INTRODUCTION
1. PURPOSE
This Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) translates the national security strategy into planning guidance for the period 2008 to 2010 to the Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) of the Unified Commands and Chiefs of the military services. This guidance includes a military strategy, strategic tasks and objectives, and an apportionment of forces for contingency planning for peace and war.
2. SCOPE
The JSCP provides:
a) A framework for military advice to the National Command Authority (NCA);
b) A summary of the National Military Strategy (NMS) for peace and war;
c) Guidance to the CINCs to accomplish specified tasks based on near-term military capabilities;
d) Planning guidance to the CINCs governing the development, preparation, and submission of plans to support the military strategy;
e) Planning guidance to the Chiefs of the military services for supporting the CINCs in the execution of their assigned tasks;
f) The strategic direction required to coordinate the efforts of the CINCs in the pursuit of national military objectives;
g) Taskings to the CINCs specifying planning requirements for contingency operations;
h) A listing of major combat forces expected to be available during the planning period and an apportionment of these forces to the CINCs for planning; and
I) Service and force-unique information and limitations on the uses of special operations forces as required to meet planning taskings.
3.IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS
a.Commanders are responsible for preparation of current plans for the execution of tasks assigned in Section V of this document. These tasks conform with the planning guidance in Sections III through VI and may be further amplified in follow-on guidance. Tasks assigned in Section V constitute requirements for planning, or other actions, by combatant commanders. Plans are categorized as operation plans or concept summaries.
(1) Operation plans are prepared in either complete format (OPLAN), concept format (CONPLAN), or concept summary.
(2) All plans must conform with domestic and international law, including the law of armed conflict and international agreements that are binding on the United States.
b.Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). JOPES Volume I (Joint Pub 5-03.1) outlines the deliberate planning process and gives guidance for preparation and submission of operation plans and Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDDs) and the review of operation plans. JOPES Volume II (Joint Pub 5-03.2) contains planning and execution formats and guidance. Formats for classified subjects and detailed functional guidance are contained in the supplement (classified) to JOPES Volume II.
4.CHANGES FROM PREVIOUS JSCP
a.General. The resumption of conflict in the Balkans, expansion of NATO to include Hungary and Poland, conclusion of a third Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START III), and reunification of Korea, have modified the security environment on which the previous JSCP was predicated. However, U.S. active and reserve forces levels, as established by the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2006, remain at 10 active Army divisions, three active cavalry regiments, and 15 National Guard (e) brigades ((e) Bde); 200 bombers and 12 active and 8 reserve Air Force fighter wings; 200 Navy battle force ships, and 3 Marine Expeditionary Forces. The nuclear triad is also sustained, as are U.S. obligations under the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The capacity to execute two nearly simultaneous major theaters of war (MTWs) was sustained as the force-structuring standard, despite the threat reduction in Northeast Asia. The potential for conflict in Southwest Asia and North Africa, and prospects for operational commitments to peacekeeping, counter-terrorism, humanitarian relief, counter-proliferation, other transnational dangers, and ad hoc coalitions to address regional instabilities and acts of limited aggression in other regions necessitated these force levels and a military strategy and deliberate planning process with enhanced flexibility and responsiveness.
b.New Framework for Operational Planning. The new national security environment requires a highly adaptive approach to planning for the use of military force in pursuit of U.S. national security objectives in peace, crises, and war.
(1)Regional threats remain the central basis for U.S. conventional force planning. This JSCP emphasizes regional planning as a top priority and directs that CINCs are no longer required to retain the Base Case Global Family of Plans.
(2) The guidance in this JSCP focuses attention on developing a wide spectrum of options for responding to a variety of possible crisis conditions. These options are labeled Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs), Deploy Decisive Force, and Counterattack.
(3) Guidance in this JSCP recognizes that significant portions of the peacetime force may be operationally deployed for missions, such as peace operations, lower in priority than a MTW mission. In accordance with the National Strategic Planning Document, such forces are apportioned for redeployment in the event of one or more MTWs.
c.Prioritization of Work. The following prioritization of planning requirements is provided as a guide:
(1)OPLANS
(a) USCENTCOM
(b) USPACOM
(c) USSTRATCOM
(2)CONPLANS with TPFDDs.
(a) USPACOM
(b) USCENTCOM
(c) USEUCOM
(3) CONPLANS and functional plans most likely to be executed.
(4)Remaining CONPLANS.
(5) Remaining functional plans.
d.Forces Available for Planning. Forces apportioned for planning will remain under the command of their providing organization until specified otherwise by the NCA.
(1) Forces, to include Reserve Component forces that are designated in Section IV as available for deployment within 180 days following notification and/or mobilization are apportioned for CINC operational planning in this JSCP.
(2) Strategic nuclear forces are not apportioned for operational planning by the regional combatant CINCs.
(3) Unless otherwise directed, Services will publish a list of combat support and combat service support forces available to each CINC. The list will be based on the need to support major combat forces apportioned for planning in Section V of this JSCP.
e.Prioritization for Training. Because of multi-apportionment of forces for regional planning, the following prioritization guidelines give an appropriate focus for training readiness:
(1)Units should train to support all plans to which they are apportioned.
(2)Training emphasis should favor MTW training over Small-Scale Conflict (SSC) training.
(3)For units apportioned to both MTW theaters, training should favor the MTW theater to which they are earlier apportioned. If apportioned in the same case to both MTW theaters, then training should be balanced between theaters.
(4) As an exception to subparagraphs (2) and (3) above, USEUCOM forces not apportioned to an MTW OPLAN in cases 1A through 3A should direct their training emphasis to USEUCOM.
(5) Units apportioned to the Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP) mission should commit resources as required to train for the SIOP mission.
 

