Statement of CJCS Chairman Shalikashvili
In Connection with the FY1998 Defense Budget
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I am proud to report to you that the United States’ military remains the finest military force on earth. Time and again this past year, the 3.1 million members of the Total Force performed superbly in a variety of challenges around the globe. Success was due in large measure to the strong support of Congress, the Administration, and the American people. But more importantly, the force succeeded because of quality people, outstanding unit leadership, and its unique ability to adapt and persevere in an environment characterized by change and uncertainty. As busy as the force has been and with all of the talk about today’s dangerous world and the difficulties Americans have faced, it is too easy to overlook the fact that today the United States and its Allies are much safer than they were in the dark days of the Cold War. This "strategic pause," where the United States has no adversaries who are global powers, is providing us with the time to regroup, reflect on the challenges ahead, and prepare America’s forces for the next millennium. One of the strategic consequences of the post Cold War period is that the U.S. has been able to reduce military force levels. Since 1989, the active all-volunteer force has been reduced by 700,000 people -- about a third of the active force. The Army has gone from 18 active divisions to 10, a 45 percent reduction; the Navy from 566 ships to 352, a 38 percent decline; and the Air Force, from 36 to 20 fighter wings, down 45 percent. These are the lowest force levels since before the Korean War. The Defense Budget has also been cut by about 40 percent since 1985. In FY98, it will represent only 3.0 percent of the Gross Domestic Product, the lowest since before World War II. The force drawdown these past few years has not been an easy experience for military members. Many outstanding Americans were asked to leave the service of their country, thousands of whom had hoped to make the military a career. But through all this, the great people in uniform have persevered and once again confirmed the importance of American leadership in a number of contingencies around the globe.
America’s military today is performing more missions, in more places than it did during the Cold War, and is doing so with significantly fewer personnel. Yet our men and women have performed brilliantly from one end of the world to the other, with Bosnia standing as a prime example.
Fifteen months ago in many Bosnian towns and cities, artillery fire was killing men and women in their homes and snipers often shot children playing in the streets. Atrocities were nearly a daily occurrence. U.S. forces went into Bosnia with the Implementation Force (IFOR), the NATO force tasked to accomplish the military tasks assigned in the Dayton Accords. It was a heavy force, involving nearly 20,000 U.S. military members who participated in keeping the factions separated, demobilizing forces, and achieving the other military goals of the Dayton accords. The situation has changed dramatically since then. Today there are no weapons firing into towns and children once again play in the streets. The absence of war brought by IFOR offers a ray of hope for the future. On 20 December 1996, U.S. forces reached a milestone with the successful transition from the Implementation Force to a Stabilization Force (SFOR). SFOR continues to build on the success of IFOR by providing time and an environment that will permit civilian initiatives to proceed. Up to approximately 8,500 U.S. personnel in Bosnia and an additional 5,000 in neighboring countries are supporting the Stabilization Force. SFOR is a mobile force that will concentrate on providing a safe and secure environment for civilian implementation of Dayton accords. The Commander, Stabilization Force (COMSFOR) is supported by an air operation built on the foundation of the successful Operation DENY FLIGHT; 1,800 U.S. personnel are involved in this facet of operations. Our forces will be in place for 18 months. Every six months, a review of the security situation and civil initiatives will be conducted with the goal of moving to a deterrent force of reduced size. Equally important to regional stability in the Balkans was Operation ABLE SENTRY. ABLE SENTRY is the U.S. contribution to the United Nations Preventative Deployment operation in Macedonia. 500 U.S. personnel joined 500 troops from other nations to ensure containment of the crisis in Bosnia.
Operations in the Middle East remained key to the preservation of regional peace and stability during 1996. Nowhere was this more evident than in efforts to deter additional Iraqi aggression and enforce UN-ordered sanctions and resolutions. With the closing of the Military Coordination Center last year, the Secretary of Defense approved a modification of the mission in Northern Iraq. Since 1991, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT had provided humanitarian assistance to the Kurds and enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. The new Operation NORTHERN WATCH will focus exclusively on enforcement of the no-fly zone. Approximately 1,100 U.S. personnel support these efforts along with personnel and aircraft from the U.K. and Turkey. Operation SOUTHERN WATCH remained in effect throughout 1996, tasked with ensuring compliance with United Nations’ Security Council Resolution 949 and the 1994 U.S. demarche prohibiting the build-up of Iraqi ground forces south of the 32d parallel. SOUTHERN WATCH remains a multinational operation with participants from the U.K., France, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. Arabian Gulf maritime intercept operations continued to monitor shipping to ensure compliance with pertinent U.N. Security Council Resolutions. Although the U.S. assumed the bulk of responsibility for operations, during 1996, the U.K, Netherlands, Australia, Belgium, Italy, and France also participated. In spite of international efforts to maintain the peace and force compliance with UN resolutions, Iraq still conducted military operations against its Kurdish population in the North. Operation DESERT STRIKE was the U.S. response to this aggression. Designed to deter Iraq from further offensive operations, U.S. forces struck military targets in Southern Iraq and expanded the no-fly zone in the South, further constraining Iraq’s military. The attack on the Kurdish population made it clear that the coalition could no longer guarantee the safety of civilians that had been working with the United States and international relief organizations to secure the peace. Operation PACIFIC HAVEN was initiated to evacuate and relocate former U.S. Government employees, political refugees, and their families. Using facilities on Guam, the DoD in cooperation with the Department of State and other agencies, airlifted approximately 6,500 Kurds from Iraq to the island of Guam. 1,540 service members and 150 civilians support this operation on Guam. All these operations were in addition to on-going participation in the Multinational Force and Observer (MFO) missions in the Sinai. Nearly 1,000 U.S. forces man outposts in the Sinai. Since 1982, these troops have performed monitoring duties in accordance with the provisions of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.
