Confronted with a drastically different world situation, the Armed Forces develop- d a new m. ilhay strategy and began reshaping the force to orient it towards the &mands of regional crisis and conflict. Even before the strategy and the force were ~ however, they were put to the test m the Persian Gulf. The DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM experience confirmed the direction that had been taken, and as the troops came home, the lessons learned and experience gained were used to tefic our course.

& Chapter II clearly depicts, much has already been done to improve the way the Armed Forces do their business. DESERT STORM demonstrated that Goldwater-Nichols reforms have changed the SeMce's warfighting roles by ensuring necessary inter-Semice combat support is always available. me theater commander or his subordinate Joint Task Force Cornmanders now have the dlOIity tOdCCidehow tO dbcm reSOUrCCS and employ the joint force. We've moved out with all deliberate speed to implement other important changes and give the Artwrican people a defense investment. higher return on their

But the process of examining how the Armed Forces organize, train, equip, and employ forces is continuous. Having developed a new National Military Strategy and begun reshaping the Cold War military to meet the challenges of the 199Qs, we resolvd to step back and take a ~cific look at roles, missions, and functions to ver@ that they are m tune with the strategy, that they foster no unnecessary duplication+ and that they produce a joint force that tmximim milhaty effectiveness ~r dollar spent on defense. Beginning last summer, a comprehensive, often painfd, "top- to-bottom" review was undertaken.

The Joint Staff was directed to lead the study because a truly joint and collective effort would likely uncover options and offer p~~- not visible from a single Semite's point of Viev'. However, the Smriccs were actively involved at every step, and the combatant commands also took part by examining their areas of interest and responsibility.

Areas selected for review were those where two or more Selvices perfoxm similar tasks, whete restructuring might generate si~ lcant cost savings, and where changes in our strategy and force structure made a comprehensive review appropriate. Study groups were formed to look at each issue,

m- l 93 93 Page 94 95 each overseen by a Joint Staff general or flag officer with applicable operational experience or expxlise on the issue. The groups met over a period of several months and prepared &tailed assessments. This process formed the basis for much of the analysis and many of the recommendations presented in this chapter.

This fimdarnental reexamination of the Armed Forces' organization and structure involved many serious issues touchkg on the ve~ existence of major communities within the Services. Disagreements were to be expected and, indeed, occurred. But the ~ the Joint Chiefs, and the CINCS took very seriously the challenge posed by Congress to conduct a "no holds barred" approach that had as its primary consideration not what is right for the Services or the Department of Defense, but what is right for America While the study's results were discussed at Iength among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it was the Chakman alone, as required by Title X, who uItirnately decided what to recommend in this report.

Significant changes are recommended m a number of areas. In others, the current division of labor should remain as it is today. In still others, further study is needed before final recommendations can be made.

UNiFIEb COMMAND Pm A detailed nwiew of roles, missions, and functions necessarily involves a review of the Unified Command Plan (UCP) &cause MISSIONS are assigned to CINCS, not to Servim. As discussed in Chapters I and II, the UCP is what prescrikcs tie geographic and functional responsibilities of the combatant CINCS. Since it was fmt published m 1946, the UCP has been @ted Rgulariy. Under Title X, as revised by Goldwater- Nichols, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is required to review the UCP not less than every two years for missions, qibiliti~, ~d force stxwture, and to recommend such changes as may be necessary m a repofl through the Secretary of Defense to the President.

Since the end of the Cold War, we have been reviewing the plan to ensure it provides the most eflktive and efficient command- and- control arrangements for a changing worid. One recommendation, since approved by the President and discussed in Chapter II, was ehination of Strategic Air Command and establishment of USSTIUTCOM as a new combatant C~~ consokiating command of d strategic nuclear forces under one CINC. This new joint Navy and Air Force command was a momentous UCP change and one which improved command and control of our entire strategic nuclear arsenal.

III- 2 94 94 Page 95 96 Additional changes to the UCP are being eX_ including the possibility of assigning designated forces bmd in the United States to a single joint command and consolidating space responsibilities.

Joint Headquarters for US Based Forces

The unified command structure works well overseas, where CINCS with a geographic ma of rmponsibility (AOR) effectively direct the forces assigned to them tiorn the Sewiccs in accomplishing a wide range of missions. In exercising their combatant command authority, the overseas CZNCS also have a major impact on the mdiness of assigned forces in thek theaters.

But tication has never been achieved in the United States to the same degree as overseas. While forces based in the United states are Msignq by law, to one CINc, many are =igncd to overseas CINCS and have limited opportunities to train jointly with the overseas- based forces they would join for mi. bry operations in crisis or war.

This lack of an appropriate joint headquticrs to oversee Semite forces based m the Continental Unites Stat- (COMJS) has alwa@ been considered a probl~ and the Joint Chiefk of Staff have twice tied to fi it. US Strike Command (USSTRICOM) was activated in 1% 1 to provide unified control over CONUS- based Army and Air Force units, kitiy, STRICOM W= @Wll

no regiondl responsibilkim but was assigned functional responsibilities to provide a general reserve for reinforcement of other uniikd commands, train assigned forces, develop joint domine+ and plan for and execute contingency operations as ordered. Later, STRKOM was given geographic planning responsibility for the Middle East, South Ai% and A& a south of the Sahara. In attempting to fulfill its functional responsibilities as a miner and provider of forces, STRICOM !kquentiy collided with the Sewius' authority under Title X to organize, trti and equip forces.

In 1971, STRICOM was replaced by US Readiness Cornmand (USREDCOM), whose mission was what STR. ICOM'Shad been origidy functional reqxmsibility for training and providing forces, with no geographic area of responsibility. REDCOM cxpxiencd some of the same Semite resistamx as its predecessor m Mfilling its assigned training responsibilities.

Over time, REDCOM was given additional fictional responsibilities, including a requixernent to plan for and provi& Joint Task Force headquarters and forces for contingency opmtions m areas not assigned to ovencas CINCs. What began as the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) eventually grew into a Nw

combatant command, US Cennal Command (CENTCOM). The Goldwater- Nichols Act of 1986 directd that REDCOM'S missions and functions be reviewed in light of

11.1- 3 95 95 Page 96 97 CENTCCMS creation. REDCC) M W= subsequently disestablished as the result of a combination of factors, not letit of which was that our strategy depended more on fonvard deployment and basing than on CONUS- based forces to contain Soviet expansion.

Today our strategy has changed, and we've reached a Ievel of joint maturhy that makes it possible to address once more the need for uni. fid command over designated CONUS- based forces. As OIH foward presence declines, it is more important than ever that our for= s & trained to operate jointly -- not just for occasional exercises, but as a way of lifb. Our new strdegy &mands forces that are highly skills rapidly deliverable, and fid. ly capable of operating effectively as a joint ~ immediately upon arrival.

A joint headquarters would facilitate the identificado~ trainktg, prepantion, and rapid response of designated CONUS- based 'orces currently under the by's Forces hnmand (FORSCOM), the Navy'sAtlantic a" leet (LANTFLT), the Air Force's Air Combat Command (ACC), and the Marine Coqls' Marine Forces A1. hltiC

-OR++ NT1. The time has come to merge these forces into a combatant

command whose @nci@ pllIpOScW be to ensure the ~ &ain. ing and jQD. Ireadiness of our response forces. With force packages already accustomed to operating jointly, their deployment will be expedited Overseas

CINCs will G able to focus more on in-theater operations and less on deployment and readiness concerns.

In addition to developing joint force packages for overseas CINCS, ti new combatant command could also be assigned certain other fictional msponsibilitiw, including





Undertaking principal rqxmsibility for support to United Nations peacekeeping operations and @g units for that purpose.

Assisting with the response to namral disasters in the United States and other requirements for military suppon to civil authorities when requested by State Governors and as directed by the Presiderm

Planning for the land defense of CONUS. Improvrng joint tactics, techniques, &d prcm. dureso

Recommending and testing joint doctrine.

After Several approaches to constituting the required joint headquarters were ex+ the conclusion was that US Atlantic c ornmand (USLANTCQM) is particularly well suited to assume this new missiom

~ It is an existing CONUS- based joint headquarters.

Q It already has a component telalionship with FORSCOM, LANTFLT, ACC, and

U4 96 96 Page 97 98 MARFORLANT. Its Cold War missio~ to defend the Atlantic sea lanes and undefic offensive mval operations against the Soviet Union, has fundamentiy changed. While continuing to perform a vital NATO missiou it has the capacity to undectake m keeping strategy.

this additional rcsponsibil@ with the revised rnilhuy

Its geographic AOR, although large, presents only a modest warfighting challenge. The command can probably

handle additional functional responsibilities.

ornmander m Chief of The C LANTCOM (CXNCLANT) MO has NATO responsibilities m his dual role as Supreme AIlied c ommander Atlantic (SACLANT). Given responsibility for rntegradng joint force packages, LANTCOM would be better able to tailor forces to reinforce our European presence under any cob-that might arise.

Under this recommendadoq LANTCOM would shift from a ptio~ y naval headqumcrs to a mom balanced combatant command headqmters and might be renamed to reflect more Mly its new focus. Its Commander m Chief would become a nominative position which could be filled by any Service.

The' Amy's FORSCOM would no longer rcquim "specified" status as a single-Service command reporting directly to the President and Secmq of Defense. With this change, the term "specified" would be retied, and all forces would belong to a joint team. The Senices wouId retain their Tkle ~ responsibilities, but training and deploying designated CONUS- based forces

~ would be the mission of this expanded CINC. UnKcation of the Armed

Forces, which began m 1947, would at last be complete.

RECOMMENDATION: coNus-based forces of FORSCOM, LANTFLT, ACC, and MARFORLANT should be combined into one joint command. LANTCOM will lx responsible foc joint training, force packaging, and facilitating deplopents during crises; supporting UN peacekeeping operatiow, and providing assistance during natural disasters.

space Since the 1950s, the United States us developed a highly capable and complex infrastructure for the Iaunch and control of space vehicles and systems. me Army, Navy, and Air Force have all been involved in various aspects of the national space program. h Force ICBM programs provided a number of the nation's early space launch vehicles, while the Amy actively develcpd rocket motors and anti- ballistic rnissik and the Navy orbited geophysical 97 97 Page 98 99 and navigaricmalsatellites. This broad- based Semite involvement m space programs was largely a result of the urgency of the cffoxt -- the Soviet Union's launching of Sputnik in 1957 during the height of the Cold War threatened long- term Soviet dominance in space. In response, the United States brought together the capabilities of its milhary Services and other agencies and the US space program was abk to move rapidly forward in the 1950s and 1960s, achieving dramatic advances in communications, intelligence gathering, and space exploration.

Although the majority of space functions today reside within the Air Force, all the Services, plus US Space Command and several Defense agencies and organizations, are involved m space activities, inckding research and development, acquisition, testing, training, and operations. USSPACECOM, headquartered m Colorado springs, Colorado, is assigned combatant command of US forces providing warning and assessment of a bomber or missik attack on the United States. In SdditiO~ CINCSPACE supports other ~Cs by ensuring that space oprations a@ warning requirements are supported.

CINCSPACE is also Commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NOMD), the US- Canadian command that provides air defense of the North American continent. CINCSPACE

ca. nks out his'mission through three Sem_ ice component commands: Air Force Space Command at Petersen Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado; Naval Space Command at Dahlgren, Viig- h@ and An- ny Space Command at Colorado Springs, Colorado.

Even with che Cold War over, our national security depends on a robust space capability. But we can no longer afford to allow multiple organizations to be involved m similar, independent space roIes and functions.

A number of improvements are undenvay to streamline spats organization and systems and eliminate unnecessary overlap. CINCSPACE recmly consolidated selected SPACECOM, NORAD, and M For= Space Command (AFSPACECOM) staff functions, and mmbined their operations centers. National system program offks, the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) and the Defense Abanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), are woding on a ~ )gram to exchange information on various techmiogy developments. The newest national space sullit? system W consolidate two existing systems+ permitting the closure of six ground stations and consolidation of operations at one site. Other near- term consolitiions include combining existing space suneilkmce and sPace defense operations centers into a single control center at SPACECOM.

ID- 6 98 98 Page 99 100 organizationally, the Joint chiefs of Staff agreed m 1991 to "dual hat" CINCSPACE as Commander, AFSPACECOM, which led to a reduction in personnel and support costs. However, it is time for an even twlder change to be evaluated: assignment of the space mission to STIWTCOM and elimhathn of SPACECOM. As this concept k stuU, several important issues must be ackkssed.

Under this proposal, after appropriate consultation with the Canadians, the c ommander of AFSPACECOM would assume command of NOR4D m Colorado springs. AFSPACECOM would ilkO operate all space systems under CINCSTRATS Command Small AIXTlyand Navy components would be assigned to CINCSTFUT and would be represented m space program Offices to ensure space systems were deveIoped to support all Sewiccs' needs. Personnel bm ail Setices would also be assigned to a Joint Space Planning St@ within S'IRATCOM. Under this plw the Air Force would be respomible for development of Iimre ditary space SyStcrIIs. Such m 0rgiU3htiOll WOIddensm Service- unique requirements for, and us= of, space were properly represented and that Services and CINCS had trained pasonnel with the howkdge to fbIly exploit the capabilities of space systems.

Other changes would include designating the Air Force as the lead Sake to coordinate with NXA on LANDSAT

remote etuth sensing operations, and consolidadng DOD's functions at NASA into a single organhtion under AFSPACECCN4. To streamline * salellite communications operations, all operational rcspnsibilitb for the l% fense SateIlite communications System (DSCS) will

mmsfcr tim the Defense Information Systems Agency to the &x Force. RespnsibiMies for the Navy's Fleet Satellite ComrnunicationS (FLTSATCOM) system will also mnsfer to the Air Force. Both DSCS and FLTSATCOM will mnai. n under the combatant command of CINCSTRAT.

