Camp Smith, HI

041200 Feb 00



1. Surran, PPF, NNM.

a. General:

1) I believe that Surran will act in a manner as to meet four objectives in the following priority:

- Protect Surranian territorial sovereignty

- Preserve his military power projection capabilities

- Secure the autonomy of the Southern Pacifica islands and northern Sumatra as part of a greater Surran

- Support operations to overthrow the governments of Pacifica and Indonesia

2) PPF-NNM actions are focused more on anti-current regime feelings than on pro-Surranian desires. I believe their priorities are:

- Economic growth

- Autonomy

- Wealth

b. The absence of authority in the Straits of Malacca has created an environment of rampant acts of piracy. The pirates and their vessels have been frequently provided safe haven in Surran and northern Sumatra. The pirates also enjoy a known but unverified financial support arrangement with the NNM. Eastland has expressed growing concern over the piracy situation and may intervene if the piracy continues. Continued Surranian support to this piracy will threaten Surran’s main effort in Pacifica by affording the international community an additional issue on which they may unite against Surranian aggression. Thus, this support is not in Surran’s best interests as alluded to in the priorities I noted above. I envision that we can control this piracy quickly with a minimum of force.

c. Surranian and PPF action in Pacifica is our greatest short to mid term threat. While political considerations have allowed the Surranian amphibious landings to occur without interference from our Stennis battle group in theater, our forward deployed naval forces have been on scene monitoring and surveilling the Surranian activities. Despite these Surranian landings along the northern coast of Luzon signalling the beginning of what we believe to be a Corps sized force deployment, I believe that the enemy’s most likely COA when confronted by a united international force will be to conduct a defense in place and hope for a diplomatic solution that extends Surranian influence into northern Luzon. This should serve as the basis for our planning.

Although the enemy seems committed to avoiding an early and direct clash with Pacifican and coalition forces, they retain the capability to reinforce their initial forces through amphibious operations in vicinity of the Lingayen Gulf with second echelon forces from Surran. Likewise, they still retain the capability to conduct some form of preemptive action prior to the arrival of US air and heavy ground forces. Our planning must acknowledge both of these potential branches and account for them. In summary, as put forth in our OPREP 3, I believe:

1) That Surran can conduct limited air attacks on UNFORPAC and Pacifican forces immediately.

2) That Surran can move to and attack UNFORPAC or Pacifican forces with one division and supporting air and naval forces by 3 Mar.

3) That Surran can build up, move and attack through UNFORPAC toward Manila with up to a corps size force with supporting air and naval forces and refitted and trained PRA forces by 25 April.

4) That the SPM can continue to conduct level I and II rear area attacks on UNFORPAC and Pacifican forces and infrastructure. Surranian support can increase this capability to level III threat by 1 Apr.

c. In Indonesia, given Surran’s decision to deploy major combat forces to Pacifica, I believe the enemy’s most likely COA is to support the NNM’s defense of northern Sumatra with a limited effort. I believe Surran will try to make it appear that this effort is as robust as the one in Pacifica and that the NNM and Surran will have the ability to conduct both offensive and extensive defensive operations. This will be an attempt to divert our attention and forces from Pacifica. I believe the NNM insurgency, while a continuing problem, must not overshadow our number one priority which is resolving the Straits of Malacca issue to prevent Eastland from moving into the area, nor our number two priority which is resolving the issue of Surranian aggression in Pacifica.

d. Vulnerabilities.

1) With the ongoing operations in Pacifica and Indonesia, and their covert support to the transnational criminal operations (TCO) in the Straits of Malacca, Surran is vulnerable to national level C2 disruption and continued support to the operations.

2) The large force deployment to Pacifica is vulnerable to LOC disruption and isolation from air and naval support.

3) I believe the Surranian-PPF and Surranian-NNM alliances are extremely vulnerable to defeat in detail. Our campaign design should use all means available to separate and isolate various elements of the enemy coalitions both physically and psychologically as a first step in the operation. Secondly, we should be quick to exploit the imbalance created by their lack of an integrated command structure and our overwhelming advantages in operational mobility, information operations, and systems lethality. A rapid, joint campaign simultaneously attacking enemy decisive points offers the best option for quickly meeting our objectives.

