Section I. Logistics Planning




Logistics preparation of the theater (LPT) is the sum of those actions (force structure, resources, and strategic lift) taken to maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of logistics support within a constrained resource environment. It is designed to minimize or eliminate potential problems during deployment, at the outbreak of hostilities, and throughout the campaign. It is a systematic tool logisticians and commanders use to accomplish their mission. The logistician and commander use it as a framework to determine where, when, and how to deploy limited resources, supplies, equipment, and people.


LPT can be compared to, but should not be confused with, intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), which is covered in FM 34-130. Some of the products generated under IPB should become a part of the logistics essential elements of information (LOGEEI) data file used to develop the plan for LPT.


FM 7-98 defines logistics intelligence as the operational and tactical information the logistician requires to develop and execute the logistic support plan. Joint Publication (Pub) 3-07 indicates



Figure 2-1. LPT planning cycle.

that logistics intelligence is critical to low-intensity planning and that it is facilitated by long-range preliminary planning, including area studies and target information folders. Joint Pub 3-07 also provides a list of the minimum areas that should be included in any logistics intelligence analysis. Some of these areas are¾


· Intent to engage in combined operations and the extent of logistics support to provide to non-DOD agencies and allies.

· Available resources in the AO.

· Conditions that alter consumption factors such as severe climate changes or supporting allies.

· Local facilities' capabilities to support reception and sustainment operations.

· Foreign military logistics structure, national infrastructure capabilities, and political inclination to facilitate US forces' support.

· Environmental, geographic, climatic, and topographical factors that may affect logistics opera-tions.

· Analyzing the host nation's capabilities and the region's LOC and ability to support the operation.


Logistics intelligence is equally critical for war and other operations. Logisticians must have a com-plete logistics data base or file to develop a solid plan for the LPT.


Unified commanders are responsible for planning for contingency operations that require armed forces. The Army component commander of a unified command will prepare supporting Army plans with logistics planners concentrating on the logistics plans. Once the contingency country or geographic region is known, the logistics planners should begin to build a LOGEEI data base. This applies even if the command only has a small probability of being deployed to a particular area. Once completed, the information in the data base can be used to develop a comprehensive plan for LPT. The relative priority given to this effort will depend on the overall concept of operation, along with other command priorities. The key point is that logisticians cannot afford to wait until maneuver units are deployed to begin the LPT.


LPT is a complex and time-consuming function. If planners anticipate correctly at the national and unified command levels, we should never have to insert troops into a completely "cold" base.


a. LOGEEI. Since this concept is relatively new, an explanation of the LOGEEI development proc-ess follows. Figure 2-2 shows a type of LOGEEI file with some suggested major categories of information. These categories will be discussed briefly. Focus will be on supply and field services aspects and applications. Keep in mind, however, that a detailed LPT plan will cover all logistics areas.


(1) Geography. Collect information on climate and terrain in the AO. Use this information to determine types of equipment needed and when. Use water information to determine the need for such things as early deployment of well-digging assets and water production and distribution units.


(2) Supply. Collect information on supply items that are readily available in the AO that can be used to support US forces. Subsistence items, bulk petroleum, and barrier materials are the most common. Collect information on the supply system of the armed forces of the supported country. Is it compatible with ours? Are major equipment items compatible? Has the host nation bought, through FMS, repair parts supporting current US systems? Answers to these types of questions will help you determine if HNS negotiations are feasible.



Figure 2-2. LOGEEI file.


(3) Facilities. Collect information on such things as warehousing, cold storage facilities, produc-tion and manufacturing plants, reservoirs, administrative facilities, sanitation capabilities, and hotels. Availability of such facilities could reduce the requirement for deployment of similar capacity. For instance, the Force Provider will house approximately 3,300 personnel. If space is available in a complex of hotels in the required location with the requisite support available, Force Provider deployment, with its significant strategic lift requirements, could be deferred.


(4) Transportation. Collect information on such things as road nets, truck availability, rail nets, bridges, ports, cargo handlers (longshoremen), petroleum pipelines, and materials handling equipment (MHE). Also collect information on traffic flow, chokepoints, and control problems.


(5) Maintenance. Collect information on maintenance facilities that could support US or coalition equipment. Examine the supported country's armed forces. Can they be used to supplement our capability? Is there a commonality in equipment and repair parts? Does the country have adequate machine works for possible use in fabricating repair parts?


(6) General skills. Collect information on the supported country's general population. Is English commonly spoken? Are interpreters and/or translators available? Will a general labor pool be available? What skills are available that we can use? For instance, will drivers, clerks, MHE operators, food service personnel, guards, mechanics, and longshoremen be available?


(7) Miscellaneous. Include any other information that could prove useful. Establish other cate-gories as needed.

b. Sources of logistics intelligence. Collecting logistics intelligence information is not as difficult as it first may appear. There is a plethora of information that is routinely collected, and there are several agencies that can assist the logistician in building the LOGEEI file.


