STATEMENT OF RONALD O'ROURKE

SPECIALIST IN NATIONAL DEFENSE

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you once again to discuss issues relating to the Administration's proposed plans for Navy ship recapitalization.

As requested, my testimony will focus on the following issues:

• the planned size of the Navy;

• the planned overall rate of Navy ship procurement and its relationship to the planned size of the Navy; and

• planned and potential rates of procurement for certain specific types of Navy ships.

Each of these issues is discussed below.

The planned size of the Navy

Over the last year, Department of the Navy (DoN) leaders have begun to openly call into question the sufficiency in the longer term of the planned fleet of about 300 ships recommended by the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The year 2000 DoN posture statement presented with the proposed FY2001 defense budget, for example, states:

The Navy and Marine Corps continue to meet their commitments primarily by drawing upon forward-deployed, “rotational” forces rather than requiring additional deployments of units that have just returned from or are beginning to work up for deployment. We have been able to do this mainly by demanding more from our people and equipment. But this cannot go on indefinitely. As we approach the next Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) [in 2001], the Navy and Marine Corps will make the point that our force levels need to remain balanced with usage expected in the future security environment.... Already, there is growing evidence that our forces are stretched.... The 1997 QDR stated that a fleet of slightly more than 300 ships was sufficient for near term requirements and was within an acceptable level of risk. Three years of high-tempo operations, however, suggest that this amount should be reviewed in the next QDR.[1]

Within the last year, at least three categories of ships within the 300-ship plan have emerged as specific candidates for increased force-level goals – attack submarines, surface combatants, and amphibious ships.

Attack submarines . Although the 300-ship plan established a tentative goal of maintaining a force of 50 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) study on future required SSN force levels completed in late 1999 and released in unclassified summary form in early February 2000 concluded that 55 to 68 SSNs would be required in 2015 and 62 to 76 SSNs would be required in 2025.[2] These force-level benchmarks are broadly consistent with the force-level benchmark established by a previous JCS study on required SSN force levels, completed in 1992 and updated in 1993, that calculated a requirement of 51 to 67 SSNs. The Department of Defense (DoD), in its amended FY2000-FY2005 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), has in effect endorsed the goal of maintaining a 55-ship SSN force over the near-term by including additional funding in FY2002-FY2005 for submarine refuelings that will be needed to maintain the attack submarine fleet at about 55 boats for the next several years.

Surface combatants . Similarly, although the 1997 QDR calls for maintaining a force of 116 surface combatants, a study completed in 1999 by the Navy’s surface combatant community reportedly calls for increasing the goal to 138 ships.[3] This figure, too, is broadly consistent with the results of other force-level studies carried out by the surface combatant community in recent years.

Amphibious ships . Lastly, although the 300-ship plan calls for maintaining a 36-ship amphibious fleet organized into 12 Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) with a combined amphibious lift capacity of 2.5 Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs), Navy and Marine Corps officials have consistently reminded others in recent years that the 2.5 MEB amphibious lift goal is a fiscally constrained figure, and that the full amphibious lift requirement for many years has been for a force with a combined lift capacity of 3.0 MEBs.[4] In testimony last year, Marine Corps officials stated that a 3.0-MEB fleet would equate to a 14-ARG, 43-ship amphibious force, with the 7 additional ships consisting of 2 large-deck (i.e., LHD-type) amphibious ships, 3 San Antonio (LPD-17) class dock landing ships, and 2 LSD-type dock landing ships.[5]

In addition to these 3 categories of ships, it has often been noted by DoN and DoD officials and others in recent years that maintaining a continuous or near-continuous presence of one aircraft carrier in each of the three major U.S. naval operating areas – the Mediterranean Sea, the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf area, and the Western Pacific – would require a force of 15 carriers rather than the 12-carrier force called for in the 300-ship plan.

Simply adding up some or all of these potential increases – 5 to 26 additional SSNs, 22 additional surface combatants, 7 additional amphibious ships, and perhaps 3 additional aircraft carriers – would produce a requirement for as many as 37 to 58 additional ships beyond the original 300-ship plan. Such an increase would produce a required fleet size similar to 346-ship fleet called for in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR).