2. Pacifica. The Pacifican government is clearly overwhelmed by the SPN, PRA, and Surranian actions. While needing international military and non-military assistance, they view U.S. and other countries’ force intervention as possibly injurious in the long term to Pacifican sovereignity sensitivities. We have to be sensitive to their concerns as we develop a multinational organizational concept, ROE, and operational concepts.

3. Eastland. Clearly a regional competitor with the greatest long term threat to our interests in the region. We need to preempt her involvement in the situation by rapid action with clear objectives, and continuous dialogue at the national and theater level.

4. Coalition partners.

a. Nations I currently see as possible coalition partners in Pacifica are: Malaysia, Thailand, South Chosun, Australia, Germany, Great Britain, and France. I expect that the TCNs for the Malaysian, Thai, and South Chosun brigades currently in UNFORPAC will transfer those units to the coalition effort, albeit with certain warfighting restrictions due to their current reduction of warfighting training during the UNFORPAC mission.

b. Many of the regional TCNs will likely be caught between whole-hearted intervention on behalf of Pacifica and Indonesia and their fear of incurring the wrath of Eastland or post-conflict Surran. None are extremely close in personal or governmental cooperation with Pacifica. However, all share mistrust of Surran’s future intentions in the region and of the long term threat posed by Eastland. They also share, in varying degrees, skepticism toward the U.S. will to exert leadership and committment of military force in the region.

c. They also realize that any sign of weakness toward limiting Surranian expansionist actions will only encourage future Surranian and Eastland expansionistic action. The NCA and I believe they will form a coalition under the umbrella of UN resolve, and permit the US to assume lead nation status.

d. This regional coalition will likely be fragile and could be weakened by excessive casualties to either coalition or enemy forces, excessive destruction caused by coalition forces in terms of necessity or proportionality, or any public display of unilateral U.S. leadership in the coalition.


1. Strategic Objective: Cessation of Surranian military action in Pacifica and Indonesia. Peace, prosperity, and greater cooperation among the nations of Indonesia, Pacifica, and Surran that embrace the values of representative governance, market economics, and respect for fundamental human rights.

2. Military Conditions:

- secure maritime environment allowing for freedom of navigation through the Straits of Malacca.

- absence of Surranian military forces in Pacifica,

- absence of Surranian ability to project significant conventional force external to Surran,

- and a secure environment in Pacifica and Indonesia that facilitates both their governments’ and other international organizations’ activities to resolve the long term sources of conflict and bring stability to the region.

3. Centers of Gravity.

a. Enemy: I believe the Surranian strategic center of gravity is their desire for a greater Surran due to its tremendous economic potential. Some decisive points the NCA and we should consider are the legitimacy of her expansionist activities (and its effect on her international standing), the Surran-Eastland close relationship, the Surranian relationship with insurgent and rebel leadership in Pacifica and Indonesia, Surran’s power projection capability, and Surran’s economic and criminal activities which provide the funds for the destabilizing and expansion activities. At the operational level, I see Surran’s navy and air power as her center of gravity during initial seizure/landing operations as they provide the means to project power forward into the region. Once set however, with a corps size force in Pacifica, Surran’s operational center of gravity becomes the corps force on the ground. Decisive points at the operational level are the mech force in the corps, C2, linkage with the SPM and PRA, and air and naval support in terms of both sustainment and combat support.

b. Coalition: I believe our friendly centers of gravity and decisive points may shift as the operation continues. Obviously, at the strategic level, our coalition alliance and legitimacy of the effort are important. At the operational level, our LOCs and force projection capability is our center of gravity as we build up forces. Once hostilities begin, I believe our air and naval power will be our operational center of gravity as they provide the ability to shield us from Surranian conventional and asymmetric attacks and provide the combat capability to rapidly paralyze Surranian ground forces. As we stabilize the post-conflict situation, our ground forces will become our center of gravity as they are the force that can provide the security for other conflict resolution activities to occur. Address how we will protect our centers of gravity as we progress through the campaign. These protection efforts may be so important as to warrant identification as theater strategic or operational objectives.