Latin America and the Caribbean Basin
The United States participated in a wide range of operations the past year in Latin America. In Haiti, Exercise FAIRWINDS continues to help promote the building of a safe and stable environment. Approximately 500 U.S. medical, engineering, and security personnel currently are in Haiti. Together with monthly port calls from Navy and Coast Guard vessels, our forces perform select humanitarian projects designed to restore the devastated infrastructure and provide hope for the population struggling to emerge from this crisis. Counter-drug operations continued in cooperation with regional governments in Operation LASER STRIKE. Working to support host nation counter-drug operations, LASER STRIKE focused on data collection and interdicting air and sea movement of illegal drugs. More than 500 U.S. personnel are making significant contributions to the development of a more comprehensive regional approach to counter-drug operations. In Honduras, Joint Task Force Bravo (JTF-B) continued its 12th year of operations designed to promote cooperative security and regional stability. The 500 members of JTF-B conduct medical training, engineering operations, disaster relief, counter-drug operations, and CJCS-sponsored military exercises. Another operation is SAFE BORDER, the U.S. contribution to monitoring the cease fire along the Ecuador-Peru border. Established by the Rio Treaty, 60 U.S. personnel joined observers from Brazil, Argentina, and Chile to mitigate the conflict. Finally, U.S. forces continued support to migrant operations at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Only a few cases remain to be resolved after more than 58,000 Haitian and Cuban refugees transited the base between 1994 and early 1996.
But these were by no means the only operations U.S. forces participated in during 1996. In Southeast Asia, America continues to seek resolution of those missing in action through Joint Task Force Full Accounting. In less than 48 hours, our forces successfully evacuated 2,400 non-combatants from 68 countries in Liberia. In the Pacific, when tensions flared between China and Taiwan, U.S. forces quickly responded by diverting two carrier battle groups to the region to limit the chances of escalation. This kind of mobility and response acts to stifle any potential misperceptions about our ability to show resolve in areas where U.S. interests are at stake. In support of domestic requests, men and women in uniform deployed to support the 1996 Olympic Games, fought fires in the West, provided flood relief in the Northwest, and assisted in clearing transportation routes during a particularly difficult winter in the Dakotas. Today, over 40,000 men and women in uniform are deployed on 14 different operations. On an average day during the past year, 50,000 military professionals participated in deployed operations, and an average of 1,700 defense civilians also deployed to support the uniformed Services. These numbers do not necessarily include the more than 250,000 forces forward stationed or routinely deployed at sea, that are in addition to the hundreds of local unit training deployments and Joint or multinational exercises that occur on a routine basis. In Korea, for example, 36,000 U.S. forces stand ready with 600,000 troops from the Republic of Korea to ensure peace on the peninsula against 1.8 million North Korean forces. The instability in North Korea remains a concern as economic problems, food shortages, and energy deficiencies continue to worsen. Kim Jong Il’s repressive regime and brittle ideology cannot address the current crisis. Thus it is imperative that our forces stand guard to protect a fragile peace. During the past year, the importance of selected reserve component contributions to operations around the world also continued to remain key. Reserve units and individuals possess many of the capabilities needed for regional contingencies and crises, exercise support, and peacetime augmentation. The Services continue to leverage the cost-effective contributions of the reserve components to compensate for a smaller Total Force. Support is funded by taking advantage of scheduled routine training periods, or through the Active component funding Reserve active duty days to meet surge requirements. As a practical example, last year, nearly 145 Guard and Reserve units activated to support operations in Bosnia. They have proudly met the challenge. The active force fully appreciates the contributions of America’s citizen-soldiers. The Services continue to take action to avoid unbudgeted costs of non-routine operations from absorbing funds required for readiness and modernization. In FY97 Congress appropriated $1.3 billion to cover military operations anticipated at the time. Two unanticipated operations resulted in $2.0 billion in unbudgeted FY97 costs: Iraq’s provocation in the North and the President’s approval of SFOR in Bosnia. To cover these costs, the Administration is requesting a FY97 $2.0 billion supplemental appropriation. The FY98 President’s Budget requests $1.5 billion in the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Account to complete operations in Bosnia, and an additional $700 million for operations in Southwest Asia. This funding is important for the sustainment of critical operations and continued success in two regions. Looking back on the operations this past year, it is gratifying to count the large number of successes. Key military determinants of success included: early involvement of military leaders in establishing a clear mission and achievable objectives, a clear chain of command, robust Rules of Engagement for operations and force protection, sufficient assets to achieve the objectives, outstanding pre-deployment training, and great people. These operations demonstrate both the importance to our nation’s security of Peacetime Engagement, Conflict Prevention, and Forward Presence, as well as the necessity for our military forces to have the ability to conduct successful operations across the full spectrum of challenges. As an integral part of a framework for success, commanders and planners must also give priority consideration to protecting our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines.
