57 992
1999
106 th Congress 1st Session
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Report
106 244
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
APPROPRIATIONS BILL, 2000
REPORT
of the
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 2561]
[Graphic Image Not Available]
July 20, 1999.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
C O N T E N T S
Bill Totals 1
Committee Budget Review Process 4
Introduction 4
Basis for Committee Recommendations 5
The President's Fiscal Year 2000 2005 Defense Program 5
Neglect of Traditional Appropriations and Acquisition Program Practices 8
``Lessons Learned'' from Recent Military Operations 10
Shortages of Low-Density, High Demand Assets 13
United States Air Force--At a Crossroads? 13
Air Force Modernization Issues 16
22
17
22 Concerns
17
Potential Alternatives
19
Major Committee Recommendations
20
Air Force Program Reprioritization
20
Ensuring ``Lessons Learned'' Are Incorporated into
FY 2001 2006 Defense Planning
21
Ensuring Appropriations Process Integrity
22
Multiyear Procurement
22
Addressing High Priority Shortfalls
22
Ensuring a Quality Ready Force
23
Modernization Programs
23
Reforms/Program Reductions
24
Tactical Reconnaissance
25
Information Assurance
26
Preparedness Against WMD Terrorist Attacks
26
Committee Recommendations by Major Category
28
Active Military Personnel
28
Guard and Reserve
28
Operation and Maintenance
28
Procurement
28
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
29
Forces to be Supported
29
Department of the Army
29
Department of the Navy
30
Department of the Air Force
31
Title I, Military Personnel
33
Programs and Activities Funded by Military Personnel
Appropriations
33
Summary of Military Personnel Recommendations for FY2000
33
Overall Active End Strength
34
Overall Selected Reserve End Strength
34
Adjustments to Military Personnel Account
35
Overview
35
End Strength Adjustments
35
Pay and Retirement Reform
35
Basic Allowance for Housing
36
Aviation Continuation Pay
36
Unfunded Requirements
36
JROTC Leadership Training
36
Quality of Life Study
37
Guard and Reserve Forces
37
Full-Time Support Strengths
38
Guard and Reserve Full-Time End Strengths
38
Military Personnel, Army
38
Military Personnel, Navy
40
AOE 1 Replenishment Ships
42
Military Personnel, Marine Corps
42
Marine Corps Security Guards Detachments
44
Military Personnel, Air Force
44
Reserve Personnel, Army
46
Reserve Personnel, Navy
48
Reserve Personnel, Marine Corps
50
Reserve Personnel, Air Force
52
Test Support Mission
54
National Guard Personnel, Army
54
Army National Guard Workyear Requirements
56
National Guard Personnel, Air Force
56
Title II, Operation and Maintenance
59
Operation and Maintenance Overview
62
Rotational Training Initiatives
63
Real Property Maintenance
63
Base Operations Support
64
Depot Maintenance
64
Spares and War Reserve Materiel
65
Force Protection Initiatives
65
Soldier Support Initiatives
66
Operating Tempo Funding
66
Recruiting and Advertising
66
Small Business Advertising
67
Guard and Reserve Unfunded Requirements
67
Army Training Area Environmental Management
67
Headquarters and Administrative Expenses
67
Consultants and Advisory Services
68
Communications Services
68
Security Programs
68
Defense Finance and Accounting Service
69
Acquisition Contracting and Travel
69
Operation and Maintenance Budget Execution Data
69
Operation and Maintenance Reprogrammings
69
A 76 Studies
70
Urban Warfare
71
Controlled Humidity Preservation Program
71
Operation and Maintenance, Army
71
Logistics and Technology Project
74
Government-Owned, Contractor-Operated (GOCO) Facilities
75
Humanitarian Airlift Aircraft
75
National Training Center Heliport Security
75
Memorial Events
75
General Purpose Tents
76
Abrams Integrated Management Program
76
Information Technology Programs
76
Operation and Maintenance, Navy
76
Oceanographic Research
81
Naval Weapons Station Concorde
81
Portable Firefighting Equipment
82
Vieques Range Complex, Puerto Rico
82
Naval Air Station (NAS) LeMoore
82
Navy Electricity and Electronics Training Series
83
Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps
83
Blount Island
85
Operation and Maintenance, Air Force
85
Interim Contractor Support
89
Manufacturing Technology Assistance Pilot Program
90
McClellan Air Force Base
90
Enterprise Integration Program
90
REMIS
90
Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide
90
Performance Measures
92
DLA Warstoppers
93
Defense Acquisition University
93
Family Therapy Program
93
Defense Finance and Accounting Service
93
Information Technology Programs
93
DLA Security Locks
93
DLA Improved Cargo Methods
94
DTRA Treaty Implementation
94
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)-Management Support
94
JCS J MEANS
94
OSD C4ISR
94
OSD Near East/South Asia Center for Security Studies
94
OSD Middle East Regional Security Issues
95
OSD Energy Savings Performance Contracts
95
OSD Job Placement Program
95
OSD Youth Development and Leadership Program
95
OSD Youth Development Initiative
95
OSD Management and Contract Support
95
WHS Emergency Notification
95
JCS Mobility Enhancements
95
National Curation Pilot Project
96
Information Systems Security Education
96
Improved General Purpose Tents
96
Department of Defense Education Activity
97
Pine Bluff Arsenal Sustainment Training and Technical Assistance Program
97
Legacy
97
Classified Program
97
Operation and Maintenance, Army Reserve
99
Operation and Maintenace, Navy Reserve
99
Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps Reserve
99
Operation and Maintenance, Air Force Reserve
103
Operation and Maintenance, Army National Guard
105
Army National Guard Center
107
Armed Forces Reserve Center
107
National Guard Bureau Nationwide Fiber Optics Network
107
National Guard Distance Learning
107
NGB Project Management System
107
Repair of UH 1 Engines
108
Moffett Field and March Air Reserve Base
108
Operation and Maintenance, Air National Guard
108
National Guard State Partnership Program
111
C 130 Operations
111
159th Air National Guard Fighter Group
111
Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund
111
Budget Justification and Budget Execution Materials
111
Kosovo Base Camp Construction
112
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
112
Environmental Restoration, Army
112
Rocky Mountain Arsenal
113
Environmental Remediation Contracts
113
Environmental Restoration, Navy
113
Environmental Restoration, Air Force
113
Environmental Restoration, Defense-Wide
113
Environmental Restoration, Formerly Used Defense Sites
114
Camp Croft
114
Lake City Army Ammunition Plant
114
Newmark
114
Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid
115
Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction
115
Quality of Life Enhancements, Defense
116
Title III, Procurement
117
Estimates and Appropriations Summary
117
Special Interest Items
119
Classified Programs
119
Rangeless Training
119
Foreign Comparative Test New Starts
119
Air Force Interim Contractor Support
119
Reprogramming Procedures
120
Army Procurement Issues
120
Unfunded Requirements List
120
Aircraft Procurement, Army
121
Apache A Model Readiness
122
Missile Procurement, Army
124
Procurement of Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army
126
Procurement of Ammunition, Army
128
Program Manager for Ammunition
128
Self-Destruct Fuzes
129
Other Procurement, Army
132
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles
134
Information Technology Programs
134
Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV)
134
Aircraft Procurement, Navy
142
V 22 Aircraft
143
KC 130J Aircraft
143
Joint Primary Aircraft Training System
144
EA 6B Aircraft
144
Consolidated Automated Support System
145
Advanced Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance System (ATARS)
146
Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance Pod System-Completely Digital
(TARPS-CD)
146
Rescissions
147
Weapons Procurement, Navy
