Since the founding of the Republic, the United States has embraced several fundamental and enduring objectives. Principal among these are maintaining the sovereignty, political freedom, and independence of the United States with its values, institutions, and territory intact; protecting the lives and personal safety of Americans, both at home and abroad; and providing for the well–being and prosperity of the nation and its people.

Achieving these basic objectives in an increasingly interdependent world requires fostering an international environment in which critical regions are stable, at peace, and free from domination by hostile powers; the global economy and free trade are growing; democratic norms and respect for human rights are widely accepted; nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and other potentially destabilizing technologies are minimized; and the international community is willing and able to prevent and, if necessary, respond to calamitous events. The United States seeks to play an international leadership role by working closely and cooperatively with nations that share its values and goals and by influencing those that can affect U.S. national well–being.

These fundamental objectives provide the foundation for the national security strategy and for U.S. defense policy and planning. It is from them that the mission, strategic vision, and corporate goals of the Department of Defense (DoD) derive.

The mission of the Department of Defense is to support and defend the Constitution of the United States; to provide for the common defense of the nation, its citizens, and its allies; and to protect and advance U.S. interests around the world. To accomplish this mission, the Department maintains trained forces ready to respond to threats to U.S. security arising anywhere on the globe.

In peacetime, the United States works with friends and allies to promote a stable world that supports economic growth and provides opportunities for emerging democracies. The routine deployment of U.S. forces overseas, combined with the maintenance of ready forces at home, promotes stability and deters the use of force against U.S. interests. The same military forces that help shape the international environment can also respond quickly to threats to U.S. security when crises arise.

In support of its basic mission, the Department of Defense:

DoD has established two corporate–level goals:

The Department’s corporate goals are fully consistent with the objectives articulated in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR report described the results of a definitive, overarching program evaluation undertaken by the Department, the fourth such comprehensive review conducted since the end of the Cold War. The QDR refined the force and policy analyses begun in the 1991 Base Force Review, the 1993 Bottom–Up Review, and the 1995 study by the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces. By examining America’s defense needs from 1997 to 2015—the potential threats the nation might face and the strategy, force structure, readiness, infrastructure, and modernization programs needed to cope with them—the QDR provided a blueprint for a balanced and affordable defense program.

The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) seeks to improve government–wide program effectiveness, government accountability, and, ultimately, public confidence by requiring agencies to identify measurable annual performance goals, against which actual achievements can be compared. The approach taken by GPRA to linking expenditures to performance is consistent with how the Department of Defense applies its internal management process—the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS)—to guide the implementation of QDR decisions. The DoD budget has one principal output: military forces that are ready to go to war. Because these forces are intended to deter potential adversaries, the outcome of the Department’s efforts in any given year is partially subject to global developments and political decisions. Nonetheless, the Department has developed a methodology that allows it to present output–oriented goals and accompanying measures within the context of GPRA.

As stated above, DoD’s two corporate goals guide the annual implementation of the QDR through the PPBS. The corporate goals form the basis for using GPRA as a management tool, and they serve as strategic goals for the Department. The document that implemented them, the May 1997 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, is the Department’s strategic plan. The strategic plan will remain in effect until revised by the next QDR in 2001, as mandated by Section 402 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2000 (Public Law 106–65).

The Department’s annual performance plan plots a short–term course toward achieving its multiyear strategic plan. Annual performance goals establish a measurable path to incremental achievement of the corporate goals articulated in the strategic plan. Performance goals are supported and evaluated by quantifiable output, which is assessed using performance measures or indicators. Normally, a given performance goal encompasses several performance measures and indicators. For that portion of the performance goal which they evaluate, performance measures are sufficient in themselves to judge results. Performance indicators are not sufficient to gauge the success of a program; rather, they provide meaningful insights for qualitative assessments. Together, performance measures and indicators quantify the output of defense programs for key metrics associated with providing a ready force and preparing for the future.

The Department’s FY 2000 performance plan and revised FY 1999 plan, published in the February 1999 Annual Report to the President and Congress, established seven annual performance goals (see Table I–1). The FY 1999 and FY 2000 performance targets and metrics addressed in this report come from that document. For FY 2001, the Department has added an eighth performance goal, focusing on financial and information management. Performance against that goal will be assessed initially in the FY 2001 report, to be published in February 2002.

The Department evaluates success in achieving the performance goals established for its budget on two levels. At a lower level of aggregation, individual performance measures and indicators are scored at the end of each fiscal year to determine how performance compared to numeric targets set when the budget was submitted. As noted earlier, each set of measures and indicators supports a common annual performance goal; it is at this level that performance against the targets is reported and discussed in subsequent sections of this appendix.

