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INFORMATION SUPERIORITY AND SPACE
DoD is committed to taking full advantage of opportunities provided by the information age’s concepts and technologies in the 21st century. Creating and leveraging information superiority and exploiting the potential of Space are on DoD’s critical path to the future. The synergy resulting from the consolidation of Information Superiority and Chief Information Officer (CIO) functions under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD(C3I)) continues to yield significant technical, operational, and financial benefits. The consolidation of space policy development and oversight and closer coordination with the Intelligence Community resulted in space concepts being better integrated into defense strategy and processes. These actions create and leverage information superiority.
What is Information Superiority?
The information age provides an opportunity to move from an approach to war preoccupied with uncertainty and damage control to one that leverages information to create competitive advantage. The United States currently enjoys a superior information position over potential adversaries by virtue of its ability to collect, process, protect, and distribute relevant and accurate information in a timely manner while denying this capability to adversaries.
This information edge is translated directly into increased effectiveness by enabling emerging network–centric concepts designed to leverage improved situation awareness. Thus, information superiority is reflected in the twin revolutions, the Revolutions in Military Affairs and Business Affairs. These twin revolutions are mutually supportive as improved business processes result in additional resources for combat capabilities increasing the tooth to tail ratio.
Importance of Information Superiority
Information superiority is the critical enabler of the transformation of the Department currently in progress. The results of research, analyses, and experiments designed to create and leverage information superiority, reinforced by recent experiences in Kosovo, are very encouraging. They demonstrate that the availability of information and the ability to share it results in enhanced mission effectiveness and improved efficiencies. This evidence points to increased speed of command, a higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, less fratricide and collateral damage, increased survivability, streamlined combat support, and more effective force synchronization.
The ability to move information quickly where it is needed and to create shared awareness provides an opportunity to develop new concepts of operation and approaches to command and control (C2) that are more responsive and provide greater flexibility. To achieve their full potential, these new concepts may require changes in organization, doctrine, material, and the like—changes that need to be co–evolved along with the development of new operational concepts and approaches to command and control. New approaches to command and control include integrating the now separate and sequential planning and execution processes to achieve greater agility and flexibility and the capability for self–synchronizing forces. Based upon a common understanding of the situation and the commander’s intent, these forces are able to quickly respond in a coordinated fashion. Information superiority provides enhanced flexibility and agility, allowing U.S. forces to be more proactive and shape the battlefield.
Role of Space
Space is a medium like the land, sea, and air where military activities are conducted. Space and space–related activities contribute increasingly to the Department’s ability to meet its national security objectives.Space forces are global in nature, support a forward presence, are necessary to maintain military readiness, and enable implementation of Joint Vision 2010 enhanced operational concepts.
DoD issued a new space policy that reflects priorities in the nation’s evolving space activities, implements the National Space Policy issued by the President in 1996, identifies needed capabilities, provides guidance to resource allocation, and directs program activities. DoD formulated and led the execution of a space control strategy that initiates technology readiness activities to enhance the surveillance, protection, prevention, and negation missions as well as to unite space control research and development (R&D) and programs.
Importance of Space
Space power is as important to the nation as land, sea, and air power. Space forces support military operations by providing information lines of communication enabling information superiority, contributing to deterrence, increasing force effectiveness, and ensuring the freedom of space.
CONTRIBUTION TO INFORMATION SUPERIORITY
Military operations rely heavily upon information lines of communication to, in, through, and from space. Space assets integrate and deliver command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities; navigation; and weather so U.S. forces can deny such to an adversary, and enable combatant commanders and operational forces to synthesize information, dictate the timing and tempo of operations, and counter an adversary’s ability to exercise command and control.
CONTRIBUTION TO COMBAT POWER
Space forces contribute to the overall effectiveness of U.S. military forces if deterrence fails by acting as a force multiplier that enhances combat power. The capability to control space will contribute to achieving information superiority and battlespace dominance.
INFORMATION SUPERIORITY STRATEGY AND GOALS
Elements of Information Superiority
Information superiority starts with the ability to collect the information needed to support operations. Achieving information superiority requires organizing information into meaningful knowledge contexts, then providing that knowledge reliably and in a timely manner to decision makers. Information, when combined into a coherent picture, experiences a dramatic increase in value. This value is greatly enhanced when it creates a shared awareness. However, this value is not realized until its reaches someone who can use it. The importance of interoperability—the ability of different organizations and systems to share and utilize information—is paramount. Without a comprehensive approach to integrating DoD’s information processes and to achieving interoperability across organizations and systems, there will continue to be gaps and barriers that diminish the quality, quantity, and timeliness of information that is available for operations. The promise of shared awareness is in synchronized efforts. Thus, it is important not only that situation–related information is shared, but also that there is a capability for collaborative decision making and sharing of commander’s intent, plans, and implementing actions. These create the conditions necessary to dynamically synchronize actions in response to developing situations and to take advantage of opportunities as they occur.
While the information age created enormous opportunities, it also created significant vulnerabilities for those who depend upon an uninterrupted flow of quality information to support operations. Protecting DoD information and information assets must not be thought of as a luxury but as a basic necessity. Protection must be engineered in from the outset, not added on as an afterthought. As information superiority is a relative concept, operations to degrade, disrupt, destroy, and exploit an adversary’s information and information processes are an integral part of achieving, maintaining, and leveraging information superiority.
Prerequisites for Progress
Harnessing information technologies to create and leverage information superiority requires changes in the way DoD does business. There are three prerequisites necessary for progress—innovation, co–evolution, and the achievement of a critical mass of information infrastructure (infostructure).
Successful innovation depends upon an understanding of the possibilities, the ability, and tools to experiment with new concepts and capabilities, and an acceptance that some innovations will fail. Closer ties between the technical and operational communities are important to provide warfighters with a better understanding of the capabilities and opportunities that emerging information concepts and technologies provide, and to provide systems designers and developers with a better appreciation of operational requirements and environments. Experimental venues that provide opportunities for discovery and that capture empirical data for analyzing the nature and impact of information superiority are essential to facilitate innovation.
Since changes in the way DoD does business are key to creating and leveraging information superiority, the co–evolution of concepts of operation, command approaches, C4ISR systems, organization, and doctrine must be an integral part of DoD’s investment strategy, and the need for co–evolution must be reflected in experimental venues. Entering the 21st century, information technologies are advancing at unprecedented rates; DoD must be in a position to anticipate and leverage these technologies.