The State Department, with its worldwide embassies, is an excellent source of detailed information on a particular country. Embassy staffs routinely do country studies that, when current, can provide most of the information you may need. A good college library is another excellent source of information.


The weather and terrain data bases in the IPB, with its overlays, can provide excellent, current information that can be used in preselecting LOCs and sites for logistics facilities. The IPB event analysis matrix and template in the IPB (see FM 34-130) can also be used to determine the need for route improvements and bridge reinforcements.


If US Army civil affairs (CA) or civil-military operations (CMO) units are either in country or targeted on a specific country, a wealth of logistics intelligence information will be available. These units have functional specialists who focus on particular areas such as civilian supply, public health, public safety, and transportation. These personnel can conduct specific country studies and provide outstanding support when the logistician begins to develop the LPT plan.


As the logistician focuses on a specific country, he should develop a comprehensive LOGEEI data file. Once developed, the logistician will use it as the primary source for developing the LPT. The following examples demonstrate this file's utility:


(1) If the logistician is concerned with petroleum support, he may review the supply portion of the LOGEEI data file to determine what is already available in the objective/contingency area. If large quantities of POL are readily available, there will be no need to use scarce airlift resources to transport fuel. When Operation Urgent Fury was initiated, some of our early airframes were used to move bulk POL. Subsequently, logistics planners found that a US firm owned a large tank farm on Grenada that could have been used.


(2) A review of the LOGEEI data fileís climate and terrain portion may indicate that potable water in the objective/contingency area is a problem. This type of information could indicate a need for early deployment of engineer well-drilling teams, water purification equipment, and water trucks. Or, conversely, the logistics planners may choose to negotiate HNS to provide water supply and distribution (as was done rather extensively in Operation Desert Shield/Storm). This would allow the early airframes to be used for other urgent requirements. HNS is an extremely important part of LPT. However, it takes a considerable period of time to develop good HNS agreements, and there is a fairly strict regimen to follow to formalize such agreements. The fact that most unified commands have special offices dedicated to HNS is an indication of its value.


(3) Assume that the command is targeted on a rather undeveloped country with an extremely poor road network. A review of the proposed concept of operation reveals the need for a lengthy north-south main supply route (MSR), but neither a road nor rail network is available. A dirt road, frequently impassable even to carts pulled by animals, is the only route available. Two streams that are breached by primitive bridging frequently cross the dirt road. Using logistics team training, the logistics planners may want to develop, using the LPT plan, a humanitarian/civic assistance program to assist the host nation in building a road with bridges that will accommodate heavy HN traffic.


Operation Blazing Trails provides an excellent example of how this concept was used in South and Central America. US Army engineers, including several units from the RC, worked with HN engineers during a training exercise. They constructed a road network that expanded the local economy, yet could be used as LOCs if military action developed. There are legal limitations and restrictions on these types of projects. It is incumbent on the logistics planner to ensure such efforts are appropriately coordinated and approved in advance. Other assets or tools the logistics planner may want to consider as the LPT plan is developed include¾


· Using pre-positioned war reserve materiel stocks (PWRMS).

· Army war reserve (AWR).

· Using containerization to limit handling.

· HNS agreements.

· Interservice support agreements (ISSAs).

· Pre-position afloat.

· Battlefield distribution system.

· Throughput.


Any actions that can be identified to reduce the cost of moving supplies, equipment, and people into an objective or contingency area can be included in the LPT plan. Planning must provide for the timely arrival of CSS assets that are balanced according to the mission. Strategic lift assets are extremely limited. Commanders cannot afford to squander even one sortie on moving unnecessary supplies, equipment, or personnel. A well-thought-out LPT plan, along with the time required for proper execution, will allow better use of our scarce strategic lift capability. LPT is a tool that will prove useful in logistics planning. However, the logistics planner must not underestimate the time and resources required to accomplish many of these actions.




One of the primary tasks in a new theater of operations is developing support requirements and selecting an area(s) for CSS base(s) development. The overriding consideration in this determination is the ability to perform the designated mission. Generally, developing support requirements incorporates the best combination of the following general considerations:


a. Defensibility and vulnerability. The area(s) must be defensible. Defensibility depends on the distance from enemy offensive means, defensive means available in the area, peculiarity of location, proximity to friendly combat forces, and the civilian population's attitude. The enemy offensive capability determines vulnerability; generally, vulnerability diminishes as the distance from enemy forces increases.


b. Space for dispersion. It is desirable to provide sufficient usable space to permit adequate disper-sion of installations. The nature and strength of supported forces dictate the optimum number of installations required; the enemy's nuclear and chemical capabilities determine the area required for the installations.


c. LOC. An LOC consists of the route (land, water, and air) that connects an operational/tactical force with a CSS base along which supplies and reinforcements move. The theater commander is vitally concerned with the LOC to and within a theater. Adequate transportation, security, and construction support for the intratheater LOC are necessary.