Under this proposed a. mangement, mq@ emcnt. s for space systems would continue to be submitted by the CINCS,

Services, or agencies to the JROC for vaii& tiom Day- to- day requirements for ~tiOIld spu SyS@ IlSUWOfiwould & submitted to CINCS'TMT,

Such a cmsolidation would consemc msou. rccs and dminate a substandal number of positions. In additi~ it could improve

warfighting support km space, allowing an increase in operational effectiveness, efficiency, and interoperabilily while mimdnhg joint Service expdse and joint Opemtiorlalf- s.

RECOMMENDA~ ON: A review will be conducted to determine if the space mission should be assigned to STFL4TCOM, and if USSPACECOM should be eliminated.


Most eqyipment purchased and opertied by the Department of Defense requires maintenana throughout its useful m. me required maintenance may be as simple as a routine oil change. The most complex work involving overhauls; the

complete rebuild of parts, assemblies or subassemblies for weapons systems and their components; and other jobs beyond the technical abilhy of individual units is the responsibility of each Service's depot maintenance system. Depot maintenance is a vast undertaking, employing about 130,000 civilians and 2,000 milirmy personnel at 30 major facilities. The Semites collectively spend about $13 bilhn a year to rebuil~ refit, and maintain over 700,000 different major items of equipmenL

Four separate systems have been sized and organized to meet four Semioes' needs in a global war, each largely independent of other Services' capabilities, With the shift in strategic focus to regionaI conflicts of shorter expected duratiou and the accompanying reduction m the size of our rnilhuy forces, the collective DOD depot maintenance' system can be reduced and restructured. Significant savings are possible

by elimimu@ excess capacity, and duplicate capability and investments.

In Septimber 1992, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff chartered a special group, consisting of retired senior officers from each Service and a senior representative fmm industry, to study the depot maintenance system and identify the best way to scale down excess capacity and reduce costs without degrading the M.@ to meet current or future peacetime and wartime needs.

The study concluded that: The current DOD depot management structure has not substantially reduced capabilities or capacity. There is currently 25 to 50 5? 0 more capacity than will be needed future.

Umecessary duplication

depot m the

exists throughout the individual semi= depots, espedly when viewed across Service boundaries.

Closure of seven or eight of the thirty milimry depshthetitieprn reducing excess apaciry and sulxxantirdly reducrng long- term costs.

'Ihe most effective way to close depots is through the overall DOI) effort to cIose or consolklate excess rniliq bases and facilities, a process overseen by the Base Rerdignment and CIOSure (BRAC) Commission.

u- 8 100 100 Page 101 102 Closure of depots involves substantial upfront expenses, but if the study proposals are implemente~ savings of $400Ni to $600M per year are achievable when all eight depots are closed.

The study group also identified three options for consolidating management of depot maintenance: &signation of a SeMce executive agent for each major commodity, consolidation of all depot rnaintenan= activities under a single Defense Management Agency, or creation of a Joint Depot Maintenance Command to oversee and administer all depot- level maintenance. It was the study group's view that a Joint Depot Maintenanx Cornrnan~ with the full authori~ to organh current depots as approved by the Joint Chiefk of Staff, would produce the greatest opportunity= for efficiency and matching depot capacity wit- h future reqllirermts.

nle Chailmm of the Joint Cbiefi of staff fomvarded this recommendation to the Secretary of Defense. As a result, the services were directed to prepare integmtd assessments outlining their commendations for depot closures and management consohiatkms m time for the BRAC Comrnisrion's Wberations which will occur earfy m 1993. still under review is the group's recommendation to create a Joint Depot Maintenance command

Tle concept contained within the study group's recommendation could have broader applications. Currently, there are a number

of combaf support agencies, such as the Defense Information Systems Agency and Defense Nuclear Agency, that are subject to the direction and control of civilian Omc& within the Office of the Secretary of Defense but retain, under Tide X, a principal task o providing operational support to the Wadighting CrNcs.

A case can be made that some of these combat suppofi agencies, which are so vita to our warfighting needs, would work more effectively and efficiently as joint commands supervised by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaH and the Joint Staff. For example, the Defense Information Systems Agency could become a Joint Information systems c ommand. his concept will be explored m mo~ depth m the next report to Congress on combat support agencies due m 1993.

RECOMMENDATION: Consider establishing a Joint Dept Maintenance c ommand to rcdmx and restructure depot-level maintenance by 25- 50%. Examine closing 7 or 8 of the 3rr diary depots which could achieve savings of $400M to $600M per year after these depots are closed. Smites recommend depot closures and consolidations to the Base Realignmen and Closure Commission.

111- 9 101 101 Page 102 103 AMERICA'SAIR POWER Aviation has been an important part of America's militq capabilities almost fko. n the moment the Wright Brothers first achieved manned flight. Initidy employed as a mh. ry instmment m World War I, by that wds end m 1918 aircraft were already txiihg used both to support troops engaged in battle and to attack enemy targets m rear areas.

Between the wars, innovative thinkers m the Army began &veloping more advanced theories on the use of the airplane to attack enemy strategic and tactical targets. The Marine Corps refined its use of air power, and the Maines' combined air-ground team was born, Meanwhile, in the Navy a group of officers was aqy. ing that naval aviation and carriers should supplant the battleship as the Navy's primary offknsive arm. As a result of these and other efforts, by the time Pearl Harbor was attacked in December 1941, America had two fore= built around theairplme- the ~& r Cows and Navy- Marine Corps aviation+

Both proved indkpemabk to victo~ in World War II. The Amy Air Corps assured our return to Europe and assisted in the breakout km the Normandy beaches. In the Pacific, the Navy's fast attack cmiers helped win the war at sea and joined Marine Corps aviation and Amy ti COTS units * supporting the arduous island- hopping campaign from ground air bases. By war's

end, the eff~ eness of strategic bombing and the advent of the atomic bomb made air power a front runner in the nuclear age.

After the war, the Navy invested m longer- range aircraft and larger aircraft carriers to provide world- wide range and nuclear capability from the sea. With the proven success of strategic and tacticaJ air power and the development of the intercominental- range bombr, the Air Force was established by Congress and took its place alongside the other Semicxx in fuMlling the vital role of global sma. tegicdeterrence.

Shaped and broadened by dramatic technological advances, the importance of aviation expanded as the helicopter came of age, The American milhary first used the helicopter in Kore& both to get the wounded wfely to treatment snd to move smalI numbers of troops. Later, during the war m Vletn~ the Army and Marines si@ cantly enhamxd their combat fkibility as gumhips and troop- carrying helicopters we,: integrated kltO airrobile tits Of Up to division size.

During the Cold War, OUl technological superiority and the demonstrated quality of America's air power, both land and sea based, contributed immeasurably to effective nuclear deterrence. And had we been forced to defend against a conventional attack by numerically superior Warsaw Pact forces, our air power would have been key to the outcome.

III- 10 102 102 Page 103 104 llle Sa'vita adapted aviation technology to their quite different warfighdng dmnains, and m the process gave their fighting units the lethality, mobility, and sustainability necessary for the evolving nature of the modem bdefield. Today, the fact that all have airplanes and helicopters causes some to argue that America has "Four Air Forces," irnp@ ing we have three more than wc need. In fact, America has only one air force, the United States Air Force whose role is prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations, The other Semites have aviation arms essential to their specific roles and fimctions but which also work jointly to project Anerica's * power.

With its global reach and global power, the Air Force brings spd, range, and precise Iethali~ to any pkulning equation. Our Navy and Marine Corps air bring power tim the sea, providing ready, visible, lethal, sustainable, and responsive presence workiwide, unconstrained by the politics of access ashore. The aviation elements of Amy and Marine Corps forces are an integral part of the unmatched mobility and lethality that figured so prominently m the SUCCeSSOf OUI ground Op@ iOllS tig @ration DESERT STORM and that chracteti America's modem ground maneuver forces. Anerica's air power makes the prospect of conflict a sobering consideration for any who would consider opposing us.

So TM& some argue that we have four air forces, m rdity each is ~eren~ playing a unique but complementary role. Together, the aviation elements of the four Setices constitute "& nerica's Air Power. " It isa potent cornbinatio~ proven over and over in combat. It has been developed over the years through the coqxration and the far-ranging vision of the Department of Defense, the Services, and the Congress of the United States. By creai. ng the US Air Force, -g Marine COPS Tactical Ar m law, and supporting carrier aviation and Amy helicopter progarns, Congress bestowed on Anerica's fighdng men and women a force that has paid for irself repeatedly. Any American who has ever faced an armed enemy is grateful for the robust capability we possess.

America's air power offers the nation -endous flediiity m pe=, during crises, and in war. However, in this period of changing threats and declining resources, the aviation fou structure that was phmned m y- past must be reevahated. Recognizing that the acquisition phm for major aviation programs mqui. ms more resources than wiIl likely be available, a review was conducted to determine if some air missions could be reduced or deleted; if existing aircrafl, such as strategic bombers, could also perform other assignments; and if certain missions, performed by more than one Service, could be combined

HI- 11 103 103 Page 104 105 While America's air power has made a mignifhnt contrition to oux nation's security, we recognize that it will be smaller m the future. The Semites, in reducing the types and numbers of aircraft, will emphasize only those programs which conrnbute the most to satisfying the national mandate for a &cisive fighting force m the air at a minimum burden to the American taxpayer. With the necessaxy reductions in aircraft inventory, there are now also opportunities to make reductions in support systems, such as training, maintenance, and testing.

The following recornmeda. tions on shaping America's air power for the future reflect the realities of a new securhy environment, exploit opportunities offered by advancing technology, and preseme required Capabfities. These recommendations cover broad areas of direct warfighting concern, such u continental air defems. e, close air support, and airborne command and control. l% ey also address Suppol? illg capabilities such as flight training and inventory management.

Continental Air Defense Theairdefense of the North American Continent is the responsibility of the North American Aerospace Ikfense Command (NORAD), a US- Canadian military orgtition whose mission is to control sovereign airspace, provide warning, and respond as required to enemy air or missile attack.

A dedicated force of more than 180 aircmfi m welve Air National Guard squadrons currently pdorms this NORAD mission. These F- 15 and F- 16 interceptor aircraft operate thm 14 bases nationwide.

The mission emerged during the Cold War, and the force was sizd to intercept the Soviet Union's long- range bomber force if it attacked fiotn over the North Pole. Over the past several decades, the interceptor force has maidned a 24- hour- aday vigil, which it continues to M day, supetbly defending America against any potential threat from enemy airmfk Nowthat the threat has largely disappeared we sirnp~ no longer need such a large, dedicated continental air defense force.

Significant savings in manpower and operating costs can be achl: ved by ehinating or sharply reducing dedicated aix defense forces and taking a new approach to the mission. Already, approximately 30 squadrons of general purpose fighters are leaving the Air Force due to thr decreasing threat. In light of the US- Soviet agreement

11.1- J2 104 104 Page 105 106 to take long- range strategic bombers off aIert and the reductions called for m the START I and U treaties, it is now possible to go further. General purpose and training forces horn the Active and Reseme components of the Services can absorb today's continentid air defense rnissio~ perhaps m its entirety. Flying from approximately 60 air bases m the continental US (CONUS) and MA% intercept- capable air- cart cover NORAD'S 14 alert sites spread throughout the United States. This will provide an ample force for the day- today air sovereignty mission.

As part of the next budget deliberations, we will determine how best to implement this recommendation. The actual savings resulting born this initiative will depend on the disposition of tiected units and bases. Options range fkorn inactivating units dedicated to continenttd air defense to reassigning them to another part of the Air Force.

This recommendation encompasses a major change in the way we perform the important mission of providing for the nation's defense and air sovereignty. It recognizes snd responds to changes m the threat m a way that expIoits _ capability'a, yet reduces costs.

RECOMMENDATION: Elimime or sharply reduce the force dedicated to this mission. Assign to existing Air For*, Navy, and Marine Cop general purpose and training squadrons.

Theatet Air Interdiction The US dim on kind- and sea- based attack aircraft, long- range bombers, cruise missiles, and surfaw- to- surface missiks to conduct interdiction. TI- mmerti interdiction (TAO describes offensive aerial actions intended to attack erwmy forces deep within theix own territory before they can engage our forces. This section will address the attack aircraft and timber portions of our TAI force. Attack aircraft are multi- mission and contribute high sortie rates and tactical agility to TAI as well as other mission arem. Coming from both land and sea, tiY complicate an enemy's air defense pbnning. Long- range bombers offer large payload and global reach. Both ~s of aircraft can carxy a wide variety of weapons. Our forces are deliira! ely structured to overwhelm an adversary *m all directions, day and night, ensuring decisive victory while minhking our own losses. Responsive, effective air

interdiction is a "must have" for America and irs auies.

A number of factors can improve the effectiveness of 'TAL

Q First, deploying forces fom~ d substantklly reduces the cost of theater air interdiction.

Q second "stealth" aircraft are essential to destroy critical, highly defended targets early in a conflict. An adequate force with stealth capabilities allows a smaller number of aircmft to attain a much

III- 13 105 105 Page 106 107 higher probability with fewer losses.

Third, advanced

of mission success, precision guided munitions (PGMs) have a dramatic impact on interdiction effectiveness. The number of aircraft required to achieve mission objectives increases ~y when adequate PGM available.

Fmal. ly, lxmbers

inventories arc not with upgraded conventional systems offer advantages and capabilities that could reduce attack aircraft requirements m certain conflict scenarios.

There are a number of observations that have been made concerning the composition of the theater air interdiction force.

Strategic bomlms, previously dedicated to Cold War nuclear missions, are now available to support theater air interdiction operations.

The long- range bomber force should be capable of deliverirlg advanced conventional precision- guided munitions (PGMs).

Bombers can be espe@ llv effective in the eadyf days of a short- notice conflict where deployrwnt of CONUS- based attack aircraft has yet to occur. In such cases, bombers can reduce aircraft requirements. In oper: ions such as DESERT SHIELD/ STORM, where adequate buildup of attack aitcrafi

occurred #rior co the commencement of hostilities, bombers may not be as critical to the TAI effort.