At the higher level, annual performance goals are evaluated in two ways. First, results for each of the subordinate measures and indicators are evaluated within the context of overall program performance. Second, a determination is made as to whether a shortfall in expected performance for any single metric, or for any set of supporting metrics, will put at risk achievement of the associated corporate goal. This subjective determination is trend–based and is inherently cumulative: a single year of poor performance may not signal that a corporate goal is at risk, although several years of unsatisfactory performance almost certainly will.

Clearly, performance shortfalls due to internal management factors may receive higher priority for remedial action than those resulting from external events (such as international crises or contingencies), where performance shortfalls often can be overcome by restoring diverted resources or reinstating disrupted training schedules. However, repeated disruptions due to unexpected contingencies, resulting in consecutive years of performance shortfalls, could lead the Department to adjust its performance expectations.

The metrics incorporated in the Department’s performance plan derive from the goals established for implementing the QDR. They represent key criteria used by the Secretary of Defense in evaluating program proposals put forward by the military services and defense agencies during the Department’s annual program and budget reviews. A DoD–wide working group—composed of representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, the Services, and defense agencies—helps draft annual updates to the GPRA performance plan, consistent with how the Department monitors QDR implementation through the PPBS process. The group also reviews verification and validation (V&V) data supporting individual performance metrics for accuracy and completeness.

In June 1999, the DoD Comptroller designated a primary OSD sponsor for each GPRA annual performance goal. The sponsors are responsible for reporting on annual performance and documenting V&V information.

The remaining sections of this report assess the Department’s progress in meeting its FY 1999 performance goals and identify performance goals for FY 2001. The presentation for each performance goal starts with a general discussion of the goal’s intent, its relationship to the corporate goal that it supports, and any major changes to the goal for FY 2001 and beyond. Next, an evaluation of FY 1999 performance is presented, followed by a discussion of the subordinate metrics. The discussions:

Although no metrics from the FY 2000 GPRA plan have been discontinued, several have been renumbered to reflect a more logical grouping for reporting performance. Specifically, last year’s Performance Measure 2.4.8 has been redesignated as measure 2.3.9 in this year’s report. All other changes merely reorder metrics under their original annual performance goal.

U.S. armed forces promote regional stability in many ways that support the national security strategy. In regions where the United States has vital and important interests, the routine presence of U.S. forces helps bolster the security of allies and friends. At the same time, interactions between forward–deployed forces and regional militaries serve to strengthen and adapt core alliances and coalitions to meet evolving security demands. In addition, the U.S. military often serves as a preferred means of engagement with countries that are neither staunch friends nor confirmed foes. Such contacts build constructive security relationships. They help promote the development of democratic institutions today and prevent these countries from becoming adversaries tomorrow. Through both example and enforcement, U.S. forces encourage adherence to international norms and regimes that provide a foundation for peace and stability around the globe.

The Department met or exceeded its FY 1999 overseas presence targets for Air Force and Army forces. For the Navy and Marine Corps, presence objectives were exceeded in Southwest Asia at the expense of deployments in Europe and the Pacific region. The increased naval presence in Southwest Asia was intended to ensure that U.S. involvement in Operation Allied Force would not be interpreted by Iraq as signifying a lack of commitment to U.S. allies and interests in that region. The Department expects to meet all of its overseas presence targets for FY 2000.

The Department canceled 37 of 191 overseas exercises planned for FY 1999. Twenty–two exercises were dropped because of the diversion of airlift assets, equipment, and personnel to support Operation Allied Force; the remaining 15 exercises were forgone in order to free funding for Y2K operational evaluations directed by Congress, for which no additional resources were provided. Five new exercises conducted in FY 1999 partially offset those canceled.

The difference between planned and actual exercise performance in FY 1999 is consistent with recent experience. For example, in FY 1995 and FY 1996, the exercise program was revised to account for deployments to Bosnia, just as the FY 1999 program was adjusted to accommodate the Kosovo operation. In each case, the loss of overseas exercises was mitigated by the experience gained from actual combined operations with foreign militaries in support of humanitarian missions or crisis operations.

The number of overseas exercises has increased slightly over the past two years and is expected to remain within a range of 195 to 205 annually through FY 2002. Despite the increased pace of overseas exercises, the Department is reducing total man–days devoted to the exercise program by limiting participation to only the most essential units and personnel, shortening exercise durations to the minimum required to meet training goals, and increasing the use of simulations. These measures will strengthen military–to–military contacts while reducing deployment demands on U.S. forces.

Some difficulties may be experienced in meeting exercise targets for FY 2000. The total appropriation for exercise programs in FY 2000 represented a reduction of $34 million from the President’s budget request. Additionally, the overseas exercise schedule remains vulnerable to perturbations from world events. Because some exercises must be planned two to three years in advance and others are scheduled for a particular season of the year, it is often impossible to delay an exercise in response to a contingency. In such cases, exercises must be canceled and the associated training forgone.

Performance Goal 1.1 is supported by five metrics: Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps overseas presence and the overseas exercise program.