INFOSTRUCTURE AND TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS
The entry fee to an information superiority–enabled future consists of a critical mass of protected information and information processing capabilities, trained personnel, and assured connectivity so warfighters can gain hands–on experience with the power of information and the possibilities of networking. The achievement of information superiority is not a one–time milestone, but rather a continuing process to identify the best that technology has to offer and adapt it to the needs of DoD. Central to this effort is a continuing emphasis on advanced technology, integration of multiple technologies into a coherent capability, and interoperability.
Making Information Superiority Happen
To ensure that the above prerequisites are in place, DoD is developing appropriate policy and oversight initiatives, actively pursuing opportunities to improve international cooperation in the areas of C4ISR and Space, partnering with industry, and working to anticipate and understand the implications of emerging information technologies.
POLICY AND OVERSIGHT
DoD established the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Programs and Evaluation to provide an integrated strategic resource perspective on all information superiority programs, to include strategic resource guidance, program assessments, and execution reviews of DoD’s information superiority systems and capabilities. The ASD(C3I) has been added as a principal member of the Defense Acquisition Board to ensure consideration of C4ISR–related issues and compliance with the Clinger–Cohen Act by all acquisition programs. Oversight of all C4ISR and Space programs are combined under one overarching integrated product team (OIPT) to provide consistency in acquisition strategies and enhanced information superiority. Oversight of major automated information systems acquisitions remains the responsibility of the Information Technology OIPT.
An Information Management Strategic Plan was developed to support the goals of the Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Defense Reform Initiative, and Joint Vision 2010. Directive memoranda are being used to issue policy guidance quickly to accommodate the fast pace of technological advancements and statutory requirements. (See Appendix J for information on Information Managements goals.)
DoD initiated the development of an Information Superiority Advanced Technology Plan to provide guidance and focus to current and emerging DoD and commercial R&D.
The success of future military operations across the spectrum of conflict depends on the ability of the United States and its partners to exchange information quickly unimpeded by technological barriers. Lessons from Kosovo indicate that the inability to share information in a secure, interoperable mode can have adverse mission consequences. DoD is taking concerted action to inform other nations of its plans for the future and to seek opportunities for cooperative developments that will improve interoperability. Where appropriate, multinational fora such as the NATO Consultation, Command, and Control Board and its subcommittees, the Combined Communications Electronics Board, the Quadrilateral C3 Senior National Representatives forum, the NATO Partnership for Peace Program, the Southeast Europe Defense Ministers initiative and the Quadrilateral International Cooperative Opportunities Group are used to engage allies and partners in a productive dialogue and to develop the necessary partnerships. The United States contributes to these efforts by providing technology for command and control, communications, and crisis management, as well as assistance with C3 architecture development and systems engineering. Specific examples of DoD’s efforts during 1999 include the creation of a U.S.–French bilateral C4ISR and Space Interoperability Working Group, the NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative, Year 2000 Outreach program, and initiatives in the areas of information assurance (IA), extremely high frequency military satellite communications, battlefield information collection and exploitation, and multifunctional information distribution. DoD also pursued international agreements on remote sensing space cooperation with Italy, Spain, and Japan and protected national security space equities at the UN Conference on Disarmament and Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
PARTNERSHIPS WITH INDUSTRY
DoD works closely with the U.S. defense industry to promote transatlantic industrial teaming and to keep the C3 community apprised of DoD plans and strategies for the future. The benefits of this closer relationship include increased chances for improving interoperability and broader markets, and increased competition leading to more affordable products and insights into the plans of the other nations. The establishment of partnerships between the defense space sector and the intelligence, civil, and commercial space sectors will serve to balance investments, enable the leveraging of scarce resources, and reduce the cost of acquiring, operating, and supporting operational space force capabilities. C3I led the successful effort to define licensing criteria for commercial hyperspectral imagery, finalized a draft interagency agreement as well as DoD Directive and Instruction on shutter control, assisted the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in its development of a commercial remote sensing enforcement plan, and represented DoD in international consultations on remote mutual restraints with other supplier nations.
Information Superiority Goals
ENSURE CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS THROUGH THE YEAR 2000 TRANSITION PERIOD
The Year 2000 problem (Y2K) involves the inability of some software to function properly after December 31, 1999. It is vital to ensure continuity of mission–essential operations despite Y2K–related problems and disruptions.
IMPLEMENT EFFECTIVE PROGRAMS FOR ESTABLISHING INFORMATION ASSURANCE AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
The Department’s defense in–depth strategy protects critical assets and processes needed for mission accomplishment through effective training and certification of personnel, improved security operations, public key infrastructure (PKI), an integrated attack sensing and warning capability, the capability to conduct computer forensics, and the ability to leverage IA/critical infrastructure protection (CIP) technology solutions. DoD must also develop policies to define the use of commercial products and ensure business practices keep pace with electronic capabilities. DoD must work with allies and coalition partners to protect information since, in an interconnected world, this translates into the ability to protect DoD’s information and critical infrastructure.
BUILD A COHERENT GLOBAL INFORMATION GRID
The Global Information Grid is a major initiative that takes an enterprise view of DoD networking, computing, interoperability, and information assurance. It places emphasis on both the importance of information as a strategic resource and the need for greater compatibility of information technology with commander in chief (CINC), Service, and agency mission critical operational processes.
ACHIEVE END–TO–END C4ISR INTEGRATION
An integrated Joint and Combined C4ISR capability is necessary to ensure that information will be available, relevant, accurate, protected, authenticated, and provided in a useful and timely manner.
PROMOTE THE DEVELOPMENT OF KNOWLEDGE–BASED WORKFORCE
Improved productivity in the information age depends, in large measure, upon the creation and maintenance of reusable knowledge–bases; the ability to attract, train, and retain a highly skilled workforce; and core business processes designed to capitalize upon these assets. Central to this effort is the employment of a number of strategies aimed at optimizing information sharing, collaboration, and reuse.
REINVENT INTELLIGENCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
Getting needed intelligence information to decision makers in a timely and useful manner is essential for information superiority. Leveraging new technologies will alter warfighting concepts and place greater demands on intelligence, requiring new collection and processing assets and greater flexibility in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems. Intelligence challenges will increase as future opponents develop asymmetric strategies ranging from the threatened use of weapons of mass destruction to the exploitation of cyberweapons. The rapid growth in global television broadcasts, the Internet, and personal communications requires a new business model for intelligence to match capabilities with a changing environment.
