lZxa~ tiVe Summarv —.—
SOME DEFINITIONS TIIe terms "roles, missions, ad functions" are often used interchangeably, but the distinctions between them are ifnportmt, ptidarly m the context of this report. ROLES arc the broad and enduring purposes for which the Semites were established by Congress in law. MISSIONS arc the tasks assigned by the President or Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders m Chief (CTNcs). FUNCI'IONS are specific respsibili. tk assigned by the President and Secretary of D2fknse to enable the Seticcs to iWll their legally established roks. Simply stat~ the
-W &ld! 2D of the Semites is to provide forces organizeq mined and equipped to
perform a & -- to lx employed by a CTNC in the accomplishment of a m.
A %iORT HETORY For the first century- and- a- half of our mtion's history, roles and missions were not subject to much debate. l% e Army's role was fighting on land The Na~~ 's and Marines' role was fighting on, and from, the sea. This simple division of labor started to get cornpti~ ed after World War I, when the Sewices Ixgan to adapt the increasing combat potential of the airplane to its mpecrivc warfighting role.
Roles and missions pew even more confused during World War II, when the gIobe was divided into theaters, each encompassing land and sea areas. A CTNC was appointed for each theater and given a missioQ so that admimls began to Comrrland sokiim and generals began to command sailors. After the war, in order to implement lessons learned, Congress passed the
National Security Act of 1947. T% is Act made the Joint Uiefi of Staff a permanent, formal body; created the United States A. ix Force as a separate Sewice; and, after amendment m 1949, led to establishment of the Department of Defense. This Act ~SO attempted to clatitjI and cod@ Servi= roles
iv 31 31 Page 32 33 and missions to provide a framework for program and budget decisions. After the Act became law, Swice hdem met at Key West, Flori& and produced a broad oudinc for Service functions. That outline guides the division of labor to this day.
In 1986, Congress passed the Goldwater- Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. [t requires the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff "to periodically recommend such changes in the assignment of functions (or roles and missions) as the Cha. ilman considers necessary to achieve maximum effectiveness of the Armed Fores." TM is the second report in accordance with the Act.
W repl% is a comprehensive summaIY of a process of internal review and self- appraisal that goes on in the Armed Forces every day. It represents the culmination of months of effort by the and the Joint Staff. 'Ilc recommendations of this report am the . Chauman's alone though the Sewicc Cbiefk, the combatant CINCS, am their staf33 were directly involved in the rev .Wpmccss.
A RAPIDLYCHANGINGWORLD Three years ago, when the first report on roles and missions was prepared, the Beriin Wall still stood. American strategic forces were on constant alert, and more than 300,000 US troops were m Europe, ready to repel any attack by the Warsaw Pact. Today the Cold War is over. The Warsaw Pact is dissolved. me Soviet Union has ceased to exist. Our strategic bomber force is no longer on alert. ANuclearand conventional control agreements have been concluded, elimindng entire classes of nuclear weapons and thousands of tanks, armored vehicles and artillery pieces. Uver a hundred thousand troops have come home from Europe.
But the disapprance of the Soviet thre~ has not eliminated the need for trained and ready Armed Forces. In the three years since the last report, Anm& m troops have been committed in over two dozen crises, ranging fkom armed confkt in Panama and the Persian Gulf to pwekeeping and humanitarian @stance missions in several parts of the wori~ and to disaster relief operations at home and abroad. In short, our _ Forces have been busier than ever in this rapidly changing worid.
Four key factors -- the end of the Cold War, budgetary constraints, the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and tie press of new regional crises -- opportunity, converged to provide the the rmxssity, and the authority
v 32 32 Page 33 34 to address the ways m which all four Semites are structured, trained, and employed m combat. As a result, more changes have cccurred in the US milkary in the past three years than in any similar period since the National Security Act of 1947.
THE MHHOD OFCHANGE First, the National Milkwy Strategy of the United Stares was developed, taking into account the new strategic landsca~.
Next, the BW Force was established to provide the means for implementing the new militay smamgy, Smaller than the Cold War force but flexible, well- trained and highly capable, the Base Force is a dynamic force which can be tailored in response to fu. rlhcrchanges in the sm. tegic environment.
Fiiy, a detailed review of the roles, missions, and functions of the Armed Forces was undertaken to ensure the new strategy and force structure were aligd as effectively as possibIe. In developing the recorrmlemdations contained in b report, the objective was to maintain -- and wherc possible enhance -- the combat readiness of the Armed Forces even as we reduced their SiZCand the COStOfMaintaining than.
WtiA? WE'VEALREADYDONE In the thm years since the fmt of these repoms was submitted mder Goldwater- NichoIs, many steps have &en taken -- some with little public notice -- to respond to the rapidly changing world and to improve both effectiveness and efficiency. Even as walls fell and empires toppled, wc were m. aldng the adjustments our @on's security rqired.
ThO Creation of US Strdegic Cummand
The organization of our nuclear forces has been changed fundamentally. For the first time, dl of America's strategic bombers, missiles, and submarines are under one commander, either an Air Force general or a Navy admiraL T% is arrangement, hard to imagine only a fiw years ago, represe~ perhaps the most dramatic change in the assignment of rola and missions among the Sewices since 1947.
Th* Elimhfion of NucieurFunciions
A a result of Presidential nuclear initiatives, developed under the direction of the Joint CbM of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, the &my and Marine Corps -- both of which have had a nuclear fimclion since
the mid- 1950s - no longer have nuclear weapons. Now they rely cm the Navy and 33 33 Page 34 35 the &r Force for nuclear support, Moreover, all tactical nuclear weapons have been removed bm ships+ submarines, and land- based naval aircrafi Finally, for the fiit time sirIce the 1950s, all US strategic bombers and all 450 Minuteman II missiles have ken taken off alem
No More Chemical Weapons With the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention in Paris on January 13, 1993, the United States renounced the use of chemical weapns. The Semites no longer need to maintain a capability to retaliate with lethal chemical weapons.
