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Chapter 11


The Department’s transformation strategy, described in this chapter, aims to ensure U.S. military preeminence well into the 21st century. Much about the future security environment is uncertain, such as the identity of the nation’s adversaries and the precise ways in which they will threaten U.S. interests. But much is already clear. A number of states will have the capability to threaten U.S. vital interests, through coercion, cross–border aggression, and other hostile actions. Other states will face internal humanitarian crises and ethnic conflict, which may require the U.S. military to respond quickly while minimizing risks of American and noncombatant casualties. Whether in the context of major theater war or smaller–scale contingencies, future opponents are likely to threaten or use asymmetric methods such as terrorism, cyber attacks on critical computer–based networks, and weapons of mass destruction in order to offset U.S. conventional superiority.

Transformed military forces are needed because the strategic environment is changing; they are possible because of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Technology, vastly changing the civilian world, is changing the military sphere as well. Exploited effectively, through innovative operational concepts and new organizational arrangements, new information systems and other technologies will allow U.S. forces to be smaller, faster, more agile, more precise, and better protected. In short, U.S. forces will be more capable of meeting the security challenges of the 21st century in order to protect citizens at home and project power abroad.

The Department is transforming its forces to meet future challenges through a clear strategy that integrates activities in six areas:

· Service concept development and experimentation efforts to develop and experiment with new operational concepts that make use of promising technologies to perform critical tasks.

· Joint concept development and experimentation to harmonize Service capabilities where possible and develop joint solutions where necessary to assure that future joint force commanders have the tools they need to meet key operational challenges.

· Robust implementation processes in the Services and joint community to rapidly identify the most promising new concepts and capabilities that emerge from experimentation and put them on a fast–track toward incorporation in the force.

· Science and technology (S&T) efforts focused on areas that can enhance U.S. military capabilities to meet projected challenges, with close ties between technologists, innovators, and warfighters.

· Efforts to encourage international transformation activities. The United States is most likely to operate as part of coalitions in executing the defense strategy. While U.S. forces may differ from those of partners in significant ways, DoD must assure there is combined interoperability in command and control and other capabilities critical for effective coalition operations.

· Exceptional people with the right skills for the 21st century and attitudes nourished in a culture that encourages bold innovation and leadership.

After describing the Department’s vision for full–spectrum dominance in future warfighting capabilities, articulated in Joint Vision 2010, this chapter summarizes the efforts underway in each of the six areas outlined above.


Joint Vision 2010 provides a template for the Department’s transformation efforts across all elements of the armed forces. It channels the Department’s innovation, energy, and resources towards a single long–term goal: full–spectrum dominance, which requires U.S. forces that are preeminent in any form of operation, from peacekeeping to major theater war. U.S. forces must be able to prevail decisively against a wide range of future threats, including adversaries armed with weapons of mass destruction. American’s strategic nuclear deterrent will remain essential for this purpose. However, conventional forces are less vulnerable and more lethal because they are able to concentrate combat power at the decisive time and place with less need to mass forces physically will also be required. Full–spectrum dominance focuses DoD’s efforts on four new operational concepts which, enabled by information superiority and technological innovation, will yield military superiority across the full range of potential military operations—dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full–dimensional protection, and focused logistics.

· Dominant maneuver involves the multidimensional application of information, engagement, and mobility to employ widely dispersed joint forces to apply decisive force against an enemy’s centers of gravity to compel an adversary to either react from a position of disadvantage or resign from the conflict.

· Precision engagement provides the ability to generate discriminating lethal or non–lethal effects against a wide range of objectives or targets. Forces are provided near real–time information on the objectives or targets and will have the flexibility to rapidly assess the results of the engagement.

· Full–dimensional protection provides defenses for U.S. forces and facilities, from peacetime through crisis and at all levels of conflict. Achieving this goal requires a joint command and control architecture that employs a full array of active and passive defense measures.

· Focused logistics integrates information superiority and technological innovations to develop state–of–the–art logistics practices and doctrine. This will permit U.S. forces to accurately track and shift assets, even while enroute, thus facilitating the delivery of tailored logistics packages and more timely force sustainment.

Joint Vision 2010 is not a specific goal for military capabilities in 2010, but instead a commitment to a path that will lead to dramatically improved capabilities to conduct military operations and to a revolutionary increase in future joint force effectiveness. The Department intends to update Joint Vision 2010 as the exploration of the RMA continues. However, the Department will retain the Joint Vision 2010 commitment to full–spectrum dominance for joint U.S. forces in the future.


Innovative and rigorous Service and joint concept development and experimentation are central to the Department’s efforts to achieve dramatic military transformation. In order to be prepared for the challenges of the future, DoD must learn systematically not only from real–world operations, but also from experiments using wargames, computer–assisted simulations, and field trials that simulate future operational capabilities. History shows it has often been disastrous defeat on the battlefield that has prompted a military organization to change. A vigorous program of concept development and experimentation that pits future U.S. forces against simulated skilled, determined opponents allows the Department to create the needed stimulus for change. The opponents portrayed in these experiments must be innovative and effective. The expectation is that U.S. vulnerabilities can be discovered in the context of these exercises and corrected before a future opponent can find and exploit such weaknesses in war.