STRENGTHEN INFORMATION OPERATIONS, SECURITY, AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
Foreign intelligence services are focused on obtaining the Department’s secrets and critical program information. DoD is committed to updating policies and programs, developing a more aggressive posture to employ Information Operations (IO) and counter foreign threats, protecting against trusted insider misconduct, and rationalizing security requirements such that necessary information sharing among coalition partners can occur while continuing to protect against the improper release of information.
PROMOTE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND BUSINESS PROCESS CHANGE
In order to realize the gains associated with information age technologies, DoD is committed to developing and implementing new ways of doing business that are designed to leverage the power of information and is committed to using electronic business/electronic commerce principles, processes, and technologies as the primary means of transacting its business.
FOSTER DEVELOPMENT OF AN ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY PLAN FOR INFORMATION SUPERIORITY
The convergence of disparate technologies into a package that has operational utility will not come about by accident. Therefore, DoD is developing an advanced technology plan for information superiority to rationalize investments, coordinate and leverage research, and focus efforts on high priority areas.
CREATE AN INFORMATION SUPERIORITY TEAM
The tenth goal enables the above nine goals by creating the necessary organizational processes, knowledgeable workforce, and teamwork within DoD to create and leverage information superiority.
CREATING THE INFOSTRUCTURE
The Infostructure Vision
The quality of DoD’s infostructure will be the pacing item on the journey to the future. The ability to conceive of, experiment with, and implement new ways of doing business to leverage the power of information age concepts and technologies depends upon what information can be collected, how it can be processed, and the extent to which it can be distributed. The ability to bring this capability to war will depend upon how well it can be secured and its reliability. DoD envisions an infostructure that is seamless with security built–in, one that can support the need for increased combined, joint, and coalition interoperability, leverages commercial technology, and accommodates evolution.
SEAMLESS AND COHERENT
To facilitate the end–to–end flow of information necessary to support network–centric operations, information processes must be transparent to users. DoD systems must transition from isolated stovepiped environments to a seamless and coherent infostructure. This requires the establishment of a Department–wide mechanism for gaining visibility into the many separate planning, budgeting, acquisition, operations, and maintenance activities that contribute to DoD’s information systems and processes. DoD’s Global Information Grid is designed to achieve this by creating a DoD–wide network management solution, comprised of enterprise network policies, strategies, architectures, focused investments, and network management control centers that bring order out of the currently, highly fragmented Service–centric DoD information infrastructure.
BORN JOINT AND COALITION
Future operations will be joint or multi–Service, include reserve components, and most likely involve partnerships with other countries to form a coalition. Their effectiveness will depend not only upon the ability of DoD to share information and collaborate internally but externally as well. Therefore, interoperability must be considered a key element in all DoD operational and systems architectures. Experience shows that after the fact interoperability fixes are costly, do not satisfy mission requirements, and create security problems. Success is achieved by incorporating interoperability from the start.
LEVERAGES COMMERCIAL TECHNOLOGY
The engine driving advances in information technologies is in the commercial sector. DoD benefits from the enormity of the commercial marketplace for information technology which drives down the costs of off–the–shelf capabilities, fuels an unprecedented rate of improvement in cost/performance, and makes interoperability easier to achieve. As a result, DoD now can reap the benefits of private sector investments, saving scarce R&D dollars to invest in militarily significant areas that the commercial sector is not addressing. The downside is that the latest technology is now available to potential foes and allies alike.
SECURITY BUILT IN
Security, like interoperability, must be incorporated into systems designs from the beginning to be effective and affordable. Security must be co–evolved with approaches to interoperability since new/revised links among systems increases vulnerabilities. While DoD’s continuing migration from analogue to digital systems will facilitate efforts, there will always be legacy systems and systems that coalition partners use that lack adequate security. DoD is exploring approaches to deal with these exceptions, however, these will in all likelihood entail limiting the functionality and utility of these nonconforming systems.
Change is the constant of the information age. DoD infostructure must be designed to accommodate rapid change as both requirements and technologies evolve. A comprehensive strategy that consists of appropriate architectures, standards, design principles, configuration management, and regression testing will be incorporated into DoD’s infostructure processes.
Infostructure Policy Initiatives
DoD is transitioning from a system–based IT management and oversight process to one based upon capability–based portfolios. A Portfolio Management and Oversight Working–Level Integrated Product Team was created to ensure that IT investments are directly linked to DoD mission, warfighter, and functional goals and outcomes; that they result in measurable improvements to DoD mission–related and administrative processes; and that the processes and systems are compliant with the Clinger–Cohen Act and related reform legislation.
ARCHITECTURES FOR JOINT VISION 2010
An integrated national security architecture is being developed to eliminate unnecessary vertical stovepiping of programs, minimize unnecessary duplication of missions and functions, achieve efficiencies in acquisition and future operations, provide strategies for transitioning from existing architectures, and thereby improve support to military operations and other national security objectives. This integration effort includes the various sources of intelligence and space capabilities. Thus, the ISR communities will be able to more efficiently access and exploit information from multiple sources as well as to integrate the end–to–end intelligence cycle to provide timely, relevant information products to warfighters.
Defense megacenters, based in the continental United States, process combat and combat support requirements for warfighters deployed around the world. DoD has substantially reduced the cost of this processing by modernizing and consolidating 194 Service and Defense Agency Information Processing Centers into five Defense megacenters with 19 regional support activities providing local computing and information technology support.
GLOBAL INFORMATION GRID
The Global Information Grid is an enterprise view of DoD networking, computing, interoperability, and information assurance consisting of a globally interconnected, end–to–end set of information capabilities, associated processes, and personnel for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel. The Global Information Grid includes all owned and leased communications and computing systems and services, software (including applications), data, security services, and other associated services necessary to achieve information superiority including the information component of weapons systems.
GLOBAL COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM
The Global Command and Control System provides near real–time situational awareness with integration of imagery and intelligence data, indications and warning, collaborative planning, course–of–action development, and intelligence mission support needed to accelerate operating tempo and conduct successful military operations. During FY 1999, significant improvements were made in the areas of security, Y2K compliance, infrastructure upgrades, and new and improved functionality.