d. Terminal facilities, beaches, and sea approaches. Transoceanic shipment (sea and air) is the prin-cipal means of access to most theaters of operation. Close examination of potential CSS bases for sea terminal facilities, usable beaches, and sea approaches is necessary. Navigational hazards constricting offshore maneuver, coupled with an enemy antisurface capability, may make an otherwise ideal location unusable. Adequate air terminal facilities and secure air approach routes are desirable. Be sure to consider requirements for supporting the local economy, military forces, and civilian population.


e. Transportation network. An adequate road and rail network is desirable within the base. An area that has poor roads but requires little engineering effort for road relocation and extension may be preferable to one with an extensive road network that is poorly located for military use.


f. Local supplies. The civilian population's requirements influence the availability of local re-sources. When local sources provide supplies, fewer supplies must be shipped in from outside sources. Ideally, a base should at least provide potable water, fuels, lumber, metals, textiles, tools, and machines.


g. Construction requirements. Construction is costly in personnel, equipment, material, and time; therefore, careful study of a potential base's construction requirements is necessary. Construction requirements are substantially reduced when one or more of the following facilities is available in the area chosen:


· Water and air terminals.

· Roads, railroads, and pipelines.

· Open, covered, and refrigerated storage facilities.

· Maintenance shops and power installations.

· Hospitals.

· Administration buildings and facilities.

· Communication facilities.


h. Local labor. An adequate local labor supply greatly reduces military manpower requirements in the base area. Security and skill-level semiskilled labor (truck drivers, mechanics, machinists, clerks, medical personnel, and interpreters), while especially desired, should not be employed to the extent that the local economy becomes paralyzed. The planning factors, support agreements, and types and uses of HNS for rear operations, CS, and CSS must be established.


i. Other considerations. Additional factors that influence developing support requirements and selecting support locations follow:


· Degree of permanency anticipated for the base.

· Estimated troop population during successive theater development stages.

· Supported forcesí geographic locations.


· Topographic, hydrographic, or climatic peculiarities of the area.

· Support requirements for allied forces.




A communications zone (COMMZ) is defined as the rear part of the theater of operations [behind but contiguous to the combat zone (CZ)] that contains the LOCs (logistic routes) established for supply and evacuation and other agencies required to immediately support and maintain the field forces. A COMMZ may be established in a theater of operations in several ways:


· After the outbreak of war in an area secured by active combat operations. Division and corps base areas may be developed in sequence and the COMMZ established when sufficient territory has been secured for the corps commander to recommend a corps rear boundary be established.

· Concurrently with active combat operations when the theater has sufficient depth to permit im-mediately designating a corps rear boundary.

· Before initiating combat operations or before initiating hostilities in anticipation of deploying combat forces at a later date. Supply stocks may be established and CSS forces deployed in sufficient numbers to maintain supply stocks and support the combat forces' initial deployment.


Planning for establishing a COMMZ proceeds concurrently with preparing OPLANs for varying contingencies in potential areas of conflict. In long-range planning, CSS requirements may necessitate acquiring base areas overseas to ensure the support of the initial deployment of combat forces and to provide facilities for stockpiling supplies to support initial combat operations. Succeeding or failing to acquire rights to overseas bases may influence OPLANs.


In the current international environment, US obligations under various defense agreements and treaties, such as with NATO, provide for committing forces as a part of a multinational command under plans the standing organizationsí multinational staff prepares. CSS will generally be a national respon-sibility. US plans must, however, consider not only the combined plan under which US forces will be employed but also agreements regarding CSS of or by allied forces and the resources and support capabilities of allied or friendly nations in whose territory operations may be conducted. As a basis for planning CSS, the JCS and the theater commander (actual or designee) will develop¾


· Initial broad planning guidance.

· Mission of forces.

· Strategic scheme of maneuver.

· Allocation of forces.

· Broad CSS policies.


Under the direction of the actual or designated ASCC commander, the TAACOM prepares overall plans, policies, priorities, and allocations for establishing and operating a COMMZ to support the designated forces. A more detailed discussion of functions and responsibilities is in FM 100-16 and FM 100-7.


Section II. Echelons Above Corps Organization for CSS




The ASCC has both operational and support responsibilities. This ST will only cover the sustainment responsibilities. The ASCC's support responsibilities are to organize, equip, train, maintain, and logistically sustain Army forces for their operational missions.


An ASCC has no fixed organization but is structured, organized, and staffed to meet the missions and requirements of the theater in which it operates. The number of personnel required depends on the size of the Army component, the scope of operations, the availability of resources, and the commander's requirements. The ASCC's size will expand as the theater matures. Normal coordination of staff activities includes combat planning and operations, intelligence gathering and reporting, coordination with multinational/multiservice forces, and logistic and administrative support of US Army forces.


