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Chapter 7


The Departmentís strategic vision for the 21st century is to ensure that U.S. forces have information superiority in every mission area and to provide all of DoDís customers with assured and secure connectivity on a protected global network. Information superiority is the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while denying an adversaryís ability to do the same. It is the backbone of the Revolution in Military Affairs and provides comprehensive knowledge of the status and intentions of both adversary and friendly forces across the air, land, sea, and space components of the battlespace. Access to, use of, and control of space are fundamental to this strategy, including reliable and affordable transport of payloads and an ability to protect assets in orbit and on the ground. Americaís space forces will contribute dramatically to United Statesí ability to gain and exploit information superiority in the 21st century. Space systems are an integral part of the deterrent posture of the armed forces, and they confer a decisive advantage upon U.S. and friendly forces.

Essential elements of information superiority include command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), along with security and information operations (IO), and many of aspects of the Chief Information Officer (CIO) role. The implementation of the C4ISR vision relies upon efficient processes and is guided by quantitative performance and investment metrics.

During 1998, many accomplishments across all elements of information superiority brought DoD closer to realizing this vision. The Department completed a dramatic reorganization that consolidates information superiority functions under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD(C3I)), who also serves as Chief Information Officer. The synergy resulting from this integration and the efficiencies it will bring to all of DoDís Total Force information activities will yield technical, operational, and financial benefits for years to come. Consolidating policy development and oversight of the Departmentís space force structure and close coordination with the intelligence community will facilitate integration of space force concepts into mainstream defense strategy and processes.


The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 established the requirement for Chief Information Officers in government. This act seeks to improve federal agenciesí mission performance through superior information management and effective use of information technology (IT), which fits well with the Departmental focus on achieving information superiority. In the new organization, the DoD CIO established offices to address the Year 2000 (Y2K) Computer Problem, Governance, Network Enterprise, and Process Change.

Year 2000 Computer Problem

On January 1, 2000, the Department of Defense intends to have a mission-capable force that can execute the National Military Strategy, unaffected by date-related failures of its computer systems. The Departmentís management strategy for its Y2K initiatives combines centralized policy and oversight with decentralized execution. The Secretary of Defense has personally engaged the direct involvement of Service and defense agency heads in this management strategy. The Department is close to completing an assessment of all of its systems and identifying Y2K issues for corrective action. A database has been created to facilitate accurate and timely reporting requirements by tracking mission critical and nonmission critical systems in various stages of Y2K compliance.


The Department of Defense is employing independent verification and validation of its systems at several levels for weapon systems and military business functions (e.g., supply, finance, and transportation). DoD has three approaches in this regard: system-centric testing addresses individual systems; functional-centric testing assures Y2K compliant systems interface and function effectively in support of DoD functional activities (accounting, finance, etc.); and mission-centric testing assures end-to-end performance of systems and interfaces. End-to-end mission-level testing will be used to demonstrate DoDís operational readiness in a Y2K scenario.


The Secretary of Defense requires personal certification by members of his senior staff of each mission critical system and of functional readiness. Contingency planning is at the forefront when testing beyond the system level occurs. DoDís operating tempo and complexity of interactions among systems require that testing take place across DoD functions and throughout a theater.

In 1999, DoD will include Y2K testing as part of special functional area tests and commander in chief training evaluations. These tests are intended to refine contingency planning on departmental, functional, and theater levels. Contingency plans for each DoD component will include prioritized lists of systems and major actions needed to minimize Y2K disruptions to the core missions of the components. At the department-wide level, continuity of operations plans will be reviewed to incorporate Y2K scenarios.

DoD is working with federal agencies, state and local governments, and private industry through the Presidentís Council on Year 2000 Conversion. The Department is identifying and solving Y2K-related concerns that arise in organizational interactions, such as performing tests across federal departments, with NATO, and with other allies. The systematic and comprehensive process that the nuclear community is using to assess mission readiness for the Nuclear Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4I) System of Systems is an excellent example of collaborative effort.


DoD recognizes that the Y2K problem could threaten the core of U.S. military superiority. The ability to obtain, process, analyze, and convey information is the warfighterís most powerful tool. It is a cornerstone of the Joint Vision 2010 warfighting framework. Information superiority enables the United States to conduct its military operations with smaller forces than would otherwise be needed.

An attack against information systems on January 1, 2000, could be masked as a Y2K problem. However, problems also could be hidden on other dates, and future research could uncover still more attacks that could masquerade as Y2K issues. For this reason, DoD must strengthen its information assurance posture. To this end, a heightened awareness effort is under way to help assure that potential attacks are not dismissed as Y2K issues. Progress is being made to develop a national response capability to computer intrusion incidents. Installing network intrusion devices on more systems, establishing a National Security Incident Response Center, and training system administrators, system security officers, and network analysts will lead to comprehensive responses and analyses of incidents.


Governance is the substructure that allows the CIO to be an effective participant in the Departmentís mission. The Clinger-Cohen Act provides modern management rules based on the best practices in business and government. The Department established the DoD CIO Council as its executive management body. The Council focuses on resolving issues, ratifying policies and prioritizing information technology budget proposals. A working level council develops the policies and vets issues for resolution. This tiered structure will enable broad participation, informed decision making, and a strong defense of information technology resource requirements. Information management governance includes strategic planning and policy, education and training, and performance assessments.


An Information Management Strategic Plan was developed to support the goals of the Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Defense Reform Initiative, and Joint Vision 2010. This plan focuses on information superiority achieved through global, affordable, and timely access to reliable and secure information for worldwide decision making and operations. This will be accomplished by providing the right information, at the right place and time, from the right sources. For example, a common framework structures policies around the achievement of information superiority. Policies that are no longer relevant are being eliminated. Directive memoranda are being used to issue policy guidance quickly to accommodate the fast pace of technological advancements and statutory requirements. Ultimately, the content of these memoranda will be incorporated into the formal DoD Directive System.