Basing makes a critical difference. Sufficient numbers of land- and sea-based bomber and attack aircraft need to be fommrddeployed or rapidly deployable to provide a quick response to short- notice crises.

Stealth teduces aircraft losses. AS these high technology aircraft are procured, a smaller total number of bombers and attack aircraft are required. Stealth also increases the likelihood of destroying critical targets during the early days of amflict when enemy air defenses are intact.

PGMs reduce losses, and their remarkable accuracy drives numlxr of airmafi required damage objectives during operations.

down the to achieve interdiction

Theater air interdiction should continue to be ~uried out using a mix of lxmbers and attack aircraft and modernizing current systems or replacing them as necessary. The ~& dhY and sun'iv~ d. ity of attack aircraft should be improved through upgrades to sensors and weapons dclivety systems. The bomber force should be moddied to give it a more effective conventional capability for the air interdiction task. All manned tiCdt would also benef5ttim more PGMs. In the determination of total aircraft required for

III- 14 106 106 Page 107 108 theater air irttcrdiction, it is necessary to consider the contributions of both bombers and attack aircraft.

RECOMMENDATION: Sufficient numbers of land- and sea- based bombers and attack aircraft need to be fonvard-deployed or rapidly deployable to provide quick response to short- notice crises. Strategic bomlxrs, previously dedicated to Cold War nucbr missions, are now available to support TM Therefore, in the determination of total aircraft required for TAI+ it is necessary to consider the contributions of both bomks and attack aircraft.

Close Air Supped Perhaps no aspect of roles and missions has spawned more debate Srncs the Key West Agrexrnent than the question of close air Supporl (cAs). CIose air support, according to the definition @ to among the Semites at Key West, is "Air action against hostile targets which are m close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air

mission with the fire and movement of those forces."

~'e most recent review of close air support reached many of the same conclusions as the 1989 Chairman's repofi on roles and missions, Uf primary importance is the need to keep the issue of w provides CAS separate from which type

I 1 1

of aircrail wll perform the function. As this nxiew proceeded, became clear that close air support it also must Ix the business of all the Armed Forces -- all of America's avkion elements can and must be prepared to support troops on the ground. With these thoughts in mind, and with the intenaon of clarifyhg responsibilities and ending unproductive controversy, several changes axeproposed.

When the Key West Agreement was signed, attack helicopter didn't exist; the CAS defhition therefore applied only to fixed- wing aircraft, and it has always been so construed. Today's highly capable attack helicopters can provide timcIy and accurate t% e support to ground troops engaged m battle, as they did in DESERT STORM.

While this robust capability m fact adds to the close air suppofi figh4 it has never been recognized m the CAS definition and is therefore not embedded m Service doctrine. By qdating the &! 5nition of CAS m a way that captures all modem capabilities, a foundation for necessary doctrinal changes can be established. Basic joint publications will be changed to reflect this expanded definition and appropriate chnges in Service doctrine will follow.

These doctrinal adjustments will ensure that CAS is available to ground commanders when needed, while allowing the theater commander the flexibility to emqioy the best pltionn for the mission theater- wide. The

III- 15 107 107 Page 108 109 integration of fixed- wing aircraft and helicopters for CAS will allow commanders at all levels to take advantage of the distinctly different, but complementary, capabilities of each type of platform. Each Service will be assigned a prirnaxy fiction for CAS, but will specialize in the type for which it is currently structured. To effect this change, recommend Semite functions be realigned as follows:





Air Force -- RirnaIy: Provide flxed-wing CAS to the Army and other forces as directed. Collateral: Provide fixed-wing CAS to amphibious operations.

Navy -- Primary: Provide fied- wing CAS for the conduct of naval campaigns and amphibious operations, Collateral: Provide fixed- wing CAS for other land operations.

Marine COWS- Primary: Rovide fixed-and rotary- wing CAS for the conduct of MVal campaigns and amphibious operations. Collateral: Rovide fixed-and rcmuy- wi. ng CAS for other land operations.

Amly - l% rluuy Provide rotary- wing CAS for land operations. Collateral Provide rotary- wing CAS to naval campaigris and amphibious opuions.

To get the most out of CASwapablc fixed- wing aircraft and helicopters, CAS procedures at the tactical level need to be Standardked. Existing procedures for requesting and controlling CAS are

predornknard~ Scrviu-~ cialized, The command and control systems and associated terminology also vtuy greatly across Setice and CINC line.. These procedural difference, spread throughout the command and control system, magn@ doctrinal differences and conrnbute to misunderstandings about Semite commitments to, and effectiveness of, CAS.

It is essential that CAS capable aircraft be fully incorportied into joint operations, To ensure uniformity of execution, a standardized, joint procedural and control system is being developed. An executive agent will be designated to create a centralized training program for all officer and ed. isted specialists charged by Service doctrine with integmtiori of all fim support, including CAS, mval gunfire, and artillery,

Whh these changes m doctd. ne, procedures and training, CAS issues will no longer center around which Semite stands to gain or lose the most, or the doctrinal implications of ck Ages to traditional roles, missions, and fincdons. Only one issue really counts+ and that is how to ensure that Anwrican troops, locked in combat with the enemy, get all the fire support they need.

RECOMMENDATION: Include attack helicopters as CAS assets and realign and chrify functions and doctrine to include CAS as a pximary mission mea for all Senices.

III- 16 108 108 Page 109 110 Marine Corps Tactical Ah Marine fixed- wing combat aircrafl are an integral element of the MAGTF and perform four tasks: offensive air support, anti- air warfare, cIec@ cmic warfare, and reconnaissance -- all of which have as their

P* PIUFW the support and protection of Marines on the ground, whether

indepen& ntly or as part of a joint force. Marines train and fight as a combined arms air- ground team and rely heavily on the support time aircraft provide. In an expxiitionary operation, once a. ittields m established ashore, most of the Marines' supporting fipowcr is provided by Marine Air. This "airborne arlillcry" provides critical fmpower to the ground commander, giving him a powerful force multiplier in combat operations.

Support of Marines and other forces ashore is often only avaihble from carrier-based air power. Marine aiscraft are mrricr-c- apable andshare with Navy aircmfta common procutwnent system d common maintenanu training. AdditiOdy, Marine tied- wing combat &craft have been designed to allow them to operate fiorn austere expeditionary sites m situations WhCrCAir Force units lack the required base Mastruckue, where adequate sea- based support k unavailable, or where the combination of Navy and Marine combat air can increase the sortie rate for aircraft supporting ground forces.

Like' other Arncrits of "America's Air Power," Marine aviation is restructuring to meet the needs of the fimre. The fixed- wing aircraft inventory will drop horn nine types of aircrafl to four, simplifying maintenance and SUppOrt. The number of F/ A- 18 squadrons is being reduced, and the number of AV- 8BS is being reduced by a quamr. These changes alone will result m significant sswings in force structure, equipment, and operating costs.

Beyond reducing manpower and equipment, greater emphasis will be placed on joint and combined operations and on funk developing capabilitim nqui. red m the complex operating environment of the "littoral" or coastal regions, While the Marine Cotps will retain its unique capability to operate tiorn the sea and horn austere sites ashore, and will continue to provide the primary aviation combat element of its combined asms team, Marine Corps squadrons will deploy more frequently a@= d Navy ships. Navy squadrons wiH sharpen their focus on littoral warfare and tailor their force structure more toward power projection and the support of forces ashore.

The Marine Coq? s has always been at the forefront in integrating ground and air elements into an effective fighting force. The unique structure of the Marine Corps is an essential element of the National Military strategy.

III- 17 109 109 Page 110 111 RECOMMENDATION: Marine corps tactical akcraft are an integral part of the Marine air- ground team and should not be eliminated. Marine Corps aircraft w- illbe reduced from nine to four aircraft types and deploy more ii- equently aboard aircraft carriers.

Flight Training During the Cold War, America's nationaI security requirements led to the development of several organizations to train flight crews for the four militaxy Semites and the Coast Guard. While some reduction of these training organizations has already occurred, significant capacity still exists beyond what is needed for the years ahead.

Reductions in excess capacity can be achieved when training is combined or consoiidat~ which is practical when Semites can use the same type of aircraft in Silllik phases of training. such consolidation .neduces costs through use of common maintenance and training facilitk, and management organizations. The advent of new training aircmft and hdicoptcm to be used by all SeMces, together with phmned reductions in p. nat training requirements, means we now have an oppommity to consolidate OUK~ training pm-fim. her.

Curm@ y the Army, Navy, and Air Force each operate their own initial or undergraduate flight naining program using 12 bases and various types of aircraft. Because of commonality inherent in cma. in potions of this training, some consolidation has already taken pIacc. Two Services (Navy and Air Force) provide all fimxl- wing akraft pilot and navigator training, and two Semites (Army and Navy) provide all helicopter training. Two training bases, one Navy and one Air Force, were closed m 1992.

Flight training is divided into two major phases, an introductory or primaq phase that teaches basic skills and an advanced phase that integrates these skills and introduces the student pilot to mihary flying techniques. FOXthe primary phase, training goals are similar for all Semites. To take advantage of this commonality of purpose, all Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard flight stu& nts will begin training using a common fixed- wing training aircmft that is being jointly developed. At a specified point, pilots wiU be selected for Service advanced training m one of four specfic follow- on specialties or "tracks": Navy Fighter/ Attack, Air Force FighterlBomber, Navy and Air Force Tankerflranspor@& ritirne Patrol, or Helicopter. While the 1991 Joint Intemervice Training Review Organization (1'I'RO) report provided analysis that helicopter training consolidation would not

III- 18 110 110 Page 111 112 provide cost savings, a workable alternative may be to provide a common helicopter for basic helicopter training for all setvices, Continued study is warranted for both consolidation of helicopter training arid development of a common training helicopter,

This initiative will reduce costs W combining flight trainkg at the minimum number of installations and by reducing the types of aircraft flown. Training advantages and cost reductions will be gained when all activities are collocated, while still affording the Semites a means for selecting students for advanced flying tracks and teaching Semite- unique skills such as shipboard huldings.

~e objective is to hWc this training consolidation plan fully implemented by the year 2000. Near- term objectives are as fouows:

Q A joint Semite team will meet in eariy 1993 to pkm this transition and determine both costs and savings. l% is team will also oversee the &vclopment of training curricuIa to suppmt consolidation

Q Beginning in 1993, flight instructors from the Services will be exchanged to provide first- liand experience and ident@ factors that may impact milling consolidation. A limited student exchange will folIow after training curricula have been developed and implemented.

O Tanke~ jTramport/ Maritirne Patrol training consolidation is expected to begin in 1994 at Reese Air Force Base, Texas after transition planning is completed by the Joint Service tcamq Eventually, Navy students selected for Maritime Patrol training will complete their entire undergraduate training at one location.

Ci By the end of 1994, the Navy and Air Force will have developed joint primary training squadrons at two locations. If it is cost effective, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard helicopter training will be moved fim PensacoIa to Fort Rucker.

With these steps, quality flight crews will & trained at reduced cost. Further initiatives, beyond those outlined above, may also be possibk.

Since curricda of the two existing test pilot schools are similar, the Services will also explore the possibility of joint test pilot training at a single location. costs to operate this program might be reduced through collocation of training assets and consolidation of selected parts of the academic and flying programs.

By altering the traditional approach to those portions of flight training where the Semites share similar goals, and by undertaking sensible changes in this area, the high quality of "America'sAir Power" will be

I sustained at reduced cost to the &nerican

ID- 19 111 111 Page 112 113 taxpayer. RECOMMENDATION: Consolidate Navy, Maine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard initial fied- wing training, and transition such training to a common primary training aircraft. Consolidate follow+ n flight training into four training pipelines. (Navy Fighter/ Attack, Air Force Fighter/ Bomber, Navy and Air Force TankerRransporr/ Maritime Patrol, or Helicopter), Determine if it saves money to move Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard helicopter training horn Pensacol~ Florida to Fort Rucker, Alabama.

Aircraft Requirements and !nventcxy Management

All together, the Semites have more than 24,000 fixed- wing aircraft and helicopters of various types in their inventories, Over the years, abaft inventories grew with expanding force S? lUCttKCand increased budgets in response to the threat hrn a Soviet tnilitq machine bent on both quantitative ad qualitative advantage. Each bicc &fined its airmail requirements and caku. bd rnventory using its own methodology, terminology, and philosophy. , Now, confronted with a much different worl~ Scmice requirements for

pm *im aircrafl as well as support aircraft for backup, attrition, testing, and

training are inconsistent, outdated, and m need of revisiofi

Two emknplm show why a new system is needed to better measum existing inventories against the requirements of our new .nditary strategy, In procuring F- 16 aircraft during the 1980s, the Air Force developed its requirements based orI an expanding force structure and included estimates for attrition losses over the F- 16's entire lifk cycle. By basing production on these estimates, the Air Force was able to lower the average "per unit" cost for the F- 16, both for itself and for potential forei~ buyers. However, with force structure coming down and with attrition rates lower than pmdicte~ the Air Force finds itself with more F- 16s than its force structure requires. Congms has contributed to this excess @ continuing to fund F- 16 production m recent defense budgets at rates lxyond that which was requested. Operations and maintenance

fhnds are baaed on a squadron's authorized aircrafl. 'Ihe Air Force maintains aircraft above a squadron's authorized level on the flight line as "attrition reserve" aircraft. Attrinon reserve is a category th is not related to expected attrition and o s which none of the other Semites use. Keeping this large resexve of aircmft undercuts the logistics system because, when an F- 16 breaks down, it is easier to simply substitute another aircraft than to procure spare parts and do repairs at the squadron or wing level.