5. Draft Mission Statement. When directed, USCINCPAC forces withdrawal or destroys Surranian forces on Pacifica and defeats her future military capability to threaten and destabilize the regional environment in the Straits of Malacca, Pacifica, and Indonesia in order to provide a peaceful and stable environment conducive to our national interests and those of our friends.

6. Initial Planning Intent. While current political considerations prevent us from taking positive action to stop the ongoing Surranian deployment of forces, we need to capitalize on the naval forces already in theater to monitor enemy forces and serve as the initial combat power to enable, and protect, our air and ground force deployment. I want to rapidly deploy forces and C2 into theater to first, ensure free rights of navigation through the Straits of Malacca and preempt possible Eastland intervention, and second, deter Surran from interfering with our force buildup in Pacifica while diplomatic efforts continue. If diplomacy and military show of force fails to force the withdrawal of Surranian forces from Pacifica, we must be prepared to destroy Surranian forces in Pacifica while we simultaneously defeat their ability to project power in the region. These military actions must set the conditions for successful Pacifican and Indonesian counterinsurgency operations, national reunification, and stable governments. I expect to continue to respect and support Australia’s leadership in international support activities to the government of Indonesia. I do not foresee the need to deploy additional ground forces to Indonesia. Throughout, we must be prepared to support an MTW in Chosun, if necessary relegating Pacifican operations to an economy of force operation.


1. General. Based on analysis of these centers of gravity, required military conditions, and the strategic aim of this campaign, your COAs should first identify the theater strategic objectives we must attain, and further identify, in conjunction with the JTF planners, the operational objectives for the Pacifican operation. Once this is accomplished we must carefully look at how we will sequence operations in the Straits of Malacca, Pacifica, and Indonesia to attain these objectives to achieve our military conditions. While the COAs should address operations in the straits and Indonesia, focus the COAs (and their differences) on operations on Pacifica and against Surranian force projection capabilities. As we plan for deployment of forces into the theater, balance the requirements for combat and logistical forces carefully as this is one of our critical decisions. As we develop our C2 concept, look closely at how we organize our forces to ensure our command relationships are optimized and allow for multinational and interagency operations. Your COAs should all consider at a minimum the establishment of a US-led, multinational force to control operations on Pacifica and whatever area external to Pacifica that you believe necessary.

2. Operational Concept:

a. Operational Phasing.

1) General. With the tyranny of distance in the Pacifican theater, I see the campaign requiring some degree of phasing to attain our objectives. I see the operation in Straits of Malacca being executed first as we build up forces in Pacifica, then Pacifica, and upon destruction of the Surranian power projection capabilities and withdrawal of forces in northern Luzon, priority shifting to Indonesia. However, political and military factors will restrain the overall length of the campaign to at most 120-180 days from beginning of deployment to redeployment of main combat formations out of Pacifica.

2) I need recommendations on how to phase the operation. What can we do simultaneously, and what must we arrange sequentially? Focus the COAs around the concept of operations addressing the Pacifican situation; the straits and Indonesia can be addressed within this overarching campaign plan for Pacifica. Give me different options on how to achieve the military conditions. Look both at a COA employing the threat or use of significant air and naval power to attain the conditions, another relying on a significant ground force, and the third, possibly a combination of both. Consider structuring all the COAs in terms of a prehostilities phase, a lodgment phase, a decisive combat and stabilization phase, a follow through phase, and a post hostilities and redeployment phase. Ensure that we attain air and maritime superiority early on to support our power protection and maintain our freedom of action.