This will reduce training, maintenance, and procurement costs and permit chemical weapons stockpiles to be destroyed safest, most efficient manner.
Belter Strategic Lift
Our new regional focus, combined with major reductions m overseas troop levels, puts enormous emphasis cm strategic mobility. l% e formation of Transportation Command had bdy Set our tm. nagment house m orde~ what remabed was to match our li. fica@ ilitiM with the new strategy and Base Force. The Mobility Requirements Study does just that. The study's rccornmencied mobility improvements will enable deployment of an Army light division andaheavy brigade toanyaisis area m
approximately' two weeks, divisions in about a month. and two heavy
Expanded Mission: Cou~ f~ r- l) rug Operafkms
In 1989, the Department of Defense -began to expand significantly its participation m America's fight to stem the flow of illegal drugs. This expanded mission requires the sustained use of active duty and Reserve forces who are propdy trained and equippd for a non- tmiitismi. d role. They are involved with interagency organizations and host- nation poliw and m. ilimy forces m planning and cmying out these counter- d. mg operations. This campaign invoks severaI of our CINC! Swho are working together closely so they can share joint lessons learned and continue to improve our capability to perform this unprecedented tnissiom
A New Look in Combat Logktlcs A change of WgiC focus titn gIobal to regional conflict 'llowed us to make major changes in the way we calculate and provide for our logistics support neds. For global war, wc needed enough stocks so that each CINC could fight his theater's fom alone and for some considerable time without resupply from the continental United States (CONUS). With our new strategy, we need only enough "starer" stocks to last until theater forces are resupplied km CONUS,
vii 34 34 Page 35 36 or 6- em other propositioned "swing" stocks that can be moved quickly from one region to another. To do this, some stocks arc being repositioned horn land to "afloat." The krny, for example, has estimated that it can achieve a 50% reduction in war reserwe requirements under this new concept. Combat logistics have entered a new era with our new strategy.
Better Inklligence Support b the Warfighter
~ intell. ig~ support available to US forces m the Gulf War was probably the best m history. -Illis was partly because of innovations that preceded the war and partly because of innovations made during the war. Notwithstanding this SUCWSS, additional mxds were kkntified combining the success and the needs, we have greatly improved what was akeady a good intelligence systcrm For example, we set up a standing board comprised of senior intelligence officials tim all intelligence organizations to &@ InilM program priorities and coordinate support for milkary operations. We established a Joint Intelligence Cater - just as General Schwarzkopf had - for W our CJNCs. We established the National MMtary Joint Intelligence Center in the Pentagon. This Center sems as a focal point for support to the commands and to joint task forces by acting as a national cie. aring house for intelligence requests and by coordinating
support f& m the CIA, DIA, and NSA. We established a Central Imagery OfXce to coordinate the timely provision of imagery products -- maps, target photos, intel photos -- to the warfighters. We also established an Ofllcc of Military Affairs Withhl the CIA to correct a deficiency m national intelligence availability identified by our commanders duting the Gulf War. FinaUy, we eliminated a shortfall m Human Xntel. ligcnce(~) -- the giving DLA.
information gathered by people -- by tasking authority for all HU? vfINT to
Ductrine and Training We have made great tides in developing, and training under, joint domine. Foremost among our new publications is Joint Wa& are of (he G'S Armed Force~ Joiti War@ re is Team Wuglare. It seines as the focal point for further f& hI- L OCEAN VENTURE 92 and TANDEM THRUST 92- conducted Off the Carolina coast and in ~Oti and the mid- Pacific respectively - saw thousands of soldiers, saiIors, airmen and Marines training together on joint wartime tasks. CIcariy indicative of our new joint doctrine andtmh. ing empWiSwas the Me of the Joint Force Air Component Comman& r (JFACC) concept m the Gulf War. The JFACC oversaw and synchronized all air component operations for General $chwaxzkopf. This was a historic first. The ovcmvhelming success of the concept was 35 35 Page 36 37 dramatically apparent in the results obtained. WHATWE'REDOINGNow Dramatic Infrastructure Changes
'l% e drawdovm to the Base Force requires a commensurate reduction in our infrastructure, More than 170 activities have been i& ntifkd by the Semites for eli. rnhatio~ consolidation, or realignment. For example, the commissary functions of all Services have ken combined into a single Defense Commissaq Agency. We have assigned executive agents to oversee common functions such as clean- up of foxmer DOD- owned hazardous waste sites, operation of common- user ocean terminal- s, and support for rmdical materiel, mikuy pstal service, and domestic disaster relief. We have reduced and reorganized SeMce staffs.
W foun& tion for the cunent assignment of Semite roles and functions -- the Key West Agreement -- was the product of a meeting convened by the tit Secretary of Defense, James Fomestal, to work out disagreements among the Semites sparked by the National Security Act of 1947. Many argue that the agreement reached at Key West is flaw~ that it- failed to resolve redundancy and duplication among the Semites. In fact, what was recognized in 1947, and has keen suppmled by Congress ever since, is that there are advantages m having complementary capabilities among the Sewks. At the national mmmand level, such flexibility provides additional options to senior decision- mdwm m a crisis. At the theater leveL CINCs can more efkctively tailor a nditary response to any contiqymy+ regardless of location.
Despite the enduring wisdom of the Key West Agreem@, we recognized the need to miew the undedying division of mponsib-. k addition to the man& te of Goldwater- Nlckh, the dramatic chang~ we were designing for the W Forws demanded such a review.