In- 20 112 112 Page 113 114 Another example is the by's AH- 1/ AH-@ program, where "WoMd maintenance" aircraft are kept in the active inventory even though these aircraft are incapable of flying. The total number of flyable aircrafl, therefore, is less than perceived.

An assessment was conducted to determine cost savings achievable through the use of updated DOD terminology and inventory definitions. The conclusion was that with common definitions among the Semiccs for support and backup categories of aircraft, we could more clearly define

_ aircraft requirements and ensure that fimds were not spent on maintenance or rntication of unnecessary aircraft.

The Sexvices are committed to developing such standard terminology and inventory definitions. To this end, an implementation plan will be developed, and the common methodologies will be used in upcoming budge~ force structure, and acquisition management activities.

Adopting a standardized akcraft inventory system camiea with it several problems. F~, we may discover that on-hand quantities of certain aircraft tjqw exceed cument requirements, forcing us 10 place aircraft in storage and/ or cease ongoing production. Storage and reclamation programs could reqll~ additional manpower and operating funds. Ceasing production of particular aircraft has implications for the health of the defense

industrial b and for America's abilhy to com~ te m forvign markets. Second, changes m inventory could require more repair parts at unit level and change the way each Service's maintenance structure is organized.

Despite these cautions, standardizing DOD aircraft terminology and inventory definitions is a necessary step that will enable the Semites to more accurately measure existing inventories against requirements.

RECOMMENDATION: Aircraft inventory terminology should be standardized Common definitions among Semites for all categories of aircrafi will assure consistent rationale for requirements and ensure procurement and maintenance fimds are ordy spent on nemssary aircrafr. 'II& standardized approach will provide consistency in the nurnlx of airfhmes procured.


Throughout the Cold War period, the Servkes pwchased a wide variety of aircraft designed to meet their requirements. In some cases the same, or very similar, aircraft were purchased by more than one Service because of an established requirement for the capability that aircraft type could provide.

We have carefully examined these aircraft common to more than one Semite looldng for ways to consolidate operations, maintenance, and training to save funds or do business more efficiently while preserving each Service's ability to perform its required functions. The results of these studies and recommendations for consolidation of common aircraft are presented m the section that follows.

Ai~ orne C~ rnand and Control

The airborne command fl~ t of our strategic nuclear f< and control 'Ceshas long been one of the most visible symbols of the Cold War. These aircraft, with their battle stad and sophistic~ d CORMllUlliGitiOUS equipment, were for years regarded as part

of the ultimate "dooms& y machine" whose prinuuY mission was to initiate the launch of a retaliato~ nuclear strike. At the height of ti.~ Cold War, the Air Force operated a fkt of 39 airborne command post (ABNCP)

EC- 135 aircr& t, Specially% onfigurcd for control of the bomber and intercontinental ballistic missile legs of the strategic triad. The Navy had a similar fleet of specially-rnod& d C- 130 aircraft to relay launch commands to our fleet of ballistic missile submarines These C- 130s were commonly known as 'TACAMO" aircraft, short for 'me ~arge Wd Move Qut."

Over the past two years, the Air Force has more than halved its ABNCP force Smlcturc. tifltiy, Ody 11 EC- 13% support the cornman~ control, and communications needs of the Commander m Chief of Strategic Command (CINCSTMT). The Navy's C- 13( I TACAMO fleet has been retired, replaced@ 16 modem E- 6&.

A review of possible further force structure reductions in this area ConcIuded that a total consolidation of Air Force and Navy functions is possible and appropriate. 'IIM Navy's E6A has been chosen as the common aidkarne due to its extended semiu life, ability to accommodate a bade staff, and capacity to handle the communications upgrades required to provide command and conlml of all * legs of the strategic triad. Funds required for modification of the E- 6A will be provided by retiring the Air Force's EC- 135 and canceling programmed upgrades, The engineering phase of this modification program is currentIy undesway.

III- 22 114 114 Page 115 116 This new joint- Semi- A3NCP will have all the capabilitim of two airhmes for the price of one. Current plans call for a joint battle staff to augment the Navy TACAMO crews on STRATCOM missions. This manning scheme promotes efficiency in aircrew training while preserving the essential jointness of the comman~ control, and communications element supporting CINCSTRAT and COnlPOrleIlt COmnlSn& rS.

RECOMMENDATION: Consolidate the Navy and Air Force aircraft and functions into the Navy's E- 6A program. The Air Force EC- 135 program will be eliminated and csndlation of its planned upgrades will iimd transition into the E- 6A.

Combat Search artd Rescue (C$ AR)

Fig and rescuing downed flight crews or other forces qpcd W enzrny lines is a task of the greatest importance. our CsAR cqMMity has improved substmtially over the past several decades as helicopters became more capable and the Armed Forces began to use this newly-acqukcd vertical lift capability to rescue downed aircrews where extraction by other means was not possible.

FirstentpIoycd duringtheKorean War, helicopter rescue operations expanded in capability and complexity in Viemam Land-and sea- based heiicoptem, escoxtcd @ fighters and other support airmaft, recovered

downed &crews throughout the combat zone, in many cases snatching them away from certain capture, l% e importamx of CSAR operations justified the formtion of dedicated units trained and equipped for the task. Despite the success of this approach, after the war ended, dedicated CSAR units were absorbed by other tasks and vimally disappeared fkomthe rnilitaxy force structure.

CSAR tasks were then taken up as a collateral fh. nction by the individual Semites. The Ar Force moderrtimd its Air Rescue Semite forces, but looked to its special operations aviation assets for CSAR. The Navy ernpIoyed its anti- submarine warfare helicopter and carrier- based assets to conduct lwth peacetime and combat search and rescue. 'The Army and Marine Corps relied on their existing aviation forces to perform CSs as did the newly- formed special @tiOllS Command (SOCOM), which has specially modified kl. icopters and fixed- wing aimaftcqmble of longer- range CSAR operations.

Combat search and rescv-. have not kept up with joti.

covert or procedures operational

doctrine as each Servia independently developed its CSAR program. During the Persian Gulf war pieced together requirements.

The remedy develop and train

a CSAR capabili~ was to meet batdefi! d

for these shortfalls is to joint CSiWl forces using the highly capable equipment the Semites have today or are programmed to buy.

KU- 23 115 115 Page 116 117 CSAR capabilities will & created on the basis of each Swice's structure, with land-based and sea- based elements organized trained, and equipped to work individualityor together, m accordana with joint doctrine, employing standardized joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. l% ese forces will be tied together m wartime by a Joint Rescue Center that will control and coordinate the forces nee& d to meet the joint force commander's CSAR needs.

Implementation has already begun. A series of joint CSAR tactical exercises was recently completed at Naval Air Station Fallow Nevada. I& ssons Ieamed from these exercises and from other recent joint exercises wili yield important standardized procedures for all CSAR forces. To further improve procedures, fbture CSAR exercises will be developed by the Joint Staff and incorporated into our exercise program. The new jointly trained CSAR forces will emphasize joint capabilities postured to provide aitical Ii& saving selvice to our soldiem, saiiors, aime% and marines -arydlere, anytime.

RECOMMENDATION: All four Services retain responsibility for CSAR operations. ,CSAR forces will be equipped to operate individually or together employing standardized joint doctrine, tacti~, techniques, and procedures.

Operational Support Akcrufl (hrrently "about500 aircraft, operated by all four Services and the Coast Guard, are dedicated to @rational Support Airiift (C) SA) -- the transport of m. ihry psonnel and high- priority cargo. Over the past few years, the Services have saved money m this area by conducting joint aircrew training and consolidating unit- level and depot maintenance. However, the size of this aircraft fleet and the overhp in support functions compelled us to Iook for ways to achieve fwther cost- savings in the areas of operations, training, and logistic support.

The aircraft involved m troop and cargo transport and VIP movement include C- 9S, C- 12S, C- 20S, C- 21S, C- 23S, C- 26S, C- 1375, P- 180s, and others. Each Service has its own fleet, aircraft overa& components. predominantly

for a total of 500 OSA including the Reserve 'l% ese aircraft are CONUS- based and traditionally have been under the o~ rational control of the individual Semites.

The current inw tory, built to support a giobal war, exceeds what is required for our regionally oriented strategy. Thecurrent excess is compounded by the fact that Congress continues to require the Servica to purchase OSA aircraft neither nquested or needed. In the last two years alone, Congress "added on" funds to the Eefenw Appropriations Bill for some 15 C- 12S, 4 C- 20S, 10 C- 215, 10 C- 23S, 19 C- MS, and 12 P- 1805 not requested by DOD.

III- 24 116 116 Page 117 118 Several alternative operations ~d management schemes were proposed for operating these aircrafi, hong them were: contracting out the entire mission to civilian contractors; consolidating the OSA fleet under a single command which would determine schedulingand assume operations responsibility; and consolidating all assets under a single Semite which would assume procurement, logistic, and support responsibilities.

Further study is necessary to determine which alternative will provide the best balance of efficiency and effectiveness. In the inte~ USTR4NSCOM is improving its capability to schedule intratheater airiift in support of wartime taskings. The Joint Staff, the Services, and TRANSCOM wi13continue to examine this issue and make appropriate adjustments as circumstances warrant.

RECOMMENDATION: OSA aircraft are in excess of wartime needs and should be reduced TIL4NSCOM wi13 develop the capability to coordinate and sckdulc intratheater airlifk -"

Atiuck t4ellcepter$ 'h rapid evolution of the attack heiicopt& r as an integral ekrncm of the forces engaged m ground maneuver warfare was underscored during the Persian Gulf War. The omnipresent attack helicopter, advancing just above coalition ground forces, was one of the classic imag= of

DESERT $TORM. The successfid integration of the attack helicopter into modem ground operations can be attributed to two factors. First, tremendous technological advances have been made in modem helicopter weapons systems such as the APACHE (AH-@) and COBRA (AH- l). Second, the introduction of these advanced weapons into our aircraft inventories was accompanied by a revolution m battlefield tactics. The ground batdefield has kccome a threedimensiomd battlespace where the attack helicopter's advanced features give the ground commander unprecedented battlefield visiom mobility, and striking power.

Both the Army and the Marine Corps operate attack helicopters u an organic element of their ground maneuver warfare. Today, thC= arc 736 AH- 64 APACHES and 875 AH- 1 COBlU4s in the my, and }24 AH- lW COB~ in the Marine Corps. The Army is phasing out its older COBRAS as IJCWAPACHES come off the assembly line, and plans a fiturc inventory of 811 APACHES and 412 COBRAS. The Marine Cotps will retain the COB~ for the foreseeable future and has invested heavily m upgrading ils air5ame and avionics m order to keep tie COBRA's CWabilitieS as near state- of- the- art as possible until the next generation of attack helicopter is produced. The Amy and Marine Corps are planning to develop and procure a common airframe to fu. lfdltheir fiture requirements.

rII- 25 117 117 Page 118 119 After an extensive review of force structure and function. aI akematives, it was found to be inadvisable and impractical to have one Semite attempt to provide this organic combat capability for the other. 'Ihe demand for constant and integrated training at the unit level in peacetime -- m order to be victorious in battle -- precludes alternative approaches. However, the Semites cm should, and will Consolidate ti~ W and initial maintenance skiIl training, as described elsewhere in this report.

Additionally, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Chief of Stfi of the kmy have been asked to review the emerging requirement for armed helicopters aboard Navy ships. Thek review will examine theti Services' existing force structures, training flow, and logi. stim infrastructures to determine the most effective, efficia and economical way to meet this new requknent.

RECOMWWDATION: kxny and Marine Corps retinue to operate attack hdiCOptCrS. CoiISOlidateS0= *W and maintenance mining, Develop and procure common ties to fidfill future requirement.

GeneraItSupport Helicopter Cornmensurare with advances m rotary- wing technology, the helicopter has grown in irnpollalw as an integml part of militaq organizations. Its functional utility and versatility allow our milhary forces to accomplish a wide vtiety of essential missions, such as air assault opertiom, anti-submarine warfare, electronic warfare and jamming, field artillery aerial obsemation, reconnaissance, command and control, medical evacuations, and logistics. Ahhough ckissd% d as support helicopters, these are

WY ~- d akfiarnes that are an integral pm of ground maneuver warfare.

Other general support hdicopters are used for non- Semite specific tasks, such as test range support, transportation, courier sexvice, and logistic support. The AmIy operates the Iargest number, but all Semites have general support helicopters.

Ways were examined to achieve fimher c~ in oprations, training, and maintenance while preserving essential


To this er@ the Services will move toward consolidating maint~ m -g, simulator training, and maintenance infrastructure. In addition, overhqqing muki- Sewice administrative Suppyt functions m the same geographic regions will be closely scrutinized. A good example of an area where consolidation may be possible is in the Washington DC area whe~ the Services operate VIP klicopter

Ill- 26 118 118 Page 119 120 detachments. As part of this effort, a review will be conducted to consider if the Reseme components or civilian contractors should assume some or all of this responsibility.

lhese planned consolidations will presave the capabilities we require from general support helicopters while achieving cost savings.

RECOMMENDATION: Consolidate maintenance training, simulator training, and maintenance infrastructure. Study consolidation of overlapping Semicc supporl functions within certain geographic areas.

Tactical Airiififlankers -- C- 130s 'Me importance of C- 130 tactical airlift and tanker support to the Armed Forces and their operations has not &minMwd m the cument security cnvironmnh From Operation DESERT STORM to Operations PROVIDE COMFORT, PROVIDE RELIEF, and RESTORE HOPE, American C- 130S have &en and wiU continue to be called on m war and for humanitarian relief around the wodd

While co@ urations and traditional Seticc- spccillc approaches to functional requirements have evolved over 30 years, there are two basic types of C- 130S "-transports (some with special capabilities) and air- to- air refueling tankers.