To meet the demands of the Clinger-Cohen Act to acquire and maintain a skilled information management work force, the Department established the Clinger-Cohen Competencies. These competencies outline the skills and knowledge requirements for CIOs and other senior managers. The DoD CIO has made information management education and training a primary goal to promote the development of an information management knowledge-based work force in DoD. To assist in doing this, the Information Resources Management College is designated the primary information management training source within DoD to establish and deliver customized information management training programs for senior and mid-level managers.


In July 1998, DoD disestablished the Major Automated Information System Review Council. The Council was DoDís primary body for overseeing major automated information systems (AISs) and other information technology investments. DoD will continue to oversee major AISs and other information technology investments through the IT Overarching Integrated Product Team, and when necessary, through special reviews by the DoD CIO. The focus of information technology investment oversight will evolve over the next year to place greater emphasis on the planning phase, on portfolios of investments, and on evaluating performance outcomes.

The level of oversight of information technology investments is based on cost and risk. There are now 94 major AISs or other major special interest initiatives subject to oversight by the DoD CIO; 47 of these have been delegated to components for oversight.

Global Networked Information Enterprise

The Departmentís current information capabilities need modernization to provide value-added services, enhance efficiencies in information sharing, and promote interoperability. Efforts are under way to achieve this modernization. The Department is taking several key initiatives to manage its worldwide information infrastructure as a coherent global networked information enterprise to provide forces with affordable information dominance, anywhere and any time.


The revision of DoDís interoperability policies continued in 1998. The intent of the expansion is to implement the Clinger-Cohen Act and the results of studies on the reorganization of the Office of the ASD(C3I), specifically the recommendation to use value chain analyses. The revisions will contain the policy for implementing the Joint Technical Architecture (JTA) in the context of an outcome-based interoperability process using the three architecture views and associated products defined by the C4ISR architecture framework, plus the C4ISR Support Plan, to depict and manage information interoperability and integration. The revised policy will be available for formal DoD-wide coordination during the first quarter of 1999.

The Architecture Coordination Council approved version 2.0 of the JTA in May 1998. Version 2.0 was broadened from the original focus on C4ISR to information interoperability and affordability for all IT as defined in the Clinger-Cohen Act, to include National Security Systems. Efforts are under way to harmonize the various JTA implementation plans and to satisfy the recommendations of the DoD Inspector General audit on this matter. The JTA also mandates DoD Information Infrastructure (DII) Common Operating Environment (COE). An analysis of the COE was started to verify the assumption that it would save funding and effort, as well as enhance interoperability.

Process Change

DoD is focusing on process change in electronic commerce, logistics, finance, personnel, command and control (C2), and capital investment and planning. This is consistent with Clinger-Cohen, which emphasizes the need to analyze and reengineer processes prior to investing in information technology.


Electronic commerce is broadly defined as doing business electronically through the exploitation of information technology and commercial practices, products, and standards. It is also a philosophy of reengineering business processes to harness the power of proven commercial market approaches to get information (in a paperless form) to the right activity at the right time. The DoD Chief Information Officer has overall responsibility for institutionalizing electronic commerce in the Department. The Joint Electronic Commerce Program Office was established in May 1998 to be the Executive Agent for strategic implementation of electronic commerce initiatives for the Services and defense agencies.


Section 5122 of Clinger-Cohen calls for an integrated Information Technology Capital Planning and Investment Control Process. DoD will use its Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System as the framework to ensure that the correct information technology investments are selected and to evaluate information technology investments and ensure their success. This approach facilitates integration of these investments into the entire DoD investment portfolio.


The space force structure represents a major component of the C4ISR force structure and will become increasingly important in deterring conflict and conducting future military operations. The Department of Defense recognizes the importance of information in the future conduct of warfare as highlighted in the National Security Strategy, National Space Policy, and Joint Vision 2010. DoD is moving toward a totally integrated battlespace, where warfighters will no longer view C4ISR as support functions, but as instruments of combat.

Improvements in sensors, computer hardware and software, and communication technologies are significantly increasing the ability to gather, process, fuse, exploit, and disseminate information in real-time and near real-time. New weapon systems will be able to achieve significantly greater range, accuracy, and lethality through the application of these C4ISR technologies, leading to a Revolution in Military Affairs. The development and introduction of weapon systems and equipment employing current and future C4ISR capabilities will prompt changes in military roles and missions, and will transform military doctrine, force structure, and organizational arrangements.

Spectrum Management

The Departmentís weapon, communications, radio navigation, surveillance, and satellite control systems use the electromagnetic spectrum for national security and military objectives. Due to the Departmentís increasingly important and complex responsibilities regarding spectrum planning and the need for spectrum allocation on a global scale, greater emphasis has been placed on spectrum management within the Department. In 1998, DoD established the Spectrum Management Directorate and the Office of Spectrum Analysis and Management to manage the spectrum, ensure compliance with the frequency acquisition process, seek doctrinal and technical improvements, improve the definition of warfighter requirements, and increase cooperation with all interested parties.

Integrating Space Forces

Space systems are an integral part of the overall deterrent posture of the armed forces. They confer a decisive advantage upon U.S. and friendly forces in terms of combat timing, battlespace awareness, operating tempo, synchronization, ability to maneuver, and application of firepower. Any nation contemplating an action adverse to U.S. national security interests must be concerned about U.S. space forces. These ensure hostile actions will be detected by the United States in a timely manner. In addition, the importance of space as a principal avenue for the unimpeded flow of information for economic prosperity, as well as national security, is increasing. DoD recognizes these strategic imperatives and will assure freedom of access and use of space to support U.S. national security and economic interests.