In some crisis situations, ASCC combat elements may be rapidly deployed to a distant theater. In this event, the ASCC may initially have some of its elements located in theater and the remainder awaiting transportation. Typically, the theater organization will be austere at the outset and gradually develop over time. Due to constrained strategic transportation, forces are prioritized into the theater. This may mean the only transportation support initially available to forces that arrive early is that which is organic to the force [e.g., a corps support command (COSCOM)] or that HNS provides. In this contingency, it is likely that the ASCC would form a tailored support package and deploy it as soon as possible to assist in supporting the corps. In established theaters, much of the combat power and support are forward deployed. Accordingly, the state of maturity at the start of the conflict is high, and it can reach full development relatively fast.


The ASCC normally is responsible for the COMMZ and locates the HQ and most CS and CSS elements there. There are two types of organizations within the COMMZ to accomplish the support mission: area and functional commands. Area commands are established by assigning geographic responsibilities to TAACOMs. TAACOMs normally subdivide their areas and assign geographic responsibilities to area support groups (ASGs). Figure 2-3 illustrates this COMMZ territorial orga-nization. The functional commands provide support on an area basis as well; however, they do not have geographic responsibilities.


The ASCC must be flexible enough to tailor its support capabilities based on requirements and priorities the commander establishes. The CSS capabilities at echelons above corps (EAC) must support units in and passing through the COMMZ and absorb the logistic requirements for those that are beyond the corps' capability or capacity.


In contingency operations, the absence of a support infrastructure in the theater may result in a different form of territorial organization that does not initially include establishing a COMMZ. In this situation, initial forces deployed to the theater would operate in the CZ and would receive support directly into forward support areas. This support may be projected forward from the CONUS bases; directly via air lines of communication (ALOC) and sea lines of communication (SEALOC); or, preferably, from land and sea support bases in or adjacent to the theater. The ASCC would coordinate the APODs and SPODs and phase appropriate support elements into the theater to accomplish mission requirements. As the buildup continues and EAC organizations are created, decisions are made as to the necessity of establishing a COMMZ. A COMMZ's designation and subsequent geographic development


Figure 2-3. TAACOM and ASG AOs.


depend on the area requirements, the forces to be supported, the scope of operations, and the theaterís projected expansion. Once the decision to establish the COMMZ has been made, the ASCC normally develops it.


Each theater echelon must be fully aware of its C2 responsibilities to efficiently and effectively con-duct the theater campaign. The ASCC communicates directly with HQDA on uniservice matters relating to administration, personnel, training, logistics, communications, doctrine, combat development, and intelligence matters. Command relationships are theater-unique and contingent upon the situation, mission, and forces available. A more detailed discussion of support and operation functions is in FM 100-7, appendix A.




The numbered army rarely executes support operations. However, it does influence CSS, and it is important to discuss its role in case there is an operational need for such command. As the theater matures, the expanding scope and purpose of combat operations and the growing complexity and size of both combat and support force structures may call for organizing an operational HQ between the ASCC and the corps. The ASCC normally decides to establish this HQ in coordination with the unified or combined commander with DA approval. When approved, the ASCC designates the numbered army HQ and commander, and publishes a directive or order that forms the command.

The numbered army HQ normally does not have a direct role in managing or executing CSS. Its role is usually limited to assessing the situation, formulating estimates and plans, establishing priorities, and coordinating support. Numbered army CSS requirements are planned and coordinated between the numbered army staff and the ASCC. This support sustains subordinate units and enables accom-plishment of task-organized operations.


Other than units organic or assigned to its subordinate echelons, CSS units providing support to the numbered army remain in the COMMZ under the ASCC's control and push forward the support required. Support will be provided, as appropriate, by area support commands or functionally oriented ASCC sub-ordinate commands. For example, the numbered army may receive support from a support group located near its assigned area.




The TAACOM, because it is assigned geographically, is termed an area command instead of a functional command. The TAACOM has four missions. Its first mission is to support units located in or passing through its assigned area. This support includes personnel and finance support, direct support maintenance (DSM), all classes of supply (less classified maps and class VIII), field services, and local transportation. Movement control, line-haul transportation, and communications security (COMSEC) are not included. The TAACOM's second mission is to provide the CZ with specified logistic support and maintenance support to the theater supply system under the theater army materiel management center's (TAMMC's) workload direction. Thirdly, the TAACOM coordinates area-related functions (such as circulation and population control) with HN elements, and supervises and coordinates real property maintenance activities (RPMAs) with the engineer command (ENCOM) through its ASGs. The TAACOM's fourth mission is rear operations within its assigned area.


The number of TAACOMs assigned to a theater depends on the size of the theater expressed in terms of the force in the theater, workload, and geographic area. The TAACOM will be comprised of only those units required to provide support. The types and number of subordinate units depend on the number and composition of corps and units within the COMMZ. Figure 2-4 is an example of a TAACOM.




Figure 2-4. TAACOM organization.





