COUNTERPROLIFERATION AND TREATY ACTIVITIES
In December 1993, pursuant to Presidential Directive, Secretary of Defense Aspin launched the Department's Counterproliferation Initiative. This initiative was undertaken in light of the growing threats to U.S. security and national interests posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, often referred to as weapons of mass destruction, and their means of delivery. In many of the world's regions where the United States is likely to deploy forces -- including Northeast Asia and the Middle East -- potential adversaries possess or are pursuing the development or acquisition of NBC weapons. The Gulf War experience showed the implications of NBC proliferation for defense planning. DoD must take seriously the potential NBC dimension of future conflicts. U.S. forces must be properly trained and equipped for all potential missions, including those in which opponents might threaten or use NBC weapons. The Defense Counterproliferation Initiative is designed to meet these challenges.
The primary goal of U.S. counterproliferation policy is to prevent NBC proliferation from occurring. The Department's activities contribute in many ways to achieving this goal. Military preparations for operations in an NBC environment make clear that threats or use of NBC weapons will not deter the United States from applying military power in defense of its national interests. Effective capabilities to counter NBC weapon systems devalue their potential political and military benefits for would-be proliferant. In addition, capabilities developed for the battlefield to deal with NBC proliferation -- especially intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance means -- can be brought to bear in support of international regimes, export controls, and other international monitoring efforts to prevent the spread of NBC weapons and related technologies.
STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION NORMS
International norms and treaties that make the acquisition, development, threat, or use of NBC weapons and their delivery means more difficult form the bedrock of U.S. counterproliferation policy. DoD actively participates in U.S. efforts that support adherence to and verification of such international regimes, and DoD experts participate fully in negotiations aimed at limiting the spread of NBC weapons and related technologies. Effective and verifiable regimes help build a barrier against proliferation and strengthen international security. The following treaties and conventions are key elements of the United States' strategy to prevent NBC proliferation.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
The 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) prohibits the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology beyond the five declared nuclear-weapons states, encourages the dissemination of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and establishes a verification mechanism through the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure that nuclear material is not being used for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives. The NPT, during its initial 25 year term in force (1970-1995), was successful in creating an international norm against nuclear weapons proliferation and limiting the spread of nuclear weapons to a very small number of new threshold nuclear weapons states.
The NPT was extended indefinitely and without condition in 1995, and was enhanced by a strengthened review process and a series of pronouncements called Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. The Principles include, among others, calls for the universality of the NPT, a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), a convention banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, transparency in export controls, enhanced safeguards, and other related arms control measures. DoD has programs aimed at improving the verification of the NPT and participates actively in advancing various Principles and Objectives with the purpose of enhancing U.S. national security.
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
The United States achieved its goal of completing a multilateral CTBT and opening it for signature before September 30, 1996. The treaty, negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, was transmitted to the United Nations, where it was approved with the overwhelming support of the world community of nations. President Clinton signed the treaty on behalf of the United States on September 24, 1996, the day it was opened for signature at the United Nations.
Once the CTBT enters into force, the Treaty will prohibit all nuclear explosions, consequently constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, as well as ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons. The CTBT will thus contribute to the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the process of nuclear disarmament, and enhance international peace and security. Nuclear weapons will still play a role in U.S. security however. As a result, the President stated that the maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear weapon stockpile is a supreme national interest of the United States. The United States will carry out a Stockpile Stewardship Program and an annual review and reporting procedure to help ensure the safety and reliability of its nuclear weapons. DoD has the lead role in developing the Treaty's international monitoring system and will play a key role in implementing the CTBT and in ensuring a high level of confidence in the U.S. nuclear stockpile.
Chemical Weapons Convention
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) treaty will form a cornerstone in international law, not only for countering the proliferation of chemical weapons but also for banning their existence entirely. Under Article I of the CWC, state parties to the treaty agree never under any circumstances to develop, produce, or otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone; to use chemical weapons; to engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons; and to assist, encourage, or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a state party under the Convention. In addition, each state party pledges to destroy chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities.
Opened for signature on January 13, 1993, the CWC had 161 signatories as of March 1, 1997. It will enter into force on April 29, 1997, 180 days following the deposit of the 65th instrument of ratification with the United Nations. The Administration has submitted the CWC to the Senate for ratification, and ratification before entry into force is one of President Clinton's highest priorities. On September 12, 1996, the Senate postponed voting on the CWC until a later date.