Metric Description. The Army maintains a mechanized division in the Asian–Pacific region and two divisions with selected command, combat, and support elements in Europe. The forces stationed in Europe affirm the United States’ leadership role in NATO and reinforce bilateral relations with key partners. Forward–deployed Army units in the Asian–Pacific region underscore the U.S. commitment to remain a stabilizing influence and to deter aggression on the Korean peninsula and elsewhere in the region.

V&V Methodology. The Army provides data on its forces for each revision of the Department’s Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) database. (For more details on the FYDP system and PPBS process, see the Related Issues section at the end of this appendix.) The number of Army units deployed is obtained from major commands and is reviewed at least twice yearly by the geographic commanders in chief (CINCs) as part of their input to the PPBS management process.

Actual and Projected Performance. The Department met its FY 1999 performance targets for Army overseas presence. No shortfalls are projected for FY 2000.

Metric Description. Performance Measures 1.1.2 and 1.1.3 record the percentage of time that a U.S. Navy carrier battle group (CVBG) or a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) and amphibious ready group (ARG) is deployed in each of three regions—the Pacific, Europe, and Southwest Asia. In combination, these measures gauge the ability of naval air, land, surface, and submarine forces to rapidly respond to crises as well as engage in exercises, military–to–military contacts, and other activities in support of regional alliances.

V&V Methodology. Data for these measures are derived from two sources: Navy deployment schedules for CVBGs, MEUs, and ARGs, as reflected in Global Naval Force Presence (GNFP) messages issued periodically by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS); and OPNOTES, a text–based tactical data exchange system maintained by the Department of the Navy that documents specific data and times for the arrival and departure of CVBGs and ARGs into or out of each region. OPNOTES depicts the position of underway and deployed naval forces. In–port and homeport forces are not typically included. The system is updated daily.

Data are verified by comparing planned deployment schedules (the Chairman’s GNFP message) against actual force presence (as documented by the arrival and departure dates recorded in OPNOTES). Data also are reviewed for accuracy at each Quarterly Fleet Scheduling Conference. This metric does not account for multiple CVBG or MEU coverage in a theater of operations.

Actual and Projected Performance. The Department met its FY 1999 performance goals for Navy and Marine Corps presence in Southwest Asia. Deployments in the Pacific fell slightly short of objectives, due to the diversion of forces to support contingency operations in Europe and Southwest Asia. While targets for ARG/MEU presence in Europe were met, the CVBG objective for that theater was not reached, due to ongoing Southwest Asian contingency deployments. Assuming a return to routine deployment patterns in Southwest Asia and absent further unanticipated requirements, the Navy and Marine Corps expect to meet their overseas presence goals in FY 2000.

Metric Description. The Air Force keeps five FWEs forward deployed in the Pacific, Europe, and Southwest Asia in support of regional engagement and crisis response missions outlined in the QDR.

V&V Methodology. The Air Force provides data on the location of its forces for each update of the FYDP database. Unit deployment data are maintained by the major commands and are reviewed at least twice annually by the geographic CINCs as part of their input to the PPBS process.

Actual and Projected Performance. The Air Force met its FY 1999 performance targets for overseas presence. No shortfalls are projected for FY 2000.

Metric Description. The overseas exercise program demonstrates U.S. resolve and the ability to project forces to locations abroad in support of national interests and commitments to allies. The program provides joint force training that emphasizes interoperability, joint warfighting doctrine, and rapid deployment. Such training, conducted in conjunction with allied or friendly militaries, provides opportunities to test and evaluate U.S. and host nation systems, lines of communication, and support agreements.

V&V Methodology. This metric is a simple count of joint and combined exercises completed. Its utility is ensured by rigidly defining what does (and does not) constitute a joint exercise. CJCS Manual 3500.03, Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States, establishes standards for joint training in four phases: establishment of requirements; planning; execution; and assessment of results. The manual standardizes procedures for each phase of the joint training cycle and establishes criteria for reporting and evaluating performance data.

Actual and Projected Performance. Operation Allied Force resulted in the cancellation of 22 combined exercises; 15 other exercises were superseded by Y2K operational evaluations mandated by Congress. Countries affected by the cancellation of exercises due to Operation Allied Force were Latvia, Bahrain, Turkey, Poland, Jordan, Oman, Spain, Greece, the United Kingdom, Singapore, Romania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Germany. Countries affected by the elimination of exercises due to Y2K evaluations were Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Canada. Five new exercises, in Central America, partially offset those canceled. Since many combined exercises in the Western Hemisphere provide disaster relief training, the exercises added after Hurricane Mitch became the basis for actual relief missions.

Absent similar unanticipated requirements, the Department expects to meet its overseas exercise goal for FY 2000.