SECTION II

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
1.GENERAL. The SCE JSCP implements, through the deliberate planning process, the SCE National Military Strategy (NMS). A detailed account of the strategic setting can be found in the SCE NMS. The summary that follows is intended to relate particular aspects of deliberate planning to that setting and strategy.
2.OBJECTIVES
a.National Military Objectives. The overarching objective of the NMS is to preserve the freedom of action of the United States. Figure II-1 portrays the supporting national military objectives.
 
Figure II-1: National Military Objectives
 -Deter attacks on the United States, its friends, and allies;
-If deterrence fails, defeat aggression promptly and decisively;
-Maintain effective alliance structures, based on equitable burdensharing;
-Promote regional stability and the spread of democracy;
-Increase U.S. influence and access to markets, resources, oceans, and space;
-Combat terrorism and subversion, and stem the flow of narcotics;
-Block or roll-back the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons
and take actions to counter their use as instruments of intimidation or war; and
-Support established arms control agreements to which the United States is a party, and control the spread of advanced conventional weapons and technologies.
 
b.Regional Objectives. Section V further identifies the military objectives of the combatant commands in each region. Those objectives are based on the NMS and the current capabilities of U.S. forces; all stated objectives are believed to be achievable within available resources. They reflect a range of plausible contingencies, including the potential for MTWs in Southwest Asia and North Africa, the potential for hostilities in South Asia over Taiwan, and concurrent U.S. military involvement in SSCs and/or counterterrorism, fighting drug trafficking, and other missions in multiple regions.
3.FOUNDATIONS AND PRINCIPLES
a.Foundations. The national military strategy is founded on the premise that the United States will furnish the leadership needed to enhance opportunities for global peace and security through Overseas Presence and Power Projection. Although remnants of the former Soviet military remain, improving East-West relations have shifted the focus of the strategy to conventional deterrence of regional threats of consequence to U.S. interests, friends, and allies. U.S. interests include promoting regional cooperation and constructive interactions with friends and allies, enabling them to assume a greater share of the burden for sustaining regional peace and security. Because U.S. Active and Reserve forces have been reduced in size, it is essential that the United States retain the capability to detect and respond decisively to the full range of likely regional security challenges, including transnational dangers, such as drug trafficking. Military planning will focus on integrating U.S. military capabilities into political, economic, diplomatic, as well as military approaches to meeting U.S. regional interests in different regions of the globe. U.S. forces will frequently be employed as a part of a coalition, in some cases outside of established alliance structures. However, U.S. forces must be capable of also acting unilaterally if required to do so. In either case, access to strategic lift and to space-based assets will remain essential. With these realities in mind, the national military strategy is founded on two strategic concepts, and is comprised of three components. The two concepts, Overseas Presence and Power Projection, describe the primary ways in which U.S. forces will contribute to the achievement of the national objectives. The three components of the strategy -- peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and warfighting -- describe the range of actions likely to be required of U.S. military forces.
(1)Concepts
(a)Overseas Presence. Overseas presence derives from permanently stationed forces, routine temporary deployments, and a broad program of contingency deployments. Presence forces, including some tailored for specific missions, perform a variety of activities that promote stability and deter conflict. Additionally, they are combat-ready forces capable of responding to a wide range of threats throughout the world. They are visible proof of U.S. commitment to defend vital interests and support friends and allies.
(b)Power Projection. With fewer U.S. forces permanently stationed overseas, we must increase our capability to project power abroad. Credible power projection complements our forward presence and contributes to deterrence and stability. It provides great flexibility in employing military force and provides national leaders time for consultation prior to a potential crisis or conflict. It is essential for all our military and political objectives.
(2)Components. U.S. forces are involved in a range of peacetime engagement activities that demonstrate commitment, improve collective military capabilities, promote democratic ideals, relieve suffering, and enhance regional stability. Peacetime engagement includes military-to-military contacts, national assistance, security assistance, humanitarian operations, counter-drug, and counter-terrorism. If these activities prove insufficient, deterrence and conflict prevention actions may be required. These include enhancing the visibility and readiness of U.S. nuclear deterrence forces, stationing powerful conventional forces abroad, participating in collective training exercises, conducting show of force operations, and participating in peace operations. Should conflicts nevertheless erupt, U.S. forces are prepared to respond unilaterally or as part of an alliance, with direct U.S. involvement or as the provider of intelligence, transportation, communication, and other supporting capabilities, in order to ensure victory and restore peace.
b.Principles. The NMS is based on the following enduring principles:
(1)Deterrence: The highest priority of our military strategy is to deter a nuclear attack against our nation and our allies. The nuclear posture review validated the need for U.S. nuclear forces for the foreseeable future. However, the NMS recognizes that U.S. deterrence of regional aggression will depend increasingly on the capabilities of U.S. conventional forces.
(2)Flexible Escalation Control: Unless the NCA directs otherwise, U.S. forces will seek to contain a conflict to a specified geographic region; deter or prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction; and deter or prevent the intervention of other major powers.
(3) Strong Alliances: For political, economy of force, and other reasons, it is in the U.S. interest to maintain strong alliances and provide the leadership of coalitions to which U.S. forces are committed. This requires shared roles, missions, responsibilities, and burdens. In all cases, the primary burden for protecting peace in a region rests with allies in that region.
(4)Force Projection: Should the United States resolve to protect its vital interests be challenged, U.S. forces must be able to respond rapidly with a broad range of options. This requires mobility assets, base access and overflight rights, secure passage, and (if necessary) capabilities for forcible entry. The support of friends and allies is critical.
(5) Maritime Superiority: Control of the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) remains essential to the achievement of U.S. national security objectives. This includes protecting access by non-combatants to resources and markets in time of both peace and war.
(6)Force Superiority: Given the reduced size of the U.S. Active and Reserve force structure, Services will strive to maintain a qualitative advantage through the acquisition of superior weapons, equipment and technologies, information warfare capabilities, and manpower.
(7)Mobilization Base: In time of crisis or war, the United States must be able to mobilize rapidly its reserve forces and defense industrial base capabilities.
(8)Space Control. The United States will maintain the capability to control the use of space to support military operations and to deny the use of space assets to adversaries.
(9)Information Warfare. The military leverage attainable from reconnaissance, intelligence collection, and high speed data processing and transmission warrants special emphasis. Global Command and Control System (GCCS) hardware and software, and the Service C4I systems linked to GCCS, contribute substantially to U.S. capabilities for information warfare, as does assured access to space-based systems.