The use of high technology weapons, communications, radio navigation, surveillance, and satellite control systems resulted in the Department’s increased reliance on access to the electromagnetic spectrum and the need for a more integrated approach to spectrum allocation. DoD co–located the Services’ Frequency Management Offices to improve coordination, defined roles and responsibilities for new and evolving spectrum management offices, updated major regulations, established spectrum management processes for special access programs, established formal training courses, conducted an analysis of the impacts of spectrum reallocation to military operations and national security, and established partnerships with key allies to ensure critical spectrum access in global operations.
GLOBAL COMBAT SUPPORT SYSTEM
The Global Combat Support System (GCSS) provides a strategy for achieving information interoperability across combat support functions, and between combat support and C2 functions. GCSS incorporates personnel, logistics, finance, acquisition, medical, and other support in a cross–functional environment. In FY 1999, GCSS provided the capabilities to access, integrate, and fuse the combat support picture, giving field commanders a total picture of the battlefield and combat support pipeline.
DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEM NETWORK
The Defense Information System Network (DISN) is DoD’s consolidated worldwide enterprise–level telecommunications infrastructure. It is transparent to its users, facilitates the management of information resources, and is responsive to national security and defense needs under all conditions in the most efficient manner. A two–tier pricing structure for the DISN is designed to gain economy of scale, increased security, and interoperability. Its goal is to provide marketplace user rates and component incentives for using DISN network service.
Accomplishments during FY 1999 include enhanced protections making the DISN more resistant to hostile attack and helping to ensure DoD’s ability to wage network centric warfare.
DEFENSE MESSAGE SYSTEM
DoD’s primary means of messaging communications (AUTODIN) will be replaced by the Defense Message System (DMS). A flexible, commercial–off–the–shelf (COTS)–based network–centric application layer system, DMS provides multimedia messaging and directory services using the underlying network and security services of the DII. DMS will interoperate with existing messaging systems during the transition.
JOINT INTEROPERABILITY TEST COMMAND
The Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC) reduces risk to the warfighter by ensuring compatibility, integration, and interoperability throughout the life cycle of DoD C4I systems. During FY 1999, JITC certified U.S. forces’ platforms for Tactical Data Information Link (TADIL) A/B/J conformance, completed TADIL interoperability certification/validation tests, conducted the largest Y2K test event in DoD on logistics systems, provided solutions to CINCs’ operational problems, and provided Y2K operational evaluation support.
PROTECTING DOD’S INFORMATION AND INFOSTRUCTURE
The Department of Defense, being the largest organization in the nation, faces significant information technology challenges in its efforts to ensure the continuity of critical missions and systems in the face of Y2K–related problems. Over one–third of all mission critical computer systems in the federal government are within DoD. DoD treated the Year 2000 problem as if it were a cyber attack directed at the very core of its military capability—at the ability to obtain, process, and control information. Securing systems for 2000 provided numerous lessons that will translate well to efforts in securing the critical information infrastructure in the future.
Y2K efforts have led to the best ever accounting of DoD systems and status. The information management structure now in place meets the requirements of the Clinger–Cohen Act. The enormous effort and awareness of IT generated by the Year 2000 problem has resulted in significant progress across the board in information superiority.
Information Assurance, a critical component of DoD’s operational readiness, ensures that the DII is capable of providing continuous and dependable service. IA depends on the continuous integration of personnel, operational, and technical capabilities to guarantee the availability, integrity, authenticity, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation of information services, while providing the means to efficiently reconstitute these vital services following an attack
In August 1998, DoD created the Joint Task Force–Computer Network Defense (JTF–CND), with a mission of coordinating and directing the defense of DoD computer systems and computer networks including the coordination of DoD defensive actions with non–DoD government agencies and appropriate private organizations. In June 1999, the JTF–CND reached its full operational capability. Effective October 1, 1999, the Commander in Chief, United States Space Command, was assigned the responsibility for Computer Network Defense (CND). Detailed studies are underway to identify core functions and develop an integrated, defense–wide, enterprise CND policy and assignment of responsibilities.
In May 1999, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued the defense–wide PKI policy that requires the use of a common, integrated DoD PKI to enable security services at multiple levels of assurance, provides a solid foundation for IA capabilities across the Department, and mandates an aggressive approach in acquiring and using a PKI that meets DoD requirements for all information assurance services.
Critical Infrastructure Protection
CIP addresses the protection of the critical assets and infrastructures DoD relies upon to accomplish its mission. A CIP Plan went into effect in January 1999 to ensure an integrated approach to CIP. The ASD(C3I) was designated the Department’s Chief Infrastructure Assurance Officer (CIAO), and senior DoD executives have been designated as CIAOs for each infrastructure. The Department began development of an analytic and assessment capability for the Defense infrastructures, leveraging existing capabilities which had been focused on commercial infrastructures. The ASD (C3I) has also been designated at the Functional Coordinator for National Defense, responsible (under Presidential Decision Directive 63) for coordinating all the CIP–related national defense activities of the U.S. government, ensuring that the comprehensive approach DoD is applying to its internal infrastructures is supported nationally and internationally by the other federal departments and agencies as well as allies and coalition partners.
DoD needs security policies and programs that pace the revolutionary changes in technology and combat on the modern battlefield. Policies must focus on providing protection based on assessments of threats and the danger and consequences of compromise for the most critical and vulnerable information, systems, capabilities, people, and facilities. The Department requires an active security paradigm that includes the following steps:
·Establish Criticality. Identify what must be protected and determine the protection requirements, analyze what is required to accomplish the mission, assess protective and deterrence systems, determine vulnerabilities to the threat environment, establish a degree of assurance to determine acceptable risk.
·Prepare. Reduce the threat by establishing a high level of assurance in the trustworthiness and reliability of people, practices, systems, and programs.
·Protect Assets. Control asset sharing, isolating information and capabilities based on need–to–know; mitigate known operational deficiencies and vulnerabilities; employ a defense in–depth strategy; and employ new technology to enforce or support security policy.
·Detect. Actively seek potential isolated and correlated threats or problems, particularly that may result in future malicious or anomalous activity.
·Respond. React to isolated or correlated anomalous or malicious activity, fix technology–based problems and correct suspected and actual unacceptable behavior using sound personnel and security management practices, seek legal or other management remedies as appropriate and when necessary.
·Strengthen Foundation. Refine security policy constructs, programs, and practices to anticipate the changing threat environment; deconflict security requirements to foster information sharing while maintaining need–to–know; strengthen personnel management practices to provide a motivated, skilled, and security–responsive workforce; establish and maintain mission–related performance measures; develop standards of professional competence for security practitioners and enhance awareness and training to ensure information is tailored for the designated audience.