3) Key to your phasing description are the military conditions that must be attained prior to transitioning to the next phase. Clearly identify the "setting the conditions" for each phase.

b. I do not expect UN formal approval for action in Straits of Malacca. Self Defense pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Charter provides ample justification for military action against the piracy. Look at the formation of a naval TF to unilaterally, if necessary, secure passage for international commerce in the straits.

c. Expect initiation of combat operations in Pacifica to commence soon after the date to be set by the UN as the deadline for Surranian forces to withdraw from Pacifica. I see a need to rapidly attack key targets on Surran at the outset of decisive combat -- particularly ports and airfields - it’s better to shoot the archer than defend against arrows... This has significant force protection ramifications. Give me your recommendations on this and other issues for the NCA to recommend for inclusion in the UN resolutions to ensure our military considerations remain tied into UN and other activities.

d. Do not plan for US ground operations in Pacifica external to the island of Luzon except for SOF specific missions. The SF advisory assistance activities on Mindanao remain an important economy of force operation as we focus our conventional forces against the Surranian conventional threat. I do not want additional ground forces of any type operating in Indonesia or the commitment of any ground forces to Surran. To counter the NNM in Indonesia, I see the continued support of the ASEAN sponsored Australian-led force.

e. I’m very concerned about the safety and status of UN military personnel and civilians that could be detained by hostile forces. I want to have the capability to rapidly respond to any incident where the safety of any US, UN, coalition, or HRO is threatened. Your planning should address extraction of personnel at risk prior to the deadline that the UN sets. If they can’t be extracted, consider steps necessary to protect them until we can effect a link up.

f. Plan to exploit the presence of JTF511 in Pacifica to facilitate Information Operations in the JOA. I believe this to be vital in convincing the enemy not to interfere with our deployment, reducing armed opposition when we execute offensive operations, rallying Pacifican public support to their government’s and our cause, and to facilitate our transition operations. Plan to deploy these capabilities into the JOA ahead of much of our combat capabilities. Additionally, I see the JTF511 transitioning to a subordinate JSOTF under the overall JFC. We have to ensure that he optimizes the HUMINT capabilities of both the Pacifican special operations forces and ours to get us a good picture on enemy force dispositions and on those Pacifican rebels and insurgents who may be considering abandoning their antigovernment positions.

g. Force protection is key to continued coalition unity and mission accomplishment. Force protection planning must be an integrated, upfront portion of all of our planning efforts. We must be able to simultaneously deploy and protect the force - both U.S. forces and those of our coalition partners.

h. ROE. I have looked at the draft ROE for this operation. Relook it and coordinate with the JCS and our coalition partners. We must ensure the ROE supports our operational concept while addressing the political realities of working within a coalition. Key pieces of this ROE will be restrictions against targeting withdrawing Surranian forces from Pacifica, and on the type of targeting we allow against targets on Surran and fixed infrastructure on Pacifica. I see a need to rapidly attack key targets on Surran at the outset of decisive combat -- particularly ports and airfields. This has significant force protection ramifications.

i. Success of our information operations is key to the success of our operational design. Ensure all planning includes support for coalition forces operating within the theater of operations. This is critically important as you develop COAs for Indonesia.

2. Logistics Concept:

a. As stated earlier, I see our LOCs and PODs as our operational center of gravity initially. This requires us to do three things. One, get them established quickly. Two, ensure that we adequately provide for their protection and security. Three, ensure that our planning includes alternate routing should we lose a given facility or develop a backlog in flow.

b. As we look at our priorities for deployment in more detail, ensure we balance our combat forces with up front deployment of RSOI enablers. We may have to accept some risk to our logistical enablers to achieve our desired deployment schedule. Look for ways to minimize this risk.

c. Priorities for support must align with the phases of the operation. In the initial phases I see the priority as receiving personnel and supplies, moving them to forward assembly areas with equipment, and building initial levels of stocks to support subsequent phases. In the later combat phases, priority must be to supporting the committed forces with fuel, ammunition, medical support and maintenance of equipment. In the post hostilities and redeployment phase priority of support should shift to follow-on forces with fuel, medical support, maintenance, and replacements.

d. I’ll need your recommendation on the Service Component Title X concept for support. Focus on the Army SCC and whether those TSC assets will remain under his control, be directly subordinate to the subordinate JFC, or to the Army Force Commander in the JOA.