Consistent with treaty obligations, DoD will ensure freedom of action in space for friendly forces, and if directed, limit or deny an adversaryís ability to use space for hostile purposes. To support space control objectives, DoD must sustain and improve capabilities to detect and monitor all militarily significant activities in space, using systems with ensured survivability and endurance. Space systems will increasingly provide the information for readiness training, operations planning, and execution during the initial phases of crises and conflict. Space forces also play an expanding role in military tasks such as the effective application of precision munitions, the identification of enemy centers of gravity, target detection/attack, the flow management of forces and logistics into a conflict area, battle/operations tracking, and campaign monitoring. The U.S. ability to effectively integrate space capabilities into military operations is critical to maintaining an effective deterrence capability and posture. The closure of overseas bases and increasing deployments to areas without a modern infrastructure increases the warfighterís reliance on space assets to provide an information infrastructure anywhere on earth with little or no notice. Future capabilities to collect and exploit geospatial information from space will sustain high quality information databases to support the training of continental United States (CONUS)-based forces on virtual battlespaces prior to deployment. Such battlefield preparation will familiarize forces with an operational area in advance and enhance mission planning and execution by increasing operating tempo and force synchronization.

Communications and Battle Management

Specific aspects of Communications and Battle Management include the emerging Global Information Grid, new applications enabled by this dynamic environment, related programs and technologies, and the increasing role of space systems in communication, command, and control.


The Department is focusing its efforts to achieve the operational capabilities to support the emerging Joint Strategy for Information Superiority. Command, control, and communications will evolve through the Information Grid to achieve this objective. The Information Grid is a subset of the Global Networked Information Enterprise and will be implemented by creating a single global, robust network based on the Network Centric Warfare concept. The Information Grid will include the Defense Information Infrastructure and sensor, battle management, and engagement capabilities. Commanders will have the flexibility to create task oriented grids within the Information Grid on an as-needed or permanent basis.


The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) is continuing to build an affordable and fully integrated, interoperable global information transport utility for the Department of Defense. In addition to the CONUS segment, DISA is developing Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) segments in both the European and Pacific theaters, as well as in the global sphere of space, and is extending the DISN concept into the deployed arena. Worldwide DISN implementation will provide an information transport infrastructure to DoD locations around the world, wherever deployed warfighters and National Communication System disaster recovery teams perform their missions. It will provide secure and nonsecure voice, data, electronic mail, video teleconferencing, imagery, and directory services. The Department has also begun a joint initiative with Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom to enhance the exchange of information across national boundaries during coalition operations.

The Defense Megacenters provide computing services critical to the global combat support operations of DoD. Defense Megacenter functionality is vital to Joint Vision 2010 operational concepts, with a major emphasis on focused logistics and full-spectrum projection of information assets. The CONUS-based Defense Megacenters process combat support requirements for warfighters deployed around the world. DoD has substantially reduced the cost of this processing by modernizing and consolidating 194 Service and defense agency information processing centers into 16 Megacenters and is in the process of further modernization and consolidation of those 16 facilities into five.


The Departmentís future Military Satellite Communications (MILSATCOM) architecture (approved in August 1996) establishes clear vectors to migrate users to satellite systems providing three general classes of service: protected, wideband, and mobile. In June 1998, a strategy for transition from the current systems to the approved future architecture was approved.

Protected communications services are secure, assured, and survivable. They are unique to the military and there is no commercial equivalent, although commercial technologies, subsystems, and processes are used to the maximum extent practical. The strategy for protected communications calls for launching todayís four remaining MILSTAR II satellites as planned, followed by the more capable Advanced Extremely-High Frequency system starting in 2006. These systems will provide strategic and tactical users with low and medium data rate communications that are survivable, difficult to detect, and jam-resistant.

Wideband communications services rapidly move large quantities of intelligence products, video, imagery, and data. The Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) provides the bulk of DoDís long-haul, wideband communications today. The wideband strategy is to launch the four remaining DSCS Service Life Enhancement Program satellites (with higher power, supporting higher throughput to tactical forces) starting in 1999, supplemented by Global Broadcast Service payloads on Ultra-High Frequency Follow-on (UFO) satellites 8, 9, and 10. Satellites known as Wideband Gapfillers will be launched starting in 2004 to reduce the growing gap between tactical wideband requirements and capabilities. A more capable commercial or commercial-like advanced wideband system is envisioned starting in 2008.

Mobile communications services provide networked multi-party and point-to-point narrowband links to tens of thousands of rapidly-moving warfighters. The UFO system will provide this type of communications through 2007. The Navy is studying the requirements to replace the current UFO constellation with a next-generation commercial or commercial-like objective mobile user system.

A major tenet of the future architecture and transition strategy is to reduce costs by leveraging advances in commercial satellite communications to the maximum extent practicable. This will include procurement of DoD-owned systems using off-the-shelf commercial buses and other high commercial parts content, commercial-like procurements, and continued leasing of commercial capabilities. As part of the MILSATCOM transition strategy, DoD is pursuing the benefits of international cooperation. The Department is investigating opportunities with several allied nations to improve interoperability, increase operational flexibility, and reduce redundancy. These efforts cover a range of cooperative options from collaboration on research, development, and testing, to joint production and satellite operation. Where mutually beneficial opportunities are found, DoD will pursue appropriate agreements while ensuring that adequate security safeguards are in place.

Positive steps have been taken to ensure end-to-end, system-of-systems operational management of DoD-owned and commercial leased SatCom capabilities and seamless integration of these SatCom systems into the DoD Information Infrastructure. The MILSATCOM architecture may not satisfy all validated emerging requirements; however, it will provide a significant increase in communications capabilities within budget constraints.


The AUTODIN system that currently provides the DoDís primary means of messaging communications will be replaced in 1999 by the Defense Message System (DMS). A flexible, commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS)-based network-centric application layer system, DMS provides multimedia messaging and directory services using the underlying network and security services of the Defense Information Infrastructure. DMS will interoperate with existing messaging systems while evolving from its current configuration to full implementation.


Command and control systems provide the means to execute nuclear, conventional, and special operations effectively. The Global Command and Control System (GCCS) was installed at over 700 worldwide locations and satisfies warfighter requirements for a seamless integrated joint C2 capability. GCCS supports the warfighter by providing an enhanced common operational picture, force status, intelligence support, orders of battle, related facility information, air tasking orders, and oceanographic data. New capabilities such as weather forecasting, collaborative planning, and improved Joint Operational Planning and Execution System handling tools are also being fielded and will be completed in early 1999.