Beginning m the surnrner of 1992, a comprehensive, "top- to- bottom" review of roles and missions was undertaken. W review, led by the Joint Staff, involved the Se~ ices and the CINCS at every step. Aeas selected for examination were those in which
ix 36 36 Page 37 38 two or more Services pexform similar tasks, where restructuring might generate significant cost savings, or where changes in smtegy and force structure made a comprehensive review appropriate. One of the primary goals was the i& ntification and elimination of unnecessary duplication of effort between the Semites, nxognizing that redundancy can be a good thing, especially m an emergency -- and that emergencies are less predictable today than at the height of the Cold War.
The 1993 Repo~ on Roles, Missions, and Functions thus examines the US Armed Forces from a perspective entirely different fioxn that of the 1989 report. It addresses W of the difficult questions king asked by Congress and tic kmican people about their Armed Forces. In a numtcr of areas, significant changes in the assignment of roles , missions, and functions arc recommended. IrI others, the current division of labor makea the most sense. In still others, further study is needed before hid recommendations can be made. 'h issues addressed and the resulting f15COlllflleIKktiOfIS are hi@ i.@@ bdOW and in the table following this summary.
S[ gniflcant Changes in the Unified Command Plan
Adetailed review of roles, missions, and functions nemsaril y involves a review of the Unified Command Plan (UCP) because * are assigned to CINCS, not to SeAces, and the UCP is the document that defines the CINCS'responsibilities. A mentioned, US Suategic Command already represents a major change to the UCP; nonetheless, we recommend one more major change and fi. uther review of another.
(1) A NewCiNCfot LJ$+ ased Forces During World War II, forces from all Services were assigned to theater CINCS who waged the war. We leamed it was the best way to fight. The National Sectuiry Act of 1947, and subsequent congressional action m 1958, made this sucossfd organization permanent. The Goldwater-Nichols Act put the firMing touches to this arrangement - ex~ for one major contingent of troops, those assigned to unils in CONUS. By 1992, this exception had become all the more glaring because of the changes in our strategy, in OUf forward deployments, and in the stnxture of our forces.
Whh troop stren@ overseas reduced, our regionally- oriented strategy depends more on forces based in CONUS -- forces that must be trained to operate jointly as a way of Ii&. Yet there is no CONUS- based CINC charged with this mission.
x 37 37 Page 38 39 The lack of an appropriate joint headquarters to oversee Service forces based in CONUS has always been considered a problem. The Joint Chiefs cf staff have tried twice to fm it.
US Smike Command was activated in 1961 to provide unified control over CONUS- based Army and Air Foru units. Initially, Strike Command was given no regional responsibilities, but was assigned fictional responsibilities to provi& a general reserve for reinforcement of other tiled commands, to train assigned forces, to develop joint doctrine, and to plan for and execute contingency operations as ordered. In attempting to M. fill its responsibilities as a trainer and provider of forces, Strike Command fkquently ailided with the Services' authority under Title X to organize, train and equip forces.
In 1971, Strike Cornrnand W= replaced by US Readiness Command. It W* given fictional responsibility for training and providing forces, with no g~ Jgraphic area of responsibility. Command experienced scmM of the same SeMce resistance as its pm& cessor m fuMUng its assigned training resporlsibiIities
Over time, Readiness Command W~ given aod functional responsibilities, including a r@ rcrnent to plan for and provide Joint Task Force headquarters and forces for contingency operations m areas not assigned to overseas CINCS. One of the Joint Task Force headquarters -- the Rapid
Deployment J& nt Task Force (RDJTF) -- eventually grew into a new combatant Comman 4 us Central Command (CENTCOM), Readiness Command wm subsequently disestablished as a result of a combination of factors, not least of which was the fact that our strategy depended more on fotward deployment and basing to contain Soviet expansion than on CONUS- based forces.
Today our strategy has changed, and we have reached a level of joint maturity that makes it possible to address once more tie need for unified command over CONUS-based forces. Unified command would faditate the training, preparation, and rapid response of CONUS- based forces currently under the -y's Forces Comman4 the Navy's Atlantic Fleet, the Air Force's Air Combat Comman~ and the Marine Corps' Marine Forces Atlantic. TIM time has come to merge these forces under a single CINC whose principal purpose will be to ensure their joint training and jornt readiness. Umits that & already accustomed to operating joind:. will tc easier to deploy. overseas CINCs will be able to focus more on rn-theater operations and less on deployment and readiness concerns.
?his CINC could also be assigned certain other functional rwqxmbilities, including
0 Undertaking principal responsibility for support to operations United Nations ~acekeeping and training units for that 38 38 Page 39 40 puzpose. 0 Assisting with the response to natural disasters m the United States and other requirements for rrdimry support to civil authorities, when requested by State Governors and as directed by the President.
Q Improving joint tactics, techniques, and procedures.
0 Recommending and testing jo~ t doctrine.
After exarnining seved approaches to setting up the required joint headquarters, we found US Atlantic Command
(USL4. NTCOM) pticukdy Wd suited to assume this new mission
It is an existing CONUS- based joint headquarters.
It already has a working relationship with the four commands that would become its permanent cornpments.
Its Cold War rnissi~ to Atlantic sea lanes and . offensive naval operations
defad the undertake against the Soviet Uni~ has fudmntdy changed. While condnuing to perform a vital NATO rnissim it has the ~wti to uridcrlake this additional msp@ ib@ m keeping with the revised military strategy.
Its geographic area of responsibi@, although large, presents w@ Mirlg challenge only a modest given the
disap@ ar2nce of the Soviet threaf. Q It can continue to perform its vital NATO missiort.