The CWC Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) has been meeting since February 1993 to complete the details necessary to have the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) fully operational at entry into force. DoD continues to participate actively in the PrepCom, providing experts on key implementation matters such as inspection procedures, data management, and inspector training. Under existing congressional mandate, DoD is destroying all of its unitary chemical weapons, which constitute the vast majority of the United States' CW stockpile. When the CWC enters into force, the United States has committed to declare and destroy the binary weapons in its stockpile, as well as remaining nonstockpile items (former production facilities, unfilled munitions, and munitions recovered from burial sites) covered by the Convention. In 1991, President Bush announced that the United States would formally forswear the use of chemical weapons for any reason, including retaliation, against any state, effective upon entry into force of the CWC. Accordingly, it is very much in the U.S. security interest to ban chemical weapons worldwide and to cause countries to eliminate their CW stocks.
Biological Weapons Convention
The President has directed that the United States promote new measures to provide increased transparency of potential biological weapons-related activities and facilities in an effort to help deter violations of and enhance compliance with the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). DoD participates in the U.S. delegation to the BWC Ad Hoc Group, mandated by the September 1994 Special Conference, and plays an important role in U.S. efforts to develop compliance measures for consideration by the Group. The United States strongly supports the development of a legally-binding protocol continuing measures to strengthen the BWC.
IMPROVING TECHNOLOGY SECURITY AND EXPORT CONTROLS
Technology security and export controls are an important element of the renewed emphasis on strengthening the preventive defense pillar of U.S. defense strategy. DoD is an active participant in the development and implementation of the U.S. government's overall technology security and export control policies.
In particular, DoD's technology security efforts are focused on two areas: ensuring that export controls are designed and implemented to prevent the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery, and preserving U.S. military technological advantages by controlling conventional arms and sensitive dual-use goods, services, and technologies.
It is U.S. policy to prohibit and curtail the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery in part through effective export controls on the goods, services, and technologies that can assist potential proliferants. DoD supports this policy by actively promoting an effective export control regulatory system both here at home and among U.S. friends and allies. In particular, DoD brings to bear its substantial technical expertise to strengthen multilateral nonproliferation regimes and the U.S. export control system.
At the same time, DoD's technology security policy recognizes that the export of conventional weapons and associated dual-use goods and technologies are not always inherently threatening or destabilizing. Many such transfers contribute to U.S. preventive defense strategy by supporting the legitimate defense requirements of allies and friends and by improving interoperability with U.S. forces for potential coalition warfare. Such exports can also contribute to a strong and responsive U.S. defense industrial base. Nevertheless, there are circumstances when such transfers of conventional arms and associated dual-use goods and technologies can be destabilizing in a regional military context. In these circumstances, DoD's participation in both the development of general arms transfer policies and the review of specific transfers in license applications referred by the Departments of State and Commerce are important elements in ensuring that these transfers are responsible and support U.S. regional defense and foreign policy objectives.
During the past year, there have been several important developments in export controls that advance the U.S. government's and DoD's technology security objectives. First, the President signed an Executive Order that provides reviewing agencies, including DoD, the opportunity to examine all dual-use export license applications submitted to the Department of Commerce. As a result, DoD now reviews all such applications that could affect national security, proliferation, and regional stability. The review is accomplished within the rigorous time constraints imposed by the Executive Order to ensure that U.S. exporters are not burdened with unnecessary delay.
The President made a decision that clarifies from which agency -- State or Commerce -- exporters must obtain licenses for exports of commercial aircraft engine hot section technologies and commercial communications satellites. For those items under Commerce control, enhanced control procedures will be instituted under Commerce's licensing system and will provide for rigorous national security and foreign policy controls to all destinations and end-users of these items worldwide. DoD will review all license applications for these items. It is important to emphasize that this decision does not decontrol any of these items.
Another important development was the establishment of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies in July 1996, a new international export control regime. (Wassenaar is the town outside the Hague where negotiations took place leading to the regime's establishment.) Export controls are the most effective if they are undertaken on a multilateral basis in cooperation with relevant governments. The Wassenaar Arrangement involves the United States and 32 other governments. It contributes to DoD's preventive defense strategy by promoting greater transparency and increased responsibility with regard to transfers of conventional arms and dual-use commodities, and restraining exports to those countries judged to pose the greatest threat to international peace and stability (for example, the rogue states of Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea). Participants have agreed to control all items through two international lists -- one for arms and one for dual-use commodities -- on a worldwide basis. These lists were implemented in November 1996. With its emphasis on conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, the Wassenaar Arrangement is designed to complement -- not duplicate -- other multilateral export control regimes such as the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Australia Group.
