The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction provokes regional instability and challenges to the interests of the United States. The United States is an international leader in developing and sustaining global norms against the proliferation of these weapons and missiles. The United States is actively engaged in dialogues with several states in regions around the world to persuade them not to acquire these capabilities or to eliminate capabilities they might have already developed. The United States also is working with states to combat proliferation by assisting them in gaining and assuring greater control over their dual-use equipment and technology. States that gain weapons of mass destruction are able to pose a significant military threat to the interests of the United States, our allies, and friends. The Department of Defense actively contributes to overall U.S. efforts to stem proliferation wherever it occurs and from whatever source, including through active and passive defenses, and maintaining the credibility of our security commitments against military threats, including from adversaries armed with nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and the missiles to carry them. This section outlines the steps the Department is taking to respond to the challenge of proliferation, and DoD measures to respond to the military threats states pose with their NBC weapons, in support of overall U.S. government efforts to respond to this challenge.
Informed by lessons learned (and some unpleasant surprises) from the Gulf War against Iraq and by the systematic Bottom-Up Review that identified post-Cold War military requirements, DoD has developed the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative. As part of this initiative, the Secretary of Defense has directed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the operational Commanders in Chief (CINCs) responsible for the planning and conduct of military operations, and the military departments and their uniformed services give greater emphasis to counterproliferation requirements and considerations.
Specific objectives of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative are to: (1) prevent the acquisition of NBC weapons and their delivery systems, (2) roll back proliferation where it has occurred, (3) deter the use of NBC weapons and their delivery systems, and (4) adapt U.S. military forces and planning to respond to regional contingencies in which U.S., allied, and coalition forces face NBC threats. The ordering of objectives is deliberate. In line with national policy, proliferation prevention is the top priority.
To achieve these objectives, the Department of Defense has requested $165.2 million in FY 1996 for counterproliferation. This effort would fund specific high priority acquisition activities to provide required military capabilities. DoD will also use these funds to modify and adapt other programs (totalling $3.8 billion) that are strongly related to the counterproliferation mission.
The Defense Department plays a role in support of all facets of national counterproliferation policy. This overview begins with proliferation protection, for which DoD has unique responsibilities, and then reviews contributions to proliferation prevention.
One of the core objectives in proliferation protection policy is to convince potential and actual proliferants that NBC weapons will be of no value because the United States and its coalition partners will have the capability to deny or limit the political and military utility of NBC weapons, and because the damage inflicted by U.S. and coalition forces in response will far outweigh any potential benefits of use.
There is no simple solution or single response to the threat posed by the proliferation of NBC weapons and their delivery systems. As is essential with all new initiatives, the right balance has to be struck between thorough, step-by-step planning and early action to remedy long identified shortfalls. A comprehensive review of the military missions and functions related to counterproliferation has been completed to ensure that all aspects of the issue are assessed. DoD assessments have been coordinated with congressionally mandated national reviews. Several acquisition programs already in the pipeline have been augmented to remedy identified shortfalls. Proliferation protection measures can be grouped into five areas of emphasis: policy, military planning and operations, acquisition, intelligence, and international cooperation initiatives. While much work is yet to be done to acquire the required capabilities, there have been significant achievements to date.
President Clinton's September 1993 policy statement to the United Nations General Assembly established the groundwork for building a new consensus within the United States and with our friends and allies abroad concerning counterproliferation objectives.
Early in his Administration, President Clinton issued guidance defining national nonproliferation policy objectives. Responding to this guidance, the Secretary of Defense issued DoD implementation instructions. Counterproliferation objectives and capabilities are now routinely addressed in the Department's planning and programming processes, with prominent emphasis in the Defense Planning Guidance. Military planning, training, and exercises now give much more emphasis to proliferation when potential major regional contingencies are addressed.
The underlying objective of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative is to make counterproliferation one of the matters that is routinely given consideration within the Department's activities. Counterproliferation is not of a unique nature requiring a stand-alone organizational structure. Rather, counterproliferation considerations have ramifications for virtually every aspect of the defense mission in this new security era and, therefore, should be embedded in the day-to-day operations. Secretary Perry has directed the establishment of a DoD Directive to fully reinforce implementation of counterproliferation policy. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy has been assigned responsibility for the development and implementation of DoD's counterproliferation policy.
Proliferation protection is based on the enhancement and utilization of existing resources. Proliferation protection requires a broad range of capabilities, including effective strategic and tactical intelligence; battlefield surveillance; counterforce; active defense; passive defense; and response to paramilitary, covert, and terrorist threats.
Military Planning and Operations
One of the objectives of the DoD Counterproliferation Initiative is to integrate proliferation concerns into the existing DoD defense planning process. At the request of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) conducted a review of the missions of the CINCs and functions of the armed services in support of the counterproliferation policy. To guide his study, the CJCS issued terms of reference for counterproliferation activities to combatant commanders that cover situations where the military might be called upon to support U.S. policy. The study addressed how the Services organize, train, and equip their forces to support the counterproliferation policy and the missions, responsibilities, and force structure of each combatant command.
The final report of the Missions and Functions Study was approved by the Secretary of Defense on May 5, 1995. It recommended that counterproliferation be assigned to the U.S. armed forces as a military mission. On May 24, 1995, the President subsequently revised the Unified Command Plan to reflect this decision. The mission to counter the proliferation of NBC weapons was assigned to those combatant commanders (CINCs) most directly responsible for carrying out the defense of U.S. national interests overseas where proliferation occurs and its immediate impact is felt -- namely, the CINCs with geographic areas of responsibility. The assignment of counterproliferation as a definitive military mission will result in optimized organizational arrangements between supported and supporting CINCs, development of counterproliferation-specific operational concepts, and tailored relationships between the CINCs and the U.S. Intelligence Community and other government agencies that will improve U.S. forces' ability to operate and prevail against an NBC-armed adversary.
The CINCs, Services, and Joint Staff are already engaged in planning activities to support the overall U.S. government effort against NBC threats. The Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) was commissioned by the CJCS to evaluate the overall U.S. military effort to respond to the challenges of the new global security environment. The CJCS designated counterproliferation as one of the nine central Joint Warfighting Capabilities to be addressed in this ongoing series of assessments. Working from national goals identified in the President's National Security Strategy, the JWCA translates these national goals into military objectives and requirements, and then identifies the military capabilities and programs necessary to meet those requirements.