149
JSOW
149
Rescissions
149
Procurement of Ammunition, Navy and Marine Corps
151
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy
153
Post Delivery Test and Trials
153
Rescissions
153
Other Procurement, Navy
155
Pollution Control Equipment
156
Rescissions
157
Procurement, Marine Corps
163
Aircraft Procurement, Air Force
167
22
168
15
168
16
169
C 130J
169
8C
170
C 135 Modifications
170
15 Modifications
171
T 38 Modifications
171
Missile Procurement, Air Force
176
Minuteman III Guidance Replacement Program
176
JSOW
177
Titan
177
Procurement of Ammunition, Air Force
180
Other Procurement, Air Force
182
Procurement, Defense-Wide
187
Electronic Commerce Resource Centers
187
Information Technology Programs
188
Classified Programs
188
National Guard and Reserve Equipment
191
Fire Fighting
191
Support to Non-Profit Agencies
192
Defense Production Act Purchases
194
Information Technology
194
Year 2000 (Y2K) Computer Problem
195
Year 2000 (Y2K) Lessons Learned
195
Inadequate Information Technology Oversight
196
Defense Joint Accounting System
197
Information Technology Oversight-Committee Recommendations
197
Financial Management Regulations
198
Standard Procurement System
199
Armor Officer Distance Learning
199
Power Projection C4 Infrastructure
199
Supercomputing Work
199
Electricity and Electronics Training Series
199
IMDS/REMIS
199
DIMHRS
199
National Guard Bureau Nationwide Fiber Optics Network
200
National Guard Distance Learning
200
Maintenance Automated Identification Technology
200
Global Combat Support System--Army
200
Ammunition Automated Identification Technology
201
National Guard Distance Learning-Courseware
201
Joint Systems Education and Training Systems Development
201
Service Information Infrastructure Shortfalls
201
Share in Savings
201
Title IV, Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
203
Estimates and Appropriation Summary
203
Special Interest Items
205
Classified Programs
205
Technical Data
205
Experimentation
205
Information Assurance as Part of Independent Operational Testing
205
Special Termination Cost Clause
206
Joint Mission Planning System
206
Utilization of Small Business
206
Anti-Tank Weapons Master Plan
208
Tactical Radios
208
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Army
208
Hunter Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)
212
Basic Research
213
Defense Research Sciences
213
Applied Research
213
Ballistics Technology
213
Human Factor Engineering Technology
213
Environmental Quality Technology
213
Advanced Technology Development
214
Medical Advanced Technology
214
Missile and Rocket Advanced Technology
214
Line-Of-Sight Technology Demonstration
214
Joint Tactical Radio
214
Artillery Systems-Demonstration and Validation
215
Operational Systems Development
215
Force XXI, Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program
215
Other Missile Improvement Programs
216
Aircraft Modifications/Product Improvement Program
216
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Navy
221
Joint Experimentation
226
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Technology
228
Intercooled Recuperative Gas Turbine Engine
228
JSOW
228
Aerial Targets
229
Bone Marrow Registry
229
Shared Reconnaissance Pod (SHARP)
229
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Air Force
236
Consolidation and Elimination of Small Programs
236
AF/National Program Consolidation
236
Air Force Science and Technology
236
Wright Patterson Landing Gear Facility
236
Aerospace Propulsion Subsystems Integration
241
Advanced Computing Technology
241
Crew Systems and Personnel Protection Technology
241
Joint Strike Fighter
242
B 2
242
Milstar
243
SBIRS High
243
Development Planning
244
16 Squadrons
244
15 Squadrons
245
Spacelift Range System
245
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Defense-Wide
252
Basic Research
255
Chemical and Biological Defense Program
255
Applied Research
255
Historically Black Colleges and Universities
255
Extensible Information Systems
255
Biological Warfare Defense
256
Advanced Technology Development
256
Chemical and Biological Defense Program--Advanced Development
256
Verification Technology Demonstration
257
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations
257
Ballistic Missile Defense
258
National Missile Defense Site Selection
259
Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
260
Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS)
260
Russian American Observational Satellite (RAMOS)
261
Space-Based Laser
261
Sensor and Guidance Technology
261
Discoverer II
262
Physical Security Equipment
262
Coalition Warfare
262
Technical Studies, Support and Analysis
263
Strategic Environmental Research Program
263
Defense Imagery and Mapping Agency Program
263
Tri-Service Directed Energy Center
263
Special Operations Tactical Systems Development
263
Information Technology Program
264
Developmental, Test and Evaluation, Defense
269
Central Test and Evaluation Investment Program
269
Operational Test and Evaluation, Defense
271
Title V. Revolving and Management Funds
273
Defense Working Capital Funds
273
Defense Reutilization and Marketing Services
273
National Defense Sealift Fund
273
Large Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off (LMSR) Ships
273
Maritime Prepositioning Force Enhancement Conversion
274
National Defense Features
274
DOD Requirements for Commercial Tanker Ships
275
Massachusetts Maritime Academy Training Ship
275
Sealift Ship Leases
275
Title VI. Other Department of Defense Programs
277
Defense Health Program
277
Peer Reviewed Research
278
Tricare Contracts and Pharmacy Costs
278
Custodial Care
278
Fatigue Management
279
Joint Diabetes Project
279
Cervical Cancer Testing
279
Gulf War Illness
280
Computer Based Modeling in Health Care
280
Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction, Army
280
Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, Defense
283
Forward Operating Locations
283
Fingerprint Operations
284
C 26 Aircraft Photo Reconnaissance Upgrade
285
Drug Testing
285
A 10 Logistical and Demilitarization Support
285
Office of the Inspector General
285
Title VII. Related Agencies
287
National Foreign Intelligence Program
287
Introduction
287
Classified Annex
287
Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and
Disability System Fund
287
Intelligence Community Management Account
288
Payment to Kaho'Olawe Island Conveyance,
Remediation, and Environmental Restoration Fund
288
National Security Education Trust Fund
288
Title VIII. General Provisions
289
Definition of Program, Project and Activity
289
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles
289
B 52 Force Structure
290
National Missile Defense
290
Aggressor Squadrons
290
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations
291
Medium Extended Air Defense System
291
Military Recruitment Financial Penalties
291
House of Representatives Reporting Requirements
291
Changes in the Application of Existing Law
291
Appropriations Language
292
General Provisions
294
Appropriations Not Authorized by Law
297
Transfer of Funds
299
Rescissions
300
Compliance With Clause 3 of Rule XIII (Ramseyer Rule)
300
Constitutional Authority
301
Comparison with the Budget Resolution
301
Five-Year Outlay Projections
302
Financial Assistance to State and Local Governments
302
Additional Views
314
106 th Congress
Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session
106 244
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS BILL, 2000
July 20, 1999.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
Mr. Lewis of California, from the Committee on Appropriations,
submitted the following
REPORT
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 2561]
The Committee on Appropriations submits the following report in
explanation of the accompanying bill making appropriations for the
Department of Defense, and for other purposes, for the fiscal year
ending September 30, 2000.