Developing and implementing a new vision of security in the information age requires recognition of the globalization of the defense industrial base and the closer integration of foreign countries in defense production. These trends will require changes in the existing security paradigm.
The Department established a single office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense responsible for CI, Security, IA, CIP, and IO to ensure a coherent approach to these issues; established the Defense Information Assurance Program to better integrate the information assurance requirements and budgets of the DoD components, implemented a new certification process for systems administrators; and contributed personnel to the National Infrastructure Protection Center.
The Department implemented the Information Assurance Vulnerability Alert process that disseminates information threat warning and remediation messages throughout DoD and monitors implementation of countermeasures, issued new guidance for Web pages to prevent inadvertent disclosure of sensitive information, and established a Joint Web Risk Assessment Cell to monitor compliance.
The CI and security challenges confronting DoD have never been greater. DoD is expanding support to critical technology protection, developing a new CI Risk Based Methodology, enhancing support to force protection, and combating terrorism. DoD has established a Joint CI Training Academy, a Computer Forensics Laboratory, and a computer investigations training program; stood up a classified project to combat terrorism; created a joint CI evaluation office; and started a joint CI assessment group to coordinate CI protection.
ENABLING THE WARFIGHTER
Information superiority for the warfighter requires that the right information is collected, processed, protected, and distributed to create shared awareness and that the tools are provided to facilitate command and control. DoD has made significant progress in each of these areas.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
Over the next decade, total ISR capability will be melded into a system–of–systems architecture which ties national/theater/tactical sensors, commanders, and shooters together to enable U.S., allied, and coalition forces to strike rapidly and decisively at extended ranges.
DoD has significantly progressed toward the next generation Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) capability by modernizing airborne platforms, improving sensors, and accelerating unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) investments. With the award of Future Imagery Architecture, the Department has made significant progress implementing the next generation satellite IMINT capability. The Department is aggressively promoting the use of commercial imagery satellite capability in conjunction with national collection assets and associated value added products and services. The Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System (ASARS) Improvement Program for the U–2 fleet provides all–weather, day/night imaging, increased area coverage, improved imagery resolution, geolocation sufficient for precision–guided munitions, and a moving target indicator (MTI) capability.
The National Imagery and Mapping Agency is leading the effort to modernize tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination (TPED) of national, airborne, and commercial ISR information. Modernization is required to meet increased demand for precise geolocation, reduced decision cycle timelines, and significantly increased in collection capability.
The Department is studying ISR capabilities and will factor the results into Service and agency modernization programs. The MTI/IMINT Fusion Study identified opportunities to integrate MTI capability from various platforms, as well as integrating and cross–cueing MTI data with imagery. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are conducting three studies to improve airborne ISR support to the CINCs. The first, with a near–term focus, analyzes current CINC ISR requirements, airborne ISR contributions to satisfying requirements, and options to reallocate airborne assets to best meet current overall peacetime and wartime requirements. The second, with a longer–term (2010) focus, addresses airborne platform and sensor IMINT and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) requirements, capabilities, migration options, and investment strategies for FY 2002 to FY 2007. The third addresses ISR capabilities needed to support military operations in urban terrain.
DoD continues investments to ensure the unified commands are able to operate in projected digital and global network environments. The National Security Agency (NSA)–sponsored interagency study, the Unified Cryptologic Architecture for 2010, documented increasing requirements derived from the revolution in information technologies. The cryptologic community joined in an Expanded Corporate Management Review Group to refine and implement a strategy for a Unified Cryptologic System. The Joint Airborne Signals Intelligence Avionics Family high and low band components completed critical design review in 1999. NSA published a draft Joint Interoperable Operator Network Concept of Operations to enhance multidiscipline tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination. In collaboration with the Director of Central Intelligence, the Department allocated additional resources to enhance DoD electronic intelligence collection and analysis capabilities to meet known needs in these areas. Also, in the collaborative effort, a congressionally Direct Action Report was recently completed tasking NSA to continue its efforts in enriching electronic intelligence.
MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURE INTELLIGENCE
The Department of Defense, in cooperation with the Community Management Staff, continues to implement the guidance set forth by the Director of Gemini Intelligence to improve United States Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) activities. The first increment of a project 6–year increase in the resources assigned to the Central MASINT Organization was initiated in FY 2000. The focus of the first year will be on improving support to joint military operations through the creation of MASINT operations and production coordination elements and the implementation of standardized processes and procedures to more efficiently address the needs of MASINT users. DoD is placing particular emphasis on strategies and techniques to strengthen MASINT TPED and increase analytical depth particularly in the arenas of advanced synthetic aperture radar (SAR), radio frequency MASINT, acoustic collections, multi–/hyperspectral information, and nuclear/chemical/biological warfare counterproliferation.
Manned ISR assets continued to be tasked at high levels throughout 1999 supporting peacetime and contingency operations highlighted by the Kosovo conflict. Kosovo operations involved 22 aircraft (seven distinct types) flying over 850 ISR combat support sorties providing 24–hour SIGINT/IMINT collection coverage. The U–2 fleet continues to be improved with upgrades to sensors and aircraft. Initial deliveries for the U–2 ASARS Improvement Program sensor with MTI and SYERS P3I electro–optic/infrared (EO/IR) sensor with multi–spectral imagery capability are scheduled for FY 2000. The RC–135 Rivet Joint fleet was expanded by two aircraft this year. The upgrade of the fleet to a common baseline configuration provided additional communication capability and connectivity vastly improving warfighter support. A third RC–135 Cobra Ball aircraft was delivered in 1999, giving the Department a 33 percent increase in airborne MASINT platform capability. The EP–3E program is upgrading connectivity and joint interoperability compliance with the Joint Airborne SIGINT Architecture. DoD expects to field additional tactical reconnaissance assets used so effectively in Kosovo. These systems include the Marine Corps Advanced Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance System (ATARS) for the F/A–18, the Air Force Theater Airborne Reconnaissance System for the F–16, the Navy Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance Pod System for the F–14, and the Navy Shipboard Information Warfare Systems.
