Tuesday, April 29, 1997 9:00 a.m
Hyatt Regency Crystal City Hotel
Regency A Ballroom
2799 Jefferson Davis Highway
PRESENTATION OF VICE ADMIRAL SHANAHAN
CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION
Vice Admiral Shanahan is from the Center for Defense Information.
VICE ADMIRAL SHANAHAN: Mr. Chairman, Members of the National Defense Panel, it is a pleasure to be here this morning to address some of the significant points being considered by the Quadrennial Defense Review and this Panel.
As you may know, the Center for Defense Information has been actively participating in the process since the Pentagon began its work last autumn -- participating as best we can from a position outside the process.
Mr. Chairman, you and your colleagues deserve a medal for your efforts to bring the NGO community to the table, so to speak. My hope is that you have established a precedence for the future.
Our fundamental position is that the QDR and the role of the NDP in the overall process of advising the Secretary of Defense and the Congress could have a significant and positive effect on the way we prepare the nation for the military-related challenges of the 21st Century.
I qualify this statement with the word "could" for two reasons.
First, the QDR is essentially a National Military Strategy Review. It is not, as many among the public and perhaps even the Congress might think, a National Security Strategy Review. It, therefore, does not look at the very important part played by other instruments of foreign policy -- active diplomacy, trade and finance, and foreign aid. Nor does it look at the most fundamental aspect of national security -- a strong and growing domestic economy that amasses the wealth which, should we ever be seriously threatened, will allow us to regenerate the military forces and military hardware necessary to ensure our national survival.
Second, despite repeated statements by Secretary Cohen, Deputy Secretary White, Assistant Secretary Warner, and others, all the signs point to the Pentagon's QDR as budget rather than threat and strategy driven.
As a practical matter, of course, as Senator Grassley pointed out to the Pentagon Comptroller last December, whatever the QDR and this panel recommend must resonate in the obscure world of the budget.
What the American people have seen over the past eight months, however, is the more familiar inter-service battles over roles and missions -- and, therefore, budget shares, rather than a realistic look at the near and mid-term threats that are foreseeable and for which our active duty forces must be ready.
As arcane as the Cold War-era Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System is, it has the merit of assessing the threat, determining the forces necessary to neutralize and, if required, defeat the threat. It also estimates the various levels of risk -- from zero to low to moderate -- that would exist as the force is adjusted to accommodate the realities of manpower availability, the size and condition of the industrial base, and national budget priorities.
Unfortunately, the Pentagon now starts with a budget target into which each of the services attempts to shoehorn as many of its programs as possible with insufficient regard for joint battlefield synergism or the actual threats to our national security.
Britain's Lord Palmerston reminded us that nations do not have permanent allies, only permanent interests.
The military forces of a nation are only one player in preserving national interests, that in a democracy such as ours, the military is not the primary line of defense of those interests when we are at peace. Nonetheless, because some nations will defy international norms, may elect to oppose legitimate U.S. interests by force, or threaten the lives and safety of U.S. and other citizens, we must retain military forces able to respond to realistic threats to our interests.
On February 6th and 7th of this year, General Hughes, Director of the DIA, testified before Congress about the military threats to the United States. General Hughes said, quote: "From a national security standpoint, the threats facing the United States have diminished in an order of magnitude and we are unlikely to face a global military challenge on the scale of the former Soviet Union for at least the next two decades."
General Hughes then listed some of the likely threats to U.S. interests. They were terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, missile proliferation, the growing economic disparity between the North and the South, increasing resource scarcity, and intra-state conflicts that produce huge refugee flows and humanitarian relief needs.
What is strike about this list, and I hope caught the attention of this distinguished Panel, is that few of these threats touch our vital national interests or seem to require first call upon traditional military forces to respond -- traditional in the sense of the 20th century massed armies and technologically-based warfare.
While it may seem a statement of the obvious, defining our core values and enduring vital national interests is critical in determining the nature and extent of the threats to those values and interests.
Our Founding Fathers provided a list of values which have served us well as general guidelines for over two centuries. Dr. Roskin, in his article, "National Security: From Abstraction to Strategy," provides a useful distinction between vital and important national interests: "Vital national interests are relatively easy to define: security as a free and independent nation and protection of institutions, people, and fundamental values. Secondary interests, those over which one may seek to compromise, typically, are somewhat removed from your borders and represent no threat to your sovereignty." He said.