(10)Arms Control. Verifiable arms control agreements contribute to U.S. security by reducing and limiting the numbers and types of weapons that can threaten the United States and by reducing arms buildups that can raise tensions and inhibit U.S. freedom of action.
4.PLANNING AND EMPLOYMENT
a.Planning Guidance. The decline in direct threats to the security of the United States and its population has been accompanied by an expansion of threats to less-than-vital, but still important U.S. interests in every region of the globe. An MTW remains a possibility in each region; the JSCP deconflicts CINC and Service plans resulting from the potential for up to two nearly simultaneous MTWs. Because these could erupt with little warning time, the NCA requires a range of preplanned options that enable U.S. forces to take advantage of whatever response time is available. As discussed in Section III, the adaptive planning process offers options utilizing all instruments of national power (political, diplomatic, economic, and military) to demonstrate U.S. resolve, deter potential adversaries, and (if necessary) deploy and employ forces to fight and win quickly and decisively. Broad policy and strategy guidance, mission assignments, and final plan reviews are furnished by the Secretary of Defense. The assumptions, concepts of operation, and forces to be employed are largely determined by the CINCs and approved by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in coordination with the military Services and defense agencies. There are three general categories of operations that CINCs must plan for and be prepared to execute. These are identified below and explained further in subsequent sections of the JSCP.
(1)Flexible Deterrence Options (FDOs): FDOs are employed under conditions of ambiguous warning to deter adversarial actions inimical to U.S. interests. All regional plans will have FDOs involving apportioned in-place and augmentation forces IAW Section V. In concert with military actions, CINCs will request and plan for appropriate political, diplomatic, and economic actions by non-DoD agencies to signal U.S. resolve and demonstrate commitment.
(2)Deploy Decisive Force (DDF): When confronted with unambiguous warning, CINCs in threatened regions will be prepared to receive an initial reinforcement of supportable warfighting forces sufficient to defend successfully and, where appropriate, engage in limited offensive operations. Forces apportioned for DDF operations are identified in Section V.
(3)Response to a No-Warning Attack: CINCs will plan for the possibility that an attack against vital U.S. interests or forces could occur without prior warning or in spite of deterrence actions. CINCs shall plan for an apportionment of forces that will permit an overwhelming response to such attacks in order to ensure a decisive favorable war termination.
b.Employment Guidance.
(1)Global Strategic Tasks: The Base Case Family of Plans for Global War will be retained, but put aside until further notice. The JSCP will not provide guidance for Base Case planning until the CJCS is directed to provide such guidance by the NCA. However, strategic tasks that remain in effect include protection of the U.S. homeland, nuclear deterrence, the clearance and protection of SLOCs, projection of decisive force, continuous support of deployed forces, and reinforcement of principal allies.
(2)Major Theaters of War: The apportionment of forces for regional contingencies (Section V) assumes that two concurrent MTWs could develop sequentially. CINC planning for the priority MTW shall be based on the receipt of forces sufficient for counterattack operations. In the event of a second, concurrent, lesser-priority MTW, the supported CINC will receive forces sufficient for DDF operations and shall plan accordingly. All of the forces specified for CINC planning in Section V may not be available for execution. In general, however, either these or other comparable forces will be made available prior to or concurrently with a DDF or Counterattack execution order.
(3)Small Scale Conflicts: Based on experience in the Balkan conflict, a portion of the total U.S. force will likely be involved in operations other than war and/or in protecting U.S. interests threatened by SSCs. In-place and augmentation forces apportioned for MTW contingencies must also be ready to respond to SSCs. In some cases, they might not be available to reinforce a CINC in time to affect MTW deterrence or initial defensive operations. Section V takes this experience into account by apportioning more in-place and augmentation forces to the U.S. Atlantic Command than are required for that command’s assigned MTW tasks. If required, these forces will be substituted for forces committed to SSCs but required to support DDF MTW operations.
(4) Plans for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Warfare: The United States no longer maintains the capability to respond-in-kind to attacks by chemical or biological weapons. While the use of nuclear weapons in retaliation for these attacks, or for limited nuclear attacks, has not been ruled out, CINCs will plan to respond with non-nuclear means until otherwise directed by the NCA. CINC’s plans will include both passive and active NBC defensive measures.
c.Planning and Employment Guidance for Peacetime Engagement Operations. U.S. CINCs and Service Chiefs of Staff (CoS) shall plan for a range of peacetime military activities. Unless otherwise directed, any combatant forces required to perform the following activities will be assumed to come from in-place or pre-designated augmentation forces:
(1)Military-to-Military Contacts. This is one of the most effective instruments to create a secure world. There are many opportunities to forge cooperative security relationships with former adversaries and formerly nonaligned nations through military-to-military contacts.
(2)Nation Assistance. U.S. forces participate selectively in many ways to help friendly nations combat lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency. These efforts must reinforce the host nation’s development, and may involve bilateral and multilateral exercises, civil-military cooperation, intelligence and communication sharing, and logistical support.
(3)Security Assistance. This program involves selective uses of U.S. technology and industry to furnish friends and allies the means to defend themselves from aggression and to fight alongside U.S. forces in a coalition effort. These activities help to build relationships with emerging democracies, and are a cost-effective alternative to direct U.S. military intervention. International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs are an important element of SA.
(4)Humanitarian Operations. U.S. forces stand ready to participate in disaster relief and humanitarian operations at home and abroad. They offer unique communication, logistics, and security capabilities. Once such operations are "up and running," U.S. forces will usually be drawn down as other U.S. agencies and/or the host government assumes responsibility.
(5)Counter-drug and Counter-terrorism. U.S. Armed Forces, working in close cooperation with law enforcement agencies, can help halt the flow of illegal drugs. In concert with our security partners, U.S. forces have important roles to play in the fight against terrorism.
(6)Noncombatant Evacuation. U.S. forces are called upon frequently to protect the lives and safety of U.S. citizens abroad. When so ordered, U.S. forces, in support of the Department of State, will use appropriate means to extract American and other designated nationals promptly and safely.
(7)Sanctions Enforcement. Military forces are increasingly used to enforce a range of sanctions, such as economic and arms embargoes, resulting from national policy decisions and United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions.
(8) Peacekeeping. U.S. forces remain prepared to support peacekeeping tasks on a case-by-case basis. If warranted, this may involve commitments of combat units. When appropriate, these tasks are to be shared with allies and friends.
(9) Peace Enforcement. On occasion, U.S. forces may be directed to participate in peace enforcement operations that stand in the gray zone between peace and war. These efforts, interwoven with diplomatic and economic activity, involve both governmental and non-governmental agencies and may be necessary to support U.S. global or regional interests.
(10)Win the Peace. In the wake of any major conflict, U.S. forces must be ready to assist an indigenous government and population to recover and restore normal peacetime services. In cooperation with U.S., allied, host nation, and international agencies, conflict termination and amelioration will be central to CINC planning efforts.

