ABOUTTHIS REPORT As amended by the Golciwatcr- Nichols Department of Defense (DOD) Reorganization Act of 1986, Thle X, United States Code requires the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit a report not less than once every three years, recommending such changes m the assignment of functions (or roles and missions) as the Chirman considers necessary to achieve maximum effectiveness of the Anneal Forces. The law specifies that m preparing such a report, the Chaiman shall consider changes in the nature of the threats faced by the United States, umwcessary duplication of effort among the Anneal Forces, and changes m technology that can be appw effectively to warfare.

Since the report responds to a DOD-oriented act, unlesr noted otherwise this report does not address roles and missions of the Coast Guard, which by law is a mihy seMce and a branch of the armed forces at all times. J

This is the second such report submitted under provisions of the Goldwater- Nichols Act. More than just a report produced once every three years to satis~ a Congressional mandate, it is a status

report on a _ -- a process of internal review and self- apprakd that goes on in the Armed Forces every day, Our most recent objective m this process has been to transition from a smategy and a force designed for global war to a regionaily-oricnted strategy and a force capable of responding decisively anytime and anywhere US interests are thretiencd.

It will be clear from this report that the militay is mindfid of a changing world, aware the American people want their &fense investment managed wisely, and committed to change that ensures our Armed Forces remain second to none.


'h tams "roles and missions" and "functions" are often used almost interchangeably, even inside the 3efense Department. But the distinctions between them are important, particularly m the context of this report.

For the 6rst century- and- a- half of our nation's history, roles and missions were easy. The Army's role, and its mission, was fighting on land. The Navy's and Marine Co@ role, and their missio~ was fighting on and from water. It was that simple.

I- 1 58 58 Page 59 60 Roles and missions began to get complicated when the Sewices discovered the mditary usefi. dness of air power. By the start of World War II, carrier- based aviation was a well- ediished branch of the Navy, and the Army Air Corps had so grown in size and stature that its iidl independence was largely a matter of time.

When we entered World Wiu II, we agreed with our British allies to divide the globe into theaters, each containing both land and water. The Pacific was a US strategic responsibility, the Indian Ocean and Middle East a United Kingdom (UK) strategic responsibility, and the Atlantic and European Theater a combined US- UK strategic responsibility. "fhcater commanders were appointed by the nation responsible for the theater and were generally tim the Service providing the preponderance of forces. In our &st exercise m giobal rditary operations, therefore, the Navy was put in charge of the Paci. fIc* the Army got the European x, and air forces of both Semites performed an air warfare d in all theaters. Directives to Admiral Niitz m the Pacifxc were transmitted bythc chief of Naval Operations on W of the US Joint Chiefi of Staff (JCS), and directives to GencraI =nhower m Europe were transmitted by the Chief of Staff of the Army on behalf of the US and UK Combined chiefs of staff.

After WoHd War II, the Joint Chiefs of Stti were esa. blished as a permanent, formal body, with a joint sti, the Air Force was established as a separate Service; the Department of Ikfense was created; and the Armed Forces were unified by the National Security Act of 1947. The Commanders m chief (CINCS) retained their Service identities, and the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of St@ of the Army, respectively, continued to act as executive agents for the Pacific and European theaters.

In 1958, however, the Secretary of Defense was given direction authority over the CINCs. Semites retained their ~, as established by law, but * were assigned, on a geographical or fiuwtiorud basis, to the CINCS.

In 1987, the distinctions between roles and missions were further modified when Congress establM@ in Iaw, a new combatant comman d the US Special operations Command (USSOCOM)} and gave it a role.

Today, ROLES :cthe broad and enduring purposes for wnich the Sewices, and USSOCOM, were established by Congress in law. In broadest terms, the role of the Semites today is to organize, rein, and equip forces, the ~ for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on lan~ the ~a~ for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on and from the se% the ti~ for prompt sustained off've and defensive

and air

I- 2 59 59 Page 60 61 operatio~; the - cm for semice with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases, and the conduct of such land oprations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campai~ and Special OperationS Command for special operations activities or missions.