As always in military affairs, however, nothing is quite that simple. For what politicians might interpret as vital national interests at any given time can be biased by ideology, convictions of the elite, common wisdom, policy inertia, and the general state of the world -- particularly when nations experience internal dislocations as they shift from authoritarian rule and central command economies to democracy and free markets.
Furthermore, history suggests that a nation which unnecessarily retains larger than needed military forces has the propensity to see every challenge as an assault on its vital interests. Such a posture cannot be sustained in terms of national will and public support, let alone economically.
If the power, the will, or the public support for using force is absent, threats to use force become hollow until, in frustration, the military is set a task that involves not vital, but distant interests, less important interests simply to prove a point.
Thus, nations risk being drawn into more and more conflicts costing more and more blood and national treasure.
This is not, I suggest, only a one-time danger. In this century alone, our long and unhappy history of intervening in Central America and in Vietnam, to cite only two instances, bespeak the unwise tendency for politicians to declare current by transitory issues as vital to the nation.
Our nation's continuing post-Cold War failure to redefine carefully the role and precedence of military forces in securing our interests against a much lower and much altered threat has needless perpetuated the drain on our resources induced by annually spending more than a quarter of a trillion dollars for military purposes. By so doing, we continue to ignore this serious economic and other non-military domestic needs that were long deferred while the nation devoted the majority of its scientific and fiscal resources to the Cold War.
While actually redressing this continuing imbalance lies outside the power of this distinguished Panel, I suggest that a thorough and careful analysis followed by strong recommendations for correcting the imbalance is completely within your mandate and should be among your most basic concerns as you review the Pentagon's QDR.
In so doing, you will reestablish two important points we now ignore: that national security is not just military security and that for military security, there is a valid distinction between strategy -- the what we want to do, which is the indispensable prerequisite to devising a capability to implement the strategy -- the how we want to do it, which in terms of current military planning is the two MRC approach of the Bottom-Up Review.
You may recall that in March of 1994, before the Senate Appropriations Committee, then Secretary of Defense Perry said, quote: "Nothing in our planning, nowhere in our planning do we believe we are going to have to fight two wars at once. I think it is an entirely implausible scenario that we would ever have to fight two wars at once."
I submit that this observation is even more true today than in 1994.
Nonetheless, the Pentagon continues to interpret President Clinton's National Security Strategy as a mandate for business as usual; permanently stationing forces abroad where the Cold War threat has disappeared; high levels of routine operational deployments; heavy emphasis on maximum readiness for all elements of the active force and selected reserve units; and purchases of expensive equipment unsuited for the scale and types of military interventions in which U.S. forces would most likely be used.
Just how these strategy components would be justified became clear during his March 1996 congressional testimony on the DoD budget, General Shalikashvili described the new basis for U.S. military force structure, end strength, infrastructure, and budgets. He said, "Managing the more uncertain world has led us to modify our Cold War approach of maintaining a threat-based force towards a capability-based approach that ensures we protect the balance to handle today's real threats as well as tomorrow's equally real possibilities."
A capabilities-based approach to my thinking is equivalent to asking for a blank check, particularly for large procurement runs of equipment designed to counter threats that no longer exist. Moreover, this mind set can be used to justify the purchase of every new piece of equipment that emerges from what many refer to as the "Revolution in Military Affairs," although as this Panel understands, technology is only one part of that revolution.
Speaking of procurement leads to the RMA's companion pursuit, the "Revolution in Business Affairs," and the issue of acquisition reform.
Acquisition reform has been underway for some years, but the returns to date have been disappointing and do not look as if they will come anywhere near the Defense Science Board projections made last year.
The vagaries of congressional funding for military programs, the practice of industry "buy-ins," and the inevitable technological glitches that reduce the effectiveness while adding to the costs of bells and whistles, will continue to play havoc with potential savings from acquisition reform. Yet, these considerations only magnify the importance of being more selective in the quantities of new systems the Pentagon procures.
The traditional "American way" of attempting to replace every piece of equipment every 20 years is simply no longer affordable. We have the technology to design, to redesign, to combine, to manipulate, and integrate systems and simulate outcomes without going through long, expensive development cycles. A workable alternative is to build-in growth potential, something that is more possible now because growth occurs in command, control, sensor, and information technologies that are largely governed by advances in computer or computer-related technology. Thus, incremental modernization would seem an easier and less expensive method of remaining on the cutting edge of technology as long as we do not detect the emergence of a technological peer competitor.