Each of the Services has concept development and experimentation activities focused on its core competencies, with activities organized to explore capability improvements in the near–, mid– and far–term. They also have established battle labs that bring warfighters and technologists together to work on key areas of warfighting.

The Services’ visions that guide concept development and experimentation efforts are consistent with Joint Vision 2010 and its objective for forces that are smaller, faster, more agile, more precise, better protected, more rapidly deployed, and more easily sustained in the field:

· All envision forces capable of rapid deployment in crisis and decisive operations in combat.

· All depend on the integration of lethal and non–lethal effects from dispersed forces.

· All envision agile forces that can reorganize quickly in response to rapidly developing situations.

· All envision modern, responsive logistics and support systems that constantly monitor demand and supply, and a dynamic support pipeline to achieve much smaller deployed footprints.

· All depend on the exploitation of information technology to enable rapid, adaptive planning and operations in which deployed forces utilize the non–deployed information support structure via high–bandwidth Internet–like communications.

While the Services’ visions and activities stress these common themes, they also reflect the unique core competencies and heritage of each Service.


The Army recently articulated a new vision of its future, entirely consistent with Joint Vision 2010. This vision calls for transforming Army forces toward an Objective Force that is strategically responsive and dominant at every point on the spectrum of future military operations. To achieve this goal, the Army plans to field forces that are more responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable. It is the synergy of these attributes that will enable the Army to meet its enduring strategic requirement to conduct prompt and sustained land force operations to protect the nation’s interests. In support of its transformation, the Army, in conjunction with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the other Services, will develop the capability to project and sustain a combat brigade anywhere in the world in 96 hours, a division in 120 hours, and five divisions in 30 days. These deployment standards will be realized over the next decade or more by moving all divisions to a common design that includes internetted command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities, dramatically reduced logistical footprints, and a common suite of vehicles that are 50–70 percent lighter than today, but just as mobile, lethal, and survivable as today’s armored forces.

The Army is developing a comprehensive transformation campaign plan. An initial redesigned operational force capability (two brigades) is already being established at Fort Lewis, Washington. As these brigades are fielded to validate the operational capabilities and requirements of its future tactical units, the Army is also beginning the process of redesigning and fielding an Interim Force—a force with the characteristics of the Objective Force but within the constraints of available and emerging technology. This will require reengineering of tactical and operational headquarters and a reexamination of the total active and reserve force structure. Focused development, final selection, and the integration of leading–edge technologies into this force will be key to achieving the Army’s transformation objectives. The Army’s Training and Doctrine Command will continue to serve as the focal point for developing the concepts, doctrine, leader development, and materiel solutions required to field the Interim and Objective Forces.

Two parallel near–term efforts will support transformation to the Army Objective Force. Force XXI will continue the effort to integrate information age capabilities in the current force through selected recapitalization of existing heavy force systems, like the M–1 Abrams tank, the M–2 Bradley fighting vehicle, and the Apache helicopter, and measures to improve the survivability and lethality of the light force. These efforts focus on quickly taking advantage of new information age technologies in combination with significant organizational and doctrinal changes to greatly enhance situational awareness at the operational and tactical levels and achieve advances in sustainability and readiness. They seek to provide a quantum improvement in the lethality, survivability, and deployability of these formations.

The Army’s 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) will be the first unit to field Force XXI capabilities and will undergo a capstone exercise in 2001 to validate the capabilities of the first digitized division. Restructured digital divisions like the 4th ID will have 25 percent fewer combat systems, but greater lethality through synchronized, precision fires and maneuver enabled by vastly improved knowledge of friendly and enemy dispositions. This force will also be smaller by approximately 3,000 personnel due to fewer combat systems and support force efficiencies.

The 10th Mountain Division is the Army’s lead organization for developing ways to increase the tactical mobility, survivability, and lethality of light forces under Force XXI. Programs are underway to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of joint command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence; to enhance contingency force operations in urbanized terrain; and to improve the capability to conduct early entry operations. Moreover, this effort is integrated fully with United States Joint Forces Command’s program for future warfighting concept development and experimentation.

The second element of the Army’s transformation will be a refinement of the Army After Next (AAN) study effort for the far–term out to about 2025. Through studies, research, wargaming, and analysis, AAN is developing ideas and insights concerning future warfare, which inform the Army’s leadership about warfighting concepts and capabilities required of the Objective Force. These studies and wargaming insights have and will continue to directly impact the emerging capability requirements for future ground combat systems, a joint transport rotorcraft, unmanned systems, C41SR, and combat service support. Over the next year, AAN will focus on implementing the Army’s transformation strategy, specifically on the linkage between the Interim Force and the Objective Force.