GCCS Top Secret (GCCS-T) provides a highly secure infrastructure for command and control throughout the force deployment cycle. GCCS-T is being upgraded and will transition to a GCCS-compatible baseline during early 1999. This upgrade will improve its nuclear planning capabilities and offer increased performance and reliability.


The Global Combat Support System (GCSS) provides a strategy for achieving information interoperability across combat support functions, and between combat support and C2 functions. GCSS incorporates personnel, logistics, finance, acquisition, medical, and other support in a cross-functional environment. In FY 1998, GCSS achieved integration of combat support information with C2 information on the common operational picture (COP). The Combat Support Enabled COP (COP/CSE) provides a unit hierarchy for a joint task force or component commands, including readiness information and query capabilities for units, platforms, airfields, and seaports. The prototype of this capability was used in the Ulchi Focus Lens 98 exercise. During 1999, the COP/CSE and the GCSS Web will be implemented at the 37 GCCS initial operational capability (IOC) sites.


DoD continues to modernize, consolidate, and optimize the U.S. Nuclear Command and Control System. This system relies on survivable and endurable command centers and a redundant, survivable communications network. Technical management responsibility for nuclear C2 software development was transferred as part of a realignment to consolidate nuclear-related activities at the United States Strategic Command. Priority attention is given to potential Y2K issues, and DoD is working with other nuclear nations such as Russia to address Y2K issues concerning nuclear command and control.


The Integrated Broadcast Service combines five current stand-alone broadcast systems into one system that will provide a theater tailored dissemination architecture with global connectivity using a standardized message format. The Integrated Broadcast Service will be interoperable with current and programmed tactical and strategic warfare systems.


The DoD National Airspace System program began procuring modernized, digital air traffic control systems in partnership with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). This procurement will upgrade voice, data, and sensor systems for quality military air traffic control services that are interoperable with the FAA. Installation of navigation and safety equipment is following a phased approach beginning with passenger aircraft and the executive fleet. DoD awarded contracts for the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance Systems and Terrain Awareness and Warning System to improve aircraft navigation safety.


Common Operating Environment. The DII COE is a framework for all DII development encompassing architectural standards, reusable components and software, sharable data, secure interoperability, and automated integration. Services and agencies control the DII COE portfolio, and select and prioritize COTS and government off-the-shelf investments based on mission need, risks, benefits, and cost. Enhancements to the DII COE are released every six months. Major goals of the 1997 and 1998 releases were to improve security, separate component parts into a three-tiered architecture, and improve reliability.

The major COE goal for 1999 is to move the underlying software architecture to complete the migration to a three-tiered architecture, separating data, the applications that manipulate the data, and the presentation (display) of the data. Major components will be reimplemented in Java. The completion of the three-tiered architecture and reimplementation of major components in Java will enhance portability and create a more open component framework. This will make the Common Support Applications layer more open and provide more reuse opportunities across mission domains. Enhancements during 2000 will support real-time operating system requirements and provide a reconfigurable kernel to better support the range of computing platforms in use by DoD.

Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS). The JTRS program employs a common architecture to allow the family of JTRS communications systems to be modular, programmable, scalable, and extendible. JTRS will be interoperable with legacy systems and will provide cost-effective upgrades to meet future requirements. The objective is to adopt JTRS as a DoD standard and acquire the systems as replacements for all of DoDís radio inventory, avionics upgrades, appropriate satellite terminals, and personal communications equipment. Production will begin by 2002, with initial operational capability for several applications by 2003.

Common Data Link. The Common Data Link (CDL) is one of DoDís primary data link standards. The CDL, which includes the Tactical Common Data Link capability, is the DoD primary data link for unprocessed data. The CDL will support air-to- surface transmission of radar, imagery, video, and the sensor information from manned and unmanned aircraft.

DoDís Tactical Data Link Architecture. The DoDís J-series family of tactical data link standards is primarily used for supporting joint data link requirements in the warfighter battlespace. The family is comprised of Link-16, Variable Message Format (VMF), and Link-22. The data link family is critical to information superiority and to battlefield situational awareness for joint and coalition forces. Theater air and missile defense network centric concepts use the Link-16 information architecture as a primary implementation tool for system and operational architectures and concepts. Link-16 also supports maritime and air surveillance efforts and provides support for other sensor to shooter requirements. Link-22, the evolving component of the family, provides extended line of sight capability. Land forces use VMF for digitizing the battlefield. The Joint Tactical Data Link Management Plan is the vehicle overseeing Service migrations to achieve an integrated, predominant, joint forces capability by 2005.

In January 1998, DoD awarded two contracts for Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL) development, Phase 2. TCDL will support air-to-surface transmission of radar, imagery, video, and other sensor information from manned and unmanned aircraft. TCDL designs make use of the latest COTS, digital, programmable radio technology. Preproduction terminals will be delivered in the summer of 1999.

Digitization. Since completion of the Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE) in March 1997 and the Division XXI AWE in November 1997, the Army changed the character of its digitization strategy from experimentation to acquisition. Using Variable Message Format, the Army is currently on schedule to achieve its first digitized division in FY 2000 and its first digitized corps in FY 2004. To prevent fratricide, the Army is funding the millimeter wave-based Battlefield Combat Identification System for the first digitized division. Millimeter wave technology has also been endorsed as the NATO standard for ground identification.

Space Infrastructure

Space forces are integral to achieving information superiority. Consistent with National Space Policy, DoD is committed to use and control space to assist in the successful execution of the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy. Space is often the sole medium that allows access to otherwise denied areas of foreign countries without violating their sovereignty.


