(C) THE GOVERNMENTS OF BOTH PACIFICA AND INDONESIA ARE EXPECTED TO PROVIDE NECESSARY ACCESS TO FACILITIES AND HOST NATION SUPPORT WHERE FEASIBLE.

(D) CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION PRECLUDES PREEMPTIVE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST SURRANESE FORCES WITHIN SURRAN OR IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS.

(E) MAJOR COMBAT FORCES ALLOCATED FOR PLANNING:

UNIT AVAILABILITY LOCATION

HQ I CORPS N+5 CONUS

HQ II CORPS N+5 CONUS

21 ID (L) (-) IN THEATER PACIFICA

1 X BDE 21 ID (L) N+7 HAWAII

4TH MX DIV N+6 CONUS

47TH AASLT DIV N+2 CONUS

209TH ACR(L) N+12 CONUS

2 AVN BDE N+4 CONUS

AWR-3 HVY BDE IN THEATER PACIFICA

62 FA BDE N+6 CONUS

63 FA BDE N+6 CONUS

64 FA BDE N+6 CONUS

2 ADA BDE N+8 CONUS

419 ADA BDE (THEATER) N+12 CONUS

42 CM BDE N+12 CONUS

489 THEATER CM BN N+12 CONUS

63 EN BDE N+8 CONUS

316 ENGINEER BDE (THEA SPT) N+24 CONUS

ENGR PORT CONST CO N+24 CONUS

EN BN (TOPO) N+16 CONUS

PRIME POWER BN N+10 CONUS

22 MI BDE N+6 CONUS

22 MP BDE N+8 CONUS

419 MP BDE N+24 CONUS

72 SIG BDE N+12 CONUS

417 SIGNAL BDE (THEA SPT) N+6 CONUS

TATSATCOM CO N+10 CONUS

CONT SIG CO N+4 HAWAII

SIG TELE BN (AREA) N+9 HAWAII

SIG BN (COMP) N+14 CONUS

SIG CO (TROPO LT) N+14 CONUS

SIG CO (TROPO HVY) N+14 CONUS

SIG CO (CMD OPS) N+14 CONUS

110 TSC (FWD) N+10 CONUS

2 COSCOM N+12 CONUS

84 MED BDE N+12 CONUS

2 FIN GRP N+8 CONUS

644 PER GROUP N+8 CONUS

8th SFG (-) IN THEATER PACIFICA

2/8TH SFG N+4 CONUS

3/8TH SFG N+4 CONUS

1-72 RGR BN N+4 CONUS

301 CA BDE N+12 CONUS

495 CA BN IN THEATER PACIFICA

27TH PSYOP GP N+4 CONUS

160TH SOAR (-) N+7 CONUS

NSWT UNIT 1-8 N+3 GUAM

16TH SOS N+3 OKINAWA

193 SOG N+7 CONUS

CVBG KITTYHAWK N+2 JAPAN

CVBG STENNIS IN THEATER EAST SULU SEA

CVBG CARL VINSON N+4 YELLOW SEA

CVBG ABRAHAM LINCOLN N+8 HAWAII

SAG MIDDLE EAST N+7 INDIAN OCEAN

SUB GROUP (9 X SSN) N+10 HAWAII/CONUS

UNDERWAY REP GRP N+10 HAWAII/CONUS

MINE COUNTERMINE GRP N+10 HAWAII/CONUS

ARG WASP IN THEATER EAST SULU SEA

ARG KEARSAGE IN THEATER EAST SULU SEA

ARG BELLEAU WOOD N+4 OKINAWA

ARG ESSEX N+4 OKINAWA

III MEF IN THEATER EAST SULU SEA

4th RLT IN THEATER EAST SULU SEA

MAG (COMPOSITE) N+4 OKINAWA

3rd FSSG (FWD) IN THEATER EAST SULU SEA

12TH AF N+7 CONUS

509TH BW N+10 CONUS

28TH BW N+14 CONUS

2 BW N+4 GUAM

64 FW N+14 CONUS

49 FW N+10 CONUS

1 FW W/ 2 SQDNS N+14 CONUS

4 FW W/ 2 SQDNS N+14 CONUS

335 W W/ 2 SQDNS N+20 CONUS

338 FW W /2 SQDS N+4 OKINAWA

20 FW N+4 OKINAWA

18 W N+l OKINAWA

(F). ONLY ONE MEF (F) HEADQUARTERS IS EXPECTED TO BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR EMPLOYMENT. COA DESCRIPTIONS MUST EXPLICITLY STATE REQUIREMENT FOR ADDITIONAL MARINE FORCES.