Throughout its transformation, the Army will maintain the capability to fulfill its non–negotiable contract with the nation. While remaining ready to fight and win the nation’s wars, the Army’s first digitized and contingency corps will also remain fully engaged in shaping the international environment and responding to crises at home and abroad short of major war. Ultimately, the light and mechanized formations of these corps will become key elements of the Objective Force, a force that will possess all of the best attributes of both, and be capable of the full–spectrum strategic responsiveness and dominance called for in the Army vision.


The Department of the Navy’s future vision of warfare is delineated in Forward . . . From the Sea, which identifies five fundamental and enduring roles: sea control and maritime supremacy, sea–based power projection to the land, strategic deterrence, strategic sealift, and forward naval presence. In the future, the Navy will perform these roles with vastly enhanced capabilities derived from a network of platforms, sensors, and information processing and analytical systems. Increasingly, mobile platforms such as Navy ships and small Marine units maneuvering ashore will benefit in the same manner as stationary units already in the network. The cumulative effect of these changes will be a shift from platform–centric to network–centric warfare, where 21st century naval engagements are characterized by speed of command rather than by attrition.

The Navy’s Maritime Battle Center has been colocated with the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island. It is investigating techniques to increase dramatically the striking power of the Navy’s ships and aircraft, tying them together under the overarching concept of network–centric warfare. For example, as a result of the Fleet Battle Experiment Delta conducted in the Far East in the fall of 1998, the Navy is already implementing an innovative solution to assist in providing responsive and lethal counter–battery fire and to suppress heavy concentrations of North Korean artillery and multiple rocket launches deployed near the DMZ. Linking its technologists closely with its warfighters and innovators, the Navy was able to apply its idea of network–centric warfare to the problem. The staff of the Maritime Battle Center and the Seventh Fleet worked to net Navy ship–based radars with Army land–based counter–battery radar systems near the DMZ. The netted sensors then sorted the data and fed it dynamically to the best–suited Army or air power shooter. This netting resulted in a projected four–fold increase in the effectiveness of the counter–battery fires.

In addition, Fleet Battle Experiment Delta addressed the problem of interdicting the anticipated seaborne infiltration of North Korean special operations forces tasked to attack targets in the South Korean rear area. It employed concepts to integrate Army Apache helicopters, Air Force AC–130 gunships, and Air Force and Navy tactical air to mount attacks on the North Korean cushion vehicles. The Land Attack Warfare System (LAWS) tested in this experiment automated the detect–to–engage process, providing information on detection of enemy craft, ingress/egress progress and plans, status of friendly assets, and battle damage assessments. The Navy is following up on this experiment by moving LAWS quickly into a program to equip the fleet and has already fielded 29 prototypes. In addition, the Maritime Battle Center, now working with the Fifth and Sixth Fleets, is conducting additional battle experiments to refine and broaden the application of LAWS, with a new focus on counterforce operations against weapons of mass destruction sites.

The power of this network–centric approach to warfare was again demonstrated in the recent Fleet Battle Experiment Echo off the west coast of the United States in September 1999. This experiment tested new methods of projecting and sustaining naval power in littoral areas in support of expeditionary forces operations, in the face of asymmetric threats. The Navy discovered that it could improve significantly its ability to defeat small, quiet diesel subs by improving underwater situational awareness with common computer decision aids to manage the vast flow of information from diverse platforms. The Navy also investigated improvements to automated battlespace management when confronted with a dramatic increase in the number of targets and the challenges of accurate identification in the littoral environment.

The Navy has long sponsored an annual summer Global wargame at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. The 1999 Global wargame applied the network– centric warfare approach to future joint warfare in the context of potential conflicts in two regions of the world set in 2010.

Marine Corps

The Marine Corps vision for future sea–based power projection operations is derived from the Department of the Navy’s Forward . . . From the Sea and captured in two Marine Corps organizing concepts for future capabilities: Operational Maneuver From the Sea and Ship–to–Objective Maneuver.

In the past, amphibious operations moved through distinct phases, pauses, and reorganizations. In the future, Marine landing forces will move directly from their ships through and across the water, air, and land of the littoral battlespace to their objectives ashore uninterrupted by topography or hydrography, thereby achieving greater surprise and complicating the adversary’s defensive operations.

Operational Maneuver From the Sea demands tactically adaptive, technologically agile, and opportunistic forces. Forces must be able to rapidly reorganize and reorient in response to changing tactical opportunities throughout the full spectrum of future operational environments, all while operating widely dispersed both at sea and ashore.

The most recent phase of Marine Corps concept development and experimentation, Urban Warrior, focused on military operations in urban terrain. While still exploring a comprehensive solution to urban warfare challenges, the Marines already have implemented lessons from this experimentation. Valuable small–unit wisdom derived from the various field experiments has been distilled in booklets on practical tactics, techniques, and procedures called X–files. These manuals are available to Marines and soldiers who may be called upon to conduct military operations in urban terrain, whether it be in the context of a major war or during peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance operations.