2. Implications for the Regional CINCs and Services. In order to protect U.S. interests in the new security environment, CINCs and Services must actively promote regional Peacetime Engagement programs and policies; work closely and cooperatively with non-DoD agencies and decision makers to ensure a synergy of military, politico-informational, economic, and diplomatic effort; sustain an appropriate forward presence in all regions; and plan adaptively for FDOs, DDF, and Counterattack operations. In order to meet these diverse requirements, U.S. military forces must be ready, responsive, tailorable (and therefore modular in design), rapidly deployable, and capable of operating effectively as part of joint and combined teams at any point along the spectrum of conflict. While this JSCP provides guidance for planning the employment of "above the line" combat forces, CINCs and Services are responsible for also planning for Forward Presence and Power Projection activities that may depend vitally and predominantly on small "below the line" combat support and/or combat service support units.

SECTION III

PLANNING GUIDANCE

1.GENERAL. Planning assumptions for warning and force availability, reserve callup, mobilization, movements, and other executive emergency measures, while necessary to develop operation plans, will likely change at execution. An element of uncertainty encompasses political, diplomatic, economic, and military considerations. Thus, the effective use of available response time requires that NCA have a menu of discriminate preplanned options. The adaptive planning guidance described in this section addresses this requirement.

2. ADAPTIVE PLANNING GUIDANCE. Adaptive planning guidance is premised on an assumption that crises can and will arise under a variety of circumstances that will, in turn, elicit a variety of responses. The JSCP assigns planners the task of developing response options keyed to a specific set of conditions at the onset of a crisis. These options -- Flexible Deterrent Options (Cases 1 and 2), Deploy Decisive Force (Case 3), and Counterattack (Case 4) -- and the crises with which they are associated are portrayed in Figures III-1 and III-2.

Figure III-1

Figure III-2
Although CINCs are directed in Section V to develop response options on the basis of specific threats, the intent of the JSCP is to produce plans varied and flexible enough to apply with only modest modification to unforeseen regional threats and unexpected contingencies.
a.Flexible Deterrent Options. Adaptive planning underscores the importance of early response to an emerging crisis. It facilitates early decision making by laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths that begin with multiple deterrent-oriented options tailored to avoid the classic dilemma of ‘too much too soon’ or ‘too little too late.’ These deterrent-oriented early response options are called Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs).
(1)During the planning process, CINC’s plans will include requests for appropriate diplomatic, informational, and economic options by non-DoD agencies, to be executed in concert with military options. Examples of diplomatic, informational, economic, and military options are depicted in Figures III-3 through III-6.
 

Figure III-3

DIPLOMATIC FDOs

• Reduce international diplomatic ties
• Increase cultural group pressure
• Alter existing meetings, programs, or schedules
• Prepare to withdraw U.S. embassy personnel
• Pursue measures to increase regional support
• Identify the national leader who may be able to solve the problem
• Develop or work within existing coalition (avoid unilateral actions when possible)
• Alert and introduce special teams: Public diplomacy, MTT, Communication
• Initiate noncombatant evacuation procedures
• Use the UN or other international institutions
• Identify clearly the steps to peaceful resolution
• Restrict activities of diplomats
• Reduce national embassy personnel
• Take actions to win support of allies and friends
• Coordinate efforts to strengthen international support
• Promote democratic elections
• Heighten informational efforts directed at the International community, opinion leaders within the national population, and coalitions formed to overcome the situation

Figure III-4

POLITICAL FDOs

• Promote U.S. policy objectives through public policy statements
• Take measures to increase public support
• Keep selected issues as lead stories
• Heighten public awareness of the program and potential for conflict
• Maintain an open dialogue with the press
• Invite in impartial observers
• Impose sanctions on C4I and weapon technology transfer
• Protect friendly C4I assets
• Develop informal as well as formal contacts with international opinion setters
• Increase C4I processing and transmission capability