The TAACOM ASG is a logistic HQ in the COMMZ that commands and controls assigned units and attached units (see figure 2-5). Its mission is determined based on assessing the CSS needs of units operating in the theater. An ASG's organization and specific missions vary over time as the battlefield changes. Its mission (as depicted in figure 2-6) is to¾


· Command, control, and supervise all assigned and attached units.

· Provide general support maintenance (GSM) to support the theater supply system.

· Provide GS supply (less medical and ammunition) to units in the theater of operations.

· Manage and coordinate HNS that replaces or augments portions of the ASG support mission.

· Plan and direct providing direct support (DS) supply, maintenance, and field services (less med-ical, ammunition, and centralized personnel and administration services) to units located in or passing through its assigned zone.

· Control and coordinate physical security and rear operations within its area of the COMMZ.

· Plan and coordinate the location or relocation of units within the ASG area.

· Coordinate area-related functions with HN elements, and supervise and coordinate RPMA with ENCOM through its ASGs.


The ASG typically consists of maintenance battalions, supply and service (S&S) battalions, and a petroleum supply battalion. The number and types of units comprising an ASG depend on the number and makeup of units in the theater.



Figure 2-5. TAACOM ASG.



Figure 2-6. ASG missions.




The following are logistic ASCC MSCs. For most, detailed descriptions are not included in this chapter but, rather, in other chapters as indicated.


a. Finance command (FINCOM). The FINCOM provides finance support to all joint and combined commands as ordered, and policy and technical guidance to finance units in the theater. See chapter 4 for more details.


b. Theater army (TA) personnel command (PERSCOM). Chapter 4 outlines the personnel service support (PSS) organizations' responsibilities in providing support for EAC operations.


c. TA medical command (MEDCOM). The MEDCOM provides COMMZ-level (echelon IV) combat health support (CHS). It provides CHS C2 units, task organizes medical assets to meet patient workload, supervises medical operations, gives staff advice to senior commanders, conducts medical regulating and evacuation scheduling, and provides consultation services. The MEDCOM is discussed in detail in chapter 5.


d. TA transportation command (TRANSCOM). The TRANSCOM provides transportation support in mode operations, including inland waterways, rail, motor, and air and terminal operations, including water, beach, air, motor transport, and rail. The TRANSCOM is discussed in detail in chapter 7.

e. Theater army movement control agency (TAMCA). The TAMCA, a major TA management cen-ter, coordinates and administers transportation policy. It is discussed in detail in chapter 7.


f. TAMMC. The TAMMC performs the centralized management function for supply and mainte-nance in the theater. It permits visibility of supply items the ASCC commander designates and serves as the prime interface between the theater and the CONUS sustaining base. The TAMMC is connected electronically with the TAMCA, TAACOM materiel management centers (MMCs), and the COSCOM MMC(s). It is also the primary interface with the AMC control element and coordinates assigned tasks, objectives, and priorities that support the theater mission. The TAMMC provides theaterwide materiel management and allocates supply items according to the priorities the ASCC commander establishes.


g. ASCC petroleum group. The ASCC petroleum group centrally distributes bulk petroleum prod-ucts for all US forces in the theater. The group commander is the ASCC's chief petroleum operator. The petroleum group provides theaterwide distribution, commands US interzonal pipelines and HN liaison, and interfaces with the TAMMC to move and distribute fuel forward into the COMMZ and corps rear areas. If pipeline systems are in use, other transportation modes provide the necessary extension from the pipeline terminals to the users. The petroleum group is organized to permit growth as the theater matures and requirements increase. One petroleum group is normally assigned for each ASCC bulk fuel distribution system. It can have from two to five battalions. The TAMMC centrally manages bulk petroleum at the ASCC. Requirements are transmitted from supported units and consolidated at the TAMMC petroleum directorate. These requirements are then submitted to the unified command Joint Petroleum Office (JPO) where they are consolidated with other US force requirements and submitted to the CONUS DLA DFSC for resupply to the theater.


The petroleum group maintains and manages a theater petroleum quality surveillance program, stores and maintains the ASCC stockage level of bulk petroleum supply, provides for alternate means of distributing bulk petroleum, and interfaces with the TAMMC petroleum directorate and the JPO for theater POL requirements. Maximum use will be made of existing pipelines, railcars, and barges for bulk POL distribution. Operating elements of the petroleum group may consist of¾


· Petroleum pipeline and terminal operating battalions that are allocated on the basis of one per two to five pipeline and terminal operating companies.

· Truck battalions (medium, petroleum) are assigned to supplement the pipeline distribution sys-tem. Each battalion can command and control from three to seven companies. Each medium truck com-pany can transport 675,000 gallons of bulk petroleum per day (line-haul).

· A petroleum lab is assigned to the petroleum group for quality assurance of the bulk petroleum products being supplied.

· One or more water supply battalions, as required by theater. See FM 10-52 for more detail.