INTEGRATING THE COUNTERPROLIFERATION MISSION WITHIN DOD
While preventing NBC proliferation from occurring in the first place remains the primary goal of U.S. counterproliferation policy, the United States recognizes that a country determined to obtain NBC weapons and their means of delivery and willing to violate global nonproliferation norms can in fact succeed despite the strongest prevention efforts. Because experience has shown that countries armed with NBC weapons can and will use these weapons to challenge U.S. security interests, U.S. armed forces must be fully prepared to counter the military threats posed by NBC proliferation. For these reasons, senior Department officials continue to take an active role in guiding implementation of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative. As a result, the Department made substantial progress toward fully integrating the counterproliferation mission into its military planning, acquisition, intelligence, and international cooperation activities. These efforts have built upon the formal policy guidance issued by Secretary of Defense Perry in May 1994, follow-on guidance contained in internal planning and programming documents, and a DoD Directive on Counterproliferation issued in July 1996 that delineates specific responsibilities, formalizes relationships among DoD organizations, and establishes common terms of reference. These documents reflect the Department's role in the entire spectrum of U.S. government activities related to NBC proliferation -- from supporting diplomatic efforts to prevent or contain proliferation to protecting the United States and its friends and allies, and their military forces, from NBC attacks.
To ensure that these broad policy objectives are met and that the implementation of the Counterproliferation (CP) Initiative is integrated and focused, in April 1996, Secretary Perry established the DoD Counterproliferation Council. The CP Council, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and composed of senior civilian and military officials, monitors departmental progress in developing the strategy, doctrine, and force planning necessary to execute effectively counterproliferation objectives. It also monitors DoD-wide efforts at training, exercising, and equipping U.S. forces for the counterproliferation mission. The CP Council met several times during 1996, focusing on the potential impact of NBC proliferation on the Department's requirement to fight two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts, as well as joint and Service doctrine, exercising and training for integrated operations in an NBC environment. In this connection, the Council identified the importance of understanding the likely NBC employment concepts and plans of proliferants, and took steps to ensure that focused intelligence assessments in these areas inform the development of regional military plans, as well as doctrine and exercising policies.
Responsibilities for Counterproliferation Missions
One of the most important activities toward fully integrating counterproliferation into the functions of the Department has been the implementation of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) May 1995 Counterproliferation Missions and Functions Study. The study concluded that each commander in chief (CINC) should be responsible for executing U.S. counterproliferation policy within his respective area of responsibility, and that implementation would be executed directly through each CINC's standard deliberate force planning process. Based on this study, Secretary Perry approved a Counterproliferation Charter prepared by the CJCS supplementing top-level policy guidance and providing a military focus for implementing the counterproliferation initiative. By issuing a Concept Plan, the CJCS subsequently provided guidance to the CINCs for developing their own concept plans for the counterproliferation mission, further defining national level counterproliferation policy in terms of operational objectives and tasks that will assist the CINCs in developing their own area-specific plans.
Needed Capabilities for Counterproliferation: Counterproliferation Program Review Committee
The interdepartmental Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC) is composed of the Secretary of Defense (Chairman), the Secretary of Energy (Vice-Chair), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence. Congress chartered the CPRC to review counterproliferation-related research, development, and acquisition programs of the represented Departments and recommend programmatic and management initiatives to address shortfalls in existing and programmed capabilities to counter NBC proliferation threats. The CPRC's most recent findings and recommendations are detailed in its annual report to Congress, Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation, issued in May 1996.
The CPRC identified 15 counterproliferation Areas for Capability Enhancements
(ACEs) in its May 1995 report to Congress and reaffirmed them in its 1996
report. The views of the CINCs, expressed through the Joint Warfighting
Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) process, were an important contribution to
the work of the CPRC, and they were fully factored into CPRC assessments
of needed counterproliferation capabilities. As such, they will be modified
periodically to reflect changes in the international security environment.
The ACEs characterize those areas where progress is needed to both enhance
the warfighting capabilities of the CINCs and the overall ability to promote
national strategies to counter the growing proliferation threat. The
counterproliferation ACEs, in priority order, are:
These ACEs also provide a foundation for building the Department's Counterproliferation Support Program and Chemical and Biological Defense Program and will serve as a basis for assessing future programmatic progress in meeting counterproliferation mission needs.
The strategic planning process for DoD's Science and Technology (S&T) program was also enhanced with the issuance of the Joint Warfighting S&T Plan in May 1996. Biological and chemical warfare agent detection and counterproliferation are two of the 12 Joint Warfighting Capability Objectives identified in the plan. Joint Warfighting Capability Objectives will receive funding priority in future DoD budgets.
CP Support Program and Chemical and Biological Defense Program
Recognizing the increasing maturity of the DoD Counterproliferation Initiative and the progress made over the last several years in substantially improving U.S. counterproliferation capabilities, the Deputy Secretary directed in January 1996 that the Department take stock of its efforts to date and review all DoD counterproliferation-related programs to assess programmatic alternatives and priorities, policy impacts, and management alternatives. The goal of this assessment was to define a restructured and optimized acquisition program that will meet the CINCs' counterproliferation needs. The analytic assessment concluded that funding for a number of high payoff efforts should be accelerated and increased, including those aimed at detection of biological weapons and NBC warning. As a result, funding for counterproliferation programs during FY 1998-03 will increase substantially.