MISSIONS me the tasks assigned ~ the President or Secretary of Defense to the CTNCS of combatant comrnands. The responsibdities of the combatant CllWs are spelled out m the Lhified Command Pl~ a document prepared by the Joint (W&, reviewed by the JCS and the Secretary of Defense, and approved by the President.

One other term is used, and often confused, m discussions of roles and missions: FUNCTIONS are specific rqxmsibilities assigned by the President and Secretary of Defense to enable the Services to fulfii their legally established roles,

In sinqie term, them the p-fun! ab of the Setices, and special operations COmmand is to provide forces -each orgm mined, and equipped to pexform a * - to be empIoyed by the CiNC of a combatant command m the accomplishment of a x. The terms

-, *, and~ areused inthis sense throughout this document.


l% ree years ago, when the 1ss! "roles and missions" report was prepared, the Berlin Wall still stood. American strategic bombers, rnissiks, and submarines were on constant alert, successfully deterring the Soviet Union tim conducting a surprise nuclear attack against the United States. Conventional US forces -- two full Army corps, and eight Air Force tacticaJ fighter wings -- stood with their NATO allies aIorig the forrified twrder that divided Europe. Two numbered fleets patrokd the seas, and additional forces m the United States were prepared to rapidly deploy in response to any aggression by the Warsaw Pact.

Today the Cold War is over. The Warsaw Pac2is dissolved, The Soviet Union has ceased to exist. NUCk= and conventional arms control agreements have been concluded hire classes of nucka. r weapons are being &rnina@ and thousands of tanks, armored combat vdlidCS, and artille~ pieces are being destroyed on both sides of the former Iron @% zirt.

Ongoing adjustments to our milimry posture reflect the enormous strategic changes of the past years. The overall size of our forws is being significantly reduced -- forces stationed m Europe are king cut m hai. f. Strategic nuclear forces are being extensively reorgm and the nuckar roles, missions, and functions of the Servic=

I- 3 60 60 Page 61 62 and CINCS are being dramatically ahered. All these changes are possible only because the prospect of a major East- West conflict, which drove our defense programs for more than @ years, has disappeared.

But elimination of the threat of global conflict ha not meant an end to conflict, nor an end to the risks facing American citizens and interests around the world, nor an end to the ncd for ready milhary forces. The Cold War has given way to a new era of urwrtainty and unrest,

Since the last report on roles, missions, and functions, American troops have been committed to armed conflict in Panama and the Persian Gulf. Our limed Forces have been called upon repeatedly, at home and abroad, to accomplish missions ranging horn disaster relief and hummiwhn assktanm, such as Hurricane Andrew relief efforts in Florida and Operation RESTORE HOPE m So- to evacuation of non- combatants from areas where conflict threatene~ or had already erupted.

On the Eurasian land mass, the end of bipolar cotintation has seen the resurgence of long- suppressed conflicts stemming * ancient animosities, religious differences, and ethnic rhwkies. Name9 like Bosnia-Herzogovcna and Nagomo- Karabakh, once unlmown, are now all too familiar. The presence of vast stores of conventional We~ nS and ammunition ~tiy incRaSCS the ptential for these local confLicts to spill over. While the huge nuclear arsenal built ~

the Soviet Union is being slowly dismantled, enough of it remains to leave Russia the one nation qmble of literally destroying the United States. Russia may not, how~ ier, be the only Soviet nuclear he~ the question of who controk weapons on the territories of other former Soviet republics is stili not settled. And other counties may acquire or develop their own capability to threaten nuclear, chemical, or biological mischief.

In the Middle East and Southwest Asia radical pcditicized Lku- n and a @itically and rnilitmily resurgent Iran threaten regional stability and directly challenge a number of US interests, inchdi. ng aCCCSSto Gulf Ofi, pofitid reform and democradc development, and settlement of the kab- kaeli dispute. Iraq continues to defy united Nations (UN) resolutions Ad menace its neighbors. mere have been some signs of progress in the Middle East peace process, but the parties remain unreconciled to the stafus quo, and violen= continues. Even if negotiations succe@ b. g- term contentious issues, such as water distriiq wiE continue to provide potential for conflict DESERT flORM taught Persian Gulf states that the United States can b a reliable security partne,, and they expect us to remain engaged m their region.