The Theater Army Special Operations Support Command (TASOSC) is an ASCC subordinate functional command. It provides the vital link between the ASCC and theater Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) units and ensures that ASCC meets its administrative, support, and sustainment responsibilities for ARSOF units. The TASOSC has no operational mission and does not layer itself between the special operations command and theater ARSOF units. Rather, it functions as a supporting HQ, responding to the theater ARSOF unit's needs just as a division support command (DISCOM) responds to its supported brigades' needs.


The TASOSC mission is to plan and coordinate the support and sustainment of theater ARSOF units conducting special operations. The TASOSC commander and his staff¾


· Plan and coordinate CSS and designated CS for theater ARSOF units and, when directed, other service and allied special operations forces (SOF).

· Plan, coordinate, direct, and supervise CS and CSS operations of assigned and attached Army forces (ARFOR) providing dedicated support to theater ARSOF units and, when directed, other service and allied SOF.


The TASOSC does not normally support and sustain theater ARSOF units. It has no dedicated support infrastructure that duplicates other ASCCsí capabilities. Under some circumstances, however, the ASCC may assign or attach CSS units to the TASOSC to support and sustain theater ARSOF units on a unit basis. During a contingency operation, the number and size of these units may be significant. In this situation, the ASCC may organize a composite support unit (provisional or permanent) that reports directly to the TASOSC commander or a supported ARSOF commander. During certain contingency operations, a corps may be the senior Army HQ. In this situation, ARSOF units may depend on the COSCOM to provide the support a TAACOM normally provides.




Power projection is a fundamental principle of our national military strategy. Therefore, force pro-jection is fundamental to Army doctrine. The Armyís dependence on force projection dictates that organizational designs be structured to support units that can deploy the right amount of capability with the minimum force structure necessary to successfully accomplish the mission. This concept describes the support C2 structure at EAC and provides EAC-type support as part of an ARFOR on a joint task force. For example, the early-entry module is an Army concept. However, the objective organization will provide a significant amount of support to other services through various executive agency directives or agreements. To facilitate this executive agency support, other service staffing will be identified for insertion as required. This other service staffing will be liaison positions provided from the major organizations being supported by the objective organization and from battle rostering from TDA activities at the strategic level such as DLA, the Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC), or the DFSC. In addition, AMC will provide strategic-level staffing (battle rostering).


a. Employment concept. For limited operations, the ASCC controls EAC support operations through the Deputy Commanding General for Support if the theater support command (TSC) is deployed and through the TSC early-entry module commander if it is not deployed. In larger, more mature operations, the complete TSC HQ may be deployed. The modular nature of the TSCís structure minimizes strategic lift requirements by allowing the commander to deploy only essential support elements identified with a derivative unit identification code. In addition, it places CSS and selected CS (engineer) operational-level units under one POC (the TSC) that will simplify CSS and CS planning and execution for the ASCC to successfully accomplish the mission.


Figure 2-7. Relationships


b. Relationship to other concepts.


(1) ASCC. The ASCC HQ will provide command and staff supervision of assigned units for executing the ASCCís responsibilities as defined in Joint Pub 3-0 and FM 100-7. When METT-T conditions warrant, the ASCC will call for TSC elements to deploy to the theater of operations if a TSC is not already positioned there. The TSC will be an MSC of the ASCC. Early-entry and functional modules (ENCOM, MEDCOM, TRANSCOM, PERSCOM, and FINCOM) will be employed as the ASCC directs. The ASCC should consider the theater logistics infrastructureís organization from the strategic context, the level of international military cooperation required, and the degree of dedicated US military resources necessary in the theater of operations as a prerequisite for ensuring timely command awareness and oversight of deployment, readiness, and sustainment issues. The ASCC must develop a strategy and must organize the forces.


The nature of each theater differs and, likewise, so may the composition and organization of Army support forces within it. The ASCC in the EUCOM, for example, is wholly located within its theater and has experienced support organizations. The CENTCOM ASCC, on the other hand, is located in CONUS and plans its own deployment and sustainment as well as its subordinate elementsí. US Army, Pacific, is the PACOM ASCC, but it is not responsibe for logistic support within the Republic of Korea because Korea has a subunified command, US Forces, Korea, with its own ASCC. Thus, the roles, missions, and organizations for each unified and subunified command are tailored according to METT-T and the CINCís vision.


(2) Modularity. The TSCís structure takes full advantage of modularized units designated to match incremental functional support capabilities to mission requirements. The TSC HQ is designed along modular guidelines. This will enhance its deployability by allowing planning and management functions to phase in when required. The following commands will require revision to deploy a functional module capable of providing EAC-level management: TRANSCOM, ENCOM, MEDCOM, FINCOM, PERSCOM, the TAMCA, and the TAACOM MMC. These same commands must have small (5 to 15 personnel) early-entry modules that can deploy, as the ASCC directs, with the TSC early-entry modules.These modular designs allow for the phased organizations that are CONUS-based since they are almost exclusively in the RC.