FORCE PROTECTION AND COMBATING TERRORISM
Few challenges loom as large as that of terrorism. The problem of terrorism and the issue of force protection are much more complex than they were 20 years ago. But terrorism isn’t a new problem, it is simply an old problem getting worse. And so today, the Combatant Commanders and the Services are redoubling their efforts to provide America’s men and women with the best possible force protection measures available. Those out to do us harm are no longer just political zealots with a few sticks of dynamite. These are determined operatives, with access to very sophisticated information and technology. They construct bombs of immense destructive power like those used at the World Trade Center and Khobar Towers. Equally challenging is the problem of chemical and biological weapons in the hands of terrorists or rogue states, dangers that U.S. forces may face in future operations. The Chemical Weapons Convention is an important step in implementing comprehensive measures to address this particular problem. I strongly urge your support for its expeditious ratification so that the U.S. has a strong voice in the control regime. Adding to the danger is the increasing level of financial support these groups receive from private sources and hostile states. Unable to confront or compete with the United States militarily, rogue nations are spending millions of dollars each year in an attempt to counter U.S. influence. These states try to achieve their policy objectives by exploiting small groups to do the dirty work for them. The Secretary of Defense commissioned the Downing Assessment Task Force to examine the facts and circumstances surrounding the Khobar Towers bombing. In response to the Downing Task Force, the Secretary designated me as his principal advisor and the Department’s focal point for all matters related to force protection. The Downing Report addressed 26 findings and 81 recommendations, 79 of which have been implemented. The actions taken in response to the Downing Report include organizational changes, policy changes, intelligence emphasis, increased use of technology, and additional physical security funding. The remaining two recommendations yet to be implemented involve contract deliveries for vehicle armor kits and personnel body armor which should be completed by 1 April 1997. The SECDEF determined one finding, dealing with the number of ambulances available in CENTCOM’s area of responsibility, was faulty. Organizational changes were made in the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and Services. I established a new Deputy Director for Operations for combating terrorism (J-34) that is now the focal point for coordinating the combating terrorism program among the Services and combatant commands. The Services and combatant commands also established focal points to ensure force protection is addressed in all daily operations and is a consideration during long range planning and funding. Policy changes were codified in DoD Directive 2000.12, "DoD Combating Terrorism Program." This directive establishes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on antiterrorism force protection matters. Additionally, it establishes new responsibilities for the Services, combatant commands, defense agencies, and OSD staff. These responsibilities range from implementation to assessment of antiterrorism programs. A major policy change resulting from the Downing Report is the delineation of force protection responsibilities between the DoD and the Department of State . In the future, force protection for overseas DoD personnel will be provided by the department which is most able to provide the best security. Currently the Joint Staff and DoD are in the process of finalizing specific country-by-country agreements between DoD and the Department of State for the Arabian Peninsula. Similar agreements are being considered for the other overseas commands. In addition, DoD Directive 2000.12 also implemented DoD Handbook O-2000.12H, as the standard for antiterrorism force protection. The handbook establishes threat assessment, education and training, physical security, personnel protection, and weapons of mass destruction related standards for all of the Department of Defense. Force protection training for DoD personnel and assessing the physical security of the installations on which they work, are two critical areas of our overall personnel security program. Through the Services and CINCs, I have implemented a four-tiered program which includes individual, unit, commander, and senior executive level training. Individual training is conducted by the Services upon entry into the military and throughout an individual’s career in conjunction with various formal training courses. Unit level training is conducted by the individual organization. This includes formal training for the unit antiterrorism force protection instructors. Commander training is provided during the Services’ pre-command training programs. This training focuses on the commander’s force protection responsibilities as outlined in DoD Directives, Joint, and Service publications. Professional Military Education will also incorporate force protection into its curriculum. The final level of training is the executive level seminar for commanders involved in force protection planning and execution. Executive training culminates with a force protection wargame. The Joint Chiefs are committed to ensuring the best available force protection equipment is available to U.S. forces. During several fora, military leaders noted the lack of "state of the art" anti-terrorism protection devices and challenged industry to draw on their extensive expertise to fulfill requirements. The response has been encouraging. But, before America procures new equipment, commanders must have a firm understanding of potential vulnerabilities and requirements. This is where a new program of vulnerability assessment plays a key role. J-34, in close cooperation with the Defense Special Weapons Agency (the executive agent) is forming a number of assessment teams that will visit more that 650 facilities and installations on a prioritized schedule. Approximately fifty assessments are scheduled in 1997. Once the teams reach full strength they will complete 100 assessments per year. These teams will not only provide commanders with vulnerability assessments and recommendations, but most importantly will educate commanders on the types of force protection capabilities available to address shortfalls. Timely intelligence information available at the appropriate level is a key factor in successfully combating terrorism at all levels of command. We have worked with the Defense Intelligence Agency to prioritize collection efforts in order to improve analysis of terrorist related events, both at the national and theater levels. At the national level, the Defense Intelligence Agency created the Office of Counterterrorism Analysis to provide support to the Joint Staff and combatant commands. Additional improvements were made by integrating the Deputy Director for Operation for combating terrorism (J-34) with the Defense Intelligence Agencies’ Transnational Warfare Counterterrorism Office. This fusion of intelligence and operations functions improved both the analysis and dissemination of threat information to the Combatant Commanders. In addition, an Antiterrorism Watch Cell has been established which supports the National Military Command Center Watch Teams in the event of a terrorist incident. Despite recent improvements in policy, procedures, and intelligence DoD’s best efforts will not prevent every terrorist incident. Therefore, OSD initiated an effort to infuse technology improvements into force protection programs. Currently OSD has three programs; the Counterterrorism Technical Support, Physical Security Equipment Action Group, and Commercial-Off-The-Shelf Technology Insertion Program to address force protection technology improvements As the SECDEF’s principal advisor, I play a strong role in this process. In November 1996, the Joint Staff sponsored a force protection symposium to discuss force protection requirements with industry. Industry is providing DoD with technological solutions and equipment to improve force protection. Evaluations of both off-the-shelf and emerging technologies are underway. As the priority for force protection is raised we need to ensure it is also given a high budget priority. We initiated a review of future funding for force protection and have designated force protection as a major issue for the FY 1998-2003 program review. In the near term, a Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiatives Fund was authorized in direct support of a Downing Report recommendation to fund emergency or high priority antiterrorism requirements. This effort was possible only because of the exceptional cooperation between the Services, Unified Commands, DoD and other government agencies, and commanders at all levels. The ultimate goal is make the U.S. military the premier anti-terrorism force in the world.