The force structure objectives established in the QDR reflect the need for balance between investments in existing forces and adequate preparation for the future. Today’s security environment presents the same pressing need for military forces that existed when the QDR was conducted. The force level objectives for FY 2001 are, therefore, essentially the same goals set in the QDR. The intent is to have forces that can fight and win two major theater wars nearly simultaneously. At the same time, the goals reflect the need for the United States to respond to smaller–scale contingencies. Although the latter deployments are much less demanding than a major theater war, they can become a high priority for the United States. That is particularly true when swift intervention of military forces is needed to contain, resolve, or mitigate the consequences of a crisis or contingency that could otherwise become far more costly and deadly.

The Department monitors the day–to–day readiness of forces through two senior forums: the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) and the Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC). The JMRR provides the CJCS a tool for monitoring the overall readiness of U.S. forces. It identifies and tracks specific areas of concern for each of the CINCs, combat support agencies, and Services. JMRR assessments, as well as other DoD–wide readiness issues, are presented monthly to the SROC. Chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the SROC includes as members the Under Secretaries of Defense; the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Under Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Chief of Staff of the Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. The SROC provides a forum for the Department’s senior civilian and military leaders to consult on standing or emerging readiness concerns.

The readiness assessments presented to the SROC are summarized four times a year in the Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC). The QRRC allows the Department to inform Congress of issues related to near–term readiness. It includes sections on readiness indicators, force tempo trends, and unit readiness ratings.

The Department failed to meet some training and operational tempo targets in recent years, due largely to the demands of contingency response missions such as Operation Allied Force. Training and tempo goals reflect the Department’s efforts to monitor the effects of increased peacetime deployment levels and overseas operations on smaller, post–Cold War military forces. While high tempo is not in itself a cause for concern, it serves to focus management attention on those particular units and skill groups that are repeatedly in demand for contingency operations. More frequent deployments place greater stress on individuals and families, which may ultimately affect retention. Specific deployment thresholds, to be exceeded only on approval of the Secretary of Defense, are set for low–density/high–demand units in the Department’s Global Military Force Policy. The Department has implemented a variety of initiatives for FY 2000 and FY 2001 to mitigate the effects of several years of persistently high operational tempos and to avoid any long–term degradation in force readiness. Details on these initiatives are provided in Chapter 4.

Training results exhibited a more positive trend, although the Army failed to achieve its tank–mile targets and some reserve component flying–hour targets. Tank–mile training—the performance benchmark for Army ground forces—exhibited an improvement, however, over FY 1998 results for the active Army and continues to demonstrate an upward trend. Army reserve component performance for tank miles declined relative to FY 1998 levels; National Guard flying hours were about 15 percent below objectives but were improved over 1998 levels. Army execution shortfalls were the result of unexpected funding requirements in the budget year that forced the Army to divert resources from training to other programs (such as real property maintenance) that are funded through the Operation and Maintenance (O&M) account. The Army expects to meet its tank–mile goals for FY 2000 by more accurately managing O&M accounts, thus reducing the need for funding migration.

It is important to note that the Army’s tank–mile program is especially sensitive to the timing as well as the availability of funding. The Army conducts battalion– and brigade–level unit training at the few installations in the United States (and the single facility in Europe) large enough to accommodate maneuvering forces. Commanders must reserve training time at these scarce maneuver areas more than a year in advance. Thus, while O&M funds used to support contingency deployments may subsequently be restored by Congress in supplemental appropriations, it might not be possible to reschedule training activities for units that have missed their preplanned drill periods.

Overall, the Department was able to meet or exceed its FY 1999 training targets, despite disruptions to the peacetime training schedule caused by Operation Allied Force. In particular, participation in Operation Allied Force skewed Air Force flying–hour program results. U.S. Air Forces in Europe and the Air Mobility Command exceeded their flying–hour targets by 16 and 19 percent, respectively, while commands in the United States generally flew fewer hours than planned. Overall, the Air Force fell slightly short of its aggregate flying–hour objective for FY 1999; no shortfalls are projected for FY 2000.

Key metrics for gauging training and readiness include active and reserve force levels, deployment frequencies (for training or operations), and specific readiness indicators and trends. GPRA metrics describing unit readiness trends by Service are reported separately in the Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress. The October–to–December QRRC serves as a combined GPRA plan and report for these classified measures.

Metric Descriptions. The QDR established a requirement for four active Army corps, 10 active divisions (including six heavy and four light divisions), and two active armored cavalry regiments. The Total Army Analyses for FY 2003 and FY 2005 identified adjustments to the support needed to sustain Army combat forces across the range of military operations. As a result, the Army is implementing plans to convert lower–priority support and combat units to higher–priority support units. Pending the completion of Total Army Analysis FY 2007, the Army will continue to work with its reserve component to refine options for reconfiguring appropriate reserve units so that they mirror active units and are more relevant to national needs.