The Marine Corps recently established a series of RMA wargames, called Project Ellis, named in honor of Major Earl Hancock "Pete" Ellis who led pioneering work on amphibious warfare concepts in the 1930s. These wargames address the long–term future of amphibious assaults and follow–on operations ashore. Conducted at the Marine Corps War College, they focus on the 2020 timeframe and are intended to aid in preparation of future Marine Corps advanced warfighting experimentation on urban operations.

The Marine Corps’ Warfighting Lab at Quantico, Virginia, leads the Corps’ RMA efforts. The Warfighting Lab investigates and experiments with new concepts in six functional areas: maneuver, intelligence, fires, logistics, command and control, and force protection. Its latest large–scale experiment, Capable Warrior, explores maneuver, fire support, and logistical concepts associated with long–range operations conducted from a mobile sea base. The lessons from this and other experiments will permit the Marine Corps to take major steps toward realizing the potential of Operational Maneuver From the Sea.

Air Force

The Air Force’s Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century calls for exploiting the RMA by combining information technologies, precision strike, and stealth capabilities to further develop modern air and space power. The vision establishes an imperative for fully integrating space–based capabilities into the nation’s air, land, and sea operations across the range of contingencies, recognizing air and space as parts of a single seamless operational medium of aerospace, and capitalizing on the synergies of aerospace power.

Transforming the Air Force into an Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF) is central to the Air Force’s vision. In the place of the Cold War construct of fighter wing equivalents, the Air Force is reorganizing many of its combat forces into ten Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEFs) that are versatile, tailorable, and highly responsive. Each will be capable of deploying a full spectrum of tailored air–to–air, air–to–ground, command and control, and support capabilities. This restructuring involves organizational, cultural, and operational changes designed to enhance the Air Force’s warfighting capability. AEFs will be able to sustain operations with a reduced forward–deployed footprint by exploiting the seamless integration of information technologies.

Most importantly, the AEF construct will also allow the Air Force to develop a more predictable force rotation schedule for meeting long–term contingency commitments and specify those units that will be most ready to deploy rapidly to meet any crises that may arise during a given period. This, in turn, will improve force stability, reduce personnel and operating tempos, and allow integration of the reserve component with active forces for all operational commitments thereby addressing a central concern that has adversely affecting Air Force personnel retention.

The Air Force is conducting an annual series of Joint Expeditionary Force Experiments (JEFXs) to develop and evaluate new operational concepts and capabilities for the near– to mid–term needed to achieve its vision. JEFX–99, conducted at various locations throughout the United States in September 1999, simulated the short– notice deployment of an AEF to a forward theater, followed by live–fly operations to portray the initial stages of an early 21st century major theater war. The experiment demonstrated that a small forward Air Operations Center (AOC) with reachback capability to a rear AOC could accomplish the mission of a large forward AOC. This demonstrated the viability of the Department’s broader ambition to reduce the size of the forces it forward deploys in theater during an operation and thus reducing vulnerability to attack. As a result of the exercise, the Air Force changed its procurement program and its AOC procedures and deployment plans. It will field in March 2000 an integrated command and control capability based on the Theater Battle Management Core System, and it is considering plans to carry out selected AOC operations in the rear for future operations, as was done in Bosnia.

The Air Force also carries out a series of future oriented annual wargames, with the mid–term wargame entitled Global Engagement. This wargame series is held in even years and is intended to illuminate the potential capabilities of joint aerospace power and alternative force structures in a timeframe 10–15 years into the future. During the odd–numbered years, it conducts Aerospace Future Capabilities Wargames that take a longer view, testing alternative concepts, systems, and force structures in warfighting environments 20–25 years into the future. The Aerospace Future Capabilities Wargames have produced a number of new aerospace concepts, including a stand–off warfare and reach forward command and control capability, which continue to be matured via follow–up analysis and subsequent wargames.

In addition, the Air Force has six battlelabs with the mission to rapidly identify and assess innovative operations and logistics concepts that improve the ability of the Air Force to execute its core competencies in support of Joint Vision 2010. The six battlelabs are: Air Expeditionary Force Battlelab, Command and Control Battlelab, Force Protection Battlelab, Information Warfare Battlelab, Space Battlelab, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Battlelab.


Complementing Service efforts is a joint concept development and experimentation program that is well underway. The creation of the joint experimentation effort at the United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) has been a singular transformation–related achievement for the Department of Defense. It assures that while robust RMA efforts are underway in the Services, there is also a strong joint perspective on concept development and experimentation. USJFCOM brings the perspective of the future joint force commander, ensuring that the voice of the joint warfighter is heard and that powerful joint alternatives for meeting key operational needs have an effective advocate in the Department’s deliberations. Joint experimentation is a critical source of the ideas and innovation necessary to transform the Department’s military forces into a truly joint team.

