



**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION DIVISION
1155 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1155**

Ref: 18-F-0165
January 14, 2022

Mr. Steven Aftergood
Federation of American Scientists
1725 DeSales Street NW, Suite 600
Washington, DC 20036

Dear Mr. Aftergood:

This is a final response to your November 1, 2017, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, a copy of which is enclosed for your convenience. We received your request on November 1, 2017, and assigned it FOIA case number 18-F-0165. We ask that you use this number when referring to your request.

The Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), a component of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, conducted a search of their records systems and located 73 pages determined to be responsive to your request. Mr. David A. Kozik, in his capacity as Initial Denial Authority for USDI, determined that the 73 pages contain information exempted from public release, including 56 pages exempted in their entirety. The withheld information is exempted from release pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(1), information currently and properly classified in the interest of national security in accordance with Executive Order 13526, as amended, Section 3.3(h)(1)(B), key design concepts of weapons of mass destruction.

In this instance, fees for processing your request were below the threshold for requiring payment. Please note that fees may be assessed on future request.

If you have any questions or concerns about the foregoing or about the processing of your request, please do not hesitate to contact the Action Officer assigned to your request, Joan Haynesworth, at 571-372-0428 or joan.l.haynesworth.ctr@mail.mil. Additionally, if you have concerns about service received by our office, please contact a member of our Leadership Team at 571-372-0498 or Toll Free at 866-574-4970.

Should you wish to inquire about mediation services, you may contact the OSD/JS FOIA Public Liaison, Tonya R. Fuentes, at 571-372-0462 or by email at OSD.FOIALiaison@mail.mil, or the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at the National Archives and Records Administration. The contact information for OGIS is as follows:

Office of Government Information Services
National Archives and Records Administration
8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS
College Park, MD 20740
E-mail: ogis@nara.gov
Telephone: 202-741-5770
Fax: 202-741-5769
Toll-free: 1-877-684-6448

You have the right to appeal to the appellate authority, Ms. Joo Chung, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Privacy, Civil Liberties, and Transparency, by writing directly to the following address: 4800 Mark Center Drive, ATTN: DPCLTD, FOIA Appeals, Mailbox# 24, Alexandria, VA 22350-1700.

Your appeal must be postmarked within 90 calendar days of the date of this response. Alternatively, you may email your appeal to osd.foia-appeal@mail.mil. If you use email, please include the words "FOIA Appeal" in the subject of the email. Please also reference FOIA case number 18-F-0165 in any appeal correspondence.

We appreciate your patience in the processing of your request. As stated previously, please contact the Action Officer assigned to your request, Joan Haynesworth, and reference FOIA case number 18-F-0165, if you have any questions or concerns.

Sincerely,

for Pamela Andrews
Stephanie L. Carr
Chief

Enclosures:
As stated



INTELLIGENCE

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000

OCT 10 2017

The Honorable Michael R. Pence
President of the Senate
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. President:

Section 2367 of title 50, United States Code provides that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit a report, commonly known as the "World Wide Threat Report," on the threats posed to the United States and allies of the United States by weapons of mass destruction (WMD), ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles; and by the proliferation of the same.

The fiscal year 2015/2016 Worldwide Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons, and Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat Report is enclosed. This report includes an assessment on the threats and proliferation of WMD, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles, an assessment on the acquisition by foreign countries of dual-use and other technology useful for the development or production of WMD and advanced conventional munitions, and any trends with respect to the acquisition of dual-use and other technology useful for the development or production of WMD and advanced conventional munitions.

I look forward to working closely with Congress on this issue. Similar letters are being sent to the Speaker of the House and the congressional defense and intelligence committees.

Sincerely

Kari A. Bingen
Acting

Enclosure:
As stated

~~Unauthorized Removal of Attachments~~



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ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

(U) Worldwide Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Weapons, and Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat

For Fiscal Year 2017

(Addressing the Time Period 01 Oct 14 to 30 Sep 16)



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Information Cutoff Date: 01 October 2016

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(U) Introduction

(U) This unclassified report was prepared pursuant to the requirements of section 234 of Public Law 105-85, as amended by section 1065 of Public Law 112-239 (codified at section 2367 of title 50, United States Code). The report provides unclassified key issues regarding the threats posed to the United States, including U.S. forces, and allies, by weapons of mass destruction (WMD), ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles. This report was drafted by the Department of Defense (DoD) in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, and was coordinated within the Intelligence Community (IC). Information used in this report is current as of October 1, 2016.