(G). ON THE GROUND STRENGTH OF US FORCES OPERATING WITHIN PACIFICA WILL NOT EXCEED 140,000 TOTAL PERSONNEL. THIS TOTAL IS INCLUSIVE OF OTHER US FORCES UNDER OPCON OF THE US JTF. THIS FORCE TOTAL DOES NOT INCLUDE THOSE SUPPORTING FORCES BASED OUTSIDE OF PACIFICA OR NAVAL PERSONNEL REMAINING AFLOAT. FORCES CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO USFORPAC IN SUPPORT OF THE UN PEACEKEEPING MISSION TO PACIFICA ARE EXPECTED TO BE PART OF THE SUBSEQUENT JTF AND ARE INCLUDED IN THE FORCE TOTAL. NO ADDITIONAL GROUND FORCES ARE AUTHORIZED FOR OPERATION IN INDONESIA. CONSIDERATION WILL BE GIVEN TO USE OF ADDITIONAL SOF, AIR AND NAVAL FORCES TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN INDONESIA. ALTHOUGH THE UNITED STATES WILL-NOT CONFIRM OR DENY US SUBMARINE OPERATIONS, US SUBMARINES WILL NOT ENTER SURRANIAN TERRITORIAL WATERS.

(H) USCINCPAC WILL PROVIDE AN ASSESSMENT OF FORCES AND STRATEGIC LIFT REQUIRED.

(I) THE FOLLOWING ASSUMPTIONS MAY AFFECT USPACOM PLANNING:

EASTLAND WILL NOT ENGAGE IN DIRECT MILITARY OPERATIONS; CHOSUN THEATER OF OPERATIONS WILL REMAIN INACTIVE UNTIL AT LEAST 1 SEPTEMBER 2000; JAPAN WILL ALLOW THE USE OF OKINAWA FOR STAGING AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OPERATIONS; AND THE CURRENTLY AUTHORIZED MINIMUM ESSENTIAL RESERVE COMPONENT CALL UP WILL REMAIN AUTHORIZED FOR THE DURATION OF OPERATION.

GENTEXT/MISSION/

2. WHEN DIRECTED, USCINCPAC DEPLOYS FORCES TO DEFEND US AND COALITION INTERESTS IN PACIFICA AND INDONESIA FROM SURRANIAN SPONSORED AGGRESSION, REESTABLISH SAFE PASSAGE FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE IN THE STRAITS OF MALACCA AND DETER FURTHER SR AGGRESSION TO MAINTAIN SECURITY AND STABILITY IN PACIFICA, INDONESIA, AND ADJACENT SEA LANES.

GENTEXT/EXECUTION/

3. COURSES OF ACTION. US OPERATIONS MAY INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING TASKS: ESTABLISH AIR SUPERIORITY IN THE REGION, OPEN AIR AND MAINTAIN AIR, SEA, AND GROUND LOCS; PROTECT AND DEFEND AIR AND SEA PORTS; CONDUCT SEA DENIAL OPERATIONS; PROTECT AND DEFEND ESSENTIAL PACIFICIA AND INDONESIA AND FRIENDLY STATES MILITARY AND CIVILIAN RESOURCES AND FACILITIES; CONDUCT DEPLOYMENT AND SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS; CONDUCT SHOW OF FORCE; CONDUCT NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS; CONDUCT JOINT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS TO DESTROY OR COMPEL WITHDRAWAL OF SURRANIAN FORCES FROM PACIFICIA TO RESTORE THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF PACIFICIA; ASSIST IN DESTRUCTION OF PIRATES AND DRUG TRAFFICKERS OPERATING IN THE STRAITS OF MALACCA; CONDUCT OTHER MILITARY OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED TO INCLUDE OPERATIONS AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION OPERATING WITHIN PACOM AOR; PERFORM SPECIAL INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS TO DISCREDIT SR MOTIVES IN ORDER TO UNDERMINE REGIONAL SUPPORT, AND CREATE A RIFT BETWEEN THEM AND PPF AND NNM; SUPPORT POST HOSTILITY OPERATIONS, AND PARTICIPATE IN FOLLOW ON PEACEKEEPING ROLE FOR AN UNSPECIFIED PERIOD.

(A) USCINCPAC.