Over 100 DoD programs strongly support national efforts to counter NBC proliferation threats. At the core of this effort is the CP Support Program, which focuses on redressing the most critical shortfalls in deployed capabilities by leveraging and accelerating ongoing and high payoff research and development projects, and the Chemical and Biological Defense Program, which oversees and coordinates all DoD efforts to acquire NBC passive defense capabilities. Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) and Service programs involving theater and national missile defense also form an integral element of the counterproliferation effort. The sections below describe recent progress to accelerate research, development, and deployment of improved counterproliferation capabilities in five functional areas. They also describe key changes resulting from the Department's internal review of all DoD counterproliferation-related programs.
The CP Support Program Office, in partnership with the Navy, successfully deployed the Navy's Specific Emitter Identification prototype system to improve capabilities to identify and track ships suspected of transporting NBC and NBC-related materials. Deployment began in 1995; a total of 32 units will be deployed by the end of FY 1997. The program will transition to the Navy in FY 1998. The CP Support Program also supported a joint DoD/Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) effort to assess the threat of organized crime activities in the former Soviet Union involving the trafficking of NBC weapons and related materials and to apply DoD and FBI technologies, operational capabilities, and training programs to train law enforcement officials in the Baltics, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union. A joint report to Congress defining efforts planned under this program was submitted in 1996.
The DoD NBC Defense Program fulfills joint passive defense requirements to
permit U.S. forces to survive and fight in a NBC-contaminated environment.
The CP Support Program enhances the NBC Defense Program by providing leveraging
funds to accelerate fielding or development of critical programs, including
remote biological agent detection systems. Over the past year, the Services
have worked together to improve the joint orientation of NBC defense
requirements, and the community is now better prepared to address shortcomings
that still exist in the U.S. NBC defense posture. The established research,
development, and acquisition program will resolve many shortcomings by executing
current procurement plans and adapting available technologies. However, funding
constraints will delay modernization and could effect training realism. Based
on experiences in Operation Desert Storm, DoD identified the following shortfalls
and issues related to NBC defenses:
Since the end of the Gulf War, significant and measurable progress has been made in addressing each of these issues. The accomplishments and plans are detailed in the DoD NBC Warfare Defense Annual Report to Congress. Specific examples of new and improved systems that have been fielded include new protective masks, advanced chemical and biological protective garments, standoff laser chemical detectors, and first-ever capabilities for point biological agent detection and standoff aerosol/particulate detection. Additionally, there has been significant progress in research and development initiatives, particularly in the development of miniature, pocket-sized chemical agent detectors and digitally automated warning and reporting networks.
An integrated system-of-systems approach that incorporates detection systems, force protection, medical programs, and decontamination will provide the most effective means to ensure that U.S. forces will be ready to fight at the time and place of their choosing. Continued modernization of NBC defenses is necessary to counter an evolving threat. Robust defenses will also help deter NBC threats by reducing or eliminating the perceived utility and effectiveness of NBC weapons.
Theater missile defense (TMD) is an essential element of DoD's approach to countering risks posed by NBC weapons delivered by cruise and ballistic missiles. Active defenses play an important role in protecting U.S., allied, and coalition forces, civilians supporting military operations, and noncombatants. By intercepting and destroying NBC-armed missiles and aircraft at effective distance and altitude, active defenses substantially enhance the ability of friendly forces to conduct successful military operations. The U.S. theater missile defense program is managed and funded by the Services, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and BMDO. The program calls for near-term improvements to existing systems, development of a new core set of TMD capabilities, and exploration of Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) and other risk reduction activities to complement the core programs. Efforts are aimed at gaining a better understanding of the atmospheric dispersion of chemical and biological agents, along with methods for neutralizing them upon intercept.
The CP Support Program funds projects to enhance U.S. military capabilities
to identify, characterize, and neutralize NBC weapons, related facilities,
and supporting infrastructure elements while minimizing and predicting the
consequences of resulting collateral effects. The Counterproliferation ACTD
-- the core of the NBC counterforce effort -- allows the operational community
to evaluate and influence the development of NBC counterforce capabilities,
while expediting emerging capabilities into concepts of operations. Key
COVERT/TERRORIST NBC THREATS
The CP Support Program is coordinating its technology prototype development activities with the Technical Support Working Group, which develops joint interagency counterterrorism requirements, and with the Special Operations Command and joint Service explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units to ensure relevance and responsiveness in meeting user needs. An effort is also underway to address critical shortfalls in adapting biological and chemical warfare defense technologies to meet the unique requirements of the special operations environment. Projects underway include development of NBC perimeter monitoring sensors, a vented suppressive shield to contain biological and chemical weapons effects, a Quick Mask for responsive protection against biological and chemical agents, a joint U.S.-Canadian EOD suit for biological and chemical threats, a nonintrusive chemical agent detection system, and a special chemical and biological agent sample extraction and rapid identification system.
