101 Meade Ave
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1351
I am appealing to Russians to act strictly in accordance with the law...Reprisals or taking the law into people's own hands is something that must absolutely be prevented. This would be war. This must not be allowed to happen. And I am appealing to the commonsense of the leaders, the present leaders of the Chechen Republic, to Aslan Maskhadov.9
At the stage of the initial accumulation of capital, the West did not have nuclear weapons, global criminal syndicates, high-precision weapons, or missile launchers. The initial accumulation of capital in the West did not go hand in hand with the erosion of the entire industrial production system. The West did not have a huge number of professionals disillusioned with reforms and discarded by the system, those whose knowledge and skills can be put to use by criminal communities.10
I, who am regarded as a dilettante, am being criticized for outlining these ways. What did they propose? Nothing, except criticism and excuses.26
KULIKOV ON ETHNIC CONFLICT
Because of the absence of respective inter-governmental agreements, such borders put millions of Russians and Russophiles into an ambiguous position where they suddenly, and against their own free will, become foreigners and perhaps stateless in the countries of the 'near abroad'.27
The negative prognosis, according to which bringing federal troops into Chechnya will cause the consolidation of the majority of the indigenous population behind Dudayev, did not materialize. There is no civil war in Chechnya. At the same time, the situation in various districts of Chechnya is quite different. Out of the eleven administrative districts of the Republic, the situation is fully controllable only where the Provisional Councils for support of Russian troops are set up and where local people take effective steps to preclude the appearance of the Dudayev hit men in inhabited areas.37
He notes further:
Most dangerous among other factors for the development of the socio-political situation in Chechnya is the real possibility of the spread of the Chechen events to the regions contiguous to the Russian Federation territory and not to these areas only in recent time there is a tendency to complicate the situation in the Republic of Dagestan where the Dudayev supporters intend to use all forces to provoke a collision with Russian troops . . . .38
RUSSIAN SOCIETY AND CRIME: FORMER MINISTER KULIKOV'S BIGGEST NIGHTMARE
Three months ago when I was appointed Minister of Internal Affairs I could not even imagine the degree of corruption in Internal Affairs organs that I have encountered. I have come to realize one thing: if we do not start purging our own ranks, the whole fight against organized crime and corruption will merely be reduced to eliminating their superficial manifestations.40
A SURVIVOR, BUT BARELY: THE KULIKOV-LEBED DUEL
ANOTHER CRISIS: THE RAID IN BYUNAKSK, DAGESTAN
...we have a right to make preventive strikes against bandit bases, wherever they are located, including the territory of the Chechen Republic. This is my view, and I intend to inform the President of this.49
DANGEROUS SIGNS, OR A PRESS SERVICE OUT OF CONTROL?
the battle is not between the old and new. The battle is between regression, degradation, and "dropping" our society into a feudal and pre-feudal condition and counter-regression, on the one hand, and the shoots of citizenship and law, of free thought and the responsibility of government action, on the other. We will be uncompromising in this battle. But this uncompromising position is nothing without depth and openness of political vision. It is very easy in such a battle to cross the line and begin moving in reverse under the guise of protecting state interests.57
RUMORS ABOUT THE DISMISSAL OF 23 MARCH
1. While in office, Kulikov's powers far exceeded those of any American official, and the true extent of his power and influence was virtually unknown outside of Russia. Inside the country he remained one of its most charismatic figures. Some opponents simply labeled him a hawk, while others accused him of trying to usurp the same power as Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beriya, Stalin's main henchman, or of involvement in suspected coups.
2. Kulikov says the country owes much to its forefathers, to include those who fought gloriously for the USSR. He notes that "in these many faces there are both things that frighten and things that gladden. We have departed from the greyness and colorlessness, as well as from the principle that 'if you are not for us, you are against us.' One wants to believe that this departure is permanent. Not only would returning to a single 'denomination' be immoral, it would be socially ineffective. When we are told that by 'lumping everybody together,' colossal political and social results were achieved, a great country was built -- the USSR, a high level of science and culture was achieved, and an impenetrable defense shield was created -- all of this accurately describes at least part of the truth about our past. We will never forget the greatness that was created by the hands of our fathers and grandfathers. We will not allow this to be desecrated by those who wish that nearly eighty years of our life be turned into a black hole, that eighty years be ripped from the pages of our history."