(1) COORDINATE AND PREPARE COMMANDERS ESTIMATE AND COURSES OF ACTION AS REQUIRED TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS. DEVELOP AND COORDINATE PLANS ANTICIPATING A LEAD NATION ROLE IN A MULTINATIONAL FORCE; PROVIDE RECOMMENDED COMMAND STRUCTURE IN FUTURE PLANS. FORCE ALLOCATION FOR PLANNING AS STATED IN PARA 1E. COORDINATING AUTHORITY FOR ALL ASPECTS OF THIS PLAN IS GRANTED EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY. REVIEW OPTIONS AND PROVIDE JCS WITH ANTICIPATED INFORMATION OPERATIONS, PSYOP, INTELLIGENCE, CIVIL AFFAIRS, AND TARGETING CONCEPTS ASAP.

(2) THE III MEF(F) AND MPS RONS 2 & 3 SHIPPING IN USCINCPAC OPLAN 3220 ARE RELEASED FOR PARTICIPATION IN CINCPAC OPERATIONS.

(3) FDO PACKAGE 2, AS REFERENCED IN USCINCPAC MSG 022100ZJAN00, IS APPROVED FOR DEPLOYMENT.

(4) CINCPAC IS DIRECTED TO PLAN, AND WHEN DIRECTED, EXECUTE MILITARY OPERATIONS TO DETER FURTHER SR AGGRESSION, DEFEND US AND COALITION INTERESTS IN PACIFICA AND INDONESIA FROM SURRANIAN SPONSORED AGGRESSION, AND REESTABLISH SAFE PASSAGE FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE IN THE STRAITS OF MALACCA . BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS TO RESTORE THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF PACIFICA, DESTROY SURRANIAN WMD CAPABILITIES, AND DESTROY SURRANESE ABILITY TO PROJECT POWER IN ORDER TO REESTABLISH AND PROMOTE SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE REGION.

(B) USCINCACOM. PROVIDE ONE ARG AND EMBARKED MEU TO USCINCPAC WHEN DIRECTED.

(C) USCINCSPACE. PROVIDE SPACE SUPPORT AS REQUIRED. COORDINATE SPACE CAMPAIGN WITH USCINCPAC.

(D) USCINCSOC. PROVIDE SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED IN USCINCPAC OPLAN .

(E) USCINCTRANS.

(1) PLAN FOR EARLY DEFENSE COURIER SERVICE INVOLVEMENT AND PLAN TO PROVIDE HIGHEST PRIORITY MOVEMENT OF QUALIFIED MATERIAL DURING THIS OPERATION.

(2) PROVIDE PRELIMINARY DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATE AND FORCE CLOSURE PROFILES TO USCINCPAC UPON REQUEST.

(3) PREPARE TO SUPPORT DEPLOYING FORCES AS REQUIRED IN TPFDD DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES.

(F) DIRNSA. PROVIDE SIGINT SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.

(G) DIA. PROVIDE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.

(H) OPSEC AND DECEPTION GUIDANCE.

(1) OPSEC. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT FORCE MOVEMENTS WILL GENERATE A GREAT DEAL OF INTEREST FROM POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES. HOSTILE COLLECTION ASSETS WILL BE ACTIVE, AND OPSEC PROCEDURES THROUGHOUT PLANNING AND EXECUTION ARE IMPERATIVE. VIGOROUS OPSEC WILL BE CONDUCTED TO PROTECT THE FORCE AND MASK THE TRUE INTENTION OF ALL FORCES. AT A MINIMUM THE FOLLOWING MEASURES WILL BE INCORPORATED: COMPUTER SECURITY SURVEY OPERATIONS AND EMPLOYMENT OF REACTION TEAMS AND PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES TO PROTECT CRITICAL C4I.

(2) DECEPTION. CINCPAC DEVELOPED DECEPTION OPERATIONS WILL SUPPORT US NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN TERMS OF MAINTAINING EASTLAND NONINTERFERENCE AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC, DIPLOMATIC, AND MILITARY COOPERATION WITH THE US.

4. THE SITUATION ON THE CHOSUN PENINSULA CONTINUES TO BE UNCERTAIN. DESPITE THE RECENT RELAXATION OF TENSIONS THE NCA CONTINUES TO STRESS THE CRITICALITY OF OUR EFFORTS THERE TO DETER NORTH CHOSUN AGGRESSION. FORCES ALREADY POSITIONED IN CHOSUN WILL REMAIN FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. LOGISTICAL STOCKS POSITIONED IN GUAM AND OKINAWA MAY BE CONSIDERED FOR USE IN PACIFICA BUT WILL NOT BE RELEASED WITHOUT CJCS APPROVAL.