The combined effects of acting on some or all of these proposals, however, could be even greater, because increasing one part of the fleet could lead to a consequent need to increase other parts as well. In particular, the results of the SSN and surface combatant force-level studies do not appear dependent on an assumed increase in other parts of the fleet. Increasing the number of aircraft carriers, however, could by itself produce an increase in the requirements for surface combatants (notionally 6 per carrier group) or SSNs (notionally 2 per carrier group). Increasing the number of ARGs could by itself similarly increase the surface combatant requirement by a few or several ships. And increasing the number of carrier battle groups or ARGs could increase the required number of combat logistic force ships. As a consequence, acting on most or all of these proposals might result, at least in theory, in a requirement for a fleet of more than 360 ships.

As discussed in previous CRS reports and testimony, whether a Navy of a given size will be able to perform its stated missions will depend on how technological developments affect the capabilities of U.S. Navy ships, aircraft, weapons, and other equipment, and on how the international security environment develops over the next quarter-century. In assessing potential requirements for U.S. naval forces, it can be noted that some observers believe that the United States during this period might be confronted with a larger and more modern Chinese navy, or a rejuvenated Russian navy, or significantly improved maritime military capabilities (including so-called area-denial or anti-access capabilities) in other countries, such as Iran. The Navy during this period could be called on, as it sometimes is today, to respond to multiple simultaneous or near-simultaneous contingencies of various kinds in different regions.

Overall rate of ship procurement and size of the Navy

The overall rate of Navy ship procurement and its relationship to the planned size of the Navy has been a concern in Congress since the mid-1990s. CRS has previously examined the issue in a 1996 report,[6] a 1997 report,[7] and 1997 and 1999 testimony.[8] This testimony updates the analysis to take into account the Administration's proposed FY2001 defense budget and amended FY2000-FY2005 ship-procurement plan.

Shorter term vs. longer term . Assuming the roughly 300-ship goal remains in place for now, the challenge in maintaining a fleet of this size, as discussed in previous reports and testimony, will occur not in the shorter run (i.e., between now and about 2010), but in the longer run (i.e., after 2010, and particularly after 2020). As a result of the significant downsizing of the fleet during the 1990s, the Navy today is composed to a large degree of relatively young ships, and a fleet of about 300 ships consequently can be maintained in the shorter run with a relatively low ship procurement rate. After 2010, and particularly after 2020, however, the relatively large numbers of ships procured in the 1970s and 1980s will reach retirement age. If ships are not procured in numbers sufficient to offset these retirements, then total fleet size at that point will drop below 300 ships.

Steady-state replacement rate . In previous reports and testimony dating back several years, CRS has focused on the concept of the steady-state replacement rate as a tool for understanding the relationship between planned force structure and required procurement rates for ships and other types of military equipment. Over the last couple of years, and particularly in presenting its proposed FY2001 defense budget and amended FY2000-FY2005 FYDP, the Administration has begun to similarly focus on this concept.

As shown in Table 1 below, the current force-level plan for the Navy, including the Administration’s amended nearer-term SSN goal of 55 boats, includes a total of 308 ships. This planned force has a weighted average service life of about 35 years (using mid-point values for ship types whose service lives are expressed as ranges) and a corresponding steady-state procurement rate of about 8.7 ships per year.[9]

Table 1. Navy ship force-level goals, service lives,

and steady-state procurement rates

Ship type

No. of ships

Service life in years

(low/mid/high)

Steady-state

procurement rate

(based on low/mid/high

service life)

Submarines:

2.00

Ballistic missile

14^a

42^b

0.33

Attack

1.67

Aircraft carriers

50^c

0.24

Surface combatants:

116^d

3.66

3.38

3.15

Cruisers/destroyers

86^d

37.5

2.46

2.29

2.15

Frigates

30^d

27.5

1.20

1.09

1.00

Amphibious ships:

36^e

1.03

Large-deck (LHA/LHD)

0.34

Other (LSD/LPD)

0.69

Mine warfare ships

16^f

0.53

Other/auxiliary:

1.79

1.52

1.34

Command ships

0.11

Combat logistic ships

0.97

0.85

0.76

Support ships

37.5

0.70

0.56

0.53

TOTAL

308

9.24^g

8.71^g

8.34^g

Implied weighted average service life

33.3