The effective use of space for military purposes requires reliable and affordable access. Current U.S. space launch systems differ only slightly from the ballistic missiles developed during the 1950s and 1960s, and are increasingly costly to use. The National Space Transportation Policy, released in 1994, balances the efforts to sustain and modernize existing launch capabilities with the need to invest in the development of new, improved space transportation systems. DoD is the lead agency for improving todayís expendable launch vehicle (ELV) fleet, including the requisite technology development. The Departmentís objective is to reduce the launch costs while improving capability, reliability, operability, responsiveness, and safety.

To achieve this objective, DoD initiated the Evolved ELV (EELV) program to replace current medium- and heavy-lift launch systems. Through this program, DoD is partnering with industry to satisfy government launch needs while fostering a greater leadership role in the international launch market. EELV will reduce life-cycle costs, shorten launch timelines, and enable more DoD, civil, and commercial launches per year. The medium-lift and heavy-lift EELVs will have their first flights in 2002 and 2003, respectively. In an innovative approach, DoD will compete EELV launch services instead of separately buying launch hardware and paying for launch operations.

Today, the bulk of U.S. government payloads are launched from the national spacelift ranges at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, and Cape Canaveral Air Station, Florida. In the future, these payloads may be launched on commercial launch systems from several U.S. spaceportsóSpaceport Florida, located at Cape Canaveral, the California Spaceport located on Vandenberg, the Alaska Spaceport at Kodiak Island, the Virginia Spaceport at Wallops Island, and the New Mexico Spaceport.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is the lead agency for the development of the next generation of reusable launch vehicles that will replace the space shuttle. The Department of Defense will cooperate with NASA in the development of technology, operational concepts, and flight demonstrations for these reusable space transportation systems.


The Global Positioning System (GPS) continues to mature into a worldwide dual-use (military and civil) positioning, navigation, and timing information resource. Integration of GPS into all levels of combat forces remains a high priority of the Services. At the same time, worldwide civil applications of GPS continue to expand, with new and more innovative uses of GPS appearing continuously.

With the growing importance of GPS to military operations and the need to maintain this military advantage for friendly forces, the Departmentís navigation warfare (Navwar) initiative is gaining momentum. Current Navwar efforts are focused on selecting the most effective solutions for assuring uninterrupted DoD and allied use of GPS while denying access to an adversary within the theater of operations. GPS service for peaceful purposes outside the theater of operations must also be preserved. Concurrent with Navwar activities, the Department is evaluating alternatives for modernizing the system to satisfy more demanding military and civil requirements. The resultant GPS enhancements will ensure continued utility of the system well into the 21st century.

An Interagency GPS Executive Board assumed management and oversight of the dual-use aspects of the system. Through this board, DoD is working closely with the Department of Transportation and other civil agencies to plan future modifications. These enhancements will provide civil users with increased accuracy and robustness and permit an even broader spectrum of GPS applications throughout the worldwide user community. The Department is also contributing to a number of international initiatives sponsored by the State Department. The goals of these initiatives are to promote international acceptance of GPS as a worldwide standard, achieve international support for protection of GPS frequency allocations, and encourage growth in the investment and trade of GPS equipment and services.


In 1994, the President directed the convergence of the U.S. polar-orbiting operational environmental satellite systems, thereby merging the Departmentís Defense Meteorological Satellite Program with the Department of Commerceís Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite program and capitalizing on the technologies developed for NASAís Earth Observing System. An Integrated Program Office was created to plan, develop, acquire, manage, launch, and operate the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS). NPOESSís primary objective is to reduce the cost of acquiring and operating polar-orbiting environmental satellite systems, while continuing to satisfy both military and civil operational requirements. In May 1998, the program successfully merged the command and control functions of both existing programs.

The NPOESS program is a three-satellite constellation that will enhance coverage and data availability to U.S. and allied forces. To promote international cooperation in space and save U.S. funds, the European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites will provide the third satellite in the converged constellation. The Department is working closely with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and NASA to ensure that NPOESS continues to satisfy national security requirements.

Space Control

Numerous countries in regions around the world are acquiring or accessing space systems, technologies, and products. Foreign nations and subnational groups are obtaining space capabilities through indigenous efforts, purchases of goods and services, and cooperative activities. The spread of indigenous military and intelligence space systems, civil space systems with military and intelligence utility, and commercial space services with military and intelligence applications poses a significant challenge to U.S. defense strategy and military operations.

Because of the value of space systems to the U.S. economy and the military in future conflicts, the United States can expect attacks against U.S. and allied space systems. Consistent with treaty obligations, DoD must be able to ensure freedom of action in space for friendly forces and, when directed, limit or deny an adversaryís ability to use the medium for hostile purposes. To support space control objectives, DoD must sustain and improve capabilities to surveil and monitor all militarily significant activities in space. DoD also will continue to design, develop, and operate space systems with ensured survivability and endurability of their critical ground and space-based functions. Moreover, DoD must have the appropriate capabilities to deny when necessary an adversaryís use of space systems to support hostile military forces.

Missile Warning

Defense Support Program satellites have provided vital strategic and theater missile warning capabilities to the National Command Authorities and to U.S. forces worldwide for nearly three decades. However, this technology is aging and Defense Support Program will soon be succeeded by the much more capable Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS). The first increment of SBIRS, scheduled for completion in FY 1999, will upgrade the ground-processing infrastructure and consolidate theater and strategic warning missions within one unified system.

The second increment, called SBIRS-High, will be a new generation of infrared early warning and surveillance satellites in Geosynchronous Earth Orbit, complemented by sensor payloads hosted on Highly Elliptical Orbiting vehicles. SBIRS-High will provide data that can be used to vastly improve missile warning and defense. The third increment of SBIRS, called SBIRS-Low, will be a constellation of Low Earth Orbiting satellites with an unprecedented capability to track ballistic missile targets through midcourse and terminal flight. SBIRS-High is in Engineering and Manufacturing Development and SBIRS-Low is currently in Program Definition. When completed, SBIRS will provide warning, tracking, cueing, and discrimination data on ballistic missiles from launch through reentryóa capability that is key to the success of theater and national missile defense systems.