5. PSYOP GUIDANCE

(A) PSYOP GUIDANCE. OPERATIONS WILL SUPPORT US NATIONAL INTERESTS OF LONG TERM SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE REGION. MILITARY PSYOP WILL COMPLEMENT OTHER NATIONAL AND FRIENDLY INFORMATIONAL ACTIVITIES FOCUSED ON SOVEREREIGN RIGHTS OF INDONESIA AND PACIFICA, NECESSITY FOR SR TO CEASE AGGRESSION, PREVENTION OF ANY USE OF WMD, AND FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION THROUGHOUT THE REGION.

(B) STRATEGIC PSYOP OBJECTIVES

(1) DETER EASTLAND FROM INTERVENING IN CONFLICT.

(2) DETER SURRANIAN ATTACK AGAINST US OR COALITION FORCES PRIOR TO US COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES.

(3) DETER SURRAN’S DEPLOYMENT OR USE OF WMD.

(4) MAINTAIN INTERNATIONAL UNITY OPPOSED TO SURRANIAN AGGRESSION.

(5) MAINTAIN REGIONAL SUPPORT FOR US FUTURE PRESNECE AND ENGAGEMENT IN REGION.

(6) INFLUENCE EARLY CESSATION OF SURRANIAN HOSTILITIES AND SUPPORT TO INSURGENCIES AND PIRACY UNDER CONDITIONS FAVORABLE TO US AND COALITION INTERESTS.

(C) CINCPAC. PROVIDE RECOMMENDED OPERATIONAL PSYOP OBJECTIVES AND THEMES TO STRESS OR AVOID FOR ASSESSMENT AND INCLUSION IN SUBSEQUENT NCA DIRECTION.

6. INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE:

(A) INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT USCINCPAC WILL BE PROVIDED UNDER SEPARATE MESSAGE.

(B) DIRDIA WILL REDIRECT NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND COMMUNICATIONS ASSETS TO SUPPORT USCINCPAC.

(C) SIGINT OPERATIONAL TASKING AUTHORITY REMAINS WITH DIRNSA.

(D) USCINCPAC WILL PROVIDE LIST OF ADDITIONAL ASSETS REQUIRED TO ACCOMPLISH TASKS.

7. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE:

(A) ALL SERVICES WILL PROVIDE CI ELEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED IN USCINCPAC OPLAN .

(B) CI LIAISON RESPONSIBILITIES IS DELEGATED TO USCINCPAC.

(C) USCINCPAC WILL PROVIDE CI COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS TO DIA.

8. CIVIL AFFAIRS GUIDANCE.

(A) CA OBJECTIVES

(1) FACILITATE MILITARY OPERATIONS BY ENSURING THAT CIVILIANS DO NOT INTERFERE WITH OPERATIONS.

(2) ASSIST COMMAND COMPLIANCE OF LEGAL AND MORAL OBLIGATIONS TOWARD PROTECTING AND CARING FOR THE LOCAL CIVILIAN POPULACE NEEDS DUE TO MILITARY ACTIVITIES.

(3) SUPPORT HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS ON A NONINTERFERENCE BASIS WITH COMBAT OPERATIONS.

(4) COORDINATE SUPPORT FOR RESTORATION OF BASIC SERVICES IN PACIFICA WITH APPROPRIATE AGENCIES.

(B) CA OPERATION CONSIDERATIONS

(1) OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS. AUTHORITY TO COMMIT US FORCES IN SUPPORT OF CA PROJECTS OTHER THAN SUPPORTING CA OBJECTIVES NOTED ABOVE IS RETAINED AT CINCPAC LEVEL. AUTHORITY WILL NOT BE DELEGATED WITH OUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF CJCS.

(2) TRANSPORTATION PRIORITY. IAW CINCPAC PLANNING REQUIREMENTS.

(3) COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS. CINCPAC WILL ESTABLISH LIAISON WITH THE US AMBASSADOR TO PACIFICA AND INDONESIA AS WELL AS THE PACIFICAN AND INDONESIAN MOD TO IDENTIFY AND COORDINATE CA REQUIREMENTS.

9. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

(A) TENTATIVE M-DAY. FULL MOBILIZATION OF FORCES IS NOT ANTICIPATED.

(B) TENTATIVE C-DAY. TBD. EXPECTED TO FOLLOW IMMEDIATELY ON APPROVAL OF CINCPAC COMMANDERS ESTIMATE. SUPPORTING AND SUPPORTED COMMANDS DEPLOYMENT AND MOVEMENT DATA ARE REQUIRED TO USTRANSCOM BY 070400Z FEB 00.

(C) ANTICIPATED D-DAY. TBD. EXPECTED TO BE NET 10 FEBRUARY 00.

(D) ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATION. IN EXCESS OF 30 DAYS, NO MORE THAN 270 DAYS.

(E) DEFCON AND DEPLOYABILITY POSTURE. AS DETERMINED BY USCINCPAC.

(F) KNOWN OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS.

(1) IAW WITH EAST ISLE- EASTLAND AGREEMENT, US FORCES WILL NOT OPERATE WITHIN 25 NM OF EAST ISLE.

(2) CHOSUN REMAINS THEATER PRIORITY. FORCES ALREADY POSITIONED IN CHOSUN WILL NOT BE REPOSITIONED WITHOUT NCA APPROVAL.

(3) THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN HAS RESTRICTED USE OF OKINAWA AND OTHER JAPANESE BASES TO SUPPORT OF COALITION LOGISTICAL OPERATIONS. COMBAT FORMATIONS MAY USE THESE BASES FOR TRANSIT TO THE DESIGNATED JOA BUT MAY NOT ORIGINATE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS FROM THEM. OPERATIONS WITH A DEFENSIVE INTENT SUCH AS NAVAL OR AERIAL CONVOY ESCORT WILL BE AUTHORIZED ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS WITH JAPANESE MOD LIAISON IN OKINAWA.

(G) PEACETIME ROE REMAIN IN EFFECT FOR FORCES OUTSIDE OF JOA ESTABLISHED BY CINCPAC. CURRENT USCINCPAC ROE FOR US FORCES IN UNFORPAC REMAIN IN EFFECT AND ARE EXTENDED TO ALL FORCES ENTERING INTO PACIFICA. OPERATION SPECIFIC ROE ARE UNDER REVIEW AND WILL BE PUBLISHED SEPARATELY.

(H) SUPPORTING COMMANDERS WILL COORDINATE AND MONITOR DEPLOYMENTS AS REQUIRED BY SUPPORTED COMMANDER.

(I) UNITS MOVE WITH APPROPRIATE MISSION-ORIENTED PROTECTIVE POSTURE (MOPP) GEAR.

(J) NO FORCES WILL DEPLOY WITHOUT NCA APPROVAL.

(K) DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED.//

GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

10. TRANSPORTATION

(A) AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY. 1B1.

(B) ALLOCATION OF STRATEGIC LIFT RESOURCES IS FOR INITIAL PLANNING, SUBJECT TO FURTHER REFINEMENTS IN PLANNING, ALERT, DEPLOYMENT, AND EXECUTE ORDERS.

(1) GENERAL. PARTIAL MOBILIZATION WAS AUTHORIZED ON 10 DEC 98 IN SUPPORT OF CINCPAC OPLAN 2323 (DEFENSE OF SOUTH CHOSUN). AIRLIFT PLANNING WAS BASED ON USTRANSCOM PLUS CRAF STAGE II. SEALIFT PLANNING WAS BASED ON USTRANSCOM CONTROLLED FLEET PLUS THE RRF AND SELECTIVE REQUISITIONING OF US FLAG MERCHANT MARINE OVER AND ABOVE THE RRF.

(2) AIRLIFT. SUPPORTED CINC USCINCPAC MAY CONTINUE TO PLAN ON JSCP SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTION 3110.11 (MOBILITY) APPORTIONMENT UNDER "WITHOUT DECLARATION OF EMERGENCY, PRESIDENTIAL SELECTIVE RESERVE CALLUP (PSRC), AND PARTIAL MOBILIZATION", CUMULATIVELY.

(3) SEALIFT. SUPPORTED CINC USCINCPAC MAY CONTINUE TO PLAN ON JSCP SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTION 3110.11 (MOBILITY) APPORTIONMENT UNDER "WITHOUT DECLARATION OF EMERGENCY, PRESIDENTIAL SELECTIVE RESERVE CALLUP (PSRC), AND PARTIAL MOBILIZATION, CUMULATIVELY.