Many RC units are now developing an immediate deployment capability staffed with personnel from the Active component and the Active Guard Reserve (AGR). Under this concept, these limited numbers of Active and AGR personnel in the ENCOM, MEDCOM, TRANSCOM, PERSCOM, and FINCOM can be aligned with the early-entry and functional modules. During phase 1, D+1, the early-entry modules will become a part of the TSC functional module. At phase 2, D+10 to D+30, the remainder of the functional modules will deploy along with the remaining TSC. The functional modules from the five functional commands become staff directorates within TSC support operations. At phase 3, subsequent to D+30 or as the ASCC directs, the C2 modules deploy. At that time the functional modules return to their parent units. The ASCC will determine if the functional commands will remain subordinate to the TSC or become MSCs under the ASCC. The deployment concept is shown at figure 2-8.


(3) Battlefield distribution. The TSC concept supports battlefield distribution by providing an EAC distribution manager. In addition, it will have an organic distribution management center that syn-chronizes the organizations involved with materiel and movement management. Battlefield distribution will also identify the requirements for a theater force opening package. It will identify the units or unit modules required to conduct force-projection theater opening operations. The early-entry module from the TSC will be the C2 element for the theater force opening package.




Figure 2-8. TSC deployment concept.


(4) Split-based operations. Split-based operations advocate deploying only that portion of a unit necessary to operate and provide support at a given time in a theater of operations. The modules remaining at home station continue to provide support and will be prepared to deploy as the ASCC requires. The support C2 at EAC may incorporate the split-based concept by using split-based MMCs in the basic TSC as well as in the ENCOM, MEDCOM, TRANSCOM, PERSCOM, and FINCOM.


(5) LSE. The LSE is a flexible, modular, civilian-dominated TDA organization supporting mili-tary operations in a theater of operations. It deploys at the ASCC/CINCís request to provide strategic and operational logistics support at the operational and tactical levels during contingencies. Its mission is to enhance readiness through unified and integrated application of AMC logistics power projection of CONUS-based technical capabilities to deployed units within any theater. Its primary capabilities are C2, technical assistance, supply, and maintenance. The LSE centrally controls all AMC elements in the theater. Other capabilities available in the LSE include depot maintenance, oil analysis, test equipment calibration, ammunition surveillance, AWR stock (pre-positioned/pre-po afloat) handoff, overseeing LOGCAP, technology insertion, and battle damage assessment.


The LSE will normally be assigned, attached, or OPCON to the TSC. In many domestic and small contingencies, the LSE may become the initial lead element. In other cases where end state has been reached and the numbered logistics HQ begins to redeploy, logistics C2 could transition to the LSE. The LSE will maintain the appropriate technical ties to AMC, DLA, TRADOC, and FORSCOM. The LSE provides a single focal point in the theater responsible for LOGCAP management in peacetime planning and upon deployment. LSE operations are detailed in FM 63-11.


(6) LOGCAP. LOGCAP provides field commanders an augmentation source for filling CS/CSS shortfalls by using contractor expertise and resources when other sources are unavailable. The AMC support contract, which is one of the many contingency contracts that fall under LOGCAP, is an umbrella contract that prioritizes peacetime contingency planning for augmentation logistics and engineering/construction services as the ASCC/CINC predetermines. It calls for a commercial vendor to prepare contingency management plans to support specific ASCC/CINC predetermined requirements. It provides expeditious logistics and engineering/construction augmentation support upon deployment with a reasonable assurance of success and within reasonable cost. (See chapter 1, section II for more detailed information).


(7) DLA contingency support team. DLA is currently developing a concept for providing DLA support in the theater of operations. Its contingency support team will enhance the strategic and operational link. It will facilitate integrated materiel management support of DLA common commodities. These include subsistence, clothing and other general supplies, package/bulk petroleum, and medical material. It can provide contract administration services for all logistics contracts in-theater and support the CINCís executive agent for contracting. When deployed to a theater, the support team will be assigned or attached to the TSC.


(8) Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI). The US Army Transporta-tion School is currently (fall of 1996) developing FM 17-3-1 to solidify the concept for RSOI. The FM deals with the coordinated operation of receiving, sorting, moving, and controlling units, personnel, and materiel entering the theater of operations. Reception begins at the POD where in-theater accountability is established and initial sorting is conducted. Staging occurs when unit personnel are married with their equipment in a controlled area. Onward movement is the coordinated action of allocating road space, transportation assets, and supporting requirements for the onward movement as well as the handoff

between the theater force opening module and the tactical unit. Integration is the synchronized handoff of units to the operational commanderís force. RSOI is the ASCC/CINCís responsibility, but the TSC and its subordinate units will execute most of the actions to support RSOI.