The Department is forging an investment strategy for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems consistent with validated warfighter requirements and within the framework of approved architectures. This strategy will balance development of new collection capabilities, modernization of current forces, and sustainment of existing infrastructures, as well as move toward robust interoperability among space, airborne, terrestrial, and maritime ISR systems. Joint commanders and their forces can expect an integrated common operational picture built on a foundation of imagery and geospatial information that displays friendly, neutral, and enemy force disposition across the global battlespace in all weather conditions. Entering the 21st century, ISR systems investment strategies will focus on mobile and sophisticated modern threats, enhanced sensor-to-shooter requirements, technology opportunities, and resource priorities.

Architectures for Joint Vision 2010

Over the next decade, total ISR capability will be melded into a system-of-systems architecture which ties national/theater/tactical sensors, commanders, and shooters together to enable U.S., allied, and coalition forces to strike rapidly and decisively at extended ranges. The Airborne Reconnaissance Architecture was published in February 1998 to integrate DoDís various airborne ISR modernization initiatives. The Future Imagery Architecture, Integrated Overhead Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) Architecture, and SBIRS architecture provide similar steps toward an integrated system-of-systems approach to overhead intelligence collection, surveillance, and warning. The future ISR system-of-systems architectures will integrate imagery intelligence (IMINT), SIGINT, and measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) products into a fused intelligence picture. Assured communications capabilities and improved tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems will be common characteristics within these architectures.


Technology advances are allowing digital imagery and video to replace some film sensor applications. Investments in digital electro-optical technology include development of focal plane arrays, digital compression techniques, digital recording devices, high-volume archives, metadata management, and digital data links. Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) is rapidly becoming an increasingly important sensor for warfighting applications. SAR not only offers an all-weather, day and night imaging advantage, but variations and improvements of SAR technology such as Moving Target Indications (MTI), Interferometric SAR (IFSAR), and Foliage Penetration provide the potential to revolutionize reconnaissance capabilities. Starting in FY 1999, the U-2 will have an upgraded SAR with improved area coverage, improved imagery resolution and geolocation accuracy, IFSAR capability, and improved MTI capability, all providing a direct precision guided munitions targeting capability to the warfighter.


Based on the National Security Agency (NSA) threat projections, the primary driver for SIGINT modernization programs is the worldwide digital revolution in communications. Real-time tactical SIGINT systems must have adaptable digital processing with a robust capability. Exploitation in this environment requires that real-time tactical SIGINT systems have an adaptable digital-processing core with a robust capability. The Department is using the National Cryptologic Strategy 21 and the Unified Cryptologic Architecture 2010 as the community-wide blueprint to guide investment strategies for reconnaissance SIGINT capabilities. The Joint Airborne SIGINT Architecture and its components, the Joint SIGINT Avionics Family (JSAF) and the Joint Interoperable Operator Network, provided a template to help build the network centric Unified Cryptologic Architecture. A JSAF prototype system flew on a Navy EP-3 in December 1997. In 1998, the Airborne-Overhead Interoperability Office effort demonstrated precision geolocation of threat emitters through real-time cooperation between airborne and overhead platforms.


The United States MASINT system, currently under development, will serve as a community-wide blueprint to guide investment in future MASINT capabilities. The Departmentís airborne reconnaissance architecture envisions unique roles for both multispectral imagery and hyperspectral technology to produce spectral and spatial imagery products. In FY 1999, the Senior Year Electro-Optical Reconnaissance System Pre-Planned Product Improvement Program and the Adaptive Spectral Reconnaissance Program will provide spectrally derived information to the warfighter. Collection and processing of Synthetic Aperture Radar Phase History Data currently supports a range of MASINT-related exploitation techniques. A currently operating Overhead Nonimaging Infrared R&D System has demonstrated its utility to military operations and Technical Intelligence, while providing technical support to the Space Based Infrared System program. With these improvements, SBIRS will provide vastly improved MASINT data for the characterization of strategic and theater ballistic missiles and other threats.


Due to the continued high demand for RC-135 Rivet Joint support for regional contingencies, peacekeeping operations, and worldwide sensitive reconnaissance operations, the Department is reengineering the existing RC-135 aircraft and has acquired two additional aircraft which will be delivered in FY 1999. The fleet of U-2 aircraft will continue to be upgraded and will complete reengineering this year. It remains in excellent shape. The Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) achieved IOC in December 1997. Nine JSTARS are currently in production. The fourth production aircraft was delivered in August 1998. The Army will field the final Guardrail Common Sensor system in FY 2000.

The Global Hawk and Darkstar High Altitude Endurance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) completed a series of successful flights in 1998 in preparation for a Military Utility Assessment beginning in FY 1999. These aircraft will provide new opportunities for warfighters to enhance continuous situational awareness. The Predator Medium Altitude Endurance UAV has accumulated over 8,000 flight hours since its introduction as an advanced concept technology demonstration (ACTD). In March 1998, Predator UAVs returned to the Bosnia for a third deployment and continued operations are expected in FY 1999. Based on the information collected from the Tactical UAV (TUAV) ACTD and a series of vertical take-off and landing UAV demonstrations, the Department will continue to pursue JROCís number one UAV priority in FY 1999, the TUAV.


Ground exploitation and dissemination systems continue to mature into modular, scalable components that provide warfighters timely, reliable information. The Distributed Common Ground System will be the basic tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination building block for airborne systems in the 21st century. The goal is to migrate single-intelligence ground stations into a seamless multi-intelligence picture to support joint operations. In 1998, the Navy began installing the first of 27 Battle Group Passive Horizon Extension Systems Surface Terminals on four aircraft carriers.

Fusing multi-intelligence products was demonstrated in FY 1998 with cueing between the Armyís Guardrail/Common sensor and Airborne Reconnaissance Low with U-2 operations in support of Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defense exercises. The result is enhanced situational awareness, improved geolocational accuracy, and reduced reporting timelines. In addition, new processing and dissemination capabilities will promote greater synergy among national and airborne sensors.