• Deploy Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters-Forward to area
• Employ reconnaissance assets to the area
• Increase military exchanges and staff visits to the area
• Conduct aircraft fly-overs
• Pre-stage sealift and airlift reception assets to air and sea ports of embarkation
• Deploy fighter squadrons/AWACS to region
• Deploy the afloat Amphibious Ready Group/ Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU) (SOC) to the region
• Open pre-positioned stockage facilities
• Open and secure sea and air Lines of Communications (LOCs)
• Deploy carrier battle group (CVBG) to the region
• Activate reserve call-up
• Initiate or increase show of force actions
• Begin moving forces to air and sea ports of embarkation (APOEs and SPOEs)
• Pre-stage or deploy contingency ready brigades
• Establish curfews and impose restrictions on leaves, separations, and retirements
• Implement meaconing, interference, jamming, and intrusion of enemy information assets
• Deploy naval Surface Action Group (SAG) to the region
• Move Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) to the region
• Move Marine Expeditionary Force (FWD) to the region
• Upgrade alert status
• Increase exercise activities, schedules, and scope
• Increase strategic reconnaissance
• Increase naval port calls or air squadron visits to the area
• Use naval or air capability to enforce sanctions
• Deploy intelligence collection and analysis to the area
• Exercise WMD passive defense
• Pre-stage airlift and airlift support assets
• Deploy J-STARS to the area
• Replace logistic infrastructure where possible
• Increase informational efforts: PSYOP, Mission awareness, Measures directed at the opponent’s military force

Figure III-7
RESPONSE FORCE - CASE RELATIONSHIP

FORCES
1.SECTION DESCRIPTION. Section IV contains planning information and data for the apportionment of U.S. forces. It identifies and describes CINC and Service force apportionment planning considerations, contains information on regional force apportionment concepts, and provides Service force apportionment databases.
2.SECTION OUTLINE
a.Part 1, General Apportionment Information
b.Part 2, Regional Planning Forces
c.Part 3, Force Apportionment Summary

PART 1: General Apportionment Information

 
1. INTRODUCTION. The apportioned forces reflect the strategy in Section II (Strategic Setting), planning guidance in Section III, and task assignments and assumptions for each CINC in Section V. The apportionment of forces is for deliberate planning. Actual force assignment, reassignment, or allocation for crisis or contingency operations will be as authorized by the NCA through the Chairman, Joints Chief of Staff to the respective CINCs at the time of execution.

2.FORCE TABLES
a. Table Location. Force apportionment to each combatant CINC for regional contingency planning (Cases 1 through 4) is contained in Section V. Some Forces apportioned in Cases 3 and 4 may not be available if more than two regions require forces at the same time.

b. Database. The CINC force apportionment tables were constructed based upon the Service data bases of Active and Reserve forces, which are summarized in Part 3.

3.FORCE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

a. Mobility Assets. Availability of mobility assets shown in OPLANs will not exceed those apportioned in Annex J. Specific assumptions concerning the availability of strategic mobility assets should be included in the CINC's Strategic Concept.

b. Strategic Nuclear Forces. Strategic nuclear forces will not be made available for regional planning.
c. Strategic Bomber Forces. Five B-1/B-1B bomber squadrons and two B-2 bomber squadrons are apportioned for use in planning conventional operations.
d. Strategic Reconnaissance Forces. Strategic reconnaissance forces are available for planning contingency operations during peace and war, as directed by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
e.Aerial Tanker and Cargo Support Forces. KC-135 and KC-10 aircraft are available in any scenario to support air refueling requirements. CINCTRANS will determine the best use of KC-135 and KC-10 assets.

f.Strategic Air Defense Forces. Strategic air defense forces will not be made available to CINCs to augment regional operation plans.

g. Theater Defense Forces. Forces assigned specific theater defensive mission will not be made available for contingency planning.
h. Maritime Pre-positioned Ships (MPS). MPS assets are available to support the worldwide response of Marine Forces. Each MPS squadron consist of a combination of container and roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ships, containing equipment for three Marine Amphibious Group Task Forces (MAGTFs), roughly one-half to one-third of a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) in size. The MPS squadrons, two of which are deployed in the Pacific (Guam and Diego Garcia) and one in the Atlantic/Mediterranean, can off-load pier-side or at anchor (in-stream) in a secure environment for arrival, assembly operations, and marriage with airlifted forces.
i.Hospital Ships. Two T-AHs (each a l,000-bed afloat hospital) furnish afloat health care facilities in support of Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force elements, and forward-deployed Navy elements of the fleet and fleet activities. T-AH operations are critical during combat when hospital facilities have not been established ashore.
j. Special Operations Forces. Special operations combat and aviation forces are described in Section V. Guidance is amplified in Annexes D, E, and L. Certain special operations forces, such as the 75th Ranger Regiment, are retained under NCA control as strategic assets and, as such, are not apportioned to CINCs in Section V for deliberate planning. Such forces may later be assigned to a CINC for planning and/or employment when so directed by the NCA.

k.Support Forces. Requirements for combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) forces are based on the supported commander's concept of operations and reflect the expected duration and intensity of conflict and the forces to be employed. Where support levels are insufficient, the CINC may be forced to alter the concept of operation to account for support shortfalls. The six major sources of CS and CSS or other service support forces, should be considered in the following sequence, in descending order; however, this sequence may be altered to prevent temporary shortfalls in CS/CSS support of OPLANs:

- CS and CSS forces already assigned to the supported commander

- Host-nation support (HNS)

- Equivalent support services from in-theater contractors with existing contracts

- CONUS-based CS and CSS forces

- Equivalent support services from CONUS contractor

- Supporting commander CS and CSS forces

4.SERVICE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

a.Army. Reserve forces are an integral part of the Army organization. Large-scale operations normally use portions of the Army’s Reserve Component (RC). This is likely to be the case with regard to CS, CSS, and (e) Bde. RC combat divisions are not apportioned. The Army Chief of Staff, in conjunction with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and unified command authorities, configures the Army service component, allocates forces, and apportions limited resources to meet the combatant commander’s requirements. The Army Service Component Command (ASCC) establishes links and coordinates with the Joint Force Headquarters and other Service Component Commanders to provide the capabilities that support a force projection concept from austere to fully developed theater. The ASCC is a flexible structure with a range of capabilities that can be task organized into a selected force based on the warfighting mission, the priorities established by national planners, resource constraints and the operational environment. These factors determine how the Army apportions forces to perform combat, logistics and support activities in theater

b.Navy. Navy forces kept in reserve are not apportioned in this JSCP. There are sufficient combatants in the active component to support the contingencies anticipated. Mobilization times for ships in Inactive Ship facilities and the National Defense Reserve Fleet are sufficiently long that they will be available only in a crisis that has a lead time in excess of 180 days. USCG forces will not be made available to the CINCs for contingency planning.