When a major technological evolution appears possible but needs to be tested by bending metal rather than stopping at simulations, the services should be restricted to basic prototyping and the production of the number of new systems required to test battlefield synergism. A very clear success in this regard was the F-117 stealth fighter. In this way, we gain the benefits both of the Revolutions in Military and Business Affairs: understanding how new technology affects and is affected by doctrine and tactics, incrementally updating selective parts of throughout force, and being able, should the need arise, to go into large scale production with the know-how already in the bank.
Mr. Chairman, given all of the foregoing, my instincts, both as a former major fleet commander and as a concerned citizen, tell me we have to completely reevaluate the way we consider future military security.
What I find disheartening is that only one active duty commander is willing to publicly challenge the automatic obeisance to Cold War assumptions and practices. General Sheehan believes the United States has a window of opportunity in which the Pentagon should call time out and seriously reassess what our military is doing and, more importantly, why.
The why goes to the heart of strategy.
Why do we sill need forces permanently based overseas when there is no enemy in Europe, unless we create one by excluding Russia from a fully integrated Europe -- or, in Asia where North Korea is a shadow of the South and where China, though touted by some as our most likely future "near peer competitor," lacks a credible and sustainable power projection capability?
Why do we still routinely steam carrier task forces and amphibious ready groups from the United States as we did during the Cold War when there is no security contingency that demands the presence of such force.
Why do we still rely on 12,500 nuclear warheads as a fundamental element of war-fighting strategy when such weapons have no military utility?
Why are the services asking for a 101 new flag officers, including the 12 approved by the Marine Corps, for the Marine Corps, last year, whose incumbents would do battle with each other on joint staffs and commissions or other non-war-fighting positions when the need is to get more military personnel into fighting units. A GAO Report released earlier this month notes that 45 percent of the active force is assigned to positions supporting infrastructure functions.
General Sheehan also called for a reduction in the number of commands, posts, and other military facilities. While political realities are such that savings from closing or realigning CONUS facilities would undoubtedly have to await another Base Realignment and Closure Commission, in the short run, savings in the order of one to two billion dollars per year could be realized by returning most of our two European based divisions stateside. And if they are judged to be necessary to the force structure, assigning them to currently underused facilities.
On this same subject, I noted a recent news report in which the generic "unnamed high ranking military officer" asserted that with a truly free hand to realign its posts, bases, and shore facilities, the Pentagon could live on an annual budget in the neighborhood of $220 billion.
Bringing more troops home from Europe should not be dismissed out of hand. It is not, nor should it be interpreted as a prelude to isolationism which CDI vigorously opposes. After fifty years, Europe should be able to handle most of its problems on its own. If we reject government paternalism at home, why do we insist on U.S. military paternalism abroad?
In this respect, the all-European protection force that just went into Albania is an indication that Europeans can act in their own interests. From a strategic political-military point of view, I believe all that is needed to reassure our European allies that the U.S. remains committed to common security is our ability to reconstitute and reinforce -- a global reach capability if and when war threatens again, rather than a permanent global force.
Having a global reach, to "reach out and touch someone," without global presence is entirely consistent with our national security strategy and is feasible given our highly sophisticated indications and warning system for tracking and projecting future threats.
As many on this Panel know from direct experience, we must be able to see and understand enough of the three strands comprising the indicators of hostilities -- capabilities, intent and will -- to give the National Command Authority sufficient warning to prevent conflict if possible or to meet aggression head-on if necessary.
Our satellites and other technical collection methods, along with human open source and specialized collectors, can acquire sufficient long-range information about these indicators to detect traditional nation-state and many sub-state threats.
The real need is better analysis -- getting the relevant information and piecing it together. What I do not understand is why after more than 35 years with the Defense Intelligence Agency, each military service still performs its own strategic intelligence analysis. With the DIA and the recent formation of joint intelligence centers to support each of the geographical commanders-in-chiefs, it is time to seriously consider "purple-suiting" intelligence assets above the tactical level, as the British have done.
Such a consolidation would have the welcome side effect of reducing support headquarters and staffs as General Sheehan has recommended. Other possibilities in this regard include consolidating the now separate medical, dental, Judge Advocate General, and military police corps and transferring the responsibilities of the Civil Works Division of the Army Corps of Engineers to a nonmilitary government agency such as the Department of the Interior.