Three key imagery collection studies completed in FY 1998 highlight the need for integration and fusion between overhead and airborne systems. National systems will be significantly upgraded through the Future Imagery Architecture and the Integrated Overhead SIGINT Architecture to support emerging situational needs and a range of new weapon systems such as the F/A-18E/F, F-22, and Joint Strike Fighter. The National Reconnaissance Office, Defense Intelligence Agency, NSA, and National Imagery and Mapping Agency are working to determine how airborne capabilities that provide flexibility, long dwell, and sustained coverage can best complement the national systemís global coverage, access to denied areas, and sustainability. The commercial imagery satellite business is promising images on demand for virtually any place on the earth within the next few years. Studies are being conducted with the commercial sector to understand the ramifications of this capability, as well as to examine how commercial imagery can be disseminated reliably during various levels of conflict.

C4ISR Integration and Interoperability

The Joint C4ISR Decision Support Center (DSC) was established to perform studies directed by a Senior Steering Group composed of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, and the ASD(C3I). During FY 1998, the DSC supported a Moving Target Indications study requested by Congress and analyzed communication of national intelligence sensor data to tactical users, command and control systems for the Sensor-to-Shooter architecture, and C4ISR interoperability process reengineering. In FY 1999, the DSC will analyze C4ISR requirements for military operations in urban areas, MTI and imagery fusion (also requested by Congress), the C4ISR impact on joint interdiction, C4ISR for coalition warfare, the C4ISR impact on dominant maneuver and full-dimension protection, and the information assurance for combat support.


Modernizing the Force

Intelligence will provide the information advantage necessary to support U.S. national security policy and the successful execution of national security operations. Defense intelligence will continue to provide warning of threats to U.S. national security interests. As threats become more complex and the speed at which they emerge increases, intelligence must anticipate and respond with greater speed and efficiency. U.S. intelligence will be flexible and adaptive to an uncertain and variable future security environment. To achieve this vision requires a common understanding of future challenges, the identification of broad strategic goals, a process that relates those goals to the diverse capabilities and activities across U.S. intelligence, and a means to measure performance against those goals.

Intelligence activities, systems, and investments must be focused on providing timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence information to the consumers. U.S. intelligence cannot examine every element to determine its potential value. The increasing sophistication of commercial information sources, from the cable news networks to the worldwide web, also provide the consumers of intelligence more choices of information sources. Therefore, four themes dominate plans and programs to improve intelligence in the 21st century:

Better integrate operations across intelligence programs and disciplines.

Improve the management of intelligence efforts.

Prepare for an uncertain future.

Transform the intelligence infrastructure.

The absence of a global competitor to the United States allows U.S. intelligence to rebuild capabilities and reconfigure activities in a planned, deliberate manner that balances the requirements of immediate and near-term national security operations. The investment in development of future intelligence capabilities is limited to those systems that will provide an identifiable contribution to national security missions. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the willingness of rogue states to use them make it imperative that U.S. intelligence increase its ability to collect, process, and analyze information to protect the people of the United States.

The challenging focus of intelligence support to military operations gained even greater importance with the issuance of Joint Vision 2010, wherein dominant battlespace awareness is a primary component for success. Joint Vision 2010 notes that future warfighting must embody the improved intelligence and command and control capabilities that will be available in the information age. This information networking is considered crucial as it forms the underlying framework to carry out the Joint Vision 2010 operational concepts. It emphasizes information superiorityóthe capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversaryís ability to do the same. There is progress against many challenging intelligence targets, such as terrorists and other transnational adversaries, but there is more work ahead.

The accomplishments of existing intelligence collection systems and the anticipated success in fielding the next generation of collection systems make it even more important to extract the most valuable information from a flood of data. The shift to more focused collection systems to provide unique information is a primary consideration in operational collection systems.

The strategy underlying the intelligence budget focuses resources where they can provide the greatest benefit to prevent, reduce, and respond to threats to U.S. national security. DoDís focus will be on closed societies and rogue states, especially those developing weapons of mass destruction.

Modernizing Intelligence Processes

Defense intelligence, in partnership with the Intelligence Community, is transforming the processes of intelligence production to meet the complex needs of political and military customers. Improvements are being incorporated in all-source analysis by more cooperative and coordinated efforts in sorting the workload for difficult targets and improving the efficiency of sharing information through the establishment of a classified internet.

The United States, the leader in imagery collection and processing from aircraft and satellites, continues with the modernization of IMINT collection and processing systems. But the emphasis now is on the development of innovative and cost-effective solutions due to the increase in coverage requirements, shortened reporting timelines, and expanded needs for more diverse information.

Programmed improvements in the ability to perform the SIGINT mission include cost-efficient and innovative approaches. The transition to the United States Cryptologic System 2010 has already begun with initial implementation of the transition plan for the Unified Cryptologic Architecture to address the exponentially exploding telecommunications and information environment of the 21st century.

DoD recognizes the absolute necessity for improving the effectiveness of the intelligence system to address the increased threats of chemical and biological agents and weapons of mass destruction. Improvements in the MASINT discipline are particularly suitable for collecting information on the testing, production, and release of chemical and biological warfare agents. This type of intelligence information will greatly assist in determining the capabilities of nations developing, producing, and testing weapons of mass destruction, and identifying violations of arms control treaties.

The collection and reporting of intelligence information gathered by Human Intelligence (HUMINT) sources and methods remain a cornerstone of the intelligence infrastructure. The Intelligence Community has made great strides to improve the interaction and coordination between the Defense HUMINT Service and the CIA HUMINT activities. HUMINT is critical to provide indications and warning, to understand the capabilities and intentions of a potential adversary, and to counter the threats posed by weapons proliferators, terrorists and drug traffickers.

The principles contained within the defense intelligence programs reflect the mandates of the Government Performance and Results Act. Strategic plans and measures to judge performance against those plans were developed and are positioned and ready to assess those performance measures and have the means to adjust efforts accordingly. The next step is to combine those separate plans into an encompassing strategic plan for all of U.S. intelligence.