c.Marine Corps

(1)Marine forces are deployed as fully integrated MAGTFs of different sizes, all of which are task-organized, combined arms forces consisting of air, ground, and combat service support units. MAGTFs normally include a command element (CE), ground combat element (GCE), aviation combat element (ACE), and CSS element (CSSE). MAGTFs come in four sizes: Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), Marine Expeditionary Force-Forward (MEF-FWD), Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), and Special Purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF). The MEF normally has a Marine division as its GCE and a Marine aircraft wing as its ACE. The MEF-FWD is normally organized with a regimental landing team as its GCE and an air group as its ACE. The MEU normally has a battalion landing team as the GCE and a composite squadron as its ACE. MEUs that possess special operations capabilities as the result of predeployment training are designated MEUs. Like a MEU, the SPMAGTF is organized to accomplish specific tasks ranging from warfighting to humanitarian assistance. It does not have a specific, normal organizational structure or composition.

(2)Each MEF normally deploys a MEF-FWD, either on amphibious shipping or by air in conjunction with an MPS squadron as its lead element. The rest of the MEF -- one or more Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) -- deploys by a combination of sea and air to reinforce the lead element and provide the CINC a division/wing/force service support group (FSSG) force complete with 60 days of sustainment. MEF-FWDs, normally deployed as the lead element of a MEF, can also operate as independent organizations to accomplish specific tasks. Each MEF-FWD is capable of limited independent combat operations and can sustain itself for 30 days. A MEU is normally forward-deployed aboard amphibious shipping as part of the fleet and carries sustainment for 15 days. However, an MEU can be formed on short notice and deployed by air. The SPMAGTF deploys by air or sea depending on the mission, the wishes of the CINC, and the size of the force.

(3)Certain Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) forces selectively augment and reinforce the active forces. However, their activation time precludes their apportionment for contingency planning.

d.Air Force. Air Force units in the Active Force and Selected Reserve are programmed, budgeted, and trained to be ready to deploy within 72 hours after notification. Some units can deploy earlier. However, any Reserve Component-unique capabilities (such as WILD WEASEL) required before Presidential Selected Reserve Callup (PSSC) should be identified early in the planning cycle.

5.ADDITIONAL PLANNING INFORMATION. The force apportionment tables in Section V deal primarily with major combat forces. The JSCP annexes contain additional planning guidance. In addition, the following publications are available as planning guides:

- Army Mobilization and Operations Planning Systems (AMOPS), Volume II

- Navy Capabilites and Mobilizationn Plan

- U.S. Air Force War and Mobilization Plan, Volume 3, Combat and Support Forces

- Marine Corps Capabilities Plan, Volumes I & II, and Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan (MPLAN)

- Coast Guard Auxiliary Plan (CGAPLAN) and Coast Guard Logistics Support and Mobilization Plan (CSGSMP)

- Joint Pub 4-05, Mobilization

6.PLANNING CONSTRAINTS

a.Forces. Constraints may affect the combat capability of forces listed in the force tables. These constraints are identified in the annexes.
b.Logistics. CINCs will notify the CJCS of anticipated shortfalls of materiel, support forces, or other deficiencies that would adversely affect the reported concept of operations.
c.Host-Nation Support (HNS). CINC plans should identify areas where HNS could satisfy U.S. requirements for facilities, supplies, security, and other support needs. This should not be construed to mean that host-nation support agreements exist to support such deployments.
d.Force Availability. CINC operation plans will include only those forces apportioned. Each CINC will determine and report to the CJCS the risks associated with meeting assigned tasks with only the forces apportioned.
   

PART 2: Regional Planning Forces
1.CONCEPTS. Regional contingencies are divided into two categories: Major Theaters of War (MTWs) and Small Scale Conflicts (SSCs). All major U.S. combat forces are apportioned within the contingency categories. Regional categories are used to identify commands assigned to develop MTW plans and to deconflict multi-apportioned forces among the commands. Further procedures are established to enable deconfliction within MTW and SSC categories and between MTW and SSC categories.

2.FORCE TABLE CATEGORIES AND THE COMBATANT COMMANDS.

a. Categories. Forces apportioned for regional contingencies in this JSCP are listedby the CINC in one of three table categories: MTW, SSC, or support. Under some circumstances, any of the combatant CINCs may be tasked by NCA to support another CINC.

b.Commands. For CINC and Service force apportionment planning, the following priority mission areas apply:

(1)MTW: Central Command (CENTCOM)

European Command (EUCOM)

Pacific Command (PACOM)

(2)SSC: Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)

Atlantic Command (ACOM)

(3)Support:Special Operations Command (SOCOM)

3.TABLE DESCRIPTION. Tables in Part 3 of Section IV provide general information relevant to the apportionment of listed forces. Within each table, forces are further divided into cases, column subsets (Service, Availability, Location, and Sources), and row subsets (in-place, Augmentation, or Reinforcement).

a.Table Cases (MTW only). Establishes separate tables for each case for MTWs.

b.Table Columns:
(1)Services. Apportioned forces are listed by Service starting with the highest level of organizational command.

(2)Availability. Availability times are based on each unit's capability to start and sustain movement from its normal geographic location. Forward-deployed forces are assumed to be available immediately for employment or repositioning. Availability is determined by notification day (N-day) for active forces, and Presidential Selective Reserve Callup (PSSC) (S-day), and partial mobilization (T-day) for reserve forces.