The key to effective planning for the operational challenges posed by proliferation is a detailed analytical understanding of this new security challenge and its implications for current U.S. strategy. Based on this analysis, the Department is determining initiatives that optimize solutions to the complex and myriad challenges posed by a future adversary's use or threatened use of NBC weapons.
Joint Staff planners have been working with the CINCs to refine counterproliferation priorities and required enhancements to U.S. military capabilities for all warfighting missions. As a result, the CINCs have developed a list of required capabilities to meet the NBC proliferation threat. The CINCs place highest priority on those missions where the most leverage could be exercised in a short time by fielding quickly enhanced capabilities. This is in line with their responsibility to be prepared to employ their forces for deterrence and defense, immediately.
The CINCs' number one priority for enhancing their counterproliferation capabilities is improved equipment to detect and characterize chemical weapons (CW) and biological weapons (BW) threats, particularly at long ranges. The wide variety of chemical and biological agents calls for a variety of protective measures. Detection and characterization is one element of passive defense. Thus, the ability to detect, range, and track CW and BW clouds, particularly at long ranges, provides additional early warning time for units at risk of attack.
The next CINC priority is the ability to intercept cruise missiles. Emphasis continues to be placed on ballistic missile intercept, but the widening availability of cruise missile technology (particularly the development and potential proliferation of low-observable cruise missile technology) requires military planners to prepare for this emerging challenge. For counterproliferation, these intercept capabilities are termed active defenses. These capabilities are particularly relevant for counterproliferation because cruise missiles are an extremely effective delivery system for BW and certain CW attacks.
Improved capabilities for the identification, characterization, and defeat of underground targets are the next set of CINC priorities. Proliferants are increasingly making use of underground facilities as they respond to the demonstrated effectiveness in the Gulf War of U.S. precision conventional munitions. For counterproliferation, the capabilities to address these targets are termed counterforce. Further discussion of this issue can be found in the Acquisition (Counterforce) portion of this section. Similarly, CINC-designated requirements concerning improvements in intelligence capabilities are addressed in the Intelligence and Acquisition (Counterforce/Battlefield Surveillance) sections.
The regional commanders have identified additional requirements for improved passive defense capabilities to operate successfully in NBC environments. Biological vaccines are one example. One of the key ingredients to dissuading proliferators from acquiring or using these weapons is eliminating the value of NBC weapons and the delivery systems to the proliferant. Passive defenses that allow sustained combat and logistical operations in the face of attacks by NBC weapons and their delivery systems are among the best ways to accomplish this.
Disabling above-ground NBC infrastructure, both production capabilities as well as weapons in storage and on delivery systems, is a CINC priority that poses some unique challenges. Collateral effects, e.g., the dispersal of nuclear, CW, or BW material following an attack, are of concern. Improved capabilities for prediction and minimization of collateral effects are required. A related priority involves new munitions for biological and chemical agent defeat. It may do little good to destroy an incoming missile if the CW or BW agent is released anyway, perhaps over U.S. or coalition forces.
Other items on the CINCs' priority list being pursued and discussed later in this section include improvements in capabilities for the detection and tracking of NBC shipments; prompt mobile target kill; support for Special Operations Forces; and the ability to locate, detect, and disarm NBC weapons in the United States and overseas.
The CINCs, working through the JCS, identify their requirements for passive defense, active defense, counterforce, and capabilities against covert/paramilitary threats. The DoD acquisition strategy accelerates programs to meet these requirements, redressing shortfalls and funding research and development (R&D) to provide capabilities that cannot be met with current systems and technologies. The JWCA Counterproliferation Team is a mechanism for providing linkage between regional commanders' requirements and the Department's R&D investment programs.
To provide focus for the Defense acquisition strategy, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy has been designated as the lead for counterproliferation programs within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The same official serves as the oversight authority for chemical/biological defense programs.
At the direction of Congress, a Non-Proliferation Program Review Committee (NPRC) was constituted in 1994. In its May 1994 report to Congress, the primary volume of which has been made available to the public, this committee identified key areas in which progress was needed to improve government-wide capabilities for proliferation prevention and protection. DoD established the Counterproliferation Support Program specifically to address the DoD shortfalls in operational capabilities identified by the NPRC. Congress provided the Counterproliferation Support Program with $60 million in FY 1995 to jump-start the program, and $108.2 million has been requested by the Administration in FY 1996 to accelerate the development and deployment of essential military counterproliferation technologies and capabilities. In addition, $57 million was added to the existing cruise missile defense programs (in the FY 1996 President's Budget Submission), bringing the total DoD enhancement for FY 1996 to $165.2 million. These funds assist the Department in addressing specific counterproliferation priorities in tandem with the existing DoD-wide FY 1996 investment of approximately $3.8 billion in programs related to countering proliferation (of which $2.4 billion is research, development, test and engineering (RDT&E) funding to provide an active defense capability).
A follow-on Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC) comprised of the Secretary of Defense (chairman), Secretary of Energy, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was constituted by Congress to provide status reports on activities to accomplish improvements identified by the NPRC. The result is a coordinated national investment strategy for counterproliferation. Details are contained in the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation, May 1995. Again, in the interest of informing the public, most of this committee's product has been released for general distribution.
The Department is focusing its investments in military systems to support counterproliferation in four areas: passive defense; active defense; counterforce; and measures to counter paramilitary, covert, and terrorist NBC threats.
It should be noted that the programs outlined below represent proposed, new, and ongoing DoD projects and new initiatives strongly related to countering proliferation. General purpose and defense infrastructure programs, such as the development and procurement programs for the various military weapon delivery platforms, are not included because they contribute to the basic capabilities of U.S. forces as well as capabilities for countering proliferation. Most of the new investments leverage existing and other in-development capabilities.
In response to congressional direction, the Defense Department has established an integrated Chemical-Biological Defense (CBD) program under the oversight of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy. The same official has oversight responsibility for the Joint Program Office for Biological Defense created to provide management oversight for critical BW defense acquisition programs, including BW vaccine production and BW agent battlefield detection programs. The Counterproliferation Support Program leverages existing programs to accelerate the fielding of critical systems and technologies.
Passive defense involves military capabilities that provide protection against NBC weapon effects. Passive defense programs involve contamination avoidance (reconnaissance, detection, and warning), force protection (individual and collective protection and medical support), and decontamination.