QUALITY PEOPLE - THE KEY TO SUCCESS
The ability of the United States military to sustain its record of operational success into the next century is based first and foremost on our ability to recruit and retain highly capable men and women. This is the reason my number one priority remains people; their recruitment and retention through strong support of the issues important to service members. During the last fiscal year, the DoD met 101 percent of the recruitment goals. 96 percent of new recruits have high school diplomas as compared to 1974, when that rate was only 61percent. 70 percent of these young people scored in the top three categories of the mental aptitude test. Twenty years ago in 1977, 32 percent of new recruits scored in the lowest recruiting category. Today it is less than 1percent (0.3%). However, emerging trends are cause for concern. The Services anticipate an increase in the number of new recruits they will need to sustain the force now that the drawdown is nearing completion. Moreover, the Services are going to continue to find themselves competing more with private industry for the best and brightest young people. This is especially true given that the soldier of the 21st century, just as the worker of the 21st century, will most likely require greater math, computer, and language skills. But recruiting is only part of the picture. The Services must concern themselves with retaining these outstanding Americans once they enlist. Overall retention rates have increased the past year. The retention rate for DoD was the highest it has been during the past seven years. The Army and Marine Corps maintained retention rates near 83 percent, the Navy increased by 2 percentage points to 85 percent, and the Air Force increased 3 percentage points above last year, from 86 percent to 89 percent. This stability provides evidence of the dividends paid by investment in quality of life programs for America’s service men and women, and reinforces the focus on these issues in the coming years.
Quality of Life Programs
Looking out on the horizon, military operations will continue to demand great sacrifice and dedication from U.S. forces. It is important to reaffirm the importance of the top five "people" priorities: compensation, retirement, medical benefits, housing, and personal dignity. Congress deserves much credit for supporting the 1997 pay increase and the additions to the Basic Allowance for Quarters. The FY98 budget funds a 2.8 percent pay increase and 3.0 percent in the out-years. But, it is bothersome that so many of the young enlisted men and women still have difficulties making ends meet. When Congress made the decision to move away from the draft to an all volunteer force, the demographics of the force changed as more people viewed service as a professional career. Forty-three percent of the force is now below 26 years of age. The Services now attract more young married couples, as opposed to the single draftees of years past. 61 percent of the active force is married, and together have more than 1.3 million children. Since the military reflects society in general, it should come as no surprise that 5 percent of the force are single parents, with all the challenges that accompany such status. Congress and DoD should jointly explore solutions to the problem of adequate compensation for these young Americans. The arduous life style and devotion to duty asked of young men and women deserve a fair recognition of their efforts through adequate compensation. Congress should resist pressures to make additional changes to the existing 20- year retirement compensation system. The foundation of the military pay system has historically been based on the concept of delayed compensation. The 20-year retirement system provides an incentive for members to make the Services a career. Reforms this past decade have already cut by over 20 percent, the value of retirement for a member leaving at 20 years. The greatly reduced force levels of today will eventually result in savings in this area in the out-years. Any additional changes made now may have unanticipated consequences in terms of force retention, recruitment, and force composition down the road. In light of decreasing military medical assets, maintaining an adequate level of health care for Service members, dependents, and retirees is a critical quality of life issue. With the drawdown and restructuring initiatives occurring throughout the Services, access to military medical facilities could become more difficult, especially for dual-eligible retirees (those over 65 and Medicare eligible). Medicare subvention will allow retirees to enroll in TRICARE and have appropriate access to military facilities. Congress should support a subvention test as a means to maintain the good faith promise to retirees and validate cost estimates. The military’s peacetime health care system maintains wartime readiness and is a key retention issue. Again this year, the Services request your support for the continued improvement of military quarters and family support. In FY98, quality of life funding is continued in such areas as barracks and family housing, child care, family support programs, and Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) activities. The planned FY98 funding for replacement or refurbishment of 5,900 family housing units and 11,000 barracks living spaces is a program worthy of unanimous support. But adequate pay, medical, and retirement benefits alone will not attract or retain the quality people we must have to sustain our armed services. We must create an environment that fosters an atmosphere of trust and respect for personal dignity. The recent incidents of sexual harassment at training centers and hazing are particularly troubling because these events are not consistent with our values of integrity, moral courage, trust and confidence. Moreover, sexual harassment and hazing destroy teamwork, a key element of combat success. We have an absolute responsibility to ensure these events do not occur. The Chiefs and I reaffirm our zero-tolerance policy for discrimination, harassment, and all actions contrary to our core values. Ours must be a military that any American can be proud to serve in. America’s parents must be able to trust in our commitment to treat their children fairly and justly and provide them a safe, harassment-free environment.