(3)Location. This column indicates the location of a unit in either a specific CINC area of responsibility (AOR) or the United States. CONUS-based naval units may be specified by coastal area. Some AOR locations are subdivided and easily identifiable by region or country.

(4)Source. This column indicates the CINC exercising normal chain-of-command authority over the apportioned force and performing peacetime administration and routine management functions.

c.Table Rows

(1)In-place. Active-duty forces assigned to a CINC in a Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Forces for Unified Commands. (Case 1)

(2)Augmentation. Active-duty forces that would come from CONUS or another CINC. (Cases 1 and 2)

(3)Reinforcement. Reserve Component forces called to active duty to support Deploy-Decisive Force (DDF) or Response to a No-Warning Attack options. (Cases 3 and 4)

d.Table Terminology. For more complete definitions of terms, see Joint Pub 1-02,Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

.

PART 3: Force Apportionment
1.FORCE TABLES. Force tables in Part 3 are a database listing the total forces apportioned by each Service for regional planning. These numbers are the maximum numbers that may be apportioned to a CINC for planning in a regional contingency. The tables are in the following order:

a.Table IV-1: Army Force Apportionment Database for Regional Planning

b.Table IV-2: Navy Force Apportionment Database for Regional Planning

c.Table IV-3: Marine Corps Force Apportionment Database for Regional Planning

d.Table IV-4: Air Force Force Apportionment Database for Regional Planning

2.FORCE TERMINOLOGY. For more complete definitions of terms, see Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

ACRArmored Cavalry Regiment; roughly 4500 man size, used as screening or covering force

Amp/MEF-FWDAmphibious Marine Expeditionary Brigade; roughly 13,500 man size; deployable on

roughly two ARGs (12-17 Amphibious ships)

APSArmy Prepositioned Set of equipment for Brigade sized unit

ARGAmphibious Ready Group; gouping of ships capable of lifting a MEU; two ARGs can lift a

MEB or MEF-FWD

BSBomber Squadron

Corps Hq/SptCorps Headquarters and supporting Corps Support Command

CWComposite Wing

CVBGCarrier Battle Group consisting of 1 aircraft carrier and wing, 2 cruisers (CG),

4 destroyers (DDG/FFG), 2 attack submarines (SSN), and one logistics ship AO.

DFEDivision Force Equivalent; (H) = Heavy, (L) = Light, airborne (ABN) or air assault (AASLT)

FSFighter Squadron

MCMMine Countermeasures

MEBMarine Expeditionary Brigade; two or more of which = a MEF

MEFMarine Expeditionary Force: division plus air wing

MPS/MEF-FWDMarine Prepositioning Ships with equipment for one MEB
SAGSurface Action Group; flexible grouping of ships/submarines not including an aircraft carrier

SFGSpecial Forces Group; 3 battalions, roughly 1230 personnel

VP P-3 Squadron (6-11 aircraft)

TABLE IV-1

U. S. NAVY FORCE APPORTIONMENT DATA BASE FOR REGIONAL PLANNING

TABLE IV-3

U.S. AIR FORCE APPORTIONMENT DATA BASE FOR REGIONAL PLANNING

TABLE IV-3, continued

SECTION V

REGIONAL PLANS

1.AUTHORITY. Execution authority for all plans rests with the NCA. Commanders exercise authority, command, and discharge responsibilities as directed by the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

2.REGIONAL PLANS

a. General. The focus for current planning is regional, and conflict may arise under a variety of circumstances from slow-building to imminent conflict situations.
b. Planning Assumptions. Assumptions governing regional conflicts, applicable to all CINCs, are in Table V-I and will be incorporated into operation plans as appropriate. Items not under U.S. control must be covered by plan assumptions concerning them.
c. Common Tasks and Planning Considerations. A number of tasks and planning considerations are common to all commands. Table V-2 lists selected common regional tasks. Commands may develop plans for the situations the commander considers necessary. Planning considerations are included to assist the development of OPLANs, CONPLANs, and Concept Summaries.

Table V-1

JSCP REGIONAL ASSUMPTIONS

Table V-2

COMMON REGIONAL TASKS

(c) Conduct mine countermeasures operations against mine warfare operations by hostile forces.
(d) Deploy amphibious forces and/or maritime pre-positioned force squadrons or pre-positioning ships to the region as an indication of the possible use of ground forces or for the purposes of deception or surveillance.
(15)Air Traffic Control. Include provisions in existing plans for continued support by the Federal Aviation Administration for air traffic control operations in the AORs of the combatant commands during periods of war or national emergency.
(16) NASA Support. Support NASA, as directed, and be prepared to conduct search and rescue missions in support of the space transportation system (STS).
(17)Humanitarian Assistance. Hurricanes, typhoons, earthquakes, drought, and manmade events may require DoD forces to lend support to government disaster relief assistance agencies with minimum notice and support civil agencies, as directed by the DoD executive agent.
(18)Enemy Prisoners of War. Include provisions for the internment of EPWs.
(19)Military Deception. Conduct military deception operations to support OPSEC, deterrence, preparation for hostilities, intervention operations, combat operations, and attainment of other strategic objectives. (See Annex K.)
(20)Search and Rescue. Establish a theater search and rescue system for the recovery of personnel and materiel. Include provisions for coordinating the capabilities of available theater Service and allied resources.
(21)Psychological Operations. Conduct psychological operations (PSYOP) in coordination with the chiefs of U.S. diplomatic missions in support of national objectives, policies, interests, and military missions.
 