In ficq economic and social disintegration challenges fledgling democracies, violence and exposes entire pqxdauons to misery, and threatens to ignite

I- 4 61 61 Page 62 63 ethnic strife and CM wars We can expect that American rniby forces and Iogistks resources will continue to take a major part m international efforts to relieve human stiering, as we are now doing in Somalia.

Asia represents a remarkable US foreign @icy success. American commitments m mutusl defense treaties, forward military presence, security assistance and education programs -- for example -have helped produce a region of stability. Democracy now blooms m areas where only a few years ago we wondered if the idea could ever take root. Newly empowered citizens are forcing governments to change in ways once unimagi. nalie. political and econotic success in Asia make it Possl% le for fiends and allies like Japan to take on a larger sham of regional securky responsibilities, But challenges to Arwricm interests and ideals also exist across the Pacific, communist rcgime3 remain in POWff in _ North Korea, bos, and Vietnam. While leadership and generational changes underway in these states offs grounds for opm the outcome of these transitions is far hn certaiu American

involvement m Asia and the Pacific is essential for pmrnoting stability and nurturing'constructive change.

In our own hemisphere, the collapse of world communism has left the production and export of iIlegaI drugs as the major threat to us interests. Other factors conrnbuting to uncertainty and unrest

include the growing disparity between "haves" and "have- nets;" territorial and kundary disputes; international debt; environmental destruction; cfhnic prejudi~ s; and dismptive insurgences+ As m other regions, US presents contributes to stability and encourages the spread of democratic values.

Another factor contributing tO instability is weapons proliferation. The growing sophistication of weapons technology and the possible emigration of former Soviet scientists and armaments experts, coupled with regional instabilities and the presence of totditarkm governments, pOSCSan increasing risk. By the end of the 1990s, many regional powers could possess nuclear, chemical, or biologkxd weapons; the means to &iiver them accurately over long distances; an~ in the absenca of an effective deterrent, the wiUto use them, Technology on the open market, such as high- resolution satellite imagery and space navigation and comrnunicarions systems, may also @ve advanced capabilities :0 powers that could never afford to develop them on their own.

Politically and WOrlornically driven immigration and the flow of refugees emtpirig wars, disease, and famine will contribute to uncertainty and unrest m the years ahead. Other factors that may affect United States security interests include environmental and health issues and rntemationd economic cort@ tiotL

I- 5 62 62 Page 63 64 While the world may be lw predictable today than it was during what President Kennedy characterized as the "long twilight struggle" of the Cold War, it is a far more promising world. The United States is safer now than at any time m aU the years that separated our airlift to Berlin from the fall of the wall which divi& d that city. The investment America made m all those decades -- m money and materiel and m the sacrifices of our sons and daughters who stood watch in heedom's outposts -- has paid off. The best peace dividend is peace. The Armed Forms are aware of the part they played m this historic change and are ready to make a similar contribution to peace in the hopeful years ahead.

DUPLICATION AND REDUNDANCY For five decades, two major themes influenced and shtqwd the assignment of roles, missions, and fknctions among the Anneal Forces of the United Statf s.

The first was the legacy of World War IL During that war, the United States fielded militwy forces of unprecedented size and scope. In the rush to assemble those ultimately victorious forces, little though; was given to the question of Service roles and missions. The Executive Branch and the Congress allocated resources and raised forces based on tlIe simple pMciple that "whatever can be done should be done." As we expanded, some overlaps

and duplications of effort develo~ d between the Army and the Navy. This situation was tolerable kcause the massive national mobilizwiow combined with the de jacm geographic division of labor between the Services made hard choices unnecessary.

Post- wax budget cutting made resource allocation an issue of paramount importance. Partly for this reason, Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947. Among its several provisions, the Act established the Air Force as a separate Sewi= and attempted to cla@ Sexvice rofes and missions to provide a tiamework for program and budget decisions. Some provisions specified m the Act sparked immdbte disagreement among the Services, so Secretag of Defeme James Forrestal convened a conference m Key West, FIon@ j where the Chi& of the Semites agreed on roles and fbncdons.