3. For example, in one course with Kulikov was Pavel Grachev, who would become the first Russian Minister of Defense; Leontiy Shevtsov, who would serve first as Kulikov's chief of staff in Chechnya, then as the Deputy Commander of Russian forces in Bosnia, and finally as the army commander of Russia's Internal Forces; and many other important personalities. Also studying with him was soon-to-be Vice President Alexander Rutskoi. There would come a day in October of 1993 when General Kulikov's forces would storm a building held by former classmate Vice President Rutskoi and after the tanks of former classmate and Minister of Defense Grachev fired on that building. There would also come a day, a few years later, when General Kulikov would negotiate with Colonel Maskhadov of the Chechen armed forces to end the fighting in and around Grozny. Kulikov respected Maskhadov for his military professionalism and for his responsible and logical approach to creating the Chechen force. He probably detected the same traits in Maskhadov that he valued in himself.
4. Author's discussion with an MVD officer while in Moscow, March 1996.
5. Interfax, "Internal Forces Continue to Downsize," Nezavisimaya Voyennoye Obozreniye, Feb-Mar, 1998, p. 1.
6. Marina Shakina, "One Resignation, Two Resignations--and then, of course, Appointments: New Appointees are Anatoliy Kulikov, Vyacheslav Mikhaylov and --Viktor Yerin," Novoye Vremya, July 1995, pp. 14-16.
7. Yuliya Kalinina, "Minister Follows into Beriya's Footsteps," Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 5 February 1997, p. 1.
8. Speech at law-enforcement conference.
9. Moscow NTV, 30 April 1997, as translated in FBIS-SOV-97-120, web site http://fbis.fedworld.gov/cgi-bin/retrieve.
10. Russian Public TV, First Channel, 14 December 1997, as translated in FBIS-SOV-97-348, 14 December 1997, downloaded from web site http://fbis.fedworld.gov/cgi-bin/retrieve.
11. For example, in opening comments to a meeting of law-enforcement officers in Moscow in 1996, Kulikov noted that when Yeltsin left society vulnerable to information of all kinds at the start of the conflict with Chechnya, he was presenting a true test of democracy to the country. He did not impose political censorship as many urged him to do, Kulikov added, allowing a deafening wave of criticism to be unleashed on him, much of which was unfounded. This was very dangerous, and for a long time Kulikov noted that he did not understand why the President acted in this way. He later came to realize, in his own words, that the President was defending the most important thing that had been won at colossal cost, the 'gulp' of political, information and human freedoms. This position involved risk-taking but it also involved an exact understanding of Russia's strategic goals, as well as a faith in the intrinsic national wisdom of the Russian people, Kulikov concluded.
12. Moscow Russian Television Network, 8 November 1995, as translated in FBIS-SOV-95-217, 9 November 1995, pp. 26, 27.
13. Story related to the author by one of General Kulikov's escorts in London, England in 1995.
14. Andrei Rodnov, "Minister Kulikov Lands in Court," Situatsiya, No. 5, February 1998, p. 5.
15. Aleksandr Budberg, "The New Minister Reckons Well: Anatoliy Kulikov is Planning to Rely on the 'Healthy Forces'," Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 8 July 1995, p. 2, as translated in FBIS-SOV-95-144-S, 27 July 1995, pp. 35, 36.
16. Moscow INTERFAX, 15 February 1996, as translated in FBIS-SOV-96-033, 16 February 1996, p. 44.
17. Radio Rossii Network, 5 January 1998, as translated in FBIS-SOV-98-005, downloaded from web site http://fbis.fedworld.gov/cgi-bin/retrieve.
18. Viktor Sokirko, "While the 'Power Ministers' Fight for Sobriety...," Komsomolskaya Pravda, 30 August 1995, p. 2 as translated in FBIS-SOV-95-168, 30 August 1995, p. 25.
19. Olga Parfenova, report of a phone-in with Minister Kulikov, "Hello, Kulikov Here," Trud-7, 10-16 November 1995, pp. 4, 5 as translated in FBIS-SOV-95-220, 15 November 1995, pp. 15-19.
20. Discussion with MVD officer close to then Minister Kulikov, Moscow, March 1997.
21. Maksim Glikin and Nikolay Troitskiy, "Solovyeva Introduced to High Office. Kulikov's Secret Rendezvous with 'Mamma Valya'," Obshchaya Gazeta, No. 38, 21-27 September 1995, p. 8, as translated in FBIS-SOV-95-186, 26 September 1995, p. 50-52.
22. "Pri ministre i s ministrom," Shchit i Mech, 2 December 1997, p. 2..
23. Moscow Russian Public Television, First Channel, the 'Vzglyad' Program, 4 August 1995, as translated in FBIS-SOV-95-152, 8 August 1995, pp. 35-42.