The United States Joint Forces Command

USJFCOM’s Joint Experimentation Directorate, headed by a two–star director, is responsible for developing and assessing new concepts and capabilities in three related areas:

· Planning and executing joint operations, such as forcible–entry operations against an adversary intent on denying access to U.S. forces, a coercive campaign to compel an adversary possessing weapons of mass destruction to undertake certain actions, and peace operations conducted in concert with coalition partners.

· Conducting inherently joint missions and tasks that involve the integration of multi–Service efforts, such as attacking time critical mobile targets like theater ballistic missile transporter erector launchers, mobile surface to air missiles, armored forces, and battlefield command posts.

· Developing the critical enablers needed to support successful joint operations, including joint C4ISR, combat identification, a common operational picture for all forces, and rapid, flexible logistics support.


USJFCOM’s first five–year campaign plan focuses on developing an integrated concept for rapid decisive operations. This concept will enable future joint forces to strike earlier and harder than current capabilities permit. USJFCOM, using integrated concept teams, is developing strategies for testing new concepts of operations and new organizational constructs that effectively exploit advanced technologies.

USJFCOM conducted its first major joint experiment in 1999, focusing on attack of time critical mobile targets. This simulation–based experiment included examination of several potential intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems, as well as dynamic tasking of both ISR sensors carried on manned and unmanned aerial vehicles and precision fires from multiple Service platforms in attacking mobile theater ballistic missiles launchers. In early summer 2000, USJFCOM will conduct a follow–on experiment expanding the effort to include attacks against mobile air defense systems and command posts in the field.

Building on and integrating existing Service plans, USJFCOM will lead a major joint advanced warfighting experiment in fall 2000. Known as Millennium Challenge, this joint experiment will integrate major experiments by all four Services to test ways the joint force commander of the future can orchestrate the capabilities provided by Service components in order to conduct decisive forced–entry operations.


As the DoD executive agent for joint concept development and experimentation, USJFCOM ensures the widest possible participation by other combatant commands. Joint experimentation efforts include functional and geographic commands from the very outset. USJFCOM’s initiatives on joint attack operations against critical mobile targets now include interaction with the United States Strategic Command, United States Transportation Command, United States Space Command, United States Pacific Command, United States Central Command, and United States European Command.

An example of USJFCOM’s close coordination with other combatant commands is their funding of United States Pacific Command’s Virtual Information Center Quick Reaction Demonstration. USJFCOM is incorporating the knowledge learned from this exploratory effort into its overall investigation of joint interactive planning with the objective of enabling rapid collaborative planning between echelons within a joint command as well as between commands, supporting staffs, and outside agencies. The United States European Command sponsors the Joint Continuous Strike Environment advanced concept technology demonstration that supports USJFCOM’s attack operations efforts. USJFCOM will incorporate the results of this demonstration into its recommendations for change to joint doctrine, organization, and technology.

Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations and Joint Test and Evaluations

Marrying new operational concepts with new technologies, advanced concept technology demonstrations (ACTDs) are aimed at rapidly fielding near–term solutions to warfighters’ needs—generally within two to four years. ACTDs represent DoD’s approach to capturing and harnessing technology and innovation rapidly for military use at reduced cost. They require the sponsorship of a commander in chief (CINC) and are the principal means for regional CINC involvement in transformation. After the proposed ACTD solution to a military need has been designed, field–usable prototypes are made, tested, and then left with operational units after the completion of the experiment. Numerous ACTDs have been employed in real–world operations, including Operation Allied Force in Kosovo.

ACTDs have three principal objectives: gaining an operator’s understanding and evaluation of the military utility of new technology applications before committing to acquisition, developing corresponding battlefield operational concepts and doctrine that make the best use of the new capability in the joint warfighting arena, and providing new operational capabilities developed during the ACTDs directly to the combatant forces as equipment leave–behinds. ACTDs focus on critical military needs as determined by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and respond to those needs with near–term solutions based on mature or nearly mature technologies.

The evaluation of military utility by operations in the field is the heart of the ACTD process. The process begins with the development of potential conceptual and hardware solutions to identified military needs. Then, field–usable prototypes are fabricated in sufficient quantity to assess operational utility. This is typically accomplished by evaluating a minimum operational capability in field exercises against realistic opposing forces. The evaluation of utility includes effectiveness of individual units, suitability for use by troops, and overall impact on the outcome of the conflict. As a result of these exercises, the user is able to refine both the battlefield operational concept and the operational requirements for the system, as well as to assess the overall value of the proposed concept to the U.S. warfighting capability.

Thirty–nine ACTDs are now underway, with 18 having been completed. Eight ACTDs are planned for completion in FY 2000; planned results for FY 2000 are outlined in the FY 2000 President’s Budget.