Force structure, of course, should reflect strategy and threat, both in terms of what and what kind of forces are needed to deter current military adventurism and the possible re-emergence of a hostile peer competitor.
In this regard, I am particularly disturbed, and believe this Panel should very carefully examine proposals to retain an artificially broad force structure that is significantly undermanned and under-equipped. The Air Force has already started down this road by reducing the number of aircraft in a fighter squadron from 24 to 18 and, in some Air National Guard units, to 15. The Army is reportedly seriously considering retaining a 10 division structure even though it does not fully man such a structure today. If true, this would appear to be a precipitous and dangerous retreat from the very public position of the Army Chief of Staff who earlier this month cautioned that "one of the things that you've got to make sure of is you've got your force structure and your end strength balanced."
While I fully support and recommend for your consideration the concept of active and fully equipped cadre units capable of rapid expansion to meet an unexpected threat, I reject completely any effort that hollows out the force that will be the nation's first line of defense when military action becomes necessary. Such a course would unnecessarily risk the lives of our military men and women.
In terms of force attributes, I recommend this Panel consider how to reintroduce mobility and agility into our forces. Ironically, our ground forces have become heavier and, thus, less mobile since Desert Storm. Furthermore, the threats our forces will face for the next 20 years more likely will employ mountainous, rugged terrain, as in Bosnia, or a mix among innocent civilians in urban areas where high-tech, metal-heavy forces and so-called "precision munitions" are of limited use.
An unwelcome corollary to this point, growing out of the continuing inter-service competition, is the unhealthy fixation on seizing and controlling terrain as the ultimate war-winning strategy. Yes, terrain must be taken and controlled. Yes, only a warrior on the ground can do this effectively. But winning really means identifying and destroying the enemy's center of gravity. Depending on the adversary, these centers will vary in importance and kind. What we develop, therefore, both in terms of force attributes and equipment, should focus not on substituting for the warrior, but on enhancing the warrior's capability.
Based on the foregoing, I suggest two possibilities which singly or together address force structure an the related issue of personnel and operations tempo.
First, we should consider a force size and structure based on the old adage, "if you can't see it, you can't shoot it." Simply put, our active forces should be sized against predictable threats. This structure would have a sensible floor, an irreducible minimum number of active force units capable of fighting across the entire conflict spectrum from low to high-intensity warfare. This minimum would be one of each type unit as a "root" on which to graft mobilization and reconstitution forces.
This suggests, for example, that the United States Army's war fight strategy still rooted in the striking power of armored and mechanized divisions, may have to evolve toward greater emphasis on light divisions and brigades and special operations components which are more appropriate to counter the current and foreseeable threats to international peace.
If the active force were targeted against predictable threats, reserve components would be oriented towards the "unforeseeable contingency." With the greatly expanded warning time available to detect and assess a change in the capabilities of possible peer competitors, the United States could rebuild active forces from pre-existing cadre and reserve units when these emerging threats rise above the horizon.
Again, using the Army as an example, fully-manned cadre battalions, which in peacetime would double as test beds for innovations in doctrine, tactics, and equipment, would break out to form the nuclei of a full combat brigade.
Second, the United States should take the lead in promoting throughout formation of a civilian-led "Crisis Intervention Unit" that would be available on a standby basis and in conjunction with our allies and friends, including Russia, for rapid response to potential trouble spots. The armed elements of such a unit, while not a regular military force in terms of heavy armament, would be armed sufficiently for self-protection and for the equivalent of constabulary work.
Such a unit would relieve the regular Army of many current personnel and operations tempo demands and preclude the need to have sufficient units in being to meet the three-to-one rotation pattern that non-traditional missions impose.
CHAIRMAN ODEEN: You have about four or five minutes left.
VICE ADMIRAL SHANAHAN: What I hope all this suggests to you is that no single national military strategy, threat or capability-based, can be the final arbiter of the size and composition of our forces. Since strategies, by definition, only apply to the means to defeat a specific threat, perhaps a better alternative to a single strategy would be some form of a national emergency response capability.
In the interests of time, I'm going to summarize.
CHAIRMAN ODEEN: Okay.
VICE ADMIRAL SHANAHAN: In summary, the considerations I have outlined and the opportunities they offer this Panel to question all the fundamentals of military policy and recommend appropriate, even radical changes, could provide enormous benefit to American society. Among these are:
A military force capable of fighting today and mobilizing for tomorrow at a lower cost.