The Department has conducted a thorough reexamination of the defensive programs that are essential to achieving and maintaining the information superiority envisioned in Joint Vision 2010. In this era of revolutionary technical and social change, it is imperative that DoD develops and maintains the ability to protect personnel and critical assets and continues development and integration of an effective capability to conduct information operations.


Defense security programs prevent or deter espionage, sabotage, subversion, theft, or the unauthorized use of classified or controlled information, systems, or war material in DoD custody. With the gradual emergence of a technology-based environment designed to encourage vast openness and the sharing of information with the public, DoD systems, personnel, and resources are much more vulnerable to new threats. Critical issues such as the security of sensitive but unclassified information and web security are being addressed.

DoD security personnel are working closely with DoD counterintelligence personnel to develop a risk-based model for leveraging security and counterintelligence funding and resources. The result will identify the proper investment balance and optimal utilization of security and counterintelligence assets. The transition of the Defense Security Service to a fee-for-service organization has begun, and the cost of security clearance investigations is already decreasing. With the growth of international commerce, reviews of foreign ownership, control, and influence cases are more numerous and complex. These reviews examine the effect of foreign influence on security at facilities performing classified contracts, as well as the growing problem of declassification of sensitive information.

The DoD counterintelligence community, consisting of the counterintelligence elements of the Services and the Defense Intelligence Agency, supports the Departmentís operational commands and forces, as well as the acquisition and the information assurance organizations and many other customers. While the core effort of the community is to detect and defeat the intelligence activities of foreign nations and terrorist organizations, it has increasingly concentrated its efforts on force protection, defending the Departmentís information infrastructure and safeguarding critical technology. Information superiority depends heavily on a robust technology program and strong security and counterintelligence programs are critical to protect that resource. The Department is modernizing and improving the robustness of its counterintelligence effort.

Information Operations

Information operations are key to achieving and maintaining Information Superiority and are critical to the operational concepts of Joint Vision 2010. They are a force multiplier across the entire spectrum of peace, crisis, war, and return to peace. Information operations are used to achieve specific objectives against an adversaryís information, information systems, and decision making processes.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense approved an IO Master Plan which includes interfaces to other U.S. government agencies. The Plan established DoDís IO vision and orchestrates Department actions among areas supporting information operationsóincluding Psychological Operations, Military Deception, Electronic Warfare, Physical Attack, Information Assurance, Computer Network Attack, and Operations Security. To conduct interagency activities, the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community formed an Interagency steering group.

Red Teams are an interdisciplinary, threat based, opposing force, which uses both active and passive capabilities on a formal, time-bounded tasking to expose and exploit information operations vulnerabilities of friendly forces as a means to improve their readiness. DoD is currently developing a DoD Instruction and a standardized methodology for performing Red Team exercises.

DoD has several initiatives to educate workers on information operations. The National Defense University provides two intensive information operations courses open to students of all federal agencies, and the Senior Service Colleges each include information operations in their curricula. Additionally, information operations are now being integrated into military exercises and wargames.

Information Assurance

Information assurance (IA) is a critical component of the DoDís operational readiness that assures that Defense Information Infrastructure systems and networks are capable of providing continuous and dependable service to the Department. Information assurance depends on the continuous integration of personnel, operational, and technical capabilities to guarantee the availability, integrity, authenticity, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation of information services, while providing the means to efficiently reconstitute these vital services following an attack. DoD has taken major steps in 1998 to improve its IA posture.

In January 1998, the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved creation of the defense-wide Information Assurance Program to provide for the planning, coordination, integration, and oversight of the Departmentís IA activities and resources. The Department initiated a defense-wide action to baseline the Information Assurance and Information Technology skills and resources within the Department; determine future requirements; and address personnel training, certification, and retention issues. A positive control process was also instituted to ensure that information on information systems vulnerabilities is appropriately disseminated and that countermeasures are promptly implemented.

In June 1998, DoD initiated a department-wide tasking to baseline where the Department stands with respect to information assurance and information technology skills in terms of present personnel numbers and projected future needs. An Integrated Process Team was formed to address training requirements and a strategy to retain highly skilled information assurance and information technology employees.

In August 1998, DoD created the Joint Task ForceóComputer Network Defense, with a mission of coordinating and directing the defense of DoD computer systems and computer networks. This mission includes the coordination of DoD defensive actions with non-DoD government agencies and appropriate private organizations.

Critical Infrastructure Protection

Critical Infrastructure Protection is another very important component of DoDís operational readiness. Critical Infrastructure Protection addresses the protection of critical assets the Department relies upon to accomplish its mission. In May 1998, Presidential Decision Directive 63 called for a national effort to assure and protect the increasingly vulnerable and interconnected national infrastructures, including electrical power, transportation, communications, and banking and finance.

In addition to having the responsibility for protection of internal DoD critical assets, DoD serves as the lead agency for the national defense special function. The ASD(C3I) was designated the Departmentís Chief Infrastructure Assurance Officer. Currently a DoD-wide Critical Infrastructure Protection Plan is being developed with the goal of implementing the plan within two years. The implemented plan will support the Departmentís fully integrated and sustainable process for providing life-cycle protection to those elements of defense, national, and global infrastructures essential to operations.

To identify and assess critical infrastructures, DoD is implementing the Critical Asset Assurance Program, as defined in DoD Directive 5160.54, issued in January 1998. This program will assure the integrity, availability, survivability, and capability of critical assets to support vital DoD missions across the full range of military operations.


The Department has seen a great deal of activity and progress toward realization of DoDís vision of space forces and information superiority. The benefits of an expanded and highly integrated organization dedicated to these goals will bring synergistic improvements in programmatic, technical, and managerial activity. With the implementation of the Clinger-Cohen Actís mandate to improve processes and adopt quantitative metrics for performance and decision making, DoD is on the verge of an era of greatly increased productivity and efficiency in articulating and satisfying its information needs. The effect of these improvements will be visible in the realization of the information superiority that enables Joint Vision 2010.

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