e. Timely and preventive medical support is one of my highest priorities through all phases of the operation and is key to force protection as well. Host nation hospitals and supplies are not available for our use, therefore the early introduction and adequacy of US medical support is a key planning function. Plan for support to the coalition and allied forces.

f. USCINCPAC’s logistical priority must remain with forces committed to Chosun. I am not willing to reposition logistical units already deployed to Chosun. I will consider the use of supplies currently located in forward ISBs on a case by case basis.

g. With the current supply constraints I see us establishing a CSR for select Class V and PGMs. Ensure the JTF’s plans allows for the use of these key items when and where they can be used decisively.

3. Deployment Concept:

a. I see the earliest possible arrival of our air and augmenting naval force capabilities as key to our ability to deter enemy offensive action, stabilize the situation in Pacifica, and protect our force projection. The OPREP 3 provides additional background on deployment planning.

b. Our force packages should be capable of rapid transition from deploying to security and employment. I see the joint force in the whole as being a simultaneous deploying, employing, and securing force. Think through AADC and TMD force protection issues during deployment.

b. Validate the flow of forces through TRANSCOM or JFAST prior to briefing me on your recommended COA.

4. Organizational Concept:

a. Unified Action. U.S. Military action is only one element of the international and U.S. means to resolve this crisis. Keep in mind how our actions must be orchestrated with the other elements of power to attain the U.S. and our coalition partners’ strategic aims.

b. I want separate command structures and JOA/AOs for the three separate concerns - Pacifica and Surran, the straits, and operations against the NNM in Indonesia. Initially, I see unilateral US JTF and TFs to protect our national interests until international agreements allow for the formation of coalition (multinational) forces. Re Pacifica, with naval forces and COMSOCPAC (CJTF511) already in theater, we have options on designating an initial JTF commander forward while we build up the force and establish a full up JTF HQs.

c. As stated earlier, I expect some form of MNF organization on Pacifica to be established ultimately. Having spoken with the Pacifican MOD, I envision the military action necessary to compel Surranian withdrawal from Pacifica or their destruction, and of defeat of their force projection capability to occur under the authority of a UN action through formation of this MNF with a US Commander and a Pacifican Deputy Commander. I see this organization being composed of a MN HQs, U.S. and those multinational elements of UNFORPAC approved by the respective national authorities, additional theater and CONUS based US forces, and designated Pacifican forces. Plan on the MNF commander being the CG of I Corps. He will be the senior US commander and be dual hatted as the US JTF commander. Give me recommendations on the organization of a MNF organization taking into account coalition partner interests and capabilities.

1) Work with JCS and the Pacifican MOD planners to work out a proposed command structure and any required AOs internal to a MNF that we may need to direct to the MNFC. Pacifica is a sovereign country; I expect their national leadership will have strong beliefs on command relationships between Pacifican and any MNF headquarters, and how we define areas of operations - especially in the Manila area.

2) I expect responsibility for operations in Pacifica will likely be divided between this US-commanded MNF with its multinational functional components and some form of Pacifican joint force in the southern islands. Push toward maintaining this Pacifican joint force at least nominally until the overall MNF leadership -- possibly in a TACON relationship. If we can’t do this, then we’ll have to ensure a responsive C3I coordination cell is established to facilitate MNF support to the Pacifican force. I realize we already have a significant SOF advisory assistance program with the Pacificans in Mindanao. They may be able to assist - at least in terms of facilitating CAS and targeting requests.

3) We need to locate the main command post for the MNF in Pacifica as close to the MNF Legitimizing Authority Headquarters and PA MOD headquarters as possible to facilitate coordination. We also need to coordinate for force assembly areas with the PA MOD. Ensure these areas will support our deployment reception plan once it is fully developed.

4) I expect to initially coordinate the interagency effort here in Camp Smith, transferring it forward to the MNF Cdr when he is prepared to accept it. Coordinate with JCS to work out the supported / supporting relationships with OGAs, especially in regard to the OGA effort against the TCOs and during post hostility operations.