Under this amngement, the present command in Norfolk, Virginia would shift from its predominately maritime orientation to a mom balanced combatant command headquarters. We would probably rename
the command so as to reflect more accurately its new focus. Its CINC would become a nominative position, which could be filled by any Service. The Army's Forces Command would no longer require "spdied" status as a s~ ze- se~ ice command reporting directly to the President and Secretary of Defense. WMt this change, the term "specified" would be retired, and all forca wouid &long to a joint team. While the Sewices would retain their Thle X msponsib~, the training and deploying of CONUS- based forces as a joint team would be a new mission for this expanded CINC. Utication of the Armed Forces, which began in 1947, wotdd at last be complete.
@ PosslbhConwllddon of Space and Sfrafeglc Commands
'TIIe United States has developed a ~bu~, higltly ~dk, and complex fiarnework for the launch and control of space vehicles and systems. Although the majority of space functions today reside within the Air Force, all the Semites, plus US Space Command and several Defense Agenciti and O~ titiOns, are involved m
.. 39 39 Page 40 41 space activities. The Commander in Chief of US Space Command (CINCSPACE), headquartered m Colorado Springs, Colorado, is assipcd combatant command of US forces providing waning and assessment of a bomber or missile attack orI the United States. In addition, CINCSPACE suppcms other CINCS by ensuring that space operations and warning requirements are supported.
CINCSPACE is also Commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NOIL4D), the US- Canadian command that provides air defense of the North American continent. CINCSPACE carries out his mission through three service component cornrnands: Air Forcx Space Command at Petersen Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado; Naval Space Command at Dahlgren+ Vi and A. unY space Comrnan d at Colorado SpMgs, Colorado.
Even with the end of the Cold War, or- national security deptds on a robust v we capability. But we can no longer Aord to allow multiple organizations to be involved in similar, independent, or duplicative space roles and fictions.
A nu. ribx of improvements are undcmvay to stmmline our space organization and systems and elirnhaw
unnecessary overiap. Organiztiotiy, tie Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed m 1991 to "dud hat" CllWSPACE as Comman& r, Air Force
Space Cornmahd. 'Thisled to a reduction m pCrSOMC} and support costs. But these changes don't go far enough; it is time for an even bolder change to be examined.
The proposal we are evaluating would resign the space mission to the Commander m Chief of US Strategic Command (CINCSTMT) and eliminam US Space Commaiid
Under this proposal, after appropriate consultation with the Canadians, the c onmander of AFSPACECOM would assume command of NORAD m Colorado springs. AFSPACECOM would dSO oprate all space systems under clNcsTRA" rs Cornrnand. small Armyand Navy components would be assigned to CINCSTRAT to ensure spm systems suppon for all Services' needs. All Semites would also be represented m appropriate planning and requirements offixs. Ile Air For= would IMresponsible for development of future mililq space systems. These actions would ensure Semiu- unique requirements for and uses of space are properly represente~ and that services and CINCs have trained persomel with the knowledge to exploit capability of space systems.
Other changes envisioned would include designating the Air Force as the lead Sewice to coordinae with NASA regarding LANDSAT remote emth sensing operations, and consolidating DOD's functions at NASA into a single organization under Air Force
.,. m 40 40 Page 41 42 Space Command To Saealrlhe military satellite communications operations, all operational responsibilities for the Defense Satellite Communications System would transfer from the Defense Information Systems Agency to the Air Force Responsibilities for the Navy's Fleet Satellite Communications system would also transfer to the h Force. Both SyStCI1'LS would remain under the combatant command of CINCSTRAT.
Under this proposed arrangement, requirements for space systems would continue to & drnittd by the CINCs, Semites, or agencies to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council for validation. Day- to- day requirements for
operational space system support would be submitted to CINCSTIU4T.
Such a consolidation would conserve scarce resources and ehinate a substamial num~ r of positions. It is envisioned that ti would _Ve Wari@ irlg SUppOfiti space, allowing an increase m operational effkdvmess *~? and rnteroperabii+ while ' mamtakhg joint Setice expertise and joint operational focus.
More analysis is needed before we assign the space mission to STRATCOM. Tllisatudysis will bedonernthe rwarfuture.
' A Change in Depot Maintenance
Another change of significant proportions that does not involve the UCP is the proposal to consolidate all depot- level maintenance under a new joint command.
Over the years, all four Setices established their own depot maintenance S)% tCmSto f) ClfOMlcorqkx mCCh3niCdand electronic work that includes overhauls, component rebuilds, and other operations beyond tic technical abd. ity of maintenance units in the field. These four Service maintenance networks, each independent of other Scxvices' capabilities and sized to support a global war, can be reduced and restructured to redu= excess capacity and eliminate no- longer- needed facihties. A study group chartered by the Chairman of the Joint CM& of S@ has recommended closure of seven or eight of the milkary depots in order to reduce exms capacity. Swings of $400 million to $600 million ~r year are achievable when all these depots are C: oscd The group also recommended establishment of a Joint Depot Maintenance c omrnand to OVC1'SCC and administer d dept- level maintenance. mlis rccommdation is still under review m the Department of Defknse; meanwhile, the Services have been directed to i& ntify and recommend depot closures and consolidations prior to the next deliberations of the Base Re_ nt and ~OSUrC Corntnissiom
xiv 41 41 Page 42 43 A look at America's Air Power 1%~ claim that America has "Four Air Forces," irnpiying it has three more than it needs, makes a wonderful sound bite but distorts the facts. In fact, America has only one Air Force, the United States Air Force, whose role is prompt and sustained offensive and defensive ti operations. The other Scmiccs have aviation arms essential to their specific roles and fictions but which aLso work jointly to project America's air power.