The Joint Test and Evaluation (JT&E) Program conducts development and operational tests and evaluations to improve joint operations. JT&E projects are jointly chartered by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics); the Director, Strategic and Tactical Systems; and the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation. JT&E projects bring together two or more military departments to address warfighter requirements and improvements in areas such as interoperability of Service systems; command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence; joint operations; joint targeting; joint combat identification; missile defense; electronic warfare; joint tactics, techniques, and procedures; and testing methodologies. Models, simulations, testbeds, and various types of field testing are used to obtain and validate data with regard to key aspects of joint military operations as a means to improve U.S. joint capabilities.


The Department is committed to rapidly implementing winning concepts and capabilities that emerge from Service and joint concept development and experimentation.

The Services are investigating ways to quickly implement materiel and non–materiel changes that arise from their experimentation. One such effort is the Army’s Warfighter Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP). It is a fund of approximately $100 million per year that the Army uses to rapidly procure relatively low–cost but high–leverage systems that performed well in experimentation. The WRAP effort has reduced acquisition cycle time for systems procured by an average of 12 months. The Marine Corps and the Air Force are establishing similar rapid acquisition programs, starting in FY 2001 and FY 2002, respectively. In the future, the Department will consider whether such a rapid acquisition program is needed to rapidly implement new capabilities emerging from joint concept development and experimentation.

The Department is strengthening its processes to coordinate materiel and non–materiel changes including doctrine, training, education, and organizational configuration. Historically, DoD has modernized its equipment and then developed, vetted, and eventually made the other necessary changes as equipment was fielded. Today, with rapid and dramatic changes in technology, U.S. forces must orchestrate or co–evolve all of these elements of military capability simultaneously. Among the initiatives in this area are the Marine Corps’ X–files, pocket–sized manuals that summarize valuable lessons for tactics, techniques, and procedures learned from recent experimentation.

Concept development and experimentation efforts focused on the longer term, generally 2020 or beyond, can have important implications for the Department’s S&T efforts. The Army, for example, has targeted S&T funds on the most promising capabilities identified by its Army After Next project. A prime example is the Future Combat Vehicle program to develop a much lighter but still survivable and highly lethal combat system—a concept that emerged out of Army After Next wargames over the past several years. The Army is working in conjunction with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and industry partners to develop alternative designs, virtual prototypes, and performance analyses of relevant emerging technologies.

As the Department’s joint concept development and experimentation program continues, it will generate proposals for both materiel and non–materiel change. The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are committed to assuring that such proposals are given sustained visibility and implemented appropriately. USJFCOM will recommend proposed changes to the Chairman for validation. Approved proposals will be forwarded to the appropriate Services, CINCs, and defense agencies for implementation. The Joint Staff will continuously track the status of all recommended changes and provide reports to senior leaders. The Defense Resources Board, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and including the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Secretaries and Chiefs, and the Under Secretaries of Defense, will systematically review the disposition of recommendations from USJFCOM and seek the Chairman’s assessment of implementation progress.


New capabilities made possible by advances in science and technology often provide the spark for a fundamental transformation in military effectiveness. New information systems, married with technological advances in other key areas including stealth platforms, unmanned vehicles, and smart submunitions, are essential to the Department’s efforts to exploit the RMA.

Pursuing the Critical Enabler: Information Superiority

The U.S. military has a significant advantage today in information–based systems, including advanced sensors, assessment and planning tools, communications, and precision–guided munitions. Yet, the Department has only just begun to understand how significantly new information systems will change the way military operations are conducted. Much more dramatic transformation is on the horizon.

With the support of an advanced, C4ISR common backbone, the United States will be able to respond rapidly and effectively to any contingency. Joint forces will achieve a state of battlespace awareness, in near real– time, that will be pervasive across the full spectrum of military operations, enabling the joint force commander to dominate any situation.

Just as much of the private sector worldwide has become increasingly connected through the growth of internetted communications, DoD is developing a complementary, secure, and open C4ISR network architecture that will facilitate the development of revolutionary improvements in joint military capabilities. The six principal components of the evolving C4ISR architecture for 2010 and beyond are:

· A robust multi–sensor information grid providing dominant awareness of the battlespace.

· A joint communications grid with adequate capacity, resilience, and network management capabilities to rapidly pass relevant information to commanders and forces and to provide for their communications requirements.

· Advanced command and control processes that allow the planning, movement, employment, and sustainment of globally deployed forces much more rapidly than in the past and that are faster and more flexible than those of potential adversaries.

· A sensor–to–controller–to–shooter grid that enables distributed joint forces to engage in coordinated targeting, cooperative engagement, integrated air defense, rapid battle damage assessment, and dynamic follow–up strikes.

· An information defense capability to protect the globally distributed sensors, communications, and processing networks from interference or exploitation by an adversary.

· An offensive information operations capability to penetrate, manipulate, or deny an adversary’s battlespace awareness or unimpeded use of its own forces.