The ability to respond to national crises requires that readiness remain the Services’ next priority. Today’s force is among the busiest in our history. This fact presupposes a high level of readiness, but it also makes maintaining readiness a more complex task. The Services made a determined effort to heed the warnings about a hollow force. Resolved to avoid the mistakes of the past, readiness accounts received top priority funding. This strategy paid big dividends in terms of mission success. However, readiness requires our constant attention as the tension between modernization, personnel programs, operations, and training becomes more acute.
America’s professional force maintained readiness the past year even with an increased level of tasking. The high OPTEMPO stressed our Operations and Maintenance accounts (O&M), as forces required additional supplies, maintenance, and training in preparation for impending taskings and exercises. In the budget, O&M receives a justified increase from $92.9 billion in FY97 to $93.7 billion in FY98. Each military Service is working to sustain high levels of readiness while implementing new initiatives to reduce costs. The rotational nature of operations such as SFOR in Bosnia and the enforcement of the no-fly zones in Iraq, challenged the operations tempo (OPTEMPO) and personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO). The regional CINCs and the Services continue to deftly manage these key issues to maintain the quality of the force. However, the increased time away from home brought on by frequent training events as well as actual operations, can erode the quality of life and family unity of Service members. Several processes and tracking mechanisms are being put into place in order to monitor the pulse of PERSTEMPO and attempt to alleviate hardships. As problems are identified, the Joint Monthly Readiness Review provides a forum for bringing them to the attention of the Services, OSD, and me for action. Initiatives are also underway to monitor those individuals in critical jobs that seem to get tasked more often than others. Prior to issuing deployment orders, the Joint Staff (J-3) in conjunction with the Service and CINC staffs, now discuss the impacts on PERSTEMPO and explore potential alternatives as required. The Navy has defined and developed OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO programs aimed at meeting both DoD directed requirements and ensuring reasonable conditions for Navy families. PERSTEMPO exceptions are personally approved by the Chief of Naval Operations; last year there were only five. PERSTEMPO rose only slightly above the Navy goal of 50 percent of the time in home port, due primarily to meeting CINC requirements and unforeseen contingency operations. Today’s Air Force is very much an expeditionary force. It is 36 percent smaller, 66 percent less forward based, and has nearly five times more airmen deployed today than in 1989. Yet careful management has resulted in less than 3 percent of Air Force personnel exceeding the Chief of Staff’s PERSTEMPO goal of 120 days per year away from home. The Marine Corps deployment tempo (DEPTEMPO) for the past year once again demonstrated an ability to provide initial response to unanticipated contingencies, such as the crises in Liberia and the Central African Republic, while sustaining forward presence. All this despite a 12 percent decrease in force structure since 1989. On an average day, the Marine Corps has approximately 25 percent of the operating force deployed. Marine Corps EA-6B electronic warfare aircraft are good examples of assets in high demand around the globe. These units are carefully managed to ensure they meet both the Commandant’s DEPTEMPO guidelines and the requirements of our Global Military Force Policy. Last year, the Army remained a resilient quality force which deployed on an average day, over 34,000 soldiers, not including many soldiers already forward deployed in countries such as Panama, Italy, South Korea, and Germany. The average yearly deployment rate rose by more than 2 percent last year. Although the Services carefully monitor the effects of increased PERSTEMPO, the adverse effects may not appear immediately. This is one reason the Joint Staff aggressively pursues PERSTEMPO measurement initiatives. Family oriented programs are another area in which the Services are very aggressive. During on-going operations in Bosnia, family service centers setup counseling services in schools attended by children of deployed Service members. Additionally, American forces have access to on-line E-mail, morale calls to home, and Morale Welfare and Recreation (MWR) support facilities throughout the area of responsibility (AOR). Chaplain support during the Bosnia operations is particularly strong to both families and deployed members. Readiness of the force is based on several components, but an important new element the past several years has been jointness.
Jointness: Ten Years After Goldwater-Nichols
The changes brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Act have had a positive effect on our readiness and have become a major source of what we refer to as "jointness." The tenth anniversary of Goldwater-Nichols was celebrated with a symposium at the National Defense University. Several panels of distinguished speakers offered unique insights into the both the process and progress of Goldwater-Nichols implementation. The symposium was an opportunity to take a historical look at Goldwater-Nichols, the improvements in jointness that it brought about, and what remains to be accomplished. Much has been accomplished. Jointness cannot be measured by the number of joint publications produced or by listing the new Joint Centers and organizations. Jointness is out in the field, in the air, and on the oceans. One only has to compare the inadequate level of air-ground cooperation in Grenada with the outstanding efforts in Haiti, where an Army light division deployed from an aircraft carrier, or look at Bosnia, where two successive commanders on the ground were admirals. The effort to improve the military advice provided to the President, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council is an important success story. The roles of the Chairman and Vice Chairman are well established and have produced tangible results. Additionally, the added voice in the resource allocation process that Goldwater-Nichols provided the CINCs has proven most beneficial. Following Goldwater-Nichols, the Department of Defense revised its acquisition directives, thus helping ensure military requirements and mission needs are met responsively through cost-effective modernization programs. OSD has initiated very important acquisition reforms this year which will help us field the warfighting capabilities postulated in 2010. Increasing the number of senior leaders who have significant Joint duty experience is still key to improving the process. A process is now in place to assess all joint manpower positions to ensure a particular manpower position provides sufficient joint expertise to be included on the Joint Duty List. An oversight board composed of eight Flag Officers or civilian equivalents have validated the process. The results of these Initiatives are being codified in a DoD manual covering the Joint Officer Management Program. Joint doctrine has emerged as a central organizing force. Without establishing the basic beliefs about the best way to fight the Joint war, operations were in danger of falling victim to "doctrine du jour," the tendency to adopt ad hoc procedures. Developing Joint doctrine has not been an easy process by any stretch of the imagination. Nevertheless, the Services, CINCs, DoD Agencies, Joint Staff, and the Joint Warfighting Center have teamed to produce a large body of authoritative Joint doctrine to enhance operational effectiveness. To date, 76 Joint doctrine manuals are in place and the body of approved Joint doctrine continues to evolve. The value of Joint doctrine has been demonstrated numerous times in deployed operations around the globe. Joint education continues as a pillar of force readiness. The National Military Strategy requires an educated officer corps capable of coping with a broad range of operations while simultaneously shaping the strategic environment. Continued improvements to joint education programs will prove to be future force multipliers. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) continues to evolve into one of the most useful tools available to the SECDEF, the Chairman, the Services, and CINCs. The JROC has grown from an acorn to a sizable oak tree in terms of responsibility and effectiveness. Now the JROC tree must grow to full maturity. Within the context of strategic planning, the JROC has expanded its scope and focus dramatically over the past three years. It now plays an increasingly central role in two areas, one associated with the validation of mission needs for the acquisition process, and one related to the assessment of Joint warfighting capabilities. In both these roles, the JROC supports me in executing one of my important Title 10 responsibilities -- to advise the Secretary of Defense on requirement priorities, assess military requirements for Defense Acquisition Programs, and provide the SECDEF with alternative program recommendations to achieve greater conformance with the priorities established. Codifying the JROC and Chairman’s role in the last Defense Authorization Bill, was an important step in the process. As Vice Chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board (and the only military member of that board) and my designated Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), the Vice Chairman now plays a pivotal role in ensuring that we achieve the optimal military capability, at the right time. The Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments (JWCAs) have provided an analytical foundation for JROC deliberations. The JROC oversees the JWCA process, directing assessments of specific Joint military areas. Through improvements in the JWCA process, the JROC has further increased the interaction with CINCs and the Services on warfighting capabilities and requirements issues. Additionally, the Joint Staff has been able to further integrate the JROC and JWCA process with the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). This process continues to mature and gain relevance, facilitating consensus among the JROC, CINCs, and the JCS on military planning and requirements. Readiness to conduct effective operations is also tied very closely to improvements in Joint training. This is where an aggressive program of Joint training and education initiatives is so important. These initiatives combine the teachings of Joint doctrine and Joint operations to fully utilize all aspects of Service capabilities as a Joint force. Professional Military Education programs have made great progress in educating officers about each Service’s capabilities and the contributions that each brings to the full range of Joint operations. These programs provide a unique environment which allows future leaders to critically assess the status today, and think "out of the box" about the future. But the theoretical must be reinforced with the practical. During the past year, the Joint Staff continued efforts to fully integrate new modeling and simulation efforts. Additionally, the staff has taken steps that enable training efficiencies by matching training requirements to the exercise program. The feedback from the theater CINCs is positive and results from the Joint Exercise Program are encouraging. Jointness is moving into the future, building on the core competencies of each of the Services. Continued cooperation will allow realization of the operational goal to achieve full spectrum dominance in the near term and out into the challenging future.
MODERNIZATION - EQUIPPING THE FORCE FOR THE 21st CENTURY
The most challenging aspect of modernization remains the continuing underfunding of our acquisition accounts. In my last two reports to you, I have stressed the need to raise procurement funding to a steady state of about $60 billion per year. This is still an operative goal although the Quadrennial Review may adjust it to meet the dictates of a new or modified force structure. This budget does not reach the target level of funding until 2001. While this is later than I think is optimal, I am encouraged that at least it is now accepted as a realistic, achievable goal. If we are to achieve this goal, as a minimum, we will have to cut out excesses and learn to work smarter. As difficult as it is politically we will have to further reduce our infrastructure. The BRAC process reduced our base infrastructure by some 18 percent and should provide a net cost avoidance of $14 billion between 1990 and the year 2001. But at the same time, while we cut these bases by a little less than a fifth, we also reduced the force by a third, and reduced our combat structure even more than that. The result is that we perhaps have more excess infrastructure today than we did when the BRAC process started. In the short run, we need to close more facilities, as painful and as expensive as it is. We also must change how we do business, relying more on outsourcing, privatization, and the procurement of off-the-shelf equipment and services. Where possible, we will also have to trim personnel end strength especially where technological changes such as improved weapons systems, afford us the possibility to consider fewer or smaller units. During the last year, the Joint Chiefs and Unified Commanders established a common vision of future capabilities that will lead us in a common direction towards future warfighting concepts and complementary interoperable capabilities. In tandem with the great work being done by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, Joint Vision 2010 provides the Services and Unified Commands the conceptual template to achieve dominance across the full spectrum of future operations. The implementation plan for Joint Vision 2010 is already well underway and will ensure that the vision is turned into reality. As the Joint Chiefs look to the future vision and requirements, the Chiefs also recognize that new technology is not the answer to all operational challenges. Some missions will still require forces to engage in many of the same activities they have had for the past 200 years. The Services remain committed to improving capabilities across the full spectrum of combat capabilities, not just on the high end. Future modernization plans will be rooted in one of four key operational concepts contained in Joint Vision 2010: focused logistics, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and dominant maneuver. Looking to the future, a few key areas require increased emphasis and wider support. DoD has already begun a number of initiatives to make these capabilities more affordable. A top priority remains strategic lift, a