BILL TOTALS
Appropriations for most military functions of the Department of
Defense are provided for in the accompanying bill for the fiscal year
2000. This bill does not provide appropriations for military
construction, military family housing, civil defense, or nuclear
warheads, for which requirements are considered in connection with other
appropriations bills.
The President's fiscal year 2000 budget request for activities funded
in the Department of Defense Appropriations Bill totals $263,265,959,000
in new budget (obligational) authority. The amounts recommended by the
Committee in the accompanying bill total $266,061,503,000 in net new
budget authority. This is $2,795,544,000 above the budget estimate;
$15,540,955,000 above the sums made available for the Department of
Defense for fiscal year 1999 in the fiscal year 1999 Defense
Appropriations Act; and, in terms of the total authority available to
the Department of Defense in fiscal year 2000, $1,283,432,000 above the
sums made available for the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1999,
when fiscal year 1999 supplemental appropriations are included.\1\
\1\These figures include $16,095,949,000 in fiscal year 1999 emergency
defense funding included in Public Law 105 277, Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1999, and Public Law 106 31,
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1999; and
$1,838,426,000 in Fiscal Year 2000 emergency defense funding also
included in Public Law 106 31.
Offset Folios 12 Insert here
COMMITTEE BUDGET REVIEW PROCESS
During its review of the fiscal year 2000 budget, the Subcommittee on
Defense held a total of 17 hearings during the period of February 1999
to March 1999. Testimony received by the Subcommittee totaled 1,394
pages of transcript. Approximately half of the hearings were held in
open session. Executive (closed) sessions were held only when the
security classification of the material to be discussed presented no
alternative.
INTRODUCTION
The Committee's consideration of the fiscal year 2000 Defense
Appropriations bill comes as America's armed forces, and the plans and
budgets intended to support them and U.S. security demands in the
future, confront a series of difficult and interrelated challenges.
As evidenced by Operation Allied Force and other recent military and
humanitarian relief operations, the U.S. Armed Forces are still without
question the finest in the world. The overall quality and skill of
America's soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines remains unsurpassed. And
U.S. training, equipment, and technology are, when considered in their
entirety, still superior to those of any potential adversary, as well as
our allies. Even so, the immediate and long-term challenges confronting
the Department of Defense (DoD), the military services, and policymakers
in the executive and legislative branches remain difficult and complex.
The international environment remains uncertain and potentially
explosive. Recent trends and developments involving Russia, China, India
and Pakistan are assuredly not optimistic, while prospects for other
regional threats--including those which have dominated recent U.S.
military planning, North Korea, Iraq, and Iran--remain both unclear and
unsettling. Meanwhile, political instability persists in many regions,
as does the growing threat posed by the proliferation of technology.
Transnational issues such as ethnic conflicts, terrorism, the
international drug trade and increasingly, ``information age'' threats
continue to loom. And now, the United States, on the heels of a mission
in Bosnia which nears four years in duration, faces an even more
difficult and more protracted commitment to the Balkans in the wake of
the Kosovo conflict.
Against this backdrop, the U.S. military--now having been drawn down
to the lowest force levels since the end of World War II--has been and
will doubtless continue to be engaged globally. Yet, even before the
recent hostilities involving Kosovo and Iraq, a combination of overseas
commitments, new missions, shrinking force structure, aging equipment,
and insufficient and, in some instances, misprioritized budgets joined
to bring the current and future readiness of the U.S. military into
question. These problems have created a punishing pace of operational
tempo and a decline in overall quality of life for servicemembers and
their families, which when combined with the effects of a strong
economy, have created a serious military manpower crisis. Within the
past year, for the first time in over two decades the U.S. Army, Navy
and Air Force have failed by significant margins to meet recruiting
goals, while these services' retention rates for experienced personnel
in critical specialty areas (such as Air Force pilots) have reached
dangerously low levels. In the meantime, serious readiness and weapons
modernization shortfalls persist. Recognizing these problems, both
Congress and now the Administration have proposed significant increases
in defense spending above previously planned levels.
Basis for Committee Recommendations
The Committee strongly believes that, in many ways, this year is a
potential watershed for future defense planning, budgets, and programs.
It is significant that there now appears to be a general consensus
between the Administration and the Congress that the U.S. military's
operational, budgetary and programmatic needs call for a steady and
sustained increase in defense spending. Yet events of just the past
eight months--notably, the strengths and weaknesses displayed during the
conduct of Operations Desert Fox and Allied Force; the deployment of
U.S. forces in support of the Kosovo Stabilization Force (KFOR); and the
ongoing domestic debate over future government spending--combine to
reinforce serious questions regarding the prospects for and adequacy of
proposed defense budgets, be it the President's or Congressional
alternatives.
Therefore, the Committee has endeavored to not only consider the
details of the Department's proposed fiscal year 2000 budget request,
but has also attempted to measure that budget and the new fiscal years
2000 2005 Future Years' Defense Plan (FYDP) against a number of factors.
These include the international challenges cited above; the need to not
only plan for current DoD needs but those likely to be confronted in
2010, 2020 and beyond; and the already well-documented and articulated
manpower, readiness and modernization needs of the DoD generally and the
services specifically.
The Committee also gave careful consideration to three additional
areas in developing its recommendations:
(a) The overall Federal budget debate and the strengths and
weaknesses of the Administration's defense budgets in that context;
(b) Neglect by certain DoD agencies of law, regulation and practices
concerning the use of appropriated funds, including the initiation of
new programs and diversion of funds provided for one purpose to another
without the required congressional notification or approval--events
which the Committee views as most troubling given the constitutional
imperative that appropriated funds be put to the uses specifically
delineated by the Congress; and
(c) The actual experience derived from the recent combat operations
involving Iraq and Yugoslavia; the degree to which the Future Years'
Defense Plan and the individual services' budgets address a series of
longstanding needs of the regional commanders-in-chief (CINCs) and our
forces in the field; and whether the nation's current national security
strategy (which calls for the U.S. military to carry out and win two,
near-simultaneous ``major theater wars'') can reasonably expect to be
supported given current defense planning and programming.