Doctrine, Training, and Exercising for the Counterproliferation Mission
The Department's effort to counter proliferation threats is not limited to identifying needed military hardware. An equally important part of the job is to adapt joint doctrine, planning, training, and exercise policies in light of the operational implications of the threat or use of NBC weapons. The Department's April 1996 report to Congress on Nuclear/Biological/Chemical Warfare Defense stressed that joint NBC defense doctrine needs to continue to evolve and include joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. The United States Army Chemical School's joint doctrine cell is assisting in the development of updated Joint doctrine with the guidance of the Joint Staff. In addition, the regional commands, as part of their task to develop concept plans for operations in an NBC environment, are assessing more fully how regional proliferation risks may affect doctrine, operational concepts, and methods. A more thorough understanding of how routine military tasks may be affected by the presence of NBC weapons and associated delivery vehicles will, in turn, help DoD better define hardware requirements and the proper emphasis to be placed on various capabilities, including theater missile defenses, passive defenses; counterforce; and command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I).
The Department also continues to make extensive use of wargames and related activities to build a common understanding about warfighting issues associated with NBC proliferation. Senior civilian, Joint Staff, and Service officials participated in a series of seminars involving scenarios where a proliferant had used NBC weapons against U.S. forces in a regional setting. Participants' discussion about the potential political and operational impacts resulting from such uses reinforced the importance of maintaining a mix of capabilities in the face of proliferation risks and thinking about how NBC proliferation may affect the way the United States fights. In this connection, the Center for Counterproliferation Research at the National Defense University is continuing its assessment of potential employment doctrine of NBC-armed adversaries and how U.S. operational concepts and military operations could be adapted to improve the U.S. ability to prevail in an NBC environment.
Intelligence Support for Counterproliferation
The U.S. Intelligence Community, with a leading role played by the Defense Intelligence Agency, continues to improve its ability to provide DoD leaders the detailed information necessary to support efforts to discourage NBC acquisition, to deter the threat or use of NBC weapons by a proliferant, and to protect against potential NBC attacks on the United States, U.S. forces, and U.S. friends or allies. A high priority is being placed on assessing the intentions, programs, operational practices, and supporting infrastructure of countries of concern (Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and North Korea), as well as countries who are also of concern as suppliers (China and North Korea). This underwrites DoD prevention efforts and provides a basis for military force structure development. Greater attention is also being given to operational intelligence (such as the location and characterization of NBC facilities, target vulnerability, early warning tracking data) and its timely dissemination, both of which are critical for planning defenses and responses to NBC threats.
In April 1996, DoD released an unclassified document, Proliferation: Threat and Response (PTR), providing detailed information to the public about the threats to U.S. security and regional interests posed by the proliferation of NBC weapons and their delivery systems. PTR also described the steps being taken by the Department to respond to the NBC proliferation phenomenon. It laid the foundation for informed public policy debate about the political and military efforts needed to counter growing proliferation risks. Public interest in the document was overwhelming, including at U.S. universities and overseas. A second printing was ordered and the report is being used as a text in many of DoD's professional military education courses.
COOPERATING WITH INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS IN ADDRESSING SHARED RISKS
The Department is continuing to work with America's long-standing allies in Europe and elsewhere to develop common approaches on counterproliferation. Notably, the Department played the leading role in moving counterproliferation to the top of NATO's agenda.
The NATO Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP), co-chaired by the United
States and a European ally (currently Italy), was established in 1994 to
determine the range of alliance and national capabilities needed in light
of proliferation risks and to recommend improvements for NATO's defense posture
to counter emerging threats from NBC weapons and their delivery means. NATO's
counterproliferation initiative is an integral part of the Alliance's adaptation
to the post-Cold War strategic environment, in which the proliferation of
NBC weapons can pose a direct threat to alliance security. As part of NATO's
strategic reorientation toward greater security responsibilities beyond Europe,
the DGP has recommended ways of improving the protection of allied forces
deployed in new roles and missions, including operations beyond NATO's periphery
where the military dangers posed by NBC proliferation are greatest. The DGP
has recommended steps to ensure NATO develops needed defenses against biological
weapons threats, which are of particular concern. In June 1996, the DGP presented
its recommendations to NATO defense and foreign ministers. It stressed the
importance of developing a core, integrative set of capabilities that will
provide a basis for continuing capability enhancements and force improvements
as proliferation risks evolve. This core set of capabilities includes:
In many of these areas, NATO already has, or is on the way to developing, the requisite capabilities. DGP findings are intended to give impetus and added rationale for fielding such capabilities, as well as to demonstrate how supplementing this nucleus of capabilities with other means -- including layered defenses against TBM attack, special munitions for NBC agent defeat and hardened NBC targets, computer modeling and simulation, and medical countermeasures -- would strengthen the alliance's overall ability to discourage NBC proliferation, deter the threat of use of NBC weapons, and protect against NBC attacks.