The Secretary issued a policy letter giving advocacy and vision to the Department’s UAV initiatives. The Global Hawk High Altitude Endurance UAV made excellent progress in the Military Utility Assessment phase of its advanced concept technology demonstration (ACTD). The long dwell capability of this air vehicle will support the warfighters’ desire for continuous situational awareness. The Predator Medium Altitude Endurance UAV performed admirably in its support of Kosovo operations flying over 780 flight hours and was also briefly deployed to Kuwait. Predator UAV systems have accumulated over 10,000 flight hours. In early 2000, both the Army and Navy expect to award tactical UAV contracts replacing Hunter and Pioneer. Despite planned program phase–outs, the Hunter and Pioneer UAVs admirably contributed to the Kosovo campaign.
Space assets continued to support both peacetime and conflict operations. The 24–hour all–weather collection coverage was invaluable to the total ISR effort. As the United States Space Command continues to advocate the warfighter’s needs, space contributions will continue to be vital toward achieving the national military objectives.
GROUND/SURFACE SYSTEM SUPPORT
The Services are aggressively migrating ground exploitation and dissemination systems to a distributed, homogeneous network capable of tasking, processing, exploiting, and disseminating multi–intelligence products delivered from multiple platforms and sensors. This effort will significantly reduce the operational footprint for initial entry and follow–on operations, as well as support split–based and joint operations. Multi–intelligence correlation was demonstrated during a Fleet Battle Experiment where the Littoral Surveillance System received and displayed Joint STARS MTI, acoustic data, SIGINT data, Predator video, and U–2 ASARS Improvement Program EO/IR and synthetic aperture radar data.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the willingness of rogue states to use them, the development of other forms of asymmetrical warfare, and the increasing capabilities terrorist organizations can develop make it imperative U.S. intelligence improve its ability to collect, process, and analyze information. These improvements require additional investments in information technologies to create collaborative work environments and progressive production procedures. A virtual analysis structure that allows quick reaction to fast moving trends, greater agility in the work environment, and the enhanced ability to deliver tailored products and services is required.
Maintaining the integrated capabilities of the Total Force remains essential for the U.S. defense strategy. Defense intelligence agencies will continue to develop and expand to all intelligence disciplines the connectivity strategy underlying the Joint Reserve Intelligence Program (JRIP). The JRIP strategy calls for establishing and maintaining an interoperable, secure system and infrastructure for engaging the military intelligence reserves in operational missions, regardless of individuals’ component, duty status, or physical location. Identifying and engaging individuals’ skills, especially in foreign language and information technology, will ensure seamless tactical–operational–strategic information/intelligence operations.
DoD will review and evaluate candidate commercial activities for competition to promote efficiency and generate savings for reinvestment into core mission areas. To this end, the Intelligence Community will continue to assess candidate activities, perform cost–comparison analyses, develop reinvestment strategies, and track identified savings.
The Department’s Military Satellite Communications future architecture which includes satellites, terminals, and control subsystems will provide users with three general classes of service: protected, wideband, and narrowband. DoD approved strategy to transition from current systems to future architecture includes leveraging commercial satellite communications to the maximum extent possible.
Protected communications services are survivable to ensure warfighter command and control at all levels of combat. The strategy for protecting communications calls for launching four Milstar II satellites by 2002 as planned, followed by the first launch of a more capable Advanced Extremely–High Frequency system in 2006. The failure of Milstar Flight 3 impacted this strategy and a plan for recovering from this loss is still under development.
Wideband communications services rapidly move large quantities of C4I information including intelligence products, video, imagery, and data. DoD’s wideband strategy is to launch the four remaining Defense Satellite Communications System satellites supplemented by Global Broadcast Service payloads on Ultra–High Frequency Follow–on (UFO) satellites. Three Wideband Gapfillers will be launched starting in 2004 to reduce the growing gap between tactical wideband requirements and capabilities. A more capable commercial–like Advanced Wideband System is envisioned starting in 2008.
Narrowband communications services provide networked multi–party and point–to–point narrowband links to tens of thousands of rapidly moving warfighters. DoD launched its last UFO satellite in 1999 and plans to supplement the constellation with a satellite in 2003 to maintain the system through 2007. In 2008, the Department plans to launch a UFO replacement system known as the Advanced Narrowband System.
JOINT TACTICAL RADIO SYSTEM
DoD continues to enhance tactical communications to provide secure, survivable, and interoperable systems for joint and combined operations of conventional forces. The Joint Tactical Radio System was initiated to provide the standard for affordable, high capacity, scalable, interoperable tactical radios to replace all of DoD’s current radio inventory, avionics upgrades, appropriate satellite terminals, and personal communications equipment.
COMMON DATA LINK AND J–SERIES TACTICAL DATA LINKS
The command data link family is DoD’s primary wideband data link standard to support air–to–surface transmission of radar, imagery, video, and the sensor information from manned and unmanned aircraft. The DoD’s J–series family (of Link–16, Variable Message Format, and Link–22) of low rate tactical data link standards is critical for battlefield awareness for joint and coalition forces. The Joint Tactical Data Link Management Plan is the vehicle overseeing Service migrations to achieve an integrated, predominant, joint forces capability by 2005.
The Army continues on the road to a digitized force employing information technologies to acquire, exchange, and employ data throughout the battlespace. The Army will equip the First Digitized Division (the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Hood, Texas) by the end of 2000 and the First Digitized Corps by the end of 2004. Army Division XXI efforts encourage innovation and have resulted in a new design for heavy divisions that reduces manpower platform requirements and combat platforms in the maneuver battalions while increasing lethality and survivability.
Command and Control
JOINT SURVEILLANCE TARGET ATTACK RADAR SYSTEM
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System is an airborne platform equipped with a long–range, air–to–ground surveillance system designed to locate, classify, and track ground targets in all weather conditions and provide targeting and battle management data to all operators, both in the aircraft and in the ground station modules. Aircraft deployed as part of NATO Allied Force operations met high operating tempo requirements, and provided time–critical information to operational decision makers and combat aircrews. Two E–8Cs were deployed in support of Kosovo operations and data from the 93rd Aircraft Wing reflects outstanding Joint STARS performance—83 of 86 combat support sorties were accomplished with launch reliability of 99 percent, mission effectiveness of 96 percent, and mission capability rate of 80 percent. Production efforts were equally successful with all aircraft on or ahead of schedule.
Combat identification is the process of attaining an accurate, real–time characterization of potential targets in a combatant’s area of responsibility so as to allow the use of weapons or other tactical options. It is essential for overall battle management, operational effectiveness, and reducing fratricide and collateral damage. Systems employed for combat identification include those using cooperative (i.e., radio frequency question and answer) and noncooperative (e.g., analysis of radar return characteristics) methods, as well as methods which rely on radio reporting of friendly units’ geographical positions over a network. DoD’s current focus is on improving interoperability between the Services, improving combat identification between ground vehicles, and improving combat identification for close air support and deep strike aircraft missions. A combat identification Capstone Requirements Document is scheduled for completion in FY 2000.