Some argue that the Key West Agreement is flawa that it failed to resolve dundancy and dll@ Cti~. h fact, what the ChiefS Kognizecl m 1947, and Congress has supported ever sinoe, is that there are a number of advantages in having similar, cornplementag capabilities among the Setice% The availability of similar but socialized capability allows the combatant commander to tailor a military response to any contingency, regardless of geographic location.

1- 6 63 63 Page 64 65 At the national command level, the existence of robust forces with complementary capabilities adds to the options available m a crisis, ~cially when the crisis is unexpected. The similar but spe- d ~pdibti~ of the Armed Seflices are not unlike the safety features of modem automobiles, which come equipped with automatic shoulder restraints, lap safety belts, and airbags. Whether these complementary safety devices come standard or as options, they are redundant and do add to the purchase prie of a car. If purchase price were the only factor, buyers would reject this built- in redundancy. But purchase price obviously is ~ the only factor, especially in an emergency, In fact, it may smm insignificant when compared to the far greater costs associated with medical care for unprotected drivers and passengers. Congress clearly understood this difference m cost, between an ounce of prevention and apoundof cure, when itrnade air bags mandatory. congress had Sill@ l n% mning inrnind whenitdirected the Chaiman of the Joint Chi4 of St@ to cOnsi& r, in making this report, not duplication of effort, but only the ~ duplication of effort among the krned Forces. Tiirne and time again in our nation's history - including and perhaps especially our recent histo~ -- the availability of sirnitar but specialized capabilities has made all the dii% erence. The purchase price has turned out to be a bargain

?he &ordinated performance of all the Armed Forces in Panama and m the Persian Gulf attests to the essential wisdom of the civilian and milhary leaders who forged the original Key West Agreement. unrivaled ability to conduct joint and combined operations today is the logicai conclusion of the process that began when Congress undertook to @ the mtion's Armed Forces and established the Department of Defense. The hope expressed at Key West forty- five years ago, of unified Armed Forces operating efficiently and effectively without bickering or unproductive competition, has become routine reality.

'I% e progress we've made was exemplified m combat operations in the Gulf War, when the Tiger Brigade of the krny's 2d Armored Division was placed under the 2d Marine Divisio% and its heavy tanks and self- propelled artillery provided additional punch for the more Hghly quipped Marines That kind of cooperation between two Sendces makes the best of the capabilib of bth, and results in a force greater than the sum of its parts.

The vision of Key West was also evi& nt in Operation "GTMO", providing assistance to 30,000 Haitian rrfugees. What began as pknarily a Marine Corps effort grew very quickly into a joint operation with a peak strength of more than 2,000 active duty and reseme troops from all Sewices and ultimately the the Coast Guard. 'IllOugh preponderance of troops we~ e

1- 7 64 64 Page 65 66 Army, everyone at Guantanamo Bay got behind the Marine one- star commanding, and the joint task force did an outstanding job.

our ability to operate joint and combined was also illustrated in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT -- humanitarian o~ rations m northern Iraq. It too began small, but soon grew into a multinational force. The ease with which nditary forces from various Semites of other mtions were able to coalesce around the nucleus of a US Joint Task Force is further rnbute to the clear vision of the DOD founders.

Another superb example was Operadon EASTERN EXIT. When the American Embassy m Mogadishu, Somalia was threatened by rebel forms just as Operation DESERT STORM W= ilbOUt to break, options were needed for evacuating the embassy staff. Tluec days away, embarked on Navy amphibious ships, was a Marine force with the capability to get h get oux people, and get out. If the situation worsened in those three days, Amy Rangers m Air Force transports, could have gotten there faster, but they'd have had less firepower on the ground and would have been harder to get out. A it ha~ n~ the situation did not deteriorate to the point where the ~ers were needed the embassy staff was rescued by a daring mval operation. But the complement. aq capabilities of the Marines and Army gave the nation's leaders more than one option. As m so many other crisis situations, the

nation was Well sewed by the flexibility inherent in our Armed Forces.

The second major factor govcfig American force planning has been the Cold War. The Soviet Union was a formidable adversary m every respect, with large and technically sophisticated forces. Almost to the ve~ end, the Soviet plitical Ieadedip showed little restraint in allocating resources to its milhary or m using force to achieve its political goals.