3.REGIONAL PLANNING
a. General. As discussed in Section III, Planning Guidance, CINCs are required to prepare operation plans for either Major Theaters of War (MTWs) or Small Scale Contingencies (SSCs) by preparing OPLANs, CONPLANs, and Concept Summaries.
b. Regional Planning - Forward Presence Operations. To help deter regional conflicts and promote stability, especially in Third World countries, innovative strategies are required to support friendly and allied governments. The intent is to implement a policy of forward presence, including diplomatic, political, economic, and military actions aimed at preventing conflict, enhancing regional stability, and building coalitions. In general, forward presence operations are categorized as follows: Operational Training and Deployment; Security Assistance (including peacekeeping operations); Protecting U.S. Citizens Abroad (including NEO and Combating Terrorism); Combating Drugs; and Humanitarian Assistance. By engaging in these activities, the United States can strengthen deterrence, build U.S. influence, develop alliance cohesion, and contribute to the prevention of war.
(1) Guiding Principle. The guiding principle for U.S. involvement is deterrence. The primary responsibility for resolving inter-regional conflict lies with the host nation. Unless that nation is willing and able politically to solve its problems, no amount of U.S. assistance will ensure a lasting solution. The strategic environment is characterized by a mix of conditions and threats that can be dealt with only by a balanced application of the elements of national power: political, economic, diplomatic, and military. Strategies and plans must reflect U.S. national interests and be realistic in expectation. Planning should include national power options that, when directed by the NCA, permit rapid transition from periods of peace to conflict and back to peace.

(2) Planning Considerations. Planning for and conducting forward presence operations should consider the following:
(a) Primacy of the Political Element. Political objectives affect military planning at every level. Courses of action often slip outside traditional military doctrine.
(b) Unity of Effort. Efforts from other government agencies and host-nation institutions must be integrated and coordinated during OPLAN and CONPLAN development.
(c) Adaptability. The skill and willingness to modify doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, training, equipment, and organization are necessary for successful operations.
(d) Legitimacy. Legitimacy of the host nation is a central concern to all parties involved. Military contributions and operations should be designed to enhance the host nation's position and legitimacy.

(e) Perseverance. Civilian and military leaders may have to reject limited or short-term objectives and successes in favor of actions supporting long-term goals.
(f) Restricted Use of Force. ROEs will usually be more restrictive, more detailed, and subject to more political scrutiny than in other types of conflicts. Military force should only be employed to the extent necessary to solve the particular problem at hand.
(3) Forward Presence Operations. Detailed discussion of forward presence operations and planning guidance and considerations for security assistance, protecting U.S. citizens abroad (including NEO and combating terrorism), combating drugs, and humanitarian assistance are found in Annex O, Forward Presence Operations.
4.REGIONAL TASKS-SPECIFIC. Specific regional objectives, tasks, and apportionment of combat forces are listed below for each combatant command.

UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND (USCINCCENT)

1. OBJECTIVES. Objectives for USCENTCOM include the following:

a. Access to Strategic Resources. In coordination with U.S. allies and friendly nations in the region, ensure continued, unimpeded access to the petroleum reserves in the Persian Gulf. In particular, prevent any hostile power from gaining control or threatening closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

b. External Security of Friendly Regional States. Foster programs to improve the defense capabilities of friendly nations in the region through approved security assistance programs. Encourage the development of political and economic activities within, and cooperative security arrangements among, friendly nations in order to enhance regional stability. When directed, provide direct U.S. military assistance to deter attacks on or defend friendly nations from external threats.

c. Regional Support to US Policy. Increase in the nations of the region support for U.S. policies, diplomatic initiatives, and U.S. crisis actions, including those related to countering international drug trafficking, transnational terrorism, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Such support should encompass agreement by regional countries to U.S. and coalition partner access to bases, overflight rights, and, as appropriate, host nation support activities. Encourage the denial of such support to potential aggressors.

2. REGIONAL CONTINGENCY TASKS.

a. Regional Conflicts. Develop a series of OPLANs to provide direct U.S. military assistance to deter attacks on friendly countries and, in the event that deterrence fails, to defend them from external attack. Develop a series of CONPLANs to assist friendly countries in combating externally supported insurgency or subversion. Plans should reflect various levels of U.S. involvement from logistics support only; to support of host nation and regional forces by U.S. air, naval, and SOF forces; to the employment of major U.S. air, naval, and ground forces.

b. Security of the Strait of Hormuz. Develop an OPLAN to ensure the security of the Strait of Hormuz from control or interdiction by hostile powers. Such plans should ensure control of escalatory measures and avoid actions which undermine support of friendly nations.

c. Combat Terrorism. Develop a series of OPLANs for the employment of U.S. SOF forces directly against regional terrorist groups, and develop CONPLANs for supporting the counter-terrorism campaigns of friendly governments.

d. Lines of Communication. Conduct routine naval operations to ensure the freedom of navigation through international waterways in the region, with particular attention to the Bab el Mandeb and Suez Canal. Develop a series of CONPLANs to respond to attempts by hostile powers to curtail or stop freedom of navigation in vital international waterways.
e. Support to Peace Operations and Humanitarian Relief Activities. Develop CONPLANs to provide a range of indirect and direct U.S. military support for the conduct of international peacekeeping and humanitarian relief activities in the region.
f. Counter-Proliferation. CINC plans will include active and passive actions and requirements for effectively countering the military and political intimidation and warfighting activities of adversaries who possess weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems.
3. FORCE APPORTIONMENT BY CASE. Table V-3 indicates the apportionment of generic Service forces (Army, Navy, USMC, and Air Force). The generic quality of this table indicates the probability that specific Army divisons, CVBGs, MEFs and Air Force squadrons may not be available at the time of execution. However, in order to facilitate detailed planning and provide a basis for prioritizing training, Table V-3 is followed immediately by a listing of those forces identified for planning against the generic apportionment.

Table V-3

CENTCOM FORCES APPORTIONED FOR REGIONAL CONTINGENCY PLANNING

CENTCOM FORCES APPORTIONED FOR REGIONAL CONTINGENCY PLANNING