Consistent with the QDR, the Navy maintains 12 aircraft carrier battle groups and 12 amphibious ready groups. The number of carrier air wings stands at 10 active and one reserve. Surface combatant ships have decreased from the 1997 level of 125 to 116 as newer and more capable systems have entered service. Reflecting changes in requirements, the attack submarine force is slated to decline from 57 boats in FY 1999 to 55 by FY 2001.

The Air Force plans for a standing force of just over 12 active FWEs, eight reserve FWEs, four air defense squadrons (0.8 FWEs), and 190 bombers (142 of which are assigned to operational units).

V&V Methodology. The Services submit data on the stationing of their forces three times a year, in conjunction with updates of the Future Years Defense Program. In addition, unit deployments are reviewed at least twice yearly by the regional CINCs as part of their input to the PPBS process.

Actual and Projected Performance. The Department met its FY 1999 performance targets for military force structure. No significant changes to force structure goals are projected for FY 2000. The FY 2001 budget supports a force of 12 fully deployable aircraft carriers. One of these ships, the J.F. Kennedy, has been serving as a reserve/training asset and conducting some active deployments. Starting in FY 2001, the J.F. Kennedy will be redesignated as an active carrier, allowing it to be fully integrated into the deployment cycle.

Metric Description. The mechanisms used to ensure force readiness vary across the Services. The specific approaches adopted are a function of multiple factors, including Service–unique force characteristics, wartime and contingency response requirements, peacetime presence levels, the availability of training infrastructure, perishable skills, and the need for flexibility. Less tangible factors—such as morale, leadership development, and team building—also are considerations. The Army strives to attain the highest possible state of readiness in its first–to–fight units, while maintaining the ability to deploy later–arriving units within prescribed timelines. The Navy and Marine Corps maintain a cyclical readiness posture, tied to the deployment schedules of their forces. When in home port, Navy and Marine units are engaged in training, maintenance, and resupply activities in preparation for their next rotational deployment. The Air Force maintains a high state of overall readiness, reflecting the rapid–response requirements of air assets in both crises and war.

Each Service has established a threshold for indicating when the pace of operations may begin to impair operational readiness, quality of life, or retention. For the Army, this statistic is the number of units deploying more than 179 days per year or the number of units containing soldiers who individually deploy more than 120 days. The Air Force uses as an indicator the percentage of personnel assigned to combat systems who are deployed more than 120 days a year. The Navy employs a combination metric for personnel tempo. To meet the Navy goal, a unit must deploy for no more than six months at a time, spend twice as much time nondeployed as deployed, and spend 50 percent of its time in home port over a five–year cycle. The Marine Corps metric is similar but sets the reporting threshold at the number of units deploying more than 180 days per year over a 36–month scheduling period.

Navy data are collected quarterly at the unit level. The data are relayed from unit commanders to fleet headquarters, which pass the messages on to Navy headquarters. The data are reviewed for accuracy at each level in the reporting chain. Navy Instruction 300.13A, Navy Personnel Tempo for Operations, defines standards for the assessment and evaluation of tempo data. Marine Corps data are maintained in an automated database at Marine Corps headquarters. Operating units report deployment activity on a semi–monthly basis; the data are recorded quarterly in the Marine Corps Training, Employment, and Exercise Plan.

The Air Force records temporary duty and duty–status changes in its automated Personnel Data System (PDS); these data are continuously updated. A January 1998 assessment by the Air Force Studies and Analysis Agency found historical PDS data to be 94 percent accurate; the TDY history file matched by 90 percent the tempo reported by operational units.

Actual and Projected Performance. The Department exceeded its deployment ceilings for Army units in FY 1999, due mainly to contingency operations in support of Operation Allied Force. As a result of follow–on activities and training, the Army will likely surpass deployment thresholds again in FY 2000. Operation Allied Force resulted in two Navy units failing to meet tempo goals in FY 1999. The Marine Corps met its FY 1999 goal, despite the increased pace of operations. Within the Air Force, 25 percent of personnel assigned to combat systems were deployed over 120 days in FY 1999; the transition to the Aerospace Expeditionary Force concept will allow the Air Force to temper the impact of contingency operations on its forces in FY 2000.

As it reconstitutes forces following Operation Allied Force, the Department will strive to meet its FY 2000 tempo goals.

Metric Description. This metric reflects the flying hours per month required by each Service to maintain pilot and crew proficiency (including training and maintenance activities) in the active and reserve components.

V&V Methodology. Army flying–hour data are collected monthly in electronic format by each Army major command; the data are reviewed quarterly at Department of Army headquarters. In addition, independent reviews of flying–hour data are periodically conducted by the U.S. Army Aviation Safety Center and the U.S. Army Cost and Economic Analysis Center.

Navy and Marine Corps data are recorded at the unit level in flight logs. The unit data are reported through the chain of command each month and are used to determine aircraft maintenance schedules. The Navy verifies these data through an independent internal review process (similar to the Army’s), under which the Navy Office for Flying Hours and Aviation Safety, within the Air Warfare Directorate (N–88), verifies and validates Certified Execution Reports provided by field elements.