The President's Fiscal Year 2000 2005 Defense Program
The Committee finds, with some qualification, that the fiscal year
2000 budget and the overall fiscal years 2000 2005 defense program
announced by the President this February is a more realistic attempt to
match ``military means to goals'' than previous budget submissions. This
new budget program calls for overall increases in previously planned
defense spending levels of approximately $112 billion over the period
2000 2005. Of this amount, a significant portion (nearly $35 billion) is
targeted specifically at improving military pay and benefits, including
repeal of the military retirement program changes adopted in 1986. Other
significant increases are programmed for readiness and operation and
maintenance funding generally, as well as critical weapons modernization
programs.
Despite these noteworthy proposals, the Committee remains deeply
troubled about whether this budget program can in fact meet both
immediate and longer-term national security challenges. Three specific
problems come to mind:
The FY 2000 2005 Defense Budget Is Linked To Large Increases in
Overall Discretionary Spending: The President's new fiscal year 2000
2005 defense program proposes steady and sustained growth in defense
discretionary spending, from roughly $272 billion in FY 1999 (not
including enacted emergency supplemental appropriations) to about $330
billion annually in FY 2005. The Committee believes such growth is
justified, especially with numerous peacekeeping commitments and the
need to reinvigorate weapons modernization accounts. However, the
Committee also believes that it is a fair question to consider whether a
defense program whose very viability hinges on such growth is in fact
realistic. The defense budget cannot be viewed in insolation from the
overall budget dynamic, involving spending levels for discretionary and
entitlement programs, potential changes in the the tax code, and
estimates of the government surplus.
Such questions about long-term budget levels are particularly
important to the DoD. Unlike most federal agencies, the DoD develops a
multi-year budget program with some degree of fidelity, essential for an
agency with hundreds of major equipment procurement and developmental
efforts. Given the current uncertainty about the future budgetary
environment, the Committee views with some caution any long-term
revitalization plan for the DoD which has at its core an assumption of
very robust outyear defense spending levels. This is especially
important in light of plans being developed by each of the military
services to make long-term commitments to major production programs
which tend to ``squeeze'' other items in the budget to unacceptable
levels.
New, ``Unbudgeted'' Defense Budget Commitments Are Already Apparent:
Since the budget was presented to the Congress in February, two new
developments have arisen which will require major revisions to the
existing DoD budget plan. The first involves Congressional action on
military pay and benefits, as expressed through both House- and
Senate-passed versions of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2000. The President's budget proposes a sizable increase
over previously programmed amounts for military compensation. Both the
House and Senate, most notably through increasing the size of the
proposed fiscal year 2000 military pay raise (from 4.4 to 4.8 percent),
but also through other initiatives, have now voted for authorization
changes which pose considerable unbudgeted outyear costs for the
DoD--perhaps more than $10 billion through fiscal year 2005.
Long-term, unbudgeted costs of continued contingency deployments are
also escalating, especially those resulting from NATO missions in the
Balkans. The Committee observes the current DoD budget plan was premised
on a gradual drawdown of U.S. forces in Bosnia, with no funds budgeted
after fiscal year 2001 for any Balkan peacekeeping force or for
continued sanctions enforcement around Iraq. Until late last year, the
average cost of these two missions had appeared to stabilize at between
$1.5 2.0 billion per year. Realistically, one must assume there will be
costs of some greater magnitude from 2001 2005 stemming from continued
U.S. deployments associated with Bosnia and Iraq; and now, these
unbudgeted costs will be compounded by those resulting from Operation
Joint Guardian, the U.S. participation in KFOR. Using conservative
planning factors, the Committee believes these could result in up to $25
billion in unbudgeted, unprogrammed costs over the FYDP.
The Committee believes it it essential that these issues be kept in
plain view as the Congress develops its defense spending recommendations
for fiscal year 2000 and beyond. They clearly cast a long shadow over
DoD's overall Future Year's Defense Program, and the viability of
planned modernization budgets in particular since personnel and
readiness programs must continue to receive top budget priority.
``Creative Accounting'' In The Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Request.-- Of
immediate relevance to the Committee's consideration of the fiscal year
2000 defense appropriations request is what senior Department officials
have publicly conceded is a FY 2000 2005 program built largely on
optimistic economic assumptions and, for fiscal year 2000, ``one-time
initiatives'' which the Committee can most charitably describe as
``creative accounting''. The most obvious and blatant of these are the
budget proposals to offset nearly $5 billion in new fiscal year 2000
programmatic increases with a like amount of budget authority
``offsets''--a $3.1 billion reduction from a ``one-time'' proposal to
incrementally fund the fiscal year 2000 Military Construction program
(that is, providing only half the required budget authority needed to
actually complete proposed military construction projects); and an
unspecified cut of $1.65 billion (in the form of a proposed, non-program
specific general reduction) embedded in the budget request for the
fiscal year 2000 Defense Appropriations bill.
The Committee finds small solace in the refrain of many senior
Administration officials that its fiscal year 2000 defense budget ``has
a $12 billion increase'' over previous plans, much of which is for
critical personnel and readiness needs--when its budget really only pays
for slightly more than half of those increases.
In essence, the Department's FY 2000 budget tries to have it both
ways: it proposes needed increases in key programs, but ``offsets'' this
growth with ``cuts'' having no substance.
The Committee will not subscribe to such a ``quick fix'' mentality.
In both this bill, and the Military Construction bill reported by the
Committee, it has rejected these proposals out of hand. Rather, to meet
DoD's unfunded requirements, finance congressional initiatives and
backfill for the budget's creative accounting, the Committee proposes an
increase over the total fiscal year 2000 defense spending level by the
President, combined with a wide range of program reductions, rescissions
of previously appropriated funds and other initiatives. This approach is
not only justified on the merits, but is a direct consequence of the
Administration's having sent up a fiscal year 2000 budget submission
which itself was ``oversubscribed'' by $4.75 billion.
NEGLECT OF TRADITIONAL APPROPRIATIONS AND ACQUISITION PROGRAM PRACTICES
Adding to the difficulties confronting the Committee in its
consideration of the fiscal year 2000 budget request are serious
budgeting and funding execution issues regarding appropriations for
defense acquisition programs. These are occuring with increasing
frequency in both the budget requests submitted by the Department of
Defense as well as in the execution of program funding once
appropriations have been provided by the Congress. Throughout this
report there will be more specific descriptions of these and related
issues. Of particular concern is the failure of certain DoD entities to
comply with many existing procedures governing the expenditure of
appropriated funds.