To meet tactical airlift and tanker Suppm requirerunts, the Air Force currently opales approaely ~

C- 130s, th~ Marine Corps 68, the Navy 17, and the Coast Guard 26. Air Force C- 130s deploy worldwide for tactical airlift, humanitarian air@ aerornedical evacuation, special operations, rel% cling, and other fUIICtiOtlS and tasks. The primary job of Marine Corps KC- 130 tankers, as part of the Marine Air- Ground team, is to refuel Navy and Maine tactical fixed- wing aircraf?. lliey also have a secondary t~ of refueling Special Opemtions Forces (SW) and CSAR helicopters. Navy C- 130s provide fleet seMce and support to the Natiomd Aeronautic and spa= Administration (1'L4SA).' Ilw Coast Guard uses C- 130S for command- and- control communications, search and ~SCUe operations, law enforcement, ice operations, and time eariy waning. 'l% ese C- 130s are aU heavily tasked.

In reviewing the C- 130 force stnxturc, the objective was to preseme its capability to perform it9 basic * WhiIe determining if efficimcies could be ildlkWd by cumbi. ning

~tiO~, ze-~ and support under one Sefvicc. A DOD C- 130 SystenM Re@ rernents Working Group had already directed that the Air Force remain the sole acquisition agent for all DOD/ USCG C- 130 &craft and retain responsibility for all depot-Ievel maintenance for CONUS- b~@ C- 130S. TIM review showed that consolidating all C- 130s under one Sefice would not be cost dfkctive, would degrade efficiency, and would greatly complicate

III- 27 119 119 Page 120 121 management and suppon of these heavily utilkd assets. & a result, consolidation is not recommended.

RECOMMENDATION: Consoli& ting C- 130S under one Service would decrease operational effectiveness, complicate management and support, and would not save money.

Jamrner Aircraff The employment of active electronic countermeasures against enemy radar and command- and~ ontrol systems, commonly referred to as "jamming," has taken on much greater impotiance as air defense systems have become more sophisticated. This fact was amply demonstrated during the Persian Gulf conflict when Navy, Marine Corps and &r Force "jammers" severely degraded Iraq's air defenses. In DESERT STORM, the availability of jammer aimraft was a prerequisite for a strike package to proceed to the target -- no jammcrs, 10 air strike. 'I% eresult was an exce@ or@ y low level of coalition aircraft losses despite Iraq's modern and elaborate air defense network. As air defense technologies proliferate, this xqyirement for advanced electronic countermeasures to support air operations is LiWy to increase.

The responsibility for providing this cap@.@ is shard by Naval aviation and the Air Force. The Navy and Marine Corps operate 133 EA- 6Bs and the Air Force

operates 40 EF- 1 llAs. With no plansfor a totally new jamrner *e until weli into the next century, the capabilities of both the EA- 6 and the EF- 111 must be continuously upgraded to keep pace with the evolving air defense threat.

Differenetx m the basic capabilities of the EA- 6 and tie EF- 111 are significant. The EA- 6 is optimized for all weather operations m close suppoti of camier air wings and Marine Air- Ground Task Forces. It can also operate from expeditionary airfields ashore. Its performance characteristics arc compatible with the Navy and Marine Corps tactical combat aircraft it escorts. In contrast, the E& l 11 is a deep-pctrating, high- speed, long- loiter airframe with all- weather terrain- following capability that is designed for "stand- off" jamming. The similar but speciali. d capabilities of EA- 6s and EF- ills give milirary commanders a range of options in combat, complicate any enemy's ail defense pknning, and reduce aircraft @tiO~

If, or example, only E& 6Bs were in the rnvemoty, Air Force bombers would be restricted in the way they could be employed to attack erwmy targets as part of a "strike package." Similarly, if the El?- l11 were the only jammer aircraft in the inventoq, Naval carrier power projection capabilities and the ability to support certain long range Air Force bomber missions with essential jammer protcedon would be unacceptably degraded.

rlI- 28 120 120 Page 121 122 Several alternatives to the present operational Srrangernents were examin~ with specik emphasis on combat capabilities, cost savings, mission responsibilities, ability to operate with other systems, peacetime training capabilities, aircrew training, maintenance training, and all levels of akraft maintenance.

The EA- 6 and the EF- 111 both derive great "economies of scale" *m the fact that

they share many components and support and training procedures with the fleets of A- 6s and F- ills managed by the Navy and Air Force, ~~ tivdy. whCfC possible, efficiency will be improved by consolidating operations, basing, training, and lo@ tics support. All jarnmer aircraft will soon be based at only three locations: Naval Air Station Whidbey IslanrL Washington Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carob and Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico.

'Illc feasibility of Consolidating the almltly programmed system Upglades to both airmaft w:* also cxatnki. Because of the extensive engineering modifications that would be z, changing the EF- 111 system to the upgraded EA- 6 system would add mo~ than $1 billion to cu. ment program COStS. Replacing Air Forcc EF- 11 IS with new EA- 6s was SISOexamined. Acquisition costs for additional EA- 6 airframes to completely replace EF- 11 1s would exceed $2 billion.

'l% eh critical combat suppoti assets provide our air components added flexibility, survivability, and effectiveness -- qualities that will become more impcmant than ever as overall force levels are reduced. Our plan is to retain both fleets of ticraft, modified M necessary to keep p= with technological advances m the defensive systems of ptential adversaries worldwide.

RECOMMENDATION: The Simik but specialize capabilities of all Navy/ Marine Corps EA- 6B and Air Force EF- 111 aircraft give rn. Wary commanders options mcombat to reduce aircraft attrition. Both aircraft should be retained and upgraded . Consolidating into one airframe would reduce effectiveness and require . additional aimraft procurement.

Ekctrmic Surveillance Aircmft Throughout the Cold War, the maintenance of robust signals intelligence (SIGINT) programs to help us understand the intent of art adversary as menacing as the Soviet Union was of paramount importance, 'Ilis was especially true because Soviet dwtrine called for a massive, short- notice invasion of Western Europe. Being able to detect preparations for such an attack well before it occurred dominated much of our intelligence- gathering hardware development. As a result, a capable fleet of surveillance &craft was developed and purch= ti. Over time, as these airti were

I integratedinto the SeMces, their unique

III- 29 121 121 Page 122 123 capabilities were found to be applicable to llMtly ~S OfC& and ~Ol@ iCtS.

While the end of the Cold War has reduced the need for systems targeted spectically against Russh it has actually intensiikd the need for the kinds of information these aircraft can provide. The uncertain nature of future milituy threats means that our leaders will have to be fully informed about the intentions of potential adversaries. The regional focus of our National Military Strategy has placed even greater emphasis on intelligence- gathering. The current situations in Bosni~ Iraq, and other regions of ethnic, religious, and social tension underscore the need for these types of systems.

Providing this information to senior decision- makers is the job of a small group of highly speciaked aircmft and their crews. These unique airframes are the EP- 3E ARIES operated by the Navy and the RC- 135 m JOINT operated by the Air For=. mere are currently 12 EP- 3Es and 14 .C- 135S m the rnventoly. m EP- 3ES arc .omebased at Naval Air Station Ag~ Guam and Naval Air Station Rot% Spaim The RC- 135S are homebased at Offut Air Force Base, ,Nebraska Both Semites have numerous forwrd operating bases and deployment sites around the world.

This force structure is barely sufficient to handle current peacetime requirements. During Operation DESERT STORM, u EP- 3E and RC- 135 aircraft were committed

to the war. & a result, other theater CINCs had only limited electronic surveillance aircraft to cover their areas of interest. If another conflict had broken out, we would not have had sufficient assets to support our forces.

The distinctions Mwcen the EP- 3E and the RC- 135 arc significan~ yet their capabilities are complementary. TIE RC- 135 is principally a strategic srcmwasset with the capability to collect signals valuable to national intelligence agencies. The RC- 135 flies at higher altitudes than the EP- 3E, enabling it to collect certain signals at greater range. It can also be refuekd while airborne, which gives it greater endurance.

The EP- 3E is principally a tactical SIGINT asset con@ ured to evaluate the battlefield electronic warfare threat, provide real- time threat warning, and conduct long-range radar targeting and analysis. The EP- 3E can operate bm shoner mnways than the RC- 135, with less ground SuppO~ equipment and ikwer personnel. Together, the two platforms provide military commanders and civilian leaders with unmatched airborne electronic flexibiliq and wplilky.

Several alternatives,

suneillance inchding consoli& ting all RC- 135 and EP- 3E air5ames under one Service, were examined. It was found that consolidation would actually cost more because each Semite is able to draw on infrastructures already m pla= to support the Navy's large P- 3 fleet

m- 30 122 122 Page 123 124 and the Air Force's sizable KC- 135 fleet. These infrastxwtures make the operation and maintenance of these 26 a. irhnes only a small fraction of the overall fleet costs.

Efforts will continue to streamline both programs where it makes sense to do so. For example, it is recommended that electronic warfare training and quipent maintenance be consolidated whcm feasible, pending the completion of a review by the DOD- sponsored Airbonw Reconnaissance Support Program Steering Group. It is also anticipated that a DOD group wiIl recommend a common electronic SUrVCihlCC phfonn be developed and

deployed early in the next centwy.

RECOMMENDATION: Navy EP- 3E and Air Force RC- 135 aircmft are my Committed and should h retained. rn. hlstructure is already in place to support the Navy P- 3 and Air Force KC- 135 ffeets, of which the EP- 3E and RC- 135 arc a small part.

Shaping AvMon forthe 90s We arc justly proud of America's air power. When called upon, our aviation elements with their WMkd and compkrr& muy capabilities have perfommd brillidy. To retain these strengths, America's aviation elements must continue to be shaped to faw the challenges of the 90s.

I III- 31

~ 'SeCtiOIl has laid Out SOnle initial observations on how this restructuring should proceed. In some cases, signitlcant changes m roles, missions, and functions have been recommended. In others, tier review is required. To truly have an impact on resource allocation, these recommendations must be factored into current and future programmatic decisions.

AUareas of aviation will continue to be examined for unnecessary duplication and potential cost savings. It is recognized that there remain a number of contentious issues that must be addressed - that what has km provided here is only the beginning of the process. Recognizing that the acquisition plan for major aviation programs requks more resources than will likely be available, a review must be conducted to ensure they are brought into balance with the reduced threat and limited resources.

In the months and years ahead, we wiU continue to ask ourselves the hard questions about our aviation inventory, suppom ti.= tructure, training, and assignment of roles, missions, and functions. This will ensure that the aviationelementsof the four Semites remain a potent force in the fimre. 123 123 Page 124 125 FORWARDPRESENCE Since the end of World War II, the day- today pres me of US forces m regions vital to US mtional interests has keen key to avening crises and preventing war. American forces around the world demonstrate our commitmen~ lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis- resqmnse capability while promoting US influence and access. In addition to forces stationed overseas and afloat, forward presence includes periodic and rotational deployments, access and storage agmments, combined exercises, SeCtllity and humanitarian assistarn, port visits, and military- m-rnilitary contacts.

Continued engagement m world afhirs through fomvard presence remains essential to America's global interests. Forward presence is the totaLity of US instruments of power and influence employed overseas (both penllrulently and temporarily) to protect national interests, provide access, promote valu~, shape events in the best interest of the United States, and provide the leading edge of America's abilhy to respond to fast breaking c. kes in a region. Forward presence sfrimgthcns collective engagement through which the United States works with its allies and fiends to protect its security interests, while reducing the burdens of defense spcndi.. g and unnecessary arms competition. Additionally, the presence of a

highly capabl~ military force with a Ml range of combat power seines as a stabilizing factor in many regions.

We must also bear m mind that instability still exists throughout the world -- witness current events m the Balkans, pans of the former Soviet Union, and Somalia -- and our fonvard- based forces have been and remain a key un& rpinn. ing to regional and world stability. During the Cold War, we executed a strategy of containment with large numbers of forward stationed forces and a permanent presence of rotationally deployed forces in fixed patterns In the new security environment, we have shifted to a strategy of cooperative engagement with smaller levels of forward stationed forces, flexible deployment patterns, and using the totality of US capabilities deployed oversas to participate m forward presence operations that demonstrate our engagement m the world.

Forward presence operations include operational training and deployments, wcurity assistance, peacekeqing operations, combating drugs and terroris~ humanitarian assistance, and protecting US citizens abroad through noncombatant evacuation operations. All of this contributes to regional stability, which supports US interests and promotes US values abroad. The challenge now is to meet forward presen= goals with a smaller presence that, ~ still sufficiently flexible and adaptive to satisfy enduring national security objectives.

III- 32 124 124 Page 125 126 An analysis of requirements revm. ls four major factors that may affect our forward presence posture. First, the changed strategic landscape permits a dramatic but carefully managed reduction in forward stationing, worldwide, Second, i% cal reaIities mean fewer resources will be available for defense. 'IMrd, post- Cold War geopolitical changes require a more regional fonvard presence capability. Fouxth, the US Armed Forces have @come a truly joint force and can complement one another m peace, crisis, and war.

These four factors led to a conclusion that further reductions m forward tioned forces can be made, but that the current rate of reduction should be maintained. We have already embarked on a plan to reduce to the Base Force levels by 1995. Going any faster would adversely af& t the cohesion and readiness of the overall force structure. After 1995, if the situation warrants, tier reductions in forwaxd- stationed forces could be considered

As fomutrd stationing is redu= d the nature of our rnilitary- to- rnilitary contacts will also change. The European theater h the potential to be one of the most unstable areas in the worl~ As the likelihood of using unilateralmilhary force declirm in this decade and beyond, our influence will be exerted through existing multinational arrangements. J. nEurope, a placewhere US interests will continue to be focuse~ we have the most successfid alliance ever

devised. Thisalliance will continue to be the mechanism through which peace and stability are maintain~ but only if we remain a part of the alliance, and only if we maintain a crediile milktry presenm within it. Even du. rirzg times of peace, forward presence enables the United Stares to infiuencz the emerging democratic process m Eastern Europeandtheformer Soviet UnionmWays that would not be possible from a CONUS-based posture.