The Air Force uses an automated database, the Reliability and Maintenance Information System (REMIS), to compare the flying–hours flown by operational units over the course of a fiscal year with projections derived from flying–hour models at the start of the year. Flying–hour data are extracted monthly from REMIS and distributed to Air Force major commands, via the Internet, for review and validation. The Department of the Air Force headquarters staff reviews flying–hour data twice annually.

Flying–hour data for each Service are assessed during the Department’s annual program and budget reviews. Details on unit readiness ratings, which are classified, are provided to Congress in the QRRC.

Actual and Projected Performance. The Department met most of its FY 1999 flying–hour targets; the exception was the Army National Guard, which improved upon its 1998 performance but still fell about 15 percent below target levels. No shortfalls are projected for FY 2000.

Metric Description. Tank miles represent the average level of peacetime activity—including in–field training, combat simulations, and equipment maintenance—needed to achieve wartime proficiency standards, as defined by Army doctrine.

V&V Methodology. Army tank–mile data are compiled quarterly from field unit reports. The data are transmitted electronically to the U.S. Army Logistics Support Activity and the U.S. Army Cost and Economic Analysis Center, which review them for accuracy and integrity and then forward them to Department of Army headquarters for management review.

Actual and Projected Performance. Due to the diversion of resources to support other Army O&M programs, the Department did not fully meet its FY 1999 performance goals for tank miles. No shortfalls are projected for FY 2000, pending receipt of supplemental funding.

Metric Description. This metric tracks the total number of steaming days (days at sea) per quarter for active and reserve component naval vessels.

V&V Methodology. Steaming days are planned and budgeted as fuel costs for ships. Actual steaming days are derived from fuel budget execution.

Actual and Projected Performance. The Navy effectively met its steaming–day goal for FY 1999 (the shortfall was less than 1 percent). No shortfalls are projected for FY 2000.

Projection forces—airlift, sealift, and equipment prepositioning—ensure that the nation has the ability to respond, with appropriate numbers and types of forces, to crises worldwide. As in its assessment of combat force levels and readiness, the QDR recognized that mobility forces must be able to respond across the spectrum of operations, from peacetime engagements to major theater wars. Further, the QDR reaffirmed the baseline requirements for an intertheater airlift capability of approximately 50 million ton–miles per day (MTM/D) and a surge sealift capacity of 10 million square feet of cargo space. (Surge sealift refers to seaborne transport capacity that can be brought to bear at the outset of a crisis. It does not include ships routinely used for prepositioning purposes, covered under Performance Measure 1.3.3.) Programmed aircraft and ship acquisitions will enable the Department to reach its goals for airlift and sealift in FY 2004 and FY 2002, respectively. The Department plans to purchase additional C–17s in the coming years to ensure that U.S. mobility forces possess the flexibility to respond to the full range of crises.

The prepositioning of military equipment and supplies near potential conflict regions reduces response time in contingencies. With materiel stored on land or afloat at overseas locations, only troops and a relatively small amount of equipment need to be airlifted to a theater early in a crisis. Objectives for prepositioning are based on those forces required very early in a conflict to halt an enemy’s advance.

The Department met its FY 1999 goals for sealift and airlift, but the continued use of prepositioning sets to support contingency operations has caused stockage levels to fall below the objectives for some items. Overall, strategic mobility assets support the Department’s ability to prosecute two nearly simultaneous major theater wars.

The major airlift and sealift acquisition programs—the C–17 transport aircraft and the new fleet of large medium–speed roll–on/roll–off (LMSR) ships—are both approximately half complete. These programs add significantly to the Department’s capability and flexibility to respond to contingencies. Missions undertaken in support of Operation Allied Force demonstrated the C–17’s ability to carry outsize loads and to land on short, austere airfields. Two LMSRs moved U.S. Army combat equipment from Germany to Greece in support of the Balkans deployment. It would have taken four to six older ships half–again as long to make this same delivery.

The airlift metric (1.3.1) tracks the growth of airlift capacity over time but does not capture short–term degradations in operational capability. Currently, the high tempo of contingency operations and maintenance problems with the C–5 are causing mission–capable rates to drop below the planning factors used to compute Performance Measure 1.3.1.

Air Force bare–base sets (equipment for establishing operations at unimproved airfields) are less ready to support combat operations than the rest of the prepositioned equipment addressed in Performance Measure 1.3.3. The continued use of these sets for contingencies and exercises has exceeded the resources allocated to reconstitute them. Thus, the Department requested, and Congress approved, $72 million in FY 1999 to restore the Air Force sets over the next few years. Since the bare–base sets are required early in a conflict, both their current condition and each future decision to use them for small–scale contingencies poses risks for executing a major theater war.