One of the highest duties of the Congress is to exercise the mandate
in Clause 7, Section 9, Article I of the Constitution of the United
States that ``No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by law.'' In terms of appropriations
provided to the Department of Defense, this mandate has evolved over
time as a result of statute, appropriations law, court rulings, and
executive branch regulations; decades of appropriations implementation
and resulting ``practices and rules''; and what the Committee regards as
an ongoing discussion with the DoD and its component departments and
agencies over budget rules and appropriate procedures regarding the use
of appropriated funds.
The Committee's perspective is one of ensuring that funds made
available in appropriations acts are in fact put to the use intended by
the elected members of Congress, under the terms and conditions the
Congress and the House and Senate Appropriations Committees place on the
funding in question. This is a responsibility the Constitution clearly
intended for the Congress--the so-called power of the purse--and
therefore, the Committee does not take issues regarding the use of
appropriated funds lightly. However, given the sheer size, complexity,
and dynamism of both the real world and the funding environments that
the Department of Defense and the U.S. military operates, the Committee
is sensitive to and has in fact actively engaged the Department on
countless occasions to ensure that the DoD has the funding flexibility
it needs to respond rapidly to emerging circumstances. The Committee
notes that unless specific restrictions have been enacted into law, in
most instances the most restrictive rules require the DoD, in accordance
with certain pre-established thresholds, to provide the Committee with
prior notification or, through the reprogramming process, to seek the
Committee's prior approval for contemplated funding shifts. All the
Committee demands is that these well-established procedures--many
enshrined in statute or appropriations law, not just custom or
practice--be followed.
Regrettably, in recent years the Committee has observed a steady
erosion of departmental compliance with these standards, prompting the
Committee to actively address these problems in recent appropriations
acts and accompanying Committee reports. The Committee further observes
these abuses have generally been most numerous and blatant with respect
to defense acquisition programs--and of late, those managed by the
acquisition communities within the Department of the Air Force, the
Department of the Army, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
For example, with respect to the Air Force, despite recent Committee
direction and, in several instances, new appropriations law, the
Committee finds that both in execution of funds provided in
appropriations acts and in its fiscal year 2000 budget submission the
Air Force acquisition community continues to ignore and violate a wide
range of appropriations practices and acquisition rules. Details on
these specific instances can be found elsewhere in this report, but a
short summary of such Air Force abuses includes:
(a) In its fiscal year 2000 budget the Air Force continues to
blithely ignore specific Committee direction and law intended to ensure
that funds appropriated for one purpose--for example, weapons
procurement--are in fact used for that purpose and not for other
efforts, such as research and development, by:
(1) Requesting hundreds of millions of dollars in various
procurement programs, when in fact the intended use is to support
operation and maintenance funding needs (in violation of DoD policy);
(2) Requesting substantial procurement funds for a program (the F 22
fighter) when in fact the use of the funds is for development (in
violation of specific Congressional direction), and
(3) Requesting substantial development funds for a program (the
MILSTAR satellite), when the intent is to use the funds for procurement
(in violation of a provision of law);
(b) Violation of both new start program regulations and law, as well
as standard reprogramming procedures, by using fiscal year 1999 funds to
begin a new start, several hundred-million dollar production program
which the Congress never formally approved (the C 5 avionics
modernization program)--and did so by diverting funds specifically
provided by the Congress for another program; and
(c) Initiation of a new Special Access Program without prior
Congressional notification as required by law.
Regarding the Army, it has in several instances ignored specific
Committee or House-Senate conference report direction on major programs,
to include:
(a) Entering into a new multi-year production contract for the Family
of Medium Tactical Vehicles, despite specific Committee direction to
defer such action until it first identified and then formally submitted
to the Congress, an approved plan to fix significant technical and
safety problems plaguing thousands of vehicles already delivered and in
service;
(b) Negotiating a multi-year production contract for the TOW Improved
Target Acquisition System (ITAS) despite both fiscal year 1999 Committee
and appropriations conference committee direction explicitly denying
approval of the ITAS multi-year contract; and
(c) In conjunction with OSD, explicitly ignoring fiscal year 1999
conference committee direction and using Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration funds for the Line-of-Sight Tank (LOSAT) program.
Regarding OSD acquisition officials, in addition to the example
involving LOSAT cited above, the Committee is little short of amazed
when it comes to their actions on the Medium Altitude Air Defense
(MEADS) program. This program was specifically terminated in the
conference report accompanying the fiscal year 1999 Defense
Appropriations Act. Internal DoD financial management documents issued
this spring noted this action and correctly stated that: ``This item has
been denied by the Congress and is not subject to reprogramming''
(emphasis added). Nonetheless, the Committee has since learned that
officials in the OSD acquisition structure as well as in the Ballistic
Missile Defense Organization, an OSD acquisition organization, directed
the use of over $2 million of funds specifically provided for another
program to continue MEADS-related activities, and actually announced the
winner of the MEADS contract competition. All for a program explicitly
terminated in the fiscal year 1999 appropriations process.
The Committee believes these and similar instances raise fundamental
questions regarding DoD program oversight and compliance with existing
law and regulations. The Committee is also compelled to note such
actions contribute to the Committee's uncertainty regarding the adequacy
of the Department's proposed defense budget and program planning. The
extent of such problems gives the Committee little confidence that the
military service or defense agency in question is requesting
appropriations for its major acquisition programs based on solid cost
estimates, testing and production milestones, and firm estimates and
commitments to funding requirements. In this sense, such actions are
extremely corrosive to sensible program management, defense planning and
budgeting. And it severely weakens the working relationship between the
executive branch--charged with proposing, then managing, programs if
funded--and the legislative branch, which in providing funding must have
confidence that the budget and program proposals underlying the funding
requests in question are accurate and executable.
The Committee could speculate as to the reason behind this growing
trend--for example, the pressure to deal with weapons modernization
demands following more than a decade of inflation-adjusted cuts in
funding--but to do so is to justify these practices. While sympathetic
to budget pressures, and aware of the desire of the acquisition
community to exercise as much control and flexibility over its programs
as possible, in keeping with its constitutional duties the Committee
simply cannot excuse violations of appropriations and acquisition law,
regulation and practice.
``Lessons Learned'' From Recent Military Operations
The combat operations over Iraq and Yugoslavia (Operations Desert Fox
and Allied Force, respectively) and their immediate aftermath have
already been instructive in terms of ``lessons learned''--not only for
DoD, the Joint Staff, the services, and the regional commands, but also
for others in the executive branch and Congress. These missions have
confirmed the wisdom of prudent investments over the years in so-called
``force multipliers''. These include such programs as advanced
reconnaissance and intelligence collection; improved command, control
and communications; selective ``platform'' upgrades, such as night
attack capability for tactical strike assets, or conventional,
all-weather precision weapons delivery capability for the heavy bomber
force; and a new generation of precision-guided munitions.
Yet these technological improvements are only one aspect of the many
factors essential to battlefield success. While much attention is being
directed at the new capabilities brought to bear in these operations,
the Committee insists that without the less-glamorous ``basics''--such
as effective logistics systems; solid training; and most importantly,
keeping a highly motivated and quality force--our technological advances
mean little.
