, format (CONPLANs), or as Functional Plans. Formats for OPLANs, CONPLANs, and Functional Plans are described in detail in CJCSI 3122.03 (JOPES Volume II). Briefly, the CONPLAN does not require the detailed identification of units and preparation of movement schedules found in the OPLAN and its accompanying TPFDD file. Presently, CONPLANs are required to have at least annexes A through D, J, and K. The Functional Plan summarizes the CINCís concept in even broader terms than the CONPLAN, is normally associated with peacetime operations, and, like the CONPLAN, is required to have at least annexes A through D, J, and K (Figure 6-22).

(b) The JSCP identifies major combat forces and strategic transportation for the CINC to use to develop each operation plan. These are called apportioned resources, and may include any limited, critical asset, such as combat forces, support forces, supplies, or strategic and theater transportation units. The JSCP generally apportions "major combat forces," a term that covers combat, not support, units and, generally, units the size of Army brigades or larger, Air Force squadrons, Navy carrier battle groups and surface action groups, and Marine Corps MAGTFs. It is important to recognize that these apportioned resources may differ from the numbers that may ultimately be furnished, or allocated, when an operation is actually executed.

(c) The JSCP establishes priorities for OPLANs that compete for limited resources.

(2) The Unified Command Plan (UCP) gives basic guidance to the combatant commander on general responsibilities and identifies geographic and functional areas of responsibility (AORs) and functional responsibilities.

(a) The Joint Chiefs of Staff issue the classified UCP as required and update it periodically. It is a task-assigning document and, therefore, specifically cites the authority the Secretary of Defense grants through memorandum or DOD directive. The President approves the UCP.

(b) In broad terms, the UCP directs the combatant commanders to be prepared to

The broad category "Normal Operations" includes responsibilities for planning and executing operations in contingencies, limited war, and general war; planning and conducting operations other than contingencies; planning and administering the security assistance program; and maintaining the relationship and exercising authority prescribed in Joint Pub 0-2 (UNAAF) and Joint Administrative Publication 1.1, Organization and Functions of the Joint Staff.

(c) The UCP, then, is a general task-assigning document that covers many contingencies for which the CINC has to prepare.

(3) Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), is also a task-assigning document. The unclassified CJCS guidance in UNAAF defines the exercise of authority by the combatant commander.

(a) UNAAF discusses the principles and doctrines governing joint activities of the Armed Forces:

(b) By broad definition, UNAAF initiates deliberate planning by assigning the combatant commander the task of "planning and conducting military operations in response to crises, to include the security of the command and protection of the United States, its possessions and bases against attack or hostile incursion." Continuing operation of the command and basic self-defense of the command are missions developed from that broad task assignment.

(4) On occasion, the CJCS may direct preparation of additional plans not included in the current JSCP. This task assignment may come in the form of a message or other directive. The new task will normally be incorporated into the next edition of the JSCP.

(5) The CINCís planning tasks are not limited to those specified by higher authority. The CINC may prepare plans considered necessary to discharge command responsibilities described in the UCP and UNAAF, but not specifically assigned. The CINC may also determine that a need exists to prepare plans to cover contingencies not assigned by the JSCP. If the CINC expects to assign tasks to forces not currently under his combatant command, the CJCS must approve.

(6) The number of operation plans prepared by a CINC using deliberate planning procedures varies with each command.

c. Products. In the deliberate planning process, the CINC is directed in the initiation phase to produce operation plans in either complete (OPLAN) format or abbreviated concept (CONPLAN) format, or to produce a Functional Plan.

(1) An OPLAN is a complete description of the CINCís concept of operations and demands much time and effort to produce. It identifies the forces and supplies required to execute the plan and includes a movement schedule of the resources into the theater of operations. The documentation includes annexes that describe the concept and explain the theater-wide support required in the subordinate commanderís supporting plan. OPLANs describe deployment and employment of forces and resources and include a TPFDD. The detailed planning essential in OPLAN development is normally required when the military response to a hostile situation

(2) In most situations the task does not require preparation of a detailed flow of resources. Though the same process is followed for producing CONPLANs as is used for OPLANs, the level of detail produced in the plan development phase of CONPLANs is abbreviated. Detailed support requirements generally need not be calculated, nor do strategic movements need to be simulated. CONPLANs do not generally include the detail typically found in OPLAN annexes, but require annexes A through D, J, and K or a TPFDD if the CJCS or CINC so directs. CONPLANs are normally prepared when

(3) A Functional Plan is used to respond to the requirements of the JSCP, at the initiative of the CINC, or as tasked by the supported commander, Joint Staff, Service, or Combat Support Agencies. Development of Functional Plans follows the same process used for OPLANs and CONPLANs throughout the concept development phase of deliberate planning. They normally are plans involving the conduct of military operations in a peacetime or permissive environment developed by combatant commanders to address requirements, such as

d. JPEC coordination. The Services also have an input during the initiation of planning. Since the CJCS apportions only major combat forces, the Services must give the CINC information about other combat, combat support, and combat service support forces that are available for planning. They also inform the combatant commander on Service doctrine, guidance, and priorities.

e. Review of previous operations. Planners should access the Joint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL) and the Joint Universal Lessons Learned Systems (JULLS) database early in the planning process and periodically thereafter to obtain specific practical lessons in all areas of planning and execution gained from actual operation and exercise experiences. A regular review of such information during the planning process can alert planners to known pitfalls and successful, innovative ideas.





a. After the CINC has received the task assignment, the staff analyzes the mission and develops tentative courses of action (COAs) to accomplish the mission. The concept development phase can be seen as an orderly series of six steps. The first five take the joint staff through a problem-solving process to develop the CINCís Strategic Concept. In the sixth step the CJCS reviews the CINCís Strategic Concept. With CJCS approval, the CINCís Strategic Concept becomes the concept of operations for the plan. Although the steps, illustrated in Figure 6-11, are diagrammed and discussed individually, in actual practice they may not be conducted separately or in the simple sequence listed. The dividing line between steps is sometimes hard to see, since steps are often repeated, combined, or done concurrently. Staff work done in one step affects work being done in others.

b. Once it has developed the CINCís Strategic Concept, the staff forwards it to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for concept review. When approved, the CINCís Strategic Concept becomes the concept of operations for the plan, and the plan is approved for further development. This review process is the same for all operation plans (OPLANs and CONPLANs).



a. To begin developing the concept of operations, the combatant commander determines the objective, reviews what resources are available for use in developing the plan, analyzes the enemy and the physical conditions that affect the task, and reviews the guidelines that have been given by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The first step in the development of a military concept of operations begins with a careful analysis of the task assignment. In the language of deliberate planning, the CINC and joint staff view the overall operation to

Figure 6-11

b. Until now, we have considered the task that has been assigned to the CINC by the JSCP or other directive. A transition from the assigned task to the CINCís mission statement must be made.

(1) Both Joint Pub 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, and Joint Pub 0-2, UNAAF, define a mission as "the task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for the action." Neither the DOD Dictionary nor UNAAF defines "task."

(2) Tasks are defined in Service documents. AR 310-25, the Dictionary of United States Army Terms, defines tasks as "the specific Army, Navy, and Air tasks which have to be done to implement successfully the phased concept of operations stemming from . . . the overall strategic concept."

c. For the purposes of deliberate planning, a clear distinction must be made between a task and a mission.

(1) AFSC defines a task as a job or function assigned to a subordinate unit or command by higher authority.

(2) Using the Joint Pub 1-02 definition, then, the subordinateís mission is derived from the task assigned by a higher authority and includes the reason for that task.

(3) This distinction between mission and task is consistent with joint planning documents. The task assigned by higher authority and its contribution to the mission of that higher-echelon commander serve as the basis for developing the subordinateís mission.

d. The product of Step 1 is the mission statement. The mission statement carries through the planning process and is included in the planning guidance, the planning directive, staff estimates, the Commanderís Estimate, the CINCís Strategic Concept, the concept of operations, and the completed operation plan.

(1) The mission statement is a clear, concise statement of the objective to be accomplished by the command (what) and the purpose to be achieved (why). Multiple tasks are normally described in the sequence in which they are to be done. Routine tasks or inherent responsibilities of the commander are not usually included in the mission statement.

(2) The mission statement developed during the mission analysis step is the basis for COA development, staff estimates, and the Commanderís Estimate. It is stated in the planning guidance the CINC issues to coordinate the planning effort, and, after further refinement, it will also be included in the final OPLAN, CONPLAN, or Functional Plan. The elements of the mission statement are who, what, when, where, why, and, possibly, how. Normally, how the operation will be conducted is described in the concept of the operation or execution paragraph developed later in the planning process as greater detail is added.

(3) An example of a mission statement is found in the operation plan for the Philippine Campaign in World War II leading to Okinawa: CANF SWPA No. 16-44 of 18 November 1944:

"[When this order is received] [t]he Pacific Fleet, including four carrier groups, will, in order to support the operation, have as its continuing task the destruction of enemy naval and air forces which threaten interference with the operation. Fast carrier task forces will effect carrier strikes on the Empire, Okinawa, Formosa, and northern Luzon . . . ."



Reference: NWP 11, Naval Operational Planning

a. This step has two objectives: first, to give enough initial planning guidance to the supported CINCís staff for work to begin on COAs and, second, to communicate planning guidance to the subordinate commanders through a written planning directive or a planning conference.

b. Initial guidance. The following paragraphs describe the information that a supported commander may give a staff to understand the assigned task, derived mission statement, and restrictions or other considerations that will affect their planning.

(1) Mission. The mission statement was developed in Step 1 from the CINCís analysis of the task.

(2) Assumptions

(a) The DOD Dictionary defines an assumption as

"A supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of events, either or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to enable the commander in the process of planning to complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on the course of action."

(b) An assumption normally covers the issues over which the commander has no control and is used to fill a gap in knowledge so planning can continue. It is stated as if it were a fact. Subordinate commanders and supporting commanders treat the assumptions of the higher-echelon commander as facts and often do not plan for the possibility that they are not. Therefore, the statement of assumptions is a critical element in the development of the concept.

(c) Assumptions have a significant impact on the planning process. When dealing with an assumption, a "branch" to the plan would be developed should the assumption prove to be incorrect. Because of their influence on planning, the fewest possible assumptions are included in an operation plan. A valid assumption has three characteristics: it is logical, realistic, and essential for the planning to continue.

(d) Assumptions are made for both friendly and enemy situations. For example, planners can assume the success of friendly supporting operations that are essential to the success of their own plan, but cannot assume the success of their own operation. For instance, COM5THFLEET included this assumption in his OPLAN for the capture of Okinawa in 1945, ". . . that the assault shipping, supporting naval forces, and army troops to be used in the operation are released promptly from Philippine operations."

(e) Planners should use a worst-case scenario. The planner should plan that the enemy will use every capability at its disposal and operate in the most efficient manner possible. To dismiss these enemy possibilities could dangerously limit the depth of planning. Planners should never assume away an enemy capability.

(f) Planners cannot assume a condition simply because of a lack of accurate knowledge of friendly forces or a lack of intelligence about the enemy.

(g) As planning proceeds, additional assumptions may be needed, some early assumptions may prove to be faulty, and still others may be replaced with facts or new information gained during the planning process. The use of assumptions is more prevalent for operations planned far into the future; the situation is less certain and assumptions must be made to complete the planning.

(3) Nuclear and chemical warfare. Planning for nuclear and chemical warfare is especially sensitive. The commander issues guidance as early in the planning process as possible. A highly specialized staff does the planning for these capabilities.

(4) Political considerations

(a) Planning for the use of military forces includes a discussion of the political implications of their transportation, staging, and employment. Political factors can have a significant effect on the prosecution of a military operation. Unfortunately, in peacetime planning they are extremely difficult to predict. Political considerations may have to be treated as assumptions.

(b) Most unified combatant commanders with a geographic area of responsibility have a Political Adviser (POLAD) as a member of their personal staffs. The POLAD is a representative from the Department of State experienced in the political and diplomatic situation in the theater. The POLAD is helpful in advising the CINC and staff on political or diplomatic issues crucial to the planning process, such as overflight and transit rights for deploying forces, basing and servicing agreements, etc.

(5) Tentative courses of action

(a) The CINC gives the staff his preliminary thinking on possible military actions early in the planning process to focus their actions. These preliminary or tentative COAs are activities initially seen to be open to the military commander that will lead to successful accomplishment of the mission. Normally, these tentative COAs are not fully analyzed for feasibility and seldom contain all elements of a refined COA.

(b) Tentative COAs may include only what military action is to be accom-plished, that is, amphibious or airborne assault, naval blockade, etc., and where the military action could take place. The refined COA contains who, what, when, where, and how.

(6) Planning schedule

(a) The commander usually issues a planning schedule with his initial guidance, although practice varies from command to command.

(b) Normally drawn up by the chief of staff, the planning schedule sets milestones or deadline dates for completing staff estimates, submitting data from subordinate and supporting commands, and completing and distributing various elements of the plan.

(7) Initial staff briefings

(a) Initial briefings on such subjects as terrain and hydrography of the area of operations, enemy capabilities, forces available, logistics support, and others are vital to the staff early in the planning process. They help the J-5 staff formulate additional tentative COAs and focus the joint staff divisions as they analyze tentative COAs and develop recommendations for the CINC.

(b) In most cases, the appropriate staff directorates prepare and present these initial briefings.

c. Commanderís intent. The commandersí intent describes the desired end state. It is a concise expression of the purpose of the operation, not a summary of the concept of the operation. It may include how the posture of units at end state facilitates transition to future operations. It may also include the commanderís assessment of the enemy commanderís intent. The commanderís intent is the initial impetus for the entire planning process. The commander refines his intent as he considers staff estimates and the Commanderís Estimate. The intent statement may also contain an assessment of where the commander will accept risk during the operation. The commanderís intent helps subordinates pursue the desired end state without further orders. Thus, the commanderís intent provides focus for all subordinate elements.

d. Planning directive. The CINC normally communicates initial guidance to the staff, subordinate commanders, and supporting commanders by publishing a planning directive to ensure that everyone understands the commanderís intent and is "reading from the same sheet of music."

(1) Generally, the head of the plans and policy directorate, J-5, coordinates staff action for deliberate planning. The J-5 staff receives the CINCís initial guidance and combines it with the information gained from the initial staff briefings; this information becomes the written planning directive issued by the CINC. The contents of a planning directive are not officially prescribed in deliberate planning procedures, but generally include the information discussed in paragraph b. preceding. A suggested format appears in Appendix A of this publication, adapted from Appendix 1 to Annex P of Joint Pub 5-03.1 (JOPES Volume I) to be republished as CJCSI 3122.01.

(2) The CINC, through the J-5, may convene a preliminary planning conference for members of the JPEC who will be involved with the plan. This is the opportunity for representatives to meet face-to-face. At the conference, the CINC and selected members of the staff brief the attendees on important aspects of the plan and may solicit their initial reactions. Many potential conflicts can be avoided by this early exchange of information. The supported commanderís staff normally prepares and distributes minutes of the conference. The record of these proceedings can also serve as the basis for a planning directive.