The three brigade sets of Army material prepositioned in Europe were not filled or maintained to the same standards in FY 1999 as Army material prepositioned in Southwest Asia, Korea, or afloat. However, because the European sets are not critical to the early phases of a major war, their lower level of fill and maintenance does not increase risk appreciably.

Key metrics for strategic mobility are airlift capacity, sealift capacity, and equipment prepositioning.

Metric Description. The FY 2004 goal of 50 MTM/D represents the minimum combined civil and military airlift capability that U.S. forces would need to fight and win two major theater wars at an acceptable level of risk. This goal was established by the 1995 Mobility Requirements Study Bottom–Up Review Update. Military airlift is required for carrying outsize loads (such as Patriot missile systems, tanks, and helicopters) and for unloading cargo rapidly, particularly at airfields lacking materiel–handling equipment. MTM/D is an aggregate measure of airlift capacity used as a top–line comparative metric. It combines measures such as aircraft flight hours per day, speed, and payload. Typical or average values are selected for each of these measures for each aircraft type in order to compute MTM/D. These average values, called planning factors, are used in developing military operation plans. Thus, changes in MTM/D values reflect changes in the number and type of airlift aircraft.

V&V Methodology. The status of primary authorized aircraft (PAA)—that is, the immediate availability of various types of transport aircraft—is recorded and tracked in the Programming Data System, maintained by the Air Force Office of Plans and Programs. Other data used to calculate airlift capacity include aircraft block speeds, average payloads, utilization rates, and productivity factors. PAA data are updated three times annually. Air Force Pamphlet 10–1403, Air Mobility Planning Factors, defines broad planning factors for peacetime and wartime airlift operations. The factors are intended to help Service, joint, and combined planners make gross estimates about mobility requirements in the early stages of the planning process. They cover intertheater airlift, aerial refueling, and aeromedical evacuation. Airlift data are verified in periodic reviews, conducted by the Air Mobility Command, of the MTM/D capabilities of the CRAF. The Air Force uses capacity models to determine PAA levels, crew ratios, and associated factors for each budget year, based on long–term programming requirements established in the QDR.

Actual and Projected Performance. The Air Force met its FY 1999 performance targets for airlift capacity. No MTM/D shortfalls are projected for FY 2000. As noted earlier, the continued high tempo of contingency operations, combined with C–5 maintenance problems, has caused mission–capable rates to drop below the planning factors used in computing this metric. Thus, in the near term, somewhat less airlift capacity is available for routine operations than indicated by the metric.

Metric Description. Square footage serves as an aggregate measure of ship capacity. It is computed from ship deck plans by the Maritime Administration (MARAD) or the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and is tracked as a planning consideration by the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). Square footage is the preferred capacity measure for roll–on/roll–off ships. For containerships and breakbulk ships, the standard measures (number of containers or volumetric capacity) are converted to square footage, based on each vessel’s ability to carry equivalent military cargo.

V&V Methodology. The Department’s primary source for ship capacity performance data is actual vessel deck plans tabulated in several different databases. Ship capacity data are collected and consolidated by MARAD and the MSC and sent to USTRANSCOM for review. The data are updated at working levels on a daily or weekly basis.

Data on ships entering the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) and on vessels under construction or conversion are collected on an as–needed basis. The Department of the Navy reviews these data quarterly for accuracy; the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff conduct detailed reviews at each step in the budget cycle. Program viability is tested annually through the unannounced, no–notice activation of two or more RRF ships to prove operability and to assess the vessels’ ability to meet activation schedules.

Actual and Projected Performance. The Department met its performance goals for organic surge sealift in FY 1999 and expects to meet its targets for FY 2000. However, projections point to an expected shortfall of 400,000 square feet by the end of FY 2001, relative to the original long–term goal of 10 million square feet. The shortfall will result primarily from a delay, from FY 2001 to FY 2002, in delivery of the nineteenth LMSR. Surge sealift capacity will, therefore, fall short of the 10–million–square–foot target in FY 2001; the goal will be reached a year or two later, in FY 2002 or 2003.

The Congress added funds to the FY 2000 budget to procure a twentieth LMSR. This ship will be used to free an older, smaller vessel for employment with the Maritime Prepositioning Force, with a net increase in surge capacity. Because the construction of the new ship and the conversion and transfer of the other vessel have yet to be scheduled, these force structure adjustments are not reflected in the FY 2001 goal.

Metric Description. Land–based prepositioning programs are maintained in Europe, Southwest Asia, and the Pacific region. These programs are complemented by sea–based prepositioning, which provides the flexibility to move equipment within and between theaters of operation. Additional prepositioning programs, not covered by Performance Measure 1.3.3, provide base, fuel, and medical support.