(U) State WMD and Missile Programs

(U) China: Continuing to Modernize Conventional and Nuclear Forces

(U) China's nuclear policy seeks strategic deterrence through assured retaliation in conjunction with a "No-First-Use" (NFU) declaration. Beijing prioritizes maintaining a nuclear force able to survive an attack and to respond with sufficient strength to inflict unacceptable damage on an enemy. Beijing's long maintained NFU policy states it would use nuclear forces only in response to a nuclear strike against China; there is however some ambiguity over the conditions under which China may need to use nuclear weapons first. China insists the new generation of mobile missiles, with warheads consisting of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and penetration aids, are intended to ensure the viability of China's strategic deterrent in the face of continued advances primarily in U.S. strategic ISR, precision strike, and missile defense capabilities. China will probably continue to invest considerable resources to maintain a limited, but survivable, nuclear force to ensure that the PLA can deliver a damaging responsive nuclear strike.

(U) China emphasizes ballistic and cruise missiles for long-range strike. It views them as powerful weapons for warfighting, deterrence and as symbols of military strength. China continues to modernize its nuclear forces by enhancing its silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and adding more survivable mobile delivery systems.

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(U) China's ICBM arsenal consists of the same series of missiles as in 2015, comprised of the silo-based CSS-4 Mod 2 (Chinese designator DF-5A) and Mod 3 (DF-5B), the latter equipped with a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) payload; the solid-fueled, road-

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mobile CSS-10 Mods 1 and 2 (DF-31 and DF-31A); and the shorter ranged CSS-3 (DF-4). The remainder of China's land-based nuclear force comprises road-mobile, solid-fueled CSS-5 (DF-21) medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) for regional deterrence missions. The CSS-10 Mod 2, with a range in excess of 11,000 km, can reach most locations within the continental United States.

(U) China is also developing a new road-mobile ICBM known as the DF-41, which is capable of carrying MIRVs. China has tested a hypersonic glide vehicle.

(U) China has deployed more than 1,000 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) with conventional warheads to brigades opposite Taiwan. China has also improved its SRBM capabilities in range, accuracy, and types of warheads, and it has fielded new SRBMs with advanced warheads such as a bunker penetrator. The bunker penetrator warhead is likely designed to destroy underground command centers or other major military facilities.

(U) China deploys two conventionally armed variants of the CSS-5 MRBM, designed to improve China's ability to strike regional targets beyond Taiwan. One of these variants - the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile gives the PLA the capability to attack aircraft carriers in the western Pacific Ocean. The DF-21D has a range exceeding 1,500 km and is armed with a maneuverable warhead.

(U) During its September 2015 parade, China unveiled the DF-26 ballistic missile. The DF-26 reportedly includes a MaRV and according to press reporting, is capable of conducting intermediate precision strikes against ground targets and medium or large-sized vessels at sea, as well as quick nuclear counterattacks.

(U) China continues to produce the JIN-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), with four already delivered and at least one more in construction. The JIN-class SSBNs could be armed with up to 12 JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), which are assessed to be a version of the CSS-10-series ICBM. The JIN class and the JL-2 give Beijing its first long-range, sea-based nuclear capability.

(U) Iran: Nuclear Program Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)

(U) On July 14, 2015, Iran, the EU, and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) agreed to the JCPOA, whereby Iran agreed to significantly curtail its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. By January 16, 2016, Iran implemented the necessary technical steps required by JCPOA. As long as Iran adheres to the JCPOA, the JCPOA limits Iran's pathway to a plutonium-based nuclear weapon for Iran, and hampers Iran's ability to conduct activities which could contribute to nuclear explosive device design and development.

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(U) The JCPOA enhances the transparency of Iran's nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and activities. It extends the time that Iran would need to produce weapons-grade uranium from two to three months to about a year. Further, as a result of the JCPOA, Iran's ability to produce and reprocess weapons-grade plutonium would be frozen for at least 15 years. Without a source of weapons-grade uranium or plutonium, Iran cannot produce a nuclear weapon.

(U) The international community is well positioned to quickly detect changes to Iran's declared nuclear facilities that could enable Tehran to shorten the time needed to produce fissile material. IAEA monitoring of uranium mills and centrifuge production—as well as Iran's provisional application of the Additional Protocol—also make it harder for Iran to divert these materials to support a covert program without being detected. The JCPOA also prohibits specific R&D activities that would contribute to the development of nuclear weapons and provides tools for the IAEA to investigate any possible breaches of these prohibitions.