In the Pacfic region, the key to our forward presence has been and will remain a network of largely bilateral security allianaxs with Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia+ the Phil@ piis, and lhiland -- and cooperation with other friendty ruuions.

For example, Japan continues to be America's key Pacfic ally and the cornerstone of US forwarddeployed defense strategy in the Asia- Pacilic region. Our relationship with Japan affOrdS US forces geomgi~ y acid navali air, and ground bases on the @phery of the Asian land mass. Despite the bmkup of the Soviet Union, our presence there mnains a timl aspect of our fommrd deployed posture. Given the great distances associated with the Pacific theater, forws maintained in Japan could deal with a wide range of local and regional contingencies.

It should also be remembered that stationing forces m Japan is actually far less expensive than keeping them m the Unit; d States. The Japanese provide some 75% of

ill- 33 125 125 Page 126 127 the cost for our forces and an average of over $3 billion in host nation support annually, more than any of our other allies,

While we maintain our long- standing overseas comrnilmcnts, the nature of our forward presence operations can change significantly. In addition to fomvard stationed and rotationally deployed forces, smaller temporarily deployed forces, either joint or single Semite, will take on increasing importance. T& e units will participate in small unit training, pmonnel exchanges, security assistance, semhars and conferences, medical support, humanitarian assistance, engineering assist. aru, disaster relief preparedness, and intelligence exchanges. These programs promote access and cooperation overseas with a small investment in resourws.

As mentioned in Chapter ~ a new concept is being developed to allow us to conduct forward presence operations at about the same pace but at lower cost. Forward presence operations will kc conducted by deploying gcogmphically and mission tailored joint forus. Tailored joti for~ packages will be employed Wherwver possible, sometimes in lieu of independent single- semice fonwtrd deployments, to canplement 'existing in- theater capabilities and assist CINCS m achieving their regional goals and objectives. Joint Task Forces (JTFs) wdl ~corne the common organization for peacetime forward presence operations, improving the ability to transition to joint

command stru& ures in response to regional C& S. ThCSC ~S Wa be built ss @tiVe

joint force packages made up of both forces scheduled to deploy during a given period and designated units m CONUS and overseas. These packages could contain a mix of air, land, special operations, space, and maritime forces tailored to meet the supported CINC'S geography and mission mpirements. With new and planned upgrades aboard Navy ships, JTF commandm will also have the tkxiiility to be based afloat or ashore.

RECOMMENDATION: Forward stationing is a key underpinning of US diplomacy. It conrnbutes to conflict prevention and lends credibility to alliances. As the global security environment changes, add. itiond reduction in forward stationed forces may be appropriate. However, 'as foxward stationing decreases, fonvard presence operations WiiI increase m importance. Continue to develop concept of Adaptive Joint Force Packages.


The capability to respond to regional crises is one of the key dernan& of our National MiMary Strategy. US forces must be prepared for differenu h tcm~ climate, and the nature of the threat, as well as for differing levels of support hn host nations and other allies.

Both Army and Marine Corps forces possess the ability to rcspnd to crises illVOl~ knd combat. As outlinedin

Title X and arnplillcd m DOD Dirtctivcs, the Amy's primary responsibility is "to or@ z@,

train, and @p forces for the cunduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land -- specMc. ally, forces to defixzt enemy

land forces and to seti, occupy, and &fmd land areas." 'Ilic Marine Corps' primary responsibility is to be o~ e _ ~d equipped "to provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for scMcc with the fleet in the seizure or &fense of advanced naval b and for the conduct of land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval Campaigm"

The similarity of Army d Marine Corps capabilitiM provides alternatives to the President and the Secretary of Dc* during a crisis. However, it leads to a question of why two services have similar mponsibfi~ for ce- land operations. l% e answer lies in the unique, yet

cmnplem! ntary capabilities of these two sc~ iccs' capabilities that span both deployment and employment characteristics.

'Tie rde of Amy forces is to defeat enemy land forces and occupy territory. Army contingency forces are organized and equipped for a full range of crises that require prompt and sustained land operations or presence. They include the following:

Q o

Airborne forces capable of responding to a crisis within hours to show US resolve and to stabilize the situation.

Light infantry forms specifkal. ly designed for rapid air deployment to provide sustained force m various types of terrain where maneuver and mobiIity are restrictd

Air assault forces structured to hit hard and fasti using lift helicopters for rapid mobility over any terrain and attack helicopters to &feat even Iwavily

armored targets.

Armored srld mechanized infantry forces capable of &titig the full range of cacmy capabilhks, including other heavy ~ored forces. Because their heavier

equipment must be deployed by sealift, these forces take longer to deploy m response to a crisis.

Tn some situations, forces can serve as the additional contingency

Amy contingency enabling forw for or expeditionary forces by eatabl. ishing a secure lodgment and then transitioning into a sustained kmd

U- 35 127 127 Page 128 129 operation. A recent example of the Amy m an ending role occurred in DESERT SHIELD, when elements of the 82nd Airb me Division were inserted in the first days to secure lodgrnents at the ports of Damrnam and Al JubaiI m Saudi Arabia. These lodgments were then handed off to other by and Marine Corps elements to develop into major bases of operation.

Marine Corps expeditionary forces are organized and equipped for a Ml range of crises that require operations fiorn the sea. Marine forces are capable of seizing and defending lodgments in littoral areas, enabling the introduction of follow+ n forces. They can deploy in two ways:


u As Marine expeditionary forces, they can use Navy amphibious shipping for crises requiring forcible entry by amphibious assault, conduct "show of force" operatioIM coupled with the threat of US intementi~ and conduct operations without sustakd logistbl support or } mt nation infrastructure.

As Maritime Prcpositionin , Fore+, which are Marine forces mat have equipment and supplies staged abwd folward deployed Maritime Prcposkioning Squadron ship, they ean bcairlifted toa their equipment, missions.

crisis ma, link- up with and perform a varietyof

With the'focus on regional crises and the inc~ ased uncemdnties of the post- Coid War era, a mix of forces with distinct but complementary capabilities is essential. Situations wilI often demand that the two Services operatetogether. An exampleis the * emblishment of a lodgrnent area by the Marines, foIlowedby a build- upof Army forces, or vice versa. Once Army forces

expand the lodgment and begin sustained land opera& ions, Marine forces can become the CINC's strategic reserve, threaten the enemy with an amphibious assault from another direct. io~ or continue to fight on land - as they did during DESERT STORM.

Time are several advantages in having similar, complementary capabilities among the two Services. It allows the combatant commander to tailor a md. itay response to any contingency, regardless of geographic location. At the national command level, ' it adds to the options available to senior &cision- rnaimr9 in a crisis, especially one that occurs Unexpeaedly.

In 1990, during Operation SHARP EDGE, Marines operating from Navy ~mi~ sl@ helped evacuate US citizens during a major upheaval m Libecia

The situation m Liberia steadily deteriorated over a period of days, permitting a Amphibious Ready Group to arrive on the scene and remain offshore for several months while continuing m monitor and evaluate events. Had the crisis erupted more quickly, Auny airborne forces might have been more

JI1- 36 128 128 Page 129 130 ~propride. Another example, discussed in Chapter I, was the Somalian crisis. In January 1991, an amphibious force quickly shifted to assist m the evacuation of US embassy and other Pmsomel. Again, had the situation required more rapid action, ArmY forces could have been used.

The comprehensive review that produced the Base Force m response to a changing worid yielded signiikmt reductions m our contingency and expeditionary forces. Accordingly, a number of Army heavy and light divisions and Marine Corps personnel were removed tirn the force structure. But our capabilities- based strategy demands the unique and complementary capabilities provided by the Army and Marine Corps. In fact, with its emphasis on rapid response to regional crises, the National Military Strategy puts a pmnium on these forces. Review of requirements is a continuous process, however, Sndmayrnthefurure produce additional areas of personnel and cost savings in contingency and expeditionary forces, to include the possibility of further reductions m the Amy's light infantry force%

RECOMMENDATION: The capabi. lit$ s of the contingency and expeditionaryforces m the Armyand Marine COTSprovide decision makers with valuable skemtives and should be retained. 'Ihe possibility of further decreases in the Army's light infantry will bestudicdasfom StXUC~ cis reduced.


The Amy and the Marine Corps both employ tanks and Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MUM) as integral parts of their doctrine for tactical operations. Both Seivices currently have tanks m their force structures, but only the Army currently has MLRS - a system which saw its first combat seMce m DESERT STORM. The Marines have programmed to buy MLRS beginning m 1994.

The Marine Corps is structured to integrate armor and artilky units into its maneuver elements. Both are inexmicably linked wish the Marine infantryman This comection is reflected m the Marines Corps' credo that "every Marine is a rifleman tint." Armor and artilIery are not separate units that simply support the infantry when necessary.

~anlis In the Base Force, the Army has tanks m eight Active component heavy (armored and mechanized infan~) divisions and m two armored cavalry regiments and two separate brigades. In the Rese~ e components, the Amy has tanks in five heavy divisions, two cadre divisions, three separate heavy brigades, six round- out and round- up brigades, and one armored cavalry regiment.

III- 37 129 129 Page 130 131 The Marine Corps Base Force ammr S& llCtUrc COmiStSOfthree tank battalions -- two active and one reserve -- to support the capability to employ two Marine Expcditionq Forces (MEFs) fhvard and outfit three Maritime Repositioning Squadrons. This small tank force pcnnits the Marine Corps to fulfill its role in the National Military Stxategy. The Amy conducts tank skills training for both the Senfices.

MLRS Eight active hy heavy divisions each have one MLRS battery with nine launchers. Additional MLRS arc located in corps artillery battalions. Marine corps MLRS capability is programmed around a total of 42 launchers. MLRS systems arc identical for both Sexviccs, and individual training for both would be COmbi. tld at by Sd100h.

The Marks will rely on MLRS to provide general support field artilIery to the Marine Air- Ground Task Force (MAGTF). In 1989, the Marine cows sckcted _ to augment its general support artillery capability. In making that dccisiou the artillery force Suucturc was realigned. Subsequent force planning decisions required additional attillery reductions. The Marine Corps gave up dl self- propelled general support cannon artillexy and retained the requirement for an MLRS battalion -- a decision based, m part, on the promise of projected savings m pcrsonncl and maintenance. The Marine Corps has argued


that MLRS is essential to offset its 45% reduction m cannon artillery, the loss of self-propcllcd capability, and reductions m tactical aviation traditionally depende. on to rnakc up for shonfalls in ad. lery.

Achowledging that armor and MLRS arc necessary capability for enabling forcks operating from the sea, the question of whether the Army can provide those capabilities to the Marines Corps was studied. Certainly, the Army possesses the tanks, MLRS launchers, and requisite crews to perform the mission. But the tougher question is whether separating tanks and MLRS fim the MAGTF would have an unacceptable impact on the Marines' ability to fight as a cohesive team, and whether having to provide part of its structure to suppon the Marine Corps would leave the Auny short of ik warfighting requirements.

A range of alternatives was examind tim having the Atmy provide all tank and MLRS support to the Maxine Corps to mahwhing the current program. it was conclu& d that severing axmor* the organic structure of the Marines would markedly reduce unit cohesion and warfighting capability and achieve ncglitible cost savings. 'Ihe Marine Corps'unique role as an enabling force horn the sea demands a force structure with enough armor to conduct its amphibious mission. Also examined was the related issue of how nany tank battalions the Marine Corps shotdd retain. There was consensus that the Marine

u- 38 130 130 Page 131 132 Corps must retain enough tank batttions to support amphibious operations and outilt three Maritime Propositioning Sq@ rons.

A different conclusion was reached on MLRS. In keeping with the adage that "the artillery is rever m the resetve," there are advantages in assigning the Army responsibility for all MLRssupport. Because MLRS units are normally positioned in the rear and typicalIy &e across maneuver unit boundaries, the impact on Marine unit cohesiveness for warfighting would not 5e as severe as losing armor. Adopting this course of action would result m significant savings -- prelimhary estimates indicme on the order of $300 million over a six year period.

But ebinating the Marine Corps' organic general support artiky is a major step that warrants an imkpth cost and Cffectivencss anaIysis before being implemented This study must also examine theimpact onthckrny ifit isquired to provide MLRS for the Mar& s, and whether tactical air and naval gunfire can povidc sufficient fire support for IWkirm fighting ashore.

RECOMMENDATION: Marine Corps will retain enough tank battalions to support amphibious operations and to outfit three Maritime Propositioning Squadrons. 'he Army will provi& any additional tank support required Tllcrc appears to be advantages m having the Amy provide MLRS support for Marine Corps operations, however, an in- depth cost and operational

cffectivenks analysis is required before irnpkneming this recommendation.

THEATER AIR DWE~ SE Theater Air Defense (TAD) is a mission that includes "all defwive measures designed to destroy attacking enemy aircrafi or missiles." TAD includes ground-, sea-, air-, and space- based systems with anti-& craft and/ or anti- missile capabilities. Since 1948, the Air Force has had the fhnction "to develop, m coordination with the other seMces, doctrine, procedures, and equipment for air defense fi- om land areas." Likewise, the Navy provides sea- based air defense and the sea- based means for coordinating contiol of defense against air attack. All the Services have functions "to orgarb, main, equip and provide forces for appropriate aix and missile defense operations m accordance with joint doctrine." All four services currently operate TAD systems. 'llMAmy, Navy, and Air Force develop and acquire their own systems. Marine corps systems are &veloped by the Atrny and the Navy.

During the Cold War, we developed robust ground- based theater air defenses to counter the signifkant threat to our ground forces posed by Warsaw Pact air forces and missiles, With that threat now gone, we

have undertaken an evaluation of how much and what kind of thcatex air defense capability we need for the future.