substantial pillar of America’s military strategy. The C-17 Globemaster III is an increasingly important component of America’s strategic mobility fleet and today the program is in good shape. The C-17 program is executing a seven year procurement for a total of 120 aircraft by 2003 (last C-17 delivered by 2004), saving approximately $1 billion compared to annual lot buys. The C-17 program remains necessary to replace the aging C-141 fleet. Strategic sealift is critical and requires additional attention. Over 95 percent of the equipment deployed during a major conflict will be lifted on ships. The Mobility Requirements Study/Bottom Up Review Update (MRS BURU), validated a need for 10 million square feet of surge capacity to move the forces for one Major Regional Conflict (MRC). This is the minimum surge sealift required for a single MRC, and it would be recycled for a second conflict. In order to ensure appropriate types of vessels required, primarily Roll-on/Roll-off (RO/RO) ships, DoD embarked on an ambitious acquisition plan of organic sealift. The nineteen Large Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off (LMSR) vessels which DoD will acquire by FY01 will be the centerpiece of America’s strategic sealift capability. Upon delivery of the last ship, five million square feet of capacity will have been added to the fleet, three million square feet for surge and two million square feet for pre-positioned equipment. This program has enjoyed strong support from Congress in the past and is funded in the Navy budget. Keeping this program on track for a FY01 completion is essential and a top strategic lift priority. In addition to the LMSRs, the study identified a need to add 19 smaller RO/RO ships to the Ready Reserve Force (RRF). This piece of the surge requirement has proved to be more difficult. Although we’ve added 14 of the 19 RO/ROs to the RRF since 1992, it is unlikely the Mobility Requirements Study/Bottom Up Review Update (MRS BURU) completion goal of FY98 for these ships can be met. The Joint, TRANSCOM, and Navy Staffs are looking at all options, including evaluation of commercial U.S. flag programs, not available at the time of the BURU, in order to fill surge requirements, to reach a capacity goal of 10 million square feet. DoD had been converting foreign built vessels in the absence of suitable US built vessels. The requirement for five more RO/ROs, or an additional 550,000 square feet, remains today, but Congress has not authorized RO/RO acquisition the past two years. We need to remain committed to reaching the Ready Reserve Force capacity goal in order to close the gap. My next priority focuses on providing U.S. forces with systems that enhance situational and battlefield awareness, and command and control. Several technologies will enhance both the ability to maneuver and engage precisely. First, the exploitation of emerging Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) technologies offer the potential of becoming great force multipliers. The JROC has done an enormous amount of work appraising UAV programs and manned platforms in order to provide recommendations regarding the reconnaissance force structure necessary to support CINC requirements. Warfighters have a requirement for a tactical UAV and my top UAV priority is a system to support the ground commanders. The JROC-chartered UAV Special Study Group is reviewing UAV programs to assess the proper funding priority for UAV programs. Once the Services establish that UAVs can carry the necessary sensors and meet mission requirements in anticipated weather conditions, DoD should move swiftly to evaluate the cost-saving tradeoffs between manned and UAV reconnaissance systems. I remain committed to fielding a UAV force that is interoperable among all Services as an important enhancement to warfighting capability. Next, the ability to ensure precision engagement and dominant maneuver as described in Joint Vision 2010 depends on providing an effective mix of both offensive and defensive information infrastructures. The fusion of all-source intelligence with the effective integration of platforms, command organizations, sensors, and logistics support will be what distinguishes the U.S. from second-rate military forces. The Services have come a long way in this area the past ten years. The lack of interoperability between the Services’ disparate command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems was a major theme of the 1970s and 1980s. Compare this with the recent successes in Joint Task Force (JTF) operations across the globe, particularly in supporting the Implementation Force in Bosnia where the U.S. established a communications and information architecture that integrated hundreds of different systems from 32 different nations. The progress made in C4 coordination was as much a miracle as the successes in transportation and enforcement. In the future, Joint Task Force integration becomes even more dependent on information superiority and new communications solutions. However, with technology advancing so rapidly, acquisition and budgeting processes may be inadequate to address C4 needs with the speed required. Potential opponents can buy state of the art C4 systems right off the shelf, but DoD requirements go through a lengthy acquisition and budgeting processes. This delay results in the warfighter often receiving "old" technology. The Services cannot afford the long lead-time of the system given the rapidly advancing status of C4 technologies. It seems prudent that where significant capabilities are commercially available in the open market, particularly when these capabilities are essential to the future vision, DoD could have a more responsive acquisition and budgeting process. This is an area that needs a hard look. The military is also facing a new challenge from the commercial and international sectors over an issue no one anticipated 20 years ago: availability of the frequency spectrum. In the rush to provide "bandwidth" for the myriad of new communications and information systems flooding the worldwide market, governments are selling-off portions of the frequency spectrum. It is critical that future spectrum sales take the impact on defense systems into account. There is potentially a significant dollar impact involved in this issue. If DoD has to yield portions of the spectrum to new commerce, existing military equipment operating within these frequencies must be replaced with systems that can operate on other portions of the spectrum. As the United States continues to improve its combat information and communication systems, an important consideration is the impact such modernization will have on friends and allies. The United States is the world’s leader in the exploitation of information technologies. This is evident in every facet of American life and is particularly true with respect to the military. Information dominance is the common thread running throughout the fabric of future operational concepts. As a result, the Services are making key investments in new information technologies, investments that will produce significant combat multipliers in the next century. Unfortunately, friends and allies are not proceeding at the same pace or with the same levels of interest. The United States must ensure key information systems remain interoperable and complementary with allies. This is particularly important to the success of multinational operations. America’s strategy must envision information architectures