(U) Under the JCPOA, a procurement channel was created that provides Iran with the opportunity for expanded access to civil nuclear goods, materials, and technology. Proposals for the transfer of nuclear-related items require approval by a procurement working group composed of representatives of the EU, the P5+1 and Iran. Any JCPOA participant can refer a procurement-related activity for dispute settlement if it is concerned that such activity is inconsistent with the JCPOA and any JCPOA participant can veto a particular procurement.

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~~(U) Iran: Missile Program~~

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(U) Russia: Chemical Weapons

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(U) Sudan: New Chemical Warfare Use Allegations

(U) In September 2016, Amnesty International published a report claiming the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) used chemical weapons during attacks on the inhabitants of the Jebel Marra area of Darfur since January. The report alleges the victims were exposed to chemicals during aerial bombardments and ground-based rocket attacks, based on photographic evidence, interviews with survivors, and descriptions of symptoms. Further evaluation of these claims is warranted; as a member of the CWC since 1999, Sudan is prohibited from developing, producing, acquiring, stockpiling, transferring, or using chemical weapons. The prohibition on use extends to riot control agents or other toxic chemicals if used as a means of warfare.

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(U) We assess that Syria has not declared all the elements of its program to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Despite the work of the Declaration Assessment Team to address gaps and inconsistencies in its CWC declaration, numerous issues remain unresolved, and the OPCW is concerned that Syria has not submitted a declaration that can be considered accurate and complete.

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~~(U) Syrian Deployed Missiles~~

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ANNEX A

to

ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

(U) Worldwide Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Weapons and Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat

For Fiscal Year 2017

(Addressing the Time Period 01 Oct 2014 to 30 Sep 2016)

~~Classified by: 149723
Derived from: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: 50X2-WMB~~

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(U) THIS INFORMATION IS PROVIDED ONLY FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES IN AN EFFORT TO DEVELOP POTENTIAL INVESTIGATIVE LEADS. IT MAY NOT BE USED IN ANY WAY THAT WILL EXPOSE OR JEOPARDIZE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS. IT CANNOT BE USED IN CONNECTION WITH ANY FOREIGN OR DOMESTIC COURT PROCEEDINGS OR FOR ANY OTHER LEGAL, JUDICIAL, OR ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES.

(U) This report includes information from FBI FISA collection. Such information, and any information derived therefrom, may only be used in a U.S. legal or administrative proceeding with the advance authorization of the Attorney General. Any recipient interested in obtaining authorization for such use in a U.S. legal or administrative proceeding should contact FBI headquarters. Any further dissemination for any other purpose must be made through FBI. Any reproduction, dissemination, or communication (including, but not limited to, oral briefings) of this information must be accompanied by a statement of these restrictions.

Information Cutoff Date: 1 October 2016

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(U) Introduction

(U) This classified annex accompanies the unclassified annual report to Congress for Fiscal Years 2015 and 2016 on worldwide threats from, and proliferation of, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic and cruise missiles. This annex is organized into three sections, which reflect the areas for the report that are required by section 2367 of title 50, United States Code.

(U) The first section provides Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE) assessments on threats to the United States, including U.S. forces abroad, and allies posed by states and nonstate organizations that possess WMD, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles.

(U) The second section provides DIE assessments on potential threats from states and nonstate organizations seeking to develop or acquire WMD, ballistic missile, and/or cruise missile capabilities. This section focuses exclusively on major potential advances in WMD-related threats or capabilities; Section 1 captures developments to extant WMD and missile capabilities.

(U) The third section provides DIE's assessments of trends from October 2015 through September 2016 in the acquisition of dual-use and other technology useful for the development or production of WMD.

(U) The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Defense Counterproliferation Office, with support from DIA regional centers—Asia/Pacific Regional Center (APRC), Europe/Eurasia Regional Center (EERC), and Middle East/Africa Regional Center (MARC)—and the U.S. Army National Ground Intelligence Center, wrote the WMD programs and proliferation portions. The National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) led authorship of the ballistic and cruise missile portions, with substantive contributions from DIA's Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC) and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). DIA's Defense Counterterrorism Center wrote the terrorism-related portions. DIA sought comments on this report from across the U.S. Intelligence Community, but its content constitutes assessments made by DoD intelligence agencies.