JOINT AND COALITION INTEROPERABILITY
DoD is developing a comprehensive Joint Interoperability Concept Plan to identify and address specific shortfalls and opportunities in the interoperability of joint and combined forces. Other initiatives designed to improve coalition interoperability include the creation of a C4ISR Coalition Interoperability Multinational Working Group (MNWG) with participants from Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In May 1999, a MNWG exercise identified impediments and shortfalls to sharing information for coalition collaborative planning and developed recommendations for the October 1999 meeting of senior level C3I national leaders who form the Six–Nation Council. A Coalition Interoperability Concept Plan is being developed to link the various actions, activities, working groups, and forums working interoperability issues among coalition partners while a Coalition Planning and Information Sharing Oversight Integrated Product Team is being formed to leverage ongoing efforts.
NUCLEAR COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS
DoD continues to maintain sufficient survivable and enduring command and control of nuclear weapons. Numerous efforts are underway to sustain and modernize these systems. Correcting Year 2000 problems and developing a process to manage the Year 2000 transition was a high priority. All mission critical systems are projected to be Y2K compliant.
The Directive on Personnel Recovery, June 30, 1997, states that bringing home those who have put themselves in harm’s way is one of the highest priorities of the Department of Defense and a moral obligation. Current DoD efforts in this regard are focused on improving Personnel Recovery capabilities for information management, critical communications links, evader location, and intelligence support.
Integration and Interoperability
DoD made significant advances in planning and implementing joint and combined end–to–end C4ISR and space integration, improving battle damage assessment, close air support, naval surface fire battlefield integration, and theater joint tactical networking.
A Joint Command and Control Integration/Interoperability Group was established to continuously review, oversee, plan, and direct joint integration and interoperability improvements. The Joint C4ISR Decision Support Center (DSC) completed a number of studies to leverage integrated and interoperable C4ISR and improve combat effectiveness. In FY 1999, the DSC analyzed C4ISR requirements for military operations in urban areas, moving target indicator and imagery fusion, IA, and C4ISR impacts on joint interdiction, coalition warfare, and combat operations.
Information operations support the objectives of the National Security Strategy by enhancing information superiority and influencing foreign perceptions. The Department’s emerging concept for IO will be the basis for aligning strategy and policy across DoD. When approved, the strategic concept will guide and integrate IO policy, organization, and implementation and the research, development, and acquisition of IO capabilities.
To protect information, maintain information superiority, and improve preparedness, DoD is employing Red Teams, which are interdisciplinary, threat–based opposing forces to expose and exploit IO vulnerabilities of friendly forces. The Department is preparing policy to standardize the methodology for conducting DoD Red Team operations.
The Department is developing an IO resource baseline to identify DoD component IO–related efforts. This will provide the Department’s leadership with great insight into DoD component IO resource, R&D efforts, and organizational focus, allowing greater resource efficiencies and DoD IO program integration.
Based on IO experience in support of Kosovo operations, DoD now has the makings of an IO framework from which to deal with future coalition/allied warfare issues to achieve/maintain information superiority. DoD education programs continue to be offered and are available to federal and military personnel. IO continues to be integrated into military exercises and wargames.
GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM
Given the multitude of military, civil, and commercial Global Positioning System (GPS) users, the newly formed GPS Support Center monitors system performance, provides tactical support to warfighters, and interfaces with key civil agencies that rely on GPS. The GPS continues to mature into a worldwide dual–use positioning, navigation, and timing information resource. The military utility of GPS–enabled precision munitions was illustrated in the conflict in the Balkans. Consequently, integration of GPS into all levels of combat forces remains a high priority. Worldwide civil applications of GPS continue to expand, with new and innovative uses of GPS appearing continuously.
With the growing importance of GPS to military operations and the need to maintain this advantage for friendly forces, the Department’s navigation warfare (Navwar) initiative continued on course, and operational requirements for Navwar were formally validated. Navwar efforts, including the recently completed Navwar ACTD, are focused on selecting the most effective solutions for assuring uninterrupted DoD and allied use of GPS, denying access to an adversary, and maintaining GPS service for peaceful purposes outside the theater of operations. DoD is evaluating alternatives and developing a roadmap for modernizing the system to satisfy more demanding military and civil requirements to ensure the continued utility of the system well into the 21st century.
An Interagency GPS Executive Board provided proactive management and oversight of the dual–use aspects of the system. Two new civil signals will be added to future GPS satellites to provide civil users with increased accuracy and robustness and to permit an even broader spectrum of GPS applications.
DoD is supporting a number of international initiatives designed to promote international acceptance of GPS as a worldwide standard, achieve international support for protection of GPS frequency allocations, encourage growth in the investment and trade of GPS equipment and services, and assure future interoperability.
The effective use of space for military purposes requires reliable and affordable access. U.S. space launch systems differ only slightly from the ballistic missiles developed during the 1950s and 1960s, and are increasingly costly to use. The National Space Transportation Policy balances the efforts to sustain and modernize existing launch capabilities with the need to invest in the development of new, improved space transportation systems. DoD is the lead agency for improving today’s expendable launch vehicle (ELV) fleet, including the requisite technology development. The Department’s objective is to reduce the launch costs while improving capability, reliability, operability, responsiveness, and safety.
To achieve this objective, DoD initiated the Evolved ELV (EELV) program to replace current medium– and heavy–lift launch systems. Through this program, DoD is partnering with industry to satisfy both government and the international commercial market launch needs. EELV will reduce life–cycle costs, shorten launch timelines, and enable more DoD, civil, and commercial launches per year. The medium–lift and heavy–lift EELVs will have their first government flights in 2002 and 2003, respectively. In an innovative approach, DoD will compete EELV launch services instead of separately buying launch hardware and paying for launch operations.
The Department will cooperate with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in the development of technology, operational concepts, and flight demonstrations for the next generation of reusable launch vehicles that will replace the space shuttle.