In addition to building C4ISR capabilities to facilitate truly joint network–centric warfare, the Department is investing heavily to improve the information processing capabilities of current and planned weapon systems and platforms. Increasingly, this investment is being guided by the results of Service and joint experimentation efforts that are exploring how forces can achieve and exploit information superiority in order to dominate future adversaries.

Linking Science and Technology Development to Warfighting

The Department has robust S&T efforts underway and is strengthening the ties between S&T and warfighting objectives. Because of the importance of a vigorous S&T effort to the long–term capabilities of U.S. military forces, the Department is committed to maintaining at least a constant real level of investment in this key area. The Department’s investment in science and technology is executed through a partnership among the defense agencies, Service laboratories, universities, industry, and international partners.

The Department continues to strengthen the S&T strategic planning process and improve the S&T community’s responsiveness to warfighting and acquisition customers. Four publications—the Defense Science and Technology Strategy, its supporting Basic Research Plan, the Defense Technology Area Plan, and the Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan—lay out the Department’s science and technology vision, strategic plan, and objectives for defense planners, programmers, and those who develop defense science and technology. The Basic Research Plan presents the Department’s objectives and investment strategy for DoD–sponsored basic research performed by universities, industry, and Service laboratories. The plan presents the Department’s investment in ten basic research areas. The Defense Technology Area Plan looks across Service and defense agency investments and describes the Department’s applied research and advanced technology development programs. To provide additional focus for the S&T investment, the Department developed five interdisciplinary areas intended to allow the Department to more fully benefit from emerging capabilities. These five focus areas are Chemical and Biological Defense, Hardened and Deeply Buried Targets, Smart Sensor Web, Cognitive Readiness, and Information Assurance.

Rapid advances in several key technology areas are creating options for significant increases in warfighting and support capabilities. Published annually, the Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan is organized into 11 Joint Warfighting Capabilities Objectives (JWCOs), aimed at preserving and enhancing current U.S. warfighting advantages and combating adversary asymmetric capabilities that pose a threat to U.S. forces and/or U.S. military systems. The 11 JWCOs are information superiority; precision force; combat identification; electronic warfare; force projection/dominant maneuver and joint readiness/logistics and sustainment of strategic systems; theater missile defense; chemical–biological warfare defense and protection; countering weapons of mass destruction; combating terrorism; military operations on urbanized terrain; and protection of space assets.


The Quadrennial Defense Review noted that although the United States must retain the capabilities to protect its interests unilaterally, it will be advantageous to act in concert with like–minded nations when responding to crises and conflicts. Acting in a coalition or alliance strengthens the political legitimacy of a course of action and brings additional resources to bear, ensuring that the United States need not shoulder the political, military, and financial burdens alone.

Building and maintaining effective coalitions also present significant challenges, from policy coordination at the strategic level to interoperability among diverse military forces at the operational level. Because coalitions will continue to present both important political advantages and significant military benefits, U.S. forces must plan, train, and prepare to respond to the full spectrum of crises in coalition with the forces of other nations. As the Department transforms U.S. capabilities via new technologies and operational concepts, careful design and collaboration will be needed to achieve this ambition. The United States must carefully identify capabilities that are particularly important to interoperability, including the command, control, and communications capabilities that form the backbone for combined operations.

NATO launched an important transformation–related initiative at the Washington Summit in April 1999. NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative includes both a NATO–centered and a nation–centered concept development and experimentation program. The NATO–centered effort will examine ways to enable a brigade–sized headquarters to exercise effective command and control over a division–sized force through the use of advanced information technologies and a flatter organizational structure. Under the nation–centered portion of NATO concept development and experimentation, experiments sponsored by one or more allies will be opened for broader participation by other NATO states, helping to ensure that the Alliance works together to move into the future.

In addition, the United States Joint Forces Command has established an integrated program to include allies, coalition partners, and friends in joint experimentation activities. By the end of FY 2000, representatives from some 20 countries are expected to be participating in this program.

Each of the Services has incorporated a program to improve force compatibility and interoperability with selected allied militaries in their RMA concept development and experimentation programs. The Army continues to expand its multinational interoperability through a variety of bilateral and multilateral fora. The Navy has been very active in assessing strategic sealift concepts with the United Kingdom and command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence interoperability with other high–tech navies. The Marine Corps involved the Dutch, British, and Australian marines extensively in its series of Sea Dragon experiments. For its part, the Air Force has been working with the air forces of the United Kingdom and Australia in the Navigation Warfare ACTD and has invited airmen from the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada to participate in its Joint Expeditionary Force experiments and Global Engagement wargames.


The Department of Defense must recruit, train, and retain people with the broad skills and good judgment needed to pursue dynamic change in the 21st century. Having the right kinds of imaginative, highly motivated military and civilian personnel, at all levels, is the essential prerequisite for achieving success in the Department’s ongoing military transformation.