It would make no more sense to assign all aircraft to the Air Force, as some would suggest, than it would to assign all iterns of any other militarily usefd tech. dogy -- radios or mucks, for example - to a single Service. The airplane and helicopter capabilities of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Colps are unique, complementary, and necessaty, Together they constitute "America's Air Power," an indispensable ingredient m any situation where Anerica. u lives are at risk That sai~ it was recogn ml that the acquisition plan for major aviation programs would require more resources than might be available. Many issues associated with air power roles, missions, and functions were therefore exarnine~ and a number of opportunities were identified to make the structure and systems that support and sustain America's Air Power more effkient. For example:
Con# henkd Alr De fertse Significant savings m manpower operating costs can be achieved ehnimting or sharply reducing the 12
and b Air Nationai Guard interceptor squadrons
dedicated solely to this mission. General
PVse ad training forces from the Active and Reserve components of the Air Force,
Navy, and Marine Corps can absorb this post- Cold War missio~ perhaps m its entirety,
7heutef Air Inttxdlction Operations deep behind enemy lines are essential to any militwy campaign. The contributions of both bombers and attack aircraft should be considered when the total number of aircraft required for theater air interdiction is determined
CloseAir Support 'The Key West Agreement has always been interpreted as limiting this support to fld- wing *. But tlds essential battlefield task can and should be performed routinely by attack helicopters as well. Sewice fictions are being realigned to reflect this expanded detion To ensure uniformity of execution by all Services that request and provide fixed- and rotary- wing close air support, standardized joint procedures are being developed.
xv 42 42 Page 43 44 MadneCOPSTacticalAlt US Marines train and fight as a combined arms air- ground team, supported by organic aircraft that can operate from carrier decks and austere expeditionary sitti ashore. Despite calls by some for its elirninatio~ Marine Corps tactical air is a unique capability, essential to our militiuy strategy. The number of aircraft types m the Marine Corps invento~ will be reduced from nine to four, and Marine Corps squadrons will deploy mose frequently aboard aircrafi carriers.
Fllghf TM@ To take advantage of tie axnrnonality of purpose and training programs among the Services for the primary phase of flight training, all Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Coast Guard flight students will begin training using a common l% ed- wing training aircraftunder jornt development. Following * fi@ -g, student @OtS T@ & selected for advsne. d training m one of four
specif5c follow- on specialties or "tracks": Navy Fighter/ Att~ Air Force Fighter/ Bomber, Navy and Air Force Tanker/ lhnspor@ 4aritime Patrol, or Helicopter.
Tanker/ Ranspo@ Witime Patrol training consolidation is expected to begin in 1994, when the Navy plans to introduce advamxd maritime training at Reese Air Force Base$ Texas. A study will &terrnine if it is cost+ ffkctive to move Navy,
Marine Cokps, and Coast Guard helicopter training -- curmndy conducted at PensacolA Florida -- to Fort Rucker, AlabarmL where Amy and Air Force training is conducted.
A/ cfti R@ c@ emenb and l~ vO~ tory Management
EachService uses a different formula to detemine how many aircraft it needs to buy, and different NIes to account for aircraft once they're in the inventory. To ensure procurement and maintenance funds are not spent on unnecessary aircraft, standardize- d terminology and procedures will be developed to govern aircraft
-~ n~ ~d invento~ management,
Common AhcratY ~e 1993 review of roles, missions, and functions included a careful examination of aimraft common to more than one Semite, looking for ways to do business more efkxivcly or efficiently while ~se. ming each &rVidS abdky to perform
- Wons. The resulting recommendations are mmmarhd below:
o consolidate the two types of airplanes used for ~d and coti of strategic forw- s. E& nimte the Air Force EC- 135 program. Use funds planned for EC- 135 upgrade to pay for transition to the Navy's E- 6A, and assign the function to the Navy.
mfi 43 43 Page 44 45 Q a a
Continue to give each Service responsibility for its own ~ ~. Use standard equipment to support interopa- ability while implementing joint docmine to enhance mining and operational effectiveness,
Improve management of @erativ~ and reduce their numbers to only those required.
Retain ~coot . ~in the Army and the Marine Corps. Consolidate aircrew and maintenance training wke practicable. The &my and Marine Corps pursue developing and procuring common airframes to fuMil future requirements.
Consolidate maintenance training, simulator training and maintenance infrastructure for s-~. Study the &Ability of consolidating overlapping service support fictions within certain geographic regions.
Retain C- 130 t~ 130 -structures as currently con.@ red. Review showed that consolidating these heavily- tasked aircraft under one Service would riot be cost- effective, would degrade efficiency, and would grcady complicate their management and support.
Retain and modemize the aircraft currently used by the Navy, Marine
c1 Corps and'Air Force to jam enemy radar systems. The Navy/ Marine EA- 6B and the Air Force EF- 111 airframes are optimized for the "from the sea" and "globaJ reach" roles assigned to their respective Services. Both derive sig, ni! hnt economies of scdc horn the fact that they share parts, support, and training procedures with the large fleets of A- t% and F- 111s managed by the Navy and Air Force. Consolidating ~ito one airframe would degrade efftiveness and require purchase of additional aircraft.
