LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAVID K. HEEBNER
ASSISTANT VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY
MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM A. NAVAS, JR.
DIRECTOR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
BRIGADIER GENERAL JAMES R. HELMLY
DEPUTY CHIEF, UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE
THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW
THE NATIONAL DEFENSE PANEL
JANUARY 29, 1998
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the findings and recommendations of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the National Defense Panel (NDP), and our assessment and implementation of these two important efforts.
Our Army - active component (AC), Army National Guard (ARNG), and the United States Army Reserve (USAR) - is the Nation's full-spectrum land force. The soldiers and civilians of the active and reserve components provide the Nation with an increasingly broad and rich set of capabilities. These capabilities span the full spectrum of military operations from support to civil authorities at home during domestic emergencies, to conducting operations other than war on the international scene, to fighting and winning major theater wars abroad when our national interests are threatened.
Our Army is globally engaged. For the past three years, the Army has averaged over 30,000 soldiers - active and reserve - deployed away from their homes and families for operational missions and training every day. Since 1989, the Army has provided over 60 percent of the forces to the 28 joint military operations conducted by our Nation's Armed Forces, while receiving about 25 percent of the Defense budget. Much of this is in addition to the over 100,000 soldiers and 28,000 Department of the Army civilians that are permanently stationed overseas in support of our security agreements. On top of these missions, Army forces - predominantly reserve forces - have responded to hundreds of calls from state and territorial governors in times of domestic crises.
Transforming for Tomorrow
Our Army is transforming to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st Century. In 1997, the Army completed two advanced warfighting experiments at the brigade and division levels that tested new operational concepts for warfighting, as well as several new and promising technologies. Decisions based on our analysis of the data we collected from those experiments are emerging. We anticipate a decision this Spring on an interim division design that will carry the Army forward to 2010 and further leverage the capabilities of both active and reserve forces.
To better balance operational requirements, forces, and resources, we are in the process of converting about 12 combat brigades in the ARNG to support forces. This initiative, when coupled with enhancements in the USAR, will resolve a significant portion of the Army's shortfall in the support forces required to implement the National Military Strategy (NMS). Additionally, we are establishing two AC-ARNG integrated divisions. Each division will be commanded by an AC major general, and will consist of three enhanced separate brigades (combat) from the ARNG. The National Guard has also been given a significant role in DoD's efforts in planning and preparation to support civil authorities that may be called upon to deal with the consequences of weapons of mass destruction should such devices ever be employed against the American homeland.
Today, the USAR continues to pursue initiatives to enhance Total Army capabilities and offset AC personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO). These include incorporating drilling reservists as instructors into the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) training program; conducting situational training exercises for response to domestic use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and expanding the multi-component unit concept which combines AC and RC forces into single units, such as using AC forces as a "fly-away" cell for immediate response, followed by the remainder of the unit.
Taken together, these initiatives reflect the increased use and relevance of our reserve forces, but also a unity of effort for America's Army.
Quadrennial Defense Review
The QDR was an extremely useful endeavor for the Army. Perhaps the most important outcome of the QDR was the revision of the NMS to more fully address the challenges, opportunities, and uncertainties of the post-Cold War strategic environment. The revised strategy recognizes the importance of maintaining adequate capabilities to respond rapidly and decisively when our national interests are threatened, as well as the imperative to prepare now for an increasingly complex and dynamic future. The revised strategy also emphasizes the potential benefits of a proactive engagement policy that seeks to shape the international security environment consistent with American values and interests. We believe the revised strategy is sound and appropriate to the rapidly changing demands of the geostrategic environment.
The QDR recognized the requirement for forces and capabilities that are appropriate against a range of requirements, not only to fight and win major theater wars. During the series of DYNAMIC COMMITMENT wargames conducted during the QDR by the Joint Staff with the Services and combatant commands, the value of the capabilities provided only by soldiers - boots on the ground - was repeatedly demonstrated. The DYNAMIC COMMITMENT wargames, based on recent operational experiences and theater war plans, were instrumental in identifying the forces and capabilities required to implement the NMS across the full spectrum of military operations. The wargame series also highlighted the challenges associated with disengaging forces from one operation, deploying them to another theater of operations, and employing them in an operation that may be dramatically different in character from the initial operation. Some of the realistic impacts of prolonged deployments on individual and unit readiness were also recognized.