III- 39 131 131 Page 132 133 Generally, we divide the TAD environment into high medi~ and low altitude threats. There will continue to be a threat from aircraft operating at high altitude (above 10,000 feet), However, the robust capability of our air forces leads us to Mi. eve that future ground- based systems need not fbcus on this threat. With our current air forces and ground- based TAD assets, we also possess a significant capability to counter any threat from manned aircraft operating at iow and medium ahitude.

In the near term, the primary threat will be from tactical baiEstic missiles. In the longer term, cruise missiles wiUalso become a threat. We expect potential adversaries to direct their ballistic and cruise missile attacks primarily against certain critical, high- value targets, such as maneuver force concentrations, command and control facilities, pcxts, and airfields.

To support the new mgionallyariented strategy, we must be able to rapidly concentrate mobile fmces for decisive action. Forces must kc abl to conduct aggressive marwuver and offave operaions. Air and missile attacks against forces on land and at sea will remain of some, but considerably less, concern. &med with chemical or biological w~ eads, enemy cruise or ballistic missiles can be a significant threat to maneuver forces and opxations.

Advanced technologies are being aggressively pursued to counter theater ballistic missile as part of the GPALS

( 1 4

1 ( (



[Global Rotettion Against Limited Strikes) ?rogram. 'l% e Army is developing the High Mtitude Theater Missile Dfense system, mo& rnizing the PATRIOT missile [PATRIOT- 3) system and developing the CORPS AIR DEFENSE (CORPS SAM) system to provide improved defense against theater ballistic missiles at long, medium, and short- ranges, respectively. The Air Force and SDIO are jointly developing a deployable airhne laser prototype to engage and destroy theater ballistic missiles m the boost phase. The Navy is developing a variety of sea based systems, most notably the sophisticated AEGIS system which incorporates netting of sensors with sea, air, and land forces. Emphasis is being placed on deployable and rapidly re- bx. table advanced theater rnkile defenses. These, along with space based systems, will provide protection of our deployed forces, as well as our friends and allies, hn ballktic missile attack.

several steps have been taken ~o improve coordination bmveen the Semites as we procure new systems. Under the SDIOS leadership, a management .smcture was created to integrate acquisition efforts. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) valkhed the 'Ileater Missile Defense Mission Need Statement m 1991, and has reviewed or will review key TAD systems. The Joint Air Defense Operations/ Joint Engagement Zone program office is working to integrate fighters and surface- to- air missiles in a more effective

III- 4( I 132 132 Page 133 134 way. Operation demonstrated integration of

DESERT SHIELIX'STORM the capability and the our modern theater air defenses. Each Service brought unique and complementary capabilities to the battlefwld. Aircraft provi& d the first and prime line of defense against enemy aircraft, while ground systems engaged the ballistic missile threat and were also prepared to counter emny fmcd- wing aircraft, helicopters, and cruise missiles,

Durkg this review of Service roles, missions, and functions, several options were examined for the theater air defense function, ranging from full consolidation of the function into a single service to mhtaining the current functions.

The Air Force Mieved it should & responsible for the entire TAD functio~ but the joint working group concluded that MI integration of ground- based TAD assets into Amy maneuver forces was key to providing for their protection. Furthermore, making changes m TAD roles and missions did not significantly improve efficiency or the ability to address the emerging mkile threat to critical assets , Fiiy, there would be substantial neax- term costs and personnel disruption associated with transfeming TAD systems or functions between Sexviccs and no long- term savings were identified. Therefore, the conclusion reached was that AC current functions, with each Semite providing TAD assets, gives the best

protcctiofi to our forces. A change m fimctions would severely disrupt the cumnt stnmure, provide little benefit, and spend taxpayer dollars unneceswily.

Coordination and cooperation on TAD system development will be increased across Service lines. As one current example, the Army and Navy, with SDIO funding, are developing a cooperative engagement capability between the Amy's PATRIOT and the Navy's AEGIS air defense systems. Tlis will enable one system to communicate and coordinate its response to any threatening aircraft or missile with the other system.

It is a& o recognized that we must continue to review the total TAD area to ensure that all current systems and those m development complement each other without providing unneeded duplication. Toward this end, we plan to conduct a Joint Mission Area Analysis, headed by the Joint Staff, to review the TAD missiom Results of ~ analysis wiIl determine if fiut. her efiernems are required in roles, missions, and functions associated with TAD.

RECOMMENDATION: A IWicw of Theater Air Defknse is needed to ensure we have the appropriate mix and quantities of air and missile defense systems. The Joint Staff will head a Joint Mission Area Analysis to comprehensively review TAD requirements, capabilities, and deficiencies.


The Department of Defense owns and opates an extensive array of training, and test and evahmion ranges and facilkh spread throughout the United States, These were developed and sized over the past several decades m response co Cold War requirements and a modernization/ acquisition pact driven by the need to retain technological superiority. Each Semite approached training, and test and evaluation from its unique perspective and developed its own infrastructures, leading to DOD- wide overlaps and redundancy.

The end of the Cold War has provided the necessity and opportunity to reevaluate our weapons test and evaluation inkwructure and to examine the potential of ekxxronicaIly linking various ranges in order to create fadities to support joint training exercises. Late in 1990, a formal process was begun to integrate test and evaluation procedures and ranges. This process, called PROJECI' RELIANCE, has already resulted in savings and consolidations throughout the Defense Department's test and evaluation titructi:

To better other technology research, efforts were begun to develop more efficient ties between operational field commanders' warfighting requirements, the Semites, and the technology research cornmuni~

(including DAkPA and the Strategic Defense Initiative). This initiative better relales test and evaluation planning with evolving research amd devebprr, ent. EspeciidIy exciting in this area is the potential to take full advantage of cutting~ dge computer modeling technology advances which enable very nxalistic substitutes for some testing.

Despite far ranging PROJIZI' RELLANCE agreements, there is stiII much room for innovation, consolidation, and savings. TIMdilemma is that DOD test and evah. mtion facilities are valuable national resources, unlikdy to be replaced once eliminated. Therefore, a deliberate review must be conducted of the test and evaluation facilities as part of our commitment to a defense- wide reduction of unneeded infrasmxture.

As part of a continuing cfforl to streamline test and evaluation range inhstructure, an executive agent would be designated to oversee the management ad integration of activities c mentIy conducted by the many independent test and evaluation ranges. This integration of existing facilities would provide a combination of Ian& se% and air ranges to fblfill test and evaluation requirements.

As an example, in the Southwestern United States, all four Services have training, and test and evaluation ranges that provide a land airspace, sea arer~ and offshore supersonic operating domain that could accommodate a major portion of our joint

m42 134 134 Page 135 136 test and evaluation needs. In addition, with proper electronic linking, this integrated facility could be used to support joint training exercises to augment training conducted on the Semite training ranges.

The Services would retain their responsibilities for range maintenance and site operations. 'lb executive agent, as single manager for the test and evaluation ranges, would be responsible for central scheduling of joint operations, validating range modernkuion needs, and developing advanced data processing to interactively tie the ranges together, This step would expand the availabii and quality of joint weapon system testing and would also provide improved joint training opportunities. 'This combintiion of operatiomdly- oriented management and advmed technology would create an unmatc~ world- class infrastructure to met training, and test and evaluation ncds well into the next cmmry. Equally important, it would provide the opportunity to divest ourseIves of unnecessary infrastructure - duplicative jobs, ranges, and installations. As a result, we see the potential for a test and evaluation inflastructurc that is modcrrq meets our needs; promotes joint systems development testing, 'knd trainhg; and reduces long- term costs.

Another proposal being reviewed is for the Amy to have testing responsibility for surface- to- air misiles, the Air Force to test air- to- surface missiles, and the Navy to

execute the air- to- air missile test program. Ln the SeMces, the guiding philosophy is to cooperate, eliminate, and consolidate. By the mid- to ltic- 90s, the Semites will have diminated 4900 persomel involved m test and evaluation and will have saved over $1 billion. 'Ihey are also cooperating on nearly 50 technology efforts that support testing and evaluation.

RECOMMENDATION : ~signate an Executive Agent to streamline test and evaluation in& mructure. Using advanced data processing, electronically link test and evaluation, and training ranges, in broad geographic areas such as the Southwest US, to enhance joint testing needs and support joint training rquircments.

1. L143 135 135 Page 136 137 CONSTRUCTIONENGINEERS In the past 45 yeas, each Setice developed a robust contingency construction engineering capability sized and shaped to provide construction support to combat forces and maintain bases and facilities around the world.

Construction Engineers provide construction skills and base operating semices under combat conditions. in peacetime, these uniformed engineers, 70% of whom are in the Reserves, augment base maintenance personnel m are= technicality beyond day- today, base- level capabilities. Often they are a key part of humanitarian assistance operations such as recent disaster relief operations in Flori~ HaWSii, and Guam.

The option of having a single Semic# provide all wartime construction units was considered. However, consolidation was rejected because of the uniquely tailored suppofi Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps construction engineers provide to combat units of their Services.

However, construction engkering manning is already being reducd as the force suucture is cut back. Army engineer units are king ~duced by 34%; Air Force units by 3970; Marine Corps units by 20%; and Navy units by 11%. Further engineer unit modifications will occur as requhnents are Mned.

The S& ices are also committed to elimimdng redundant entry- level and advanced construction skill training by reducing to a minimum the number of training sites. This initiative is discussed m greater detail m the section on mining consolidation contained elsewhere m this report.

The functional review also considered a wi& range of management ahematives for consolidating engineering functions above the base level. 'l% ese Serviu fimctions extend from headquarters, through regional office3, to the installation level for planning, technical services, and work performance. There are policy and programmatic differences between the Services in the resource levels dedicated to installation support, the rnixtum of contract versus in-house operations, rnilkmy manpower use, and financing and budgeting methods.

We plan to evaluate consolidation of broad installation support rwponsibilities, currently provided by technics! support units, both geographically and fictionally, in pm- such as environrnent. id SCMCCS, contract administratio~ engineering design fiC@ standards, technical guidance, processes and forms, civil engineering R& D, and automated management systems.

RECOMMENDATION: Consolidation of individual Se~ ice engineer units is not recommended because it would not save money and would provide no

I advantages. Reductions already underway

rl14 136 136 Page 137 138 decrease construction engineers m the Army by 34%, Air Force by 39%, Marines by 20%, and Na~ by 11%.

OPERATING TEMPO (OPTEMPO) Well- mined mditary units fight effectively and win. l'his nation's soldiers, SadOrS, tixq and marines must go into combat believing m themselves, their equipment, and their units. Their lives and the success of the mission depend on proper preparation. OPTEMFO is the term used to describe those training and rwdirws programs that contribute to that preparation. OIWEMPO is specified m terms of average flying hours per aircrew per month, average days underway at sea per ship or submarine per quarter- year, or average operating miles per combat vehicle per year. It includes the maintenance and support of specific equipment as well as the operating crew. Tllua, au activities associated with OPTEMPO contribute directly to the readiness of units.

TM Hccs have aggressively pursued the use of new technology to reduce OFIZMPC) costs. one example is the Navy's ~ of Battle Force In- port Simulator Training, where senior naval decision- makers can simulate moving ships and aircraft to train rather than involving the actual ships or eqmding the ammunition necessary to refine these skills at sea. Similarly, the Amy and the Air Force have increasingly used

simulations for major exercises such as REFORGER. "Instead of deploying 114,000 troops and their equ@ rncnt co Europe as was done in REFORGER 88, for REFORGER 92 sophisticated simulations were used and only 26,000 troops were actually moved. This saved an estimated $16 million in transport costs ~d $23 ~on ~ reimbursement costs for manuever damage to European roadways, forests, and fields.

The cost of introducing new weapons SySk3TlS is dSO being reduced by increasing

the use of simulators to improve the skills of our people before they enter the cockpit, tank, or get their ship undemay, Rather than troops spending mom time m the field training on these new systems, simulators provide operators a potion of t- he training they need to develop their skills. For some of our troops, simulators provided the only exposure to new weapons systems prior to DESERT STORM.

As form are redu~ d, the overall %wg~ e cost Of operations and maintenance will b redueed. Moreover, our

new concepts for conducting foward pre= nee operations, described earlier in this chapter, wiU have tie added effect of reducing certain OITEMPO rates. But because there will be fewer units forward-bascd ne~ likely trouble- spots, and because resource- intensive missions such as humanitarian assistanm will likely increase, OPTEMPO rates may increase for many units.

n145 137 137 Page 138 139 However, there is a limit to cutting back on field training. To maintain peak readiness, our troops must train often with other Semites and with our allies, The new _ strategy puts a premium on forces that are ready to respond to regional crises

and can be rapidly integrated into a coalition force. We ~member all too well how, tier the V~ etnam War ended, we severely cut OPTEMPO resulting in reduced retic! SS levels and the "hollow" nditary forces of the 1970s. We are determined not to allow that to happen again as our force structure is drawn down.

OPTEMPO is did to m* SS and combat capability. To cite one example, our aviators worked hard for nearly a decade and a half to increase OPTEMPO from its low point following the Vietnam War. Because operational aircraft fly more sorties per month, aircrews have achieved a higher state of readiness. h the opening &ys of DESERT SHIELD, this higher training readiness allowed us to have our tlrst fighters m place m Saudi AraMa just 34 hours after receiving the order to deploy. In additi~ two carrier battle groups already operating in the vicinity of the Gulf, as well as the naval forces of Joint Task Force Middle East, were fully ready fbr combat operations. In large measure it waa peacetime training OPTEMPO that provided the combat skills to defeat rapidly and effectively one of the world's largest and best equippd militaries while suffering relatively few US or coalition

casualties. ' Higher OYI'EMPO also trardates into safer operations. For example, during the 1980s the abikty of the Air Force's Tactical Air Command to sustain a higher training OYI'EMPO led to a far lower mishap rate that saved the equivalent of 300 aircrail and 250 lives. Navy tactical aviation experienced similar safety improvements, where an 11' ZO increase m flight hours resulted m a 45% decrease in aircraft mishaps.