Retain cment types of ~ectroti~ . - m the Navy and the Air Force. Existing quantities of Navy EP- 3Es and Air Force RC- 135s are bandy sufficient to handle peacetime requirements for gathering electronic intell. igacc. Hirnh@ n" g either type or repkcing one with the other would be costly and would contribute nothing to etieness. Support structures aheady m place for the large fleets of Navy P- 3s and Air Force KC- 135S make the operation and maintenance of 12 EP- 3Es and 14 RC- 135S a small fbction of overall costs ,,
mii 44 44 Page 45 46 A Look d Other Key Questions Fowwd Presence Foward presence is the totaLity of LJS insmurnents of pwer and irlfhlell= employed overseas. Forward stationing is one element of forward presence and is a key underpinning of us diplomacy. 1! contributes to conflict prevention and lends credibility to alliances. As the global security environment changes, additional reductions m forward stationed forces may be appropriate. However, as forward stationing decre- s, other forward presence operations will increase m importance. A new concept is being developed which envisions using geographically and mission tailored joint forces to conduct forward presence operations. These "Adaptive Joint Force Packages" could contain a mix of air, Iana special operations, space, and maridme forces tailored to meet the supported CINCS
-menu, potentially at a lower cost than today's deployments.
Contingency und fxpedltfonafy P'ofcee
With its emphasis on rapid response to regional *, the National Mili@ y Strategy 'places a pnium on the eqxditionary capabilities of the Marine Corps and the contingency capabilities of Army airborne and light infantry forces. Bath *S of forces should be retaine~ however, the review of requirements k
continuou~ and may in the future include the possibility of further reductions m the Army's light infamy forces,
Tunk$ and IWRS fur the Marine Corp$ T& Marine Corps is structured t ~ integrate armor and artiIlery units into its maneuver elements. Severing armor from the organic structure of the Marines would markedly reduce unit cohesion and warfighting capability and produce negligible costs savings. The Marine Corps must retain enough tank battalions to support amphibious opmtions and outfit three Maritime Repositioning Squadrons. Any requirement for additional tank support ~ be provided by Auny armored units. There do appear to be advantages m making the Army responsible for all MLRS (MuJtip] e Launch Rocket System) support; however, taking away the Marine Corps' organic general support artillery and having the Army take on the additional function of supporting the Mark= is a major step that requires indepth cost and effkctiwxx analysis before impIemmtation can h considered. We will ~rfonn that indepth analysis in the near future.
-or AI' Dufmsa All four Semites currently operate theater air defense systems. Study showed there would be substantial and personnel disruption transferring these systems
near- term costs associated with and associated
. .. 45 45 Page 46 47 functions between Setices. No long- term savings were identified. A comprehensive review of theater air &fense is needed to insure the planned mix and quantities of & and missile defense systems are appropriate. The Joint Staff will head a Joint Mission ha Analysis to review theater air defense requirements, capabilities, and deficiencies. The results of this analysis will determine if tier refinements to Service roles and functions are appropriate.
Trulnlng, and l'6s# unci ~valuuflo~ S~ cti~@ s
The extensive array of training and test and evaluation facilities built for World War II and maintained throughout the Cold War Ctl! l be restructured m keeping with the changed world. An integrated test and evaluation range structure will be developed under the management of an executive agent as paxt of the effort to lower costs and increase eff'venes. As an example, integration and ektronic linking of Ae many Service training and 'esting ranges in six western states and off 'k California coast would provide a IaI@ airspace, sea area and ofihom supersonic operating domain to accommodate a large portion of our joint training, test and evaluation needs well into the next ecrlnlry.
ConMrucfion Enghwws Each Sewice has its own construction engineering capability, sized and stmctu. red over the years to suppom combar forces m a global war and maintain a worldwide array of bases and facilities, In view of the smaller requirements of our new m. ilimy strategy, the Semites are reducing their engineer stmctures -- the Afrny by 34 percent, the Air Force by 39, the Marine Corps by 20, and the Navy by 11 prmnt. 'Thepossibility of having one Semite provide all wartime construction units was evaluared; however, such a consolidation was rejected because of the uniquely tailored support each Sawice's construction engineers provide to its operational units.
OpercdlnQ Tempo "OP'I'EMPO" is a term describing the pace of operations and training. OPTEMPO detelmlne " s the rate at which funds are spent fiorn the Operations and Maintenanw (O& M) accounts to buy the fue~ repair parts, and suppli= consumed during normal operations. when we examined whether additional 04LM savings couid be achieved through prudent reductions in OFI'EMPO, we came to several conclusions. First, increased use of simulation helps train commanders and leaders in operational Art and tactics, and weapons crews in engagement techniques. But the requirement to be ready to go on an instant's notice still &mands that people be trained in the fielcL
xix 46 46 Page 47 48 at sea, and m the air cm theix weapons and support systems. Second, new forward presence concepts wiil reduce some OFTEMPO rates during routine peacetime operations. However, reduced overseas basing and increased emphasis on resou. rce-intcnsive operations like peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance may mean an actual increase in 0~. Finally, for a smaller force, increasingly based in CONUS, keeping units tidy trained is the only certain way to ensure they are ready to respond as part of a winning team when tailed
Initiul Sklll$ Tralnlng Cument training establishmetm reflect Cold War training requirements -- they are big, expensive, and overktpping. While some training has already been ccmsolida@ more training installations and facilitk m probably be closed or consolidated to reduce costs. Toward that end, and as part of the continuous process of internal review and self- appraisa the SeMces, with Joint Staff support, are conducting a comprehensive scrub of all military skills trsining.