24. Anatoliy Makarov, "Anatoliy Kulikov has Apparently Found Trillions for the Wages of the Defenders of Law and Order. Whom Did the General Scare?" Sovetskaya Rossiya, 20 February 1996, pp. 1, 2 as translated in FMSI-SOV-96-036, 22 February 1996, p. 48.
25. Moscow Russian Public Television, 14 February 1996, as translated in FBIS-SOV-96-033, 16 February 1996, pp. 38-42.
26. Ibid., p. 42.
27. Anatoliy Sergeevich Kulikov, "Russian Policy in the Sphere of National Security: Essence and Magnitude of Internal threats to Stability and Order," European Security, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Autumn 1997), p. 20. This article is from Minister Kulikov's speech at the Conference on Russian Defense and Security Policing," King's College, London University, 16-18 May 1995. All references to the words of Kulikov in this section of the article are taken from this talk.
28. Ibid., p. 27.
29. Ibid., p. 28.
30. Russia's situation was characterized by Kulikov as a struggle for political power. It included attempts to destroy the economy, and fights between the haves and have-nots. Tendencies for the breakdown of the State system were still manifesting themselves. Armed conflicts had occurred on Russia's borders, further stretching and weakening its armed forces. The fact that three fourths of Russia remained uninhabited invited looks of envy and interest from abroad. In Kulikov's words, the external threat of wars for independence moved closer to Russia while conditions for such a war inside the country ripened. The fate of Russian citizens in the near abroad was affected by economic difficulties, social strains, ethnic conflicts and political disagreements both inside and outside of Russia. The crisis in Chechnya brought this situation to a boil and made it imperative that legislative acts be elaborated and transferred into the language of service manuals to provide a legal basis for the actions of soldiers, because a struggle for independence within Russia itself was now possible.
32. Strategic decisions, on the one hand, were aimed at preventing crises in ethnic relations by creating, in advance, the legal, political, economic and socio-psychological conditions for the maximum smooth and civilized development of these processes. Operative and tactical decisions, on the other hand, primarily relied on power structures and force. Use of the power factor must be ensured by proper conditions for its legal, civilized development and use.
33. Ibid., pp. 28, 29.
34. Ibid., p. 32.
36. Ibid., p. 33, 34.
37. Ibid., p. 34.
38. Ibid., p. 35.
39. Speech to law-enforcement conference.
40. Parfenova, Ibid.
41. Interfax, 4 November 1995, as translated in FBIS-SOV-95-214, 6 November 1995, pp. 34, 35.
42. Harder to fathom is a figure Kulikov offered regarding killings in 1995. He claims that the MVD was able to find the murderer 75% of the time, which is difficult to comprehend. Of course, perhaps he did not include all of the contract killings in this figure. See Parfenova. For some interesting charts on the structure and dynamics of economic crime in Russia from 1991-1995, and results of work by the MVD in 1995, see Olga Shlyapnikova and Oleg Utitsin, "Anatoliy Kulikov: Terrorism is a State Matter," EKSPERT, No. 8, 26 February 1996, pp. 12-14, as translated in FBIS-SOV-95-068-S, 8 April 1996, pp. 97-101.
43. Oleg Rubnikovich and Irina Skarnikova, "Activity of Criminal Groups in Russia is Growing: But the Militia is Still Maintaining Control Over the Situation," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 20 February 1996, p. 1.
44. Moscow Russian TV, 16 March 1996, as translated in FBIS-SOV-95-054, 19 March 1996, pp. 31, 32.
45. Penny Morvant, "Kulikov on Crime and Corruption," OMRI Daily Digest, 20 January 1997.
46. "Ministry Issues Statistics on Crime in Russia," Moscow Interfax, 3 December 1997.
47. Vladimir Lopatin, "The MVD is Using Sham Figures Like a Fig Leaf to Cover Itself," Komsomolskaya Pravda, 17 January 1998, p. 2 as reported in FBIS-SOV-98-054, 23 February 1998.
48. Interfax, 17 February 1998, as translated in FBIS-SOV-98-050, 19 February 1998.
49. Moscow NTV, 6 January 1998, as translated in FBIS-SOV-98-?,
50. Moscow INTERFAX, 12 January 1998, as translated in FBIS-SOV-98-012, 12 January 1998, and downloaded from web site http://fbis.fedworld.gov/cgi-bin/retrieve.