Within the contamination avoidance area, sensors for joint task forces, mobile BW/CW reconnaissance, and systems capable of detecting multiple BW/CW agents and characterizing new agents are being developed. Technological advances are being pursued in remote detection, miniaturization, lower detection limits, logistics supportability, and biological detection capability.
In the force protection area, improved mask systems and advanced protective clothing are being developed under a joint program that will reduce the weight, heat stress, and logistics burden of current gear. Medical research is providing improved prophylaxes, antidotes, treatments, vaccines, and medical casualty management systems. Lightweight BW/CW protective shelters and integrated collective protection technology advances are also supported.
For decontamination, modular systems are being developed. Technology development programs to examine advances in sorbents, coatings catalysis, and physical removal are supported. The CBD program also includes projects to protect U.S. forces from nuclear and radiological weapons effects, including detection and warning sensors, individual and collective protection, medical response, and decontamination. The total RDT&E and procurement budget for the CBD program in FY 1996 is about $350 million.
As a counterpart to these activities, the Counterproliferation Support Program leverages existing programs to accelerate the deployment of important systems. Specifically, the program is supporting projects to: (1) accelerate (by up to six years) the fielding of an advanced long-range eye-safe infrared lidar (laser detection device) to provide long-range battlefield warning of CW/BW use; (2) explore whether ultraviolet multifrequency lasers can be employed to detect and characterize biological agents by their fluorescent spectra; (3) develop miniaturized BW/CW point detectors with increased sensitivity that are amenable to installation on unmanned aerial vehicles; (4) accelerate (by two years) the procurement of improved individual protective clothing and collective protective equipment; (5) supplement the CBD decontamination technology base; and (6) enhance existing joint NBC doctrine and training procedures by intensified battlefield simulation. Approximately $30 million has been budgeted in FY 1996 for these passive defense elements of the Counterproliferation Support Program.
The Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) and the military departments also manage a number of passive defense programs. DNA has programs to ensure the survivability of weapons systems in a nuclear environment; $95.5 million has been budgeted for these investments in FY 1996. The Navy's Radiological Controls program provides RDT&E of radiation monitoring equipment for Navy and Marine Corps use. The Army's programs include the operation of Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, as the primary test range for biological and chemical defense equipment and the Nuclear Effects Survivability program, which develops technology to enhance the survivability of Army systems in nuclear environments. Additional details may be found in the May 1995 Counterproliferation Program Review Committee Report.
This facet of counterproliferation involves programs that improve capabilities to detect, track, identify, intercept and destroy, and neutralize NBC warheads delivered by airborne launch platforms, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles, while minimizing collateral effects.
To address the security challenges posed by the proliferation of NBC weapons and the ballistic missiles used to deliver them, DoD is continuing to implement the new priorities established for ballistic missile defense identified in the Department-wide Bottom-Up Review. These new priorities respond to the end of the Cold War. They focus on requirements to prepare for major regional contingencies that may involve adversaries with NBC weapons.
The threat of the use of ballistic missiles has grown enormously over the past two decades. Ballistic missiles have been used in six regional conflicts since 1973. During the Gulf War, the United States and its Coalition partners were unable to locate Iraq's mobile launchers and halt ballistic missile attacks. Ballistic missiles -- coupled with NBC weapons -- will pose an even greater threat to U.S. security and that of allies and other friendly nations. To effectively counter such threats, a layered defense is optimal, with effort being made to attack prior, at, or immediately after launch so that NBC warhead debris and contamination do not land on friendly territory or troops. While engagement prior to launch is optimal, it may be more practical in some situations to engage missiles after they are launched. The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) has the lead in this technology and acquisition effort.
To achieve active defense against missiles armed with NBC warheads in a theater conflict, DoD has developed a theater missile defense (TMD) architecture that will entail deployment of multilayered defenses. These layers consist of a lower tier including Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3), Navy area TMD, and Corps Surface-to-Air Missile/ Medium Extended Air Defense System (SAM/ MEADS), and an upper tier comprising Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Navy wide-area TMD; and boost phase intercept.
The technologies necessary to destroy enemy ballistic missiles during boost phase soon after launch are still being developed. Additional efforts are aimed at gaining a better understanding of the dispersion of BW/CW agents in flight and methods for neutralizing them to reduce collateral effects associated with ballistic and cruise missile engagements.
BMDO is currently conducting several TMD programs including: (1) boost phase intercept; (2) demonstration, validation, and engineering manufacturing development for various TMD concepts including Patriot PAC-3, THAAD, the Navy Upper Tier and Lower Tier Systems and Corps SAM/ MEADS; (3) advanced sensor technology and innovative science and technology RDT&E programs for post-2000 defense systems; (4) threat and countermeasures projects that define adversary military systems to ensure a robust defense system; and (5) assessment, modeling, and experimental activities involving collateral effects release associated with attacking cruise and ballistic missiles armed with NBC weapons. BMDO has budgeted approximately $2.4 billion in FY 1996 to support these programs.
BMDO active defense programs are supplemented by a number of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Navy, and Air Force programs. In its air defense initiative, DARPA is developing the Mountain Top radar for defense against manned aircraft, cruise missiles, and theater ballistic missiles; $45.6 million has been budgeted for the program in FY 1996. BMDO and the Navy will also provide FY 1996 funding for the Mountain Top ACTD (Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration). DARPA's Enhanced Program for Cruise Missile Defense will provide additional sensor platforms and fire control capabilities to accelerate its overall air defense initiative; $57 million has been budgeted for this program in FY 1996.
The Air Force is managing three programs in this area: the Theater Missile Defense program, the Airborne Laser (ABL) program, and the Space Sensor and Satellite Communication Technology program. The Air Force will field one ABL prototype with a contingency capability in 2001. The ABL destroys theater ballistic missiles in the boost phase, causing debris to fall on enemy territory, and it also provides a rapidly deployable wide-area defense capability. Approximately $47 million has been budgeted for these activities in FY 1996.
This component of counterproliferation involves development of military capabilities to target (using battlefield surveillance and other intelligence assets), plan attacks, seize, disable, destroy, disrupt, interdict, neutralize, or deny the use of NBC weapons and launch platforms and their supporting command, control, and communications (C3); logistics structure; and reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition platforms while minimizing collateral effects. Attack operations include action by air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces.