Chapkdn andLegalCop ChapMrLS ml judge advocat= are X- OffiC- CH, subject to the performance standards, regulations, policies, and
particular customs of their parent Semites. Consolidating all chaplains and lawyers under a single SeMce, which some have suggested, would result m insigni& artt cost
savings add have a negative effect cm the quality of pastoral care and legal support provided to the men and women of the Armed Forces and their fties. Consolidation is therefore not recommen& d.
infell! gence Despite steps taken to implement kssom learned m DESERT STORM and centralize management functions, the existing intelligence structure stiil largely reflects its Cold War origins. The Defense Intelligence Agency is assessing avaib. ble intelligence resources with a view toward creating intelligence support units to provide Joint Task Force Commanders a fully operadonal intelligence support organization. DIA is also nearing completion of a study
mat is ~ additional consolidation of some Servke- ievel rnteiligence production
FOfce ~ctufe As part of a continuing review, the Department of Defhse will continue to work with Congress to determine the proper Active and Resexve force mix. As additiond ways are sought to consolidate fimctions and reduce defense spending, a study of National Guard and Reserve headquarters and staffs should be conducted to identify duplication that may be unnecessary. 47 47 Page 48 49 THE MAIN POINT As us national se! curity nds have chamged, so has the US militay. The recomrncndarions m this report advocate the need to continue to reshape our rnilhy to address the challenges of the future, whik recognizing that it must be done intelligently, prudently, and responsibly.
With the guiding premise of doing what's right for Amcric~ the tough issues facing the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine COTS have been addressed head- on. These thorough, titi and frequently challenging appraisals have yielded concrete results. The 1993 Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States outlines new approaches to how the Services intend to do business. The report represents a cl= expression of our comrnilrnent to change. But above all, it dmxments the Anneal Forces' h recognition that the maiu
Pwse of =- ro~= l ~sio~$ ~ functions is to protect Americ&
xxi 48 48 Page 49 50 Table of Recommend'dions ISSUE ENDATICW Would a joint Headquarters for US CON. JS- based forces of Based ForceS improve the joint FORSCOM, LANTFLT, ACC, and training, preparation, and rapid MARFORLANT should be response of CONUS- based forces? combined into one joint command. LANTCOM will be responsible for: joint training, force packaging, and facilitating deployments during crises; supporting UN peacekeeping operations; and providing assistance durimr natural disasters.
Can efflciericiti be achieved by A review will be conducted to assigning the Space mission to determine if the space mission USSTR4TCOM? should be assigned to STRATCOM, and if USSPACECOM should be eliminated
I Shodd =eS& vi& ' De~~ Consider establishing a Joint Depot . tenance facilities, which Maintenance C ornmand to reduce perform major maintenance on and restmcture depot- level equipmen~ be restmctured or rnahtenance by 25- 50$ Z0. Examine reduced? closing 7 Or 8 of the 30 military depots which could achieve savings of $4( K) M to $60UM per year after these depots are closecL Services , recommend depot closures and consolidations to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission.
mii 49 49 Page 50 51 ENDATIO~ Does America need four semrate air kerica has only one air force, the forces; one each in the Army, Navy, United States Air Force. The tiy, Air Force, and Marine Corps? Navy, and Marine Corps each have aviation arms essential to their assigned warfighting roles. Each air am provides unique but complementary capabilities. They work jointly to project America's Air Power.
Continental Air DefeE&, protecting Eliminate or sharply reduce the force the US from enemy air attack is dedicated to this missiom Assign to now performed by 12 Air National existing Air Force, Navy, and Guard interceptor squadrons Marine Cows general purpose and dedicated solely to this mission. Is training squadrons. this dedicated force sti necessary?
Theater Air Interdiction (TAI), the Sufficient numbers of kind- and sea-destruction of enemy forces deep based lmrnbers and attack aircraft behind their lines, is currently done need to be fonvarddeployed or by attack aircrti and bombers. Is rapidly deployable to provide quick there an optimum mix of bombers response to shofi- notice crises. and attack a "cr@ with which to Strategic bombers, previously carry out tli+ mission? dedicated to CoId War nuclear missions, are now availabIe to support TAL Therefore, in the determination of totaI M I reqpked for TN it is necessary to consider the contributions of both bombers and attack aircraft.
... Xxlu 50 50 Page 51 52 UE ECOMP& J$ lD4T10N Close Air StlDD@ (CAS) is the use Include attack helicopters as CAS of aircraft to directly support ground assets and realign and clarify troops engaged in combat with the fimctions and doctrine to include enemy. What types of aircraft CAS as a primary mission area for should be included in the CAS all Semites. mission?
. Should ~arine Corm Tactical Air Marine Corps tactical aircraft are an wings be reduced or eliminated? integral part of the Marine air-ground team and should not be eliminated. Marine Corps aircraft will be reduced from nine to four aircraft types and deploy more freuuentiy aboard aircraft carriers.
Fixed- wing Flifit Training is now Consolidate Navy, Marine Corps, conducted by both the Navy and the Air Force, and Coast Guard initial Air Force; helicopter training is fixed- wing training, and transition conducted by both the Army and such training to a common primary Navy. Could tight training be training a. kcr# L Consolidate consolidated? follow- on flight training into four Wg pipelines. (Navy Fighter/ Attaclq Air Force Fighter/ Bomber, Navy and Air Force Tanker/ lYanspOr@ faridme Patrol, or Helicopter). Determine if it saves money to move Navy, Marine , Corps, and Coast Guard helicopter training from Pensacola, ~orida to Fort Rucker, AJabam&
xxiv 51 51 Page 52 53 . TIO~
The Services have different ways of Aircraft inventory terminology calculating Aircraft Reuuiremen@ should be standardize 1. Common and Inventmv Mana~ emen~ Should deftitiom among Services for all this rnethodology be standardized? categories of aircraft wiII assure consistent rationale for requirements and ensure procurement and maintenance funds are only spent on necessary aircraft. This standardized approach will provide consistency in the number of airframes nrocmxi
Should the Navy and the Air Force Consolidate the Navy and Air Force use a common airframe for Airborne aircraft and functions into the Navy's Command and Control of strategic E- 6A program The Air Force forces'? EC- 135 program will be eliminated and cancellation of its planned upgrades will fund transition into the E- 6A
~ho~ d *e ~ All four Services retain I@ QLE (CSAR) mission belong to responsibility for CS 4R operations. only one Setice? CSARforces WiUbe equipped to
operate individually or together employing standardized joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures.