(3) It is absolutely vital to the success of the planning process that all members of the JPEC be kept informed. The ultimate success of the supported commanderís mission will depend on the support and cooperation of each subordinate and supporting commander. A large measure of that success results from a clear understanding of the commanderís intent. Of course, each new plan spawns supporting plans; early CINC guidance allows supporting commanders to begin concurrent planning to develop those supporting plans.



a. Introduction. Staff estimates are the foundation for the CINCís selection of a course of action. In this step, the staff divisions analyze and refine each COA to determine its supportability. The thoroughness of these staff estimates may determine the success of the military operation.

(1) Not every situation needs an extensive and lengthy planning effort. It is conceivable that a commander could review the assigned task, receive oral briefings, make a quick decision, and direct the writing of a plan. This would complete the process and might be suitable if the task were simple and straightforward.

(2) Most combatant commanders, however, demand the thorough, well-coordinated plan that necessitates a complex staff estimate step. Although written staff estimates are not mandatory, most will be carefully prepared and coordinated and fully documented.

b. The CINCís entire staff is deeply involved in the deliberate planning effort. The J-5 normally coordinates the overall process of long-range planning, prepares the initial planning guidance, and coordinates the staff estimates. As illustrated in Figure 6-12, most major joint staff divisions, J-1, J-2, J-4, and J-6, prepare staff estimates; in addition, input may be solicited from the CINCís special staff on specialized or technical matters. The J-5 gathers information and, with the J-3, proposes and revises tentative COAs. The J-3 might also complete a staff estimate to compare COAs for supportability and recommend a preferred COA to the J-5. In the later stages of staff analysis, the J-5 begins to focus on selecting information from the staff estimates to assist the CINC in preparing the Commanderís Estimate.

c. The purpose of staff estimates is to determine whether the mission can be accomplished and to determine which COA can best be supported. This, together with the supporting discussion, gives the CINC the best possible information to select a COA.

Figure 6-12

(1) Each joint staff division

(2) Because of the unique talents of each joint staff division, involvement of all is vital. Each staff estimate takes on a different focus that identifies certain assumptions, detailed aspects of the COAs, and potential deficiencies that are simply not known at any other level, but nevertheless must be considered. Such a detailed study of the COAs involves the corresponding staffs of subordinate and supporting commands; this coordination is essential, since they bring details of force support and employment not viewed at the theater level.

(3) The form and, possibly, the number of COAs under consideration change during this step. These changes result in refined courses of action.

d. The product of this step is the sum total of the individual efforts of the staff divisions. Complete, fully documented staff estimates are extremely useful to the J-5 staff, which extracts information from them for the Commanderís Estimate. The estimates are also valuable to planners in subordinate and supporting commands as they prepare supporting plans. Although documenting the staff estimates can be delayed until after the preparation of the Commanderís Estimate, they should be sent to subordinate and supporting commanders in time to help them prepare annexes for their supporting plans.

(1) The principal elements of the staff estimate normally include mission, situation and considerations, analysis of friendly COAs, comparison of friendly COAs, and conclusions. The details in each basic category vary with the staff performing the analysis. The principal staff divisions have a similar perspective--they focus on friendly COAs and their supportability. However, the J-2 estimate on intelligence concentrates on the enemy: enemy situation, enemy capabilities and an analysis of those capabilities, and conclusions drawn from that analysis. The analysis of enemy capabilities includes analysis of the various courses of action available to the enemy according to its capabilities, which include attacking, withdrawing, defending, delaying, etc. The J-2ís conclusion will indicate the enemyís most likely course of action.

(2) Guidance on the format for staff estimates is found in Appendixes 2 through 5 to Annex P of Joint Pub 5-03.1, JOPES Volume 1, to be republished as CJCSI 3122.01. Appendixes B through E of AFSC Pub 1 include staff estimate formats adapted from JOPES Volume 1. Combatant commanders may direct that additional details be included in their particular staff estimates.

e. Often the steps in the concept development phase are not separate and distinct, as the evolution of the refined COA illustrates.

(1) During planning guidance and early in the staff estimates step, the initial COAs may have been developed from initial impressions and based on limited staff support. But as concept development progresses, COAs are refined and evolve to include as many of the following as applicable:

(2) These refined COAs are developed by an iterative process of modifying, adding to, and deleting from the original, tentative list. The staff continually estimates and reestimates the situation as the planning process continues. Early staff estimates are frequently given as oral briefings to the rest of the staff. In the beginning, they emphasize information collection more than analysis. It is only in the later stages of the process that the staff estimates are expected to indicate which COAs can best be supported.



a. Definition. Joint Pub 1-02 defines the Commanderís Estimate (of the Situation) as "a logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to a course of action to be taken to accomplish the mission." In deliberate planning, it is the document that clearly states the CINCís decision and summarizes the CINCís rationale for that decision. The Commanderís Estimate becomes a tool to communicate valuable guidance from the CINC to the staff and subordinate commanders. As such, it is a valuable planning tool for the staff and subordinate commanders.

b. Generally, after receiving direction from the CINC and drawing from information in the staff estimates, the J-5 assembles the staff estimates and drafts the documentation for the Commanderís Estimate. It is prepared for the CINC to describe the chosen COA. In deliberate planning, the Commanderís Estimate is a planning document used by the command. Appendix 6 to Annex P of Joint Pub 5-03.1 (JOPES Volume 1) to be republished as CJCSI 3122.01 furnishes a format for the Commanderís Estimate; Appendix F of AFSC Pub 1 also includes a format adapted from JOPES Volume 1. Figure 6-13 shows the basic

subdivision of information; the five main paragraph headings outline steps to basic problem solving. A more detailed guide to preparing a Commanderís Estimate is contained in Figure 6-14, "A Primer on the Commanderís Estimate."



a. Introduction. The CINCís Strategic Concept is the proposed concept of operations for the plan, an expanded version of the COA selected in the Commanderís Estimate prepared in Step 4. It is a narrative statement of how the CINC expects to conduct operations to accomplish the mission. It serves two purposes:

Figure 6-13

(1) It clarifies the intent of the commander in the deployment, employment, and support of apportioned forces.

(2) It identifies major objectives and target dates for their attainment.

b. Format. The CINCís Strategic Concept is written in sufficient detail to impart a clear understanding of the CINCís overall view of how the operation will be conducted, or concept of operations. The particular format for submission of the CINCís Strategic Concept is prescribed in CJCSI 3122.011 and Appendix G of AFSC Pub 1. The elements of information that clearly convey the CINCís concept of operations include the following.

The Commanderís Estimate is an essential tool in deliberate and crisis planning. Using the staff work of the preceding steps, it documents the decision process used by the combatant commander (CINC) in choosing his course of action (COA). It becomes the foundation of the CINCís concept of operations and all future planning. The document is more than a collection of information from prior staff work; it is the statement of the CINCís decision process to select a COA. Often prepared by the J-5 for the CINCís signature, it is a definitive statement of the direction of subsequent deliberate planning.

A Commanderís Estimate is used in both deliberate and crisis-action planning. Its format in deliberate planning is set forth in Appendix 6 to Annex P of CJCSI 3122.01, JOPES Volume I. Appendix F to AFSC Pub 1 includes a format adapted from JOPES Volume l. The estimate consists of five paragraphs.

PARAGRAPH 1--MISSION. The mission statement that was developed in the mission analysis step, written during planning guidance, and refined during the staff estimate step is restated in Paragraph 1. This mission statement will be used throughout the operation plan.

PARAGRAPH 2--THE SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION. This information is limited to the significant factors that influence the CINCís choice of COA. Separate subparagraphs will describe enemy capabilities and list friendly COAs to be considered.

(1) Characteristics of the area of operations. This information is furnished by J-2. The topics suggested in Pub 1 Appendix F illustrate information that may be influential in selecting a COA. The list is neither mandatory nor exhaustive.

(2) Relative combat power. This is not simply a list of the numbers of combat troops and weapons. The planner also assesses the competence

and characteristics of the forces, their composition, location, disposition, and information that measures combat effectiveness.

PARAGRAPH 3--ANALYSIS OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES. The purpose of Paragraph 3 is to evaluate each proposed friendly course of action as though opposed by each enemy capability. This series of wargaming exercises illustrates that the commander considered the most significant and influential confrontations.

The comprehensive analysis that is documented in Paragraph 3 is sometimes difficult for new planners to begin. First, planners organize their thoughts: consider enemy capability #1 against friendly COA #1, e.g., consider the enemyís capability to defend against our amphibious assault. How will the terrain affect the matchup? What effect will the lines of communication have? What is the relative combat power of forces?

How will this confrontation affect further operations? Comprehensive planning at this point does not restrict the flow of ideas under consideration. The process of selection comes later. No reasonable possibility should be overlooked.


Figure 6-14

The planner will note that certain features begin to appear dominant as the wargaming and analysis continue. Some of these factors will clearly favor friendly forces and others will favor the enemy. These dominant considerations are known as governing factors. They are used by the J-5 and the CINC to focus the evaluation of friendly COAs.

The total enemy capabilities may be numerous, yet the decision-maker must focus on a small, manageable number to permit comprehensive analysis. Two methods have been developed to reduce the number of enemy capabilities under consideration without compromising the value of the wargaming exercise.

likely to govern the commanderís choice. Although an enemy capability may be unquestionably critical to our success, it may not contribute to the decision-makerís choice of one COA over another.

PARAGRAPH 4--COMPARISON OF FRIENDLY COAíS. This paragraph weighs the advantages and disadvantages of each friendly COA in light of the governing factors, e.g., relative combat power, logistics support, terrain, mobility, etc. It is a narrative description of the advantages and disadvantages of each COA as seen by the CINC. In preparation, it may be useful for planners to summarize their analysis. In reality, the actual comparison may be a mental process that lacks documentation or a computer simulation weighing sensitivity of the COA to enemy capabilities. In this paragraph the CINC describes his method for comparing each COA measured in factors he considers important to the success of the operation. Normally, the supporting tools used in the analysis are not included in the final document. A clear picture is given of the results of the analysis that led to the decision of COA.

The final part of paragraph 4 is a statement that concludes, "Course of action # ____ is favored because . . . ."

PARAGRAPH 5--DECISION. In practice, the J-5 may prepare, coordinate, and submit to the CINC a recommended COA, but the final product, when signed by the CINC, gives the rationale used in the decision process. The document need not be the compelling argument as to the choice of a particular COA; it is, however, a statement of the CINCís decision for use by planners in understanding the rationale that went into the choice of the COA.


Figure 6-14


ADEQUACY. Will the course of action actually accomplish the mission when carried out successfully? In other words, is it aimed at the correct objectives?

FEASIBILITY. Do we have the required resources, i.e., the personnel, the transportation, the resupply, the facilities, etc.? Can the resources be made available in the time contemplated?

ACCEPTABILITY. Even though the action will accomplish the mission and we have the necessary resources, is it worth the cost in terms of excessive losses in personnel, equipment, material, time, or position? Is the action consistent with the law of war and militarily/politically supportable?

VARIETY. OPLANs will comply with joint doctrine as stated in approved/test publications in the Joint Publication System. Incorporating appropriate joint doctrine when preparing OPLANs facilitates crisis action planning and the execution of planned operations. There are military operations in which only one feasible course of action exists. Generally, in joint operations this is not the case. The Commanderís Estimate analyzes and compares substantially different courses of action. Listing alternative, but only superficially different, COAs preempts the CINCís decision and eliminates an important and useful purpose of the Commanderís Estimate.

COMPLETENESS. When the COAs have been reduced to a manageable number, a last check is given to confirm that they are technically complete. Does each retained course of action adequately answer

The refined COAs are used by the CINC in his final decision; they must be explicit to allow sound judgments to be made. Care is shown not to usurp the initiative and prerogative of subordinate commanders by including too much of the "how."


Figure 6-15

(1) Situation

(2) Mission

(3) Execution

(4) Administration and Logistics

(5) Command and Control

c. Concept Development Conference. The CINC may call a concept development conference involving representatives of subordinate and supporting commands, the Services, Joint Staff, and other interested parties. Such a conference might be convened if additional work is required from subordinate and supporting commanders, which may be the situation either when the original task is to prepare an OPLAN and substantial subordinate commander involvement is required in the next phase (plan development) or when considerable effort will be required to prepare supporting plans. The conference would be convened to ensure that adequate direction is given to subordinates. Subordinate and supporting commanders base further planning on guidelines in the CINCís Strategic Concept.

d. The transmittal of the concept. The commander must ensure that his concept is accurately described both to members of the planning community, so they can continue planning in support of the operations, and to the CJCS for review and approval.


613. STEP 6? CJCS CONCEPT REVIEW. Once the CINCís Strategic Concept is prepared, it is forwarded to the CJCS for review and approval. The process is the same for OPLANs, CONPLANs, and Functional Plans, whether they are new plans or existing plans for which the concept has changed. Reviews should be completed within 60 days of referral; however, the Director, Joint Staff, may extend the review period if necessary. With CJCS approval, the CINCís Strategic Concept becomes the concept of operations for the plan. It will be used in paragraph 3 (Execution) of the Basic Plan and described in detail in Annex C of the OPLAN.

a. Initiation of review. The Joint Staff conducts the review for the CJCS. When the Joint Staff receives the CINCís Strategic Concept, it determines whether the concept is in the proper format, conforms with JSCP guidance, is consistent with joint doctrine, and is therefore ready for review. If not, the submitting headquarters is notified by memorandum or message.

b. Review responsibilities. The Joint Staff, Services, and designated defense agencies (National Security Agency (NSA), National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)) conduct independent reviews and submit comments within 30 days of referral. Comments by Joint Staff directorates and defense agencies are submitted to the Joint Staff Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7), which has primary staff responsibility for conducting reviews. The Services submit comments to the Secretary, Joint Staff.

c. Review criteria. The purpose of the concept review is to

(1) determine whether the scope and concept of operations are sufficient to accomplish the task assigned,

(2) assess the validity of the assumptions,

(3) evaluate compliance with CJCS guidance and joint doctrine, and

(4) evaluate acceptability with regard to expected costs and military and political supportability.

d. Review comments. Comments back to the CINC concerning his concept are classified as execution-critical, substantive, or administrative.

(1) Execution-critical comments describe major deficiencies that negatively affect the capability of the plan to meet the JSCP objective and may prevent execution of the plan as written. Examples of such deficiencies include such things as failure to meet assigned tasks, deviations from joint policy, and major logistics shortfalls.

(2) Substantive comments pertain to less critical deficiencies such as deviations from CJCS guidance or JOPES formatting. These deficiencies would not prevent execution of the plan.

(3) Administrative comments are offered for clarity, accuracy, and consistency. They include such items as outdated references, improper terminology, and minor errors.

e. Review results. Results of the review are forwarded to the supported commander by memorandum or message stating that the concept is either

(1) approved for further plan development or

(2) disapproved and requires significant changes before resubmission.

f. Post-review actions. The supported commander incorporates changes required by the CJCS as follows:

(1) A formal change incorporating all execution-critical comments is submitted to the CJCS within 30 days of receipt of the review results.