In the counterforce area, DoD is working to improve capabilities to defeat NBC threats before they can be used against U.S., allied, and coalition forces and noncombatants. U.S. forces must be capable of a rapid and effective response to contingencies throughout the world. Resources are being applied to improving capabilities for battlefield surveillance, target characterization, and munition/ agent defeat.
For battlefield surveillance, DoD is improving capabilities to detect, identify, and characterize NBC forces and associated infrastructure elements in a timely manner to support targeting, mission/ strike planning, and post-strike battle damage assessments (BDA). Emphasis is being placed on continuous wide-area surveillance; detection of mobile targets (particularly NBC-armed mobile missile launchers) and improved BDA capabilities. DoD is also enhancing capabilities for the integration and analysis of sensor inputs. These capabilities are required to provide the data needed to support attacks in the often very limited time windows available before mobile targets move from previously identified locations. As the Gulf War demonstrated, this is an extremely challenging problem. We were not successful in attempts to detect and destroy mobile SCUD-class theater ballistic missiles prior to launch. Such missions require the orchestration of inputs from sensors in near real-time and the prompt response of weapon systems capable of defeating these targets.
Target characterization -- accurate information concerning the locations and characteristics of NBC related facilities -- is required for counterforce operations. The detection and characterization of hardened underground NBC facilities are particularly vital given the challenges of defeating these targets. An underground location does not preclude a facility from being located, characterized, and defeated. The warfighter needs intelligence information that characterizes the NBC facility, ideally to the level of resolution needed to direct precision munitions against the most critical elements within it. This information needs to be supplemented with modeling tools that can assist in target characterization and selecting the most effective weapon.
To make effective use of this target information, our forces must have weapons that are capable of penetrating through walls and other barriers that provide protection for above- and below-ground structures. They must also have munitions that can defeat the NBC targets engaged. For biological and chemical weapon targets, new types of agent defeat munitions are needed. These systems must be able to perform their missions in scenarios in which NBC targets are protected by air defenses and (in the future) missile defenses. Concurrently, there is a requirement for a new system for the prediction of the collateral hazards that might result from attacks on NBC targets. The collateral effects induced by damage to the chemical or biological weapon targets may be far more significant than the direct and collateral effects induced by the munitions used in the attack.
The Counterproliferation Support Program is supporting several specific projects in the counterforce area. The investments focus on sensors, collateral effects mitigation, weapon effects and target response, advanced weapons and warheads, munitions for neutralization of chemical and biological agents, concepts for defeat of tunnels, and a Counterproliferation ACTD.
Priorities for new sensors to support counterforce operations include tactical Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS) and airborne forward looking infrared radar for target surveillance, characterization, battle damage assessment and collateral effects monitoring, and developing a weapon-borne sensor to enhance underground target bomb damage assessment; $9.3 million has been budgeted in FY 1996 for these programs as part of the Sensor Technology Project.
Improving our understanding of collateral effects release phenomenology and transport is a priority for counterforce attacks against NBC targets. Approximately $8.9 million has been budgeted in FY 1996 for source term characterization and transport prediction, phenomenology experiments, and assessment tools.
Improving the state of knowledge in weapons effects and target vulnerability/response is required to ensure that counterforce operations are effective. Over $9 million has been budgeted in FY 1996 for experimental and analytical assessment of NBC target vulnerability response and automated target planning for NBC targets/proliferation path assessments to assist in target identification and strike planning.
Developing advanced penetrating weapons and advanced warheads/payloads for enhanced lethality and functional kill against hard underground targets is required because some proliferants have opted to locate their NBC capabilities in underground or otherwise hard-to-defeat locations and facilities. In FY 1996, $14.3 million has been budgeted to develop an enhanced penetrating munition to defeat underground targets. It will be compatible with most tactical delivery platforms and have all-weather, anti-jam precision guidance capability. Additionally, $3.5 million has been budgeted in FY 1996 for development of a high temperature incendiary weapon payload and a classified payload.
Concern regarding collateral effects has prompted efforts to develop new types of biological and chemical agent neutralization weapons. Approximately $4 million has been budgeted in FY 1996 for development of prototype agent defeat munitions.
We are also emphasizing tunnel defeat concepts, target response, and vulnerability assessment because some proliferants have opted to make use of these very difficult-to-defeat facilities. Approximately $9.9 million has been budgeted in FY 1996 to assess tunnel response and vulnerability.
ACTDs are a new approach to acquisition. They rapidly integrate and demonstrate new military applications of current technologies. They are performed for a warfighting command customer and provide (following demonstration) a small quantity of new prototype systems. Responding to a CINC priority, a Counterproliferation ACTD is being conducted to integrate advanced sensors, mission planning tools, collateral effects prediction capability, and enhanced conventional weapons. The ACTD is designed to support rapid fielding of these new capabilities; $2.7 million has been budgeted for this program in FY 1996.
These new DoD counterforce initiatives are supplemented by current DARPA and DNA programs. The DARPA "Warbreaker" or Critical Mobile Targets Project is focusing on Distributed Interactive Simulation to support R&D activities associated with sensor systems, communication sites, and information processing systems to detect, identify, and prosecute high value, time-critical fixed and mobile targets such as theater ballistic missiles, tanks, and artillery; $135 million has been budgeted for this project in FY 1996. DNA's weapon system lethality program is developing lethality criteria for a full spectrum of weapons, including precision guided munitions and advanced conventional and unconventional payloads. The target base includes hard and superhard underground facilities, fixed surface facilities, and seabased structures; $46 million has been budgeted for this project in FY 1996.
MEASURES TO COUNTER PARAMILITARY, COVERT, AND TERRORIST THREATS
Acquisition investments in this category are intended to protect military and civilian personnel, facilities, and logistical/mobilization nodes from this special class of NBC threats, both in the United States and overseas. This category of threat is increasing. Particularly challenging is the threat of covertly emplaced NBC weapons. The chemical weapon attack on the Tokyo subway by Japanese terrorists is a grim example. DoD is actively pursuing several activities to counter paramilitary, covert delivery, and terrorist NBC threats and protect military facilities and logistical/mobilization nodes against these threats. These include supporting, training, and equipping Joint Special Operations Forces, Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) teams, and NBC weapon response teams to detect, neutralize, and render safe NBC devices both in the United States and overseas. These DoD capabilities can be provided to assist appropriate U.S. government authorities in countering these threats, operating within the parameters provided by law and regulation; the Defense Department is not a domestic police agency.