V&V Methodology. Service–specific prepositioning data are updated with each revision of the FYDP database. Ship inventory data are updated monthly and can be viewed on the Military Sealift Command (MSC) web page. Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS) data, maintained by the Joint Staff, are updated by the respective Services every three years for shipboard sets and monthly for sets stored ashore.

Actual and Projected Performance. DoD met its FY 1999 performance targets for prepositioning and expects to achieve its goal for FY 2000. However, because some prepositioned supplies were used during FY 1999 for contingency operations (mainly Air Force supplies not directly captured in this metric), the level of readiness for these sets, as reported in GSORTS, may decline.

No amount of technological sophistication will enable the U.S. military to respond to future challenges if it fails to maintain the quality of its personnel or to make the investments necessary to develop them to their full potential. The Department is committed to recruiting high–quality service members, providing robust training for them, and improving the quality of life of its military personnel and their families.

The measures for Performance Goal 2.1 address recruiting and retention. The recruiting metrics focus on enlisted personnel, where the Department’s major challenges lie. Officer recruitment is monitored annually. The primary management challenge with respect to the officer corps is maintaining the proper mix of occupational specialties. For example, the Navy has recently had difficulty in recruiting naval flight officers (non–pilot officer aircrew personnel) and nuclear propulsion officers and in retaining aviation, surface, and nuclear specialists. Legislative initiatives to expand specialty pay have been developed to help remedy this situation. At the end of FY 1999, the Air Force had a shortfall of 1,267 pilots, concentrated primarily in the fighter and theater airlift specialties. Despite actions to increase the size of pilot training classes and other management initiatives, the shortage is projected to grow over the next several years. The Air Force has lengthened the time pilots are required to serve on active duty following flight training, yet long–term challenges remain.

As noted above, the Department did not fully meet its military manpower goals for FY 1999. While retention rates and recruit quality remained steady or declined only slightly, the overall number of recruits fell short of objectives. The major factors inhibiting recruiting performance were the robust economy and continued record low unemployment. In the short term, the Department remains able to meet all operational requirements, but continued recruiting shortfalls could, over time, jeopardize the maintenance of QDR–mandated force levels and readiness standards.

The Department is acutely aware of the need to sustain QDR–directed levels of manning and therefore monitors annual gains and losses closely. For FY 2000, a number of tools and incentives have been implemented to assist in achieving recruiting targets.

Shortfalls in retention are of particular concern, since reenlistment shortages are the costliest in terms of the impact on long–term readiness and the overall well–being of the force. Shortfalls in first– and second–term reenlistments often result in occupational and skill–level mismatches within units, exacerbating problems caused by high overseas deployment rates. Thus, recent and significant changes in benefits and reenlistment incentives have been targeted at this group of service members. Still, current retention challenges are expected to continue, due to the combined effects of the 1990s force drawdown, an extended period of low domestic unemployment, changing employee attitudes and expectations, and increased uncertainty associated with worldwide force commitments.

In addition to the discussion presented below, Chapters 4 and 10 review issues related to force readiness and quality of life, including challenges facing the Department in reaching recruiting and retention goals.

Four metrics support Performance Goal 2.1: enlisted recruiting, recruit quality benchmarks, active retention rates, and reserve attrition rates.

Metric Description. The Department–wide goals set for enlisted recruiting represent the projected number of new personnel needed each year to maintain statutorily–defined military end–strengths and the proper distribution by rank, allowing for discharges, promotions to higher rank, and anticipated retirements. As personnel trends change throughout the year, the monthly and yearly recruiting objectives must be adjusted. This process yields a revised DoD–wide annual goal against which recruiting is evaluated.

V&V Methodology. Each Service captures recruiting information at the time of enlistment in a dedicated computer system. Automated reports, produced monthly, are used to track progress in meeting recruiting targets and to set new monthly goals. Data flow and V&V strategies are summarized, by Service, in Table I–2.

Actual and Projected Performance. Performance trends for enlisted recruiting are summarized in Table I–3.

Metric Description. The quality benchmarks for recruiting were established in 1992, based on a study conducted jointly by DoD and the National Academy of Sciences. The results produced a model linking recruit quality and recruiting resources to the job performance of enlistees. The model illuminates the relationships among costs associated with recruiting, training, attrition, and retention. It uses as a standard the performance levels demonstrated by junior servicemen and women who served in the Gulf War. The Department has adopted recruiting targets derived from this model—90 percent high school diploma graduates and 60 percent top–half aptitude personnel (AFQT categories I–IIIA)—as its minimum acceptable quality thresholds. Adhering to these benchmarks will reduce personnel and training costs, while ensuring that the force meets high performance standards.

V&V Methodology. Data collected as part of the enlistment process are routed, reviewed, and managed using the same mechanisms employed for Performance Measure 2.1.1.

Actual and Projected Performance. The Department exceeded its goal for recruit quality in FY 1999 and expects to meet or exceed the FY 2000 target.