Accordingly, the Committee not only acknowledges the exemplary
performance of the U.S. forces deployed in direct support of these
operations, but all those who helped prepare, train, and equip those
forces. This provides a vivid reminder to Congress and the senior
leadership in the executive branch of the shared responsibility to work
in concert with the senior military leadership of the Department and the
forces in the field to fashion a defense program which balances these
competing prerogatives.
In keeping with this obligation, then, while laudatory of the
performance of U.S. forces in these recent engagements, the Committee
must register its deep concern over a number of issues which these
recent operations have highlighted.
Current Force Structure and Current Commitments Are Not In Balance.
--It is now all too apparent that the military services are not yet
properly reconfigured from their old ``Cold War'' orientation, or are
simply undermanned or underequipped in certain key categories, to meet
the Nation's emerging global commitments at an acceptable level of risk.
In the immediate aftermath of the Yugoslav campaign, the Chiefs of Staff
of Army and Air Force, in different yet equally compelling ways, have
brought this issue into sharp focus. The new Army Chief of Staff has
pronounced publicly that, without new and innovative thinking in his
service--including a fundamental restructuring of the Army's heavy and
light units--his service risks losing strategic and tactical relevance.
The Air Force Chief of Staff declares that the immediate well-being of
his service--stretched by years of unanticipated operations,
unprecedented rates of ``peacetime'' operational tempo, declining
readiness indicators, personnel turbulence and shortages, and now, two
major air campaigns within the past eight months--makes a lengthy
``stand-down'', including a significant reprieve from overseas
deployments, essential if he is to properly reconstitute his force.
This Committee recognizes these are complex issues, with each Service
facing its own unique challenges. But it is clear the strategy, roles
and missions, and force structure assumptions underpinning the
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) two years ago--which now form the basis
of current DoD planning--must be revisited. This is a considerable
undertaking, made more difficult by the uncertain world situation, the
budget environment and many difficult resource allocation issues in each
service. Nevertheless, the Committee expresses its conviction that, in
light of the additional commitments incurred by U.S. forces since the
QDR was conducted, as well as the serious personnel and readiness
problems that have emerged over the past few years, the Secretary of
Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the senior leadership of each
of the military services, and ultimately, the President and the Congress
must deal with these issues head on, as soon as possible.
Fundamental Problems Persist In Matching Resource Allocations To
Operational Requirements.-- For years, the Committee has expressed deep
concern that the DoD's annual budget submissions have consistently
failed to adequately address certain critical warfighting needs. This
disconnect was illustrated during the early stages of Operation Allied
Force, when the Air Force had to submit an urgent reprogramming request,
and then an emergency supplemental budget request for the Conventional
Air-Launched Cruise Missile (the Air Force's only long-range, all
weather conventionally armed stand-off weapon), because inventories had
been drawn down to unacceptable levels. The Committee notes this problem
would have been far worse had not the Congress in the mid-1990's
provided funding for 250 CALCMs, which had not been budgeted by the Air
Force or the DoD. Had this not occurred, CALCM would not have even been
available for Operations Desert Fox or Allied Force.
The Committee also notes that many of the innovations which were used
to great effect in Operation Allied Force--such as the use of B 2 and B
1 bombers in a conventional bombing role--are available now only because
of congressional actions to both initiate and accelerate many of the
upgrades required for these missions. For example, the initial
deployment of a precision-guided conventional weapon on the B 2--which
served as a clear precursor to its subsequently being equipped with the
highly effective JDAM munition--was the so-called ``GATS GAM'' interim
weapon, a congressional initiative.
These examples, unfortunately, are symptomatic of many recent budget
decisions. The Committee has stated its view repeatedly that many
programs with strong warfighting applications ofttimes are given short
shrift in annual service budget submissions. The reasons for this vary,
but are usually found in either budget pressures, service parochialism,
and the aversion of many of the services' acquisition hierarchies to
upgrade existing systems (as opposed to developing a new system from
scratch). The Committee has also observed that these problems are
especially acute when the capability or system in question has a
``joint'' or ``national'' character, and is needed by multiple services
or joint warfighting commands. Regrettably, even when such capabilities
are of great utility to forces in the field, they often involve missions
or capabilities--such as logistics, transportation, intelligence
collection and reconnaissance, and electronic combat--which the military
services often fail to consider on a par with what each considers its
core requirements.
SHORTAGES OF LOW-DENSITY, HIGH-DEMAND ASSETS
The Committee is especially troubled as many of these deficiencies,
including shortages in so-called ``low-density, high-demand'' assets,
have been well known for some time. These include, but are not limited
to: electronic warfare aircraft and specialized jamming equipment;
tactical intelligence collection and dissemination assets (ranging from
collection assets such as the U 2, RIVET JOINT, AWACS and JSTARS
aircraft and tactical UAVs; interoperable, secure communications and
command and control, to include new data links and data fusion
capability); and tactical airlift, aerial refueling capability and other
transportation and logistics support platforms and equipment. The
Committee has consistently supported additions over DoD budget requests
for such programs over the years. Nevertheless, continued shortages in
these and many other categories clearly posed operational constraints
during Operations Desert Fox and Allied Force. This not only impeded the
regional commands charged with prosecuting the air campaigns, but also
other regional commanders who were confronted with the physical
diversion of assets from their areas of responsibility and other
unexpected resource shortfalls.
The Committee's concern about these problems is not new, and it has
demonstrated it will not shy from taking actions to ensure that our
forces in the field are not at risk or caught short. In this regard, the
recently-enacted emergency supplemental appropriations act which
provided funding for the conduct of Operation Allied Force (Public Law
106 31) created a new appropriations account, the ``Operational Rapid
Response Transfer Fund'', that was expressly intended to provide a
funding source to meet immediate shortfalls and needs identified by the
regional CINCs. The Committee understands the Department will soon make
use of the $300,000,000 provided by the Congress in this fund to address
some of these most urgent problems, such as those plaguing the limited
inventory of Navy EA 6B jamming aircraft. The Committee commends the
senior leadership of the Department for expeditiously following through
on the Congress' intent in this regard.
However, it is clear much more must be done. As with the questions
raised earlier in this report about the proper size and organization of
each of the military services, a continued failure by the DoD
generally--and the military services and defense agencies
specifically--to consistently link operational needs to decisions about
resource allocations and defense program development carries with it
serious implications for the ability of the U.S. military to carry out
the current national security strategy. This is not just a theoretical
discussion, nor one which the Committee believes can be deferred. The
Committee bill, across all services and defense agencies, is intended to
bring these questions to the forefront--and in the instance of one of
the military services--the United States Air Force--the Committee
believes these problems are now so acute that it must take a series of
immediate and forceful steps.
United States Air Force--At A Crossroads?