A return to our tradition of melding all throughout elements of national power -- diplomatic, political, economic, social, and military -- into a cohesive and synergistic foreign policy.
More resources devoted to creating sustainable national wealth by, among other measures, transitioning excessive military capacity to civilian production, the real engine of our national strength and security. And reduced anxieties in Russia and perhaps in other nations about our large standing force.
Mr. Chairman, in your statement before the House National Security Committee on April 16, you talked about the need for vision. I believe we will achieve that vision only if this Panel, as a representative of the American people -- goes back to the very basics of our foreign policy by seeking the answer to one question: What are America's truly vital national interests -- those whose absence would fundamentally alter our national structure and its guarantees of life, liberty and our American way of life?
I believe the answer to this question will allow you to help our nation chart a renewed vision for ourselves and the world.
The alternative, clinging to the Cold War strategy and all that this implies, can only squander our unparalleled opportunity to continue leading the world into a more peaceful 21st century.
As Shakespeare wrote in Julius Caesar, "Men at some time are masters of their fates: The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves.
Thank you, sir.
CHAIRMAN ODEEN: Thank you very much.
Our third speaker is Lieutenant General McInerney of the Business Executives for National Security. Again, thank you for being here this morning.
CHAIRMAN ODEEN: Okay. Admiral Shanahan, would you please go up to the podium?
VICE ADMIRAL SHANAHAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN ODEEN: Go ahead.
VICE ADMIRAL SHANAHAN: Perhaps I could comment on your question about the budget?
CHAIRMAN ODEEN: Sure. That would be fine.
VICE ADMIRAL SHANAHAN: I have my budget manager here in the audience, someplace, Chris Hellman, so he'll jump up and hit me if I say something wrong.
The FY '97 budget, as you know, came out at about $265.3 billion. The budget that's currently under consideration, the '98 budget, is anticipated to be about $268 billion, up around $3 billion, depending on what the Members of Congress do. They're negotiating now. Perhaps they'll add $4 billion or more to it.
The Clinton Administration, in projecting out to the Year 2001 or 2, anticipates next year kind of a little dip in the budget, and then it gradually goes up again, in the out years. Well, the other party wants to spend more money now and anticipates spending less money in the out years.
I don't know how that will all work out, but it does create kind of a difficult situation. But I think that's sort of where we're going.
Mr. Ambassador, as I understand Secretary Perry, when he briefed on kind of our war-fighting strategy, or our national security, he projected three lines of defense, as I recall.
The first line of defense was to be preventive action or preventive diplomacy -- in other words, to prevent threats from arising.
His second line of defense was to deal with threats that did arise. And then the third line of defense was, if deterrents failed in that second line of defense, using military force to defeat the threat.
If you look at resource allocation, in my judgment, we have automatically dismissed or are disregarding the first and second line of defense, because we're putting all our resources into the third line of defense and shortchanging our preventive action efforts, specifically in the diplomatic area.
I would hope that, at some point in time, that imbalance between the third line of defense and the first line of defense would be redressed.
CHAIRMAN ODEEN: You talked about withdrawing forces from Europe and Asia, the four deployed -- not the Navy forces, I understand. You were really talking the four deployed forces, I believe is what you suggested. No, you were talking more broadly than that?
VICE ADMIRAL SHANAHAN: More broadly than that, yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN ODEEN: What about the diplomatic impact of that and the impact on our relationships in those areas? At least we're led to believe that there's very, very strong support for the countries in Asia and Europe for a U.S. presence. How do we handle that issue? What are the implications of a pullback along the lines you suggested?
VICE ADMIRAL SHANAHAN: Let me first address it in the form of forward Naval forces deployed. I think that it's time to change deployment patterns.
In other words, a carrier task force that goes into the Mediterranean, looks around, nothing is going on, it's seen, bring it home, or send it up into the North Atlantic for a couple of weeks or a couple of months, bring it home. The same thing in the Pacific.
In other words, they're visible, but we have gotten into this idea of sending a carrier task force to the Med. and anchoring it there for six months, cruising around, whether there is a crisis or not, whether there is a need for it or not.
There are alternatives to the Naval overseas presence. I like the Air Force's Air Expeditionary Force that General Fogelman has been talking about, as a relief, from time to time, for a Naval carrier task force, flying the F-16 to Saudi Arabia or exercising.