In June 1996 -- for the first time in 12 years -- NATO's defense ministers launched an accelerated out-of-cycle force planning process for counterproliferation, through which allies are making resource commitments to develop and field needed capabilities. This extraordinary effort demonstrates how counterproliferation has become a top priority for NATO in the post-Cold War era.
NATO's counterproliferation initiative has also provided the context for discussions with Partnership for Peace countries, including Russia and Ukraine, on security challenges of mutual concern. Through these consultations, NATO is working to ensure interoperability and coalition effectiveness in future operations that include Partner countries.
Countries outside of NATO have also recognized the growing security risks posed by proliferation. DoD has bilateral or collective defense arrangements with many nations and conducts combined operations with their militaries. Many countries have also participated in -- and will likely do so in the future -- international coalition operations in which the presence of NBC weapons has been a factor. For these reasons, DoD has held discussions with long-time friends and allies to forge common approaches for improving military capabilities in the face of NBC risks. The Technical Cooperation Program with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom pursues defense research collaboration to facilitate cooperation in research and development in several technology areas, including chemical defense. In addition, the Tri-Partite Memorandum of Understanding with Canada and the United Kingdom seeks to enhance cooperation in the RDT&E of chemical and biological defense programs.
These international activities demonstrate that the United States is not alone in its concerns for the defense dimension of proliferation. The Department remains committed to building international partnerships with allies and friends whose security and national interests are threatened by NBC proliferation.
TREATY ACTIVITIES -- THREAT REDUCTION THROUGH ARMS CONTROL
The United States is a party to a number of agreements with states of the former Soviet Union or the former Warsaw Pact relating to the control of nuclear and conventional weapons and their delivery systems. While most of these treaties have their origins in the Cold War, they remain important by providing legally binding mechanisms for reducing (and in some cases eliminating) categories of arms, as well as enhancing confidence and international stability. The Department of Defense plays a key role in the development of U.S. arms control policy, the formulation of proposed new arms control measures, and the resulting negotiation and implementation of arms control agreements. The Department is also responsible for ensuring U.S. compliance with its arms control obligations. A unique DoD element, the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA), performs inspection, escort, and monitoring functions associated with verification of arms control treaties and agreements.
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), that was signed in 1991 and entered into force in December 1994, is the first treaty actually to reduce the number of the superpowers' deployed strategic offensive arms. START requires the parties to reduce the number of accountable strategic warheads by over 40 percent and to reduce the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (for example, missile launchers and heavy bombers) by roughly one-third from pre-START I levels. Reductions are divided into three phases, with the treaty's final limits to be achieved by December 2001.
START I was originally concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union; Russia, Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine formally became parties with the United States to START I through the Lisbon Protocol, an agreement concluded after the breakup of the Soviet Union. In documents associated with the signing of the Lisbon Protocol in May 1992, Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine agreed to eliminate all strategic offensive arms from their territories within the seven year START I reduction period and to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as nonnuclear weapon states.
The Lisbon Protocol, in conjunction with the Russian-United States-Ukrainian Trilateral Statement, also provided the basis for the removal of all nuclear weapons from Kazakstan in 1995, from Ukraine in May 1996, and from Belarus by the end of 1996. As of November 1996, over 3,400 strategic warheads have been transferred to Russia from Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine.
Phase I Limits
Phase II Limits
|Strategic Delivery Vehicles||2,100||1,900||1,600|
|Total Accountable Warheads||9,150||7,950||6,000|
|Ballistic Missile Warheads||8,050||6,750||4,900|
|Heavy ICBM Warheads||*||*||1,540|
|Mobile ICBM Warheads||*||*||1,100|
|* Not applicable.|
The sides began reductions of older systems well ahead of entry into force of the Treaty and continued their activities related to the elimination of ballistic missile launchers and heavy bombers throughout 1996. By October 1996, over 850 missile launchers and bombers had been removed from START accountability in Belarus, Kazakstan, Ukraine, and Russia. As a result of these eliminations, the former Soviet states are already well below the second intermediate ceiling on deployed missile launchers and bombers, ahead of the required schedule. The United States is helping the four former Soviet states to carry out their treaty obligations under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. The United States, for its part, has removed warheads and missiles from most of the missile launchers to be eliminated under START I and has retired and moved to a central elimination facility all heavy bombers earmarked for dismantlement under the Treaty. The United States has also eliminated 800 strategic missile launchers and heavy bombers and has completed almost 70 percent of the warhead reductions required to meet the START I limit on total accountable warheads. As a result of these activities, the United States has already met the final START I limit on missile launchers and heavy bombers five years early.