51. Moscow NTV, 8 January 1998, as translated by FBIS-SOV-98-011, and downloaded from web site http://fbis.fedworld.gov/cgi-bin/retrieve.
52. Mark Deych, "Minister Kulikov was Misunderstood," Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 13 January 1998, p. 4, as translated in FBIS-SOV-98-013, 13 January 1998, and downloaded from web site http://fbis.fedworld.gov/cgi-bin/retrieve.
53. Teymuraz Mamaladze, "Threatening Maneuvers on Kulikovo Field," Novyye Izvestiya, 9 January 1998, p. 1 as translated in FBIS-SOV-98-009, and downloaded on 9 January 1998 at web site http://fbis.fedworld.gov/cgi-bin/retrieve.
54. Vadim Dubov, "General Kulikov through the Eyes of Academic Pavlov," Novoe Vremya, No 7, 1998, p. 3.
55. Moscow INTERFAX, 9 January 1998, as translated in FBIS-SOV-98-009, and downloaded from web site http://fbis.fedworld.gov/cgi-bin/retrieve.
56. Margarita Popova and Yelena Skvortsova, "A Blabbermouth is Once Again a Boon to a Spy," Obshchaya Gazeta, 29 January-4 February, 1998, No. 4, p. 1, as translated in FBIS-SOV-98-041.
57. Speech at a law enforcement conference.
58. Sergei Kokut, "Anatoliy Kulikov has a Programme for Military Reform," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 10, 1998, from Johnson's List 2055, 2/10/98..
59. Sergey Sokut, "Anatoliy Kulikov Has His Own Military Reform Program," Nezavisimaya Voyennoye Obozreniye, No. 6, 13-19 February 1998, p. 3.
60. Marianna Maksimovskaya, fro the "Segodnya" program on NTV, 7 February 1998, as reported in FBIS-UMA-98-038, 7 February 1998.
61. Yuliya Kalinina, "The Enemy Within. Minister Kulikov is Preparing for a Military Coup. Whether to Suppress it to Take Part in it, He has not Yet Decided," Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 23 January 1998, pp. 1, 2 as reported in FBIS-SOV-98-023, 23 January 1998.
62. Viktor Litovkin and Yuriy Snegirev, "Army and Police Continuing to Serve No Matter What," Izvestiya, 24 March 1998, p. 2.
63. Vladimir Kostrov, "Lev Rokhlin Supported Anatoliy Kulikov. Vice Premier Believes he was Misunderstood," Russkiy Telegraf, 12 February 1998, p. 3 as reported in FBIS-SOV-98-043, 12 February 1998.
64. Interfax Communications and Electronics Report, Volume II, Issue 12 (72), 18-24 March 1998, as translated by FBIS-SOV-98-082, 23 March 1998.
65. Aleksandr Igorev and Oleg Kutasov, "Not a Single Boot Will Remain in the MVD," Kommersant-Daily, 24 March 1998, p. 2.
66. Moscow Interfax, 24 March 1998, as reported in FBIS-SOV-98-083, 24 March 1998.
67. Aleksandr Budberg, "What Devil Has Beguiled Yeltsin? The President Has Recovered--the Government Has Died," Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 24 March 1998, p. 1.
68. "Many People in the MVD are Confused," Moskovskiye Novosti, No 11, 22-29 March 1998, as reported in FBIS-SOV-98-084, 25 March 1998.
69. Matthew Fisher, "Boris does his Spring Cleaning," Toronto Sun, March 27, 1998, as downloaded from Johnson's List on 27 March 1998.
70. "Controversial Russian banker appointed to Security Council," NUPI Database, downloaded from the Internet on 14 May 1998 at site www.nupi.no/cgi-win/Russland/krono.exe/243.
71. Discussion in Moscow with a Kulikov advisor, April 1998.
72. "CIS summit in the wake of the appointment of Berezovskiy," NUPI Database, downloaded from the Internet on 14 May 1998 at site www.nupi.no/cgi-win/Russland/krono.exe/243.
73. Moscow Interfax, 17 February 1998, as reported in FBIS report of 19 February 1998.
74. Pavel Yegorov, "A Berezovskiy Mess," Profil, 1 April 1998, No. 12, pp. 13-14 as reported in FBIS-SOV-98-104, 14 April 1998. The report indicates that Berezovskiy planned the event, and that Kulikov counted on the President's common sense and miscalculated.
75. Aleksandr Budberg, "What Devil has Beguiled Yeltsin?" Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 24
March 1998, pp. 1, 2 as reported in FBIS-SOV-98-084, 25 March 1998.