(2) Substantive comments must be incorporated when the plan is submitted for review in its entirety in the plan review phase of the deliberate planning process.



a. The deliberate planning process has progressed from receipt of the task assignment to development of the CINCís concept of how the assigned task will be accomplished. The CINC has documented the plan in sufficient detail for the reviewing authority, the CJCS, to understand fully the overall military concept of operations. Moreover, the transmittal of the concept gives continuing guidance to subordinates as they begin more detailed planning. The procedures in concept development are not rigid. Through each step, the planners identify and analyze factors that could adversely affect the accomplishment of the CINCís mission. This discovery and problem-solving process continues even while they are preparing the CINCís Strategic Concept; they may adjust or revise the concept at any time. Shortages in types, quantities, or timing of forces or resources (called shortfalls) are among the most critical factors. The identification and resolution of shortfalls continue throughout the entire planning process.

b. Joint Planning and Execution Community coordination. The planning procedures during the concept development phase are conducted primarily by the CINC and the CINCís staff. The component commanders, joint task force commanders, and subordinate unified commanders have been involved. Outside the CINCís theater, supporting commanders, such as USTRANSCOM and other combatant commanders, and defense agencies, have attended coordination meetings, received the supported CINCís guidance, and given valuable insight during development of the concept.

c. The development of the CINCís concept of operations has been described as the most difficult phase of deliberate planning, because of the many subjective determinations that must be made. Now begins the detailed development of the flow of resources and the determination of whether that operation is possible with the apportioned forces and transportation. This next phase, plan development, is undoubtedly the most time-consuming phase.





a. Overview. At the close of concept development, the CINC sends his Strategic Concept to the CJCS for review and approval. Once approved, it becomes the concept of operations for plan development and subsequent phases of the deliberate planning process. In the plan development phase, the staff expands and formally documents the concept of operations in the appropriate operation plan format. The process is the same for OPLANs, CONPLANs, and Functional Plans.

b. CONPLANs and Functional Plans are not as fully developed as OPLANs. CONPLANs do not require the level of detailed planning in support, sustainment, or transportation that OPLANs do. Unless the supported commander requires it, annexes and appendixes are not required to be as fully developed as in an OPLAN, and, generally, TPFDD development is not required. Therefore, CONPLANs present a less complicated plan development problem than OPLANs. Because OPLAN development requires all the procedures for the plan development phase to be accomplished and CONPLAN development does not, subsequent discussion of the plan development phase will focus on planning procedures for OPLANs.

c. During the initial steps of this phase, the spotlight moves to the subordinate commanders; generally, in unified combatant commands, these are the component commanders. Planners on the staffs of the component commands begin developing the total package of forces required for the operation. They start with the major combat forces selected from those apportioned for planning in the original task-assigning document and included in the CINCís concept of operations. Working closely with the staffs of Service headquarters, other supporting commands, and combat support agencies, they identify requirements for support forces and sustainment.

d. The supported commander consolidates each componentís forces and supplies, and phases their movement into the theater of operations. The resources are proposed for arrival in-theater and at the final destination using apportioned intertheater transportation, CINC-controlled theater transportation, and transportation organic to the subordinate command. The strategic movement is simulated in a computer model; reasonable assurances can then be given by the CINC that the operation is transportation feasible.

e. The later steps of the phase fill the planís hypothetical (notional) units with actual units and those supply entries that can be replaced. In the refinement step, movement of these units is again computer-simulated, and USTRANSCOM develops movement tables. The final documentation for the transportation-feasible OPLAN is prepared. Two phases follow plan development in the deliberate planning process. The first presents the OPLAN package to the CJCS for final review and approval, and the second sees subordinate and supporting commanders developing necessary supporting plans.

f. For clarity, the plan development phase will be described in eight sequential steps shown in Figure 6-16. In reality, these steps may overlap, be accomplished simultaneously, or repeat. The same flexibility displayed in the course of action refinement process of the preceding phase is seen again here, as shortfalls are discovered and eliminated. The sheer magnitude of the problem is enormous; tens of thousands of separate combat and support units and materiel shipments make up large OPLANs. Computer support within JOPES makes the timely development of a realistic flow of manpower and supplies possible.

g. ADP support. The plan development phase produces huge amounts of information about the forces, the equipment and materiel support to those forces, and the time- time-phased movement of personnel and materiel to the area of operations. To manage this mountain of information, planners need ADP support. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) provides ADP support to operation plan development. JOPES is accessed by planners and throughout the JPEC through the Global Command and Control System (GCCS). Planners use specialized application programs in JOPES and interface with other application programs through JOPES, to create a Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) computer file. The TPFDD is created by entering and relating data supplied by sources throughout the JPEC and generated by JOPES and JOPES-related applications. The discussion of plan development in this volume will first cover the eight steps previously mentioned, followed by a section covering the ADP support available in JOPES to help accomplish the steps.

h. TPFDD LOI. The supported commander publishes a letter of instruction (LOI) at the beginning of the plan development phase of deliberate planning. The purpose of the LOI is to give the CINCís component commanders and supporting commands and agencies specific guidance on how the plan is to be developed. The supported commanderís staff coordinates with affected commands such as USTRANSCOM and its

Figure 6-16

components before publication to ensure that the guidance given in the LOI is current. The LOI must furnish specific guidance concerning these items:



a. Introduction. The purpose of force planning is to identify all forces needed to accomplish the CINCís concept of operations and phase them into the theater of operations. Force planning is based on CJCS, Service, and USSOCOM (for special operations) guidance and doctrine. It consists of force requirements determination, force list development and refinement in light of force availability, and force shortfall identification and resolution. Force planning is ultimately the responsibility of the supported commander, but the components do most of the work.

(1) The original task-assigning instrument, the JSCP or other such directive, identifies major combat forces. Tasks assigned in the UCP and UNAAF generally use in-place forces already under the combatant command of the CINC. Forces apportioned for use in making operation plans will be those projected to be actually available during the JSCP period at the level of mobilization specified for planning. CJCS approval is required when CINC-initiated OPLANs cannot be supported with apportioned resources. The CINCís strategic concept clearly identifies the principal combat forces required by the concept of operations.

(2) A total force list includes much more than just major combat troops. Combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) forces, as well as smaller units of combat forces, are essential to the success of any military operation. The most up-to-date guidance on combat and support capabilities and methods of employment is available in Service planning documents and directly from Service headquarters commands. Therefore, each component command develops its own total force list composed of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces (C, CS, CSS) using Service planning documents: Army Mobilization Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES) in four volumes, Navy capabilities and Mobilization Plan (NCMP) and fleet planning guidance, Marine Corps Capabilities Plan (MCP), and the Air Force War and Mobilization Plan (WMP) in five volumes. Essential combat and support forces that are available for planning may also be listed in the applicable JSCP supplemental instructions.

(3) The apportioned major combat forces may have been described in relatively large fighting units, such as Army division and brigade, Navy carrier battle group and surface action group, Marine expeditionary force and unitbrigade, and Air Force wing and squadron. The final product for each componentís total force list will include detail down to unit level, i.e., battalions, squadrons, detachments, teams, etc. Certain terms describing the movement of forces are essential to understanding this step of the planning problem and later discussions of the JOPES ADP applications that planners access to build the TPFDD.

b. Movement terms. Forces move from their home location to a specified destination in the theater. This movement involves planning by several echelons of command, possibly stops at several intermediate locations en route, and a schedule constrained by a variety of operational requirements. These essential items of information are first considered and identified during the force planning step. Figure 6-17 illustrates the flow of resources.

(1) Key locations routinely used in deliberate planning include the following:

(a) The actual calculation of dates and the determination of locations used in deliberate planning begin with the destination (DEST), the geographic location where the force is to be employed. It is the terminal geographic location for the movement of forces in the TPFDD. To reach the DEST may require strategic and theater transportation controlled by the CINC as well as theater transportation controlled by subordinate and supporting commanders. Arrival at the DEST is not to be equated to coming into direct contact with an opposing force; rather, arrival at the DEST only satisfies the concept of operations envisioned by the CINC and subordinate commander. For example, the DEST for an Army terminal service unit may be a transshipment point many miles from direct contact with the enemy.

(b) The port of debarkation (POD) is the airport (APOD) or seaport (SPOD) within the theater of operations where the strategic transportation requirement for forces is completed, generally a large airport or seaport. It may or may not be the ultimate destination. For example, troops landing at an airfield in country Blue, the POD, may have to be transported many kilometers to their planned defensive position on the country Blue-country Red border (DEST). In some cases, the POD and DEST are the same place, e.g., an airfield in Germany may be the POD and the final destination for an

Figure 6-17

Air Force squadron. The port of support (POS) is the geographic location within the objective area where strategic transportation ends for air-transported supplies, resupply, and replacement personnel; sealift ammo; sealift POL; and sealift supplies and resupply. This is expected to be a distribution point; intratheater transportation from this geographic point may be required.

(c) The port of embarkation (POE) is the point where strategic air or sea transportation begins. Generally, it is the location in CONUS where strategic shipments begin. For Reserve units, the POE probably will not coincide with the home location (HOME) or mobilization station. The origin (ORIGIN) is the beginning point for a deployment move. For Active forces the ORIGIN and the POE will probably not be the same geographic location. For instance, Fort Bragg is the ORIGIN and Pope AFB is the POE for the 82d Airborne Division. Transportation to the POE is the planning responsibility of the providing commander or Service, with either organic transportation or transportation arranged by a supporting commander, such as USTRANSCOMís component, the Army Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC).

(d) Several additional locations within the theater may also influence deployment; an intermediate location (ILOC) is a stopping point in the deployment movement that may be used for strategic staging, changing mode of transport, necessary cargo handling, training, or marrying forces and equipment that are being transported by split shipment. The ILOC can occur between ORIGIN and POE, between POE and POD, or between POD and DEST. A marshalling area is the location where troops are matched with pre-positioned war stocks of equipment and supplies, such as the Army War Reserve Pre-positioned Sets (AWRPS) located in Europe, Italy, Norway, Korea, Kuwait, and Qatar. These pre-positioned stocks may also be afloat as part of the Armyís AWR-3 configuration or with one of three U.S. Marine Corps Maritime Pre-positioned Ships (MPS). Another ILOC may be a strategic staging location for holding forces not yet directly committed to the theaterís military operation. Finally, the Tactical Assembly Area (TAA) is the location where units assemble before tactical employment.

(e) These locations all play important roles in the deployment of forces and supplies. Since the arrival at the DEST is the key to successful participation in the CINCís concept, readying forces and supplies at the ORIGIN or POE, scheduling intermediate stops, and scheduling theater transportation from POD to DEST influence the planning and timing of the movement.

(2) Timing is crucial. Times are important because they offer a method to track the movement of resources and measure attainment of the CINCís schedule for involvement of the forces and required arrival of supplies. In addition, the assignment of dates allows JOPES application software to compare simulated movement with the CINCís desired movement schedule to determine whether the concept is transportation-feasible.

(a) The force must arrive and unload at its destination by the required delivery date (RDD) if it is to take a supportive part in the operation and contribute meaningfully to its outcome. It is not enough just to get a unit to its destination; it must arrive on or before the RDD. Arriving too early may create an unnecessary logistics support problem; too late may mean that the forces cannot affect the outcome of the operation. Another date, the CINCís required date (CRD), has been introduced in response to the administrative shifting of the RDD that sometimes takes place during plan development to resolve simulated shortfalls. It is the original RDD, established by the CINC, and is listed in the TPFDD to give visibility to RDDs that do shift and to show the impact of later arrival. It is intended that CRDs not be changed without CINC approval, as such changes can significantly alter the concept of operations.

(b) For the strategic move, planners begin with the RDD to determine some important interim dates. Deployment planners are interested in having units arrive at the POD between an earliest arrival date (EAD) and the latest arrival date (LAD). The EAD is the earliest a planner can allow the first element of personnel or equipment to offload from strategic lift at the POD; the LAD is the latest date for the last element to arrive at the POD and complete offloading in time to arrive at the DEST by the RDD. The unloading of the last unit is termed "closing the force." Whatever transportation time may be required to move between the POD and DEST is the difference between LAD and RDD.

(c) At the other end of the route, the mobilization and intra-CONUS planners (the Services, force-providing organizations, and the supporting transportation commands) are primarily concerned with preparing and scheduling the forces at the HOME, mobilization site, and ORIGIN. The ready-to-load date (RLD) is the earliest date a unit is available at the origin for onward transportation to the POE. The available-to-load date (ALD) is the earliest time that the unit can begin loading at the POE. An earliest date of completion (EDC) of loading is the scheduled time that all loading is completed at the POE. The earliest departure date (EDD) is the earliest date after the ALD that the shipment is ready to depart from the POE. Theoretically, these dates would be calculated backward from the RDD after considering marshalling and assembly times, theater and strategic deployment transportation times, etc. In fact, there is seldom any slack early in the planning period; the RLD and ALD are generally the minimum time required to prepare the units and materiel and transport them to the POE. Delays here may adversely affect arrival time at DEST.

(d) In practice, planners calculate the arrival window at the POD by determining the time to complete each link in tactical, intratheater transportation. Beginning with the RDD (or CRD) set by the CINC, deployment planners determine the time it will take to get from the POD to the DEST--time both to match with split-shipped or AWRPS equipment and to perform necessary assembly. Since most units cannot fully arrive on one day, there is an EAD-LAD window from the earliest arrival of the units and/or equipment at the POD and the latest departure from the POD to the DEST that will still satisfy the RDD. In theory, subtracting the time to perform strategic lift between POE and POD from those dates would result in the deadline required to complete assembly at the HOME/ORIGIN/POE for onward shipment. In practice, planners realize that on execution, competing demands will be made to mobilize, prepare for movement, and transport forces, equipment, and supplies. An RLD-ALD window is generally determined for the embarkation end of strategic transportation, and compromises begin to ease the impact on the final delivery date at the DEST. The possible loss of visibility of the original RDD that can result from these compromises led to the introduction of an inviolate CRD.

(3) Planners must have a clear understanding of force planning.

(a) It is easy to visualize a complicated movement of Reserve units. They may require movement from their home location (HOME) to their mobilization site and, possibly, onward to an Active base (ORIGIN) for training and marrying with equipment. Further movement may be required to the POE, where strategic transports will be met. These can become transportation planning problems even before troops and equipment leave CONUS. Such movement requirements are not limited to the Reserve Component. Active-duty units may also require intra-CONUS transportation from ORIGIN to POE. This enormous field of planning is basically the responsibility of the Services and is executed through the USTRANSCOM component, MTMC. This is called mobilization planning. It can significantly affect strategic lift and, ultimately, the arrival of combat units under the CINCís concept, and is therefore important to supported commanders. ADP applications for mobility planning are envisioned within JOPES to furnish planning tools that facilitate this crucial transportation link.

(b) Strategic deployment planning is the central focus of deliberate planning. It involves the strategic transportation of forces from POE to POD and of supplies and replacement personnel from POE to POS. Planning is done for transportation by sea and air lift assets that are apportioned to the CINC for planning. This lift is furnished by a supporting commander when the OPLAN is implemented.

(c) Within the theater, transportation may be required from a POD to the DEST. Transportation may be done in several ways, but of primary interest to the CINC is the requirement for limited theater airlift, a resource that may also be apportioned in the JSCP or limited by Service capabilities. This onward movement from POD to DEST is termed theater deployment planning and may be significant to the CINC if requirements for use of theater lift assets exceed the CINCís theater capabilities or if the simulated intratheater movement is not scheduled to meet the RDD. Arrival of the force at the right place and time (factors that are determined by an employment scheme and the concept of operations) is the ultimate objective of the deployment.

