|Making Peace While Staying Ready for War: The Challenges of U.S. Military Participation in Peace Operations||Section 7 of 7|
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) used data
from various sources to prepare this analysis. Those sources include surveys
of Army and Marine Corps personnel, training manuals, and the services'
own reviews of their experiences in peace operations.
To analyze the impact of participation in peace operations on military readiness, CBO developed a survey and asked for responses from units in the Marine Corps and the Army. The survey was designed to track those units' experience before, during, and after deployment to peace operations. Participants were asked the following questions about their preparation for deployment and the process of restoring their military readiness after they returned home.
Additional maintenance required by equipment deployed to OOTWs or used in training for such deployments.
Commander assessments of changes in conventional warfighting readiness, even if not captured in SORTS ratings.
Reconfiguration of units to meet OOTW requirements, resulting in changes from conventional TOE/TDA.
Additional equipment provided to a unit or units to meet the requirements of OOTW.
Responses to CBO's Survey
Fifty-three units in the Marine Corps responded to the survey in March 1996. CBO received information about the readiness of Army units from the Army's Forces Command in late 1995 and then followed up with its survey. The Army provided its responses to the survey and further readiness data in July 1996. The nine responses came primarily from units that had participated in Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. The Army also said it was still waiting for some units to complete the survey and would forward the responses to CBO as they arrived. However, CBO never received additional responses from the Army.
The survey results were limited in several ways. First, the response
rate was limited by personnel turnover, the passage of time, and incomplete
recordkeeping between the end of the peace operation and the unit's receipt
of the survey. Second, not all respondents completed the entire survey.
And third, the rate of return was far greater from Marine Corps units than
from Army units. For that reason, CBO used the results of its survey to
draw implications only about the experience of Marine units in peace operations.
CBO also obtained data from two surveys conducted by the U.S. military.
One was a poll of 57 Army officers with experience in operations other
than war taken by a researcher at the Army War College in 1997.(1)
The second survey was conducted by the Center for Army Lessons Learned
in 1996 and included data from 221 Army commissioned and noncommissioned
officers with experience in peace operations.(2)
Like CBO's survey, those polls represented attempts to distill the experience
of participants in peace operations into a series of conclusions about
specific issues such as training time, the overlap between peace operations
and conventional warfighting, and the time required to restore a unit to
its predeployment readiness.
TRAINING AND DOCTRINE MANUALS
The services' training and doctrine manuals set forth the tasks that
each type of unit must be able to complete in various missions. CBO compared
the specific tasks required in conventional warfare and peace operations
for different types of units at different levels. For the Marine Corps,
CBO examined the missions that a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) is certified
to execute and the certification process that each MEU must complete before
its deployment at sea. For the Army, CBO compared mission training plans
for conventional warfighting with those for peace operations and with training
certification checklists that commanders use before actual deployments.(3)
To see whether the military has begun to apply the lessons learned in
previous deployments to current operations, CBO reviewed after-action reports
and situation reports from peace operations in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda,
and Bosnia.(4) CBO also
searched numerous entries in Army and Marine Corps databases about units'
experiences in those operations.(5)
Finally, CBO reviewed the training given to units deployed to Bosnia (both
before and during deployment) to evaluate the readiness of those units
upon their return.
1. Lt. Col. Alan D. Landry, Informing the Debate: The Impact of Operations Other Than War on Combat Training Readiness (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, April 7, 1997).
2. Center for Army Lessons Learned, The Effects of Peace Operations on Unit Readiness (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: CALL, February 1996).
3. U.S. Army Europe Combat Maneuver Training Center, Mission Training Plan for Stability Operations (Hohenfels, Germany, June 1995), and Stability Operations: STX Plan (Hohenfels, Germany, October 12, 1995); Department of the Army, Brigade and Battalion Operations Other Than War Training Support Package (Draft), Training Circular 7-98-1 (May 1995).
4. Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operations Other Than War, Volume IV: Peace Operations, Newsletter No. 93-8 (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: CALL, December 1993), Operation Restore Hope Lessons Learned Report (November 1993), Operation Uphold Democracy: Initial Impressions, vol. 1, Haiti D-20 to D+40 (December 1994), Operation Uphold Democracy: Initial Impressions, vol. 2, Haiti D-20 to D+150 (April 1995), and Operation Uphold Democracy: Initial Impressions, vol. 3, Haiti (July 1995); U.S. European Command, After Action Review Operation Support Hope 1994 (Stuttgart-Vaihingen, Germany); U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review (BHAAR I) Conference Report (Carlisle Barracks, Pa., May 19-23, 1996), and Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review (BHAAR II) Conference Report (April 13-17, 1997).
5. Available in the Marine Corps Lessons Learned System (a database maintained by the Warfighting Development Integration Division of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command located in Quantico, Va.) and the Web site of the Center for Army Lessons Learned (http://call.army.mil/call.html).