(4) THE JOINT TRANSPORTATION BOARD (JTB) HAS DETERMINED THAT TOTAL AIR AND SEA-LIFT CAPABILITY MUST BE ALLOCATED TO SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS IN OTHER THEATERS AND TO MAINTAIN ESSENTIAL LOCS PER SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTION 3110.11 (MOBILITY).

(C) FUNDING FOR TRANSPORTATION COSTS WILL NOT BE PROVIDED BY THE JOINT STAFF. ALL REQUESTS FOR TRANSPORTATION WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH DOD 4500.32R, MILSTD 4P. PARENT SERVICES OF DEPLOYING UNITS MUST PROVIDE FUND CITES FOR MOVEMENT. USTRANSCOM MAY PLAN ON NCA DECISION RESPONSE TO STRATEGIC WARNING WITH SUFFICIENT LEAD TIME TO RESPOND TO CINCS PRE C-DAY MOVEMENT REQUIREMENTS BEGINNING AT C-2 WITH PARTIALLY MOBILIZED LIFT ASSETS AND PERSONNEL.

11. JOPES WILL BE USED TO DEVELOP COA. COORDINATE WITH THE JNOCC FUNCTIONAL MANAGER IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT APPROPRIATE JOPES SITES (TO INCLUDE NMCC) ARE ON NETWORK DISTRIBUTION FOR EACH COA PID.

12. FORCE ACTIVITY DESIGNATOR (FAD) WILL BE ISSUED BY THE APPROPRIATE SERVICES.

13. KNOWN LOGISTICS CONSTRAINTS

(A) STRATEGIC AIRLIFT AND SEALIFT ARE ADEQUATE TO PROVIDE TIMELY SUPPORT TO DEPLOYMENT AND SUSTAINMENT REQUIREMENTS.

(B) SOME SUSTAINMENT COMMODITIES, ESPECIALLY HIGH-TECHNOLOGY WEAPONS, ARE IN SHORT SUPPLY. LOGISTICAL STOCKS POSITIONED OUTSIDE OF CHOSUN AT THEATER STOCKAGE SITES TO SUPPORT POSSIBLE CHOSUN CONTINGENCIES ARE DEEMED AVAILABLE AND SHOULD BE USED FOR PLANNING IN SUPPORT OF PACIFICA OPERATIONS. CINCPAC IS AUTHORIZED TO RELEASE HIGH TECHNOLOGY WEAPONS AND SUPPORTING AMMUNITION AND SPARE PARTS PREVIOUSLY DESIGNATED FOR CHOSUN ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS.

(C) EXPANSION OF THE INDUSTRIAL BASE IS NOT VIABLE IN THE SHORT TERM, ESPECIALLY ON PARTIALLY MOBILIZED FOOTING.

(D) LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR PARTICIPATING COALITION NATIONS IS TBD. PRIMARY LOGISTICAL SUPPORT IS EXPECTED TO BE A NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. HOWEVER, IN THEATER LOGISTICAL CONCEPT SHOULD ALLOW FOR US TO ASSUME LEAD NATION ROLE FOR COMMON CRITICAL LOG FUNCTIONS AND COMMODITY SUPPLY.

14. PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT CRITERIA. ESSENTIAL UNIT MESSING IS AUTHORIZED FOR PERSONNEL ATTACHED, ASSIGNED, OR SERVING IN A TEMPORARY DUTY OR TRAVEL STATUS.

15. CODE WORD ASSIGNED THIS OPERATION IS STARSITE.

16. REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. USCINCPAC IS AUTHORIZED TO USE OPREP-1 REPORTING PROCEDURES, AS REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH JOINT PUBS 1-03.8 AND 6-04. AFTER COMPLETION OF THE OPERATION, SUBMIT DETAILED AFTER ACTIONS REPORTS TO CJCS IN ACCORDANCE WITH JOINT PUB 1-03.30 AND CJCS MOP 53.

17. CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH USCINCPAC OPLAN 2324.

18. PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

(A) PUBLIC RELEASE OF INFORMATION ABOUT THIS OPERATION IS NOT AUTHORIZED UNTIL FINAL APPROVAL HAS BEEN GIVEN BY OASD (PA). PUBLIC AND NEWS MEDIA INQUIRIES CONCERNING THIS OPERATION SHOULD BE TAKEN AND REFERRED TO THE DIRECTOR FOR PA, OASD. AFTER DUTY HOURS, CONTACT THE DOD PUBLIC AFFAIRS DUTY OFFICER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION, OASD(PA). DURING REGULAR DUTY HOURS, CALL DSN 222-J567 , OR COMMERCIAL AT THE SAME NUMBER (RECORDED MESSAGE WILL PROVIDE CELLULAR PHONE NUMBER OF DUTY OFFICER) OR CONTACT THE NMCC, DSN 222-J987 OR COMMERCIAL AT 009-J3498 AND 009-J3400, RESPECTIVELY).

(B) ANTICIPATED PUBLIC AFFAIRS APPROACH WILL BE ACTIVE ONCE CLEARANCE IS GIVEN BY OASD.

(C) PROVIDE INTERIM PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE VIA SEPARATE MESSAGE TO OASD(PA). IN GENERAL THE INTERIM PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE WILL INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

(1) A PROPOSED SHORT STATEMENT (GENERAL IN NATURE) WITH RELATED QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, AS APPROPRIATE.

(2) A PUBLIC AFFAIRS SITUATION AND ANALYSIS REPORT. THIS SECTION OF THE INTERIM GUIDANCE SHOULD PROVIDE THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER’S ASSESSMENT REGARDING) REQUIREMENTS FOR INTERNAL INFORMATION AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS ACTIVITIES.

19. COMBAT CAMERA. THIS OPERATION WILL BE DOCUMENTED TO THE MAXIMUM PRACTICABLE EXTENT BY JOINT COMBAT CAMERA AND PARTICIPATING MILITARY SERVICE COMBAT CAMERA FORCES.

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/

20. COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE. WHERE CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS RESOURCES ARE NOT SATISFIED BY AUGMENTING OR SUPPORTING JOINT ELEMENTS, USCINCPAC WILL VALIDATE AND FORWARD REQUIREMENTS FOR CJCS-CONTROLLED TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS ASSETS IN ACCORDANCE WITH CJCS MOP 3. BECAUSE OF LIMITED SATELLITE CAPACITY, USCINCPAC WILL BE PREPARED TO RECOMMEND RELATIVE PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATE CHANNELS AND CIRCUITS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS OPERATION, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE SUPPORTING COMMANDERS.

21. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS.

(A) USCINCPACOM IS THE SUPPORTED CINC. USCINCEUR, USCINCACOM, USCINCSPACE, USCINCTRANS, USCINCSO, USCINCSOC, AND USCINCSTRAT ARE SUPPORTING COMMANDERS. COMACC IS A SUPPORTING RESOURCE MANAGER. NSA, DMA, DISA, AND DIA ARE SUPPORTING AGENCIES. THE NCA APPROVED COMMAND RELATIONSHIP WILL BE DETAILED IN SUBSEQUENT MESSAGES

(B) OPERATION TO BE CONDUCTED JOINTLY IN COOPERATION WITH THE ARMED FORCES OF PACIFICA, INDONESIA, AND OTHER COALITION NATIONS. ANTICIPATE PACIFICA WILL RETAIN FULL COMMAND OF PACIFICAN FORCES WITHIN THE MANILA MILITARY DISTRICT. DETAILS OF MULTINATIONAL COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS TO BE DETERMINED BETWEEN CINCPAC, NCA, AND PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES.

(C) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS FOR PARTICIPATING COALITION FORCES WILL BE DETERMINED ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS WITH THE SOURCE GOVERNMENT. ALL NON-US FORCES ARE EXPECTED TO PASS TACON TO THE COMMANDER, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCES IF ESTABLISHED.

(D) SPECIFIC DATES FOR TOA OF THE PACIFICA AOR FROM UNFORPAC TO THE PROJECTED MULTINATIONAL TASK FORCE IS TBD BUT IS EXPECTED TO BE NLT 7 DAYS AFTER PASSAGE OF EXPECTED UNSC RESOLUTIONS AUTHORIZING MILITARY ACTION IN PACIFICA. IDENTITY OF THOSE NATIONS CURRENTLY PARTICIPATING IN UNFORPAC WHO WILL BE ASSIGNED TO THE SUBSEQUENT MULTI-NATIONAL TASK FORCE IS UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME. OTHER NATIONAL CONTINGENTS MAY REQUIRE EXTRACTION SUPPORT SHOULD THEY NOT JOIN THE COALITION.

AKNLDG/Y//