DoD is devoting significant resources to developing the necessary technical means to counter NBC paramilitary, covert delivery, and terrorist threats. Much effort is underway in tactical intelligence and related programs to conduct counterproliferation missions. Other programs include development of special warfare and C3 equipment, airbase protection programs, Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) support activities, multi-Service EOD teams, and RDT&E of advanced technologies to support the U.S. Special Operations Command and EOD operations. Just over $12 million has been budgeted for these programs in FY 1996.
New DoD initiatives to counter paramilitary/covert and terrorist NBC threats are being supported by the Counterproliferation Support Program. These efforts are focused on developing an effective response to chemical and biological threats through development of BW/CW emergency response teams modeled on Department of Energy's NEST. Projects underway include evaluation of military facility NBC defense and developing enabling technologies and equipment to support and fund joint training exercises to improve readiness of NBC response teams. Just under $5 million has been budgeted for these projects in FY 1996. The Department of Energy national laboratories are also contributing to these projects, including work with DNA's Nuclear Incident Program to improve military base and mobilization/logistical node defense against nuclear threats.
Finally, the Navy's Joint Service Explosive Ordinance Disposal Systems program develops specialized EOD equipment and tools required for detecting, locating, and rendering safe NBC munitions. The Navy has budgeted about $4.8 million for this program in FY 1996.
Effective intelligence support is critical to all aspects of the DoD counterproliferation effort. To assist Department officials in taking advantage of proliferation prevention and protection opportunities, the Intelligence Community must provide accurate and timely intelligence assessments on the motivations and plans of leaders in states that may elect to develop NBC weapon capabilities, the clandestine procurement networks used by these states, the status of their NBC weapon programs, and locations of both weapon production capabilities and deployed weapons. Information on NBC weapon-related intentions, capabilities, and activities of transnational groups, such as ethnic or regional movements, terrorists groups, or organized criminal elements, also is needed. This is a demanding set of requirements. The dual-use nature of many technologies involved in NBC and delivery systems development complicate these tasks.
The Intelligence Community has taken steps to improve the management and coordination of intelligence support to DoD customers. As part of this effort, additional DoD personnel -- including the addition of a military deputy -- have been assigned to the DCI's Nonproliferation Center (NPC) -- the Intelligence Community body that orchestrates intelligence activities related to proliferation. NPC and the Intelligence Community have instituted a new strategic planning, resource guidance, and evaluation process that better serves overall counterproliferation efforts. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), however, remains the prime conduit for national-level intelligence support to the Defense Department. To better focus its intelligence support to counterproliferation, it created an Office for Counterproliferation and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Assessments.
As the threat from proliferants has increased, the Intelligence Community has provided timely information in support of diplomatic, law enforcement, and military efforts to prevent proliferation. The successes of these efforts range from providing actionable intelligence to decisionmakers so they can attempt to stop specific activities to supporting the development of U.S. strategies to deal with proliferators.
Moreover, intelligence programs provide the critical input to the challenges for military planning and operations -- chemical and biological agent detection, characterization of underground activities, information on weapon design to facilitate disabling activities, locating and identifying mobile targets, and calculating weapons effects. In addition, increasingly accurate U.S. weapons require even more fine-grained intelligence information on proliferants' facilities and weapons effects.
Particular emphasis has been given to providing increased warning time before potential adversaries translate technological potential for proliferation into operational NBC weapon capabilities. U.S. acquisition -- and even training and doctrine -- lead times do not permit the luxury of a "wait and see" approach. With lead times for new U.S. capabilities sometimes as long as five to ten years, DoD needs to be able to anticipate the threats that might be faced in future regional contingencies through early analysis of a proliferant's NBC weapons efforts. To meet this requirement, the Intelligence Community has established new working arrangements with the technical expertise of the Department of Energy and its national labs. This has expanded from a primarily nuclear focus to include chemical and biological weapon threat detection, characterization, and analysis.
It is very likely that we will not fight alone on the battlefields of the future. Future conflicts are likely to involve coalition operations, as was the case in the Gulf War. Building and maintaining coalitions in such conflicts will be one of the keys to successful military operations. The ability to protect our populations, territory, and forces, and those of our friends and allies, therefore, becomes a paramount consideration in building and maintaining coalitions, as well as succeeding in military operations. As a result, the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative places great emphasis on international cooperation in preparation for future crises or conflicts where the threat or use of NBC weapons may be present.
DoD has been working with America's long-time allies in Europe and Asia to develop a common approach to counterproliferation. Following President Clinton's emphasis at the January 1994 NATO Summit on the danger to Alliance members from NBC proliferation, significant progress has been made in integrating counterproliferation policy into the new, post-Cold War agenda of the Alliance.
At the summit, NATO Heads of State directed that the Alliance intensify and expand its political and defense efforts against proliferation. Three groups were subsequently created: the Joint Committee on Proliferation (JCP), which monitors overall Alliance efforts; the Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP), which focuses on how NATO can reinforce traditional nonproliferation efforts; and the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP), which examines the defense aspects of proliferation, including the military capabilities needed to discourage NBC proliferation, deter NBC weapons use, and if necessary, to protect NATO territory, populations, and forces.
In May 1994, NATO approved two milestone documents: a political framework paper structuring the broad political-military approach of the Alliance to proliferation, and a three-phase workplan for the DGP to address the defense implications of proliferation. The DGP is co-chaired by the United States and one of the European Allies on a rotating basis. France provided the first European co-chair. Having assessed the risks posed by the proliferation of NBC weapons to the Alliance, the DGP has begun the next phase of its work, in which it is grappling with the operational implications of the threat or use of NBC weapons for Alliance military capabilities. In this task, NATO is building on the relevant capabilities of the national militaries and the ongoing work of NATO planning groups. NATO is working to establish a framework for defense activities related to proliferation and to reach conclusions on the full spectrum of Alliance and national capabilities needed to deal with the range of proliferation threats.
The DGP's work is an important part of the Alliance's continuing adaptation to the new security environment. NATO shows that the United States is not alone in its concern for the defense dimension of proliferation. Today, the Alliance sees dealing with proliferation as one of its key missions. This demonstrates that the Alliance remains committed -- indeed, well-qualified -- to address emerging security concerns. It also provides a tangible example of the continued interest of the European allies in cooperative transatlantic security with the United States.