The Department is targeting its efforts at three critical populations—young people with needed skills and attitudes, innovators, and current leaders. Each of these populations must be cultivated via slightly different strategies.

Young People with Needed Skills and Attitudes

Young people with essential technical skills and broad leadership abilities must be recruited, promoted, and retained to have the 21st century military envisioned in Joint Vision 2010. Advanced technology and new operational concepts cannot be fully exploited unless the Department has highly qualified and motivated enlisted personnel and officers who not only can operate these high tech systems, but can also lead effectively in the highly complex environment of the future.

The Services have targeted initiatives to attract and retain individuals with the skills and attitudes needed for 21st century warfare. For example, to highlight key skills needed for the 21st century and assure that it is growing the talent that it will need in the future, the Army recently established several new functional career areas, including Information Systems Engineering and Information Operations. The Air Force is reviewing options for the development of a specialty code or special experience identifier to track individuals trained and experienced in information operations. Similarly, the Department of the Navy recognizes that it needs to keep the best young people, and particularly those with the initiative so necessary for success in the 21st century. For example, the surface warfare community is looking closely at how to restructure the division officer tours for its junior officers to promote creativity and innovation and take full advantage of new technologies.

There are also efforts underway to create a virtual unit within the reserve component staffed by information technology specialists to assist the active forces in developing capabilities and conducting various types of information operations.

The Department is also exploiting new technologies to improve the way it trains and educates personnel. The learning environment of the future will allow the Department to educate, train, and provide performance support to U.S. service members and DoD civilians, anywhere and anytime. It will focus on the student, taking knowledge to the individual via a global learning network. It will utilize a common framework for learning software and learning content that will provide opportunities for reuse and interoperability across computer platforms and organizations on an unprecedented scale. Learners will have a broad range of options including distributed learning technologies, distributed simulations, embedded training capabilities, and intelligent systems designed to meet individual and situational needs. The future learning environment, with its emphasis on continuous, readily accessible opportunities for skill enhancement, will replace some of the traditional training and professional military education courses that exist today in the Department’s education and training institutions and the operational community. Innovative use of information processes and computer network technologies will make the learning process better, faster, and cheaper, without increasing personnel tempo or degrading readiness.


The Department is seeking to create an environment conducive to bold innovation. For one of the largest bureaucracies in the world, this is a daunting challenge. A vital part of the Department’s transformation effort is encouraging real debate and the competition of ideas. DoD needs to make sure that the bureaucracy does not smother good ideas before they have a chance to develop and then compete effectively on their merits. DoD’s concept development and experimentation programs must be open to new, sometimes radically different ideas from all sources, both from within and outside the Department of Defense.

The Department needs to assure that key participants and leaders in technology development, concept development, and experimentation are connected to the core operational and support communities. Service experimentation programs are relatively young. As time passes, the Department must ensure that people involved in these activities have good opportunities for promotion and selection to key command positions.

The Role of Senior Leaders

Senior DoD leaders—including the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, key members of the Office of the Secretary of Defense staff, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the leadership of the Services—will guide the Department’s efforts to establish an environment that encourages innovation and change. The history of successful military innovation shows clearly that senior leaders must directly support a transformation effort to ensure that it receives necessary funding support and talented personnel. These leaders must help foster a culture that actively encourages innovative concept development and true experimentation in a realistic, challenging environment, with thorough vulnerability analysis and red teaming that simulates dedicated and capable adversaries. Moreover, one must be fully prepared to discover that some apparently promising new concepts and capability combinations will fail to achieve the desired results.

Senior leaders, both today and in the future, must also explain clearly to the public why DoD’s military transformation effort is essential, and must work closely with Congress in order to pursue significant changes in the way U.S. forces are organized, trained, and equipped. DoD’s pursuit of the Revolution in Military Affairs has the potential for far–reaching impact over time—on how U.S. forces conduct the full range of military operations.


The Department is transforming its forces to meet 21st century challenges through a clear strategy that integrates activities in six areas: Service concept development and experimentation; joint concept development and experimentation; rapid implementation processes; science and technology efforts; international transformation activities; and recruiting, training, and retaining exceptional people.

Each of the six elements of the Department’s transformation strategy is essential. Science and technology development is critical, but absent innovative concept and new organizational arrangements discovered through Service and joint concept development and experimentation, new technologies will not produce fundamentally new concepts for conducting military operations. Similarly, revolutionary ideas developed through concept development and experimentation will mean little unless effectively implemented by U.S. forces. Future military success also requires that the United States involve key allies and partners to ensure that it is able to operate effectively in future coalition operations. Recruiting, retaining, training, and enabling innovators and future leaders are the necessary prerequisites for success in each of the other elements of the Department’s transformation strategy.

The Department of Defense must transform its forces to remain dominant—indeed, to remain relevant—in the dynamic and highly uncertain security environment of the 21st century. The Department’s transformation efforts are well underway, and significant changes have already been undertaken. Much more dramatic changes are on the horizon.

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