The entry into force of START I ushered in a verification regime of unprecedented complexity and intrusiveness. In addition to verification by national technical means, data notifications, missile flight test telemetry exchanges, and other cooperative measures, the Treaty provides for 12 types of on-site inspections and exhibitions, as well as continuous on-site monitoring activities at specified facilities. During 1996, the Treaty parties continued to conduct on-site inspections at current and former strategic installations in the United States and former Soviet Union. The United States hosted over 25 such on-site inspections at DoD facilities. DoD representatives also participate in meetings of the START Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). The JCIC, convened periodically in Geneva, provides a forum for the five START parties to discuss issues relating to compliance with START obligations and to agree on practical measures to improve the Treaty's viability and effectiveness.
The START I Treaty set the stage for a subsequent agreement between Russia and the United States further reducing strategic offensive arms, known as START II. START II, signed by President Bush and President Yeltsin in January 1993, makes unprecedented reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear forces and codifies rough strategic equivalence at much lower levels. START II will reduce deployed strategic nuclear forces by about two-thirds from pre-START I levels. In addition, the Treaty will eliminate all multiple warhead (multiple, independently-targeted reentry vehicle (MIRVed)) intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and, for the first time, will place limits specifically on submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) warheads. START II also eliminates the discount provisions from START I warhead counting rules. Instead, bombers will be attributed with the number of weapons for which they are actually equipped. START II ensures the drawdown of nuclear forces will occur in a favorable direction -- away from large, vulnerable, first-strike missiles such as the Russian SS-18 and towards weapons better suited for a retaliatory role. Such a force will enhance stability by eliminating the pressure to use MIRVed ICBMs quickly in a crisis, lest they be destroyed in an attack.
START II's reductions are to be completed by January 1, 2003. The United States has offered to help Russia implement its START II reductions by providing assistance through the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.
With the Senate's vote to ratify START II, the United States now awaits action by the Russian legislature to approve the treaty. DoD has worked closely with other agencies in encouraging members of the Russian State Duma and Federation Council to vote in favor of START II ratification. Consistent with an agreement that President Clinton and President Yeltsin reached during the September 1994 Summit, successful ratification and entry into force of START II will provide the United States and Russia the opportunity to negotiate further reductions in their nuclear weapons.
Pursuant to legislation that prohibits DoD from retiring strategic forces below START I levels until START II enters into force, however, the Department has concluded a review of the cost to keep forces at START I levels, and it is budgeting to do so.
START I Final Limits
START II Final Limits
|Total Strategic Warheads||
|Ballistic Missile Warheads||4,900||*|
|MIRVed ICBM Warheads||*||0|
|Heavy ICBM Warheads||1,540||0|
|Mobile ICBM Warheads||1,100||START I applies|
|* Not applicable.|
Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Nuclear Forces
The Treaty on Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1987, entered into force in 1988. It required the elimination of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. All such declared missiles were eliminated by mid-1991. The INF Treaty is of unlimited duration, prohibiting production and possession of missiles subject to its terms. Its inspection regime, consisting of short-notice inspections at former INF facilities and continuous portal monitoring of certain missile production facilities, remains in force. DoD personnel are key participants in these inspection and monitoring activities and take part in the INF Special Verification Commission, at which the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine meet to discuss and resolve Treaty implementation and compliance issues.
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, signed in May 1972 by the United States and the Soviet Union, limits anti-ballistic missile systems (for example, systems which counter strategic ballistic missiles). The Treaty has contributed to the creation of more favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic offensive arms. The breakup of the USSR created the need to determine the status of ABM Treaty-related facilities now located in several New Independent States and to determine which state/states should succeed the USSR as Parties to the ABM Treaty. Together with those states that so far have demonstrated an interest in becoming parties to the ABM Treaty (Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia, and Ukraine), the United States has been negotiating an agreement that would establish the process and conditions under which Soviet successor states may do so. The United States expects these four states to elect to become Treaty parties; it remains to be seen whether any others will.
With the proliferation of theater ballistic missiles among third world nations, the United States plans to develop and deploy highly capable TMD systems. Although the ABM Treaty does not address TMD systems per se, it does require that non-ABM missiles, launchers, and radars not be given capability to counter strategic ballistic missiles and not be tested in an ABM mode. The Administration believes that clarification of the distinction between ABM systems, which are limited by the ABM Treaty, and non-ABM systems, which are not so limited, is necessary. The United States is seeking that clarification within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission.