With a smalIer structure, all of America'sArmed Forces must be ready to respond on short notice. M& mining adequate OPTEMPOwill enable these men and women to defend America'sinterests whereverin the woridthey are sent.

RECOMMENDATION: OFTEMPO cannot h reduti The amount of warning time available before cmndtin g forces to combat is generally a therefore, the need forahigh state ofm3dimssisincre*. In SdditiOQ ~" forward stationing is reduced, forward deployments &come m re important in supporting US foreign policy.

11146 138 138 Page 139 140 lNImALSKIM TWINING Initial *training inthe* uyis the responsibility of Air Force Air Training Cornrnad Naval Education and Training c omrnan~ my Training and Doctrine Cornrnan~ and Marine Corps Combat Development Command.

Current Semicc tnining estati. ishments reflect Cold War training requirements -- they are big, expensive, and overbpping. Each Semite trains annually a large number of persomel m a wide array of Spccialti= and skills. As a result, there arc a number of duplications m training performed at more than 100 mil. itay bases.

Steps have Aready been taken m some areas to eliminate xedundant training. The Interservics Training Review Organization (fTRO), a voluntary, Semite- chaired group, cmerltly reviews proposed training consolidations and collocations for potential cost savings. During the past twenty years, ITRO studies have rcsulwd in uaining course consolidations and collocations which have saved over $300 million. OIWexample is the consolidation of much of DODs intelligence instmxtion at Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas ~ at the DOD Mapping School at Fort BeIvoir, Virginia ITRO also was of major assistance following the closure decision on two of the .4ir Force's SK large technical training centers; C'hanuteAir Force Base, Illinoi+ q and LQwxy Air Force Base, Colorado; m &term. ining where to move

trainingcokes affected by the closure. The services will also lx conducting a comprehensive review, with Joint Sti support, of all militmy sld training, specialty by specialty, to identify potential training areas for further course collocations and'or consolidations. The review will begin by

establishing b mining and facility standards and by identifying ways to use the best of the current infrastructure. An aggressive, phased review schedule will be developed along with solid ground rules the review's conduct.

while the review will concentrate

for on initial skill training, it will cover all military skills. It is expected that the review will result m significant cost savings. Most importantly, the resulting training efficiencies will enable the Armed Forces to train more effectively, producing an even better and mom capable fightingforce

RECOMMENDATION: Some mining is already being consolidated. Services arc conducting a comprehensive rcviewofallmilharyw~- g 10 identify additional areas for consoliddom

KU47 139 139 Page 140 141 CHAPLAIN API~ LEGALCORPS Chaplain Corps Each Semite (except the Marine Corps) is responsible for recruiting and trai. nhg its own chapkins. The functions of chaplains in each Semite difkr and are unique to the communities they sezve. Accordingly, each Semite has taken a different approach to these tasks. The Amny and the Navy direct their pastoral care primarily to the soldiem, sailors, and marines assigned to operating forces. The Air Force concenmates more on community structure and family pastoral care.

While the chaplain corps takes up only a small part of the overall defense budget, it will be reduced as the overall for- structure comes down over the next few years. Authorized active duty end strength for chaphins m FY 1997 is forecast at 2,755, a reduction of 565 or about 20% from today.

A number of ahematives for consolidating the! chaplain corps were eX*~ but because the cbplaincy is in place and working we~ there is no need to fix it. There would be insignificant cost savings fio~ other alternatives, and they would have a negative effect on the provision of quality _ to the men and women of the Armed Forces.

"'Legai Corps 'I'he &my, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps all have uniformed judge advocates who provide a wide range of legal semices to their Service. They work for the commander or head of activity under the technical supervision of the Judge Advocate General concsmed or the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The DOD General Counsel, who is by law the chief counsel for the Department of Defense, renders opinions that are bind" lg on all lawyem in DUD, including judge advocates. Day- today legai services are ders, military members, rendered to cornrnan and their familia by judge advocate organizations that are part of the SeNice for~ structure. Although they serve mjoint commands and DOD- level positions, judge advocates are primady dedicated to sewing their parent Service.

Eight areas of law are basic to W four Senfk. es: cridnal law, administrative law, Litigation international law, acquisition law, labor law, ckdrns, and legal assistance. While these areas of law practiced by judge advocates within each se~ ice are similar, the actual practice of law varies significantly tim Sexvice to SeMce. Moreover, while judge advocates have common legal skills, they serve fit as officers of their particular Services, subject to the same performance standards, regulations, policies, and procedures as all other officers of their Service. Their practice of law is predicated

u148 140 140 Page 141 142 upon, and intertwined with, the unique force structure, operational context, and policy decisions of their Sawice.

Each Military Depar( rnent maintains a school for training its judge advocates and civilian attorneys in Scmice- unique and common areas of law. Many of the courses arc open to attorneys from all the Armed Forces and other Federal agencies. Enlisted legal persomel are trained and assigned within the Sewice pmonnel system, with oversight by the Judge Advocates General. The SeNices have taken steps to increase efficiency and reduce coss through several cooperative efforts, These efforts are centered around professional dev& prrmnt training, both at the officer and erdisted leveIs,

A range of ahematives was examined to consolidate or centralize legal services within DOD m order to ehinate duplication, improve qual@, or reduce costs. Options included Centrabd training of an court reporters, consolidating claims fimctions, and combining all headquarters-level judge advocate functions. Some of these option9 had akady been consideti and mje* (Mng the Defense Managcrpent Review process as not cost eff& t. ive. Others would require significant statutory revisions and would disrupt the cument statutory scheme envisioned by Congress. After careful analysis, it was decided to maintain the present DOD Iegal service system while continuing to

investig~ additional opportunities for cooperation among the Semius, with a particular emphasis on consolidating legal training wherever possible.

RECOMMENDATION: Do not consolidate the Chaplain and Ugal Corps. No savings are achieved.

MLLIGENCE Despite the efforts described m Chapter Ii to strengthen performance of intelligence functions and cenmlize management in response to the changing world situarion, the existing intelligence structure largely reflects a focus on the Cold War Soviet threat. 'l% erefore, the DIA is continuing to assess the intelligence resources available at combatant commands, Semiccs, Joint Task Forces, and national and departmental IeveS. sto improve the utility and cost effkctivcness of intelligence products.

Future operational requirements demand M intelligence s')\ tems interoperabiLityh the first order of but =ss. Several specifk steps are being taken to improve the support the Intelligence Community provides to the country.

'l% e succxs of the Joint Intelligent Center concept was well proven during the Gulf War and stimulated the development of a JIC to support each of the combatant commanders. However, as future crises or contingencies develop, the intelligence

III- 49 141 141 Page 142 143 system must be able to surge to provide planning and operations support to the commanders m the field. Although the JTF commander can receive intelligence support horn the combatant CINC'S JIC, such an organization doesn't provide the commander the ability to rapidly integrate intelligence information liom information tim intelligence units. necessary to assist

the battlefield with national and Senfice This capability is timely decision- making during combat and other contingency opmations.

Therefore, during fit- me JTF deployments, intelligence support units will be drawn from the supporting JIC and assigned to the JTF commander to provide a fully opxational intelligence Suppon organizadon+ Thisunit will be ableto exchange information with all JXs, the National Military Joint Intelligence Center, and ail Department of Defense agencies, In his capacity as senior uniformed milhary intelligence officer m DOD, the Director of DIA is conducting a study to determine the proper structure and organization for this new intelligence support unit.

Another area reviewed was the military intelligence production infrastructure. The Sesvices each maintain distinct intelligence production organizations to support the intelligence requirements of the Service and

component organizations and to support Semicc intelligence- related systems acquisition. Analysis of intelligence is

conducted at' six Sefice- level intelligence production centers, two of which are m the Washington, DC area. In addition, there are five inte~ gence production centers, located around the United States, that focus on dySiS Of SCiCIlti& and ~c~ c~ information. DIA also has significant general - intelligence capabiliti~ and is charged with providing specific int. dligence

products for the Secretaty of Defense, the Chaimnan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the combatant cornmandem. DLAalso manages the Service science and technology intelligence production centers.

Consolidation of some or all of these intelligence production centers under a joint intelligem organization would reduce infrastructure and overhead and could result in substantial savings. A DIA study, which is nearly compIete, will offer several options for such a consolidation.

TIM collection of intelligence and production of intellig- products is a complex effort that has evolved as various threats have been iden lied and new technologies have been exp dted to provide needed informatio~ With the change in our security focus and in the nature of them facing the United States, it is possible for the Intelligence Community to consolidate intelligence fictions at the department level, while preserving separate Sewice intelligence

branches to fhllill requirements unique 10 a particular seMM+ boundaries among Traditional or intificial Semites and intel. ligenu

111- 50 142 142 Page 143 144 organizations must not interfere with the ulttie mission of providing high quatity, timeIy intelligence to opcratiorud forces, force planners, and defense policy makers. The maximum capability for the least cost must be vigorously pursued and unnecessary duplication rooted out.

RECOMMENDATION: Further consolidation of intelligence production centers under a joint intelligence organization might redum infrastructure and overhead. A nearly- complete DL4 study will offer several options for additional consolidations .

RESERVEFORCESTRUCTURE The Reserve force structure is an essential part of our total force policy and of the Base Force. National Guard and R= ese~ e forces were critical to the success of Operation DESERT SHIELD/ STORM, just as they have been invaluable m other militay operations before and sin=. As we reduce the active force suucture, DOD has been working with the Congress to also reduce the Reserve force structure m a baianced way. TIM goal is to ehinate reserve elements, prirnady Army, which are no longer requird to face threats that have disappeared - threats that led to the significant build- up in the 1980s m our Rescmc forces.

Last year, Congress directed the Secretary of ~fcnsc to conduct an independent review of the Active component and Resc~ e component (AC/ RC) mix of forces and submit a report ~ing alternatives to thetwrwt andprogrammed AC/ RC mix to met the defense

*= n* of the 1990s.

This study was conducted by the FUND Corporation, a Federally-~& d Research and Development Center (m) independent of the Militq Departments, with support provided by other FFRDCs. In its review, RAND assessed the existing total force policy, including the methodology used to determine how force reductions should be distributed within and among Active and

51 143 143 Page 144 145 Reserve components. The study also examined several possible mixes of Active and Reserve forces, assuming a range of manning levels and declining budgets. Finally, the review considered possible revisions m the missions assigned to Active and Resemc units, training practices, and the organizational structure of Active and Reseme components.

DOD received the N Report on December 1, 1992 and is evaluating its findings and recommen& tions. Based on this evaluation, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Stti and Secxetary of Defense will identi@ the mix of Active and Reseme forces needed to carry out future milhary missions. DODS dySiS of the - report will be fomvarded to Congress by February 15, 1993.

Pdiminq review of the RAND Report found it to be a thoughtful treatment of the ongoing debate regarding the appropriate structure and nix of active and msewe miUtary form for the post Cold War era. The report acknowkdgcs the carefid preparation that went into construction of the Base Force d its plan to use reseme forces in crisis response operations, particularly m the areas of strategic airlift and combat se~ ice support forces.

The report idefies and assesses a number of innovative and potential y useful initiatives to improve training and, hence, inCmiiS2the RadixUSSand early dCp~ Oy~@ of reserve ground combat forces. Careful

consideration' wilI be given to proposed initiatives as "the ongoing analysis and evaluation of force reductions arc examined.

As we look for additional ways to save taxpayer dollars, a review of National Guard and Reseme headquarters and sti should be conducted to ident@ any unnecessary duplication. Care must be taken to pnxerve the Reserve compnents' ability to fidfiIl their essential role m the Total Force policy and their other statutory obligations including the Guard's unique links to the state governors.

RECOMMENDATION: Evaluate the MND AC/ RC study. As part of the ongoing review, determine the proper active and reseme force mix. A study of National Guard and Resewc headquarters and staffs should be conducted to idenr@ any unnecessary duplication


As America's national security needss have changed so has America's milhary. We have undertaken the largest restructuring in the last four decades while in the midst of the greatest force reductions since the end of World War II.

With the guiding premisese of doing what is right for Arnerica we have addressed head-on the tough issues facing the Services. We have reported on the numerous changes already accomplished in the past three years. We have conducted an across-the-board examination of those areas where further change held the promise of increased efficiency or economy. These have been thorough, frank, and sometimes painful appraisals, and they have yielded concrete results.

We should also point out that this report represents but a single frame of a continuing movie. TIM changes featured here, the studies we are undertaking, and the dimtions inwhich we are moving are the W steps m this process. We continue to adapt our thinking, processes, and our forces to stay on leading edge of operational excellence mponsible fiscal stewardship.

not win our the and

This report represents the dmination of a period of intensive review that was undertaken to streamline the way we do business on a &y to day basis. It documents a fimdamental recognition within the Armed Forces of tho United States that roles, missions, and fimctions are not cast in stone, but continue to evolve as dmmstanccs warrant . Although many measures were used to evaluate whether to accept or reject a change, m the ~ analysis *C decision was based on wo criteti First, was it smart? @d secon~ did change increase the

produtivi~, eflkiency, and capability of our men and women in the kned Forces?

The recommendations presented represent decisions on each issue, but these are not all the changes that will take place. During the upcoming budget deli- ions, priorities will be established and decisions made that willaffect all of the services. me inherent shortcomings in conducting a w& w of one's own organization arc also ~cognized. "fherefore, iIldiVidUdS and organizations are encouraged to come fonwird with ideas and suggestions that might result in additional efficiencies or ecamm. ies in our AMA Forces. These ideas must include real practical savings that do not &tract from the readiness and capabilities that the American public demsnds from the military forms.

We have a superb militaq organization that has wmd oux country wcil both at home and abroad. Although change is inevitable and necessary, we must guard against pwipitous remmrnendadons for changes that lack thorc@ and thoughtful analysis. We simply must provide the proper training, equipment, and support to all of tie men and women in the Armed Forces, whom we ask, on a daily basis, to go inharm's way.

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