NATO Enlargement:
Pro and Con Arguments

NATO named three candidate states for membership at its summit meeting in July 1997. A two-thirds vote of approval, probably to be taken in spring 1998, will be necessary for the U.S. Senate to give its advice and consent to revise the North Atlantic Treaty and admit new members. Key arguments favoring U.S. approval of enlargement include the need to bring stability in central Europe, a region that has long been unstable; building a strong transatlantic link with new European democracies; and extending collective defense to countries that remain concerned about a potential Russian threat. Key arguments against NATO expansion include the concern that it will exacerbate tensions with Russia; result in substantial costs and risks that the allies are unwilling to share and the American people are unwilling to shoulder alone; and dilute the mission, political likemindedness, and military effectiveness of the alliance.

BACKGROUND

On July 8, 1997, NATO extended invitations to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to begin negotiations to enter the alliance. Some countries, led by France and Italy, wished to invite Romania and Slovenia as well, which the Clinton Administration opposed. The alliance commended Romania, Slovenia, and the Baltic states for progress towards democratic and economic reform, and pledged future enlargements, without promising invitations to specific countries.

NATO intends to complete accession negotiations with the three candidates in December 1997. The objective of the negotiations is to ensure that the three countries understand their obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty and alliance budgets. NATO will produce a protocol formally inviting the countries to join the alliance. That protocol will serve as an amendment to the Treaty, and be submitted to member states for their approval. A two-thirds vote of those present in the chamber will be necessary for the U.S. Senate to give its advice and consent. A vote is likely in the spring or early summer of 1998. All NATO members must approve the three countries' candidacies for them to join the alliance. NATO officials wish to admit the states formally in April 1999.

ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING ENLARGEMENT

• Europe is the home of many of the world's most important democracies and market economies; enlargement will promote stability in Europe by providing a secure environment for new members for further consolidation of democracy and open markets. Enlargement will gradually end Cold-War divisions in Europe and bring new members into an integrated Euro-Atlantic community.

• Collective defense remains the core of the alliance. Extending it to qualified new members will deter aggression in a traditionally unstable region.

• Enlargement will sustain U.S. leadership in Europe. While expansion of the European Union (EU) is important for encouraging stability, NATO enlargement will further secure the transatlantic link that many European states wish to preserve and extend.

• NATO is a defensive alliance. Enlargement should not threaten Russia. NATO has no current plan or need to station either large conventional forces or nuclear weapons on the soil of new members.

• The NATO-Russia Founding Act of May 1997 provides Moscow with "a voice but not a veto," and ensures that Russia will enjoy consultation on the key security issues outside NATO territory.

  An alternative view is that Russia remains a potential threat, and that enlargement will secure for the alliance a significant presence in a strategically important area, thereby limiting Moscow's potential sphere of influence.

• Enlargement will prevent the "renationalization" of defense in central Europe. Each new member need develop only that part of its military that serves overall alliance purposes, and will benefit from a NATO military infrastructure linking it to countries committed to collective defense.

• The costs of enlargement will be modest, in part because there is little threat. In comparison, failure to expand the alliance would leave central European states anxious over potential border and minority issues with neighboring states, and sustain their need for multi-faceted militaries able to fight a broad array of potential adversaries.

• U.S. and western defense industries will benefit by securing markets for their armaments in the newly allied states.

ARGUMENTS OPPOSING ENLARGEMENT

• There is no threat to any current ally or candidate state, and no need to expand NATO's collective defense commitments. Enlargement will create new dividing lines in Europe by putting Russia on guard against an alliance moving into its traditional areas of influence. Not inviting such countries as the Baltic states and Romania to join the alliance signals Moscow that they are isolated and subject to its influence.

• The key U.S. interest in Europe is ensuring Russia's continued democratization and integration into the community of nations. Enlargement will humiliate Moscow and create a "Weimar Russia," vulnerable to Russian nationalists hostile to the west who believe that the country's interests are being sacrificed by weak leadership.

  An alternative view is that Russia will gain a foothold in alliance decision-making through the Founding Act, under which it can appeal to European publics to deflect NATO from its desired course.

• Clinton Administration proposals for the prospective renegotiated Treaty on Conventional Forces (CFE), as part of an unspoken deal on enlargement, are too generous to Russia and thereby make the political and military cost of enlargement too high.

• In the post-Cold-War era, securing European stability should be left to political institutions, such as the European Union, and not to NATO. Central Europe's true needs are strong economic structures and democratic institutions, which are not NATO functions and the EU can do more to encourage. EU countries are wealthy, and can well afford the costs of stabilizing their eastern neighbors.

• NATO enlargement will be expensive, and the allies show no willingness to share the costs. The Administration estimates a cost of $27-35 billion over 12 years, but other estimates are higher. CBO, for example, estimates costs over 15 years at $60 billion to $125 billion, depending upon the level of threat projected.

• The American people understood well the threat from the Soviet Union, and were fully engaged in supporting collective defense during the Cold War. Today, in a post-Cold-War environment, they are not willing to assume the costs and the unnecessary risks for defending central Europe from external threats, especially when there are pressing economic and social needs at home.

• Enlargement will dilute the alliance by complicating decision-making, and admitting countries without established traditions of democratic practices and civilian control of the military. The three candidates are too small to contribute meaningfully to alliance missions, particularly the mission of collective defense.

• Enlargement will weaken the alliance's true mission of collective defense. Crisis management, peacekeeping, and NATO's other "new missions" will make of the alliance a collective security organization, where political rather than military functions predominate.

• Bosnia demonstrates that the Europeans are not willing to bear the burden for ensuring security in their own backyard. If instability develops in central Europe, the United States will have to shoulder the financial and military costs of bringing peace.