The air campaigns against Iraq and Yugoslavia, which on the whole
featured an exemplary level of professionalism, technical sophistication
and skill, were conducted and supported in large measure by the men and
women of the United States Air Force. To them, and their colleagues in
the other branches of the military and defense agencies who also played
important roles in these operations, the Committee expresses its
gratitude and respect for their service and bravery.
In the Committee's view, this performance on the part of the Air
Force is all the more remarkable in light of the serious problems which,
over the past few years, have increasingly beset this service as it
struggles with the twin dilemmas of redefining its role in the post Cold
War era while being called to carry out an increasing number of missions
with fewer people. Among the most serious of these problems:
--For the first time since 1979, the Air Force will miss its
recruiting goals for new enlistees--by nearly 2,600 individuals. This is
especially noteworthy given the Air Force's success since the transition
to an all-volunteer force in attracting many more potential recruits
than it actually requires.
--The Air Force also is coping with serious retention problems,
particularly in the midyear grades, with acute shortages in a large
number of specialty career fields ranging from air traffic controllers
to security police. Of considerable concern is that the Air Force is
already suffering from a steep shortage of pilots, with an existing
deficit of over 1,100 that is projected to approach 2,000 within the
next three years.
--Overall Air Force readiness--as measured by the mission capable
rates of aircraft and other key systems--has steadily declined in each
of the past eight years, with an overall rating of less than 75 percent
(an eleven percent decline since 1991) prior to the onset of Operation
Allied Force.
--In the past three years a major aviation spare parts shortfall has
arisen in the Air Force (as well as the Navy), due largely to faulty
estimates which failed to accurately reflect the effects of increased
operational tempo on aging equipment. Despite the appropriation of
roughly $2 billion over budgeted amounts for spare parts over the past
three years, continued operational demands and the time required to
procure the necessary parts and perform required maintenance make it
likely that Air Force operational readiness rates and equipment
availability will remain low for the foreseeable future.
--Despite the proposed increases in the President's budget
submission, major funding shortfalls persist across nearly all Air Force
mission and functional areas. In February 1999 the Air Force Chief of
Staff submitted to Congress an ``unfunded priority list'' for fiscal
year 2000 alone of over $2.3 billion. The following month, in response
to a request from the House Armed Services Committee, senior Air Force
officials provided a detailed unfunded shortfall list covering the
period of the current Future Years Defense Plan (fiscal years 2000
2005). After adjusting this list (removing from it fiscal years 1999 and
2000 needs tied to the contingency operations involving Iraq and Kosovo,
most of which were dealt with in the emergency supplemental
appropriations act enacted in late May), the Air Force still documents
unfunded needs totaling over $14 billion (emphasis added).
All of these problems were present prior to the air campaigns against
Iraq and Yugoslavia, which senior Air Force officials freely admit
stretched existing Air Force personnel and assets to the limit. For
example, during Operation Allied Force, the Air Force was compelled to
implement the so-called ``stop-loss'' program, whereby individuals whose
terms of service were due to expire were formally notified that they
could be kept on active duty for an indefinite period owing to
operational needs. At the time stop-loss was invoked, the Air Force
indicated nearly 34,000 servicemembers in critical specialty areas could
have their tours of duty involuntarily extended as a result of Operation
Allied Force and the Air Force's other global missions.
Air Force operational assets were also clearly taxed by Operations
Desert Fox and Allied Force. The most acute problems occurred in certain
categories--such as reconnaissance, airlift, and aerial refueling--where
the Air Force carries a disproportionate share of, if not the only,
capability within the U.S. armed forces to support major military
operations. The Air Force itself describes its unique capabilities as
``Global Reach, Global Power''. One may then ask, can the Air Force
today or in the future deliver on this motto's promise? These weaknesses
give the Committee doubts about the U.S. military's ability to carry out
the ``near-simultaneous, two major theater war'' capability that the
national military strategy is premised upon. Of even greater concern is
the fact that the six-year Air Force budget program demonstrably falls
short of meeting both existing and projected requirements in these
critical areas.
Now, following Operation Allied Force, the Air Force Chief of Staff
has made clear his view that the Air Force must conduct a ``stand-down''
of at least several months duration, to reconstitute its forces and give
its officers and airmen a chance to recover from the operational tempo
which is the root cause of many of the Air Force's personnel and
readiness problems. The Committee has been advised that this standdown,
as envisioned by the Air Force, would be of sufficient scope and length
that many current operational requirements being carried out by the Air
Force would either have to be transferred to the other services or left
unaddressed.
The Committee believes such candor on the part of senior Air Force
leadership--clearly at variance from the typical ``can do'' attitude
which the military services often take to an extreme--deserves both
respect and careful consideration. It says much about the current state
in which the Air Force finds itself.
The Committee recognizes many of these problems are not of the Air
Force's making, nor could they have been forecast. Many stem from a
series of decisions and events which began in 1989 91, starting with the
fall of the Berlin Wall, the resulting dissolution of the Warsaw Pact
and the Soviet Union, the Persian Gulf War, and the acceleration of a
major defense build-down in response to these events and federal budget
pressures. The Committee is well aware of the difficulties these changes
posed for all the military services, and the Air Force in particular.
Moreover, the operational employment of U.S. forces has changed
markedly in recent years. The Air Force and its sister services not only
continue to carry existing regional commitments and their potential
warfighting demands, but now find themselves regularly deployed on a
large scale on what had just a few years ago been called
``non-traditional missions'', such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement,
and humanitarian relief operations. Each of the services--not just the
Air Force--have and will continue to struggle with these new missions.
With 20/20 hindsight, the Committee believes that the Air Force's
recognition of the scale of its modernization dilemma may have
inadvertently contributed to many of the personnel and readiness
problems it now confronts. The Committee remembers vividly how just two
years ago the then-Chief of Staff of the Air Force explained to the
Committee how his service had consciously decided to give up force
structure and manning levels in order to free up additional resources
for modernization. Now, that gamble, and others taken by this Service,
have come home to roost, leading to what the Committee believes is an
Air Force personnel and readiness crisis, even while the Air Force still
confronts a modernization crisis of considerable size and scope.
Air Force Modernization Issues
It is indisputable that the Air Force has many unmet needs in
modernization, many of which were on clear display during Operation
Allied Force.
There is a requirement for at least five additional Joint STARS
surveillance aircraft beyond those currently funded or budgeted--yet
after this year, the Air Force budget provides none.
At least 20 percent of the KC 135 aerial refueling fleet--which uses
1950's and 1960's vintage airframes--has yet to be modernized with
improved engines and other equipment which will not only extend its
service life but greatly increase its operational flexibility and
availability. The Air Force budget fails to request even one tanker
conversion in its budget until fiscal year 2002.
The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Transportation Command, declares a need
for at least 150 C 130J tactical airlift aircraft--yet the Air Force
budget fails to buy any until fiscal year 2002 and active duty units are
not scheduled to receive any new C 130's until 2006.