U.S. TMD programs are going forward without ABM Treaty constraints on the capabilities necessary to meet TMD requirements. All U.S. TMD programs that have matured to the point where it is possible to assess compliance have been determined to comply with the ABM Treaty.
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty
The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), signed in November 1990, formally entered into force in November 1992. The treaty required the destruction of thousands of tanks, artillery pieces, armored combat vehicles, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft. The reductions were initially designed to achieve parity between NATO and the former Warsaw Pact. Although the groups of nations are no longer aligned as the Treaty envisioned, CFE still provides the cornerstone for the future security environment in Europe.
Over 2,000 inspection teams from virtually all 30 states have inspected units, formations, and destruction facilities of other participants routinely and as intended by the Treaty, verifying information concerning those units which have been provided annually by each nation. The Department of Defense continues to play a very active role in the verification and compliance activities associated with the CFE Treaty.
The Treaty has completed the 40 month reduction period, during which over 58,000 pieces of equipment were destroyed. The Treaty is now in the Residual Period, which lasts indefinitely. A CFE Treaty Review Conference, which reviewed Treaty operation and implementation for the first five years, was conducted in May 1996. One result of this conference was to begin the process of adapting the Treaty to bring it in line with evolving security structures in Europe, with negotiations beginning in early 1997. In addition, at the Review Conference the 30 CFE parties approved an agreement to realign the flank region of the CFE map, along with new constraints, additional information, and inspections for that area. Parts of the flank agreement are provisionally applied until mid-May 1997, by which time all parties will have confirmed their final approval of the document, including the United States.
In 1996, the On-Site Inspection Agency participated in over 52 inspections under the Treaty in states of the former Warsaw Pact and escorted foreign teams during 11 inspections of U.S. forces in Europe.
Open Skies Treaty
The Open Skies Treaty, signed March 24, 1992, in Helsinki, establishes a regime of unarmed aerial observation flights over the entire territory of its 27 signatories. The United States ratified the Open Skies Treaty in December 1993. The Treaty is designed to enhance mutual understanding and confidence by giving all participants, regardless of size, a direct role in observing military or other activities of concern to them through the collection of photographic and other specified data. Ongoing technical issues regarding Treaty implementation are being worked by the Open Skies Consultative Commission in Vienna. DoD continues preparations for treaty implementation. U.S. Open Skies aircraft, operated by the United States Air Force and staffed by OSIA, participated in 12 trial flights in 1995. During 1996, numerous aircraft flight tests and data collection flights led to the roll-out of the first fully operational capable aircraft. A successful practice U.S. certification event was conducted at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, with 45 participants from 18 signatory countries. Eight trial flights occurred, of which five joint trial flights were conducted in other countries. Treaty entry into force is awaiting ratification by Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus.
The On-Site Inspection Agency
The On-Site Inspection Agency is a joint-Service defense agency whose charter has been continuously expanded to assist in strengthening arms control and nonproliferation norms. Since January 1988, OSIA has been tasked by Presidential directives with ensuring U.S. readiness for and implementation of inspection, escort, and monitoring activities related to verification provisions of several conventional and strategic arms control treaties and agreements.
Because of its extensive operational expertise and experience, OSIA has been tasked to execute other missions that require its unique resident skills and organization, for example, the audit and examination provisions of agreements concluded under the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. OSIA also serves as Executive Agent for DoD support to the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq that fulfills Security Council Resolutions 687 and 715 and as the DoD Executive Agent for the Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program (DTIRP), a security and countermeasures program under the auspices of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence. As Executive Agent for DTIRP, OSIA works closely with its peers in U.S. industrial facilities and at military installations targeted for on-site inspections. Agency technicians, trained in arms control security awareness techniques, develop site-specific procedures that help ensure foreign inspection team access does not result in the loss of proprietary or sensitive information. Another mission assigned to OSIA involves its direct support (to include training, inspections, and technical advice) to the on-site arms control and Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) inspections conducted pursuant to the Dayton Agreement.
To better support implementation of arms control agreements and in-county activities under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, OSIA has established four Arms Control Implementation Units to serve as forward posts for arms control and defense-related functions and provide vital liaison functions with U.S. embassies in Moscow, Kiev, Minsk, and Almaty.
By means of the Counterproliferation Initiative and active involvement in the implementation and verification of arms control treaties and agreements, DoD is focused squarely on the challenge of reducing the dangers from weapons of mass destruction and improving international stability and security, while maintaining capabilities to respond to any threat. The Department's aggressive leadership in counterproliferation and threat reduction, manifest through numerous concrete programs and activities, has yielded substantial results and will continue to be vital in achieving national objectives in this area.