The Government of Japan has also recognized the growing danger from attacks with missiles, including those armed with NBC warheads, the need to strengthen the defensive capabilities of U.S. and Japanese forces, and the necessity of maintaining capabilities for combined joint operations. To meet this threat, the United States and Japan are working to identify the theater missile defense capability Japan will need and to evaluate options for acquiring that capability in future years, including opportunities for cooperative programs.
DoD is currently beginning other cooperative efforts with allies. A defense science symposium involving participants from the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia was conducted in the United States in March 1995. This symposium focused on counterproliferation technology applications and on the identification of opportunities for collaborative research and development to enhance counterproliferation capabilities. The United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom have initiated a cooperative R&D program to improve capabilities for detecting, characterizing, and providing protection against biological and chemical agents based on lessons learned during the Gulf War.
Proliferation prevention is the United States' primary objective. DoD contributions to proliferation prevention are part of a coordinated national effort involving multiple departments and agencies, allied states, and international organizations. Defense Department support includes the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, export control activities and DoD inspection, verification, and enforcement support for the treaties and arms control regimes that limit NBC weapons and associated delivery systems. The Defense Department also plays an important role in the four thrusts involved in proliferation prevention -- denial, reassurance, dissuasion, and actions to reverse proliferation.
International norms and standards make an important contribution to proliferation prevention. In addition to creating an atmosphere of restraint, they may provide the preconditions, e.g., inspections, that impede proliferation. These international norms can be specifically agreed to in export control and arms control agreements or they can result from informal arrangements between states.
A great success in the area of norm establishment has been DoD support for the unconditional and indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT, which became effective in 1970, establishes obligations for both nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapons states regarding the transfer, manufacture, or acquisition of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It allows all parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy while at the same time prohibiting transfer and acquisition of nuclear weapon capabilities.
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program
The CTR program provides the services, tools, and technology required to help the New Independent States (NIS) with the elimination or reduction of weapons of mass destruction and to modernize and expand safeguards against proliferation within the NIS. The program consists currently of nearly 40 separate projects, grouped into three categories, reflecting the objectives established by Congress.
First, Destruction and Dismantlement activities help with the dismantlement and elimination of weapons of mass destruction and their launchers in the four eligible states where they remain (Russia, Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine). The availability of U.S. assistance encourages these countries to undertake the dismantling of weapons, and then the CTR program provides the actual equipment, services, and training required to implement their dismantlement decisions. Specifically, CTR Dismantlement and Destruction activities are:
Projects in this area assist in the dismantlement or destruction of strategic nuclear missiles, silo launchers, liquid and solid rocket propellants, and Russian chemical weapons. Also included is assistance in the destruction of the launcher tubes in ballistic missile-firing submarines, the elimination of heavy bombers, and the elimination or conversion of the infrastructure (hardware and personnel) that supports these systems.
Second, through chain of custody activities, the CTR program decreases the dangers from the nuclear weapons and fissile materials that remain in the NIS, particularly Russia. During the difficult and uncertain period of transition in these states, the continued secure chain of custody of nuclear weapons and materials is vitally important to both the United States and the NIS. Chain of Custody activities enhance security, safety, and control of nuclear weapons and fissile material in Russia by assisting in centralizing fissile material in a limited number of storage areas and strengthening safety, security, and control during movement and interim storage. Projects provide assistance to enhance effective controls over nuclear weapons and the fissile materials removed from them throughout the drawdown and dismantlement of these weapons. This includes providing safe and secure transportation of nuclear weapons from operational sites and storage areas to dismantlement facilities; improved security and accountability for weapons in transit; safer and more secure storage and transport of fissile material removed from nuclear weapons by providing storage containers; and designing, equipping, and assisting in construction of centralized fissile material storage facilities.
Finally, CTR supports Demilitarization efforts. CTR Demilitarization activities are encouraging the demilitarization of Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakstan, and Russia by supporting conversion of NIS defense enterprises, expanding defense military contacts, and reemploying weapons scientists. These activities are decreasing the long-term threat by reducing the capacity and economic pressures in the NIS to continue to produce weapons of mass destruction.
CTR supported defense conversion industrial partnerships help to reduce the potential of a future nuclear threat at its source, as do international science and technology centers the United States and other countries have set up in Moscow and Kiev. Through these centers, former Soviet nuclear scientists and engineers are being reemployed in peaceful, civilian endeavors. These projects reduce the supply of weapons of mass destruction available for foreign sale, the incentives for relying on such sales for income, and provide job alternatives for weapons scientists who might otherwise be tempted to sell their nuclear expertise abroad. The defense conversion investments under CTR are win-win-win -- they help reduce the threats from weapons of mass destruction; they help the NIS build peaceful, commercially viable market economies while reducing excess military capacity; and they provide opportunities for U.S. industry's entry into potentially large markets for civilian goods and services.
CTR has gone far to reduce the threat of proliferation within and outside the former Soviet Union in the three short years of its existence, and the bulk of the achievements have been in just the past year. The program has facilitated the return to Russia of over 1,700 warheads from Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine; the removal to secure storage of over 2,800 warheads from missile and bomber bases; the deactivation of four regiments of SS-19 ICBMs in Ukraine; the removal of 750 missiles from their launchers; and the elimination of approximately 630 strategic launchers and 91 bombers throughout the NIS. CTR assistance also helped prompt Ukraine to begin early deactivation and shipment to Russia of SS-19 and SS-24 warheads and to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state, thereby allowing the Start I treaty to enter into force -- a key nonproliferation success.
CTR has contributed to other efforts to prevent proliferation. Over 5,000 former Soviet weapon scientists and engineers once engaged in nuclear weapons research are now or soon will be employed on peaceful, civilian research projects, thus reducing the threat of the transfer of their deadly expertise to potential proliferant states. The Project Sapphire mission in November 1994 to remove 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium to the United States from Kazakstan was partially financed with CTR funds.