MISSILE DETECTION/MISSILE WARNING
Defense Support Program satellites have provided vital strategic and theater missile warning for nearly three decades. This technology is aging and will soon be replaced by the more capable Space–Based Infrared System (SBIRS). The first increment of SBIRS will upgrade the ground–processing infrastructure and consolidate theater and strategic warning missions within one system. The second increment, SBIRS–High, will be a new generation of infrared early warning and surveillance satellites in Geosynchronous Earth Orbit, complemented by sensor payloads hosted on Highly Elliptical Orbiting vehicles. SBIRS–High will provide data that can be used to vastly improve missile warning and defense. The third increment of SBIRS, SBIRS–Low, will be a constellation of Low Earth Orbiting satellites with an unprecedented capability to track ballistic missile targets through midcourse and terminal flight.
METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITE CONVERGENCE
An Integrated Program Office was created to plan, develop, acquire, manage, launch, and operate the National Polar–orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS). Its primary objective is to reduce the cost of acquiring and operating polar–orbiting environmental satellite systems, while continuing to satisfy both military and civil operational requirements. NPOESS is proposed as a three–satellite constellation that will enhance coverage and data availability. To promote international cooperation in space and save U.S. funds, the European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites will provide the third satellite in the fully converged constellation. The Department is working closely with NOAA and NASA to ensure that NPOESS continues to satisfy national security requirements.
Satellite control involves operations to deploy and sustain military systems in space. The Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN) is the primary C2 support capability for DoD, the National Reconnaissance Office, civil, and allied space programs providing data processing, tracking, telemetry, satellite commanding, communications, and scheduling for over 100 satellites. The Naval Satellite Operations Center provides similar support for Navy satellite systems. The AFSCN global antenna network also provides unique launch/early orbit and anomaly resolution services. As a backup, Air Force Transportable Mission Ground Stations can provide mobile C2 capabilities for certain DoD satellites.
The Department’s future satellite operations architecture establishes clear vectors to migrate satellite control into an integrated and interoperable satellite control network. The Department is working closely with NASA and NOAA in developing a strategy to transition from current and planned systems into the future (20+ years). This strategy establishes timelines to improve satellite capabilities, consolidate and enhance the ground infrastructure, and develop new frequency standards.
The spread of indigenous military and intelligence space systems, civil space systems with military and intelligence utility, and commercial space services with military and intelligence applications poses a significant challenge to U.S. defense strategy and military operations. Because of the value of space systems to the U.S. economy and the military in future conflicts, the United States may experience attacks against U.S. and allied space systems. Consistent with treaty obligations, DoD must be able to ensure freedom of action in space for friendly forces and, when directed, limit or deny an adversary’s ability to use the medium for hostile purposes. To support space control objectives, DoD must assure the availability and effectiveness of all mission critical space capabilities. To this end, DoD is reviewing the adequacy of protection afforded space assets. DoD also has initiated a Technology Development Program that will enhance the security, survivability, and operational continuity of space systems to include ground, link, and orbital segments. Moreover, DoD must have the appropriate capabilities to deny when necessary an adversary’s use of space systems to support hostile military forces.
Research and Analysis
There is much that remains to be known about creating and leveraging information superiority. DoD initiated the Information Superiority Investment Strategy program to provide an analytical framework and a body of empirical evidence to support C4ISR–related Quadrennial Defense Review analyses. DoD’s C4ISR Cooperative Research Program is dedicated to advancing both the state of the art and practice of command and control. The program focuses on highly leveraged projects designed to better understand and measure shared awareness and self–synchronization, to develop and assess new approaches to command and control, to design experimental processes needed to co–evolve information–enabled mission capability packages, and to understand the challenges associated with coalition command and control.
ENABLING BUSINESS PROCESS IMPROVEMENT
Governance is the substructure that allows the DoD CIO to be an effective participant in the Department’s mission. The CIO Executive Board serves as the executive management body focusing on resolving issues, ratifying policies, and prioritizing information technology budget proposals. During FY 1999, emphasis was placed on policies to improve network operations and management, interoperability, computing, information dissemination management, information assurance, enterprise software licensing, governance, and the alignment of IT investments with the goals and priorities of the missions being supported.
DoD established the Clinger–Cohen Competencies to meet the Act’s requirement to acquire and maintain a skilled workforce. These competencies outline the skills and knowledge requirements for CIOs and other senior managers with information technology responsibilities. The DoD CIO has made information management education and training a primary goal to promote the development of an information management knowledge–based workforce in DoD. In July 1999, the Department conducted an in–depth study of IA and IT skills and resources within DoD focusing on training, certification, and personnel management.
Enterprise Software Initiative
Enterprise Software Initiative (ESI) is a project that is saving money on DoD common–use, COTS software by creating DoD–wide Enterprise Software Agreements. The ESI working group has also identified software best practices and will develop a DoD–wide business process for acquiring, distributing, and managing DoD Enterprise Software. ESI is realizing savings, from 28 percent to 98 percent off General Services Administration pricing, as a result of innovative process changes. In July 1999, the Department began conducting an in–depth study of IA and IT skills and resources within DoD focusing on training, certification, and personnel management.
Many advances were achieved in furthering information superiority capabilities in the plans, policy, and programmatic areas. OASD(C3I) increased emphasis on leveraging the Planning, Programming, Budget, and System and the Capabilities Program and Budget System to obtain much needed resources for programs critical to the success of the information superiority vision and, as a result, was able to increase funding for a number of critical programs. Significant accomplishments include laying the foundation and basic elements of a secure, interoperable infostructure with the addition of funds to:
·Implement a public key infrastructure.
·Expand defensive information operations.
·Establish a joint interoperability test and standards program.
·Establish the Joint Task Force – Computer Network Defense and develop a comprehensive approach to Computer network defense.
·Build and protect the DoD infostructure.
·Complete the Global Position System.
·Ensure adequate intelligence support to the fused operations–intelligence common operational picture.
·Improve Electronic Intelligence capabilities.
·Increase future battlespace awareness by initiating the acquisition of Global Hawk acquisition and improved SIGINT.
·Enhance tactical imagery and provide a quick reaction capability.
·Initiate an end–to–end system of sensor tasking, information processing, exploitation, and dissemination of intelligence.
·Improve C4ISR support to Kosovo operations.
Much progress was made in reaping the rewards of advancing information technology and the opportunities of space. There is convincing evidence of the enormous potential of space and information superiority–enabled Network Centric Warfare and supporting network–centric operations. Much remains to be done. The major challenges continue to be in the areas of interoperability, information assurance, and the achievement of a coherent Infostructure to support DoD’s twin revolutions—the Revolution in Military Affairs and the Revolution in Business Affairs.
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