(9) Warfighter Information Network (WIN). The WIN is the proposed operational concept for signal support to the digitized force. It is an evolving network comprised of commercially based infor-mation and communications systems designed to increase the capacity and velocity of information distribution throughout the theater. The TSC will require the fully planned and reliable command, con-trol, communications, and computer architecture of WIN for situational awareness, multimedia services and imagery, and asset visibility. The information systems that support the TSC are evolving into a com-mon operating environment and an integrated baseline. The WIN will provide the required interoper-ability so we can rapidly disseminate information throughout the theater and to the strategic level.


c. Organization and employment. The TSC is a multifunctional organization with most of its sup-port functions under a single command. This will centralize C2 of these functions at EAC level. There are several significant changes from current structure and operational relationships.


· This concept eliminates TAACOMs.

· The TSC will be a modular HQ.

· The TSC early-entry module provides an active element in each ASCC for preoperations plan-ning and early deployment. This module would consist of positions identified from within the TSC TOE or its supporting modules (dual slotting) designed and staffed to deploy as early as D+1, followed by the functional modules (ENCOM, MEDCOM, TRANSCOM, PERSCOM, and FINCOM) not later than (NLT) D+30. If the ASCC decided to deploy the early-entry module, personnel would move from their standard TOE positions into the position identified in the module. This capability would be available for both Active and RC units.

· The TSCímodular design will ensure EAC support capabilities arrive early, minimizing strate-gic lift.

· This concept will place the traditional EAC functions¾ PSS, CHS, transportation support, finance support, and engineer support¾ under the TSC in addition to supply, maintenance, and field serv-ices support. The TSC will then manage these functions through modules the parent organizations provide; i.e., ENCOM, MEDCOM, TRANSCOM, PERSCOM, and FINCOM. Based on the CINCís campaign plan and operations to be conducted, the ASCC determines the support force structureís nature and scope. He may elect to deploy the rest of the commands to reduce the TSC commanderís span of control and to provide additional senior-level expertise to the theater. At that time, the functional modules (engineer, medical, transportation, personnel, and finance) will revert to the parent unitís control. Organizational flexibility will allow the ASCC to directly manage those functions for which he perceives a need. Even while under TSC control, the functional modules will retain technical ties to their parent C2 module, to the appropriate staff sections on the ASCC staff, and to the appropriate strategic-level support organizations. For instance, the links between the PERSCOM and ASCC G1 and the USTA PERSCOM will continue.

· The TSC contains a significantly increased capability for performing contingency contracting and coordination HNS. When the LSE is deployed as a subordinate organization to the TSC, this organic TSC capability can be OPCON to the LSE.

· The LSE can either be assigned or attached to the TSC or, in some instances, serve as the senior logistics C2 element in the COMMZ. The LSE will retain a technical chain of command with AMC and other appropriate strategic-level organizations.

· The existing TAMMC will no longer be required under this concept. Spaces generated from its inactivation will be used to resource a distribution management center (DMC). Additionally, TAMMC spaces will be used to resource a small increase in the TSC and in the TAACOM MMC that will then be redesignated as the TSC MMC. The DMC will manage materiel and movement functions for the support operations officer. The DMC will have staff supervision over the TSC MMC (formerly the TAMCA) and the medical logistics management center (MLMC) (formerly the theater medical materiel management center). The TSC MMC and TSC movement control activity, along with elements of the MLMC, will be collocated in the vicinity of the DMC.

· The ASGs will be responsible for area support at EAC and sustainment functions previously shared by theater-level support organizations and the TAACOM(s).


The TSC will provide several key functions to the ASCC. It has battle command responsibility for assigned and attached units. It can provide support, as the ASCC/CINC directs, to US Army units, other US services (executive agencies), DOD civilians, contractors, and multinational forces in its area of responsibility as agreed upon and when advantageous to the US effort. The key support functions include¾


· Supply support.

· Maintenance support.

· Transportation support.

· Field service support.

· PSS.

· CHS.

· Construction and engineer support.

· Rear area security in the COMMZ when the ASCC directs.

· Prisoner of war, refugee, and/or displaced nationalsí custody, control, internment, and disposition.

· Support across the full spectrum of CMO.

· Force and unit reception, staging, and onward movement and coordinating the integration of these forces with combatant commanders.

· Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) support.

· Retrograde and redeployment operations.

· Logistics-over-the-shore operations (LOTS).

· Procurement support (commercial contracts, contracting for HNS, and administering LOGCAP).

· Transitioning operations to other military forces.

· Governmental and/or international agencies.

· Coordinating field sanitation for large-scale (more than one unit) operations.


The TSC also provides many battle command functions. It serves as the ASCCís single POC for support when organized for total support in the COMMZ. It executes the support mission by directing subordinate units. It also plans, provides, and determines requirements to support the ASCCís mission. Figures 2-9 through 2-12 depict the TSCís proposed organization.




Figure 2-9. Support command (SUPCOM).





Figure 2-10. SUPCOM general staff.



Figure 2-11. SUPCOM special staff.





Figure 2-12. Support operations.