To contain this Soviet military power, the United States fashioned a network of alliamzs. We mainhed the largest peacetime force structure in our history, with Ia@ sea, and air forces at forward bases in Europe and Asia We opposed axnrnunist subversion and insurgences throughout the world, with political and economic pressure and even with mibry forw. We developed and sustained a large rnilitq- industial Corrtplc% both to supJ) ort Ouxforces- in- being and to provide the means for emergency rnobihtiom And wz illV_ d billions of dollars in advanced technology in an effofi to rnahtain a qualitative edge m the face of overwhching numerical superiority.

I- 8 65 65 Page 66 67 THElhIpAm OF TEcHNOtmY As new technologies have moved from the laboratory to the bait. lcfiel~ they have been seized upon by the Armed Forces and adapted to the needs of air, land and sea combat. One example of milky technology that all Sewices have adapted to their specialized warflghting roles is the radio. Wireless communications were fist used by the rnilimy m World War I and soon had a positive effect on the cornmart~ conuol, and communications capabilities of all Semites. AStechnolo~ advamxd, tiOS increased in range and reliability, and we have come to rely on them m virmally every option our forces undertake. Although in the past we have developed radios in one Service that could not cornmuni@ e with radios developed by another SeMcc, we have long since recognized and are fixing that problem Today, interoperable communications capabilities are an hdispcmable part of our joint military operations.

The airplane is another example of technology that changed warfare. We &gan to see its effixts m World War 1. Following that war, the Navy ernbadced on one course leading to the fast canicr fleets that in World War Ii made victory possible in the Pacific. 'Ihe Atmy embarked on a different course which led to the strategic bomber fleets that contributed signifkantly to the Normandy invasion and the liberation of Europe.

As ~os and airplanes demonstrate, soldiers, sailors, airme~ and marines are aIways eager to get their hands on any new technology that promises to help them win wars. The advanced systems m which we invested so much national treasure during the Cold War years are no exception. Many of those systems had their baptism of fin m @tYl+ tiOnS JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM.

The technologies that came of age m Panama and the Pe~ ian Gulf have clearly altered warfare, some in ways we have only &gun to appreciate. Space systems, for example, were used extensively to provide early warning, intelligence, smeilhmce, navigation, comman~ controf, and Communkations, and battle damage assessments to our coalition commanders m the Guif. Satellites fd information to troops m their foxholes, aviators m their cockpiis, seamen afloat, and missilecrs m their Patriot batteries. Information gathered horn space supported every aspect of planning, controlling, and winning the war with Iraq,

The acderating pace of technological development has implications for the division of Mm among the Sem- ices, paniculady the functions of developing and procuring new equipment. lle nation that can most quickly incorporate technological innovations will have a decided edge on any fiture bardefield. To shorten the time between drawing boiud and operational availability, efficiencies and new measures of effectiveness must

I- 9 66 66 Page 67 68 continually be incorporated into the ways the Services go about equipping their forces.

The effect of new technologies on roles, missions, and functions will continue to be evolutionary. Technological breakthroughs will undoubtedly influen= Sewice fimctions.


Thechmges of the last three years led to a fundamental change in our strategy and our force structure. TIIc military's task was spelled out by President Bush m a speech in Aspen, Colorado on August 2, 1990 -- the same day Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait-Noting that the United States would be ill-served by forces representing nothing more than a scaled- back or shrunken- down version of the CoId War force, President Bush &fined our task as one of shaping our capabilities to meet the needs of regional contingencies and peacetime presence,

our response to the changing strategic landscape was further elaborated m the Resident's August 1991 - Sc-Of the Stm , which * announcd tit by mid- decade, the _ would be 25% smaller than the forces we maintained m the last days of the Cold War and described how phtnned reductions would cut forces to a mimnum acceptable level -- the Base ForCc.

A few nhths later, m January 1992, the~ straegy of the L! nAkd t W W= published Reflecting the fimlarnental shift horn a Cold War focus on containment to a regional orientation, it articulates a flexible new strategy designed to protect our interests and support our objectives worldwide, and it elaborates the strategic pMciples that underlie our force planning.