that avoid the same compatibility pitfalls encountered within our own Services in the 1970s and early 1980s. Additional enhancements to the operational concepts of precision strike and full dimensional protection center on the recapitalization of our tactical aviation programs. The Joint Chiefs supported transitioning the Joint Advanced Strike Technology effort into an acquisition program. The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program is the benchmark for future Joint weapon system efforts. The JSF program will provide the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force with a critical, survivable, lethal, and highly interoperable multi-role strike capability. The efficiencies associated with this cooperative, Joint-Service development approach are substantial and deserve support from Congress and the Administration. Additional aviation modernization programs and technology upgrades will be needed to ensure voids in capabilities do not occur in the next century. Stealth technologies have provided America with an unmatched combat capability in the F-117 fighter and B-2 bomber. Low observable technologies will eventually be exploited in a wider array of combat systems including the F-22, naval vessels, tanks, ground vehicles, and the JSF. Both DoD and Congress should fully support leveraging this technology through continued investment. However, funding for additional B-2s is not in the best interest of the force. The limited procurement budgets can be put to better use on higher priorities. One of those advancing priorities key to protecting our force is the development of effective Theater Missile Defenses (TMD) for deployed forces. U.S. forces face danger from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their associated delivery systems. The JROC is monitoring progress in the TMD area and is taking the prudent course in relation to concerns about the priority of the National Missile Defense Program. For example, in FY 96, JROC actions prioritized funding for lower tier systems to address the near-term ballistic missile threat. Recently (24 Jan 97), the Navy Area Defense System successfully intercepted a ballistic missile in the first test of its new infrared seeker at the White Sands Missile Range. The Patriot Advanced Capability 3 system is scheduled to conduct its first test by this summer. Additionally, earlier this fiscal year, DoD increased funding for upper tier programs. This will accelerate the fielding of the Theater High Altitude Air Defense System (THAAD) and provide for additional risk mitigation testing of the Navy Theater Wide Defense System. The NMD Deployment Readiness Program optimizes the potential for an effective National Missile Defense System. If the decision is made to deploy a NMD system in the near-term, then the system fielded would provide a very limited capability. If deploying a system in the near-term can be avoided, DoD can continue to enhance the technology base and the commensurate capability of the NMD system that could be fielded on a later deployment schedule. The objective here is to be in a position to be three years away from deployment, so America can respond to the emergence of a threat. This approach fields the most cost effective capability that is available at the time the threat emerges. The FY98 budget authority requested for ballistic missile defense is $3.5 billion. During FY99-03, an additional $17.9 billion is planned. Beginning with the FY 1998 budget, funding for Theater Missile Defense programs are in the appropriate Service accounts.
The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) does not start with a clean slate, rather it begins with the fact that the U.S. currently has the best force in the world. America’s military is the envy of the world because of what it can accomplish on a daily basis. It is not just the equipment that other nations admire. It is the organization, leadership, training, and the great people. Thus, the QDR must ensure that tomorrow’s force is every bit as capable to protect America’s interests as is today’s force. The QDR is a serious effort to examine strategies, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plans, management, and other elements. It will highlight what is right and those areas where change is required. If there is an opportunity to restructure ourselves to be better prepared to protect America’s interests, then we will respond appropriately. However, when the nation’s security is at stake, changes have to be made carefully. American forces must have the capability to prevent future conflicts by shaping the strategic environment, deter conventional and nuclear war, and when necessary, fight and win the nation's wars. These tasks underscore the need to maintain well-balanced forces to prevent conflict through engagement, deter conflicts before they start, or fight and decisively win those that do. In short, America must maintain a military capable of dominating an opponent across the full range of military operations. Mobility and forward deployment will be essential characteristics of the force. Like mobility, forward deployment provides military commanders with several advantages. The ability to forward deploy forces, whether permanently, rotationally, or temporarily in the Pacific, the Middle East, and Europe dramatically reassures allies of America’s commitment, reduces the response time to regional crises, signals a commitment to defend American interests, and moderates potential aggressiveness directed at friends and allies. Prepositioning of equipment is a facet of overseas presence that demonstrates to allies the U.S. commitment to come to their aid if threatened or attacked. Prepositioning also gives the U.S. the ability to respond faster to a developing crisis and increases the ability to deter war. The capabilities of forward deployed units must be sufficient to quickly and decisively prevail across a wide range of potential operations. In the future, success or failure of operations may be determined by America’s response in the first few hours or days of a crisis. Forward deployment provides significant side benefits as well. A continuing program of engagement relying on military-to-military contacts, multinational exercises, and Joint training opportunities provides the regional Combatant Commanders with the building blocks necessary for effective operations. The complex political demographics unique to each AOR are carefully considered in developing a proper level of Joint and Multinational exercises to support each CINC’s engagement strategy. These programs enhance levels of trust between regional friends, strengthen command relationships, promote doctrinal and tactical awareness, and enhance the mission of conflict prevention. The array of bilateral and multinational cooperative efforts this past year reinforce the importance of the alliances and partnerships that grow out of engagement programs. Nowhere is this more evident than in the cooperation between a rejuvenated NATO and members of the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program. America’s active and reserve soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are establishing the ties so critical to ensuring a lasting peace on the European continent. Today, the United States has the best military in the world. With continued support from Congress and key investments in quality people, readiness, and modernization, America’s forces will remain preeminent in the year 2010 and beyond.