Only by considering the full range of requirements for Army forces and capabilities - in support of both federal and state missions -- were we able to identify appropriate force structures and personnel end strengths for our active and reserve forces. We believe that the Army force structure requirements identified in the QDR report are adequate to implement the NMS with acceptable risk. Our intent is to achieve the force structure and personnel end strength reductions in such a manner as to minimize their potential negative impact on our ability to support all aspects of the NMS. The impact of emerging technologies and insights gained from our ongoing experimentation will be considered in the restructuring and reduction process. We believe that the resulting Army - with QDR savings reinvested in priority programs - will be better balanced to meet the Nation's demands.
The QDR also gave us the opportunity to reassess many of our fundamental processes and procedures. As a result, we identified over $8 billion in potential efficiencies, and reprogrammed the anticipated savings to address funding constraints in key Army programs, especially modernization. Our intent is to continue to "help ourselves" to the maximum extent possible during this period of transformation. However, even after the savings from the Army-identified efficiencies and personnel end strength and force structure reductions are incorporated, meeting our goal of shaping the Total Army - active and reserve - in force structure, personnel end strength, modernization, and infrastructure in order to meet the Nation's future needs, will not be easy.
National Defense Panel
We view the work of the NDP as useful, far-reaching, and fundamentally sound. We agree with the Panel that our force structure cannot be based solely on the two major theater war construct, but rather must be adequate across the full spectrum of military operations. We demonstrated the necessity for a full-spectrum force in the DYNAMIC COMMITMENT exercises.
We note that the Panel strongly endorsed our experimentation process (Force XXI), and our recommendation to expand Service experimentation efforts into a more holistic, joint experimentation process. The Panel's advocacy of moving more quickly to Army After Next - while limiting Army XXI enhancements to forward-deployed forces and III Corps - deserves additional consideration. Our near-term concern is controlling the rate of change, so as to not inhibit our ability to deal with near-term challenges, nor lose our way on our path to the future. It is important to remember that our Army After Next process is looking more than two decades into the future. While we envision a fundamentally different Army in 2020 and beyond - mentally and physically more agile than today's force - a significant degree of the rate of possible change is linked to our success in the Nation's laboratories. While we can envision the type of Army we want in 20-30 years, many of the core technologies to help us realize our vision are either immature or non-existent at this time. We have a lot of work to do in this regard, and we are convinced that joint experimentation is key to the most direct and cost effective course to the future.
We agree with the Panel's call for better cohesion among our active and reserve components in pursuit of better leveraging the capabilities of all components. We accept the Panel's observations as a validation of our current process and initiatives to build mutual trust and confidence through greater integration, shared experiences, and more exchanges of leaders between components. We acknowledge that there is much to be accomplished in this area, but the leaders of the Army - active and reserve - are committed to work together to accomplish the mission.
The past fifteen months have seen the completion of the Quadrennial Defense Review and Alternative Force Structure Assessment, as directed in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997. Both were worthy and productive endeavors, and have provided many ideas for additional assessment and action. As a result of the QDR and the work of the NDP, the Army is better balanced to meet the challenges and opportunities of an increasingly complex and dynamic strategic environment.
Since the end of the Cold War, the Army has been the workhorse of our Armed Forces in implementing the NMS. Requirements for Army forces have risen sharply, but Defense resources continue to be apportioned according to Cold War formulas. This imbalance between strategy-based requirements and apportioned resources remains a concern.
We continue to seek and explore opportunities to be more efficient, while retaining the full-spectrum capabilities required to ensure decisive victory with minimal casualties. While much work remains to be done to complete our envisioned transformation, we believe the importance of the American soldier in the defense of our Nation and our interests - today and in the future - is better understood within the Department of Defense and among our Nation's political leaders. We are committed to working with this Committee to ensure that the Army remains ready while transforming to meet the challenges and opportunities of the future.