The Army the same way, can take a battalion, a division, a corps, whatever, and go out and do exercises. So there is still a force presence, but it's not permanently based.
I think our allies, in some cases, want us there because they know they're going to let George do it and, as a result, they -- and, as you can see right now, the track record in Europe, all of our allies are reducing the sizes of their armed forces; they're reducing the sizes of military spending. They aren't maintaining prepositioned war reserves, as anticipated or expected, because they know that the United States will come in and pick up the slack.
The fact that we have the capability to project our strength from CONUS bases is something that we need to educate our allies on, that we would be willing, in line with our vital interests, in line with our important interests, to reach out with our global protection force.
We have to decide, I think, Mr. Chairman, are we going to be a global power with global reach or do we want to be a global power with global presence, permanently stationed?
CHAIRMAN ODEEN: Okay, next question. Jim?
MR. McCARTHY: For the non-traditional missions, I believe you recommended a global police force or a civilian-led function --
VICE ADMIRAL SHANAHAN: Yes, sir, a crisis intervention function force.
MR. McCARTHY: -- a crisis intervention force, in which you would not have the military participated? Or could you be more descriptive of that? You argued that the rotational base of our military force would be eased, because this other force would take care of that.
But if I understood your construct, you're going to, in effect, build another force that has a rotational requirement in a crisis like Bosnia or someplace else, so I didn't understand exactly what you meant. Could you expand on that?
VICE ADMIRAL SHANAHAN: What I meant by that was, for example, in Bosnia today, the U.S. military in Bosnia, we would have to maintain sufficient forces in Germany to allow for three and one rotation.
MR. McCARTHY: Right.
VICE ADMIRAL SHANAHAN: With my crisis intervention unit, they would be replaced and they would stay there until they get the job done, and --
MR. McCARTHY: How would you handle a second crisis, or one that extends for a long period of time?
VICE ADMIRAL SHANAHAN: Well, you know, that's a difficult question to answer. It depends on the size of this international crisis intervention force, and it would be international. It would not be fully carried by the United States.
As a matter of fact, probably the troops, military troops, the constabulary, might be trained and organized using foreign, and let the United States provide what we do best. That is, the airlift, the sealift, the communications, the intelligence, to back up such a force, and reduce the visibility of the American military in these crisis forces.
As was pointed out, it does take away from the mentality to fight when you get people, soldiers, who are trained to break things and kill things, suddenly end up trying to maintain peace, and it makes it difficult to retrain them and bring them back into doing the job they're supposed to be doing.
You will find in your handout a copy of my proposal on this intervention force, along with an organizational chart, where the forces would come from and how they would be employed.
CHAIRMAN ODEEN: Rich Armitage.
MR. ARMITAGE: Admiral, there doesn't seem to be a handy definition of RMA, at least one that everyone can adopt. Can you give us your view on what RAM is?
VICE ADMIRAL SHANAHAN: Yes, sir, I'll try. Let me first say that I think RMA has been around for a long time. RMA has given us helicopters, it's given us laser range finders, it's given us side looking radar, it's given us infrared. It's even given us the nuclear bomb. That's kind of the general thing of RMA.
But, what I'm concerned about today is, my definition of RMAM is the latest -- and I don't mean to be smart or facetious -- it's the latest Pentagon high-tech jargon.
It refers to a quantum leap in battlefield effectiveness that results from the synergism achieved when technological breakthroughs affecting numerous weapon systems are combined with radical changes -- radical changes -- in military doctrine and force structure. That's our definition of RMA.
MR. ARMITAGE: So what does that mean?
VICE ADMIRAL SHANAHAN: Yes, sir. Exactly. What does that mean? I don't know exactly what that means. It means -- RMA to me is more than just technological advances. It's leadership. It's adjustments in doctrine and tactics. It's adjustments in force structure.
In other words, maybe you don't talk about Army division any longer. We talk about other kinds of unit organizations. To me, it's an evolutionary process that people think about all the time, taking advantage of advances in technologies, taking advantage of advances in information capabilities, to meld in, to adjust your leadership, and to adjust your tactics and doctrine.
CHAIRMAN ODEEN: Okay. Other questions?
CHAIRMAN ODEEN: If not, thank you, and I'll ask General McInerney to take the podium.
VICE ADMIRAL SHANAHAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.