Due to fiscal constraints the Air Force has restructured the
next-generation of early warning satellites used for detection of
ballistic missile launches, the Space-Based Infrared System-High and
-Low. In so doing, at least in the case of SBIRS-High, the Air Force has
taken a fully funded, well-crafted acquisition program and within less
than nine months, restructured it into a higher risk program, with a two
year slip in fielding, excessive concurrency between development and
production--and in the process generated an unfunded shortfall of nearly
$100 million in its fiscal year 2000 budget.
These are just a few examples where the Committee believes the Air
Force acquisition program and budget priorities are inconsistent with
actual need. Programs relied upon by forces in the field, and in some
instances the National Command Authority, are not funded adequately or
deferred. Other efforts, which may have some intrinsic merit but are
really nothing more than expensive demonstration projects, receive
increased budget allocations. Meanwhile, as described earlier in this
report, the Air Force acquisition community seems at times to be
completely oblivious to the legal and DoD policies in place governing
the proper use of appropriated funds.
f 22
The centerpiece of the Air Force's modernization program for at least
the past decade, along with the C 17 transport aircraft, has been its
next generation air superiority fighter, the F 22. The F 22 was
originally conceived in the early 1980's to counter a projected threat
driven by the expectation that the then-Soviet Union would couple the
sheer size of its force structure with significant technological
advances in fighter and air-to-air technology. Following the demise of
the Soviet Union and the huge downsizing of the now Russian military,
the Air Force has continued development of the F 22 based largely on
what it states is its desire to guarantee air superiority over any
potential adversary for the foreseeable future. The original F 22
inventory objective of 750 aircraft has since been revised downwards, to
a figure of 339 today, enough to equip three wings plus expected
attrition reserve requirements.
As currently configured, there is little doubt that the F 22, if it
meets its performance specifications, would far outclass any single
fighter known to be under development. Even with the change in the
threat environment, little of the F 22's high performance
characteristics have changed in the past decade. The Air Force would
concede that both development and production of the F 22 is indeed a
challenging task, for that is the purpose of the program--to develop a
fighter so capable that it will guarantee U.S. forces air superiority
for decades once it is fielded.
However, the ambitious technical goals of the F 22, which include a
series of new production processes as well as the most advanced avionics
and electronics ever fielded on a U.S. aircraft, have led to a series of
delays in the F 22 development program. Juxtaposed with the Air Force's
desired fielding schedule, this has led to a program whose recent
history has been marked by continual cost growth and whose current
acquisition profile would, even if examined in isolation, raise serious
questions about the overall affordability and feasibility of this
program.
Given these factors, and the magnitude of other Air Force problems in
personnel, readiness and modernization, the Committee decided to make
the F 22 a focus of its deliberations. The following sections cites the
key points which it took into consideration when making its
recommendations.
22 concerns
F 22 has been experiencing technical problems.-- The F 22 has
experienced several technical problems including: manufacturing problems
with titanium castings; delamination of longerons; structural weaknesses
in aft fuselage; anomalies in brakes, inertial reference system and
environmental control system; nagging fuel leaks; problems with engine
low pressure turbine blades, high pressure turbine blades, and engine
combustors; and problems with excessive engine vibration. The Air Force
reports that there are 97 issues limiting aircraft operations and 68
issues limiting ground maintenance. There are already indications that
further flight testing in fiscal year 1999 will be curtailed while the
Air Force labors to correct these technical problems. While the
Committee recognizes that the sophisticated technology intended for use
in the F 22 makes such technical problems likely, it also must consider
that the successful resolution of these problems will further both delay
schedules and drive up costs.
Affordability of the F 22 is questionable.-- Based on Air Force
acquisition reports, the F 22--even without further cost growth--is
projected to cost three times as much as the aircraft it replaces (the F
15). The unit cost of the six F 22's proposed to be procured with fiscal
year 2000 funds is $300 million per plane compared to a $55 million per
plane cost for the F 15. To finance such an expensive program, DoD's
modernization plan requires unprecedented levels of spending on tactical
aircraft over the next 20 years. In fact, DoD's tactical aircraft
modernization plan requires twice the historical percentage of
procurement dollars to buy roughly half the number of aircraft.
The Air Force has not demonstrated it can control F 22 costs.-- Ten
years ago, the Committee recommended termination of the F 22 (then
called the Advanced Tactical Fighter) based in part on concerns over
cost growth and unrealistic budgeting. Then, the Air Force told the
Committee that F 22 development would cost $14 billion, a $900 million
increase from the estimate provided six months earlier. Since then, the
program has experienced a decade of cost growth with the current
estimate for F 22 development now exceeding $23 billion. In the last six
months alone, the development cost increased another $700 million and
the production cost of just the first 6 aircraft increased $300 million.
The Committee notes, that without any further cost growth, the F 22
program is budgeted for more than $23 billion over the next six years
alone, and has a ``total cost to complete'' of $40 billion assuming the
Air Force's current schedule, cost estimates, and inventory objective of
339 remain static. Independent cost estimates developed within the
Pentagon, the Congressional Budget Office, and the General Accounting
Office all indicate that the Air Force production cost estimates are
excessively optimistic. For example, the Cost Analysis Improvement Group
within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, responsible for
developing independent cost estimates for the Secretary, believes the F
22's total production costs are understated by at least $9 billion.
The current F 22 acquisition plan has a high potential for even
further cost growth.-- The F 22 is a technically challenging program
combining stealth, advanced sensors and avionics, and the ability to
cruise at supersonic speeds. The Air Force will not finish basic testing
of these capabilities for another four years. To date, the program has
completed only five percent of the required testing. The advanced
sensors and avionics (perhaps the highest risk elements of the program)
have not been tested on the F 22 at all. Yet this year's budget proposes
production funding for six aircraft.
Overall, the Air Force's acquisition strategy requires the purchase
of over $13 billion worth of aircraft before completion of basic
operational testing. The unit cost of these initial aircraft increased
40 percent over the last 2 years, and any problems found during the next
four years of testing will simply add to these costs.
U.S. has overwhelming numerical advantage of advanced fighters
without F 22.-- Current threat projections for 2010 indicate that the
United States will have a 5 to 1 numerical advantage of advanced
fighters against our most challenging adversaries without the F 22.
Against what could be considered the most likely medium term adversaries
used in Air Force planning scenarios, the United States enjoys a numeric
advantage of 26 of our advanced fighters for every one belonging to our
adversaries.
POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVES
The Committee also examined potential alternatives to the current F
22 program, and makes the following findings.
F 15 economic service life extends beyond 2015.-- The Air Force has
justified the need for the F 22 in part as a replacement for aging F 15
aircraft. However, service life data from the Air Force indicates that
the F 15 can exceed 16,000 flying hours without major structural
changes. The ave