Denial involves carefully targeted export controls and the disruption of weapons and technology trade which would assist the potential proliferant in obtaining NBC weapons and delivery systems. U.S. export control policy has two principal objectives. First, we want to stop -- or at least retard -- the transfer to potential proliferant states of those technologies which could permit them to design, manufacture, or acquire NBC weapons and their delivery systems and other dangerous armaments. Second, we want to monitor flows of dual-use technologies that are acceptable in themselves, but which if diverted or applied to military end uses could have a negative impact on our national security interests. Some of the key objectives are as presented below:
|"Although we recognize that export controls cannot be 100 percent effective in preventing individual transfers, we are convinced that such efforts buy us time to implement other measures to mitigate the impact of these transfers. We believe that a more focused approach of the denial strategy -- concentrating on those key enabling technologies that are produced by a limited number of states -- will, if applied universally, raise the cost to, and increase the difficulty encountered by, even the most determined proliferant."|
|Mitchel B. Wallerstein|
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Presentation to the Conference on Dealing
with the Spread of Nuclear Weapons
The Hague, May 19-20, 1995
DoD's technology security program is designed to prevent the transfer of dangerous and sensitive technologies to countries that pose security threats. When technology is transferred to a country that does not pose a threat, DoD contributes to national efforts to ensure that the transfer is done in a manner that does not endanger U.S. interests or compromise our national security. In addition to controlling transfers of destabilizing conventional weapons and associated dual-use technologies, DoD's technology security program supports the Department's Counterproliferation Initiative.
The Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) provides unique military expertise in the processes used to review export applications and serves as the primary DoD agent for executing DoD's portion of the U.S. denial strategy. In order to prioritize export control reviews as they apply to chokepoints, DTSA applies the OSD Critical Technology Support Program, a congressionally mandated mechanism for identifying the most important, militarily relevant technologies. Assistance is provided by the Department of Energy's Office of Energy Intelligence, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Defense Nuclear Agency, and other DoD components. Defense Department and other U.S. Intelligence Community organizations actively support the export review process by identifying the key technologies that enable NBC proliferation. Intelligence provides important information on pending or ongoing foreign shipments of critical materials, to include technical assessments of materials and whether they are intended for legitimate civilian use or for military applications.
These analysts also provide critical information on how proliferants acquire technologies and materials through the use of complicated covert procurement networks. Because many of these networks include maritime transport, the Counterproliferation Support Program is directly supporting the deployment this year of the Navy's Specific Emitter Identification (SEI) System to improve DoD's capabilities to identify and track ships at sea suspected of transporting NBC weapons, delivery systems, and NBC related materials. DoD has budgeted approximately $2.8 million to continue the development of special SEI equipment in FY 1996.
These intelligence capabilities will help the United States maintain and strengthen controls on critical technologies. These controls can have a dramatic effect on slowing the pace of programs and raising their costs. This contribution is important to the ongoing efforts to focus and strengthen key international export control regimes. These capabilities can also be used to support diplomatic demarches and international inspections. Accurate and timely information on a proliferant's activities and intentions can be used to build a global consensus that international norms have been violated.
While DoD shares responsibility for U.S. policy on international regimes with the State Department, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and others, the Defense Department provides unique technical and military expertise vital to making these regimes effective. In addition to intelligence support, DoD participates in the negotiation of these regimes, providing valuable operational and technical knowledge.
DoD also plays a leadership role in the implementation of many arms control and nonproliferation regimes. For example, DNA has focused efforts on technologies to assist in verification of arms control agreements; the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) is responsible for implementing inspection and escort and monitoring requirements under the verification provisions of several U.S. treaties and agreements. A total of $84.6 million has been budgeted for OSIA inspection support in FY 1996. The primary export control and international nonproliferation regimes are outlined below, with specific DoD contributions highlighted.
COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR MULTILATERAL EXPORT CONTROLS (COCOM) SUCCESSOR REGIME
COCOM was a Cold War era export control regime in which the United States and allies restricted the export of technologies to the Soviet Union and other communist countries. DoD has played a central role in negotiations designed to replace COCOM with a new export control regime. The aim is to provide transparency, responsibility, and restraint in the transfer of conventional arms and sensitive dual-use technologies to countries and regions of concern, to include areas where U.S. and allied forces might face hostile military actions. This regime is designed to complement and reinforce other export control regimes. Through cooperation and sharing of information, it will enable the United States and other participating countries to better track and monitor sensitive arms and technology transfers as they occur. Russia and other formerly COCOM proscribed countries have been given incentives, such as greater access to advanced technologies, to join the regime -- provided they agree to follow the regime’s rules. This parallels other DoD efforts, such as CTR, to address the potential spread of NBC weapons and their delivery systems, advanced conventional weapons, and sensitive dual-use technologies from Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union.
MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR)
The MTCR is a voluntary arrangement of 28 states including the United States, Canada, Western Europe, Russia, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, and Hungary. It controls exports of equipment and technology -- both military and dual-use -- that are relevant to missile development, production, and operation. DoD provides intelligence and operational expertise for the national-level decisions that are made, on a case-by-case basis, concerning implementation of this regime's controls
NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS' GROUP (NSG)
This group, comprising 30 countries, seeks to control exports of nuclear materials, equipment and technology, both nuclear-specific and dual-use. Russia is a member of this group. Other former Soviet Republics -- notably Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakstan -- are not. China and Brazil are among the major potential suppliers of nuclear resources that are not members. The United States' position is that observance of NSG guidelines for nuclear exports by all potential suppliers (irrespective of their decision to join the group) is crucial for controlling the flow of nuclear materials and technologies.
The Australia Group is an informal arrangement of 29 industrial countries including the United States, Canada, most of Western Europe, Japan, New Zealand, and Australia. It seeks to prevent the spread of chemical and biological weapons material and dual-use technology. The group holds information exchanges and prepares lists of chemical precursors, microorganisms, and related equipment for member countries to control by export licensing and monitoring.
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT)
The United States is seeking to conclude negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996. A CTBT will strengthen the global norm against proliferation of nuclear weapons and constrain development of nuclear weapons capability in both proliferant states and acknowledged nuclear weapon states. DoD provides technical expertise in the CTBT negotiations. The Defense Department's Advanced Research Projects Agency has a program to demonstrate the capabilities of seismic and nonseismic monitoring systems for use in verification of a CTBT (approximately $14 million has been budgeted for FY 1996). The Air Force also has a program, the Nuclear Detonation Detection System, which is aimed at improving capabilities to detect nuclear detonations. Approximately $16 million has been budgeted in FY 1996 for this program.