(d) Employment planning is another area vital to the successful execution of the CINCís concept of operations. It involves the actual use of personnel and materiel in the theater of operations. Detailed planning for employment is normally the responsibility of the subordinate commanders, such as component commanders or a joint task force commander.

(e) Overarching the mobilization, deployment, and employment planning processes is the Servicesí responsibility to sustain their forces. Though such sustainment planning is not completely supportable within the current capabilities of JOPES, improvements to JOPES ADP will include applications with much more capability to support it. Sustainment involves the resupply of materiel and replacement of personnel lost in the operation.

(f) The traditional focus of deliberate planning has been on strategic deployment. Improvements in ADP hardware, application software, and planning procedures continue to expand the view and control of the CINC in deliberate planning. Requirements for JOPES ADP to deal with the full planning spectrum from initial generation of force lists in mobilization through monitoring of employment and sustainment have been identified. The scope of JOPES is discussed in Chapter 5.

c. Building the force list. Given the mission and the concept of operations to accomplish it, the component planner reviews the forces apportioned for planning and included in the CINCís concept of operations, confirms the appropriateness of those forces, and determines the applicable CS and CSS forces from Service planning documents. The component force lists are developed with the full involvement of the supported commander. The subordinate commander submits the time-phased force list to the CINC for review and approval. By submitting the component force list, the supporting commander indicates full understanding of the concept of operations and assurance that the forces in the force list will support that concept. The CINCís staff merges the component force lists and evaluates the resulting consolidated force list. It analyzes the consolidated force list to confirm that it is adequate to perform the mission. When the supported commander concurs with the consolidated force list, the components then add any missing information needed to deploy the forces. Planners may build a force list in different ways.

d. Planners can create a force list unit by unit, starting with the apportioned combat forces and adding all necessary CS and CSS forces identified in doctrinal publications. This is a time-consuming effort, since OPLANs can contain several thousand separately identifiable units, or force requirements, and scores of data elements for each entry are needed to plan the movement adequately. An alternative method uses force modules. These are groupings of C, CS, and CSS forces, as well as a calculated amount of sustainment. Using either method manually would take an extremely long time. Fortunately, JOPES ADP support greatly aids in building the force lists for a plan, and is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.

(1) Understandably, each Active and Reserve unit in the U.S. Armed Forces today differs from the others. Even seemingly similar units within a Service may have different unit performance characteristics, various physical sizes of personnel and equipment assets, and even different unit readiness and combat capability. It is impossible to distinguish each unit separately at this stage of force planning, and no attempt is made to do so. Instead, a model is substituted, one that generally represents each different category of unit in each Service. Each model is a generic (notional), or type, unit--one that is representative of an operational capability. Nearly 8,500 type units are on file representing units ranging in size from a two-person Air Force personnel team unit to a 6,500-member nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. Type units are used to build a force list line by line.

(a) To build a force list line by line requires the following unit descriptive information about the forces to be listed:

(b) The unit movement information, such as ORIGIN, POE, ILOC, POD, and DEST, is needed.

(c) In addition, suggested times are introduced for RLD at the ORIGIN, ALD at the POE, and EAD and LAD at the POD. These times are determined from the expected transportation modes using apportioned strategic and tactical lift assets, plannersí professional assessments of necessary loading and unloading times, marshalling and assembly times, final transport time to the DEST, and the RDD set by the CINC.

(d) In fact, when the necessary routing information is included, there are 96 separate identifiers that peacetime planners find useful in describing the movement and physical characteristics of an individual unit. Almost 75 percent of these must be entered individually.

(e) The process is further complicated by mixing the CS and CSS forces identified in Service doctrine with the combat forces. Their movement into the theater is phased to meet operational requirements of the fighting force as well as operational constraints levied by transportation.

(2) A more efficient way to build force lists is through the use of force modules. Force modules are planning and execution tools used within JOPES to link major combat units with supporting units and a minimum of 30 daysí sustaining logistics supplies. Movement for the entire package is phased to support the concept of operations. The force module concept permits rapid construction of a combat force and satisfies the longstanding need to link support and sustainment requirements with each major combat force in both deliberate planning and crisis action planning, and permits the monitoring of execution. Many force and support requirements can be added to a planís database with a three-character force module identifier (FMI). There are three types of force modules:

(a) The first type is the Service force module. Service force modules are built by the Service headquarters to represent the generic (notional) structure of major combat units. Each Service force module contains the combat forces, the combat service (CS) and combat service support (CSS) forces required to support the combat forces, and associated sustainment for all of these for at least 30 days. Service force modules are designed to be basic building blocks to aid the planner in quickly creating force lists in both deliberate and crisis action planning. A basic library of Service force modules is maintained by the Services in the JOPES database.

(b) The second type of force module is the OPLAN-dependent force module. Like Service force modules, OPLAN-dependent force modules group combat, CS, CSS, and sustainment elements, but they are developed by the CINC to meet the specific demands of a particular OPLAN. They may begin as Service force modules that are then tailored to fit the requirements of the OPLAN in development, or they may be created by the CINC or components to fulfill a specific planning task. OPLAN-dependent force modules recognize theater-specific conditions: anticipated weather conditions, expected host-nation support contributions, expected intensity and nature of conflict, etc. OPLAN-dependent force modules are extremely useful to planners. Maintained as components of approved OPLAN TPFDDs, they reside in the JOPES deployment database and are accessible to planners for use in building TPFDDs for other plans. Because they have been tailored to specific anticipated scenarios and conditions, they are more directly applicable to similar scenarios in both deliberate and crisis action planning.

(c) The third type of force module is the force tracking force module. This force module is OPLAN-dependent and does not contain sustainment data. Force tracking force modules consist of major combat units and are required for all OPLANs.

(d) Administratively, force modules are extremely convenient for identifying and monitoring groupings of forces. They are valuable because they facilitate block manipulation of data associated with each module, display large amounts of aggregated information about the forces and cargo included in an OPLAN, and facilitate tracking of forces planned for use in various options within an OPLAN, such as the options required by adaptive planning. Both the current JSCP and JOPES procedures require use of force modules in deliberate planning.

(e) Expanding on the utility of force modules is the concept of force module packages (FMPs). These are groups of force modules oriented on specific functional capabilities (e.g., air superiority, close air support, or reconnaissance). They can facilitate even more rapid TPFDD building in deliberate planning plan development or in crisis action planning.



a. Overview. The purpose of support planning is to identify the quantities of supplies, equipment, and replacement personnel required to sustain the forces identified in Step 1, and phase their movement into the theater to support the concept of operations. Support planning determines the quantities of supply by broad category and converts them into weights and volumes that can be compared to lift capability. Thus, they become calculations of phased movements that become deployment movement requirements. The intent is not to identify the detailed levels of particular supplies, but to identify and phase into the theater the gross quantities of needed sustainment. These quantities are based on the number and types of C, CS, and CSS units to be employed in the operation. Support planning is completed when all significant supply, equipment, and personnel requirements have been determined, consolidated by the supported commander, and then entered into the TPFDD file for the plan.

(1) Sustainment capability is a function of U.S. logistics capability, inter-Service and inter-allied support, Service guidance, theater guidance, and the resulting time-phasing. Appropriate Combat Support Agencies and the General Services Administration (GSA) give the Services planning information concerning the origin and availability of non-Service-controlled materiel.

(2) The actual support calculation uses consumption rates developed and maintained by the Services under their responsibility to supply, equip, and maintain their forces assigned to combatant commanders. This calculation is generally made by the component commanders, who refer to Service and USSOCOM planning guidelines and doctrine. It is also possible for the supported commander to perform the calculations using component-supplied force lists and planning factors.

(3) Support requirements include supplies, equipment, materiel, and replacement personnel for the forces, as well as civil engineering, medical, and EPW materiel, and equipment and supplies to support the civil affairs effort.

(4) During the support planning step, planners are primarily concerned with how much strategic lift will be needed to move the support requirements. Thus, the gross estimates of supplies and replacement personnel do little more than initially determine the amount of space and number of passenger seats needed. Before the operation plan is complete, and definitely before it can be implemented, logistics and personnel planners will attempt to define the requirements in more detail.

b. Guidance from the CINC. The initial concept of support was developed during the concept development phase. Early in the planning the CINC gives guidance to the subordinate and supporting commands that defines the length of the operation, strategic lift availability, supply buildup policies, and anticipated supply shortages. The supported commander also gives guidance on transportation priorities, available common- and cross-servicing agreements between subordinate and supporting commands, personnel attrition factors, ports of support, etc.

c. Calculations. The computation of sustainment uses Service planning factors, or consumption rates, and the number of forces, or consumers, to be supported. The product of these factors becomes a total supply requirement, as illustrated in Figure 6-18. This total must be expressed as gross movement requirements in barrels of petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL); short tons or measurement tons of equipment and materiel identified by broad supply class or subclass; and numbers of personnel. These calculations are generally made by the component commanders.

Figure 6-18

(1) The actual calculations are usually done using planning factors from the Services. These planning factors can be applied to numbers of people, numbers of equipment types, or numbers of recurring type units, for instance, rations: 6.8 lbs per person per day; spare parts: 25 filters per 10-18 tractors per month operating in a dusty environment; or munitions: number of high-explosive rounds per day fired by 155mm batteries in heavy rate of fire.

(2) Performed manually, the calculations for the many force records in a typical TPFDD would be overwhelming. Consumption rates vary with the class and subclass of supply, theater or area within the theater of operation, intensity of combat for different Services and time periods, etc. JOPES ADP is a great help in performing these calculations and adding the supplies to the TPFDD. Supplies are phased into the theater in increments to avoid overloading logistics support facilities and transportation. It is important to note that the key to successful support planning is the prudent choice of planning factors.

d. Definitions. Numerous terms are fundamental to an understanding of support planning and the JOPES ADP that supports it. Support requirements for deploying forces are divided into two major categories: unit-related supplies and equipment, and non-unit-related supplies and equipment. The relationships of the supply categories are shown in Figure 6-19.

Figure 6-19

(1) Unit-related supplies and equipment include a unitís organic equipment, basic load, and additional accompanying supplies specified by the CINC.

(a) The basic load is the quantity of supplies required to be on hand within a unit. This is the materiel that makes the unit capable of engaging the enemy immediately on arrival at the DEST. The Service determines this quantity, and it is included in the Service-generated description of each type unit, indistinguishable without reference to Service documents. Some units carry no basic load, others may deploy with 3, 5, 15, 30, or 60 days of supply. When a planner selects a type unit and enters it into the OPLAN TPFDD, the unit-related supplies already included in the type unit description are added automatically to the TPFDD as well. The planner must know the days of supply and the expected supply consumption that are considered basic load and already included in the type unit description.

(b) To maintain effective contact with the enemy may require considerably more than the basic load. When a unit deploys, it is normally required to arrive with enough supplies to perform its mission without being resupplied for a stated period ranging from one to five days. The CINC defines in the concept of operations the length of time that the unit must be self-sustaining. Additional accompanying supplies extend the period supported by the basic load. The amount of additional accompanying supplies that must be added to the basic load quantities varies from unit to unit; it depends on the unitís mission and doctrine. The quantity of additional accompanying supplies must be calculated and added to the OPLAN TPFDD for arrival with the unit. These supplies are unit specific and are readily identifiable for the specific unit.

(2) Non-unit-related supplies and equipment include all support requirements that are not in the Service-generated type unit descriptions or augmented by accompanying supplies. These supplies are not identified for a specific unit, thus the designation non-unit-related. It is useful to further divide the broad category of non-unit-related supplies into subcategories.

(a) Army War Reserve Pre-positioned Sets (AWRPS) are a forward-deployed part of the nationís total war reserve stocks. Because strategic transportation assets are limited, especially in the early days of a deployment, pre-positioning supplies eliminates some of the competition for strategic lift. Pre-positioning is an essential sustainment asset that further bridges the time between when a unit begins to operate in the theater and when continuous resupply is established. The Armyís AWR-3 Program, the Marine Corps Maritime Pre-positioning Ships, and the Army and Air Force Afloat Pre-positioning Ships (APS) program in the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean are examples of pre-positioned war materials that substantially reduce the near-term strategic lift requirement for unit equipment allowance, basic load, and additional accompanying supplies.

(b) Sustaining supplies are needed by forces to support them from the time their accompanying supplies and APF (if available) run out until the continuous resupply pipeline opens. This is especially true if forces have deployed over long distances. The continuous resupply pipeline largely depends on sealift. Sealift could take days or weeks to begin making regular deliveries, because of the loading and unloading time at the ports, and the sailing time between them. Sustaining supplies, therefore, are normally delivered by airlift.

(c) Resupply includes all the materiel needed to sustain the forces and is the supplies necessary to replenish the consumed supplies. Quantities to supply all in-place and deploying units in the theater are computed. Resupply will be a continuous requirement as long as forces remain in an area of operations.

(d) Supply buildup includes all supplies above the consumption rate that can be delivered into the area of operations and stockpiled. The stockpile then acts as a buffer in the supply system that can continue to sustain the forces should the supply pipeline be temporarily interrupted. Supply buildup policy is defined in the concept of support in the CINCís Strategic Concept. For example, the policy may specify that a 15-day supply buildup of all supply classes be in place at the end of 30 days.

(e) Replacement personnel are categorized as a non-unit-related requirement that is designed to keep all units daily at 100 percent combat effectiveness. The requirement for replacement personnel is computed using Service attrition factors at various rates for noncombat losses and intensities of combat. Replacements are time-phased into replacement centers within the objective area at regular intervals. On the other hand, filler personnel are individuals of suitable grade and skill initially required to bring a unit to its authorized strength.

(3) The ADP support for deliberate planning generates the strategic deployment of supply requirements to a port of support (POS), which is essentially to supplies what a POD is to forces--the terminus of strategic movement. The POS is also significant because some supplies, POL and ammunition for instance, require special facilities or cannot be offloaded at some ports without significant disruption of port activity. From each POS, supplies will be made available to designated units. For each place where their forces will be located, component planners designate a POS for air cargo, general sea cargo, POL, and munitions. From the POS the responsibility for onward transport may fall to the component commander, depending on how the CINC sets up intratheater supply through his directive authority.

(4) The terms "classes" and "subclasses" of supply have been used. The hundreds of thousands of items in the Federal supply system are categorized in one of ten broad classes. Figure 6-20 lists these classes. It further indicates the magnitude of the

Figure 6-20

planning problem that must result in calculations, even in general terms, of the supplies required to first prepare an armed force for an operation and then continue to sustain it. Deployment planning focuses on very broad categories, but it does subdivide the 10 classes into a total of just over 40 subclasses. For instance, ammunition is subdivided into ammo-air and ammo-ground; subsistence is divided into subclasses for in-flight rations, refrigerated rations, nonrefrigerated rations, combat rations, and water.



a. NBC defense planning

(1) Enemy use of NBC weapons has the potential to significantly affect U.S. operations. The enemyís capability presents major defensive problems and requires indepth study and detailed planning.