xxv 52 52 Page 53 54 Should the Ope rational Swmort OSAaircraftarein excess of Aircraft (OSA) fleet be reduced and wartime needs and should be should management for all Services reduced. TEWWCOM will develop be consolidated to improve the capability to coordinate and el% ciency? schedule intratheater airlift
Should the Army and Marine Corps Army and Marine Corps continue to both operate Attack Helicoote~? operate attack helicopters. Consolidate some aircrew maintenance and training. Develop and procure common tiames to fulfill future requirements.
Should some of the General SUDDOII Consolidate maintenance training, Helicopter operations be simulator baking, and maintenance consolidated? infrastructure. Study consolidation of overlapping Service support functions within certain geographic areas.
Should C- 130 OpeGMiOnS, Consolidating C- 13( IS under one managernen~ and support be Semite would decrease operational consolidated under one Service? effectiveness, complicate management and supporL and would not save money.
xxvi 53 53 Page 54 55 JSSUE ECO- DATiO~ Do the Navy, Air Force, and Marine The shdar butspecialized Corps all need to operate Jamrner capabilititx of all Navy/ Marine Aircr@? Corps EA- 6B and Air ForceEF- 111 aircraft give military commanders options in combat to reduce aircraft attrition. Both aircraft should be retained and upgraded. Consolidating into one &flame wm. ld reduce effectiveness and require additional aircm. ft procurement
Should the Navy EP- 3E and h Navy EP- 3E and Air Force RC- 135 Force RC- 135 ~hxtroniq aircraft are fully committed and Slllweillance Aircr@ both be should be retainecL Infrastructure is retained? already in place to support the Navy
P- 3 and Air Force KC- 135 fleets, of which the EP- 3E and RC- 135 are a Smau part
As an element of ~onvard Prese~ c et Fonvard stationing is a key should fonvard stationing of US underpinning of US diplomacy. 1? 'orces be further reduced? contributes to conflict prevention and lends credibility to alliances. M the global security environment changes, additional reduction in fonvard stationed forces maybe appropriate. However, as fonvard 6 stationing decreases, fonvard presence operations will increase in importance. Condnue to develop the concept of Adaptive Joint Force Packages.
xxvii 54 54 Page 55 56 'ISSUE Is it necessary to retain Continwmcy The capabilities of the contingency and Extxxiitioft aw Forces in both the and expeditionary forces in the Amy and Marine Corps? Amy and Marine Corps provide decision makers with valuable alternatives and should be retained. The possibility of further decreases in the Army's light infantry will be studied as force structure is reduced.
Should the Army provide Tanks and Marine Corps will retain enough MLRs to the Marine Corps? tank battalions to support amphibious operations tmd to outilt three Maritime Propositioning Squadrons. The Army will provide any additional tank support required. There appears to be advantages in having the Army provide MLRS suppoti for Marine Corps operations, however, an in- depth cost and operational effectiveness analysis is required before implementing this recommendation.
Should The- ate hr r " Defensq (TAD) A review of I% eater Air Defense is responsibilitim and systems be n~ ded to ensure we have the consolidated into one Semite? appropriate mix and quantities of air and missile defense systems. The Joint StafYwill head a Joint Mission Area Analysis to comprehensive~ y review TAD requirements, capabilities, and deficiencies.
... 55 55 Page 56 57 1 TIO~
Should consolidations and Designate m Executive Agent to reductions be made to the Services' streamline test and evaluation Training, and Tes~ and Evaluation infrastructure. Using advanced data I. nfias~ cture in order to focus processing, electronically link test investment to improve selected and evaluation, and training ranges, facilities and cut cost? in broad geographic areas such as the Southwest US, to enhance joint testing needs and support joint main. irw requirements.
Should Construction Erwineen be Consolidation of individual Service consolidated in one service? engineer units is not recommended because it would not save money and would provide no advantages. Reductions already underway decrease constmction engineers in the -y by 34%, Air Force by 3970, Marines by 20%, andNavyby
Should Opera tirw Tem~ OPTEMIW cannot be reduced. The (OFTEMPO) bereduced as a result amount of warning time availabIe of the changes in the world security before committing forces to combat
environment'? is genetiy sfnal. k therefore, the need for a high state of readiness is increased k additio~ as forward stationing is reduce~ forward deployments become more important in S1. lppofig US foreign pol. ky.
nix 56 56 Page 57 58 ISSUE Should the Services' h- dial SkiIIS Some training is already being Training be consolidated since the consolidated. Semites are force structure is declining? conducting a comprehensive review of all rrlilitary initial Sl! dls training to identify additional areas for consolidation
I Should the Semites' Chap lain and Do not consolidate the Chaplain and Legal CorDSbe consolidated? Legal Corps. No savings are I Should Intelligence organizations be Further consolidation of intelligence further reduced? production centers under a joint intelligence organization might reduce infrastructure and overhead. A nearly- complete IXA study will offer sevefal options for additional consolidations.
Does the current and programmed Evaluate the RAND AC/ RC study. Ac . e Co DOn nt and Res rv~ As part of the ongoing review, =( A: RO * :@ t tie de~~ e he Prop'= =tive ~d defe~ requirements for the 1990s? reserve force mix. A study of .
National Guard and Rese~ e headquarters and staffs should be l / . conducted to iden@ any