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC)
The BWC, signed in 1972, prohibits development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons. The United States is promoting new measures that provide increased transparency of potential biological weapons-related activities and facilities in an effort to help deter violations of and enhance compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention. DoD will participate in the U.S. delegation to the forthcoming BWC Ad Hoc Group negotiations and will play an important role in U.S. efforts to develop off-site and on-site compliance verification measures for consideration by the group. The United States strongly supports the development of a legally binding protocol of such measures to strengthen the BWC.
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)
The CWC bans the use, development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, and transfer of chemical weapons. Opened for signature on January 13, 1993, as of March 15, 1996, the CWC had 160 signatories and will enter into force 180 days following deposit of the 65th ratification with the United Nations (currently there are 49 ratifications). The CWC Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) is meeting to complete the details necessary to have the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) fully operational at entry into force.
DoD has participated actively throughout the PrepCom process, providing expertise on a range of implementation issues such as inspection procedures, data management, and inspector training. Specifically, DNA is accomplishing the CWC Verification Technology Program, which focuses on the technologies required for multinational verification of the CWC. Approximately $12.6 million has been budgeted for this program in FY 1996.
The nonproliferation regimes discussed above may not be able to prevent proliferation by a determined leadership. Experience suggests that a determined proliferant is likely to succeed. The effectiveness of denial strategy should be determined by the extent to which it frustrates and slows proliferants' efforts, and in the message denial efforts convey regarding our seriousness of purpose. This success is best measured as a function of time -- time to improve regional instabilities that affect the motivations to acquire or develop NBC weapons and their delivery systems, and time to dissuade existing and potential proliferants.
Reassurance and Dissuasion
Denial efforts put time on our side, but time is not enough. Denial must be complemented by regional security dialogue, arms control and confidence building, security assistance, and other forms of reassurance that security needs can be met without resorting to NBC proliferation, and with a vigorous public diplomacy campaign which emphasizes the political, economic, and military costs of proliferation.
Regional instability remains one motivation for proliferation. By reducing regional tensions, we can help reduce the demand for both NBC and advanced conventional weapons. The Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Middle East Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group are two regional arms control and confidence building fora that work to broker agreements to reduce regional tensions. The OSCE has provided the framework for the negotiation of several important European security agreements such as the 1990, 1992, and 1994 Vienna Documents and the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. The OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation agreed to a Code of Conduct for political-military behavior, a Global Exchange of Military Information, and Nonproliferation Principles at the 1994 OSCE Budapest Summit. Created in 1991 as part of the Madrid Middle East peace process, ACRS is a forum for developing regional confidence building measures. ACRS is one of several multilateral working groups in the Madrid process designed to complement the bilateral peace talks. DoD has played a critical role in supporting these efforts by providing operational and technical expertise to these negotiations.
U.S. Security Assistance programs also can help to defuse regional tensions by enabling friends and allies to acquire conventional equipment, services and training for legitimate self-defense and to support participation in multilateral security efforts, such as coalition warfare. U.S. Security Assistance programs include Foreign Military Sales, International Military Education and Training, and emergency provision of excess U.S. defense articles. These programs supplement U.S. overseas presence and peacetime engagement by improving the defense capabilities of allies and friends, while demonstrating U.S. commitment to defend common interests.
Alliances and bilateral defense arrangements create a powerful incentive for allies and friends to refrain from the acquisition of NBC weapons. Through the forward deployment of U.S. military forces, the United States provides allies with tangible demonstrations of our commitment to their security, not withstanding proliferation by other nations in their region. The forward deployment of capable combat forces and periodic demonstrations of our ability to deploy additional forces from the United States, when and as required, may be the Department of Defense's most important contribution to proliferation prevention. These tangible demonstrations of security commitments make it possible for responsible leaderships in allied and friendly nations to conclude that they can rely on U.S. security commitments to provide for their security.
Military-to-military cooperation and contacts also help reassure friends and allies while at the same time dissuading the acquisition of NBC weapons and technology. The extensive U.S. bilateral military-to-military contact program builds trust and promotes professionalism in the armed forces of our friends and allies. These contacts also reinforce basic tenets such as civilian control of the military and the honoring of international norms of behavior.
Regional arms control and confidence building, security assistance and alliance efforts, and military-to-military contacts, however, are only as good as our ability to effectively communicate our intent to proliferants and those threatened by that proliferation. U.S. counterproliferation efforts are part of this public diplomacy campaign. The preparations we undertake through the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative will provide the ability to protect our forces, allies, and future Coalition partners from the consequences of NBC weapons and their delivery systems attack. This initiative is designed to support our public diplomacy campaign by not only convincing proliferants they gain no advantage through NBC weapons and their delivery systems proliferation (at great expense), but also by helping states resist the temptation to proliferate in response to an adversary's proliferation.
Actions to Reverse Proliferation
Measures to reverse proliferation are the final component of prevention. In some instances, this is involuntary, as in Iraq under UN supervision. In other cases action is self-initiated, as appears to have been the case in South Africa and the non-Russian nuclear weapons states formerly part of the Soviet Union. Available policy instruments here include making available intelligence information concerning the status of regional proliferation (and proliferation reversal) efforts, initiatives to defuse regional tensions that might motivate proliferation, and support for inspection and verification activities. CTR in the nuclear-weapon-possessing New Independent States formerly part of the Soviet Union is particularly significant.
|"Weapons of mass destruction -- nuclear, biological, and chemical -- along with their associated delivery systems, pose a major threat to our security and that of our allies and other friendly nations. Thus, a key part of our strategy is to seek to stem the proliferation of such weapons and to develop an effective capability to deal with these threats. We also need to maintain robust strategic nuclear forces and seek to implement existing strategic arms agreements."|
|A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement,|
The White House, February 1995, p. 13.
The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons is not a hypothetical threat. A number of states have NBC military capabilities; a larger number are capable of producing such weapons, potentially on short notice.
Prevention of proliferation is the first priority. The Department of Defense provides critical support to national and international prevention efforts. The Defense Department has unique responsibilities for the military responses needed if prevention fails: active defense, passive defense, counterforce, and response to paramilitary/covert threats.
Our current appreciation of the counterproliferation threat dates from the Gulf War, in which there were a number of unpleasant surprises involving Iraq's NBC programs. Development of a coherent, effective national response has required policy initiatives, adaptation of military planning and operations, acquisition of new capabilities, new Intelligence Community programs, and international cooperation. In a brief period of time, considerable progress has been made. Much, however, remains to be done.
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