(2) The component commands submit their NBC defense requirements to the supported command. Service component commandersí plans for operations in a nuclear/biological/chemical (NBC) environment are consolidated into a single joint stand-alone TPFDD file, separate from the OPLAN TPFDD. Guidance for NBC defense operations is found in Appendix 2 to Annex C in CJCSM 3122.03). Planning considerations include enemy NBC capabilities; friendly NBC defensive capabilities; participation of allies in NBC defense operations; related assumptions; shipment, intratheater receipt, pre-positioning, issue, and accountability of NBC defense equipment; subordinate tasks; and procedures and responsibilities for furnishing NBC defensive logistics support to allied forces, if applicable.

b. Nuclear planning

(1) Introduction. The possible proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world presents the joint planner with new problems. Nuclear planning considers the possibility that nuclear weapons may be introduced in combat; planners must assess the impact that will have on their operations. Because the use of nuclear weapons in any military operation would be so influential, there is a temptation to make one of two tacit assumptions during planning: nuclear weapons will not be used at all or nuclear weapons can be quickly employed by friendly forces if the need arises. Either assumption can be dangerous. The joint planner must work with a realistic appreciation of both the possibility of the employment of nuclear weapons and the CINCís lack of effective control over the decision for their initial use. Nuclear planning guidance issued at the unified or combined command level is usually based on political policies. It stems from national-level considerations, but is influenced by the military mission. Nuclear planning is conducted by the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) in coordination with U.S. combatant commanders and certain allied commanders.

(2) Guidance for documenting the planning for nuclear operations is found in CJCSI 3122.11. There are several areas to consider: nuclear initiation, assumptions, enemy nuclear capabilities and defense options, friendly nuclear assigned support tasks, missions, concept of nuclear operations, weapon allocations, targeting, subordinate tasks, limitations, supply, storage and transportation, support for allied forces, command and control, including release procedures, and nuclear options and reconnaissance operations to support nuclear options.



a. Overview of transportation planning

(1) The supported commander does transportation planning. This step and two others outline the procedures to solve the complex strategic movement problem. The task is to simulate the strategic movement of requirements generated by component planners during the force planning and support planning steps using organic lift and the apportioned common-user strategic transportation resources. The goal in transportation planning is to produce a feasible strategic transportation movement in support of the CINCís plan, a very difficult and complex thing to do. It is an iterative process: if the simulation of movement indicates that the forces and nonunit supplies cannot be moved in time, planners identify the problems, evaluate their impact on the overall plan, incorporate solutions, and, if necessary, simulate the strategic move again. Figure 6-21 illustrates the relationships between the three steps: transportation planning, shortfall identification, and transportation feasibility analysis.

(2) As Figure 6-17 illustrates, the strategic movement is only part of a complex logistics problem: units must travel from home or ORIGIN to POE, supplies must be requisitioned and delivered on time to the POE, combat force loading must be done according to the type of offloading expected (amphibious assault, airdrop, administrative, etc.), and there are always competing demands for lift resources and support facilities. Transportation feasibility should not be confused with overall plan feasibility. Strategic transportation is only one element in the picture of overall plan feasibility; transportation from ORIGIN to POE, and POD to DEST, must be available as well as the actual capability to furnish the nonunit supply requirements calculated in the support planning step.

b. Before the iterative transportation planning process can begin, all force and nonunit records must be entered into the TPFDD. Each entry equates to a movement requirement; if not all the requirements are known, their movement cannot be simulated to determine feasibility and make adjustments as required.

Figure 6-21

(1) Component commanders have already considered the competing demands for limited strategic transportation; limitations of the support capabilities at intermediate locations along the route; limitations of the personnel processing, materiel handling, and materiel storage capabilities at the POE and POD; capabilities of theater transportation between POD and DEST; and required transport time between POD and DEST, etc. In concept development, component planners determined key logistic elements, such as the size of forces, equipment, and nonunit supplies; probable ORIGIN, POE, POD, POS, marshalling and assembly requirements, and DEST; the expected timing to reach each stop along the way, etc. Phasing of movement was planned, and the CINC may have already issued guidelines to divide apportioned lift resources among the components.

(2) At this point in deployment planning, a completed movement plan considers competition for limited lift assets, mobility support facilities, and priorities of the CINC to support the concept of operations. USTRANSCOM reviews the TPFDD file with CINC-assigned PODs and identifies preferred POEs.

(3) The Service component planners designate as many actual units as they can to replace the generic (notional) type units in the force list, taking into account the CINC-assigned POD and USTRANSCOMís preferred POE, and identify any support problems to the supported commander. This process of assigning actual units to force requirements is known as sourcing.

(a) Army sourcing of CONUS-based forces begins in force selection by USACOMís Army component, the Forces Command (FORSCOM).

(b) The Air Force distributes its apportioned force list to major commands and separate operating agencies to source combat and support units; the War Mobilization Plan, Volume 3, the Air Force planning document, identifies real-world forces available for deployment, employment, and redeployment in support of listed OPLANs.

(c) At this stage in planning, the Navy sources only a few requirements. The OPLAN is a planning document covering the period specified by the JSCP, while specific Navy resources that would be used in the plan are highly mobile. For example, a carrier battle group that is in Norfolk today may be in the Indian Ocean a month later. Generally, the Navy will complete sourcing only during crisis action planning, when operation plans are converted to OPORDs.

(d) Sourced requirements in the TPFDD file contain the same kinds of detailed data for actual real-world units that they previously contained for the generic (notional) type units.

(4) The TPFDD is modeled using the Joint Flow Analysis System for Transportation (JFAST); that is, the strategic deployment of all transportation requirements, forces and supplies, is simulated reflecting the deployment. The LAD at the POD or POS, as applicable, was established for each requirement when TPFDD record entries were completed. The movement simulation software in JFAST calculates a feasible available to load date (FALD) for each requirement at its POE, if the requirement requires land movement provided by the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC). JFAST also provides an arrival/unloading date at the POD or POS, given the factors that influence the movement of forces and nonunit supplies, and the data in the TPFDD. The transportation feasibility of the OPLAN is determined by comparing the arrival/unloading dates reflected by JFAST to the LAD for TPFDD, checking to see that there is sufficient port throughput capability, and looking to see if there is sufficient common-user airlift and sealift capacity to move the force and its support. If these conditions are met, the plan can be judged to be grossly transportation-feasible.

(5) When it is determined that the expected arrival of forces and supplies at the DEST does not conform to CINC requirements, a shortfall is said to exist. The shortfall may be attributed to any or a combination of many causes, but the shortfalls discussed here are transportation shortfalls. The realization that a shortfall exists may come from a detailed computer simulation, manual calculations by skilled logisticians, or a "best guess" by an operation-oriented planner. The earlier a shortfall is discovered, the earlier planners can explore solutions and correct the plan.



a. Introduction. Although not included as a distinct step in plan development, the requirement to transport personnel and materiel from the theater of operations requires close coordination. The movement of equipment requiring repair, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), and medical evacuation out of the combat theater are also concerns of the logistics planner. Recent experience with transportation simulation has demonstrated that the transportation requirements for these categories are far more of a problem than originally anticipated. The expectation of "more than enough airplanes to haul stuff back to the States" is no longer accepted without considerable planning effort to support it. To consolidate medical evacuation, NEO, and other retrograde requirements, a separate retrograde TPFDD is usually created.

b. The Department of State is primarily responsible for NEO and determines whether and when NEO operations are executed. The combatant commands are responsible for furnishing support and conducting NEO operations. DOD Directive 5100.51, "Protection and Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Certain Designated Aliens in Danger Areas Abroad," gives guidance on protection and evacuation of U.S. citizens. The supported commander develops time-phased NEO requirements in coordination with the Department of State and USCINCTRANS. These requirements are entered into the OPLAN TPFDD or the retrograde TPFDD, if developed.

(1) The joint planner preparing NEO plans works in coordination with the Department of State and the embassy in the country concerned. Biennially, the Department of State submits to the Department of Defense an estimate of the number of Americans in each country, their status, and transportation requirements at each alert condition. The Department of State alert system is graduated from warning to imminent unrest/hostile action.

(2) The Department of State has a crisis response organization to monitor and advise on NEO. The operations center keeps 24-hour watch on world conditions; the staff includes a military representative. The regional bureaus and country desks monitor specific activities within their geographic areas of responsibility. A task force working group of national agencies, called the Washington Liaison Group, may be established to plan and conduct operations during heightened alert conditions. The embassy in-country team, made up of the ambassador and staff, is the focal point for combatant command coordination of NEO planning.

(3) A Department of State request for assistance generally does not come until an alert condition of imminent unrest/hostile actions exists or host-nation and civil channels are not available to conduct NEO.



a. Shortfall identification, like transportation planning, does not occur at only one point in deliberate planning. The supported commander should continually identify shortfalls throughout the planning process and, where possible, should resolve them by early coordination and conference with component commanders and supporting commanders. This step focuses on identifying and resolving transportation shortfalls highlighted by the deployment simulation conducted during transportation planning.

b. Shortfalls are identified in a variety of ways; the computer-simulated movement performed in transportation planning, however, identifies the simulated late arrival of forces and nonunit records. Reports generated during the computer simulation also identify reasons for the late arrivals: shortage of lift resources, overloaded mobility support facilities, excessive requirements for intratheater lift, etc.

(1) Planners make reasonable corrections or adjustments to the movement requirements. For example, analysis might show that shortfalls are caused by inadequate materiel-handling capacity. Planners could initiate a solution by rescheduling shipments when the POE is not operating at full capacity or identifying an alternate POE for some TPFDD movement requirements. They should restrict adjustments to those that will not affect the CINCís concept of operations or concept of support.

(2) Planners identify unresolved shortfalls for corrective action by higher-level decision-makers, or those that must be resolved with other commanders by compromise or mutual agreement. The CINC alone approves changes that affect the concept of operations or the concept of support.

c. In conjunction with subordinate and supporting commanders, planners may use any one or a combination of the following alternatives to resolve transportation shortfalls:

d. Situations may occur when the identified shortfall simply cannot be resolved (inadequate forces or transportation apportioned in the JSCP or furnished by the Services to accomplish the assigned task) and no alternative within the CINCís authority would result in a satisfactory solution.

(1) In such a situation, the shortfall and other critical limiting factors and their impact on mission accomplishment, the associated risk of not resolving the shortfall, the threat level that apportioned resources can meet, and any recommended change in the task assignment are submitted to the CJCS for resolution.

(2) However, plan development based on apportioned resources continues; OPLAN completion is not delayed pending resolution of shortfalls or limiting factors. Paragraph 10 of the Plan Summary will assess the impact of shortfalls and limiting factors and list the tasks that cannot be accomplished. Planners submit a separate TPFDD identifying shortfall force and nonunit cargo records.

(3) When planners identify a problem that adversely affects the OPLAN, they act immediately either to correct it or to coordinate its resolution. Problems get more difficult to handle the longer they go unresolved. If numerous shortfalls are left for resolution until this step in planning, the work required to resolve them becomes complicated and frustrating.

e. The CINC usually calls a plan development conference to develop initial closure profiles and to assess the feasibility of closure to meet the CINCís concept of operations. Here planners consider shortfalls unresolved by the planning staffs, explore solutions, and assess resulting risks. All subordinate and supporting commands attend the conference at the invitation of the supported commander. This is not the first time the planning staffs of supporting commanders have coordinated on the development of the plan. It may be the first time that they make hard decisions and compromises to resolve crucial, previously unresolvable shortfalls.



a. Transportation planning has been going on long before the planner reaches this step in plan development. Hasty analyses that manually simulated the transportation movement were performed as early as the staff estimate step in the concept development phase; repeatedly, shortfalls have been identified and resolved without fanfare. In the transportation planning and shortfall identification steps, planners collected and added information to the computer database, identified shortfalls, and implemented the formal process for handling the unresolved shortfalls.

b. Strategic transportation is formally analyzed in Step 6. After the computer simulation and, possibly, several iterations of the transportation steps, the result is the conclusion by the CINC that the OPLAN is grossly transportation-feasible and ready for TPFDD refinement. There is no finite definition for "grossly transportation-feasible."

Computer modeling of the TPFDD can demonstrate whether or not the CINC has sufficient strategic lift capability apportioned; and whether or not POEs and PODs have sufficient throughput capacity to handle the planned flow of forces and their sustainment.



a. For OPLAN development, the TPFDD refinement process consists of several discrete steps or phases that may be conducted sequentially or concurrently, in whole or in part. These steps support other elements of the plan development phase: force planning, support planning, transportation planning, and shortfall identification. These plan development steps are collectively referred to as TPFDD refinement. The normal TPFDD refinement process consists of sequentially refining forces, logistics, and transportation data to develop a TPFDD file that supports a feasible and adequate plan. Database size and time constraints may cause overlapping of several refinement phases. The TPFDD file for regional plans is normally refined using two refinement conferences, a combined Forces and Logistics Conference, and a Transportation Conference. TPFDD files for MRC OPLANs may be refined at three separate conferences (Forces, Logistics, and Transportation Conferences) as are TPFDD files for global plans. Refinement conferences may be combined or omitted as required to provide for the most efficient refinement of either a single OPLAN or a family of OPLANs developed for a common planning task. For regional plans, that decision is made by the supported commander in consultation with the Joint Staff and USTRANSCOM. For global planning, the decision will be made by the Joint Staff in coordination with the combatant commands. The supported commander conducts conferences for regional plans in conjunction with USTRANSCOM and in coordination with the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff conducts conferences for global plans in conjunction with USTRANSCOM and in coordination with the combatant commanders.

(1) Forces refinement. This initial phase of TPFDD refinement is conducted in coordination with supported and supporting commanders, the Services, the Joint Staff, and other supporting agencies. USCINCTRANS normally hosts forces refinement conferences at the request of the supported commander. The purpose of forces refinement is to confirm that forces are sourced and tailored within JSCP, Joint Staff, and Service guidance; to assess the adequacy of CS and CSS force planning; and to resolve shortfalls. USTRANSCOM furnishes sealift and airlift capability estimates based on lift apportionment throughout the process to ensure transportation feasibility.

(a) Before any forces refinement conference, supported commanders update force lists against the latest TUCHA file, which contains the type unit information accessed by JOPES application software. The Services update the TUCHA file quarterly to reflect current force structure and data.

(b) Movement requirements to compensate for shortfalls of pre-positioned equipment are furnished to the supported commander by the appropriate component command before any forces refinement conference.

(c) Before any forces refinement conference, the Services ensure that the Logistics Factors File and Civil Engineering Support Planning File reflect current data. These files are OPLAN-specific and interface with other JOPES applications to generate TPFDD requirements.

(d) Before any forces refinement conference, the Services ensure that the latest quarterly update of the Service Force Module Library has been completed.

(e) Forces TPFDD files are sourced by sourcing agencies at least 30 days (or as specified in coordinating instructions) before any forces refinement conference. Joint Staff J-3, as functional database manager, monitors and facilitates the transfer of data, as required.