The Base Force was initially conceived as the minimum essentiaJ force required to meet the risks and uncertainties then prwalent. It was designed to nmimize the capabilities of each Sewice and integrate their Active and Rcseme components into an effective miliq team capable of responding across the full spectrum of conflict. But the Base Force has become a dynamic force. When the nation's mditary requirements

ck~ ~y, as they have with strategic nuclear weapons m the years since

the Base Force W= M. tMly ~~~ edt tie Base Force can and should be adjusted.

A smcturcd through 1995, the Bue Force sets fom levels appropriate to our national interests and the regional concerns we have around the world. It is a superbly trained, capable force, ready when called by the president to go to the scene of a developing crisis, go quickly, and go jointly.

1- 10 67 67 Page 68 69 RESHAPINGTHE MILITARY. With the end of the Cold War, the strategic threat that drove our planning, and upon which the division of labor among the Services was for so long predicated, has receded. Though wc arc still obligated to plan for the re- emergence of a global military threat, we are confident we would have sufficient time to reconstitute the forces required, and that we need not retain the forces necessary to fight a global war.

In the past we've been faced with similar oppormnities to reduce the size of our rnilby and cut defense spending. World War I was "the war to end wars," and when it was "over over there," wc brought the troops home and settled into isolationism. Throughout the Roaring Twenties and the Great Depression that followed, maintaining a strong military was never a national priority. And we paid for i~ We paid when totditdan govemrnen= began their expansionist aggression, aggression that might have been deterred by the existence of strong US forces. We paid at Pearl Harbor, and at Kasserinc Pass in North fiCZ

~en World War If ended m victory, we repeated our mistake. Again we faikd to keep our forces ready, and we again paid the price m Korea, m the awful retreat to the Pusan perimeter. This time we are &termined to get it right. With the Cold War's end, the great change in our strategy

has been' not only moving away from increasingly unlikely global warfare, but also making sure the form that remains is ready and able to deal decisively and successfully with regional mises -- the way we were ready for Operations JUST CAUSE m Pan- PROVIDE COMFORT in Turkey and northern Iraq, and RESTORE HOPE in Somalia. Being ready for crises like these means being ready with a total force, consisting of highly trained, come- as- you- are Active forces, augmented, and in some cases even pre~ ded, by the speciahzed skills that reside m our Reserve components. When the crisis turns into something bigger, like Operation DESERT SHIELD/ STORM, far greater numbers of National Guardsmen and Resemists must be called up, We simply cannot go to war without them.

We are confident we can maintain the capabilities we need for this new era of uncertainty and unrest, and that we can do so with fewer men and women m unifom, fewer Active forces m the by, Navy, Air Force, and Marine CorpY fewer reswes; fewer defense civihns; and fewer defense industrial workeni

We can do it in P way that protects the nation from unacceptable risk, and that returns to the American peopIe some of the treasure they'veteen devoting over the years to support a strong defense.

But we cannot maintain the necessary capability if we slash our operating procurement accounts so severely that and the

1- 11 68 68 Page 69 70 readiness of our su@ forces is damaged. We cannot preserve our Iniliw strength if we place perceived economy ahead of proven effectiveness, or if we place one Semite or component ahead of othem.

If we proceed too ~ickly, or impose changes so large they cannot be absorbed, the risk is that we may destroy the basic fabric of our fighting fome. The superb balance demonstrated by our Armed Forces in their mastery of the air, sea, land, and space of the Persian Gulf must be mdm. ained.

Over the past three years, the nation's nditaxy leaders exhaustive xwiew foroes; md OUr

have undertaken an of our strategy; our roles, missions, and functions. We have sought areas for Consolidation Stmamlmm " " g, and outright reduction. Chapter II of this report

highlights the thanges wc have almdy made to adapt our forces to the realities of a changing world. In the three years since the 1989 "Re~ -ton Roles and Functions of the Armed Forces," we have accomplished much toward building a force for an era of uncertainty. And so far we have gotten it right. In spite of reductions, reorganizations, and withdrawals, our forces have remained ready. They've proven thek effectivene~ the and agw by dealing decisively with sudden contingencies, large and small.

But not evey restructuring proposal that sounds appealhg stands up when carefully analyzed, and not every study we've commenced has been concluded. Chapter KII of this report presents additional areas we've examined or continue to examine in our ongoing process of building t. b am right for America. Armed Forces

1- 12