(2) Logistics refinement. This second phase of TPFDD refinement is primarily conducted by the Service logistics sourcing agencies, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and CINC components under the overall direction of the Joint Staff and/or the supported commander. USCINCTRANS normally hosts logistics refinement conferences for the Joint Staff and the supported commander. The purpose of logistics refinement is to confirm sourcing of logistics requirements per JSCP, Joint Staff, and Service guidance and to assess (by the Joint Staff and the supported commander) the adequacy of resources furnished by support planning, including complete medical and civil engineering planning.

(a) The logistics community begins refinement of the TPFDD with a completely sourced and adequate force list TPFDD furnished by the supported commander.

(b) Before logistics refinement conferences, the CINCs, Services, and defense agencies involved develop and/or source facilities and materiel support requirements.

(c) Before the start of the logistics phase, Services and supported commanders ensure that the appropriate planning factors are mutually agreeable and used throughout the logistics refinement process.

(d) During logistics refinement conferences, the CINCs, Services, and defense agencies involved resolve problems regarding non-unit-related personnel, cargo, retrograde, medical evacuee, and resupply records, including shortfalls.

(e) Before a logistics refinement conference, USCINCTRANS assesses initial common-user transportation feasibility in coordination with the supported commander and the Joint Staff, and gives the results to the conference participants. At the conclusion of the logistics refinement conference, USCINCTRANS reassesses transportation feasibility for the supported commander to ensure that the TPFDD is ready for transportation component command flow.

(3) Transportation refinement. Transportation refinement is conducted by USCINCTRANS in coordination with the supported CINC, Joint Staff, Services, and other CINCs. USCINCTRANS normally hosts transportation refinement conferences. The purpose of transportation refinement is to adjust the flow of OPLANs to ensure that they are transportation-feasible and are consistent with JSCP, Joint Staff, and Service guidance.

(a) Transportation refinement begins with the supported commander giving a sourced TPFDD file to USCINCTRANS for transportation flow.

(b) During the transportation conference, participants resolve transportation-related problems, as well as coordinate combined transportation requirements and shortfalls. Movement tables are furnished and the supported commander determines whether the closure profile is consistent with his concept of operations.

b. USTRANSCOM assesses the gross transportation feasibility of the OPLAN when force and logistics TPFDD refinement is completed. If a plan is determined to be grossly transportation-feasible at that stage, the Joint Staff in coordination with the supported commander may consider the OPLAN "effective for planning." This concept recognizes that the work to date is valid and current and could be used for execution before submitting the final OPLAN for CJCS approval. Designation as effective for planning is predicated on the fact that the CINCís Strategic Concept for the plan has received CJCS approval, sustainment requirements have been generated, and the check for gross transportation feasibility indicated the plan was transportation-feasible.

c. The supported commander, in coordination with the Joint Staff and USCINCTRANS, publishes refinement guidance in the TPFDD LOI prepared at the beginning of the plan development phase of deliberate planning.

(1) To enhance the flexibility and utility of the JOPES database, TPFDD data is intensively managed and updated. This is done to ensure database accuracy to facilitate rapid conversion to an OPORD in crisis action planning. This intensive management includes replacing sourced units that are changed or deactivated, updating the TUCHA and other standard reference files, and updating force lists based on JSCP changes to Service force structure.

(2) Normally, representatives of the supported commander, supporting commanders, the Joint Staff, Services, defense agencies, and components attend refinement conferences.

(3) Completed TPFDD files are normally made available to refinement participants through USCINCTRANS no less than 30 days before refinement conferences. Medical working files, personnel working files, planning factors files, ports of support files, unit consumption factors files, and control files will be submitted with the TPFDD file.

(4) The supported commander certifies that the TPFDD file is ready for refinement.



a. Definition. Plan documentation is the final step in the plan development phase of deliberate planning. The objective is to document the operation plan in JOPES format for submission to the CJCS for final review and distribution to the JPEC. The fully documented plan, including its refined TPFDD, is an operation plan in complete format (OPLAN).

(1) The OPLAN includes a summary, the basic plan, a series of detailed annexes, and other administrative documents describing the CINCís concept in great detail. The basic plan describes the situation, mission, plan of execution, and administration and logistics concepts, and identifies the CINCís plan for command and control.

(2) The annexes give an exhaustive treatment of the basic subjects: commands supporting the plan (task organization), intelligence, operations, logistics, personnel, and a multitude of other vital subjects. The annexes are further expanded by a long list of appendixes that contain an even more detailed statement of the CINCís concept for specific elements of the plan. CJCSI 3122.04, the classified supplement to JOPES Volume II, contains guidance for preparing many of the classified annexes and appendixes.

(3) Information gathered by the planning staff during the entire deliberate planning process is used for plan documentation. The actual writing of individual elements of the plan need not wait until this step; it begins when there is enough assembled information for the particular topic. The CINCís Strategic Concept prepared during the concept development phase may have been a substantial beginning to OPLAN documentation.

Information on the details of particular annexes that was not included in the CINCís Strategic Concept is now developed and collected for the final OPLAN document.

(4) CJCSI 3122.03 (JOPES Volume II) contains administrative guidance and formats for the OPLAN. Figure 6-22 shows the major elements of an OPLAN and a list of annexes.

Figure 6-22

(5) The documentation of the OPLAN reflects the latest changes to the TPFDD resulting from the refinement process. Planners often make changes that are absolutely necessary to close the force. While the CINC or other appropriate members of the staff approved them, it is possible that these changes altered the original concept of operations. The documentation step is the final opportunity to meld the computer description of the operation, manifested in the TPFDD, with its written description.

b. The documentation step includes not only preparing the written package but also producing the TPFDD updated by the refinement process. Supporting commands and agencies that receive the plan can review the database on-line via GCCS. If the plan is sent to an organization that does not have access to the necessary JOPES ADP capabilities, selected information can be extracted from the TPFDD and included in the written plan. The Time-Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL) is just such a printed computer product that displays extracts of specific data from the TPFDD file. The TPFDL may be included as Appendix 1 to Annex A of the OPLAN.





Reference: Joint Pub 5-03.1, JOPES Volume I to be republished as CJCSI 3122.01

DJCS-438-95, 5 April 1995, Plan Review Guide

Joint Administrative Instruction 5204.01E

DJSM-438-95, Plan Review Guide

a. Introduction. In this phase, the Joint Staff performs or coordinates a final review of operation plans submitted by the combatant CINCs. It is a formal review of the entire operation plan. Approval of the plan is the signal to subordinate and supporting commands to develop their plans in support of the CINCís concept. The supporting commanders donít wait until the plan is approved before beginning to develop their supporting plans; they have been involved in doing this while the CINC has been building the plan.

b. Sources of plans for review. The CJCS has statutory responsibility for reviewing contingency plans. By this authority, the Joint Staff reviews plans from the following sources:

-- new plans in response to JSCP or CJCS task assignments

-- changes to existing plans

-- existing plans recommended for continuation

-- existing plans recommended for cancellation

c. Types of review. The Joint Staff and JPEC conducts two types of reviews as reflected in Figure 6-23.

(1) Concept review is the final step in the concept development phase of the deliberate planning process. The CINCís Strategic Concept is reviewed for adequacy, feasibility, validity of assumptions, compliance with CJCS guidance, consistency with joint doctrine, and acceptability with regard to expected costs and military and political supportability. CJCS concept review is discussed in detail in paragraph 613 of this publication and in Chapter IV of Joint Pub 5-03.1 to be republished as CJCSI 3122.01, JOPES Volume 1.

(2) Final plan review is conducted during the Plan Review Phase of the deliberate planning process and is applicable to all operation plans. It is a formal review of the entire plan, including TPFDD, updated medical working file, and appropriate civil engineering support planning files, if applicable. When an operation plan is approved, it is effective for execution when directed.

d. Review criteria. Approval of the operation plan during final review depends on whether it satisfies the CJCS task assignment and demonstrates the effective use of apportioned resources. This is summarized as adequacy and feasibility. In addition, operation plans are reviewed for consistency with joint doctrine and acceptability.

Figure 6-23

(1) The review for adequacy determines whether the scope and concept of planned operations are capable of satisfying the task assigned in the JSCP. The review assesses the validity of the assumptions and compliance with CJCS guidance.

(2) The review for feasibility determines whether the assigned tasks could be accomplished using available resources. The primary factors considered are whether the resources apportioned to the CINC for planning by the JSCP and Service planning documents are being used effectively or whether they are being exceeded.

(3) Operation plans incorporate appropriate joint doctrine as stated in approved and final draft or test publications contained in the Joint Doctrine Publication System. Incorporation of appropriate joint doctrine when preparing operation plans streamlines adaptation of operation plans to specific crises in crisis action planning and facilitates execution of operations during all phases and operations for crisis resolution.

(4) The review for acceptability ensures that plans are proportional and worth the expected costs. It joins with the criterion of feasibility in ensuring that the mission can be accomplished with available resources and adds the dimension that the plan can be accomplished without incurring excessive losses in personnel, equipment, materiel, time, or position. Using this criterion, the plans are also reviewed to ensure that they are consistent with domestic and international law, including the Law of War, and are militarily and politically supportable.

e. CJCS action. Operation plans submitted to the CJCS for review are referred to the Joint Staff Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate, J-7, which conducts and coordinates the final plan review. Other Joint Staff directorates, the Services, and defense agencies are consulted as required.

(1) Review comments are categorized as follows:

(a) Execution-critical comments are major deficiencies that negatively affect the capability of the plan to meet the JSCP objective and may prevent execution of the plan as written. Examples include such items as failure to meet assigned tasks, deviations from joint policy, and major logistics shortfalls.

(b) Substantive comments are less significant deficiencies that include deviations from CJCS guidance or JOPES formatting, or significant errors involving the TPFDD. These deficiencies would not prevent execution of the plan.

(c) Administrative comments are offered for clarity, accuracy, and consistency. They include corrections for such items as outdated references, improper terminology, and other minor errors.

(2) Reviews are processed under the provisions of JSI 3140.01. The review should be completed within 60 days of referral. The Director, Joint Staff, may extend the review period if circumstances warrant.

(3) Review results are forwarded to the supported commander by memorandum (or message) stating that the plan is given one of the following dispositions:

(a) Approved (effective for execution, when directed). Any critical shortfalls within plans that cannot be resolved by the supported commander will be outlined within the review comments and the approval memorandum.

(b) Disapproved.

f. Post-review actions

(1) Within 30 days of receipt of the CJCS review results memorandum, the supported commander sends a message to the CJCS, stating his intentions concerning incorporating all execution-critical comments. A formal change incorporating CJCS execution-critical comments to correct resolvable items must be submitted to the CJCS with 60 days of receipt of the review results. Substantive comments must be incorporated into the first change to the operation plan or by the next CJCS review.

(2) Within 15 days of receipt of the CJCS review results memorandum, the supported commander sends a message to the component commands notifying them of

(a) operation plan approval status;

(b) operation plans replaced, deleted, or changed as a result of CJCS review; and

(c) component commandsí responsibilities to notify supporting commands and agencies of operation plan effectiveness and tasks.

(3) Within 15 days of receipt of the supported commandís operation plan review notification message, component commanders send a message to all supporting commands and Service agencies who are assigned tasks within the plan, relaying operation plan status and effectiveness.

(4) When a formal change is received, the Joint Staff reviews it to verify incorporation of CJCS comments. The scope of the review is determined case by case.

(5) The supported commander normally reviews and approves supporting plans prepared by subordinate and supporting commanders and other agencies. Supported commanders advise the Joint Staff when issues from these reviews cannot be resolved between the commanders concerned.





Reference: Joint Pub 5-03.1, JOPES Volume I, to be republished as CJCSI 3122.01

a. During this final phase of the deliberate planning process, the supported commander directs the preparation and submission of supporting plans. These deal with mobilization, deployment, and employment. Paragraph 3 of the operation plan and paragraph 3 of the Plan Summary clearly document the task assignments. As required by the CINCís task assignment, component commanders, joint task force commanders, supporting commanders, or other agencies develop supporting plans. As shown in Figure 6-24, many of these commanders in turn assign their subordinates the task of preparing additional supporting plans. As an extreme example, a local unit-recall roster ordering an individual Service member to report for duty in case of a contingency can be considered a supporting plan.

b. Chapter 1 of Joint Pub 5-03.1, JOPES Volume 1, to be republished as CJCSI 3122.01, contains specific instructions for assigning discrete plan identification numbers (PIDs) to every operation plan entered into the JOPES system. Supporting plans are assigned a PID identical to that of the supported plan. In some cases, however, a command is required to perform essentially the same actions to support two or more supported commanderís plans. In these situations, the supporting commander may prepare a single, omnibus plan rather than multiple supporting plans that restate identical material. The supporting plan summary lists the plans it supports, and the supporting plan PID is assigned without regard to the PIDs of the plans it supports.

c. Employment plans normally are the responsibility of the commander who will direct the forces when the plan is converted into an OPORD and executed. In many cases, however, the politico-military situation cannot be clearly predicted, so detailed employment planning may be delayed until circumstances require it.

d. Supporting plans, when required by the supported commander, are submitted by the supporting command or agency within 60 days after CJCS approval of the supported plan. Information in the supported plan need not be repeated in the supporting plan unless the supported commander so directs. In the absence of Joint Staff instructions to the contrary, the supported commander will review and approve supporting plans. The CJCS

Figure 6-24

may be asked to resolve issues that arise during the review of supporting plans, and the Joint Staff, on behalf of the CJCS, can review any supporting plan.




627. INTRODUCTION. The JOPES deliberate planning process would be unacceptably slow, unresponsive, and inflexible without the support of JOPES automated data processing (ADP). In the deliberate planning process, planners develop, analyze, refine, review, and maintain joint operation plans and prepare supporting plans using JOPES ADP. It is also used in crisis action planning to tailor and refine existing operation plans to produce executable OPORDs, or rapidly develop wholly new COAs and work them into executable OPORDs, in response to contingencies as they arise. In deliberate planning, JOPES ADP helps primarily in the plan development phase to build and flow the force list, calculate and flow nonunit cargo and personnel required to sustain that force, complete specialized planning such as civil engineering and medical support, and test for gross transportation feasibility. The product of this process is the TPFDD, a transportation-feasible database containing all the forces, materiel, and personnel required to execute and support the CINCís concept of operations, phased into the area of operations at the places and times required by the CINCís concept. The TPFDD can be thought of as an expression of the CINCís concept of operations through the scheduled deployment of the forces and sustainment required to execute it. Throughout the planning process, planners have access to several applications programs first to initialize the TPFDD (create the database), then to add forces, then support, then transportation planning data. During this process the TPFDD grows. Once the TPFDD is built, JOPES ADP helps refine it before and during the refinement conferences. JOPES ADP supports plan review, the development of supporting plans, and TPFDD maintenance to keep the database current.


628. JOPES FILES. The JOPES application programs accessed by the planner while building the TPFDD draw information from numerous data files. Standard reference files, several of which are listed in Figures 6-25 and 6-26, contain basic, relatively imperishable data required to build any TPFDD. Planning and execution files and support files also furnish data for manipulation by JOPES application programs. The user generates many of these through JOPES application programs. Most standard reference files are plan-independent; that is, the data they contain are not plan-specific, but are valid for generating any plan. Such files as the TUCHA, GEOFILE, and CHSTR are plan-independent. Plan-unique files contain data valid only for a specific plan. Most plan-unique files are created by JOPES applications while building the TPFDD, and information is drawn from them by various JOPES applications to generate plan-specific TPFDD data. Figure 6-27 lists several examples of plan-unique files. The TPFDD itself is the ultimate plan-unique file.



a. Unit movement characteristics

(1) Information on movement characteristics of a type (notional) unit is contained in the Type Unit Data File (TUCHA). The acronym "TUCHA" comes from the previous name of the file, Type Unit Characteristics File. The TUCHA describes the capabilities of each type unit in narrative form and defines the unit in terms of total personnel; numbers requiring transportation; categories of cargo in the unit; weight of equipment and accompanying supplies; volume of equipment categorized as bulk, outsize, oversize, or non-air-transportable; and numbers and dimensions of individual units of equipment. The Services maintain the file and update it quarterly.



Aerial Ports and Air

Operating Bases File

  • Airfield planning factors, e.g., throughput capacities for free-world air facilities, runway length & width, weight-bearing capacity, A/C parking space, fuel & cargo storage capacity, etc.


Transportation Assets

  • Time-phased availability of common-carrier air- & sealift
  • Types and source of military and commercial transportation assets
  • Created from data in JSCP


Characteristics of



  • Standard planning factors for airlift available for deployment planning, e.g., utilization rate, passenger & cargo capacity, speed, range, load/off-load times, etc.
  • Standard planning factors for sealift available for deployment planning, e.g., ship category capacity, average speed, load/off-load times, etc.


Port Characteristics

  • Information on physical and operating characteristics of selected free-world ports, e.g., size, depth, number of berths, beach data, categories & capacities of cargo-handling & storage facilities


Standard Distance File

  • Distance between POE-POD pairs listing mode of transport, POE-POD, GEOLOC code, Suez/Panama Canal status, OPLAN identification, number of stops, computed distance


Type Unit Data

  • Movement characteristics for standard deployable units
  • Force descriptions for nondeployable unit types


Type Unit Equipment


  • Descriptions & dimensions of

· · specific pieces of wheel/track equipment for TUCHA file type units

· · all hazardous cargo

· · non-self-deployable aircraft

· · floating craft

· · items measuring more than 35í


Logistics Factors File

  • Standard logistics planning factors to compute resupply, determine ESI, and identify shortfalls


Civil Engineering Files

  • Description of deployable facility sets
  • Operational capability of Service construction units
  • Description of Service facility component systems


Force Module Library

  • Collection of Service/joint force modules for C, CS, CSS forces plus 30 dayís sustainment

Figure 6-25



Standard Geographic


  • Automated repository of the DOD for the registration of military locations, and worldwide geographic locations subject to reference during military planning and operations. Examples:

· · Worldwide geographic locations and sites listed by

country & states, installation types, and CINC AORs


Status of Resources

and Training System

  • Report of unit readiness in terms of

· · authorized/actual personnel strength

· · percent of assigned equipment ready for operations

Figure 6-26



Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data File

Description, routing, and aggregated cargo movement characteristics of forces defined for a specific OPLAN as well as the nonunit sustainment, i.e., supplies and cargo


Summary Reference File

Major repository for summarized or detailed information about specific records in the TPFDD file or other general information relating to the specific OPLAN, i.e., movement tables, cargo details for tailored and nonstandard units, etc.


Planning Factors File

Planning factors and parameters used in all phases of support planning, i.e., theater factors, lbs. of rations per person per day, etc.


Personnel Working File

Used in the support planning to designate origins and APOEs for replacement personnel as well as percentages to be routed from each ORIGIN or POE


Force Record Extract File

File created for LOGSAFE processing that contains cargo resupply factors, i.e., attrition factors for equipment, based on threat level


Ports of Support File

Reference file to determine ports of support for the non-unit-related records


UTC Consumption

Factors File

Resupply consumption factors by UTC that are extracted from Logistics Factors File or introduced by the user, i.e., air defense ordnance used per day, etc.


Medical Working File

Population at risk records from OPLAN force list and planning factors entered by the medical planner, e.g., admission rates, evacuation policies, combat intensity, etc. (used in MEPES)

References: Applicable usersí manuals Figure 6-27

(2) Data in the TUCHA are accessed by using unit type codes (UTCs). These are five-element alphanumeric codes that identify units of common functional characteristics. Service planning documents and automated files list units and show the number of each type available for planning.

(3) The unit identified by UTC in the TUCHA is a type, or "notional" (generic), unit. It is a representative unit with the approximate physical and movement characteristics of all the actual (real-world) units that it represents. It is, therefore, an average, generic approximation of what real-world units of that type should be. It is, for example, an infantry battalion as opposed to, say, the 2d Battalion, llth Infantry; or a CVN as opposed to, say, the USS Nimitz; or an F-15 fighter squadron as opposed to, say, the 94th Fighter Squadron.

b. Timing of movements. Before development of each force requirement is finished, the key dates for required movement must be determined and entered for each force record. Beginning with the CINCís RDD or CRD, the supported commander and subordinate planners calculate the EAD-LAD window at the POD or POS in addition to the EADs and LADs at intermediate locations. Soon, more detailed planning is required, and the Service, supporting commander, and defense agency planners develop the RLDs and ALDs at the ORIGINs and POEs. Determination of these dates is not automated--the responsible planner must enter them.

c. Unique force record descriptions

(1) After the force list has been finished and assembled, each separate force record, or line entry, in it is assigned a plan-unique alphanumeric code called a force requirement number (FRN). When an FRN has been assigned to a unit in a plan, it generally is not changed in the course of the plan. The FRN is useful because it allows the planner to track a unit that may change sequence position in the TPFDD as the TPFDD is worked and refined. FRNs are two, three, four, or five alphanumeric characters that identify a single force requirement.

(2) Two additional characters, called fragmentation and insert codes, may be added to the FRN in positions 6 and 7. These two additional characters identify a force entry that requires more than one iteration of the FRN to satisfy the force requirement, such as three individual brigades to satisfy the requirement for a division, etc. The resulting identifier becomes the unit line number (ULN).

(3) JOPES and the JSCP both require that force planning be done using force modules, described in paragraph 616.d.(2) of this chapter. Generally, force modules are groupings of combat, combat service, and combat service support forces, with or without appropriate non-unit-related personnel and supplies. The elements of force modules are linked together or uniquely identified so that they can be tracked, extracted, or adjusted as an entity in the planning and execution databases. Force modules offer an efficient way to do force planning and build forces rapidly in the TPFDD. Each individual ULN is identified as being associated with one or more force modules. Each force module in a plan is identified by a three-character alphanumeric identifier called a force module identifier (FMID).

(4) To differentiate between CINC OPLAN TPFDD files and force modules in the JOPES database, the first characters of ULNs and FMIDs are assigned in JOPES Volume II. Whenever possible, the force module identifiers for a given TPFDD should be identical to the parent ULN for major combat forces.

d. The preceding descriptors are needed to explain force movements either in narrative form or computer jargon. The JOPES ADP programs use these terms to describe the CINCís concept of operations in the TPFDD. Three basic application programs assist the planner in the force build step.

e. The application program in JOPES/GCCS that deals specifically with force planning is the Requirements Development and Analysis (RDA) system. It was first developed for force planning as DART and has been integrated into GCCS. RDA assists the planner in creating a force requirements file, analyzing the data, and changing the data. These data will be used later to determine the gross feasibility of transportation. The codes and nomenclature of application programs are often confusing. Some JOPES abbreviations and acronyms will be introduced as necessary information in the force planning step. ADP support is introduced here because it includes the manual procedures and the rational process for assembling the force list.

(1) Purpose. RDA allows planners to create, analyze and edit Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD). RDA supports force deployment during execution, and logistics planners and operators in deliberate and crisis action planning. RDA provides the capability for creating and modifying force and nonunit requirements associated with OPLANs. It allows manipulation of TPFDD data and creates graphical displays to ease editing and compare transportation capabilities. It allows planners to analyze the force records; select, delete, or modify type units or force modules and modify the information defining movements and narrative descriptions; split the movement of a force record into air and sea shipment; assign movement parameters to individual units or groups of force records; reorder the list of movements, using planner-selected descriptions; selectively create summaries of transportation requirements; identify for analysis a categorized listing of support forces; lay the groundwork to analyze the gross transportation feasibility of the force records; audit the file for format and content; and perform a miscellany of administrative functions.

(3) Files. RDA draws information from numerous databases: TUCHA; descriptions and characteristics of major equipment or cargo categories listed in the major equipment file (MEF); standard worldwide geographic locations (GEOFILE); characteristics of transportation resources (CHSTR); the permanent databases used for reference, including standard distance files (SDF) and characteristics of airports (APORTS) and seaports (PORTS); transportation assets (ASSETS); and dimensions of equipment found in the type unit equipment detail file (TUDET). The planner creates the TPFDD and SRF described in detail the CINCís concept of operations. The planner may also call for standard or ad hoc printed formats for use in analysis and to satisfy administrative requirements of the OPLAN.

Access to and within RDA is controlled by the Information Resource Manager(IRM) application in GCCS. Major RDA functions include the following:

f. A much quicker way to identify and add large numbers of units to a plan uses Service/joint force modules and previously created OPLAN-dependent force modules. The Force Module Edit (FMEdit ) function of RDA allows planners to review and modify groups of TPFDD records using forces module identifiers.

(1) Purpose. Force modules (FMs) already exist that include complete combat packages made up of C, CS, and CSS forces in addition to some nonunit cargo and personnel. By gaining access to this library, the planner may build a new TPFDD or modify an existing TPFDD quickly and effectively. RDA also allows the planner to go into an existing TPFDD and group force entries into a new or existing FM. A very valuable secondary function of RDA is that large groupings of force entries can be identified for ease of monitoring during plan execution or for use in executing deterrent options.

(2) Foundation. The force modeling function of RDA allows the planner to seek FMs that are either already built and maintained by the Services or built by a CINC during prior OPLAN creation. A supported commandís existing OPLANs are especially useful because they have already been sourced and incorporate numerous planning factors and operating parameters that are unique to their areas of responsibility. Significant combinations of these forces and supplies have already been identified by a unique force module identifier in existing OPLANs for use in subsequent deliberate and crisis action planning. As a result of that work, the CINC can now display and retrieve vast quantities of force module information.

(3) Flexibility. The force modeling function of RDA should include the same functionality that existed in JOPES on WWMCCS:

g. Application. Component planners use JOPES ADP force-building applications to compile a total component force list. Given the mission, the planner reviews the type combat forces apportioned in the task-assigning document and called for in the CINCís concept of operations, and determines applicable CS and CSS units from Service planning documents. The plan is built by selecting individual units by UTC or by selecting entire force modules; however, all force requirements are included in force modules.

(1) The merged collection of the componentsí force lists becomes the CINCís consolidated force list. The database is called the OPLAN Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data file (TPFDD); numerous working papers can be printed that selectively display elements from the data file.

(2) The summary reference file (SRF) is created in the database along with the TPFDD. It includes administrative information on the plan identification number, date of the concept of operations, and number of records; force and nonunit record summaries describing numbers of unit and force records, fragmented forces, and aggregated cargo shipments; movement data for nonstandard units not included in the TUCHA; and descriptions of the planning factors and simulated environments used in the ADP support process.

(3) The components can use actual (real-world) forces, if they are known, to build their force lists. This obviously solves many problems early in planning by permitting actual data to be used in place of representative sizes, locations, etc. Some Services list actual units in Service planning documents; others, like the Navy, are unable to identify specific units very far in advance because of their mobility. Eventually, the type (notional) units will have to be replaced with more accurate information before the completion of plan development. In the case of the Navy, the geographic locations of both combat and support forces change drastically month to month, and most units are self-deploying. Type units are used for most Navy force requirements throughout the deliberate planning process.

(4) Supported commanderís role. The supported commander participates fully in development of the component force lists. The subordinate commander submits the time-phased force list to the CINC for review and approval. The supported commander has been involved in the concept development and, now, in the details of force planning. By submitting the component force list, the supporting commander indicates full understanding of the concept of operations and confidence that the forces in the force list will support that concept. The CINCís staff merges the component force lists and evaluates the resulting consolidated force list. This consolidated list is analyzed to confirm that it is adequate to perform the mission. When the supported commander concurs with the consolidated force list, the components then add any missing information needed to deploy the forces from origin to destination, such as mode and source of transportation, POD, EAD-LAD, priority of off-load at POD, DEST, and RDD.



a. The Logistics Sustainability and Feasibility Estimator (LOGSAFE) is the baseline GCCS ADP tool currently used in support planning. This application program calculates the gross non-unit-related equipment and supplies to support the OPLAN. These calculations determine the nonunit movement requirements by using numbers of personnel, number and types of UTCs, Service planning factors, and user-supplied CINC planning guidance from the CINCís Strategic Concept and TPFDD LOI. These gross determinations for supplies are translated into weights and volumes and added to the TPFDD as movement requirements.

(1) Purpose. LOGSAFE allows the planner to

The planner can also selectively aggregate the data to reduce the number of nonunit cargo records using the EAD-LAD window at each POS and, thus, best phase the movement requirement for sustainment cargos to support the concept of operations while most efficiently using available lift, and port and materiel handling or transport facilities.

(2) Foundation. Planning parameters for the calculations are chosen from two sources: the UCFF uses resupply consumption factors for unit type codes (UTCs) and the PFF includes a wide variety of planning factors that are used throughout the LOGSAFE process. Daily consumption rates for 43 subclasses of supply are computed by either pounds or gallons per UTC, or pounds or gallons per person per day. Fuel, ammunition, repair parts, and major end items are equipment-related supplies and are computed as a function of numbers of force records, for example, number of UTCs that describe 155mm artillery batteries. Other items of supply, such as food, clothing, and medical supplies, are better suited for planning factors listed in units of pounds per person per day. The Logistics Factors File (LFF), a JOPES standard reference file, is the foundation for the UCFF and PFF. The LFF uses Service-developed consumption rates for UTCs, and origins for resupply. The LFF initializes the PFF, which the user can then update and modify with factors to describe more accurately the situation in the theater.

(3) Flexibility. The planner has great flexibility in using planning factors in LOGSAFE. The planner can modify the following parameters:

(4) Information required. To execute LOGSAFE, users need a minimum of information: the period of planning for the OPLAN, the increments in which resupply will be delivered, the supply class/subclass consumption factors for each UTC in the plan, the weight-to-volume multipliers for converting short tons to measurement tons, specification of the objective area for determining theater-specific multipliers, and the combat intensity rate for periods of planning.

(5) Files. LOGSAFE uses information from various standard reference files available to all users: TUCHA, GEOFILE, and LFF. It uses and adds to the unique, OPLAN-dependent files prepared in the force development step: TPFDD and summary reference (SRF) files. LOGSAFE creates unique files for use in its calculations: temporary working data files, POSF, UCFF, and PFF.

b. In addition to calculating supplies, the CINC must analyze civil engineering requirements of planned contingency operations. The resulting analysis is not precise, but is a tool the planner uses to analyze actual facility asset data, anticipate new facility requirements, project war damage, recognize actual and projected civil engineering forces, determine required civil engineering materials, and acknowledge available support from the host nation. The formal document, called a Civil Engineering Support Plan (CESP), includes analysis of facility support requirements and any other sustainment engineering requirements associated with execution of the OPLAN. The GCCS software package that generates facility requirements data which is analyzed to determine the adequacy of engineering support for an OPLAN is the Joint Engineer Planning and Execution System (JEPES). A JEPES user can produce reports and graphics to reflect generated engineering requirements, existing assets, and engineering resources. JEPES extracts pertinent TPFDD records, computes facility requirements, and determines if adequate facilities exist to support deployed forces. The reports can be used to identify facility deficiencies and shortfalls in engineering capability, information that is used by components for detailed planning. Normally, responsible component commanders are given the task of coordinating the CESP for their specific construction management areas. These area CESPs are then consolidated by the CINC into a single theater-wide CESP for the operation plan.

(1) Purpose. The modules used in the ADP support package offer the capability to maintain unit and facility information in the existing files; analyze troop and facility requirements data from the TPFDD; determine facility requirements based on forces employed, unit mission, and war damage; schedule existing engineering manpower; and prepare the necessary reports and tabs to identify facility and construction requirements and develop scheduling information.

(2) Foundation. JEPES uses the TUCHA to develop the master list of essential mission facilities for each separate UTC in the force list; the TPFDD file is used to build the TROOP file for determining units that have initial facility requirements; and numerous planning factor files are developed and maintained by the Services to define the support required.

(3) Flexibility. The planner uses JEPES to determine expected facility requirements that must be met with new construction and war damage repair. The planner can alter the following parameters: number of personnel, aircraft, and vehicles supported; amount of host-nation assets that can be used by friendly forces; anticipated amount of war damage to existing facilities; priority of construction effort; conversion of engineering troop strength to engineering capability; decreased engineering unit efficiency during early operations; attrition of personnel, equipment, and construction products as a result of enemy action; required completion date for new construction; and circuitous routing of supplies from POS to DEST.

(4) Files. JEPES uses both Service-maintained files for basic planning guidance and the OPLAN-dependent TPFDD files to determine specific facility requirements. The Services define and set priorities for the facilities required for each UTC, the capabilities of engineering units, planning factors to convert personnel loading at a base to specific facility requirements, and the acceptability of existing facilities to meet contingency operations. JEPES application functions include the following:

c. Medical Planning and Execution System (MEPES) is a baseline GCCS application that supports both deliberate and crisis planning. The process considers the population at risk, length of stay in hospital facilities, and Service-developed frequency data for injury and death. The result is a planning tool to determine patient load, requirements for patient evacuations, and both Service and component medical planning requirements.

(1) Purpose. The system uses an interactive mode to create working files and modify planning factors, and to perform calculations and print reports. The reports include theater-wide analysis and component planning details, such as number of several categories of physicians, operating room requirements, and whole blood and intravenous fluid requirements, and planning factors for use in the nonunit resupply calculation procedures. The products of MEPES are used in the medical annex to the OPLAN, input to the personnel and sustainment models, identification of possible medical planning deficiencies in the OPLAN, and analysis of the impact of COAs on medical requirements.

(2) Foundation. Planners develop the population at risk (PAR) from the TPFDD file. Through automated interface with the TPFDD, MEPES assists the medical planner in quantifying the impact of a proposed OPLAN COA on the medical system using data from the existing TPFDD, the Medical Reference database, population at risk files, and the Medical Planning File. It gives medical planners a tool to perform gross medical feasibility and supportability assessments using scenarios that focus on particular OPLANs, series of OPLANs, or specific geographic areas that consider varying enemy threats, tempos of operations, climates, and frequency of patient distribution. The medical database estimates numbers of personnel who are wounded in action, killed in action, administratively lost, and dead of wounds, and evacuation rates and length of stay conforming to evacuation policies.

(3) Flexibility. MEPES resource forecasts include the following:

The result is a calculation of medical requirements that reflects a forecast of the theater medical resource requirements based on the warfighting scenario and supports time-phased medical sustainability analysis by generating estimates of time-phased casualties by type, medical evacuees, and returns to duty.

(4) Files. A temporary medical working file (MWF) is created from reference files and planner-modified planning factors. The resulting detailed planning reports are for use by theater and Service planners:

d. Two systems have been developed for GCCS to support personnel and mobilization planning and replace the WWMCCS-based Non-unit Personnel Generator (NPG):

(1) Individual Manpower Requirements and Availability System (IMRAS). IMRAS functions as a personnel planning system to assist in individual manpower mobilization planning and execution. It supports manpower and personnel planners during mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities for both deliberate and crisis action planning. IMRAS supports development of the personnel estimate of the situation and personnel appendixes to plans.

(2) Force Augmentation Planning and Execution System (FAPES) Prototype is a decision support tool that enables the mobilization staff officer at the supported command, Joint Staff, Services, and supporting commands to support mobilization planning, monitoring, and execution requirements. The prototype is a Windows-based application designed to use reserve component unit TPFDD and GSORTS data stored in the GCCS core database.

e. The MRG was the original model used to compute requirements of supply and replacement personnel. However, the MRG did not consider the availability of supplies from Service and Defense Logistics Agency inventories. For logistics, therefore, joint operation planning with the MRG was not a true capabilities activity. Moreover, the MRG only aggregated supplies into one of ten classes by POE-POS channel. A more accurate method of calculating resupply was needed. The Logistics Capability Estimator (LCE) was an attempt to answer this need. However, the LCE never achieved required levels of performance, and neither the MRG nor LCE is used. The Logistics Sustainability Analysis Feasibility Estimator (LOGSAFE) was developed to replace the MRG and the LCE. It is part of GCCS initial operational capability. It can rapidly generate nonunit sustainment records; identify, quantify, and integrate time-phased CINC-critical items; compare requirements with available assets; identify shortfalls and chart sustainability; identify substitute items to overcome sustainment shortfalls and relate these items to the employment of forces; and support determination of the overall logistics feasibility of COAs.

f. Summary. The GCCS applications for support planning are essential to determining feasibility of the CINCís concept of operations. The original WWMCCS-based Movements Requirements Generator program, the MRG, made gross estimates of nonunit resupply and replacement personnel. Logistics planners have expanded the original scope of the sustainment calculation. It is now possible to calculate more accurately medical requirements for physicians, supplies, and facilities with MEPES; the requirements for personnel replacements and reserve force mobilization with FAPES/IMRAS; civil engineering requirements for construction of facilities and war damage repair using the JEPES; and, with LOGSAFE, supply requirements. Not all calculations of sustainment are automatically added to the OPLAN TPFDD; planners must run some of these programs separately, and add their calculations manually. Further, work remains to be done in automating the calculation of requirements in support of civil affairs and enemy POW programs. Nevertheless, the rapid development of resupply calculations has greatly improved the plannerís ability to develop a feasible OPLAN and to appraise the supportability of tentative COAs. This is especially useful in crisis action planning.



a. Introduction. The purpose of the three steps of transportation planning is to determine the gross strategic transportation feasibility of the CINCís OPLAN. The CINC compares each subordinate commanderís transportation requirements and the total apportioned strategic transportation capabilities. A GCCS application program called the Joint Feasibility Analysis System for Transportation (JFAST) simulates strategic movement. Planners at the supported command run a computer simulation of air, land and sea movements of the forces and their support requirements from ORIGIN to POE to POD. JFAST uses the transportation assets identified in the JSCP for the OPLAN to "move" the forces and supplies. JFAST incorporates all the factors that influence the movement of force and nonunit requirements and calculates computer-simulated feasible dates to arrive and be unloaded at the POD. The feasibility of the OPLAN is determined when the modeled dates are compared with the CINCís latest arrival dates (LADs). The simulated deployment movement of a requirement that results in an arrival on or before the LAD is considered by the CINC to be grossly transportation feasible. Numerous conditions, including lift capacity and port capability, are attached to this transportation simulation, since neither all transportation assets, OPLAN force records, nor resupplies may have been sourced. Therefore, even when simulated results indicate arrival earlier than a LAD, it cannot be stated with absolute certainty that the OPLAN will close. All that can be said is that the plan is grossly feasible when considering strategic transportation.

b. Purpose. JFAST uses planner-specified parameters to determine whether the movement can be accomplished within the timeframe established by the CINC.

c. Foundation. Information about the movement of forces and supplies has been created in the OPLAN-dependent computer files: the TPFDD, files created by the GCCS/JOPES ADP application programs, such as RDA, and the miscellany of support programs and modules, for example, the LOGSAFE, MEPES, FAPES, IMRAS, and JEPES. The resulting file lists force and nonunit records by individual identifiers, i.e., ULN, CIN, PIN, that include the amounts to be moved, the timing, and the channel of flow for the planned movement.

(1) The planner must evaluate the TPFDD to analyze information such as POE-POD channel data, port throughout capability, airlift and sealift capacity, numbers of personnel, tons of materiel, and barrels of POL.

(2) The planner may create new files or modify standard files, including transportation assets, characteristics of transportation, ports and airfields, identified from the TPFDD to meet the constraints of the particular operational concept. Transportation assets are selected that match the apportioned forces from the JSCP or task-assigning document, the asset characteristics are defined, and the attrition rates are introduced.

(3) JFAST models the transportation flow based on the identified parameters; the results are displayed in graphic or tabular reports form. Simulations of the movements are calculated using the ALD at the port of embarkation, travel time, and EAD at the port of debarkation. There are three simulations, LAND, SEA, and AIR.

(4) JFAST produces reports that identify the computed estimated feasible available to load (FALD) date at POE (if the LAND model is run), the departure date from the POE, and arrival and unloading dates at the POD. Standard reports display information needed by the planner to analyze the movements.

(5) JFAST draws from the OPLAN TPFDD, summary reference file, and standard reference files, such as ASSETS, GEOFILE, CHSTR, PORTS, APORTS, TUCHA, and a ship availability file.

(6) Reports produced by JFAST include the following:

(7) JFAST is especially useful to planners not just because of its speed of analysis, but because it displays the results of that analysis graphically. This greatly enhances the plannerís ability to assess the feasibility of the plan and identify transportation shortfalls. The user can modify lift allocation and port throughput capability within JFAST to aid in shortfall resolution. If resolution requires altering the phasing of resources, the TPFDD must be modified outside of JFAST and then brought back into JFAST for further transportation analysis.

(8) An especially useful feature of JFAST called the Notional Requirements Generator (NRG) allows rapid phasing of representative real-world forces, with CS, CSS, and sustainment, for transportation analysis. The combat forces in the NRG database represent real-world forces. The model generates appropriate CS and CSS, according to Service doctrine, for the combat forces selected by the planner, and also generates sustainment. Sustainment is generated using planning factors generally consistent with Service doctrine; the planner can modify some sustainment planning factors, including climate, supply buildup policy, and level of combat. Though not as accurate as formal TPFDD development, the NRG allows the planner to rapidly create, in effect, a list of movement requirements and analyze it for transportation feasibility in JFAST. This feature is particularly valuable for exploring COA feasibility early in the deliberate planning process (before full TPFDDs are developed) and in Crisis Action Planning when the time for planning is constrained.

d. Dynamic Analysis and Replanning Tool (DART). DART preceded RDA for force planning and continues as a very useful planning tool available to the JPEC. It has been successfully used in both deliberate and crisis action planning. DART is an integrated set of automated data processing tools and a database management system that gives joint planners the ability to rapidly create, edit, and analyze TPFDDs for data accuracy and transportation feasibility. DART makes it possible for planners to consider more alternatives (COAs, shortfall resolution options, etc.) than before and to produce, in less time, a potentially feasible COA, thus facilitating more rapid decision-making. DART is capable of rapid TPFDD modification. Planners find using both DART and JFAST together to be particularly effective--DART for rapid TPFDD manipulation, and JFAST for detailed transportation feasibility analysis.


632. JOPES ADP SUPPORT SUMMARY. JOPES ADP, which resides on the Global Command and Control System, is used in the deliberate planning process by the JPEC to develop, analyze, refine, review, and maintain joint operation plans and to prepare supporting plans. JOPES ADP is used primarily in the plan development phase by the components to build the force list, calculate the flow of nonunit cargo and personnel, and complete specialized planning such as civil engineering and medical support. Through this process the TPFDD grows. When the components complete this work, the CINCís staff merges the TPFDDs and tests gross transportation feasibility. ADP is used to refine the database before and during refinement conferences. In the plan review phase JOPES ADP supports the review process, and, in the supporting plans phase, supporting commands may use JOPES ADP to analyze the supported commandís TPFDD. Finally, during maintenance of the TPFDD, JOPES ADP is used to make necessary updates.


633. TPFDD MAINTENANCE. TPFDD maintenance is a process designed to keep a contingency plan as up to date as possible. When an OPLAN is published at the conclusion of the deliberate planning process, it is considered to be adequate and feasible in light of apportioned resources. Since it is based on existing intelligence information, it is current. However, the situation described in the OPLAN changes; the real-world conditions that led to the response outlined in the CINCís concept may change over time, and the CINCís concept may no longer be the most effective response. When the concept requires major revision, the entire deliberate planning process may have to be repeated; operation plans are periodically reviewed to make such determinations. However, even when the basic concept remains valid, the data contained in TPFDD files become outdated for many reasons. The objective of TPFDD maintenance is to systematically and effectively incorporate changes to TPFDD files required to maintain as up to date as possible the database of phased forces, materiel, and sustainment that makes up the CINCís concept. TPFDD maintenance focuses largely on the changes to deployment data that have occurred since refinement. Its aim is to reduce the amount of change required to adapt the TPFDD for response to an emergent contingency. Although the supported commander is ultimately responsible for TPFDD maintenance, USTRANSCOM plays a key role in keeping the TPFDD current.

a. Periodic TPFDD maintenance is a relatively routine administrative job, performed at defined intervals after the TPFDD becomes effective for execution with CJCS approval resulting from the plan review phase of deliberate planning. JOPES ADP is used for TPFDD maintenance, and supported CINCs ensure that changes are loaded at scheduled intervals designated by the Joint Staff. Changes in sourcing, unit equipment, location, or state of unit readiness affect the plan, since they may change the amount of materiel to be deployed or the POE where it will be loaded. As the force structure changes, alternate units may have to be designated and substituted to satisfy the force record requirement of the TPFDD. The sources of information used to keep the deployment database current are as varied as the information itself. All members of the JPEC are responsible for keeping the JOPES database current, and regular reporting procedures have been established in Joint Pub 1-03 series, Joint Reporting Structure.

b. It is highly unlikely that a plan would be implemented in its entirety without changes. Any changes made in early stages of the operation are likely to affect events taking place later on. Therefore, it makes sense to concentrate the plannersí efforts on keeping the initial stages of a plan current. Normally, the JPEC intensively manages the first 7 days of air and 30 days of sea movement requirements to ensure continued database accuracy when converted to an OPORD. Different periods of intensive management can be specified by the supported commander. For example, in a very large and complex OPLAN, the commander may decide to have only the first five days of air movements intensively managed. When a plan is being implemented, later portions of the plan will be incrementally updated as earlier portions are being executed, to adjust to the actual results of the execution of earlier portions.

c. Being ultimately responsible for TPFDD maintenance, the supported commander is the final authority for approving changes to the OPLAN TPFDD.